Defense Management
Munitions Requirements and Combatant Commander's Needs Still Require Linkage Gao ID: GAO-05-765R August 12, 2005In October 2002 we reported that inadequate linkage existed between near-term munitions needs of the combatant commanders and the purchases made by the military services. The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with our recommendations and took steps to address them by rewriting the overarching DOD Instruction for determining munitions requirements. Related to our ongoing work on prepositioned stocks, we assessed whether DOD's efforts thus far and initiatives planned for the future will ensure the required linkage since successful implementation of operational war plans is contingent on the availability of the right mix and quantity of munitions. To make our assessment, we obtained and analyzed information from cognizant organizations within DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Headquarters and subordinate units of the Military Services, and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). We conducted our analysis of DOD's munitions requirements process in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
While the revised DOD Instruction established requirements to create the needed linkage between the combatant commander's munitions needs and the military services procurement decisions, limited implementation has been achieved. The Instruction, which was revised in October 2003, in response to our recommendation, identified key timeline dates and requirements for each of the DOD organizations involved in the process. The Instruction was modified to create a linkage between the combatant commander's munitions needs and the purchasing decisions of the military services. However, this linkage did not occur because there has been little, if any, compliance by DOD organizations with the Instruction's requirements. Our recent assessment of prepositioned munitions supporting the operational war plan of USFK revealed that key timeline dates were missed and required coordination with USFK was not accomplished. For instance, threat reports developed by the Defense Intelligence Agency that are used to identify key targets were late. As a result, USFK officials told us they had to identify target lists based on dated information. DOD officials stated that the specific timeline and other requirements were not met because formal communication links needed to ensure compliance were not established. The department recognizes that further changes are needed and is revising the Instruction a second time. Our review of the current draft Instruction raises two concerns. First, the draft Instruction does not include additional oversight and control criteria to ensure compliance by all organizations involved in the munitions requirement process. Second, the draft Instruction does not require combatant commander participation in risk assessments performed prior to and after the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission occurs. Combatant commanders are in the best position to identify the impact of not having munitions needed to support the operational plan. Non-compliance by any of the myriad of organizations involved in the munitions requirements process could result in procurement decisions that will not support operational war plans and impact the war fighter's ability to execute them. Based on our follow-up efforts and analysis, this letter includes recommendations to ensure that there is adequate linkage between combatant commanders' munitions needs and the purchases made by the military services.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-765R, Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant Commander's Needs Still Require Linkage
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August 12, 2005:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld:
The Secretary of Defense:
Subject: Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant
Commander's Needs Still Require Linkage:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In October 2002 we reported[Footnote 1] that inadequate linkage existed
between near-term munitions needs of the combatant commanders and the
purchases made by the military services. The Department of Defense
(DOD) concurred with our recommendations and took steps to address them
by rewriting the overarching DOD Instruction for determining munitions
requirements.[Footnote 2] Related to our ongoing work on prepositioned
stocks, we assessed whether DOD's efforts thus far and initiatives
planned for the future will ensure the required linkage since
successful implementation of operational war plans is contingent on the
availability of the right mix and quantity of munitions. To make our
assessment, we obtained and analyzed information from cognizant
organizations within DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Headquarters and
subordinate units of the Military Services, and U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK). We conducted our analysis of DOD's munitions requirements
process in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
While the revised DOD Instruction established requirements to create
the needed linkage between the combatant commander's munitions needs
and the military services procurement decisions, limited implementation
has been achieved. The Instruction, which was revised in October 2003,
in response to our recommendation, identified key timeline dates and
requirements for each of the DOD organizations involved in the process.
The Instruction was modified to create a linkage between the combatant
commander's munitions needs and the purchasing decisions of the
military services. However, this linkage did not occur because there
has been little, if any, compliance by DOD organizations with the
Instruction's requirements. Our recent assessment of prepositioned
munitions supporting the operational war plan of USFK revealed that key
timeline dates were missed and required coordination with USFK was not
accomplished. For instance, threat reports developed by the Defense
Intelligence Agency that are used to identify key targets were late. As
a result, USFK officials told us they had to identify target lists
based on dated information. DOD officials stated that the specific
timeline and other requirements were not met because formal
communication links needed to ensure compliance were not established.
The department recognizes that further changes are needed and is
revising the Instruction a second time. Our review of the current draft
Instruction raises two concerns. First, the draft Instruction does not
include additional oversight and control criteria to ensure compliance
by all organizations involved in the munitions requirement process.
Second, the draft Instruction does not require combatant commander
participation in risk assessments performed prior to and after the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission occurs. Combatant
commanders are in the best position to identify the impact of not
having munitions needed to support the operational plan. Non-compliance
by any of the myriad of organizations involved in the munitions
requirements process could result in procurement decisions that will
not support operational war plans and impact the war fighter's ability
to execute them.
Based on our follow-up efforts and analysis, this letter includes
recommendations to ensure that there is adequate linkage between
combatant commanders' munitions needs and the purchases made by the
military services. In commenting on a draft of the letter, DOD
concurred with our recommendations and identified steps that it is
taking to implement them.
Background:
Our October 2002 report revealed that inadequate linkage existed
between near-term munitions needs of the combatant commanders and the
purchases made by the military services based on computations derived
from the department's munitions requirements process. This disconnect
resulted in the combatant commanders and the services identifying
different munitions needs and, ultimately, in the combatant commanders
reporting shortages. The disconnect occurred because DOD's munitions
requirements determination process did not fully consider the combatant
commander's preferences for munitions and weapon systems to be used
against targets identified in projected scenarios. We recommended that
DOD establish a direct link between the munitions needs of the
combatant commanders and the purchasing decisions made by the military
services. In concurring with this report, DOD stated that that the lack
of linkage between the combatant commander's needs and the requirements
established by the military services had been studied and that a
solution would be documented in the next update of the DOD Instruction
3000.4 in Fiscal Year 2003.
On October 23, 2003, DOD Instruction 3000.4, DOD Munitions Requirements
Process was reissued. The new Instruction identified specific
responsibilities for each organization involved in the Munitions
Requirements Process and identified multiple instances of required
coordination with combatant commanders to ensure a linkage between the
combatant commander's needs and the munitions purchased by the military
services.
Land Warfare & Munitions Division, Defense Systems, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)
officials stated that, in November 2004, they convened a conference of
the military services, combatant commanders, and DOD organizations who
participate in the munitions requirements process to determine what had
to be done to establish linkage between the combatant commanders' needs
and the munitions purchased by the military services. This conference
resulted in a decision to, again, revise DOD Instruction 3000.4 to
include more specificity as to when and why combatant commanders must
be involved in the munitions requirements determination process and to
more closely align munitions requirements to combatant commanders'
operational war plans.
Inadequate Linkage Continues to Exist:
Despite the department's efforts to establish linkage between combatant
commanders' needs and purchasing decisions of the military services,
inadequate linkage continues to exist. During our assessment of
prepositioned munitions supporting the operational war plan of USFK, we
found that specific requirements and timelines established by DOD
Instruction 3000.4, as revised in 2003, were not met by DOD
organizations. We found that not all organizations complied with the
Instruction's requirements in developing the Fiscal Year 2005 munitions
budget submission. For example:
* The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not coordinate with
combatant commanders prior to developing threat reports. According to
USFK officials, updated intelligence information was not included.
* DIA Threat Reports needed by the combatant commanders to produce
Phased Threat Distributions[Footnote 3] (PTD) were late. According to
USFK officials, they had to develop PTD's on prior year threat reports.
* Only the Air Force coordinated with USFK prior to modeling munitions
requirements, the other services developed their requirements
independent of USFK involvement.
* None of the services coordinated with USFK on the results of their
individual modeling processes prior to development of POM submissions.
As a result, there were no assurances that combatant commander
munitions needs were met.
DOD officials stated that the specific timeline and other requirements
were not met because formal communication links needed to ensure
compliance were not established.
DOD is currently revising the Instruction again. According to DOD
officials, a new element requires combatant commanders to present and
defend operational war plan munitions requirements as part of the
Current Year Analytic Agenda Process[Footnote 4]. This process,
separate and apart from the munitions requirements process, results in
the development of a current year baseline requirement for munitions
needed to support operational war plans. The current year baseline
provides the military services with an early look at what they should
see in the near year PTDs prepared by the combatant commanders as part
of the Munitions Requirements Process. It also provides a level of
coordination between the military services and the combatant commanders
in determining what is needed to support the operational war plan.
While this procedure, as well as other refinements to the Instruction
should result in better linkage between combatant commanders' munitions
needs and the munitions purchased by the military services, we
identified two main concerns: (1) inadequate mechanisms to ensure
compliance with requirements and (2) insufficient combatant commander
participation.
We determined that the draft Instruction still assigns responsibility
for ensuring compliance with requirements by all organizations involved
in the munitions requirement process to USD (AT&L). In our discussions
with USD (AT&L) officials, we pointed out that no additional oversight
and control measures have been added to the draft to ensure compliance
with the Instruction's requirements. We believe and JCS and USD (AT&L)
officials agree that without additional oversight and control at a high
enough level, compliance by all organizations to meet the Instruction's
requirements prior to Program Objective Memorandum submission may not
occur.
The draft Instruction also calls for a risk assessment both prior to
and after the Program Objective Memorandum submission occurs. According
to DOD officials, while the military services and JCS representatives
participate in these assessments, combatant commanders are not required
to attend. Both JCS and USD (AT&L) officials agreed with our opinion
that the combatant commanders need to participate in these assessments
because they would be in the best position to identify the impact of
not having the munitions needed to support the operational war plan. In
addition, their participation in these risk assessments could impact
military service procurement decisions and reduce the quantities of
munitions shortages that combatant commanders report through Joint
Quarterly Readiness Reports.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that there is adequate linkage between combatant commanders'
munitions needs and the purchases made by the military services, we
recommend that you:
* Direct the incorporation of oversight and control measures into DOD
Instruction 3000.4 to ensure that all organizations involved in the
munitions requirement process fully comply with all requirements.
* Direct combatant commander to participate in pre-and post POM risk
assessments.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the action taken on our recommendations
to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee
on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this
letter. A written statement must also be sent to House and Senate
Committees on appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this letter.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a written draft of this letter, DOD agreed with our
recommendations and identified steps that it is taking to implement
them. DOD's comments are reprinted in the enclosure.
In commenting on our recommendation to direct the incorporation of
oversight and control into DOD Instruction 3000.4, DOD stated that
incorporation of oversight and control measures will help ensure that
all Military Services follow strict guidelines for munitions
requirements determination and validation. Additionally recent changes
in the revised Instruction, along with newly instituted communications
measures and organizational taskings, have greatly improved the
participation and timeliness of the process.
In commenting on our recommendation to direct Combatant Commanders to
participate in pre-and post POM risk assessments, DOD stated that
Combatant Commander participation in the process is absolutely
necessary. The Services have already implemented several actions this
past Munitions Requirements Process cycle to facilitate dialog with
Combatant Commanders to improve collaboration and engage them in
conflict resolution of risk assessment issues. DOD Instruction 3000.4,
currently under revision, includes additional control measures to
ensure appropriate risk assessments by Combatant Commanders and the
Services.
We are sending copies of this letter to the appropriate congressional
committees and the director, Office of Management and Budget. The
letter is also available on GAO's homepage at http://www.gao.gov. If
you or any of your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-8365. Key contributors to
this letter were John Pendleton, Jeffrey Kans, Enemencio Sanchez, and
Robyn Trotter.
Signed by:
William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosure:
Enclosure:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-3000
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-05-765R, `DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Munitions Requirements and
Combatant Commander's Needs Still Require Linkage,' dated June 29, 2005
(GAO Code 350593/GAO-05-765R).
The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense: 1) direct the
incorporation of oversight and control measures into DoD Instruction
3000.4 to ensure that all organizations involved in the munitions
requirements process fully comply with all requirements; 2) direct the
Combatant Commanders to participate in pre-and post-POM risk
assessments.
The Department concurs that the DoD Munitions Requirements Process
needs to incorporate oversight and control measures to make certain all
components fully comply with all requirements and ensure Combatant
Commanders participate in risk assessments. These measures will ensure
credible requirements are generated. As stated in your draft report,
the 3000.4 DoD Instruction is again under revision. The Department is
incorporating changes into this revision that will enhance the
timeliness of the process, baseline requirements, provide oversight and
control measures, and require more involvement from the Combatant
Commands in risk assessments. The Department's concurrence is enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
Enclosure:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JUNE 29, 2005 GAO CODE 350593/GAO-05-765R:
"DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Munitions Requirements and Combatant Commander's
Needs Still Require Linkages"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the incorporation of oversight and control measures into DoD
Instruction 3000.4 to ensure that all organizations involved in the
munitions requirement process fully comply with all requirements. (page
5/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
The Department concurs with the GAO recommendation. Incorporation of
oversight and control measures will help ensure that all Military
Services follow strict guidelines for munitions requirements
determination and validation. Additionally, recent changes in the
revised Instruction, along with newly instituted communication measures
and organizational taskings, have greatly improved the participation
and timeliness of the process.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct combatant commanders to participate in pre-and post POM risk
assessments. (page 5/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
The Department concurs with the GAO recommendation to direct Combatant
Commanders to participate in pre-and post-POM risk assessments.
Combatant Commander participation in the process is absolutely
necessary and they have been very interested in participating in risk
assessments. The Services have already implemented several actions this
past Munitions Requirements Process (MRP) cycle to facilitate dialog
with the Combatant Commands in an effort to improve collaboration and
engage them in conflict resolution of munitions requirements risk
assessment issues. Likewise, the 3000.4 DoD MRP Instruction, currently
under revision, includes additional control measures to ensure
appropriate risk assessments by the Combatant Commanders and the
Services.
[End of section]
(350593):
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Munitions
Requirements and Combatant Commanders' Needs Require Linkage, GAO-03-17
(Washington, D.C.: October15, 2002).
[2] Department of Defense Instruction 3000.4, DOD Munitions
Requirements Process, October 23, 2003.
[3] Phased Threat Distribution allocates targets to each military
service and allied forces where political commitments exist.
[4] The Current Year Analytical Agenda Process begins with the National
Military Strategy and incorporates the requirements of Contingency
Planning Guidance, Strategic Guidance Summary, the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, Operational Plans, Concept of Operations, and the
Current Forces Database to arrive at Current Year Baselines for
Munitions requirements.
