Defense Logistics
DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts Gao ID: GAO-05-775 August 11, 2005Problems in the supply distribution system dating back to the Persian Gulf War have impeded the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide effective and timely logistics support to the warfighter. DOD has taken actions to improve the distribution system by assigning new organizational responsibilities, including designating U.S. Transportation Command as the "Distribution Process Owner" (DPO); issuing a new logistics transformation strategy; and undertaking specific improvement initiatives. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess DOD's organizational structure and transformation strategy to improve the distribution system and (2) determine the status of, and timelines for completing, specific DOD distribution initiatives. agreed with the latter two.
Although DOD has made progress in addressing supply distribution problems, the department's ability to make coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has accountability and authority for making such improvements and because the current strategy to transform logistics does not provide a clear vision to guide and synchronize future distribution improvement efforts. The U.S. Transportation Command developed a draft directive to define the DPO role, but no directive has been approved or issued almost 2 years later because of disagreement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) concerning the Secretary's intent in designating the DPO. Whereas the Command asserted that the Secretary intended for the DPO to have broad authority to direct changes to the distribution system, OSD took the position that the Defense Logistics Executive--the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)--was the accountable entity and that the DPO was to act as an advisor. As a result of this disagreement, accountability and authority for improving the distribution system remain unclear. In addition, the DPO's roles and responsibilities may overlap with those of other organizations that are involved in deployment and distribution. In recent testimony on DOD's business transformation efforts, GAO has stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for performance to specific organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish goals. Furthermore, DOD's current strategy to transform logistics lacks elements of an effective strategic plan, including specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and resources needed for achieving distribution objectives. Because of the problems in DOD's organizational structure and current strategy, DOD faces challenges in taking a coordinated and systemic approach to improving the distribution system. Until these issues are resolved, DOD has little assurance that warfighters in future conflicts will have more effective and timely logistics support. Two of DOD's five distribution initiatives GAO reviewed have been successful enough to warrant application to future operations, but the future of the other three is less certain because they lack funding or other support. Two promising initiatives that have been implemented are, first, the establishment of a deployment and distribution operations center in Kuwait to coordinate the arrival of supplies and, second, the consolidation of air shipments to Iraq that do not require sorting and repacking when they arrive in theater. The other three initiatives GAO reviewed are facing challenges to their implementation that raise concerns about when they will be completed. For example, the Army has not fully funded two new communications and tracking systems to better connect logisticians on the battlefield, and thus has placed their fielding schedules into question. The delay increases the risk that some future deploying units will lack a capability to effectively submit and monitor their supply requisitions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-775, Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2005:
Defense Logistics:
DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but Further
Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts:
GAO-05-775:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-775, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
House Committee on Armed Services:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Problems in the supply distribution system dating back to the Persian
Gulf War have impeded the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to
provide effective and timely logistics support to the warfighter. DOD
has taken actions to improve the distribution system by assigning new
organizational responsibilities, including designating U.S.
Transportation Command as the ’Distribution Process Owner“ (DPO);
issuing a new logistics transformation strategy; and undertaking
specific improvement initiatives. GAO‘s objectives were to (1) assess
DOD‘s organizational structure and transformation strategy to improve
the distribution system and (2) determine the status of, and timelines
for completing, specific DOD distribution initiatives.
What GAO Found:
Although DOD has made progress in addressing supply distribution
problems, the department‘s ability to make coordinated, systemic
improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the
distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has
accountability and authority for making such improvements and because
the current strategy to transform logistics does not provide a clear
vision to guide and synchronize future distribution improvement
efforts. The U.S. Transportation Command developed a draft directive to
define the DPO role, but no directive has been approved or issued
almost 2 years later because of disagreement with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) concerning the Secretary‘s intent in
designating the DPO. Whereas the Command asserted that the Secretary
intended for the DPO to have broad authority to direct changes to the
distribution system, OSD took the position that the Defense Logistics
Executive”the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics)”was the accountable entity and that the DPO was to act as an
advisor. As a result of this disagreement, accountability and authority
for improving the distribution system remain unclear. In addition, the
DPO‘s roles and responsibilities may overlap with those of other
organizations that are involved in deployment and distribution. In
recent testimony on DOD‘s business transformation efforts, GAO has
stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for
performance to specific organizations or individuals who have
sufficient authority to accomplish goals. Furthermore, DOD‘s current
strategy to transform logistics lacks elements of an effective
strategic plan, including specific performance goals, programs,
milestones, and resources needed for achieving distribution objectives.
Because of the problems in DOD‘s organizational structure and current
strategy, DOD faces challenges in taking a coordinated and systemic
approach to improving the distribution system. Until these issues are
resolved, DOD has little assurance that warfighters in future conflicts
will have more effective and timely logistics support.
Two of DOD‘s five distribution initiatives GAO reviewed have been
successful enough to warrant application to future operations, but the
future of the other three is less certain because they lack funding or
other support. Two promising initiatives that have been implemented
are, first, the establishment of a deployment and distribution
operations center in Kuwait to coordinate the arrival of supplies and,
second, the consolidation of air shipments to Iraq that do not require
sorting and repacking when they arrive in theater. The other three
initiatives GAO reviewed are facing challenges to their implementation
that raise concerns about when they will be completed. For example, the
Army has not fully funded two new communications and tracking systems
to better connect logisticians on the battlefield, and thus has placed
their fielding schedules into question. The delay increases the risk
that some future deploying units will lack a capability to effectively
submit and monitor their supply requisitions.
What GAO Recommends:
To enhance DOD‘s ability to improve the supply distribution system, GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) clarify the
responsibilities, accountability, and authority between the DPO and
Defense Logistics Executive; (2) issue a directive to institute these
clarifications; (3) direct that improvements be made in DOD‘s logistics
transformation strategy; and (4) address underfunding of new
communications and tracking systems. DOD disagreed with the first two
recommendations and agreed with the latter two.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-775.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William Solis, (202) 512-
8365, solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Accountability and Authority for Improving the Distribution System
Remain Unclear:
Two Initiatives Have Shown Promise, but the Future of Three Other
Initiatives Is Less Certain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Distribution Problems During Operation Desert Shield/Storm and
Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Figures:
Figure 1: Very Small Aperture Terminal:
Figure 2: Mobile Tracking System:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 11, 2005:
The Honorable Joel Hefley:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Long-standing problems in the supply distribution system have impeded
the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide effective and
timely logistics support to the warfighter. These problems have
included an insufficient capability to support combat forces during the
early stages of a conflict, limited communications, a shortage of
trucks and other transportation equipment, difficulties in distributing
supplies within the theater of operations, limited visibility of assets
within the distribution system, and problems with managing shipping
priorities. Such problems occurred during Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm, and DOD after action reports, as well as studies by our
office and other organizations, have documented similar supply
distribution problems during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Most recently, in
April 2005, we reported that a lack of asset visibility was a problem
in Iraq that affected supply distribution and the readiness of
forces.[Footnote 1] In addition, since 1990 we have identified supply
chain and inventory management, including distribution, as one of DOD's
high-risk areas.
DOD has recently taken actions aimed at addressing supply distribution
problems. In September 2003, the Secretary of Defense designated new
organizational responsibilities in the logistics area, including
designating U.S. Transportation Command as the "Distribution Process
Owner" (DPO) to improve the efficiency and interoperability of the
distribution system. DOD also issued a new strategy in December 2004
for its logistics transformation efforts. Meanwhile, DOD components
have undertaken a number of specific initiatives to address supply
distribution problems.
In response to your request, we reviewed the progress DOD is making
toward achieving logistics improvement efforts for supply distribution.
Specifically, we (1) assessed DOD's organizational structure and
transformation strategy to improve the distribution system and (2)
determined the status of specific DOD distribution initiatives,
including timelines for completing them.
To assess DOD's organizational structure and transformation strategy,
we analyzed U.S. Transportation Command's progress in implementing its
DPO responsibilities, including efforts to define the role of the DPO
in response to the Secretary's 2003 memorandum. We also analyzed DOD's
logistics transformation strategy to determine the extent to which it
provides a framework for guiding and synchronizing distribution
improvement efforts. To determine the status of specific DOD
initiatives, we selected five initiatives that were highlighted as
major ongoing efforts by representatives of U.S. Transportation Command
and the Army in March 2004 testimony before the House Committee on
Armed Services. We focused on these two DOD components because of the
key roles they have had in supply distribution operations in Iraq. The
two U.S. Transportation Command initiatives we reviewed were (1)
establishing a deployment and distribution operations center to
coordinate the arrival of supplies in theater and (2) improving the
interoperability of information technology systems supporting the
distribution system.[Footnote 2] The three Army initiatives we reviewed
were (1) consolidating air cargo pallets for shipment to a single
supply support activity--called "pure packing," (2) acquiring two
communications and tracking systems to better connect logisticians on
the battlefield, and (3) creating command and control units that are
trained and equipped to rapidly receive military forces into a theater
of operations and provide initial logistics support, which the Army
refers to as a "theater opening" capability. In addition to these five
initiatives, other distribution improvement programs are continuing
within the department. Several of these programs have been included in
a plan DOD has recently developed, in coordination with the Office of
Management and Budget, to address the DOD High-Risk Area of supply
chain management.[Footnote 3] For the five initiatives in our review,
we obtained information on their purpose and funding, as well as their
fielding schedule where appropriate. We discussed the specific
initiatives and issues concerning supply distribution with officials
from U.S. Transportation Command, the Army, the Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness), and the
Joint Staff. We visited the U.S. Central Command area of operations to
obtain a first-hand view of distribution problems in the theater and
how solutions were being implemented to correct them. Because some of
the initiatives have been implemented for only a short time, we
obtained limited data on the effectiveness of initiatives that have
been implemented, and we did not independently validate these data. We
determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. We performed our work from July 2004 through June 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The
scope and methodology section contains more detailed information on the
work we performed.
Results in Brief:
Although DOD has made progress in addressing supply distribution
problems, the department's ability to make coordinated, systemic
improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the
distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has
accountability and authority for making such improvements and because
the current logistics transformation strategy does not provide a clear
vision to guide and synchronize future distribution improvement
efforts. When the Secretary of Defense designated U.S. Transportation
Command as DPO, he directed the Command to develop a directive within
30 days to define the DPO role. Although the Command developed a draft
directive, it has not been approved or issued almost 2 years later
because of disagreement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) concerning the Secretary's intent in designating the DPO. Whereas
the Command asserted that the Secretary intended for the DPO to have
broad authority to direct changes to the distribution system, OSD took
the position that the Defense Logistics Executive--the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)--was the
accountable entity and that the DPO's intended role was to act as an
advisor. As a result of this disagreement, accountability and authority
for improving the distribution system remain unclear. In addition, the
DPO's roles and responsibilities may overlap with those of other
organizations that are involved in deployment and distribution. In
recent testimony on DOD's business transformation efforts, we stated
that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for performance to
specific organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to
accomplish goals. Furthermore, DOD's current strategy to transform
logistics stymies the department's ability to improve distribution
because it does not provide clear direction to guide and synchronize
improvement initiatives based on a common vision of a future
distribution system. For example, the strategy lacks guidance on
specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and resources needed
for achieving stated objectives. DOD officials have acknowledged the
shortcomings of the current strategy and are working to develop a more
detailed roadmap to guide improvement efforts. Because of the problems
in DOD's organizational structure and current strategy, DOD faces
challenges in taking a coordinated and systemic approach to improving
the distribution system. As a result, DOD has little assurance that
warfighters in future conflicts will have more effective and timely
logistics support.
Two of the five DOD distribution initiatives we reviewed have been
successful enough to warrant application to future operations, but the
future of the other three is less certain because they lack funding or
other support. Two promising initiatives that have been implemented
are, first, the establishment in January 2004 of a deployment and
distribution operations center in Kuwait to coordinate the arrival of
supplies and, second, the use of pure packing for air shipments to
Iraq, an effort the Army began in response to a January 2004 request
from U.S. Central Command. According to DOD, both these initiatives
helped improve the flow of supplies into and around the theater of
operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom. On the basis of the success of
these initiatives, U.S. Transportation Command is working with other
regional combatant commands to establish a deployment and distribution
operations center within their organizations, and the Army is
incorporating its pure packing initiative into its regulations for Army-
wide application. The other three initiatives we reviewed are facing
challenges to their implementation that raise concerns about when they
will be completed. The Army has not fully funded two new communications
and tracking systems to better connect logisticians on the battlefield,
and thus has placed their fielding schedules into question. The delay
increases the risk that some future deploying units will lack a
capability to effectively submit and monitor their supply requisitions.
In addition, the Army is making progress toward developing a theater
opening capability, but it is uncertain whether this capability will be
deployed at the same time as combat forces in future conflicts.
Finally, U.S. Transportation Command is facing challenges in improving
the interoperability of information technology supporting the
distribution system, an effort the Command has undertaken in its role
as DPO. The Command was delayed in receiving funding to begin this
initiative and will miss a deadline for developing a transition plan to
guide future information technology investments. Moreover, the Command
has not been able to gain agreement from other DOD components on which
of their existing information technology systems should be included in
this effort to improve interoperability.
This report contains four recommendations aimed at enhancing DOD's
ability to take a coordinated and systemic approach to improving the
distribution system, including clarifying the scope of
responsibilities, accountability, and authority between the DPO and the
Defense Logistics Executive. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOD did not concur with our recommendations that the Secretary of
Defense clarify the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and
authority between the DPO and the Defense Logistics Executive; and that
he issue a directive reflecting these clarifications. DOD concurred
with our recommendations to include improvements to the Logistics
Transformation Strategy in its Focused Logistics Roadmap, and to
determine whether sufficient funding priority has been given to the
acquisition of the Very Small Aperture Terminal and the Mobile Tracking
System. The department's written comments are reprinted in appendix I,
and our evaluation of them appears in the Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation section of this report.
Background:
Distribution is part of the process and activities for managing the
supply chain that include purchasing, producing, and delivering
products and services to the warfighter during contingency operations
consistent with the National Military Strategy. According to joint
doctrine, distribution is the process of synchronizing all elements of
the logistics system to deliver the "right things" to the "right place"
at the "right time" to support the combatant commander in an area of
operations.
The distribution system has two distinct segments: strategic-national
and theater. The strategic-national segment consists of moving supplies
from points outside a theater of military operations into the theater.
The military services and the Defense Logistics Agency manage supplies
and provide for asset visibility. U.S. Transportation Command provides
transportation support, primarily strategic airlift and sealift, as
well as in-transit asset visibility. The theater segment consists of
distribution that occurs within a theater of military operations.
Theater distribution is the responsibility of the geographic combatant
command, such as U.S. Central Command. The combatant commander will
generally designate one military service to act as the theater lead
service to oversee logistics support to all of the service components
and to the theater. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Central
Command designated the Army as the theater's lead service for logistics
support.
Long-standing Problems in DOD's Distribution System:
Long-standing problems in DOD's distribution system have continued to
impede its ability to provide effective and timely logistics support to
the warfighter during recent operations. Such problems occurred during
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991, and DOD after action
reports, as well as studies by our office and other organizations, have
documented similar supply distribution problems during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as shown in table 1.
Table 1: Distribution Problems During Operation Desert Shield/Storm and
Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Logistics Force Reception:
Operation Desert Shield/Storm--1991: The deployment of combat forces to
the theater of operations in advance of support units created
logistical support difficulties. The military's decisions to "push"
enormous amounts of equipment to the theater and to deploy combat units
before support units in the first 3 months of the campaign contributed
to the Army's and Marine Corps' problem of limited capability to store
and retrieve equipment and supplies during the initial stages of
Operation Desert Storm. A small cadre of logisticians was established
to receive incoming equipment, supplies, and personnel; support the
combat units that were deployed; and build a logistics infrastructure
in an austere environment;
Operation Iraqi Freedom--2003: DOD's priority was for combat forces to
move into the theater first. A study suggested that distribution assets
were either deleted from the deployment plan or shifted back in the
deployment timeline. As a result, logistics personnel could not
effectively support the increasing numbers of combat troops moving into
theater. A shortage of support personnel in theater prior to and during
the arrival of combat forces was reported, and those who arrived were
often untrained or not skilled in the duties they were asked to
perform. The shortage resulted in delays in the processing (receipt,
sorting, and forwarding) of supplies, and backlogs. Contractors
performing distribution functions had become overwhelmed and a joint
contractor military organization quickly evolved. As two divisions
entered the theater, the need for a Theater Distribution Center became
apparent and an area in the desert was designated as a storage and
cross-dock area.
Limited Communications:
Operation Desert Shield/Storm--1991: The distance of the supply routes
created communications problems within the logistical system because
Army officials had difficulty communicating using their equipment,
which was designed for much shorter ranges. Military doctrine called
for units to be equipped to operate up to 90 miles from main supply
bases. However, the Army supported military and logistics bases over
600 miles from its main supply bases;
Operation Iraqi Freedom--2003: A number of factors limited
communications between the various logistics systems, including
distances being too great for supply activities to effectively transmit
data by radio, a lack of bandwidth in the theater to satisfy all
systems users, systems that were incompatible with each other, and
units lacking the necessary equipment or being delayed in connecting to
the supply system.
Shortage of Ground Transportation Assets:
Operation Desert Shield/Storm--1991: Although the Army was the
designated theater manager for surface transportation, it could not
fulfill that role because it lacked the transportation assets to meet
its own requirements. The Army experienced shortages of surface
transportation assets such as heavy-equipment transports, tractor
trailers, and material-handling equipment, which limited the services'
ability to transport equipment and supplies. When parts requisitions
were filled, transportation problems often slowed efforts to get parts
to combat units. Many of the available trucks were inadequate and
unreliable. More than half of the heavy transportation assets were
either contracted commercial trucks or trucks provided by other
nations. Despite the deployment of 72 percent of its truck companies in
support of 25 percent of its combat divisions, the Army still relied on
host nation support trucks to meet requirements;
Operation Iraqi Freedom--2003: The lack of adequate ground
transportation, especially cargo trucks, contributed significantly to
distribution problems. The 377th Theater Support Command, responsible
for logistics support in Kuwait, needed 930 light/medium and medium
trucks but had only 515 trucks on hand when combat began, creating a
strain on materiel movement. Available transportation assets could not
meet the Marine Corps' and the 3rd Infantry Division's capacity
requirements. High-priority items such as food did not always move as
intended. Contractors responsible for moving meals ready-to-eat from
ports to the Theater Distribution Center at times had only 50 of the 80
trucks needed. At one time 1.4 million meals ready-to-eat were stored
at a port in theater, awaiting transport to customers.
In Theater Distribution Difficulties:
Operation Desert Shield/Storm--1991: Units experienced a shortage of
critical spare parts and had to strip parts from inoperable equipment
and trade for parts with other units. Army units, for example,
experienced difficulties in obtaining spare and repair parts for their
Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Abrams tanks. Parts were generally
available in Saudi Arabia at the theater level, but their distribution
to combat units was inadequate. Mechanics and logistics personnel in
combat units had to work around the formal parts distribution system
and "scrounge" for needed parts. Documentation on containers packed at
U.S. depots did not include adequate descriptions of container
contents. Transportation and supply personnel in Southwest Asia had to
open the containers to determine their contents and destination.
Containers began stacking up in the ports because the transportation
system could not move them out of the port areas quickly. Materiel
designated for specific units often never reached them because no
procedures were established to document the arrival of incoming
supplies, and the units, in most cases, were not notified when materiel
they requisitioned arrived. The rapid redeployment of units resulted in
similar container problems, with the majority of containers being
opened at U.S. ports to identify the contents and destination;
Operation Iraqi Freedom--2003: The lack of repair parts delivery
resulted in a loss of trust and confidence in logistics systems and
processes, and units were forced to improvise. At times there were
shortages of some spares or repair parts needed by deployed forces.
Personnel noted shortages of items such as tires, tank track,
helicopter spare parts, and radio batteries. As a result, units
resorted to cannibalizing vehicles or circumventing normal supply
channels to keep equipment in ready condition. Early in the operation,
inefficient packaging and palletizing of air shipments created supply
backlogs in Kuwait. These backlogs delayed the delivery of supplies
shipped by air to units in Iraq, which included armored vehicle track
shoes, body armor, and tires. Once in theater, mixed shipments had to
be manually opened, sorted, and re-palletized at theater distribution
points, causing additional delays. Some mixed shipments were not marked
with all the intended destinations so the contents of the shipments had
to be examined. By the fall of 2003, 30 percent of the pallets arriving
at the Theater Distribution Center still had to be reconfigured in some
way. DOD could potentially pay millions of dollars for late fees on
leased containers or on the replacement of DOD-owned containers due to
distribution backlogs or losses.
Limited Asset Visibility:
Operation Desert Shield/Storm--1991: The Army did not have visibility
of repair parts at the unit level and could not readily redistribute
parts among units. Army officials did not have visibility of on-hand
stocks at the unit and division levels, and they were operating in a
vacuum deciding how much of an item to order. Army and Marine Corps
officials at seaports generally knew when a ship was to arrive but had
only a general idea about the type of cargo it was carrying. Incomplete
manifests, mislabeled containers, or generic cargo descriptions were
not uncommon for ships. Officials at an airport usually did not know
the contents of incoming shipments until the unloading was complete,
and air shipments also suffered from inaccurate manifests and
mislabeled pallets. Army officials of a support command did not have an
in-transit system for tracking cargo after it was shipped, and they had
to keep personnel at the ports to determine the contents and
destination of incoming cargo;
Operation Iraqi Freedom--2003: The lack of in-transit visibility over
supplies impeded distribution. Because of incomplete radio frequency
identification tags on incoming shipments, logistics personnel had to
spend time opening and sorting the shipments, significantly increasing
processing time. According to U.S. Central Command, about 1,500 Small
Arms Protective Inserts plates for body armor were lost and 17
containers of meals ready-to-eat were left at a supply base in Iraq for
over a week because no one at the base knew they were there. Marine
Corps officials became frustrated with their inability to "see"
supplies moving towards them and lost trust and confidence in the
logistics system and processes. Logistics systems used to order, track,
and account for supplies were not well integrated and could not provide
the essential information to effectively manage theater distribution.
Misuse of Shipment Prioritization:
Operation Desert Shield/Storm--1991: In the initial phase of Desert
Shield, Defense Logistics Agency officials were overwhelmed with high-
priority requisitions for the items they managed, and until they
received distribution guidance from theater managers, they issued items
on a first-come first-serve basis. DOD officials in the theater
confirmed the use of the high-priority code for most requisitions made
in country;
Operation Iraqi Freedom--2003: DOD's lack of an effective process for
prioritizing cargo for delivery precluded the effective use of scarce
theater transportation assets. The Joint Movement Center, which was
responsible for validating and prioritizing movements in the theater,
did not have the required resources, processes, and tools to perform
this function and did not attempt to manage truck movements.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD lessons learned studies and prior GAO
reports.
[End of table]
DOD's Changes in Organizational Responsibilities and Transformation
Strategy:
The Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated September 16, 2003,
designated the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, as DPO and
directed the Command to (1) improve the overall efficiency and
interoperability of distribution-related activities--deployment,
sustainment, and redeployment support--during peace and war; and (2)
serve as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the
strategic distribution system. The Secretary's memorandum also
designated the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) as the Defense Logistics Executive. The memorandum states
that the Defense Logistics Executive shall have the authority to make
changes necessary to integrate the global supply chain and, in
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepare
any directives, instructions, and decision memos; and suggest
legislative changes. After this memorandum was issued, U.S.
Transportation Command established a DPO management structure
consisting of an Executive Board, a Distribution Transformation Task
Force, a steering group, and working groups to oversee and manage the
DPO's improvement initiatives. This management structure includes
representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the
military services, and the Defense Logistics Agency.
In December 2004, DOD issued its Logistics Transformation Strategy. The
strategy was developed at the direction of the department's fiscal year
2006 Strategic Planning Guidance. The guidance directed the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to
reconcile three logistics concepts--force-centric logistics enterprise,
sense and respond logistics, and focused logistics--into a coherent
transformation strategy. Force-centric logistics enterprise is OSD's
midterm concept (2005-2010) for enhancing support to the warfighter,
and it encompasses six initiatives.[Footnote 4] Sense and respond
logistics is a future logistics concept developed by the department's
Office of Force Transformation that envisions a networked logistics
system that would provide joint strategic and tactical operations with
predictive, precise, and agile support. Focused logistics is a concept
for force transformation developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
identifies logistics challenges and capabilities needed to meet the
challenges. In December 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
approved the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, one in a
"family" of joint operating, functional, and integrating concepts that
collectively depict how transformed forces will operate in the
future.[Footnote 5]
Recent U.S. Transportation Command and Army Initiatives to Address
Supply Distribution Problems:
In March 2004 testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House
Armed Services Committee, senior officials of U.S. Transportation
Command and the Army highlighted continuing initiatives aimed at
addressing supply distribution problems.[Footnote 6] One initiative
highlighted by U.S. Transportation Command was the establishment of a
deployment and distribution operations center to assist U.S. Central
Command with distribution. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanders
at the senior levels were not able to prioritize their needs and make
decisions in the early stages of the distribution process because they
did not know what was being shipped to them. The result was an
overburdened and overtasked transportation and distribution system. The
operations center was established at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, in January
2004 and placed under the tactical control of the Commander, U.S.
Central Command. Its mission was to help coordinate the movement of
materiel and forces into the theater of operations by confirming the
combatant commander's deployment and distribution priorities;
validating and monitoring theater air and surface transportation
requirements; providing asset visibility; setting the conditions for
the return of materiel from the theater; and synchronizing the forces,
equipment, and supplies arriving in theater with critical theater lift
and theater infrastructure limitations. The operations center acquired
a workforce of approximately 60 personnel provided by U.S.
Transportation Command and other DOD components.
A second initiative highlighted by U.S. Transportation Command was
improving the interoperability of the information technology systems
supporting distribution. In his testimony, the senior U.S.
Transportation Command official noted that there were more than 200
information technology systems supporting distribution and that the
lack of interoperability among these systems during Operation Iraqi
Freedom had contributed to problems such as poor asset visibility.
Improved interoperability, he stated, would provide the warfighter
greater reliability and predictability for sustainment supplies. In
July 2004, OSD's Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness and the Joint Staff's Director for Logistics
designated U.S. Transportation Command, as DPO, to be the office with
primary responsibility for overseeing departmentwide efforts to improve
information technology support for distribution, including sustainment
and force movement. The term used to describe this role is "portfolio
management." Specifically, the Command was assigned to (1) develop a
process for managing its portfolio of information technology systems by
August 2004; (2) identify potential returns, goals, outcomes, and draft
performance requirements by the end of 2004; and (3) develop an
information technology transition plan by the end of 2005 to guide
information technology investments.[Footnote 7]
In the March 2004 testimony, the Army official identified four focus
areas for the service's initiatives to improve logistics support,
including supply distribution. The four focus areas were connecting
Army logisticians, improving force reception, modernizing theater
distribution, and integrating the supply chain. Following are the Army
initiatives we reviewed under three of these four focus areas.[Footnote
8]
* To connect logisticians, the Army stated that it would acquire two
systems: the Very Small Aperture Terminal, a compact satellite to
replace line-of-sight communications to send and monitor requisitions
for supplies from the battlefield; and the Mobile Tracking System, a
satellite-based, two-way text messaging system installed in trucks to
provide position locations and allow truck drivers to communicate with
a dispatcher. According to the Army, these systems will improve
logisticians' visibility of the status of their supply requisitions.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, logisticians lost confidence in the
supply system because their ability to monitor requisitions was
impaired by a lack of reliable communications.
* To improve force reception, the Army stated that it would develop a
"theater opening" capability--a headquarters deployed at the same time
as combat forces to provide a single command-and-control element
focused on joint force generation and sustainment--to rapidly receive
military forces into a theater of operations and accomplish such tasks
as maintaining real-time visibility of personnel and equipment en route
to the theater; execute joint reception, staging, and onward movement
operations, including the care and feeding of the forces and force
protection; and serve as a joint theater logistics headquarters when
augmented with additional capabilities. During the onset of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Army did not have a logistics organization designed,
trained, and equipped to receive forces in the theater. As a result,
critical force reception capabilities were often missing, and combat
units were tasked to receive forces, provide logistics support, and
move elements into assembly areas.
* To modernize theater distribution, the Army stated that it would
require pure packing (also called pure palleting), which is the
consolidation of air cargo pallets for shipment to a single supply
support activity, streamlining the theater distribution process. Pure
pallets contain materiel destined solely for a single organization and
do not require sorting and repackaging at interim distribution nodes.
During the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, mixed pallets had
to be unpacked, sorted, and repacked in the theater of operations
before they were shipped forward, which lengthened the delivery time.
Accountability and Authority for Improving the Distribution System
Remain Unclear:
Although the Secretary of Defense's 2003 memorandum designated new
organizational responsibilities in the logistics area, accountability
and authority for improving the distribution system remain unclear. The
Secretary's intent in designating U.S. Transportation Command as DPO
has been a point of dispute between the Command and OSD, and almost 2
years later no directive has been issued to define the DPO's role. In
addition, the DPO's roles and responsibilities may overlap with those
of other organizations that are involved in deployment and
distribution. Moreover, DOD's current strategy to transform logistics
lacks elements of an effective strategic plan and does not provide
clear direction to guide and synchronize distribution improvement
initiatives based on a common vision of an end-to-end distribution
system for future military operations. With no single entity
accountable for optimizing the distribution system's overall efficiency
and interoperability and without an effective transformation strategy
to guide and synchronize improvement efforts toward a common vision of
a future distribution system, efforts by DOD components to improve the
distribution system will likely remain fragmented and limited in scope
rather than coordinated and systemic.
Intent of the Secretary of Defense in Designating the DPO Is in
Dispute:
Although U.S. Transportation Command has initiated actions to implement
its DPO responsibilities and has made progress addressing supply
distribution problems, it has been unable to reach agreement with OSD
on the intent of the Secretary of Defense's DPO designation. As a
result, accountability and authority for improving the distribution
system remain unclear. The Secretary of Defense's memorandum, in
designating U.S. Transportation Command as DPO, directed the DPO to
draft a directive to define the DPO's authority, accountability,
resources, and responsibility to improve distribution, and to submit
this draft directive within 30 days of the date of the Secretary's
memo. As directed by the Secretary, U.S. Transportation Command drafted
a directive. The draft directive states that the DPO serves as the
single entity to direct and supervise execution of the global
distribution system on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Subject to
the direction and control of the Secretary and the Defense Logistics
Executive, such directive authority includes promulgating and
disseminating directives, regulations, instructions, and decision
memorandums and taking other actions, as appropriate, to carry out DPO
responsibilities, the draft directive states.
OSD officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Office of General
Counsel reviewed the draft directive and determined that it asked for
DPO authorities that conflicted with the services' statutory
authorities to supply and support their forces, and with the regional
combatant commanders' statutory authorities to direct theater
distribution within their areas of responsibility. During an interview,
a representative from the OSD General Counsel's office stated that the
draft directive would have required statutory changes and that the
Secretary of Defense's memorandum did not clearly call for such
sweeping changes.
OSD then prepared its own version of the DPO directive, placing the DPO
in an advisory role to the Defense Logistics Executive, with
responsibility for studying the distribution system and making
recommendations to the Defense Logistics Executive on how to improve
the efficiency of the system. Under OSD's revised directive, the
Defense Logistics Executive rather than the DPO would be accountable
for improving the distribution system.
U.S. Transportation Command disagreed with the OSD-revised directive,
contending that it did not implement the Secretary of Defense's
designation of the DPO as the single entity to direct and supervise the
execution of the distribution system. In a July 2004 letter to the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics), the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, wrote that
the OSD-revised directive (1) diluted the authority originally vested
by the Secretary of Defense in the DPO; (2) did not vest the DPO with
sufficient authority to make enduring factory-to-foxhole distribution
improvements; and (3) could inhibit services, commands, and other
distribution stakeholders in fully cooperating with the DPO's efforts
to drive necessary changes. U.S. Transportation Command and OSD
continued to work collaboratively until the end of calendar year 2004
to get the draft directive back on track but subsequently decided not
to continue pursuing a DPO directive. OSD issued guidance defining the
role of the Defense Logistics Executive. The instruction, which does
not mention the DPO, states that the Defense Logistics Executive shall
monitor distribution process improvements to ensure consistency with
the requirements of the defense logistics and global supply chain
management system.
We have previously reported that key practices for successful
transformation include leadership that sets the direction of
transformation and assigns accountability for results, and the use of
crosscutting implementation teams, which can provide the day-to-day
management needed for success.[Footnote 9] In recent testimonies on
DOD's business transformation, we underscored the importance of these
elements and stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability
for performance to specific organizations or individuals who have
sufficient authority to accomplish goals.[Footnote 10] In March 2005,
DOD characterized the DPO as the department's single entity to
revolutionize the distribution system, working with services and
combatant commanders in synchronizing the distribution of personnel and
equipment from factory to foxhole.
DPO Roles and Responsibilities May Overlap With Those of Other
Organizations in the Distribution System:
The many designations of logistics responsibility that DOD has executed
in the past few years, coupled with existing conflicts in joint
doctrine regarding who is responsible for synchronizing theater
distribution, may have created overlaps in roles and responsibility.
Specifically, the DPO's roles and responsibilities may overlap with
those of U.S. Joint Forces Command, which has been designated as the
Joint Deployment Process Owner, and with those of the Defense Logistics
Agency, which is the Executive Agent for the supply chain management of
certain classes of supply. In a prior report, we have noted existing
conflicts in joint doctrine regarding responsibility for theater
distribution.
Joint Deployment Process Owner:
The Secretary of Defense, in a 1998 memorandum, designated the Joint
Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner. The principal
role and focus of the Joint Deployment Process Owner is to (1) maintain
overall effectiveness while improving the joint deployment and
redeployment processes so that all supported joint force commanders and
supporting DOD components can execute them more effectively and
efficiently and (2) resolve joint deployment and redeployment process
problems that span functional and organizational boundaries. The DPO,
however, was explicitly directed by the Secretary of Defense to improve
the overall efficiency and interoperability of deployment, sustainment,
and redeployment support.
Executive Agent for Supply Classes:
In 2004, the Defense Logistics Agency became Executive Agent for bulk
petroleum, subsistence (food and water), and medical items.[Footnote
11] By the end of 2005, the Defense Logistics Agency is also expected
to become the Executive Agent for clothing and individual equipment as
well as for construction materials. Executive agent is a governance
structure used within DOD to ensure collaboration and cooperation among
DOD components. The Defense Logistics Agency's role as Executive Agent
includes distribution responsibilities that may overlap with those of
the DPO. For example, as Executive Agent for bulk petroleum, the
Defense Logistics Agency is responsible for end-to-end distribution, to
include establishing equipment standards and interoperability
requirements in collaboration with the military services and the
combatant commands. As Executive Agent for subsistence, it is
responsible for, among other things, distributing subsistence products
throughout the supply chain and delivering items to locations as
mutually agreed to with the military services and the combatant
commands. As Executive Agent for medical items, it is responsible for
managing the distribution of surge and sustainment materiel from
commercial sources to the theater of operations, and establishing in-
theater operational relationships to ensure distribution of medical
items to support tactical situations.
Conflicting Theater Doctrine:
We have previously reported that conflicting doctrine impeded the
establishment of a distribution system capable of delivering supplies
to the warfighter smoothly and on time.[Footnote 12] Currently, joint
doctrine institutionalizes separate management of sections of the
distribution system by placing responsibility for logistics support
outside the theater with the individual services and the U.S.
Transportation Command. However, it also requires the theater commander
to synchronize all aspects of logistics necessary to support the
mission. This conflicting doctrine is contrary to DOD's principle of
centralized management for theater distribution. An SAIC study also
reports that joint doctrine does not contain any specific or
prescriptive guidance on how the combatant commander might ensure a
seamless distribution process.[Footnote 13] We recommended in our April
2005 report that the Secretary of Defense revise current joint
logistics doctrine to clearly state, consistent with policy, who has
responsibility and authority for synchronizing the distribution of
supplies from the United States to deployed units during operations.
While DOD agreed with the intent of this recommendation, it did not
commit to taking any specific actions.
Logistics Transformation Strategy Is Lacking Key Elements to Guide and
Synchronize Improvements to the Distribution System:
Although DOD's current strategy to transform logistics provides a
crosswalk of the department's various logistics concepts and
initiatives back to the approved Focused Logistics Joint Functional
Concept, the strategy does not provide clear direction to guide and
synchronize efforts to improve the distribution system across the
department. For example, it lacks information on specific performance
goals, programs, milestones, and resources to achieve focused logistics
capabilities. OSD and Joint Staff officials agreed that the document
does not provide elements essential for an effective strategic plan.
U.S. Transportation Command officials also noted that the current
strategy does not address joint logistics governance, roles and
responsibilities, and accountability to guide the DPO's efforts to
improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of the distribution
system.
According to OSD officials, shortcomings in the Logistics
Transformation Strategy will be addressed in a follow-on document
called the Focused Logistics Roadmap. However, according to OSD
officials, the contractor initially assigned the task of developing the
roadmap did not perform well, and there have been difficulties in
obtaining performance metrics and budget data from DOD components on
their logistics initiatives. OSD missed its February 2005 target date
for issuing the roadmap. This effort was restarted in March 2005. OSD
hired a new contractor, and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) issued new guidance to the DOD
components directing them to provide data needed to complete the
analysis. OSD officials estimated they would publish the roadmap by
August 2005.
Two Initiatives Have Shown Promise, but the Future of Three Other
Initiatives Is Less Certain:
Two of DOD's five initiatives we reviewed have been successful enough
to warrant application to future operations, but the future of the
other three are less certain because they lack funding or other
support. Two promising initiatives that have been implemented are the
establishment of a deployment and distribution operations center in
Kuwait and the use of pure packing for air shipments to Iraq. According
to DOD, both these initiatives helped improve the flow of supplies into
and around the theater of operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom. On
the basis of the success of these initiatives, U.S. Transportation
Command is working with other regional combatant commands to establish
a deployment and distribution operations center within their
organizations, and the Army is incorporating its pure packing
initiative into its regulations for application Army-wide. The other
three initiatives we reviewed are facing challenges to their
implementation that raise concerns about when they will be completed.
The Army has not fully funded two new communications and tracking
systems to better connect logisticians on the battlefield, placing
their fielding schedules into question. The delay increases the risk
that some future deploying units will lack a capability to effectively
submit and monitor their supply requisitions. In addition, the Army is
making progress toward developing a theater opening capability, but it
is uncertain whether this capability will be deployed at the same time
as combat forces in future conflicts. Finally, U.S. Transportation
Command is facing challenges in improving the interoperability of
information technology supporting the distribution system.
Deployment and Distribution Operations Center:
On the basis of the success of the deployment and distribution
operations center in Kuwait, U.S. Transportation Command is leading an
effort to rewrite military doctrine to establish a similar organization
within each of the regional combatant commands. According to U.S.
Transportation Command, the operations center in Kuwait succeeded at:
* shifting use of airlift to sealift to reduce costly airlift
requirements and to free up airlift capacity;
* moving units from point of origin to final destination rather than
through intermediate locations with time-consuming layovers (a concept
referred to as "single ticket");
* testing satellite tracking of containers and trucks; and:
* improving distribution management, including the use of pure pallets
and containers, developing a container management plan, and improving
the retrograde of Army materiel.
U.S. Transportation Command reported that the deployment and
distribution operations center in Kuwait produced cost avoidance of
$360 million from January 2004 through March 2005. We did not
independently verify these cost data. According to the Command's data,
about $312 million, or 87 percent, of the cost avoidance was attributed
to shifting the mode of strategic transportation from airlift to
sealift in conjunction with U.S. Central Command's shipping priorities.
According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, the effectiveness
of the operations center in Kuwait and favorable reports following
subsequent tests of the concept in Korea and the U.S. Pacific Command
have prompted other regional combatant commanders to request the same
capability. The U.S. Transportation Command is working with the U.S.
Joint Forces Command to incorporate the deployment and distribution
operations center into joint doctrine as a regional combatant command
organization.[Footnote 14] At the time of our review, this effort was
in the early stages. As the deployment and distribution operations
center is currently envisioned, the regional combatant command would
provide a core staff from its own workforce, and this core staff would
be augmented with personnel from other military organizations as the
intensity of military operations increased. The number of core staff
has not been determined, but it could range from 10 in U.S. Southern
Command to perhaps 20 in U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific
Command, according to U.S Transportation Command officials. The
regional combatant command would be responsible for acquiring a core
workforce with the right skill mix and for providing them with the
equipment and the necessary training.
Pure Packing:
In January 2004, U.S. Central Command requested that all air shipments
entering its area of responsibility be pure packed. The Army and
Defense Logistics Agency worked to implement pure packing at Defense
Distribution Center Depots in the United States, and in April 2004, the
Army issued a message to establish pure packing as a servicewide
policy. Army officials said they plan to amend service regulations to
reflect this policy change. The switchover to pure packing increased
the time required to build pallets at the Defense Distribution Center
Depots but reduced the workload in the theater of operations and
reduced the overall delivery time to the warfighter. According to an
Army official, pure packing contributed to a decrease in requisition
wait time for most shipments from over 40 days in October 2003 to
consistently below 25 days since February 2005.[Footnote 15] We did not
independently verify these requisition wait time data. Requisition wait
time is the amount of time spent from when a logistician in the
battlefield orders an item from the supply system until the item is
received. According to this official, the Army set a requisition wait-
time goal of 20 days or less for all Army cargo moving by air pallet to
Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom sustainment operations. To meet the
more complex and labor-intensive requirements associated with pure
packing and, concurrently, to address the surge of work at its
distribution centers, the Defense Logistics Agency hired an additional
800 employees, added shifts, redistributed workloads, and authorized
increased overtime. To absorb these costs, the Defense Logistics Agency
increased its overhead and surcharges to the Army. Neither the Defense
Logistics Agency nor the Army could provide information on the total
cost of implementing pure packing.
Acquisition of Systems to Connect the Logistician:
Very Small Aperture Terminal: The Army has identified a requirement for
775 Very Small Aperture Terminals. (See fig. 1.) Although the systems
will be fielded primarily to active brigades, each National Guard and
Reserve brigade will receive one system and then receive additional
systems at Army training centers prior to deployment at the same level
as the active units. Upon returning from their deployment, Guard and
Reserve units will turn in the additional systems. Fielding began in
July 2004 and will continue through fiscal year 2007. Seven units have
been fully fielded with 106 systems and four units have been partially
fielded with 64 systems as of June 2005. The unit cost is $75,000, and
the total funding requirement for the 775 systems is $256.6 million
through fiscal year 2011. However, funding data provided by the Very
Small Aperture Terminal program office show that the program is
underfunded by a total of $21.4 million for fiscal years 2005 and 2006,
or 24 percent of the $90.3 million in total funding requirements for
these 2 years, placing the fielding schedule in question. Program
officials said the current funding level would delay fielding the
systems. They noted that the unfunded requirements have been
prioritized and included in the Army's budgeting for its modularity
efforts. According to a program official, additional funds from fiscal
year 2005 supplemental appropriations may be provided to reduce the
shortfall. In addition, according to an Army official, logisticians are
concerned about the future of the system in light of the Army's
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) system currently under
development. Win-T is the Army's future high-speed, high-capacity
communications network, which will link Army units with higher levels
of command and provide video, data, imagery, and voice services. The
Army is scheduled to have initial capability on the system in 2010. The
Win-T system would duplicate many of the functions of the Very Small
Aperture Terminal and could potentially result in reduced funding for
this system, this official said.
Figure 1: Very Small Aperture Terminal:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Mobile Tracking System: Although the Army originally identified a total
requirement for 47,000 Mobile Tracking Systems, the Army now plans to
acquire 18,629 systems to meet basic needs, which the Army refers to as
a "good enough" fielding authorization. (See fig. 2.) According to a
May 2004 memorandum signed by the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, fielding the Mobile Tracking System at the "good enough"
level can be done with an acceptable level of risk. The memo did not
define "acceptable level of risk," but it added that to mitigate risk,
the Army would develop a capability to move the systems between
vehicles rather than permanently mounting the systems. Requirements for
active and reserve forces are the same, with priority fielding to units
deploying to Iraq. The fielding schedule calls for all active and
reserve components to be fielded in 3 years. The system would be
installed on one of every two military police vehicles; one of every
five trucks; all ground ambulances; all movement control/dispatchers;
and all command and control elements of a logistics unit. The Mobile
Tracking System program has fielded 7,500 systems to 14 major units as
of June 2005. Each unit costs an estimated $17,000 for the original
version and $21,000 for an enhanced version that includes the
capability to read radio frequency identification tags placed on in-
transit cargo, an enhanced Global Positioning System, and a panic
button. The total funding requirement at the "good enough" level is
$455.2 million through fiscal year 2011. However, funding data provided
by the program office show the program is underfunded by a total of $39
million for fiscal years 2005 and 2005, or 35 percent of the $110.3
million in total requirements for these 2 years, placing the fielding
schedule in question. Program officials said some authorized units
would not be receiving systems at the current funding level. According
to a program official, additional funds from fiscal year 2005
supplemental appropriations may be provided to reduce the shortfall.
Figure 2: Mobile Tracking System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Theater Opening Capability:
Although the Army is making progress developing a theater opening
capability, it is uncertain whether this capability, when fully
developed, will be deployed at the same time as combat forces in future
conflicts. During the early stages of Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD's priority was to deploy combat
forces prior to logistics support, resulting in theater distribution
problems. In addition, we noted that most of the units the Army is
converting to provide this capability are in the reserve component,
raising questions about whether these units could be mobilized quickly
enough to be deployed in the early deployment stages. Army plans call
for converting seven existing transportation units that would be
trained and equipped to provide a theater opening capability, with the
first units to begin conversion in September 2006. Of these seven
units, four are in the Army Reserve, one is in the National Guard, and
two are active component units.
Interoperable Information Technology:
The U.S. Transportation Command has met the time frames set by OSD and
the Joint Staff for (1) developing a process to manage the group of
information technology systems supporting distribution and (2)
identifying potential returns, goals, outcomes, and draft performance
requirements. In August 2004, the Command issued its Distribution
Portfolio Management Process setting out the roles, processes, and
information needed to determine and adjust the set of distribution and
force movement systems to support the Logistics Domain.[Footnote 16] It
also provided an estimate of the resources--24 government personnel and
fiscal year 2005 funding of $11.93 million for contractor personnel,
office space, travel, and consultants--it needed to accomplish the
portfolio management taskings and timelines established by OSD and the
Joint Staff. In December 2004, U.S. Transportation Command identified
the potential returns, goals, and outcomes for portfolio management and
drafted performance requirements for the portfolio. In March 2005, U.S.
Transportation Command published an overview of the joint distribution
architecture that provided a blueprint for future distribution
information technology systems that are interoperable and enable an end-
to-end distribution capability.
Although U.S. Transportation Command has met the milestones for these
two tasks, it has been delayed in issuing a transition plan to guide
DOD's investment strategy for these systems. The transition plan was
initially due by the end of calendar year 2005, but the Command's
latest estimate for completion is June 2006. Command officials cited
delays in receiving fiscal year 2005 funding for this effort as a
reason for slipping the delivery date for the information technology
transition plan. According to U.S. Transportation Command officials,
they requested funding from OSD for DPO activities in August 2004, but
did not receive funding approval until February 2005. In addition, the
Command's ability to execute an effective information technology
transition plan by June 2006 depends on (1) gaining agreement from DOD
components on which information technology systems should be included
in the distribution portfolio, (2) obtaining from DOD components the
technical information on the systems and data bases in the distribution
portfolio, and (3) completing an end-to-end supply chain analysis,
which requires input from the Defense Logistics Agency and Joint Forces
Command.
Identifying Systems to Be Included in the Distribution Portfolio:
U.S. Transportation Command has been unable to gain agreement from DOD
components that own and fund information technology systems on which
systems should be in the distribution portfolio. The Command, in
conjunction with OSD, identified approximately 500 information
technology systems DOD-wide that they believe belong in the
distribution portfolio. According to Command officials, DOD components
have agreed with the selection of about 80 of the systems thus far, and
discussions are continuing regarding other systems. Of the
approximately 500 systems identified, 128 belonged to the Defense
Logistics Agency. However, Defense Logistics Agency officials told us
that that they believe only 2 of these 128 systems belong in the
distribution portfolio, and that the others are (1) not information
systems, (2) not within the scope of the distribution portfolio, or (3)
being absorbed into the agency's business system modernization efforts,
also referred to as enterprise resource planning. According to U.S.
Transportation Command officials, the Defense Logistics Agency and the
services do not agree that enterprise systems belong in the DPO's
distribution portfolio, but rather that they should remain exclusively
within their respective agency or service portfolios. Command officials
noted that the enterprise systems will eventually consolidate numerous
legacy logistics systems, many of which have distribution-related
activities.
We have previously reported that DOD lacks effective management
oversight, control, and accountability over its business system
investments and that the manner in which business system funding is
controlled hampers the development and implementation of broad-based,
integrated business system solutions to address DOD-wide
problems.[Footnote 17] Each military service and defense agency
receives its own funding and is largely autonomous in deciding how to
spend these funds, thereby enabling multiple system approaches to
common problems. To improve management oversight, we have recommended
that Congress consider appropriating funds to operate, maintain, and
modernize DOD's business systems to domain leaders rather than the
military services and defense agencies. DOD disagreed with this
recommendation, noting that the portfolio management process, including
investment review boards, would provide appropriate control and
accountability over business system investments. While the
establishment of investment review boards is consistent with our
previous recommendations, we continue to believe that appropriating
funds for DOD business systems to the domains will significantly
improve accountability over business system investments.
Obtaining Technical Data on Systems and Data Bases:
If U.S. Transportation Command can reach agreement with the DOD
components on which information technology system should belong in the
distribution portfolio, it will still have to collect and analyze a
substantial amount of technical data on the individual systems and the
data bases they manage in order to complete its information technology
analysis and develop its transition plan by June 2006. According to
U.S. Transportation Command officials, if they do not have the
technical information on these systems and data bases by September
2005, it will be difficult to complete the information technology
transition plan by June 2006 and execute its responsibilities for
portfolio management.
Completing an End-to-End Supply Chain Analysis:
This end-to-end supply chain analysis is aimed at identifying gaps that
need to be bridged and areas where systems need to be made
interoperable. This analysis is being performed by U.S. Transportation
Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and Joint Forces Command, with
each organization responsible for separate components of the analysis.
According to U.S. Transportation Command's timeline, the supply chain
analysis must be completed by September 2005 to allow it time to
complete its overall analysis by February 2006 and develop its
investment technology transition plan by the new June 2006 target date.
Based on information provided by the DPO, however, it is uncertain
whether the supply chain analysis will be completed by September 2005
due to the multiple organizations involved and issues concerning
coordination and funding of the separate analysis efforts.
Conclusions:
A lack of clear accountability and authority for improving the
distribution system presents a significant challenge to DOD in its
efforts to correct long-standing problems that date back at least to
the Persian Gulf War. The Secretary of Defense's decision in 2003 to
designate U.S. Transportation Command as the DPO appeared to signal
that the department would take a more coordinated and systemic approach
to address supply distribution problems. Moreover, as recently as March
2005, DOD characterized the DPO as the department's single entity to
revolutionize the distribution system, working with services and
combatant commanders in synchronizing the distribution of personnel and
equipment from factory to foxhole. However, DOD's ability to make
coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across the multiple
organizations involved in distribution is stymied because of problems
in clarifying who has accountability and authority for improving the
distribution system. U.S. Transportation Command has asserted that the
DPO is the single accountable entity, whereas OSD has taken the
position that the Defense Logistics Executive is the accountable entity
and the DPO has an advisory role. The issue of accountability is
further confused by OSD guidance that is silent on the role of the DPO
and states that the role of the Defense Logistics Executive is to
"monitor" improvements in the distribution system. In addition, the
Defense Logistics Agency is responsible for distribution functions in
its role as executive agent for specified supply classes, and Joint
Forces Command is responsible for resolving deployment and redeployment
process problems in its role as the Joint Deployment Process Owner. In
both cases, these roles and responsibilities may overlap with those of
the DPO. Another underlying problem that stymies DOD's ability to
improve distribution is the lack of an effective logistics
transformation strategy to guide and synchronize improvement efforts
toward a common vision of a future distribution system. Until DOD
defines which single entity has accountability and authority for
improving the distribution system and develops an effective
transformation strategy, DOD will face challenges in taking a
coordinated and systemic approach to improving distribution and may
experience continued problems in providing timely and effective
logistics support to the warfighter.
Recognizing shortfalls in the distribution process, U.S. Transportation
Command and the Army have embarked upon some promising and potential
solutions to these issues. However, the Army has not fully funded its
requirements for communications and tracking systems. The delay
increases the risk that some future deploying units will lack a
capability to effectively submit and monitor their supply requisitions.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance DOD's ability to take a more coordinated and systemic
approach to improving the supply distribution system, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:
* Clarify the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and authority
between the DPO and the Defense Logistics Executive as well as the
roles and responsibilities between the DPO, the Defense Logistics
Agency, and Joint Forces Command.
* Issue a directive instituting these decisions and make other related
changes, as appropriate, in policy and doctrine.
* Improve the Logistics Transformation Strategy by directing the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to
include specific performance goals, programs, milestones, and resources
to achieve focused logistics capabilities in the Focused Logistics
Roadmap.
To address the current underfunding of the Very Small Aperture Terminal
and the Mobile Tracking System, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to determine whether
sufficient funding priority has been be given to the acquisition of
these systems and, if not, to take appropriate corrective action.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Acting Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) did not concur
with the first two recommendations and concurred with the last two
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix I.
DOD did not concur with our recommendations that the Secretary of
Defense clarify the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and
authority between the DPO and the Defense Logistics Executive, as well
as the roles and responsibilities between the DPO, the Defense
Logistics Agency, and Joint Forces Command; and that he issue a
directive instituting these decisions and make other related changes,
as appropriate, in policy and doctrine. DOD stated that it is confident
that the responsibilities, accountability, and authority of the DPO
exercised under the Defense Logistics Executive's guidance are clear to
the DPO, the Defense Logistics Agency in its Executive Agent roles, and
Joint Forces Command in its Joint Deployment Process Owner role. The
department stated that it did not issue the U.S. Transportation
Command's proposed DPO directive because its Office of General Counsel
found that the proposed directive's definition of the DPO's
responsibilities, accountability, and authority was inconsistent with
the statutory roles and responsibilities of the secretaries of the
military departments. The department also stated that the DPO has not
been "stymied" by the lack of a directive--rather, that the DPO,
working cooperatively with the Joint Logistics Community, has made
significant progress in its DPO role.
While the department has issued directives and instructions defining
responsibilities for the Defense Logistics Executive, the Defense
Logistics Agency in its Executive Agent role, and the Joint Forces
Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, it has not issued a
directive on the DPO--despite the Secretary of Defense's stated
interest in defining the DPO's authority, accountability, resources,
and responsibility to improve distribution--in part because such a
directive would be inconsistent with the statutory roles and
responsibilities of the secretaries of the military departments.
Although we did not evaluate the potential need for changes in
statutory roles and responsibilities with respect to the distribution
system, such changes may be appropriate once DOD has defined
organizational responsibilities, accountability, and authority needed
to enhance the department's ability to take a more coordinated and
systemic approach to improving the supply distribution system. The
department stated that it is confident that the scope of
responsibilities, accountability, and authority of the DPO are clear,
yet it did not address the specific overlaps of distribution
responsibilities in its policy and doctrine that we identified. As
pointed out in this report, we have identified supply chain management
as a high-risk area, in part because of problems in the distribution
process, and we have identified the lack of a comprehensive, integrated
approach to addressing those problems. The department has characterized
the DPO as its single entity in charge of revolutionizing the
distribution system by working with the services and combatant
commanders to synchronize the distribution of personnel and equipment
from factory to foxhole. However, we believe that unless the department
(1) clarifies the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and
authority between the DPO and the Defense Logistics Executive, as well
as the roles and responsibilities between the DPO, the Defense
Logistics Agency, and Joint Forces Command; and (2) implements our
prior (April 2005) recommendation to clearly state, consistent with
policy, who has responsibility and authority for synchronizing the
distribution of supplies from the United States to deployed units
during operations, its well-intended efforts may not effectively
address the department's long-standing problems in distribution.
Regarding the department's statement that the DPO has not been stymied
by the lack of a directive, we agree that progress has been made by the
DPO and other DOD entities in addressing supply distribution problems,
and our report identifies promising initiatives. We have modified our
report to clarify that DOD is stymied in its ability to make
coordinated, systemic improvements cutting across the multiple
organizations involved in the distribution system. We also note that
DOD initiatives such as the deployment and distribution operations
center were developed as improvised solutions to logistics problems
reported during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As of the time of our review,
these solutions have not been instituted into policy or doctrine.
Notwithstanding the progress made to date in addressing supply
distribution problems, we continue to believe that DOD needs to take an
institutional approach in order to avoid ambiguity about the DPO's
roles and responsibilities in the future and to address the
department's long-standing supply distribution problems in a
coordinated and systemic fashion. A directive, along with appropriate
changes in policy and doctrine, can provide the organizational and
policy structure necessary for an institutional approach.
With regard to our recommendation to improve the logistics
transformation strategy to include specific performance goals,
programs, milestones, and resources to achieve focused logistics
capabilities in the Focused Logistics Roadmap, DOD concurred that
improvements are necessary in DOD's Logistics Transformation Strategy
and stated that it would include these elements in the roadmap in order
to achieve the focused logistics capabilities.
Regarding our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to direct the
Secretary of the Army to determine whether sufficient funding priority
has been given to the acquisition of the Very Small Aperture Terminal
and the Mobile Tracking System, and if not, to take corrective action,
DOD concurred and stated that the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) will direct the Secretary of
the Army to determine whether sufficient funding priority has been
given to the acquisition of these systems.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess DOD's organizational structure and transformation strategy to
improve the distribution system, we obtained information on the
progress made by U.S. Transportation Command in implementing its role
as the DPO. We discussed the accountability, authority, role, and other
issues pertaining to the DPO with U.S. Transportation Command officials
and reviewed a draft directive and other documents related to the DPO.
We also discussed DPO implementation with officials from the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), with the Joint Staff, and with the OSD Office of General
Counsel. We met with the U.S. Joint Forces Command on its role as the
Joint Deployment Process Owner and the Defense Logistics Agency on its
role as the Executive Agent for certain classes of supply. We examined
DOD's overall efforts to institute a long-term logistics strategy by
reviewing DOD's December 2004 Logistics Transformation Strategy,
monitoring the impending release of the Focused Logistics Roadmap, and
interviewing officials from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) to obtain their perspective
on problems and solutions that were taking place agencywide. We also
met with officials from the OSD Office of Force Transformation, Army
Logistics Transformation Agency, the Navy, and Air Force, and the
Marine Corps.
To identify the status of initiatives that DOD is taking to address
supply distribution issues, we focused on five initiatives that were
highlighted in testimony by representatives from the U.S.
Transportation Command and the Army before the Subcommittee on
Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, in March 2004. Although
other DOD components have important roles in the distribution system,
we decided to focus on the initiatives of these two organizations
because of the key roles these organizations have had in the supply
distribution system for Operation Iraqi Freedom. We obtained
information from the U.S. Transportation Command and the Army on the
status of the five initiatives, including their purpose, funding, and
fielding schedule where appropriate. Because some of the initiatives
have been implemented for only a short time, we obtained limited data
on their effectiveness, and we did not independently validate these
data. We conducted interviews with officials from U.S. Transportation
Command and from the Army's G-4 logistics directorate, the Army
Materiel Command, the 3rd Infantry Division, the Combined Arms Support
Command, and program offices responsible for the Very Small Aperture
Terminal and the Mobile Tracking System. We also obtained pertinent
information on supply distribution issues and initiatives from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics), including the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness); the Joint Staff logistics
directorate; and the Defense Logistics Agency. We visited the U.S.
Central Command area of operations to obtain a firsthand view of
distribution problems in the theater and how solutions were being
implemented to correct them. We reviewed prior GAO reports, DOD after
action reports, and studies by other organizations concerning supply
distribution issues that occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom and
past military operations going back to Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, and it will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on the
matters discussed in this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-8365
or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense:
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS:
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500:
JUL 26 2005:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
report, "DEFENSE LOGISTICS: DoD Has Begun to Improve Supply
Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain
These Efforts," (GAO Code 350560/GAO 05-775), forwarded to DoD for
comment by letter dated July 7, 2005.
The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) clarify the
scope of responsibilities, accountability, and authority between the
Distribution Process Owner (DPO) and the Defense Logistics Executive as
well as the roles and responsibilities between the DPO, the Defense
Logistics Agency, and Joint Forces Command; (2) issue a Directive to
institute these decisions, (3) direct that improvements be made in
DoD's logistics transformation strategy, and (4) direct the Secretary
of the Army to validate the funding priority of certain systems.
The Department does not concur that there is a need to clarify the
responsibilities, accountability, and authority between the DPO and the
Defense Logistics Executive. The Department agrees that improvements
are necessary in the currently published DoD logistics transformation
strategy. Detailed comments on the report are enclosed.
Signed by:
Bradley Berkson:
Acting:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JULY 7, 2005 GAO CODE 350560/GAO-05-775:
"DEFENSE LOGISTICS: DoD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution
Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
clarify the scope of responsibilities, accountability, and authority
between the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) and the Defense Logistics
Executive (DLE) as well as the roles and responsibilities between the
DPO, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM).
RESPONSE: Non-Concur. The DLE and the DPO are clear on their
relationship and their respective responsibilities, accountability, and
authority. The Department's Office of the General Counsel found that
the USTRANSCOM-proposed chartering directive that would have defined
the DPO responsibilities was inconsistent with the statutory roles and
responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Accordingly, that directive was not issued. However, the DPO has not
been "stymied" by this lack of a directive - rather, the DPO, working
cooperatively with the Joint Logistics Community, has established
strategy, implemented initiatives to improve the Defense distribution
system, instituted metrics to measure progress, and overall has made
significant progress in its DPO role. The Department is confident that
responsibilities, accountability, and authority of the DPO exercised
under the DLE's guidance are clear to the DPO, the Defense Logistics
Agency in its Executive Agent roles, and Joint Forces Command in its
Joint Deployment Process Owner role.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
issue a directive instituting the above decisions and make other
related changes, as appropriate, in policy and doctrine.
RESPONSE: Non-Concur. The Department's Office of the General Counsel
found that the USTRANSCOM-proposed chartering directive that would have
defined the DPO responsibilities was inconsistent with the statutory
roles and responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military
Departments. Accordingly, that directive was not issued. However, the
DPO has not been "stymied" by this lack of a directive - rather, the
DPO, working cooperatively with the Joint Logistics Community, has
established strategy, implemented initiatives to improve the Defense
distribution system, instituted metrics to measure progress, and
overall has made significant progress in its DPO role.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) to include specific performance goals, programs, milestones,
and resources to achieve focused logistics capabilities in the Focused
Logistics Roadmap.
RESPONSE: Concur. The Focused Logistics Roadmap will include specific
performance goals, programs, milestones, and resources to achieve
focused logistics capabilities.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to determine whether sufficient
funding priority has been given to the acquisition of the Very Small
Aperture Terminal and the Mobile Tracking System, and, if not, take
appropriate corrective action.
RESPONSE: Concur. The USD (AT&L) will direct the Secretary of the Army
to determine whether sufficient funding priority has been given to
acquisition of stated systems.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William Solis, (202) 512-8365:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling, Assistant
Director; David Epstein; Larry Junek; Paulina Reaves; and Cheryl
Weissman made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[2] The term "interoperability" refers to the ability of different
systems to communicate effectively, including sharing information.
[3] The distribution-related programs in DOD's plan include Radio
Frequency Identification, Item Unique Identification, Joint Regional
Inventory Materiel Management, War Reserve Materiel Improvements, Joint
Theater Logistics, Deployment and Distribution Operations Center,
Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative, and Business Management
Modernization Program. We plan to issue a report soon on DOD's program
to track supplies by using radio frequency identification tags. We have
also undertaken a review of the Army's shortage of armored trucks
during Operation Iraqi Freedom and will report on this issue
separately.
[4] These six initiatives are (1) depot maintenance partnership, (2)
condition-based maintenance plus, (3) total life cycle systems
management, (4) end-to-end distribution, (5) executive agents, and (6)
enterprise integration.
[5] As approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the
Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept defines seven capabilities
needed to effectively project and sustain military forces: (1) joint
deployment/rapid distribution, (2) agile sustainment, (3) operational
engineering, (4) multinational logistics, (5) force health protection,
(6) information fusion, and (7) joint theater logistics management.
[6] Testimony of Major General Robert Dail, Director of Operations,
U.S. Transportation Command, and Lieutenant General Claude V.
Christianson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army,
before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee on
March 30, 2004. Major General Dail was subsequently promoted to
lieutenant general and assigned to the position of Deputy Commander,
U.S. Transportation Command.
[7] As directed by section 332 of the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense
Authorization Act, DOD is changing its approach to business system
modernization. The Secretary of Defense is required under the
authorization act to develop an enterprise architecture for defense
business systems not later than September 30, 2005. Beginning October
1, 2005, business systems modernization investments over $1 million are
to be certified as being in compliance with the enterprise
architecture. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics) is the certifying authority for the Weapon System
Lifecycle Management and Materiel Supply and Services business mission
areas, including the portfolio of distribution systems. The Defense
Business Systems Management Committee also must approve the
certification.
[8] Under its fourth focus area--integrating the supply chain--the Army
stated that it would develop integrated processes and an information
systems architecture through the integration of three capabilities--the
Logistics Modernization Program, the Global Combat Service Support-
Army, and Product Life Cycle Management Plus--into its Single Army
Logistics Enterprise. While the outcome of this enterprise initiative
will have an impact on distribution, its purpose within the context of
this focus area is on incorporating certain standardized business
practices such as performance-based agreements. Therefore, we have
excluded this enterprise initiative from our review. As part of our
ongoing work on DOD business systems modernization, we have reviewed
aspects of this enterprise initiative. See GAO, DOD Business Systems
Modernization: Billions Continue to Be Invested with Inadequate
Management Oversight and Accountability, GAO-04-615 (Washington, D.C.:
May 27, 2004) and DOD Business Systems Modernization: Limited Progress
in Development of Business Enterprise Architecture and Oversight of
Information Technology Investments, GAO-04-731R (Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2004).
[9] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003) and Military Transformation: Clear Leadership,
Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's
Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).
[10] GAO, Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish
and Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business
Management Transformation, GAO-04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23,
2004), DOD'S High Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation
Requires Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership, GAO-05-520T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2005), and Defense Management: Key Elements
Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business Operations, GAO-05-629T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005).
[11] DOD Directive 5101.8, DOD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Bulk
Petroleum, August 11, 2004; DOD Directive 5101.9, DOD Executive Agent
(DoD EA) for Medical Materiel, August 23, 2004; DOD Directive 5101.10,
DOD Executive Agent (DoD EA) for Subsistence, September 27, 2004.
[12] GAO-05-275, p. 39.
[13] SAIC, Objective Assessment of Logistics in Iraq, Contract No. GS-
10F-009IL, Task Order 73510 (March 2004), Chapter 6.
[14] U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for developing joint
force doctrine.
[15] One exception to this continual decrease was the acceleration of
hostilities from May to August 2004 that resulted in an upward increase
in requisition wait time for most shipments to almost 40 days.
[16] On May 12, 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) realigned his offices to better support
business transformation and in doing so he consolidated the Logistics
Domain and Acquisition Domain into a single directorate--Supply Chain
Systems Transformation Directorate. The new directorate is responsible
for aligning business capabilities to DOD goals, allocating resources,
and overseeing policy in support of two newly created business mission
areas--Weapon System Lifecycle Management and Materiel Supply and
Service Management. U.S. Transportation Command officials believe that
the portfolio of distribution systems previously within the Logistics
Domain now lies within both of the two new business mission areas.
[17] GAO-04-615.
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