Defense Acquisitions
Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program Gao ID: GAO-05-924T July 19, 2005In April 2002, the Department of the Navy launched the DD(X) Destroyer program to develop a stealthy, multi-mission ship that would provide advanced land attack capability to support forces ashore and contribute to military dominance in shallow coastal waters. Numbers and costs for the DD(X) have changed since the inception of the program. According to the program's official cost estimate, the first ship is expected to cost $3.3 billion, with per unit costs decreasing as production progresses. DD(X) is approaching Milestone B and critical design review--two key decision points that will shape the future of both the program and the Navy itself. This testimony focuses on (1) the challenges the DD(X) program is expected to encounter, (2) the program's approach and progress in managing attendant risks, and (3) potential consequences if program progress falls short of expectations.
Demanding requirements and time frames present substantial challenges for the DD(X) program. DD(X)'s revolutionary design and automated operations require multiple technological advances. For example, to carry out its primary mission of land attacks, DD(X) must be able to strike land targets from distances of up to 83 nautical miles (about 96 miles)--a capability requiring a level of accuracy and range not yet achieved in naval gunfire. To meet DD(X)'s stealth requirements, new materials, designs, and construction processes are being developed, including a radical hull design that reduces the ship's signature by sloping out--not in--from the ship's deck to the waterline. In addition, many traditionally manned functions will be automated to appreciably cut crew size and reduce operational costs. At the same time, the DD(X) program has imposed a tight schedule--one that calls for concurrent development, design, and construction. To reduce risk in the DD(X) program, the Navy is building 10 engineering development models that represent the ship's most critical subsystems and technologies. While use of these models is a sound approach, planned testing of the models continues through system design and, in some cases, into detailed design and construction, creating risk. Any problems identified through testing could require design changes and result in delays and cost increases. Past GAO work shows that demonstrating technological maturity--that is, the technology has been shown to perform in its intended environment--at the start of system design and development is key to reducing risk and meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives. In addition, the models are not identical in design to the subsystems that will actually be installed on the first ships and thus will require additional work to reach the final design. The consequences of not meeting the challenges facing the DD(X) program are significant. If the program fails to demonstrate capabilities, develop software, or integrate subsystems as planned, these activities will be pushed into the later stages of design and construction. In these stages, the cost of work and delays is much higher and the schedule much less forgiving than in earlier stages. At the same time, the Navy must compete for funding with other programs, while supporting existing platforms and deployments, in a time when the discretionary budget is constrained. In light of the risks framed by the DD(X)'s challenges, decision makers should consider potential trade-offs in advance, including accepting reduced mission performance, increased costs, delayed shipyard work, and/or additional manning. It would be prudent to consider the palatability of such trade-offs now before authorizing the construction of the first ship--a commitment the Navy plans to make by the end of this fiscal year.
GAO-05-924T, Defense Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 3:30 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, July 19, 2005:
Defense Acquisitions:
Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program:
Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management:
GAO-05-924T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-924T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Projection Forces, House of Representatives Committee on Armed
Services:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In April 2002, the Department of the Navy launched the DD(X) Destroyer
program to develop a stealthy, multi-mission ship that would provide
advanced land attack capability to support forces ashore and contribute
to military dominance in shallow coastal waters. Numbers and costs for
the DD(X) have changed since the inception of the program. According to
the program‘s official cost estimate, the first ship is expected to
cost $3.3 billion, with per unit costs decreasing as production
progresses.
DD(X) is approaching Milestone B and critical design review”two key
decision points that will shape the future of both the program and the
Navy itself. This testimony focuses on (1) the challenges the DD(X)
program is expected to encounter, (2) the program‘s approach and
progress in managing attendant risks, and (3) potential consequences if
program progress falls short of expectations.
What GAO Found:
Demanding requirements and time frames present substantial challenges
for the DD(X) program. DD(X)‘s revolutionary design and automated
operations require multiple technological advances. For example, to
carry out its primary mission of land attacks, DD(X) must be able to
strike land targets from distances of up to 83 nautical miles (about 96
miles)”a capability requiring a level of accuracy and range not yet
achieved in naval gunfire. To meet DD(X)‘s stealth requirements, new
materials, designs, and construction processes are being developed,
including a radical hull design that reduces the ship‘s signature by
sloping out”not in”from the ship‘s deck to the waterline. In addition,
many traditionally manned functions will be automated to appreciably
cut crew size and reduce operational costs. At the same time, the DD(X)
program has imposed a tight schedule”one that calls for concurrent
development, design, and construction.
To reduce risk in the DD(X) program, the Navy is building 10
engineering development models that represent the ship‘s most critical
subsystems and technologies. While use of these models is a sound
approach, planned testing of the models continues through system design
and, in some cases, into detailed design and construction, creating
risk. Any problems identified through testing could require design
changes and result in delays and cost increases. Past GAO work shows
that demonstrating technological maturity”that is, the technology has
been shown to perform in its intended environment”at the start of
system design and development is key to reducing risk and meeting cost,
schedule, and performance objectives. In addition, the models are not
identical in design to the subsystems that will actually be installed
on the first ships and thus will require additional work to reach the
final design.
The consequences of not meeting the challenges facing the DD(X) program
are significant. If the program fails to demonstrate capabilities,
develop software, or integrate subsystems as planned, these activities
will be pushed into the later stages of design and construction. In
these stages, the cost of work and delays is much higher and the
schedule much less forgiving than in earlier stages. At the same time,
the Navy must compete for funding with other programs, while supporting
existing platforms and deployments, in a time when the discretionary
budget is constrained. In light of the risks framed by the DD(X)'s
challenges, decision makers should consider potential trade-offs in
advance, including accepting reduced mission performance, increased
costs, delayed shipyard work, and/or additional manning. It would be
prudent to consider the palatability of such trade-offs now before
authorizing the construction of the first ship”a commitment the Navy
plans to make by the end of this fiscal year.
What GAO Recommends:
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-924T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy's
DD(X) Destroyer program, part of the family of future surface
combatants. The DD(X) is being developed as a next-generation multi-
mission destroyer. It is intended to provide advanced land attack
capability to support forces ashore and contribute to military
dominance in the shallow coastal water environment known as the
littorals. The DD(X) program began in April 2002 with the award of a
design and development contract to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems. Since
that time, the program has been developing key technologies and a
system design to meet the requirements established by the Navy.
Currently DD(X) is approaching key decisions on design and acquisition
strategy that will shape the future of both the program and the Navy
itself.
We have published two previous reports on technology development in the
DD(X) program.[Footnote 1] Today I would like to discuss (1) the
challenges the DD(X) is expected to meet, (2) the program's approach
and progress in managing attendant risks, and (3) potential
consequences if program progress falls short of expectations.
Summary:
The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding
requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns.
Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program, including multiple
missions, with a focus on land attack; stealth; manning levels of less
than half of the predecessor Arleigh Burke destroyer; and a
construction schedule that must address industrial base priorities. To
meet these demands, the DD(X) will employ revolutionary designs and
automated operations, requiring multiple technological advances, to be
accomplished on a schedule that calls for concurrent development,
design, and construction.
Key to the management of risk is the building of 10 engineering
development models that represent the ship's most critical subsystems
and technologies. Progress is being made on each, and the delay in the
decision to authorize the first ship has allowed additional work to be
completed. Tests of several engineering development models resulted in
successful demonstration of key components and progress toward final
testing. In other models, tests identified technical problems that will
need to be overcome before ship installation or that have led to
changes in the ship design. Although the use of engineering development
models is a good approach, the timing for their completion entails
risk. Our work on successful commercial and defense product
developments shows that demonstrating mature technology at the start of
system development is key to reducing risk and meeting cost, schedule,
and performance objectives. In the case of DD(X), testing of the
engineering development models continues into system design and some
extend into detailed design and construction. In addition, the models
are not identical in design to the subsystems that will actually be
installed on the first ships and thus will require additional work to
reach the final design.
The Navy has developed a structured approach for meeting the
challenging demands of the DD(X). At the same time, it must be
recognized that these challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and
do not have much give in them. They may not be simultaneously
achievable regardless of the acquisition strategy. To the extent that
the large scope of activities remaining for the DD(X) do not go as
planned, work--in the form of demonstrating capabilities, developing
software, integrating subsystems, and actual fabrication--will travel
to the later stages of design and construction. In these stages, the
cost of work and delays is much higher and the schedule much less
forgiving than in earlier stages. In light of the risks framed by the
DD(X)'s challenges, decision makers will have to be prepared to make
difficult trade-offs. These could include accepting reduced mission
performance, increased costs, delayed shipyard work, and/or additional
manning. It is advisable that the palatability of such trade-offs be
discussed now before the upcoming commitment to authorize construction
of the first ship is made.
Background:
The DD(X) program is currently in the system design phase, approaching
two key decision points. One is Milestone B, when the Navy will decide
on whether to authorize the award of a detail design and construction
contract for production of the lead ship(s). Milestone B was planned
for March 2005 but has been delayed several times and is now expected
to take place before the end of the fiscal year. The other key decision
point is the critical design review, scheduled for September 2005. This
review is intended to demonstrate the design maturity of the ship and
its readiness to proceed to production. Following these decisions, a
contract will be awarded for detailed design and construction.
Fabrication is planned to start in 2008. The Navy's most recent cost
estimate places the cost of the first ship at $3.3 billion, with per
unit costs decreasing as production progresses.[Footnote 2]
The DD(X) Challenge: Deliver Unprecedented Performance on a Tight
Schedule:
The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding
requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns.
Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program. First, the DD(X)
is required to perform not only its primary mission of land attack, but
also anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and mine warfare tasks. For the
land attack mission alone, the ship must be able to precisely strike
land targets from distances of up to 83 nautical miles, a capability
requiring a level of accuracy and range not yet seen in naval gunfire.
Second, the DD(X) must meet stealth requirements, which affects the
destroyer's signature across all spectrums (infrared, radar cross
section, and acoustic). Third, to reduce operational costs, crew size
must be at least half of historical levels, requiring the automation
and computerization of many traditionally manned functions. Finally, to
manage shipyard workloads, the Navy believes construction of the DD(X)
must begin in 2008.
To meet these demands, performance and schedule objectives, the DD(X)
will employ revolutionary designs and automated operations, requiring
multiple technological advances, to be accomplished on a schedule that
calls for concurrent development, design, and construction. To meet
stealth requirements, completely new materials, designs, and
construction processes are being developed, including a revolutionary
hull design--the tumblehome hull form--which widens as it approaches
the waterline. Another departure from traditional shipbuilding design
is the peripheral vertical launch system, which situates missile
enclosures peripherally instead of centrally. Several new technologies
are being developed to provide the needed weaponry, radars, signature
reduction, fire suppression, and propulsion. Advances in automation are
necessary to replace many manpower-intensive tasks. For example, the
advanced gun system will be completely automated, requiring crew only
for the command to fire and replenishment of its magazines. Fire
suppression will also be highly automated. This level of sophistication
necessitates a large software development effort--14 to 16 million
lines of code.
DD(X) Acquisition Strategy Requires Completing Technology Maturity
During Detail Design and Construction:
To reduce risk in the DD(X) program and demonstrate the ship's 12
technologies, the Navy is building 10 engineering development models
that represent the ship's most critical subsystems. The development
models are described in table 1.
Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models:
Engineering development models: Advanced gun system;
Description: Will provide long-range fire support for forces ashore
through the use of unmanned operations and the long-range land attack
projectile.
Engineering development models: Integrated deckhouse and apertures;
Description: A composite structure that integrates apertures of radar
and communications systems.
Engineering development models: Dual band radar;
Description: Horizon and volume search improved for performance in
adverse environments.
Engineering development models: Integrated power system;
Description: Power system that integrates power generation, propulsion,
and power distribution and management.
Engineering development models: Total ship computing environment;
Description: Provides single computing environment for all ship systems
to speed command while reducing manning.
Engineering development models: Peripheral vertical launch system;
Description: Multipurpose missile launch system located on the
periphery of the ship to reduce damage to ship systems.
Engineering development models: Integrated undersea warfare system;
Description: System for mine avoidance and submarine warfare with
automated software to reduce workload.
Engineering development models: Infrared mockup;
Description: Seeks to reduce ship's heat signature in multiple areas.
Engineering development models: Hull form;
Description: Designed to significantly reduce radar cross section.
Engineering development models: Autonomic fire suppression system;
Description: Intended to reduce crew size by providing a fully
automated response to fires.
Source: DD(X) program office and contractors.
[End of table]
The engineering development models are the most significant aspect of
the program's risk reduction strategy. They represent a disciplined
process for generating the information needed for development. In using
engineering development models, the Navy seeks to achieve increasing
levels of technology maturity by first defining the requirements and
risks of a developmental technology and then executing a series of
tests to reduce these risks and prove the utility of a technology. It
is these tests that provide confidence in a technology's ability to
operate as intended. Once the technology is demonstrated, the subsystem
can be integrated into the ship's system design. The progress of
technology maturity is recorded and communicated clearly through the
use of established metrics,[Footnote 3] affording the program manager
and others readily available information for use in decision making.
While engineering development models provide the Navy with vital
information on the progress of technologies, the models are being
completed later than they should, putting more pressure on the
remainder of the program.
Our reviews of commercial and Department of Defense acquisition
programs have identified a number of specific practices that ensure
that high levels of knowledge are achieved at key junctures in
development and used to make investment decisions. The most important
practice is achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start
of system development. A technology reaches full maturity when its
performance is successfully demonstrated in its intended environment.
Maturing a technology to this level before including it into system
design can reduce risk by creating confidence that a technology will
work as expected and allows the developer to focus on integrating
mature technologies into the ship design. This improves the ability to
establish realistic cost, schedule, and performance objectives as well
as the ability to meet them. Including the technologies in the system
design before reaching maturity raises the risk of discovering problems
late and can increase the cost and time needed to complete design and
fabrication.
The DD(X) program is based on a concurrent schedule that calls for
developing and testing key subsystems during system design and into
detailed design. The schedule for DD(X) and its attendant development
models is shown in figure 1. Most of the testing of the development
models takes place during the program's system design, which culminates
in critical design review. In some cases, the testing of development
models continues through the start of DD(X) construction. If problems
are found in testing, as has been the case with other programs, they
could result in changes in the design, delays in product delivery, and
increases in product cost.
Figure 1: DD(X) First Ship and Engineering Development Models Schedule:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As you can see, testing of some engineering development models
continues through the detailed design and construction phase. Not shown
here are the events that will follow tests of the development models.
The development models demonstrate the technologies but are not
identical in design to the subsystems that will actually be installed
on the first ships. Tests performed with development models may also
not demonstrate the full functionality of the systems needed for DD(X).
In some cases, such as the dual band radar, substantial changes will be
needed. Results of testing need to be analyzed and integrated into the
final design, and production plans will need to be finalized and
approved before the subsystems are manufactured. Testing of the final
subsystems will take place before and after installation into the ship.
In responding to our September 2004 report,[Footnote 4] the Department
of Defense stated that it is appropriate to take a reasonable amount of
risk in developing technologies for the lead ship of DD(X) given the
long production time associated with shipbuilding. Yet DD(X) will
proceed from the start of system development to initial capability in
the same or less time as other major acquisition programs for which DOD
does call for demonstration of technology maturity before development
start. Table 2 gives time periods for DD(X) and DDG-51, as well as
other nonshipbuilding systems.
Table 2: Comparison of Time from System Development to Initial
Capability:
System: DD(X);
Start of system development: March 2004;
Initial capability: January 2013;
Time elapsed: 8 years, 10 months.
System: DDG-51;
Start of system development: March 1983;
Initial capability: February 1993;
Time elapsed: 9 years, 11 months.
System: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet;
Start of system development: May 1992;
Initial capability: September 2001;
Time elapsed: 9 years, 4 months.
System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle;
Start of system development: December 2000;
Initial capability: September 2010;
Time elapsed: 9 years, 9 months.
System: Joint Strike Fighter;
Start of system development: October 2001;
Initial capability: March 2012;
Time elapsed: 10 years, 5 months.
System: F/A-22 Raptor;
Start of system development: June 1991;
Initial capability: December 2005;
Time elapsed: 14 years, 6 months.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Other shipbuilding programs have developed acquisition strategies that
sought to mature key technologies before their inclusion into system
design, especially if they are vital to the performance or design. The
CVN-21 program had a risk-reduction strategy that defined a timeline
for making decisions about a technology in line with the start of
system design. One example of a technology that followed this strategy
was the electromagnetic aircraft launching system, an advanced
technology key to meeting system requirements. While there were other
technologies not matured to levels as high as the launch system, the
majority followed the risk-reduction strategy and had options to switch
to an existing technology should development fail. The Navy tested the
Virginia class submarine's nonpenetrating periscope at sea before
including it into requirements, assuring that the submarine's design
could benefit from that technology while reducing the risk it would
delay design.
Progress on Engineering Development Models:
Much of the testing to this date has been for components of subsystems,
for example tests on the turbine engines that supply electricity to the
integrated power system. Tests of several engineering development
models resulted in successful demonstration of key components and
progress toward final testing. One example is the advanced gun system,
which has been able to rapidly change design or correct deficiencies to
meet requirements and demonstrate capability. In other cases, tests
identified technical problems that will need to be overcome before ship
installation or that have led to changes in the ship design. Examples
include the integrated power system or the dual band radar. While these
problems could be considered normal for any developmental program,
especially when this many new technologies are being developed
simultaneously, they are occurring as the program approaches a decision
on starting detail design and construction.
Advanced Gun System:
The advanced gun system is a large caliber, unmanned gun system
designed to fire long-range projectiles in support of land attack
missions, such as strikes at specific targets or suppressing fire in
support of ground troops. The DD(X) design calls for two gun systems
with approximately 300 rounds in each magazine, as well as an
additional 320 rounds in an auxiliary magazine. Because the gun system
provides supporting fire for land attack, a fundamental mission
objective of the DD(X), it needs to be able to quickly and accurately
hit a substantial number of land-based targets from a significant
distance. The system consists of the mount (the gun together with its
housing and movement mechanisms), a fully automated magazine, and a
munition known as the long-range land attack projectile. A schedule of
key events for the advanced gun system can be seen in table 3.
Table 3: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Advanced Gun System:
2004:
October: Virtual testing of gun system;
Second quarter: Component testing begins;
December: First munition guided flight test.
2005:
First quarter: Component testing ends;
April: Factory acceptance testing of the magazine;
January-February: Munition guided flight tests;
May: Factory acceptance testing of the mount;
May: Long-range land attack projectile preliminary design review;
July: Land-based testing of the mount and magazine;
April-September: Further guided flight tests of munition.
2006 and beyond:
To be determined: Munition firing from gun system.
Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
In October 2004 the advanced gun system was tested using a physics-
based software model that included the software functionality for all
major components of the advanced gun system and incorporated the
results of physical testing. Results met or exceeded expectations for
response time, rate of fire, sustained rate of fire, range, and pallet
unloading rate. The contractor has begun verifying the results through
testing of physical components. In April, the magazine component of the
advanced gun system successfully completed factory acceptance testing
by demonstrating its ability to meet requirements and has been shipped
to Dugway, Utah, for integration into further land-based tests. In May,
the mount component completed similar testing. Land-based tests
scheduled to begin in mid-July will demonstrate the entire firing
sequence of the advanced gun system. However, these tests will not
demonstrate the ability of the gun system to communicate target
information to the munition or the ability to move the gun side to
side. The munition will not be tested with the gun until after ship
installation.
The munition for advanced gun system, known as long-range land attack
projectile, has completed four flight tests at Point Mugu, California;
and has successfully demonstrated launch, tail fin deployment, canard
deployment, rocket motor ignition, global positioning system
acquisition, and some flight maneuvers. The first guided flight test
failed when the canards deployed improperly and controlled flight was
lost. The issue was identified, corrected, and successfully resolved in
later flight tests. The current schedule calls for completion of an
additional three flight tests by the end of September 2005. Flight
testing of the munition will continue after critical design review.
Recently, the design of the advanced gun system was changed to support
ease of production for DD(X). The advanced gun system will now be
constructed as a single modular unit, transported to the shipyard, and
installed as a block. This redesign has added some weight, which has
been accounted for in the current design.
Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures:
Integrated deckhouse and apertures refers to the superstructure on the
deck of the ship and the openings in which radar, sensor, and
communication equipment are placed. The deckhouse is dependant on the
use of recently developed composite materials to meet requirements for
weight. A major focus of deckhouse design is to reduce the ship's radar
cross section signature. A separate technical challenge, referred to as
co-site interference, involves placing apertures in precise locations
to ensure the signals from the multitude of antennas do not interfere
with one another. The contractor, Northrop Grumman, is building two
test articles to fulfill requirements for the testing of the deckhouse.
One is a fire and shock test article that will be subjected to
underwater explosions; the other is an integrated deckhouse article
that will be tested for radar cross section and antenna placement. A
schedule for key events for the integrated deckhouse can be seen in
table 4.
Table 4: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Deckhouse:
2004:
August: Begin antenna predelivery tests;
November: Begin fire and shock testing (postponed).
2005: February: End antenna predelivery tests;
March: Shielding effectiveness tests;
April: Lightning-protection tests;
June: Co-site interference tests;
July: End fire and shock testing (postponed);
September: Radar cross section tests.
2006 and beyond:
To be determined: Fire and shock testing (postponed).
Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Construction on the fire and shock test article continues to be delayed
due to questions about the material properties of the composites
involved, and lack of adequate test facilities. Further time is needed
to conduct analysis of composite properties regarding issues such as
structural strength, corrosion, toxicity of fumes when composites catch
fire, and ability to bind composites with the steel hull. The program
office states that the ability of the deckhouse design to meet
requirements will continue to be analyzed in support of the critical
design review. In addition, facilities for shock testing of large-scale
articles, such as those needed for testing of the deckhouse, are not
available until 2006. Testing of the fire and shock article has been
delayed until the next contract period, after DD(X) critical design
review.
Since May 2004, a series of changes involving equipment, antenna size,
and positioning have been made to the deckhouse, which has caused
changes in the placement of apertures. The integrated deckhouse test
article was scheduled to begin testing for radar cross section in May,
including all deckhouse antennas and the multifunction radar (half of
the dual band radar system), and for co-site interference in June.
The deckhouse has experienced some problems remaining within its
margins for weight. To reduce weight, the program has made a number of
changes to the design including modifications to fragmentation
protection, and redesigned power and cooling systems for the radars and
other components. The program office states that the deckhouse is now
in compliance with its weight budget.
Dual Band Radar:
The dual band radar monitors airborne and surface activities, guides
weaponry to targets, and conducts environmental mapping. The dual band
radar is made up of two major radar systems, the multifunction radar
and the volume search radar, unique technologies that are brought to
bear jointly on a range of critical tasks to improve overall depth and
quality of battlespace vision. The volume search radar specializes in
providing information on aircraft, missiles, and other activities in
the vast, open sky environment. In contrast, the multifunction radar is
designed to monitor airspace at horizon or near the surface levels for
threats such as low-flying antiship cruise missiles. Key events for the
dual band radar can be seen in table 5.
Table 5: - Schedule of Key Events Relating to Dual Band Radar:
2004:
September-October: Multifunction radar tests for clutter rejection and
sensitivity.
2005:
September: Multifunction radar cross section tests.
2006:
February: Integration and test of volume search radar array;
February-May: Multifunction radar at sea tests;
May: Engineering development model "string" test for the volume search
radar;
June: Volume search radar Array delivery.
2007 and beyond:
August: Dual band radar land-based tests;
To be determined: Continued development of volume search radar to meet
requirements.
Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Testing and development of the multifunction radar is proceeding well.
There have been a number of design changes, including a power/cooling
system redesign that reduced weight. These changes will be validated in
land based tests with the volume search radar in August 2007. Tests of
the multifunction radar's clutter rejection capabilities and firm track
range, two key functions required for demonstration, have been proven
in demonstrations with realistic targets. In a simulated scenario, the
multifunction radar has demonstrated the ability to guide an Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile against an inbound cruise missile. Testing of the
radar's ability to communicate with one of its own outbound missiles
will take place in 2007, when the fully assembled dual band radar
undergoes land-based tests. A significant risk remaining is ensuring
that the shape and placement of the multifunction radar meets radar
cross section requirements.
The transmit/receive units, the individual radiating elements that are
the essence of the volume search radar, encountered difficulties when a
key component failed in testing. Officials believe they have identified
a solution to the problem, but a further design iteration is needed to
fully satisfy performance requirements for the engineering development
model. Additional iterations of design will be necessary before ship
installation.
The schedule for construction of the dual band radar is already
challenging, with the radar for the first DD(X) scheduled for placement
after the ship is already afloat. Additional delay in development of
the volume search radar could affect the schedule for ship construction.
Integrated Power System:
The integrated power system centrally generates and distributes power
to the ship for all functions, including propulsion. This design allows
greater flexibility in power use and will allow the integration of high-
energy weapons in the future. The integrated power system consists of
three primary components: turbine generator sets, a power distribution
system, and propulsion motors. A significant technical challenge is
development of the propulsion motors, which are used to turn the shaft
and propeller. To reduce risk the program carried two designs of
propulsion motor, the permanent magnet motor and the advanced induction
motor. A schedule of events for the integrated power system can be seen
in table 6.
Table 6: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Power System:
2004:
October: Main turbine generator set factory acceptance test;
October: Advanced induction motor factory acceptance test;
November: Auxiliary turbine generator factory acceptance test.
2005:
January: Auxiliary turbine generator factory acceptance test;
January: Permanent magnet motor test failure;
July-September: Land-based testing of integrated power system.
2006 and beyond:
To be determined: Full power load test;
To be determined: Integration and testing with ship control system.
Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
The program has completed initial testing on propulsion motors for
DD(X). The program carried two designs of propulsion motor, the
permanent magnet motor and the advanced induction motor. The program
preferred to use the permanent magnet motor due to its ability to meet
requirements with less weight and noise, but carried the advanced
induction motor as a backup. Recently, the permanent magnet motor
failed to demonstrate the speed needed to produce the required power.
The advanced induction motor tested successfully in October 2004 and
has now been selected as the propulsion motor for DD(X). Carrying a
backup to a critical new technology is a smart strategy and paid off on
the propulsion motor. This change does have has implications for design
as the advanced induction motor is heavier and less efficient than the
permanent magnet motor, will require more space, and operates at a
different voltage. It will take two advanced induction motors linked
together to replace one permanent magnet motor.
Navy officials stated that the advanced induction motor will be tested
this summer to 18.25 megawatts, half of what the ship requires per
propeller and half of what the permanent magnet motor was to
demonstrate. The advanced induction motor will also demonstrate half of
the torque needed per propeller. While two advanced induction motors
will be needed to turn one shaft in the final design, program officials
state that there is little risk in simply adding a second motor to
reach full power. During demonstrations this summer, the advanced
induction motor will also be tested for integration with the power
distribution system.
Factory acceptance tests on turbine generators were performed to
demonstrate their ability to produce the power needed for DD(X). The
design for DD(X) requires two main turbine generators and two auxiliary
turbine generators that are tested to similar requirements. The main
turbine generator set, a Rolls-Royce MT-30 turbine and a generator
produced by Curtiss-Wright, was tested in October 2004. Due to
limitations of contractor facilities, the turbine engine and the
generator were tested separately. Some problems with heat were
experienced in testing of the turbine engine, but program officials
have stated these issues have been resolved. The program tested two
different turbine engines for the auxiliary generator sets, a Rolls-
Royce MT-5 and a General Electric LM-500. Both turbine generator sets
demonstrated they were able to produce the power necessary and actually
produced more power than predicted.
Design of the power distribution system was also changed to reduce
weight and improve performance. According to officials, the Navy will
use a system it has been developing called "integrated fight through
power," which includes the use of solid state components and rapid
switching technologies.
Total Ship Computing Environment:
Program officials estimate that DD(X) will require 14 to 16 million
lines of new and reused software code. The total ship computing
environment, which accounts for a large portion of the software, will
provide a common architecture for major ship systems to facilitate
integration and to speed command and control while reducing manning. A
schedule of events for the total ship computing environment can be seen
in table 7.
Table 7: Schedule of Events Relating to Total Ship Computing
Environment:
2003:
September: Preliminary design review.
2004:
May: Critical design review;
June: Software release 1 certification.
2005:
March: Software release 2 certification;
May-September: Land-based tests;
September: Software release 3 certification.
2006 - 2009:
Completion of remaining 3 software releases.
Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
While not a physical technology, the magnitude of software development
for DD(X) still needs time for development, design, testing, and
correction like the other engineering development models. An
engineering development model for the computing environment is being
developed for testing and includes three of six software releases.
These three releases include the critical infrastructure functionality
needed, as well as some functionality for anti-air, undersea, and land
attack missions. To prove the functionality of the computing
environment, it will be tested in a software integration center and
connected with data from other engineering development models.
Computing environment development plans include many of the software
best practices identified in our past work, including developing
software in an evolutionary environment, following disciplined
development process, and using meaningful metrics to measure progress.
While robust development plans are in place, the computing environment
is on a tight schedule that continues beyond the start of construction
and has limited margin for correction of defects found in testing.
While the total ship computing environment has not experienced
significant challenges thus far, a demanding effort lies ahead. About
three-quarters of the software development effort occurs during the
detail design and construction phase.
Additional engineering development models:
Our review of the remaining engineering development models has been
less extensive. Nonetheless, I would like to highlight a few aspects of
these systems.
The peripheral vertical launch system consists of the missile launcher,
referred to as the advanced vertical launch system, and the enclosure
for the launcher, referred to as the peripheral vertical launch system.
The system is located on the sides of the ship to improve
survivability, rather than the more traditional central positioning. A
demonstration in May 2004 to test the peripheral vertical launch system
against expected threats resulted in destruction of the test article
that necessitated redesign and further testing. A second test
replicating the same conditions with the new design and representative
materials was held in June 2005.
The integrated undersea warfare system is used to detect mines and
submarines in the littorals and consists of medium and high-frequency
arrays, towed arrays, and decision-making software to reduce workload.
Tests for the demonstration of mine warfare systems were scheduled for
May, and were to take place on a vessel modified to carry DD(X) sonar
and processing equipment. Submarine warfare tests were scheduled for
June. According to program officials, at-sea tests of algorithms for
antisubmarine warfare, a key component in reducing manning, have been
changed to laboratory testing due to a lack of test ships. Significant
advances in the automation of submarine detection and tracking may be
required to meet manpower goals.
As a part of requirements for signature management, the DD(X) program
seeks to reduce the heat signature of the ship using material
treatments on the deckhouse and passive air cooling for engine exhaust.
The use of subsystems or materials to reduce heat signature has changed
due to design trade-offs for performance, weight, and cost. A sheeting
water system for the hull has been deleted from the ship design and
replaced with an alternate system. Program officials have determined
that further testing of exhaust suppressors for the main turbine
generator is no longer necessary. Program officials stated that the
operational requirements are still achievable using the new design.
DD(X) uses a radically new hull design to reduce the radar cross
section of the ship. Development also includes design of a new
propeller. Scale models of the hull form are currently being tested for
factors like resistance, efficiency of the propeller, and capsize
probability. Development of the software model used to predict hull
form behavior is continuing.
The autonomic fire suppression system utilizes new technologies, such
as smart valves, flexible hosing, nozzles, sensors, and autonomic
operations to reduce the crew and time needed for damage control. This
system is vital for meeting requirements for ship survivability and
manning. Testing for the system was performed on two Navy test ships
and has been successful. An initial test aboard the ex-Peterson, a
former destroyer used as a test ship, successfully demonstrated the
system's ability to detect damage and control fires. Tests aboard the
ex-Shadwell, another larger test ship, demonstrated the same abilities
for specific ship environments. Because the exact components used in
testing aboard the ex-Shadwell may not be the ones used in ship
construction, Navy officials state that it is unclear how the
engineering development model will translate into final ship design.
Consequences of Not Meeting DD(X) Challenges Must Be Discussed Early:
The Navy developed a structured approach for meeting the challenging
demands of the DD(X) --multiple mission requirements, stealth, reduced
manning, and industrial base timeframes. This strategy builds in some
margins for risk, such as for additional weight and manning, should
they become necessary. At the same time, it must be recognized that
these challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and do not have much
give in them. They may not be simultaneously achievable, regardless of
the acquisition strategy.
The DD(X) strategy relies on multiple activities occurring concurrently
to meet its schedule. To the extent things do not go as planned, work-
-in the form of demonstrating capabilities, developing software,
integrating subsystems, and actual fabrication--will travel to the
later stages of design and construction. In these stages, the cost of
work and delays is much higher and the schedule much less forgiving
than in earlier stages. In light of the risks framed by the DD(X)'s
challenges, decision makers will have to be prepared to make difficult
trade-offs. For example,
* If technologies do not perform as expected or have unintended
consequences, such as additional weight, will the user accept lower
performance or will more time and money be allocated to delivering
required performance?
* If costs increase, will more money be provided or will performance
trade-offs be considered to reduce cost?
* If the schedule will not allow the ship, as currently scoped, to be
ready for in-yard fabrication, will scope be reduced to maintain
schedule or will industrial base consequences attendant to a schedule
delay be accepted?
* If the ship actually demands a larger crew than planned, can the
manning be afforded and accommodated aboard ship or will workload be
reduced to meet planned crew size?
In planning for such contingencies, there are a number of factors that
should be considered. Earlier this year, we issued a report on cost
growth experienced by previous shipbuilding programs.[Footnote 5] One
of the key factors in cost growth was the extent to which the maturity
of design affects costs. In the course of doing this work, shipbuilders
emphasized the importance of properly sequencing work to achieve cost
efficiency. They pointed out that the cost of performing a task
increases if it is delayed further into the construction process. For
example, one shipbuilder estimated that the same task performed early
in the construction process at a steel, electrical or other shop is 3
times more expensive when delayed until assembling units or sections of
the ship at the dock, and 8 times more expensive if the ship is afloat.
According to another shipbuilder, before construction begins on a
particular section of the ship, firm information is needed on equipment
and components including such information as the dimensions, weight,
and power and cooling requirements. When technologies are still being
developed and tested, the Navy's ability to gather this information and
finalize design is constrained. When firm information is not available
and construction proceeds, the potential exists that work will not be
done in the most efficient sequence and that changes will lead to
redoing work already completed, increasing cost and delaying delivery.
Another factor is the DD(X) does not have fallback technologies that
could mitigate changes to design and performance. The program has
passed the decision point for inclusion of the two viable fallback
technologies the program began with, a different hull form and the
advanced induction motor. If the other technologies embodied in the
engineering development models run into difficulties, they cannot be
substituted. Thus, their consequences, whether in performance, weight,
or manning, would have to be ameliorated through trade-offs.
When considering the possibility of cost growth, it must be taken into
account that spending on the program comes at a time when the Navy is
also procuring Virginia class submarines, Littoral Combat Ships,
amphibious vessels, support vessels, and the last of the Arleigh Burke
class destroyers. In addition to DD(X) the Navy is also developing new
aircraft carriers and aircraft, and may soon start development of new
cruisers and submarines. The Navy must compete for funding for these
programs with other services, while simultaneously supporting existing
platforms and deployments, at a time when the discretionary budget is
constrained.
Finally, delays in the schedule for DD(X) construction would reduce the
flow of work to the shipyards at the time that DDG-51 construction is
drawing to a close. This could result in declining workloads, revenues,
and employment levels.
As the cost, schedule, and capabilities of a program change, the
business case for that program changes as well. The business case for
DD(X), or a similar capability, has already changed multiple times
since the Navy launched the future destroyer development effort in
1995. Originally, under the DD-21 program, the Navy planned to build 32
ships at an average cost of approximately $1 billion when the cost of
development is also included. After the program transitioned to DD(X)
the number of ships required changed repeatedly with numbers ranging
from 24 ships to 16 to 8. The latest program baseline, released in
April 2004, outlines a purchase of 8 ships at an average cost of around
$2.9 billion with the inclusion of development costs.[Footnote 6] A new
life cycle cost estimate, released in March of 2005, presents different
figures on number of ships and costs. Even this estimate does not
reflect the current acquisition strategy proposed by the Navy. The Navy
will have to decide what constitutes an acceptable business case for
the DD(X) and at what point the business case becomes unacceptable.
It is important that these contingencies be confronted now and
discussed because once the detail design and construction phase begins,
it will be very difficult to change course on the program.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any questions.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Paul L.
Francis at (202) 512-4841.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Karen
Zuckerstein, J. Kristopher Keener, and Marc Castellano.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Progress of the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-05-752R
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2005); GAO, Defense Acquisitions:
Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-04-973 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).
[2] The quoted estimate assumes alternating production at two shipyards
beginning in fiscal year 2007.
[3] One metric utilized by the DD(X) program office is technology
readiness levels. This metric incorporates many of the factors that
determine technology maturity, including form, fit, and function, into
a single digit numerical score.
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer
Program, GAO-04-973 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).
[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help
Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005)
[6] Amounts are in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars.
