Reserve Forces
An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages Gao ID: GAO-05-660 July 12, 2005The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet its global commitments without continued reserve participation. The Army Reserve provides critical combat support and combat service support units, such as medical and transportation units, to the Army. While Army Reserve members historically could expect to train one weekend a month and 2 weeks a year with activations for limited deployments, since September 11 some have been called upon to support ongoing military operations for a year or more. GAO (1) identified the challenges the Army Reserve faces in continuing to support overseas operations and (2) assessed the extent to which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to improve the Army Reserve's readiness for future missions.
While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to support military operations since September 11, 2001, GAO found that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to provide these forces due to personnel and equipment shortages. The three primary causes of these shortages are (1) the practice of not maintaining Army Reserve units with all of the personnel and equipment they need to deploy, (2) current DOD and Army personnel policies that limit the number of reservists and length of time reservists may be deployed, and (3) a shortage of full-time support staff to develop and maintain unit readiness. These challenges are compounded by emerging recruiting shortfalls. The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's readiness and provide more deployment predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a comprehensive management strategy for integrating the initiatives to ensure that each initiative most efficiently contributes to the achievement of its overall readiness and predictability goals. One of the Army Reserve's major initiatives has been to develop a rotational force model. However, the model cannot be fully implemented until the Army determines the types and number of Army Reserve units it will need to carry out its plans to restructure into a more modular and flexible force. Because the Army has not defined what personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the new modular and rotational models, it cannot be assured that its initiatives are most efficiently working together to meet readiness goals and that funding is appropriately targeted to meet those goals. Until plans that integrate the initiatives are completed and approved and adequate resources are provided to implement them, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress will continue to lack assurance that DOD has an effective and efficient plan for resolving the Army Reserve's growing challenges.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-660, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages
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Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages' which was released on July
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Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2005:
Reserve Forces:
An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and
Equipment Shortages:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-660]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-660, a report to Congressional Committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet its global commitments
without continued reserve participation. The Army Reserve provides
critical combat support and combat service support units, such as
medical and transportation units, to the Army. While Army Reserve
members historically could expect to train one weekend a month and 2
weeks a year with activations for limited deployments, since September
11 some have been called upon to support ongoing military operations
for a year or more.
GAO (1) identified the challenges the Army Reserve faces in continuing
to support overseas operations and (2) assessed the extent to which the
Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to improve the Army Reserve‘s
readiness for future missions.
What GAO Found:
While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to support military
operations since September 11, 2001, GAO found that it is becoming
increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to provide
these forces due to personnel and equipment shortages. The three
primary causes of these shortages are (1) the practice of not
maintaining Army Reserve units with all of the personnel and equipment
they need to deploy, (2) current DOD and Army personnel policies that
limit the number of reservists and length of time reservists may be
deployed, and (3) a shortage of full-time support staff to develop and
maintain unit readiness. These challenges are compounded by emerging
recruiting shortfalls.
The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to
improve the Army Reserve‘s readiness and provide more deployment
predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a
comprehensive management strategy for integrating the initiatives to
ensure that each initiative most efficiently contributes to the
achievement of its overall readiness and predictability goals. One of
the Army Reserve‘s major initiatives has been to develop a rotational
force model. However, the model cannot be fully implemented until the
Army determines the types and number of Army Reserve units it will need
to carry out its plans to restructure into a more modular and flexible
force. Because the Army has not defined what personnel, units, and
equipment the Army Reserve will need under the new modular and
rotational models, it cannot be assured that its initiatives are most
efficiently working together to meet readiness goals and that funding
is appropriately targeted to meet those goals. Until plans that
integrate the initiatives are completed and approved and adequate
resources are provided to implement them, the Secretary of Defense and
the Congress will continue to lack assurance that DOD has an effective
and efficient plan for resolving the Army Reserve‘s growing challenges.
Army Reserve Personnel Still Eligible for Overseas Deployment,
Ineligible to Deploy Again under Personnel Policies, and Ineligible/Not
Available to Deploy for Other Reasons as of March 28, 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Based on 196,219 soldiers in the Selected Reserve.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO makes two recommendations to enhance planning and implementation of
Army and Army Reserve initiatives related to readiness and
predictability of deployments, including identifying funding to
implement them. DOD agreed with the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?-GAO-05-660.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent,
(202) 512-4402, or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of figure]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Personnel and Equipment Shortages Will Make It Increasingly Difficult
for the Army Reserve to Continue to Support Overseas Operations:
The Army and the Army Reserve Have Initiatives to Improve Readiness and
Deployment Predictability, but Full Implementation Depends on Detailed
Coordination and Funding Decisions:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces:
Table 2: Army Reserve Enlisted Occupations with over 70 Percent of
Personnel Mobilized since September 11, 2001:
Figures:
Figure 1: Composition of the Army Reserve by Category:
Figure 2: Equipment Items Most Transferred from Nonmobilized Units to
Mobilizing Units from September 2001 to April 2005:
Figure 3: Percentage of Army Reserve Personnel Eligible, Previously
Mobilized, or Ineligible/Not Available for Mobilization as of March
2005:
Figure 4: The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Model:
Letter July 12, 2005:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
U.S. House of Representatives:
The Army Reserve is a citizen-soldier force that is trained and
organized to complement the combat forces of the active Army by
providing specialized combat service and combat service support skills.
For example, the Army Reserve provides over 95 percent of the Army's
internment brigades, railway units, Judge Advocate General units,
training and exercise divisions, and civil affairs units. It also
provides over two-thirds of the Army's psychological operations units,
chemical units, hospitals, and medical groups. As of March 2005, the
Army Reserve had about 196,000 readily accessible members who
participated in drills and training.
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Army Reserve's
primary role was to provide support forces for major combat operations
and limited support to operations around the world, such as those in
the Balkans and Kosovo. However, since September 11, the Army Reserve
has provided large numbers of soldiers and units on an ongoing basis to
meet requirements for ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Some skills, such as civil affairs specialists, that have been in
particularly high demand reside heavily in the Army Reserve. Moreover,
while Army Reserve soldiers historically could expect their military
service to be part time--including attending training for 2 weeks each
year and attending drills one weekend each month with potential
activations for limited deployments--many reservists have been on
active duty for over a year to support current operations.
The challenges in mobilizing large numbers of reservists on an ongoing
basis have led to questions about whether changes are needed in the way
the Army Reserve is structured and resourced. In light of new security
threats and increased operational demands, the Army has recently
embarked on several new initiatives to increase its flexibility and
responsiveness. For example, as outlined in 2004 in the Army Campaign
Plan, the Army, including its reserve components, is in the midst of a
major transformation to a more flexible modular force based on brigades
rather than divisions. In addition, the Army plans to implement a force
rotation model that would enable it to better predict when soldiers
might be mobilized.[Footnote 1]
We have previously reported on issues related to how the reserve
components have been mobilized and used for recent operations and made
recommendations on actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
services need to take to improve the efficiency of mobilization for
reserve forces. In August 2003 and September 2004, we reported on
several reserve mobilization issues, including the mobilization
approval process, DOD's limited use of the Individual Ready Reserve,
and long-term reserve force availability issues.[Footnote 2] We also
reported on the effect of the continuing high use of National Guard
forces and challenges to prepare the National Guard for future overseas
and domestic missions.[Footnote 3] In addition, we recently provided
observations on the Army's plans to convert to a modular
force.[Footnote 4]
We prepared this report focused on the Army Reserve under the
Comptroller General's statutory authority and are sending it to you
because it contains information that will be useful for your oversight
responsibilities for reserve personnel and readiness issues. The
objectives of this report are to (1) identify the challenges the Army
Reserve faces in continuing to support overseas operations and (2)
assess the extent to which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps
to improve the Army Reserve's readiness for future missions.
To address our objectives, we analyzed data generated by the Total Army
Personnel Data Base - Reserves and provided by the U.S. Army Reserve
Command on the numbers of reservists that were mobilized for operations
since September 11, 2001, and their military occupations and numbers of
personnel that had not been mobilized. We assessed the reliability of
data from the Total Army Personnel Data Base - Reserves and the Reserve
End Item Management System by 1) reviewing existing information about
the data and the systems that produced them; 2) performing electronic
testing of the relevant data elements; and 3) interviewing Army Reserve
officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data
used were sufficiently reliable to address our objectives. We analyzed
DOD publications and reports on equipment shortages to identify trends
in the status of equipment the Army Reserve has on hand. We
supplemented this information with visits to Army and Army Reserve
commands and units, including training units and an Army mobilization
station. We reviewed documentation on the status of initiatives to
improve long-term readiness and predictability. We also discussed the
challenges the Army Reserve faced in providing ready forces and
initiatives to improve readiness and deployment predictability with
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army, and the
Army Reserve. We conducted our review from April 2004 through June 2005
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Details on the scope and methodology used in our review are described
in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to support military
operations since September 11, 2001, we found that it is becoming
increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to provide
ready forces in the near term due to worsening personnel and equipment
shortages. There are three primary causes of these shortages: (1) the
practice of not maintaining Army Reserve units with all of the
personnel and equipment they need to deploy, (2) current DOD and Army
personnel policies that limit the number of reservists and length of
time reservists may be deployed, and (3) a shortage of full time
support staff to develop and maintain unit readiness. First, because
Army Reserve units are not generally maintained with all the required
personnel and equipment, based on the expectation that there would be
time to supplement personnel and equipment after mobilization, the Army
Reserve has had to transfer personnel and equipment from nonmobilizing
units to mobilizing units so that when these units deployed overseas
they would meet combatant commanders' requirements for fully manned and
equipped units. From September 2001 through March 2005, the Army
Reserve transferred about 53,000 soldiers from nonmobilizing units to
mobilizing units. Similarly, from September 2001 to April 2005, the
Army transferred about 235,900 pieces of equipment among units. While
these actions met immediate requirements, transfers continue to
decrease the capabilities of the units from which the personnel and
equipment were transferred, which hampers their ability to prepare for
potential future missions. Second, the Army Reserve also faces
challenges in continuing to provide ready forces because so many of its
personnel have already been mobilized and cannot be mobilized again
under current DOD and Army policies regarding the length of time
reservists may serve overall and in the theater of operations. As of
March 2005, the number of Army Reserve personnel eligible for
mobilization under current policies had decreased to about 31,000
soldiers, or about 16 percent of Army Reserve personnel, and all of
these personnel may not have the required skills and ranks needed to
support ongoing operations. Senior Army Reserve officials have
expressed concern that without change in personnel policies the Army
Reserve will soon be unable to continue to provide forces with the
necessary skills and grades to support Army operations. Recent
recruiting and retention problems have further reduced the available
pool of reservists. Finally, the Army Reserve has been authorized only
about 68 percent (26,354) of the 38,846 full-time staff it required
during peacetime to perform the critical readiness tasks, such as
training and maintenance. Collectively, personnel and equipment
problems have hampered the Army Reserve's ability to train and
effectively support ongoing operations efficiently and predictably in
the near term, and emerging recruiting challenges could exacerbate
these problems in the future.
The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to
improve the Army Reserve's readiness and provide more deployment
predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a
comprehensive description of how the Army Reserve will be structured,
manned, and equipped after the transformation and a detailed plan for
funding priority initiatives and integrating the independently
developed initiatives to ensure that each most efficiently contributes
to the achievement of its goals of improved readiness and predictable
deployments. One of the Army Reserve's major initiatives has been to
develop a rotational force proposal designed to train and equip units
over a 5-year cycle for possible deployment in the sixth year. The
rotational force model cannot be fully implemented, however, until the
Army determines the types and number of Army Reserve units it will need
to support its reorganized, modular combat forces and identifies the
resources it will need to implement the plan. Meanwhile the Army
Reserve is implementing another initiative designed to increase the
percentage of required personnel that units are authorized by
eliminating units in low-demand skills and moving personnel to high-
demand skills. But, without the final determination of the Army's
requirement for modular support units, the Army Reserve cannot be sure
that it is not closing units with the skills the Army will need under
its modular structure. Furthermore, the Army and Army Reserve have not
yet developed detailed estimates for the Reserve's reorganization to a
rotational and modular force. Another initiative, begun in fiscal year
2001, will increase the number of full-time personnel assigned to
support the Army Reserve performing day-to-day administrative,
training, and maintenance activities. However, despite increases in
these tasks due to ongoing operations, the initiative is not planned to
increase full-time support to meet even peacetime requirements and may
not provide the level of support needed under the new rotational model.
Until more detailed plans are completed and approved that integrate the
initiatives and adequate resources are provided to implement them, the
Congress will continue to lack assurance that DOD has an effective and
efficient plan for resolving the Army Reserve's growing personnel and
equipment challenges.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army and
the Chief, Army Reserve, to develop a detailed plan that addresses how
the Army will integrate and manage the initiatives it has developed and
is implementing to improve readiness and mobilization predictability
for Army Reserve personnel. In its comments on a draft of this report,
DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations.
Background:
The Army Reserve is composed primarily of citizen soldiers who balance
the demands of a civilian career with military service on a part-time
basis. During the Cold War, it was expected that the Army Reserve would
be a force to supplement active forces in the event of extended
conflict. However, since the mid-1990s, the Army Reserve's citizen
soldiers have been continuously mobilized to support operations
worldwide, including those in Bosnia and Kosovo. In today's strategic
environment, the Army Reserve's role has evolved to a complementary
force, continuously supplying specialized skills for combat support and
combat service support for Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
and Iraqi Freedom. Rather than the historical part-time employment in
the Army Reserve, some Army Reserve personnel have now been
involuntarily activated for over a year.
The members of the Army Reserve fall into three major categories: the
Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. (See fig.
1.) Members of all three categories are subject to mobilization in the
event of national emergency.
* The Army's Ready Reserve includes about 310,000 members and is made
up of two subcategories: the Selected Reserve, which has about 197,500
members, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which comprises about
112,500 members. The Selected Reserve includes soldiers who are
assigned to units and participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or
training periods each year and serve on active duty for training at
least 14 days each year; soldiers who voluntarily serve on extended
tours of active duty; and soldiers assigned on an individual basis to
various headquarters where they would serve if mobilized and train on a
part-time basis to prepare for mobilization. Members of the Individual
Ready Reserve include individuals who were previously trained during
periods of active service, but have not completed their service
obligations[Footnote 5]; individuals who have completed their service
obligation and voluntarily retain their reserve status; and personnel
who have not completed basic training. Most of these members are not
assigned to organized units, do not attend weekend or annual training,
and do not receive pay unless they are called to active duty.
* The Army's Standby Reserve represents about 1,030 personnel who
maintain their Army affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve.
Standby Reserve personnel have been designated key civilian employees
who have responsibilities that would keep them from being mobilized,
such as members of the Congress, or have temporary hardships or
disabilities that prevent them from participating in reserve
activities. These personnel can be mobilized if necessary to fill
manpower needs in specific skills.
* The Army Retired Reserve comprises all reserve officers and enlisted
personnel who receive retired pay on the basis of active or reserve
service and may be ordered to active duty in emergency situations.
Currently, about 747,000 personnel[Footnote 6] are in the Retired
Reserve.
Figure 1: Composition of the Army Reserve by Category:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Data as of February 28, 2005.
[End of figure]
The majority of the reserve forces mobilized for current operations
have been members of the Selected Reserve, who are members of units and
attend monthly drills. Some members of the Individual Ready Reserve and
Retired Reserve have also been mobilized to provide specialized skills.
In addition to personnel in these categories, the Army Reserve relies
on a small number of full-time personnel to provide the day-to-day
administrative, training, and maintenance tasks that units need to be
able to attain readiness for their missions and deploy. The Army
Reserve full-time support personnel are equal to about 13 percent of
the authorized number of reservists.
The Army Reserve is headed by the Chief, Army Reserve who is the
principal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army for all Army
Reserve matters. Among other duties, the Chief, Army Reserve provides
reports to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, through the
Secretary of the Army, on the state of the Army Reserve and the ability
of the Army Reserve to meet its missions; manages the full-time support
program; justifies and executes the personnel, operation and
maintenance, and construction budgets for the Army Reserve; and
participates in formulation and development of Army policies.
The Army Reserve is a part of the total Army, which also includes the
active Army and the Army National Guard. The Chief of Staff of the Army
is charged with integrating reserve component matters into Army
activities and provides strategic guidance to the Army Reserve on
transformation. The Chief of Staff of the Army, as senior military
leader of the Army, participates in the development of Army plans,
policies, programs, and activities and supervises their execution. The
Secretary of the Army, as the senior official of the Department of the
Army, is responsible for its effective and efficient functioning.
Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of
mobilization authorities. As shown in table 1, two authorities enable
the President to mobilize forces, but with size and time limitations.
Full mobilization, which would enable the mobilization of forces for as
long as they are needed, requires a declaration by the Congress.
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces:
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12301(a); "Full Mobilization";
Provisions: Declared by Congress:
In time of war or national emergency; No limit on numbers of soldiers
called to active duty; For duration of war plus 6 months.
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12302; "Partial Mobilization";
Provisions: Declared by the President: In time of national emergency;
No more than 1,000,000 reservists can be on active duty; No more than
24 consecutive months.
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12304; "Presidential Reserve Call-up";
Provisions: Determined by the President: To augment the active duty
force for operational missions; No more than 200,000 reservists can be
on active duty; No more than 270 days.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions.
[End of table]
The Office of the Secretary of Defense implements the activation of
reservists under mobilization authority. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, who reports to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for providing
policy, programs, and guidance for the mobilization and demobilization
of the reserve components.
On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national
emergency existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center
in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and he invoked the
partial mobilization authority. On September 20, 2001, DOD issued
mobilization guidance that among other things directed the services as
a matter of policy to specify in initial orders to Ready Reserve
members that the period of active duty service would not exceed 12
months. However, the guidance allowed the service secretaries to extend
orders for an additional 12 months or remobilize reserve component
members under the partial mobilization authority as long as an
individual member's cumulative service did not exceed 24 months under
the President's partial mobilization authority.
Since September 11, there have been six separate rotations of troops to
support Operation Enduring Freedom and four rotations of troops to
support Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began in 2001. The Army has
identified the personnel and units that are expected to deploy in 2005
in the seventh rotation of forces for Operation Enduring Freedom and
the fifth rotation for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
To address the continuing demand for ground forces, in 2004, the Army
extended the time that reservists must be deployed overseas for
missions related to Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq or Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The Army's current guidance is that
soldiers should serve 12 months with their "boots on the ground" in the
theater of operations, not including the time spent in mobilization and
demobilization activities, which could add several more months to the
time a Reserve member spends on active duty. The Army's Forces Command
identifies the Army units and personnel to be deployed to meet the
requirements of the combatant commanders.
Personnel and Equipment Shortages Will Make It Increasingly Difficult
for the Army Reserve to Continue to Support Overseas Operations:
The Army Reserve has provided ready forces for ongoing military
operations since September 11, 2001, by transferring personnel and
equipment to deploying units; however, it is running out of personnel
who can be mobilized under current policies and equipment that meets
deployment standards for three key reasons. First, the Army Reserve is
having difficulty continuing to support ongoing operations because its
units are not routinely resourced with all the personnel and equipment
needed to deploy. Therefore, to meet combatant commanders' requirements
that deploying units have all the personnel they require for their
missions and have equipment that is compatible with other units in the
theater of operations, the Army Reserve has had to transfer uniformed
personnel and equipment from nonmobilized units to prepare mobilized
units. This has left nondeploying units with shortages in personnel and
equipment, which hampers their ability to train for future missions.
Second, based on data provided by the Army Reserve, about 40 percent of
Army Reserve personnel have already been mobilized once and under
personnel policies cannot be mobilized again. This, in addition to
emerging recruiting issues that contribute to the availability of
personnel, has led to a smaller pool of reservists eligible for
deployment and is making it more difficult for the Army Reserve to
provide trained and ready personnel with the specific grades and skills
needed for future operations. Third, the Army Reserve has been
experiencing increasing shortages of the full-time support staff who
maintain equipment, train personnel, and conduct the day-to-day
administration of nonmobilized and returning units. This hampers the
Army Reserve's ability to maintain unit readiness. These challenges,
when viewed collectively and in view of emerging recruiting challenges,
threaten the Army Reserve's ability to provide ready units for ongoing
operations and prepare units for future missions.
The Army Reserve Has Prepared Mobilized Units by Transferring Personnel
and Equipment from Nonmobilizing Units, but It Faces Shortages of
Personnel and Equipment in the Near Term:
To provide the ready forces required to meet mission requirements since
September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve has had to transfer personnel and
equipment from nonmobilized units to mobilized units--a practice that
has left nonmobilized units with shortages of resources and challenges
the Army Reserve to continue to support near-term operations. The Army
Reserve, like the National Guard, has been structured according to a
"tiered resourcing" approach. Under tiered resourcing, the Army has
accepted some operational risks to save money by funding Army Reserve
units to maintain fewer personnel and less equipment than they would
need in the event of a deployment. Instead, units train at lower states
of readiness with the expectation that there would be sufficient time
to add the required personnel and equipment prior to a deployment.
Units anticipated to be needed earlier in an operation are provided a
larger portion of their required personnel and equipment, while units
that are not likely to be needed until later during an operation, if at
all, are given lower levels of resources. This strategy effectively
supported the types of operations that were anticipated before
September 11, 2001, but in the current environment combatant commanders
have required that Army Reserve units deploy with all the personnel and
equipment they needed for their missions. While the Army Reserve has
met these requirements, it has done so by transferring resources from
nonmobilized units, which has impaired its ability to train for future
missions. It has used this approach because its personnel and equipment
levels have not increased significantly since September 11, 2001,
despite the high pace of operations. In addition, the overall number of
personnel in the Army's Selected Reserve has declined as recruiting and
retention issues have emerged.[Footnote 7] Senior Army Reserve
officials have expressed concern that without change in the policies,
the Army Reserve will soon be unable to continue to provide forces with
the necessary skills and grades to support Army operations.
Personnel Transfers Have Enabled the Army Reserve to Mobilize Ready
Units, but the Pool of Deployable Units and Personnel Is Declining:
To meet combatant commander requirements for fully manned units, the
Army Reserve has had to transfer large numbers of personnel from
nonmobilizing units to provide specifically required capabilities and
to prepare mobilizing units for deployment. From September 11, 2001,
through March 2005, the Army Reserve mobilized about 118,270 soldiers
from the Selected Reserve.[Footnote 8] Of the total number of soldiers
mobilized, approximately 53,000 (45 percent) were transferred from
nonmobilized units to fill shortages in mobilized units and to provide
personnel to fill specialized requirements, such as medical teams, that
did not require an entire unit. Over 50 percent of the requests for
Army Reserve personnel have been for groups of six soldiers or less. As
a result of these personnel transfers, existing shortages in
nonmobilized units are growing, which limit these units' ability to
conduct training and require them to receive significant infusions of
personnel from other units if they are alerted for mobilization.
Additionally, the pool of reservists from which to fill requirements
for certain skills and grades is decreasing.
Under tiered resourcing, Army Reserve units have generally been
assigned about 80 to 85 percent of the personnel they require to
perform their assigned missions, under the assumption that the
shortages could be filled before the units would deploy. Additionally,
some personnel assigned to units may not be deployable for personal
reasons, such as unfulfilled training requirements, health problems, or
family situations. However, for Operation Iraqi Freedom, combatant
commanders requested that the Army mobilize Army Reserve units with 100
percent of the required personnel. Therefore, to support the first
rotation of Army Reserve troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom in March
2003, the Army Reserve had to transfer about 20 percent of the required
personnel from nonmobilized units. These initial transfers worsened
existing personnel shortages in nonmobilized units and increased the
numbers of personnel that had to be transferred when these units were
subsequently mobilized. To meet the combatant commander's personnel
requirements during the second rotation of troops for Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2004, about 40 percent of the required personnel were
transferred from other units. Beginning in fall 2004, combatant
commanders have required that Army Reserve units mobilize with 102
percent of their required personnel so that casualties or other
personnel losses during the mobilization process or during deployment
can be replaced from within the unit. This requirement means that units
will require even more personnel to be transferred to them before they
deploy and will increase personnel shortages in remaining units even
further. According to Army Reserve officials, units mobilizing in the
near future may have to receive over half of their required personnel
from outside the units.
As current conflicts have continued, the Army Reserve has experienced
recruitment shortfalls and lost personnel from resignations and
retirement. Although the Army Reserve is authorized to have 205,000
personnel in its Selected Reserve, the number of participating members
was about 197,000 in February 2005. The number of members had decreased
to about 196,000 in March 2005.
As the number of Army Reserve personnel available for mobilization
continues to decrease, the personnel who remain do not necessarily have
the ranks or skills needed to fulfill combatant commander requirements.
For example, captains are the Army Reserve's unit-level leaders,
responsible for filling key command and staff positions. In 2001, the
Army Reserve lacked about 42 percent of the 14,996 captains it
required, and as of January 2005, this percentage had increased to
about 52 percent. The Army Reserve attributes the shortage of captains
to fewer officers transferring to the Army Reserve from the active
Army. Similarly, the number of warrant officers--the Army Reserve's
technical experts and pilots--has also been decreasing. In September
2003, the Army Reserve lacked 28 percent of its required 2,730 warrant
officers, and as of February 2005, it lacked 37 percent. In order to
meet requirements with these shortages, the Army Reserve has had to
fill requirements by assigning personnel in other grades who may not
have as much training and experience as these officers.
Furthermore, the Army Reserve is experiencing increasing shortages of
personnel who have certain skills that have been in high demand since
September 11, 2001. For example, there has been a large requirement for
truck drivers to support current military operations. Of the over
11,200 truck drivers assigned to the Army Reserve, over 8,690 have
already been mobilized since September 11, 2001, leaving only about
2,510 (or 22 percent) still available for deployment. As table 2 shows,
over 70 percent of enlisted personnel in some occupations have already
been deployed and are no longer eligible for deployment. While some of
these skills have been in high demand across the Army, some, such as
civil affairs, reside primarily in the Army Reserve and sometimes in
small numbers of critical personnel. While new recruits are constantly
entering the Army Reserve, training them with specialized skills, such
as intelligence analysis, takes time.
Table 2: Army Reserve Enlisted Occupations with over 70 Percent of
Personnel Mobilized since September 11, 2001:
Military occupation: Construction manager;
Number of soldiers assigned: 891;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 89.
Military occupation: Supervisor of construction equipment operators;
Number of soldiers assigned: 683;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 87.
Military occupation: Concrete and asphalt equipment operator;
Number of soldiers assigned: 194;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 84.
Military occupation: Truck driver;
Number of soldiers assigned: 11,226;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 78.
Military occupation: Supervisor of general engineers;
Number of soldiers assigned: 313;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 76.
Military occupation: Civil affairs specialist (emergency management
specialist);
Number of soldiers assigned: 2,439;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 74.
Military occupation: Carpenter and mason;
Number of soldiers assigned: 1,999;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 74.
Military occupation: Transportation manager;
Number of soldiers assigned: 578;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 73.
Military occupation: Mortuary affairs specialist;
Number of soldiers assigned: 228;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 73.
Military occupation: Ammunition specialist;
Number of soldiers assigned: 1,774;
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001: 72.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Reserve Command data.
Note: Data as of March 2005.
[End of table]
As the pool of Army Reserve personnel considered available for
deployment continues to decrease, the Army Reserve is becoming
increasingly challenged to find qualified soldiers to perform key
functions needed to support ongoing operations.
The Army Reserve Has Transferred Equipment between Units to Prepare
Mobilized Units but Is Experiencing Increasing Equipment Shortages:
Since September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve has mobilized its units with
the most modern and highest quantity of equipment it has had available,
but increasing shortages threaten the Army Reserve's ability to
continue to meet equipment requirements in the near term. As with
personnel, Army Reserve units are not generally allotted all of the
equipment they need to deploy; they receive a percentage based on the
mobilization sequence of war plans, with those units expected to deploy
first receiving priority for equipment. Since September 11, combatant
commanders have required deploying units to have 90 percent of their
required equipment, even though Army Reserve units are typically
maintained with less than 80 percent of their equipment requirement. In
order to meet equipment requirements, the Army Reserve has had to fill
shortages from other sources within the Army Reserve. According to our
analysis, the Army Reserve transferred 235,900 pieces of equipment
worth about $765 million from September 13, 2001 through April 5, 2005.
As figure 2 shows, individual (49 percent) and unit (23 percent)
equipment represented the two largest categories of equipment
transferred.
Figure 2: Equipment Items Most Transferred from Nonmobilized Units to
Mobilizing Units from September 2001 to April 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In the fiscal year 2006 National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Report,[Footnote 9] the Army Reserve reported that in February 2005 it
had about 76 percent of the equipment it requires. However, this
estimate includes equipment items that are older than those used by the
active component, such as previous generations of trucks and older
models of night vision goggles, rifles, and generators. The Army
Reserve does not generally receive new equipment at the same time as
the active Army. When the active Army receives newer, modern equipment
items, it often passes the older equipment to the Army Reserve. While
these items are considered substitutes for newer items for some
purposes, such as training, combatant commanders barred many of them
from current operations because the Army cannot provide logistics
support for the older items in theater. Therefore, the equipment Army
Reserve units have that is acceptable for deployment is lower than the
overall figure indicates. For example, Army Reserve units often train
with older less capable versions of radios than their active duty
counterparts have, so deploying Army Reserve units have had to be
supplied with the new radios after they deployed. In addition, Army
Reserve units have far fewer than the overall average for some
equipment items. For example, the Army Reserve has less than half of
its requirement of night vision goggles, and a portion of the goggles
it has are not the most modern type. While units can be provided
additional equipment from the Army after they deploy, these units do
not have much time to train with new equipment prior to conducting
actual operations. Moreover, continuing equipment shortages in
nondeploying units also result in loss of training opportunities and
increase the number of equipment items that must be transferred to
prepare units for mobilization.
As the Army Reserve struggles to continue to provide the required
equipment to its mobilized units, its existing equipment inventory is
aging more quickly than originally planned due to high use and a harsh
operational environment. According to the 2006 National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Report, equipment is being used in theater at rates
five times higher than under peacetime conditions, and several major
equipment items, including some light and light-medium truck fleets and
engineering equipment, are nearing or past their anticipated lifetime
use. The report noted that higher use is resulting in increased costs
for parts and maintenance as well as a reduction in overall unit
readiness. Additionally, according to the report, the Army Reserve
estimates that currently as much as 44 percent of its equipment needs
servicing. This includes equipment returned from the first rotation of
troops in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, about one-fourth of which
still requires maintenance before it can be reused. Moreover, returning
Army Reserve units are being required to leave certain equipment items,
such as vehicles that have had armor added to them, in theater for
continuing use by other forces, which further reduces the equipment
available for training and limits the Army Reserve's ability to prepare
units for mobilizations in the near term.
The Army Reserve's Ability to Provide Ready Forces Is Affected by
Current Personnel Policies:
The Army Reserve's ability to continue to provide ready forces in
support of ongoing operations is further affected by current DOD and
Army personnel policies, which affect the number of reserve personnel
eligible for deployment. As we have reported previously, the
availability of reserve component forces to meet future requirements is
greatly influenced by DOD's implementation of the partial mobilization
authority under which personnel serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom were mobilized and by the department's personnel
policies. Specifically, we reported that the policies that affect
mobilized reserve component personnel were focused on the short-term
needs of the services and reserve component members rather than on long-
term requirements and predictability of deployment.[Footnote 10]
Army Reserve personnel serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom have been activated under a partial mobilization authority,
which enables the secretary of a military department, in a time of
national emergency declared by the President or when otherwise
authorized by law, to involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 24
consecutive months.[Footnote 11] However, DOD's policy implementing the
mobilization authority is that any soldier who has served 24 cumulative
months during the current conflicts is ineligible for any further
activation unless the President signs an additional executive order or
that soldier volunteers for additional duty. Time for pre-and
postmobilization activities and accrued leave days are also counted
toward time served on a reservist's "24-month clock" under this policy.
While the DOD policy limits the time a reservist can serve on active
duty to 24 months, Army policy[Footnote 12] states that reservists who
have been mobilized for Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom
will serve no more than 12 months in the theater of operations. Thus,
under this policy, an Army reservist who completes an in-theater
rotation of 12 months, along with pre-and postmobilization activities
(adding an average of 6 months to mobilization), serves about 18 months
of the 24 months allowed under the DOD policy. In addition, because
these deployments cannot be less than 12 months under Army policies,
the Army Reserve considers these reservists ineligible to deploy again.
As figure 3 shows, as of March 2005, about 43 percent of Army Selected
Reserve personnel have been mobilized since September 11, 2001, and are
not eligible to be remobilized under current DOD and Army policies.
Only about 16 percent, or 31,300 personnel, are considered eligible for
mobilization. The other 41 percent are ineligible or not available at
this time for a variety of reasons, including the nature of their
current assignments--such as providing recruiting and retention
support, training for mobilizing units, and other critical duties; lack
of required training; or various medical and administrative issues,
such as pregnancy or pending separations. Those soldiers who complete
the required training or resolve medical and family issues may become
available for mobilization in the future.
Figure 3: Percentage of Army Reserve Personnel Eligible, Previously
Mobilized, or Ineligible/Not Available for Mobilization as of March
2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Based on 196,219 soldiers in the Selected Reserve as of March 28,
2005.
[End of figure]
In a December 2004 memorandum, the Chief, Army Reserve reported to the
Chief of Staff of the Army that the Army Reserve's ability to provide
ready personnel was impaired by the DOD's implementation of
mobilization authorities and the Army's deployment policies, among
other issues. He noted that the overall ability of the Army Reserve to
continue to provide ready forces was declining quickly. He reiterated
similar concerns during testimony to the House Committee on Armed
Services' Subcommittee on Military Personnel, in February 2005. Senior
DOD officials maintained that the military services have enough
personnel available to meet requirements, and the policies have not
changed since then.
The Army Reserve Lacks Required Full-time Support Staff:
Another significant challenge the Army Reserve faces in continuing to
provide support for near-term operations is that it has not been
authorized all of the full-time support staff it needs to perform
critical readiness duties at home. These personnel play a key role in
maintaining Army Reserve unit readiness and participating in
mobilization/deployment planning and preparation by performing the day-
to-day equipment maintenance, administrative, recruiting and retention,
and training tasks for the Army Reserve force. These staff fall into
three categories: reservists who have been selected to serve on
extended active duty, civilian employees, and active Army personnel.
Based on a pre-September 11, 2001, analysis, the Army Reserve
identified a requirement for about 38,000 full-time support personnel
during peacetime, which equates to about 18.5 percent of the 205,000
members it is authorized by law. These personnel are needed to perform
ongoing equipment maintenance, administrative, recruiting and
retention, and training tasks. However, the Army Reserve is only
authorized about 26,350 full-time support personnel, or about 68
percent of its full-time requirement and 12.8 percent of the authorized
number of reservists. The Army Reserve's full-time staffing is the
lowest proportion of all the reserve components. By comparison, in
2004, the Army National Guard was authorized full-time support equal to
15 percent of its end strength, and the Air Force Reserve was
authorized full-time support equal to about 22 percent of its end
strength. Moreover, the Army Reserve's authorized full-time support
does not take into consideration recent increases in the pace of
operations. The Army Reserve has not been authorized all of the full-
time support staff it requires because, under the tiered resourcing
planning strategy, it was assumed that Army Reserve units would not
need to deploy quickly, and thus the risk associated with lowered unit
readiness was acceptable.
While the Army Reserve has not been authorized the full-time personnel
necessary to meet its requirements, the number of full-time personnel
available for day-to-day activities is being further reduced because of
the ongoing requirements for active duty and reserve personnel. First,
some full-time civilian employees, called military technicians, must as
a condition of employment be members of Army Reserve units. According
to Army Reserve data, as of May 2005, about 1,100 (14 percent) of the
Army Reserve's military technicians were deployed in support of current
operations, in some instances resulting in a gap in support for day-to-
day operations in nonmobilized units. In addition, in March 2005, the
Army announced its decision to reassign 223 (about 88 percent) of the
254 active Army staff who perform critical training and readiness
support positions in the Army Reserve because these soldiers are needed
in the active component. In announcing the planned reduction, the Army
noted that the planned decrease will reduce premobilization training;
threaten the Army Reserve's ability to activate units at required
levels of capability; and reduce or limit support for approval of
training plans, oversight of readiness reports, and annual assessments
of personnel, equipment, and training. The Army Reserve is in the
process of determining ways to mitigate the loss of the active Army
personnel.
The Army and the Army Reserve Have Initiatives to Improve Readiness and
Deployment Predictability, but Full Implementation Depends on Detailed
Coordination and Funding Decisions:
The Army and Army Reserve have taken several steps to plan and
implement a number of initiatives to address the readiness challenges
described above and improve deployment predictability for soldiers, but
they have not yet made decisions on the numbers and types of units the
Army Reserve will need in the future and several key decisions about
the Army Reserve's structure and funding have not yet been finalized.
One of the Army Reserve's primary initiatives is to transition to a
rotational force model, which would enable reservists to know in
advance when they might be expected to deploy to overseas operations
and would break the cycle of unanticipated and ad hoc transfers of
personnel from nondeploying units to deploying units. While the Army
Reserve plans to begin implementing its rotational force model with the
return of currently deployed units, it is awaiting several Army
decisions concerning the structure, number, and types of Army Reserve
support units the Army will require for its new modular force and how
the Army Reserve's rotational force model will be funded. The Army
Reserve is also undertaking a number of other initiatives designed to
make the most efficient and effective use of its personnel--including
reducing its force structure to provide remaining units with all the
personnel they are authorized, increasing full-time support,
establishing a process for centrally managing soldiers who are
ineligible for deployment, and changing the command and control of some
units--but these initiatives are not all linked by a detailed
management plan. While the Army's Campaign Plan defines overall goals
to improve readiness of Army units, including Army Reserve units, it
does not describe the personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve
will need under the Army's modular structure and rotational force
generating model. Until the Army determines these future requirements
for the Army Reserve and integrates the various initiatives under way
in a detailed plan, the Army and Army Reserve will not be in a position
to determine their needs, so the Secretary of Defense and the Congress
will not have assurance that the current problems of degrading
readiness and unpredictable deployments will be fully and efficiently
addressed.
Implementation of the Army Reserve's Rotational Force Model Awaits
Critical Funding and Structure Decisions:
The initiative to transform the Army Reserve into a rotational force,
within which units are provided a predictable cycle for conducting
individual and unit training followed by potential mobilization,
involves a major change in the way the Army planned to train and use
Army Reserve forces in the past. The Army Reserve has completed
significant planning on its rotational force model, and its plan
appears to address the critical issue of providing forces continuously
without undue stress on reservists. However, the Army Reserve is
awaiting several key decisions by the Department of the Army before it
can implement the model, and full implementation could take several
years.
At present, Army Reserve units are assigned to missions based on war
plans and, under tiered resourcing, are maintained at varying levels of
readiness based on when they are expected to be needed to deploy in
accordance with war plans. Units that are not expected to be needed
early in existing war plans are not expected to be ready to deploy
without significant time following the outbreak of a war to improve
their readiness with additional personnel and equipment. However,
current military operations associated with the Global War on Terrorism
have called for units and personnel earlier and for longer periods than
anticipated in previous war plans and have raised issues about the
impact of unforeseen deployments of Army Reserve forces on reservists,
their families, and their employers.
In July 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to the Army
directing it to develop a plan that would enable the service to better
predict when personnel and units might expect to be mobilized. The
Secretary's objective was to limit a reservist's involuntary call-up to
active duty to 1 year in every 6 years. The Army's 2004 Campaign Plan
assigned responsibility to the Army Reserve for developing a method to
meet this objective.[Footnote 13] When the plan was issued in April
2004, the Army Reserve had already begun developing a proposal for a
new rotational force generation model based on cyclical readiness,
called the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model. As shown in figure
4, under the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model, reserve forces
would be divided into 10 groups called packages, each containing
several units with the range of capabilities that might be needed to
conduct military operations. Army Reserve units would move through the
phases of the cycle and be ready to serve as a standby deployable force
during the fifth year of the 5-year cycle.[Footnote 14]
Figure 4: The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Model:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Army Reserve designed the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model
with the intention of keeping units and packages intact and on a
predictable schedule. In addition, unlike the tiered resourcing
strategy based on when units would be needed for combat operations
under existing war plans, the plan assigns priority based on when units
will be ready and available for deployment. It also reflects an
assumption that in the future the United States will be less able to
predict and plan for specific threats, so the services will have to
maintain a certain portion of their active and reserve forces ready at
all times to conduct a range of potential military operations should
the need arise. The Army has included the rotational concept in the
Army Campaign Plan and intends to implement it across the Army. We
believe that the concept is a step toward balancing the need for a
continuing supply of ready units with the need for more predictability
of deployments, but plans are in the preliminary stages and
implementation issues, such as training standards and funding needs,
have yet to be decided.
Under the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model, Army Reserve units
would not be expected to have all the personnel and equipment they
would need to complete their missions until they were in the later
phases of the model. During the beginning phases of the cycle, units
would begin to receive new or replacement equipment and additional
personnel and begin other administrative, logistical, or personnel
activities necessary to increase their level of readiness. During the
next phases, individuals would receive training to develop the skills
needed for their specific occupations, and units would train together
on unit tasks. For example, truck drivers would be initially expected
to improve their individual ability to drive a particular truck. After
achieving a specific level of driving proficiency, they would train
with the other drivers and learn how to drive in a truck convoy. Over
the training period, units would have access to all the modern
equipment they would need to deploy, so there would be no need for
large-scale, unscheduled transfers of equipment to ready mobilizing
units. At the end of the training phase, units would undergo a
validation process to determine whether they would be capable of
mobilizing in support of Army operations. Units in the final phase of
the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model would be trained, manned,
and equipped to perform their missions, so the time needed to mobilize
these units would be significantly reduced compared to current
operations.
In addition to the improved ability to provide ready forces, the Army
Reserve expects the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model to improve
the quality of life for its members by enabling soldiers, their
families, and their employers to better predict when a reservist could
be mobilized. The planned rotational model is intended to meet the
Secretary of Defense's goal of limiting involuntary mobilizations,
although under the model proposed by the Army Reserve, units could be
mobilized once every 5 years rather than every 6 years, the Secretary's
original goal. The Army Reserve's current force rotational planning
model would enable it to inform reservists of their deployment
eligibility schedules several years ahead of a possible deployment so
they could make family and career plans.
According to the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force plans, if requests
for forces exceed those that are within their deployment time frame,
the Army Reserve could accelerate training for forces nearing the final
phases of the model. This would mean earlier deployment than
anticipated for some forces. However, according to Army Reserve
analysis, no historical deployments since World War II have required
more forces than would be contained in 4 of the planned 10 Army Reserve
Expeditionary Force packages.
While the Army agrees with the Army Reserve's concept of the rotational
force model and intends to implement the concept for the active forces
as well as Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces, Army and Army
Reserve officials have not come to agreement on the specifics of how
the Army Reserve model will be implemented. Key issues currently under
discussion are the number of packages that should be created and the
duration of the rotational cycle. Although the Army Reserve proposal
would create 10 force packages and establish a rotational cycle of
between 5 and 6 years, some Army officials advocate creating 12 force
packages and a 6-year cycle that would comply with the Secretary of
Defense's initial guidance. Army Reserve officials noted that the model
could be adjusted to accommodate a deployment cycle of 6 years.
However, the Army Reserve proposal advocates creating 10 packages
rather than 12 packages because each package could contain a larger
percentage of the force. Likewise, Army and Army Reserve officials have
not agreed on a plan for how the Army Reserve would provide additional
forces if the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model cannot provide
enough deployable forces to meet operational requirements. Army
officials anticipate that final plans for the Army Reserve's rotational
model will be approved in midsummer 2005 and will detail the rotational
cycle and the number of expeditionary packages the Army Reserve will
need to build. However, even if all the planning decisions were
finalized in the near future and the Army Reserve could begin
implementation immediately, full implementation will likely take
several years to complete because the rotational concept is based on
the sequential flow of units through the model, and the first units
would not reach readiness until at least 2010.
While the Army Reserve intends to implement its Army Reserve
Expeditionary Force model with troops returning in 2005 from military
operations overseas, continued demands for units and individuals may
make it difficult for the Army Reserve to adhere to the model and avoid
having to take deployment-eligible reservists out of their units'
rotational cycles to meet immediate needs for personnel. Further, the
Army and Army Reserve have not fully estimated the costs associated
with the Army Reserve's rotational model and programmed funding to
begin the process of resetting and reconstituting returning forces as
they enter the rotational model. As of May 2005, Army Reserve planning
officials were still in the process of reviewing what equipment,
training, and personnel will be required for both the units rotating
through the model and the support structure that will be required for
those units once the model is implemented. Army Reserve officials
explained that they cannot begin to develop funding requirements until
the Army determines the units the Army Reserve will need. If funding
requirements are not carefully estimated and included in the Army's
budget, the model's eventual effectiveness in providing a more orderly
and predictable process for supporting overseas operations may be
diminished.
The Army Is Reorganizing Its Forces, but Plans Detailing the Numbers
and Types of Army Reserve Support Units It Needs Are Not Completed:
The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and
capable of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in fiscal
year 2004, the Army began to reorganize its active duty combat forces
from a force structure organized around divisions to one that is based
on more flexible modular brigades. However, as we have previously
reported, the design of the modular units is still evolving and not all
the equipment required is fully known or funded.[Footnote 15] The Army
has not completed planning for how active and Army Reserve component
combat support and combat service support units will be organized to
support the new modular brigade combat teams.
The Army is currently completing a review of its force structure--
called the Total Army Analysis--to determine the number and type of
units it needs to meet the goals of the National Defense Strategy.
Previously conducted Total Army analyses did not include an assessment
of the support forces that would be needed under the Army's modularity
initiative. In 2004, the Army began another review to determine what
active and reserve support units it will need to support its new
multifunctional modular brigades. The Army plans to use the results of
the analysis to compile a detailed list of the numbers and types of
units the Army Reserve will need to provide in support of the modular
combat forces. As of March 2005, the Army was still analyzing the
results of the process and was continuing to assess the requirements
for support forces. Until the results are released, the Army Reserve
cannot identify the numbers and types of units that it will need to
support the Army requirements in each of the rotational packages.
In addition, the Army and Army Reserve have not yet developed detailed
estimates for the Army Reserve's reorganization into modular units. The
Army Campaign Plan assumes that supplemental resources the Congress
provides to the Army to fund the Global War on Terrorism will be
available to pay some of the costs of the modular conversion for
reserve component support units. However, until the Army completes all
of its force structure designs for support brigades, the Army Reserve
will not have a total picture of its personnel and equipment
requirements and will not have all the information it needs to evaluate
funding requests for modularity.
The Army and the Army Reserve Have Several Other Initiatives Currently
Under Way to Improve Capabilities, but Stages of Implementation Vary:
The Army and the Army Reserve have other initiatives under way for the
purposes of improving readiness and capability. However, these
initiatives are in varying stages of planning and implementation. While
all the transformational initiatives seek to improve the Army Reserve's
ability to provide ready forces, they have not been coordinated as part
of a comprehensive plan that would establish goals for initiatives,
coordinate their objectives and time frames, and set funding
priorities. Moreover, the Army has not determined the personnel, units,
and equipment the Army Reserve will need to transform to a modular,
rotational force and effectively support Army operations in the future.
In July 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to begin
to rebalance the capabilities that reside in the active and reserve
forces to better meet the continued high demand for personnel with
certain skills in support of ongoing operations. Key objectives of this
initiative are to improve unit readiness and increase services' ability
to meet the requirements of continuous operations by eliminating units
with low-demand skills and moving personnel into units with high-demand
skills. It also aims to provide units with more of the required
personnel by ensuring that all personnel assigned to units are eligible
to deploy. When the initiative is fully implemented in 2009, the
rebalancing will result in force structure changes affecting about
34,000 Army Reserve positions and 236 Army Reserve units. Although
intended to increase the Army Reserve's readiness and capability, this
rebalancing effort was begun before the Army began its modular
restructuring effort. The two initiatives--rebalancing and modular
restructuring--have not been coordinated within a management framework
that is needed in light of the potential impact of major organization
changes. Senior Army Reserve leaders have raised concerns that because
the initiatives are not well integrated, the Army Reserve may be
eliminating some of the types of units that it will eventually need to
supplement the modular support brigades.
To increase units' readiness by assigning only deployable personnel,
the Army Reserve is also establishing a process to centrally manage
soldiers who are not eligible for deployment because they are
untrained, awaiting administrative discharge, pending medical
evaluations for continued service, or in the process of voluntarily
moving between units. Until this initiative is fully implemented some
soldiers will remain assigned to units where they occupy positions, but
because they are not eligible for mobilization, they do not contribute
to unit readiness. By accounting for these soldiers centrally in a
separate "Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students" account, as
exists in the active Army, the Army Reserve anticipates that it can
relieve units of a major administrative responsibility and enhance
overall unit readiness. The Army Reserve has begun implementing this
initiative and estimated that at the end of June 2004 about 12.8
percent of its assigned strength met the requirements for assignment to
one of the four categories. The Army Reserve expects the number of
personnel in this account to eventually level off at about 10 percent
of the number of soldiers it is authorized, or about 20,000 soldiers.
Recognizing the need for more full-time support staff, in fiscal year
2001, the Army started to implement an initiative to increase the
number of full-time support positions for reservists on active duty and
civilians by 4,551 positions by the end of fiscal year 2011. When
complete, the planned increase would bring the number of full-time
support staff for the Army Reserve to 28,806 personnel, about 14
percent of the Army Reserve's end strength. However, planned increases
would not provide the Army Reserve's peacetime requirement for full-
time support, even as the high pace of current operations has increased
demands for the training, administrative, and maintenance skills full-
time staff provide. Moreover, the Army Reserve will lose the full-time
support of about 223 active duty Army soldiers because they are needed
in the active component, which will offset some of the benefit of
increases in reservist and civilian full-time support. The Army Reserve
has not yet developed a management plan to offset these risks in the
near term or address the increasing shortage of full-time support staff
due to deployments.
Another initiative is designed to address the readiness problem that is
created when personnel are transferred out of some units to provide
capabilities to other units in the active or reserve component. The
Army Reserve's Individual Augmentee initiative is designed to provide a
pool of volunteer soldiers, trained in high-demand specialties, who are
ready to mobilize quickly as individuals rather than units. According
to the Army Reserve, it is currently working to implement this
initiative and has established a goal of 3,000 to 9,000 Individual
Augmentee positions by the end of 2007.
The Army Reserve is also in the process of changing the command and
control of some of its units to better focus on soldier and unit
readiness. For example, the Army Reserve plans to reduce the number of
commands charged with readiness activities and establish a training
command in order to clarify responsibilities and standardize training.
In addition, the Army Reserve is implementing plans to transfer some
installation and facility support activities to the Army so that Army
Reserve readiness personnel can focus on training programs.
Furthermore, the Army Reserve is in the process of establishing a
consolidated medical command and a consolidated intelligence command to
more effectively manage these specialized skills. While the Army
Reserve expects these actions to support the goals of the Army Campaign
Plan, the details of how that will be accomplished are not specified in
that plan.
Conclusions:
While the Army's acceptance of military risk in maintaining the Army
Reserve in peacetime with fewer people and less equipment than it
needed for its mission was an effective strategy for containing costs
during the Cold War, the security environment has changed dramatically
since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and that strategy is
no longer viable. Threats are no longer as predictable, so the services
will need to maintain more forces ready to deploy as needed. In
addition, operations related to the Global War on Terrorism are
expected to last a long time and require the continuing support of the
Army Reserve. The Army and Army Reserve's previous tiered readiness
policy has created the need for wholesale transfers of personnel among
units to meet wartime requirements and degraded the Army Reserve's
ability to continue to provide forces for ongoing operations. In
particular, the Army Reserve is running out of personnel who are
eligible to mobilize under current personnel policies and who have the
grades and skills required for current operation. The current
operations are not expected to end soon, and without change, the Army
Reserve will not be able to provide the personnel and units needed for
future rotations of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, or
other needs.
The Army's Campaign Plan sets out overall goals for improved readiness
of Army units, including Army Reserve units, but it does not describe
the personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under
the Army's modular structure and rotational force generating model.
Without a clear indication of what the Army Reserve will look like in
the future, the Army and Army Reserve cannot be sure that the changes
they are undertaking in the short term will enable it to achieve the
desired end state of a flexible and ready force and ensure that funding
is targeted to priority activities. While the Army and Army Reserve
have various initiatives under way to improve Army Reserve readiness
over time, not all of these initiatives are being integrated and
coordinated to ensure they most efficiently achieve overall goals.
Lacking a mechanism that coordinates and synchronizes initiatives that
are in various stages of implementation, the Army and Army Reserve
cannot be sure that all of the separately developed initiatives work
together in timing and scope to achieve readiness goals efficiently and
set funding priorities for various activities. For example, without
information on the types of units that the Army Reserve will need under
modularity, the Army Reserve cannot be sure that its other rebalancing
efforts are not eliminating the types of units that will be needed in
the future when additional costs would be generated and delays incurred
to re-create them.
The Army Reserve's key initiative of establishing a rotational force
cannot be fully implemented until the Army finalizes decisions
concerning how the Army Reserve will fit into the Army's planned
transformation to a modular force and funding needs and sources have
been determined. Until these decisions are finalized and an
implementation plan is agreed upon that details how the Army Reserve
can ready units and individuals to meet requirements on an ongoing
basis, the Army Reserve will have to continue transfers from its
dwindling levels of personnel and equipment.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief,
Army Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, to define the end state of the units, personnel, skills, and
equipment the Army Reserve will need to fit into the Army's modular
force and develop a detailed plan to ensure that the ongoing diverse
initiatives collectively support the desired outcome of improved
readiness and predictable deployments within current and expected
resource levels. The plan should, at a minimum, include:
* an assessment of the types and numbers of units that the Reserve
needs in its force structure to support future Army and joint missions,
* a process for coordinating the implementation steps and time frames
of the different initiatives,
* a method of assessing the progress and effectiveness of the
initiatives,
* a reassessment of the Army Reserve's requirement for full-time
staffing support given its new operational role, and:
* identification of resources needed to implement each of the Army's
and the Army Reserve's initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's
readiness.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army, in conjunction with the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief,
Army Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, to develop an implementation plan for a force rotation model
for the Army Reserve that describes:
* the types and numbers of units that should be available for
deployment during each year,
* the funding the Army Reserve will need to support its transition to a
rotational force, and:
* the readiness levels for each phase of the rotation, including a
description of the associated levels of personnel and equipment and the
strategy for providing them, and how readiness will be evaluated.
Agency Comments:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with our
recommendations. The department's comments are reprinted in their
entirety in appendix II. In addition, the department provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, and
other interested committees. We are also sending a copy to the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of the Army, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, and we
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have questions, please contact me on (202) 512-
4402 or by e-mail at [Hyperlink, stlaurentj@gao.gov]. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this
report are included in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess whether the Army Reserve has provided forces required by the
combatant commanders since September 11, 2001, and the challenges it
faces in sustaining near-term operations, we analyzed the Department of
the Army's Manpower and Reserve Employment of Reserve Component Forces
& Effect of Usage report data for fiscal years 1986 through 2003 and
discussed the sources and uses of the information with officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We obtained
information on personnel mobilized and remaining from the Army
Reserve's Personnel Division. We analyzed data generated by the Total
Army Personnel Data Base - Reserves and provided by the U.S. Army
Reserve Command on the numbers of reservists that were mobilized for
operations since September 11, 2001, and their military occupations and
numbers of personnel that had not been mobilized. We obtained and
analyzed data detailing the amounts, types, and costs of completed
equipment transfers by the Army Reserve from September 13, 2001 through
April 5, 2005, from the Reserve End Item Management System. We assessed
the reliability of data from the Total Army Personnel Data Base -
Reserves and the Reserve End Item Management System by 1) reviewing
existing information about the data and the systems that produced them;
2) performing electronic testing of the relevant data elements; and 3)
interviewing Army Reserve officials knowledgeable about the data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We analyzed Department of Defense publications and reports information
on equipment shortages, including the 2004, 2005, and 2006 National
Guard and Reserve Equipment reports to analyze trends in the status of
the equipment the Army Reserve has on hand. We obtained and analyzed
data on the numbers and types of full-time staff assigned to Army
Reserve units and the metrics used in identifying full-time staff
requirements from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Force Programs
Office. We also discussed full-time support issues with readiness and
training officials. To understand how current personnel and equipment
policies affect the Army Reserves' capability to provide support for
near-term operations, we gathered and reviewed copies of relevant
documents, including presidential executive orders and the Army's
personnel planning guidance.
To assess the extent to which the Army Reserve is planning and
implementing initiatives designed to improve its readiness and provide
predictability of deployment for its members, we reviewed and analyzed
policy guidance; instructions; documents; and implementation plans
related to Army and Army Reserve initiatives, including the Total Army
Plan; the 2004 Army Campaign Plan with change 1; the 2003 and 2004 Army
Transformation Roadmap; the Army's 2004 and 2005 posture statements;
the Army Reserve's 2005 posture statement; the Army's 2004 and 2005
modernization plans; the Army Reserve's expeditionary force planning
documents; and other Army Reserve planning and budget documents. We
also discussed the status of planning for the Army Reserve's conversion
to a rotational force and a modular structure with Army and Army
Reserve officials. To assess ongoing initiatives to improve readiness
and force management, we reviewed status reports and discussed
implementation challenges with Army Reserve officials managing the
initiatives.
We conducted our review from April 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800:
JUN 22 2005:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, 'Reserve FORCES: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, dated May 25, 2005 (GAO Code
350505/GAO-05-660).
Should you have any questions reference this response please direct
them to my point of contact, COL Charles Barham, 703-693-2217,
charles.barham@osd.mil.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
T. F. Hall:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED MAY 25, 2005 GAO CODE 350505/GAO-05-660:
"RESERVE FORCES: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of
Staff of the Army, the Chief of the Army Reserve, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to define the end
state of the units, personnel, skills, and equipment the Army Reserve
will need to fit into the Army's modular force and develop a detailed
management plan to ensure that the ongoing diverse initiatives
collectively support the desired outcome of improved readiness and
predictable deployment. The plan should include:
* an assessment of the types and numbers of units that the Reserve
needs in its force structure to support future Army and joint missions;
* a process for coordinating the implementation steps and time frames
of the different initiatives;
* a method of assessing the progress and effectiveness of the
initiatives;
* a reassessment of the Army Reserve's requirement for full time
staffing support given its new operational role; and:
* identification of resources needed to implement each of the Army's
and Army Reserve's initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's readiness.
(Page 36/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation as written.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army, in conjunction with the Chief of
Staff of the Army, the Chief of the Army Reserve, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to develop an
implementation plan for a force rotation model for the Army Reserve
that describes:
* the types and numbers of units that should be available for
deployment during each year;
* the funding the Army Reserve will need to support its transition to a
rotational force; and:
* the readiness levels for each phase of the rotation, including a
description of the associated levels of personnel and equipment and the
strategy for providing them and how readiness will be evaluated. (Page
36 and 37/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation as written.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals also
made major contributions to the report: Margaret Morgan, Timothy A.
Burke, Alissa Czyz, Ronald La Due Lake, Kenneth Patton, Rebecca Medina,
and Eileen Peguero.
(350505):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel
and equipment, activating units and members of the reserves for active
duty, and bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness for war or
other national emergency.
[2] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the
Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-
term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and
Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).
[3] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National
Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).
[4] GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
16, 2005).
[5] While enlistment contracts can vary, a typical enlistee would incur
an 8-year military service obligation, which could consist of a 4-year
active duty obligation followed by a 4-year Individual Ready Reserve
obligation.
[6] The Army Retired Reserve includes retirees from both the active and
reserve components.
[7] GAO, Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and
Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces, GAO-05-419T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
[8] According to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command as of May 2,
2005, 10,361 members of the Individual Ready Reserve, individual
mobilization augmentees, and members of the Retired Reserve have been
ordered to active duty.
[9] Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report
for Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[10] GAO-04-1031.
[11] 10 U.S.C. § 12302.
[12] Department of the Army, Department of the Army Personnel Planning
Guidance (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2005).
[13] In October 2004, the Army issued Change 1 to the Army Campaign
Plan which assigned the Army Forces Command responsibility for
implementing a rotational force for the total Army.
[14] Army Reserve officials estimate that about 60 percent of Army
Reserve forces could be available to meet demands-40 percent at any
given time and an additional 20 percent by accelerating the process.
[15] GAO-05-443T.
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