Military Transformation
Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach Gao ID: GAO-05-962R August 4, 2005In response to a Congressional request, we issued a report in June 2005 on the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in determining and allocating resources needed to implement the New Triad today and in the future. In that report, we made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to provide greater visibility of the projected spending and future investments for DOD's efforts to create the New Triad and acquire future capabilities. On April 28, 2005, we provided DOD with a draft of that report for review and comment. DOD did not provide comments in time to incorporate them in that report, which went to printing on June 24, 2005. DOD provided its comments to us on June 30, 2005. To present DOD's comments and provide our perspective on them, this report briefly summarizes our June 2005 report's objectives, results, and recommendations, along with DOD's comments and our evaluation of the comments.
In our June 2005 report, we determined the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage future investments needed to achieve the synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New Triad. We found that although DOD established its New Triad in 2001, it has not developed a way to fully identify projected spending for New Triad programs in its FYDP. We also found that despite the long lead time generally needed to develop and acquire new systems and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach for acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of its aging systems that provide New Triad capabilities. DOD did not concur with our three recommendations to develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of New Triad-related program elements in the FYDP; modify the FYDP to establish a virtual major force program; and report funding levels for the New Triad in the department's summary report to Congress, which DOD addressed as one recommendation in its comments. We continue to believe that each of these three recommendations have merit and, if implemented collectively, would provide DOD and congressional decision makers with the most complete accounting of the projected spending planned for the New Triad over the next several years as they deliberate the budget and make decisions on the affordability, sustainability, and trade-offs among efforts to develop and acquire capabilities. DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach for the New Triad.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-962R, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach
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August 4, 2005:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Chairman:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach:
In response to your request, we issued a report in June 2005 on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in determining and allocating
resources needed to implement the New Triad today and in the
future.[Footnote 1] In that report, we made recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense to provide greater visibility of the projected
spending and future investments for DOD's efforts to create the New
Triad and acquire future capabilities. On April 28, 2005, we provided
DOD with a draft of that report for review and comment. DOD did not
provide comments in time to incorporate them in that report, which went
to printing on June 24, 2005. DOD provided its comments to us on June
30, 2005. To present DOD's comments and provide our perspective on
them, this report briefly summarizes our June 2005 report's objectives,
results, and recommendations, along with DOD's comments and our
evaluation of the comments. DOD's comments, which were provided by the
acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy, are included as enclosure I to this report.
Summary of Objectives, Results, and Recommendations:
In our June 2005 report, we determined the extent to which DOD has (1)
identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Year
Defense Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long-term investment
approach to identify and manage future investments needed to achieve
the synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New Triad.
In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded
the range of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad,
which consisted of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also
conventional and nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive
capabilities. The review also called for revitalizing the U.S. research
and development and industrial infrastructure that would develop,
build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems and be
capable of responding in a timely manner to augment U.S. military
capabilities when necessary. According to DOD, the three legs of the
New Triad-offensive strike, active and passive defenses, and responsive
infrastructure-are intended to be supported by timely and accurate
intelligence, adaptive planning, and enhanced command and control
capabilities. The review stated that the synergism achieved through the
integration of nuclear and conventional offensive strike and defensive
capabilities would provide the President and Secretary of Defense with
a broad array of military options to better address the spectrum of
potential opponents and contingencies that may arise in the coming
decades. Figure 1 shows the three legs of the New Triad and its
supporting elements.
Figure 1: The New Triad:
[See PDF for Image]
Note: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-
launched ballistic missiles.
[End of Figure]
We found that although DOD established its New Triad in 2001, it has
not developed a way to fully identify projected spending for New Triad
programs in its FYDP. In light of the challenges DOD faces in
transforming strategic capabilities in the current fiscal environment,
decision makers need to have the best and most complete data available
about the resources being allocated to the New Triad. Although DOD has
identified some New Triad-related spending in the FYDP, our notional
analysis of such spending included in the FYDP through 2009 indicates
that overall spending for the New Triad could be much greater than
DOD's limited analyses have identified. DOD has not fully identified
New Triad spending because the diversity and scope of the New Triad and
ambiguity of the concept make it difficult for DOD officials to reach
agreement on a complete list of programs, according to DOD officials.
Additionally, the current FYDP structure does not readily identify and
aggregate New Triad spending. A mechanism to aggregate FYDP spending,
known as a "virtual major force program," has been used by DOD to
identify space funding and could be beneficial in tracking New Triad
funding, according to some DOD officials including the Commander of the
U.S. Strategic Command. Without some mechanism to aggregate funding
associated with the New Triad, DOD will be limited in its ability to
guide and integrate New Triad spending.
We also found that despite the long lead time generally needed to
develop and acquire new systems and the need to consider long-term
affordability issues, DOD has not developed an overarching and
integrated long-term investment approach for acquiring new capabilities
and replacing some or all of its aging systems that provide New Triad
capabilities. Best practices show that long-term capital planning is
needed to help organizations define direction, establish priorities,
and plan future budgets. While DOD has identified some near-term
investments, its investment plans are incomplete because some key
capabilities for the New Triad have not been fully assessed in context
of the New Triad and long-term replacement of key platforms have not
been assessed in the context of the new security environment and DOD-
wide affordability challenges. Although DOD recognizes the need for a
long-term investment approach, it has not begun to develop one because
its concepts for nonnuclear strike and missile defense are not fully
mature. However, delaying the preparation of a long-term investment
approach puts DOD at risk of not developing an affordable strategy.
Additionally, DOD and Congress will not have sufficient information to
effectively determine future investment costs, the priorities, and
trade-offs needed to sustain New Triad implementation. While we agree
that some concepts are continuing to evolve, and that new systems are
still under development, we do not believe that these circumstances
preclude DOD from beginning to plan for the future of the New Triad. As
new information becomes available, we would expect to see adjustments
in DOD's plans-that is the nature of long-term planning.
To strengthen DOD's implementation of the New Triad and provide greater
transparency of resources that are being applied to developing,
acquiring, and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommended in
our June 2005 report that the Secretary of Defense take the following
four actions:
* Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in
consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to (1)
develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program elements
in the FYDP, which support activities for developing, acquiring, and
sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to establish a
virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating new data
fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New Triad-
related program elements to provide increased visibility of the
resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year
the funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the
department's summary FYDP report to Congress. The Secretary of Defense
should direct that these three actions be completed at or about the
time when the President's budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to
Congress.
* Direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to develop an overarching and integrated long-
term investment approach for the New Triad that provides decision
makers with information about future joint requirements, projected
resources, spending priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding
time lines. As part of developing and implementing this approach, DOD
should leverage the analyses, assessments, and other information
prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System process. The Secretary of Defense should direct that development
of a long-term investment approach be completed in time for it to be
considered in the department's preparation of its submission for the
President's budget for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be updated, as
needed, to adapt to changing circumstances.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD's comments on a draft of our June 2005 report are summarized below
and reproduced in enclosure I. DOD concurred with one of that report's
four recommendations.
DOD did not concur with our three recommendations to develop and obtain
approval of a comprehensive list of New Triad-related program elements
in the FYDP; modify the FYDP to establish a virtual major force
program; and report funding levels for the New Triad in the
department's summary report to Congress, which DOD addressed as one
recommendation in its comments. DOD believed that developing an
official New Triad virtual major force program would be difficult and
would not contribute substantially to developing coherent long-range
investment plans. It believed that a New Triad virtual major force
program would be more difficult to develop than the one that was
created for space because the New Triad is presently much more complex
and difficult to separate from other DOD-wide programs than the
programs for space. DOD stated that while it is fairly straightforward
to identify some program elements that contribute substantially to a
particular New Triad capability, it would be highly subjective and
difficult to attribute other elements to the New Triad. For example,
DOD believed that it would be very hard to determine which conventional
strike program elements to include in the New Triad. It further stated
that categorizing science and technology efforts as relevant to the New
Triad would also be very subjective. DOD believed that placing a
program element in the New Triad virtual major force program would not
automatically make a program a high priority or that the department
would set aside funding for New Triad programs. Furthermore, DOD
believed that a list of New Triad program elements should be more
narrowly defined than the notional list prepared by GAO and that a New
Triad major force program should include only those program elements
that are most central to or contribute most directly to New Triad
capabilities.
We continue to believe that each of these three recommendations have
merit and, if implemented collectively, would provide DOD and
congressional decision makers with the most complete accounting of the
projected spending planned for the New Triad over the next several
years as they deliberate the budget and make decisions on the
affordability, sustainability, and trade-offs among efforts to develop
and acquire capabilities. As our June 2005 report states, DOD needs to
move beyond a broad conceptual framework for the New Triad it
articulated in December 2001 and begin to identify the program elements
currently in its FYDP that are intended to provide capabilities for the
New Triad, whether they are fully or not fully dedicated to its
missions. Establishing a virtual major force program for the New Triad
in the FYDP would provide an important mechanism for DOD and Congress
to continuously identify and track projected spending, trends, and
priorities and enhance an understanding of the progress made by DOD in
developing and shaping New Triad capabilities. Our notional list of New
Triad-related program elements was intended to provide an illustrative
example of how a comprehensive list could be developed and we agree
that it could be more narrowly defined if necessary. We believe that
knowledgeable DOD officials should be able to agree on the most
relevant program elements that make up the New Triad. DOD predicated
the New Triad concept on creating a synergy between the capabilities
provided by nuclear and conventional strike; active and passive
defense; responsive infrastructure; and enhanced command and control,
planning, and intelligence. But without some coherent and systematic
attempt to identify program elements in the FYDP and aggregate and
report on those elements, DOD stakeholders and congressional decision
makers do not have the information they need to understand how this
synergy is being achieved and to make decisions on programs that affect
the creation and success of the New Triad concept. We also believe that
a comprehensive and approved list of New Triad program elements could
provide a foundation for developing long-range investment plans by
helping to better define the New Triad and the capabilities currently
being developed and acquired, their availability, and the scope of
those efforts. Additionally, we believe that Congress could benefit in
its deliberations on funding levels for New Triad-related programs in
the President's budget for fiscal year 2007 if DOD were to fully
implement our recommendations at or about the time that budget is
submitted to Congress.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop an overarching and
integrated long-term investment approach for the New Triad. In its
comments, DOD stated that its recently completed Nuclear Posture Review
Strategic Capability Assessment provides an initial effort toward that
goal by identifying shortfalls in capabilities that would be used to
develop individual investment strategies. The department stated that
these individual plans and strategies are required as well as an
overarching integration of these efforts. DOD also agreed that it
should leverage the analysis, assessments, and other information
prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System process as part of developing and implementing this approach. We
support DOD's efforts in this direction and look forward to additional
actions by the department to bring this approach about, particularly to
support preparation of its submission for the President's budget for
fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Such a long-term investment approach will
not only be of great value to the department for identifying and
prioritizing its resources for acquiring future New Triad capabilities,
but it will assist Congress in its deliberations on New Triad-related
initiatives and programs.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
On the basis of DOD's comments on our recommendations regarding actions
for DOD to take to provide greater visibility of projected New Triad
spending in the FYDP, as discussed above, Congress should consider
requiring the Secretary of Defense to:
² develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program
elements in the FYDP, which support activities for developing,
acquiring, and sustaining New Triad capabilities;
² modify the FYDP to establish a virtual major force program for the
New Triad by creating new data fields that would clearly identify and
allow aggregation of New Triad-related program elements to provide
increased visibility of the resources allocated for New Triad
activities; and:
² report each year the funding levels for New Triad activities and
capabilities in the department's summary FYDP report to Congress.
Congress should also consider requiring DOD to complete these actions
at or about the time when the President's budget for fiscal year 2007
is submitted to Congress.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 (stlaurentj@gao.gov). Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in enclosure II.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures - 2:
Enclosure I:
Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2900:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 30, 2005:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report GAO-05-540, "MILITARY
TRANSFORMATION: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New
Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach," dated
April 28, 2005, (GAO Code 350475).
The DoD nonconcurs with Recommendation # 1 and concurs with
Recommendation #2. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations and
report are attached. The DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on
the draft report.
Signed by:
Mira R. Ricardel:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy:
(Acting):
Attachment:
As stated:
Gao Draft Report--Dated April 28, 2005 GAO Code 350475/GAO-05-540:
"Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation l: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in
consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to: (1)
develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program elements
in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which support activities
for developing, acquiring, and sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2)
modify the FYDP to establish a virtual major force program for the New
Triad by creating new data fields that would clearly identify and allow
aggregation of New Triad-related program elements to provide increased
visibility of the resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3)
report each year the funding levels for New Triad activities and
capabilities in the Department's summary FYDP report to Congress. The
Secretary of Defense should direct that these three actions be
completed at or about the time when the President's budget for fiscal
year 2007 is submitted to Congress. (Page 35/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Nonconcur. Developing an official New Triad virtual major
force program (MFP) would be difficult and we believe that such a
virtual MFP would not contribute substantially to developing coherent
long-range investment plans. The following material expands on these
concerns.
Not Simple As The New Triad Adapts To Future Needs: Developing a New
Triad Virtual MFP would be much more difficult than developing a Space
Virtual MFP, because the New Triad is presently much more complex and
difficult to separate from other DoD-wide programs than Space. The New
Triad has today many more components than the old Cold War triad.
Moreover, future mission capability needs, future threat developments,
and innovative technology applications will necessarily mean changing
components. In some cases, it might be fairly straightforward to decide
whether a particular program should be included as a Program Element if
it contributes substantially to a particular New Triad capability. In
other cases, the determination would be highly subjective and difficult
to attribute to New Triad or General Purpose Forces. For example:
Offensive Strike: It would be fairly straightforward to include the set
of "Old Triad" Program Elements in the New Triad, although there might
be major differences of opinion on how to deal with the tanker force
(and tanker replacement). However, it would be very hard to determine
which conventional strike Program Elements to include in the New Triad.
Active and Passive Defenses: Programs in this category would probably
include ballistic missile defense, cruise missile defense, and chem/bio
defense. Unfortunately, many of the systems relevant to cruise missile
defense are also relevant to general air defense. There appears to be
no straightforward criteria on which to obtain agreement on how to
handle such multi-role systems.
Responsive Infrastructure: Most of the government-owned New Triad-
related infrastructure is in NNSA. But much of the infrastructure for
designing and making DoD New Triad systems is in private industry, and
the viability/responsiveness of this infrastructure tends to follow DoD
investments in the relevant systems. As such, there is no valid method
to account for DoD-relevant private infrastructure.
Command, Control, Intelligence, and Planning: There are some planning
systems that are dedicated to long-range strike and that definitely
support the New Triad concept (e.g., the ISPAN system at USSTRATCOM).
While satellites for detecting ballistic missile launches are
definitely part of the New Triad, DoD has large investments in numerous
other C4ISR systems that might or might not be classed as part of the
New Triad, depending on highly subjective determinations.
A final consideration is that many Science and Technology efforts could
be considered relevant to the New Triad as well as other important
capabilities. Categorizing such programs would be very subjective.
Questionable Utility: Even if the Department produces an officially
endorsed list of Program Elements that comprise the New Triad, it is
not clear that this will help in developing coherent long-range
investment plans --a "road map" that the Department really needs. Being
in the New Triad MFP would not automatically make a program a high
priority, and it is very unlikely that the Department will "fence"
funding for New Triad programs. For example, everyone agrees that
bombers and ICBMs are part of the New Triad, but this agreement has not
been of assistance in developing long-range investment plans for those
systems.
Scope Of New Triad Virtual MFP: Finally, if the Department were to
develop a New Triad Virtual MFP, we believe the list of New Triad
Program Elements should be more narrowly defined than the draft list
prepared by the GAO. A Virtual MFP should include only those program
elements that are most central to, or contribute most directly/
exclusively to, New Triad capabilities. The Cold War-era strategic
nuclear triad consisted of a few well-defined elements. The New Triad,
on the other hand, consists of a much wider range of capabilities, as
described above. Most of these programs are not exclusively for the New
Triad but also provide capabilities for general-purpose forces. The
GAO's very long list of New Triad Program Elements (Appendix III) could
easily capture a disproportionate percentage of the DoD FYDP, and many
of the "New Triad" programs listed could be more readily attributed to
general-purpose forces than to the New Triad. Increasing the number of
questionable Program Elements in a New Triad Virtual MFP would reduce
the already uncertain utility of such a Virtual MFP.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to develop an
overarching and integrated long-term investment approach for the New
Triad that provides decision makers with information about future joint
requirements, projected resources, spending priorities and trade-offs,
milestones, and funding time-lines. As part of developing and
implementing this approach, DoD should leverage the analysis,
assessments, and other information prepared under the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process. The Secretary
of Defense should direct that development of a long-term investment
approach be completed in time for it to be considered in the
Department's preparation of its submission for the President's budget
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be updated, as needed, to adapt to
changing circumstances. (Pages 35 and 36/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. We agree that the Department needs overarching
and integrated long-term investment plans for major New Triad
capabilities, such as long-range strike, strategic C3, and ballistic/
cruise missile defense. The recently completed Nuclear Posture Review
Strategic Capability Assessment provides an initial effort towards that
goal through efforts to identify shortfalls in capabilities that could
then be used to develop individual investment strategies. Such efforts
will be required as well as an overarching integration of these
efforts. Investment plans and strategies should provide decision makers
with information about future joint requirements, projected resources,
spending priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding time-lines.
We also agree that, as part of developing and implementing this
approach, DoD should leverage the analysis, assessments, and other
information prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process.
Enclosure II:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R.
Jaffe, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, David G. Hubbell, Kevin L. O'Neill, Julie
M. Tremper, and Renee S. McElveen made key contributions to this report.
(350736):
FOOTNOTES
[1] See GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More
Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach, GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).
