Defense Transportation
Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization Gao ID: GAO-05-819 September 29, 2005Airlift is a flexible, but expensive, transportation method. From September 2001 to April 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $9.5 billion using airlift to transport equipment, supplies, and troops for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As of December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 percent of all cargo and passengers transported for these operations. DOD has stated that high demand for available airlift assets requires the department to use airlift assets as efficiently as possible. However, DOD's primary objective emphasizes delivering "the right items to the right place at the right time" over using aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO sought to determine whether DOD used capacity on strategic military aircraft transporting cargo and passengers between the United States and overseas theaters for OEF and OIF as efficiently as possible.
Because the Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is the Air Force agency responsible for managing airlift, does not systematically collect and analyze operational factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. AMC collects data about short tons transported and information about operational factors, such as weather and runway length, when planning and executing airlift missions. AMC does not capture data about these variables in a manner that allows officials to determine historically whether aircraft capacity was used efficiently. Historical mission planning files and the Global Air Transportation Execution System that is used to track mission data could provide some information about operational factors that affect mission payloads, but limitations associated with these data sources do not allow officials to determine whether DOD used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data about operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions, GAO calculated the average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to historical average payloads, known as payload planning factors. GAO found that over 97 percent of C-5 missions and more than 81 percent of C-17 missions carried payloads below DOD's payload planning factors. However, because data on operational factors that impact payloads were not available, GAO was not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of aircraft capacity. Without adequate information about operational variables and how these impact mission payloads, AMC officials do not know the extent to which opportunities exist to use aircraft more efficiently and whether operational tempo, cost, and wear and tear on aircraft could be reduced. In addition, DOD officials do not have the benefit of such analysis to determine future airlift requirements for planning purposes.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-819, Defense Transportation: Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization
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Report to the Secretary of Defense:
September 2005:
Defense Transportation:
Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and Analyze Better Data to Assess
Aircraft Utilization:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-819]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-819, a report to the Secretary of Defense:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Airlift is a flexible, but expensive, transportation method. From
September 2001 to April 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent
about $9.5 billion using airlift to transport equipment, supplies, and
troops for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
As of December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 percent of all
cargo and passengers transported for these operations. DOD has stated
that high demand for available airlift assets requires the department
to use airlift assets as efficiently as possible. However, DOD‘s
primary objective emphasizes delivering ’the right items to the right
place at the right time“ over using aircraft capacity as efficiently as
possible.
Under the Comptroller General‘s authority, GAO sought to determine
whether DOD used capacity on strategic military aircraft transporting
cargo and passengers between the United States and overseas theaters
for OEF and OIF as efficiently as possible.
What GAO Found:
Because the Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is the Air Force agency
responsible for managing airlift, does not systematically collect and
analyze operational factors that impact payloads on individual
missions, DOD does not know how often it met its secondary goal to use
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. AMC collects data about
short tons transported and information about operational factors, such
as weather and runway length, when planning and executing airlift
missions. AMC does not capture data about these variables in a manner
that allows officials to determine historically whether aircraft
capacity was used efficiently. Historical mission planning files and
the Global Air Transportation Execution System that is used to track
mission data could provide some information about operational factors
that affect mission payloads, but limitations associated with these
data sources do not allow officials to determine whether DOD used
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data
about operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions,
GAO calculated the average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft
and compared these to historical average payloads, known as payload
planning factors. GAO found that over 97 percent of C-5 missions and
more than 81 percent of C-17 missions carried payloads below DOD‘s
payload planning factors, as shown in the table below. However, because
data on operational factors that impact payloads were not available,
GAO was not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient
use of aircraft capacity. Without adequate information about
operational variables and how these impact mission payloads, AMC
officials do not know the extent to which opportunities exist to use
aircraft more efficiently and whether operational tempo, cost, and wear
and tear on aircraft could be reduced. In addition, DOD officials do
not have the benefit of such analysis to determine future airlift
requirements for planning purposes.
Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding AMC‘s
Payload Planning Factors:
[See PDF for image]
Notes: This analysis does not consider operational factors used for
mission planning because data were not available. Although the C-130,
KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift aircraft, GAO
has included them in its analysis in those instances when AMC used
these aircraft in strategic airlift roles. Because C-5 aircraft have
separate compartments for passengers and cargo, we use a 71.5 payload
planning factor (the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads).
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to improve DOD‘s collection and analysis
of information on operational factors that impact payloads transported
on strategic airlift missions. DOD concurred with our recommendations.
However, based on DOD‘s comments, GAO has modified one recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-819.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William Solis at (202)
512-5140 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Extent to Which AMC Used Capacity as Efficiently as Possible on
Strategic Military Aircraft Cannot Be Readily Ascertained:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for Strategic Airlift:
Appendix III: Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft Capacity
Utilized:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Payload Planning Factors and Allowable Cabin Loads for
Strategic Aircraft:
Table 2: Load Message Utilization Data Field Codes and Definitions:
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding
Payload Planning Factors, by Plane Type, October 2001 to September
2004:
Table 4: Missions Carrying No Cargo and Not Meeting the Minimum
Requirements for Use of Strategic Airlift:
Table 5: Payloads Transported by Type of Aircraft, October 2001 to
September 2004:
Figures:
Figure 1: Percentage of Cargo Transported by Sealift and Airlift for
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, September 2001 to
December 2004:
Abbreviations:
Figure 2: C-5 Aircraft:
Figure 3: C-17 Aircraft:
Figure 4: C-141 Aircraft:
Figure 5: C-130 Aircraft:
Figure 6: KC-10 Aircraft:
Figure 7: KC-135 Aircraft:
Figure 8: Unloading of a HH-60G Pave Hawk Helicopter from a C-17 in
Support of OIF:
Figure 9: Loadmasters Chain Down Cargo on a C-17:
Figure 10: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting How Placement of Cargo Can
Decrease Payloads:
Figure 11: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting Placement of Cargo to
Accommodate Passengers:
Letter September 29, 2005:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld:
Secretary of Defense:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
When deploying forces overseas for the United States, the Department of
Defense (DOD) uses a variety of means to transport equipment, supplies,
and troops to a theater of operations, including rail, trucks, ships,
and aircraft. From September 30, 2001, through April 30, 2005, DOD
spent more than $19 billion to transport equipment, supplies, and
troops in support of the Global War on Terrorism, including Operations
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).[Footnote 1]Of this, DOD
has spent about $9.5 billion to transport equipment, supplies, and
troops for OEF and OIF via airlift, which is a fast and flexible, but
expensive, transportation method relative to sealift. At the end of
December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 percent (464,239 short
tons) of the more than 3.4 million short tons transported via airlift
and sealift for these operations.[Footnote 2] According to U.S. Air
Force doctrine, high demand for limited airlift assets requires the
department to use airlift as efficiently as possible while still
meeting combatant commanders' delivery time frames. Because DOD
emphasizes delivering the "right items to the right place at the right
time" for the warfighter, this doctrine states that meeting mission
needs is the Air Mobility Command's (AMC) primary objective, while the
efficient use of aircraft capacity is a secondary goal. Nevertheless,
United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and AMC officials are
looking for ways to decrease costs and use aircraft capacity as
efficiently as possible while continuing to meet mission needs. These
officials acknowledge that they need information that helps decision
makers understand whether aircraft capacity was used efficiently while
meeting mission needs, especially when the pace of operations is high,
and to plan for future airlift transportation needs.
We conducted this review under the authority of the Comptroller
General. We sought to determine whether DOD used strategic military
aircraft efficiently during OEF and OIF. Specifically, our objective
was to assess the extent to which DOD used all available space and
weight on these aircraft when transporting equipment and supplies--
hereafter referred to as "cargo"--and passengers for OEF and OIF to the
extent possible.
In performing our work, we reviewed applicable DOD guidance,
interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials, and analyzed AMC aircraft
mission data. For purposes of this report, we focused our review of
strategic airlift missions on contingency and special assignment
airlift missions in support of OEF and OIF.[Footnote 3] We excluded
channel missions--scheduled flights over established worldwide routes
on government-owned or chartered aircraft under the operational control
of AMC that are used for cargo and troop movements--because these occur
on a regular schedule, and it is possible that payloads would regularly
be light. To obtain a better understanding of operational factors, such
as weather, fuel considerations, and aircraft and airfield
characteristics, that can impact payloads on individual missions, we
reviewed a limited number of historical mission planning files for OEF
and OIF and a Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES) data
field that could provide some information about operational factors on
individual missions. However, limitations associated with these data
sources prevent using these for analysis to determine whether DOD used
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of
reliable data about operational factors, we obtained and analyzed
strategic military airlift mission data for missions occurring from
October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2004, for the two operations to get
an indication of how well AMC utilized aircraft capacity. To determine
whether DOD used capacity on these aircraft as efficiently as possible,
we analyzed whether payloads transported for OEF and OIF met historical
average payloads, known as payload planning factors. We compared
average payloads transported by each aircraft type to the payload
planning factors for each aircraft type. We also assessed the
reliability of these data by reviewing existing documentation related
to the data sources, electronically testing the data to identify
obvious problems with completeness or accuracy, and interviewing
knowledgeable agency officials about the data. We determined the data
were sufficiently reliable for calculating average payloads transported
on each type of aircraft. However, data were not sufficiently available
to determine how operational factors impacted payloads transported on
individual missions. Without information about operational factors that
impacted payloads on these airlift missions, we are unable to determine
whether DOD used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. We
discussed our methodology with AMC officials who agreed that such an
analysis was appropriate. We conducted our review from September 2004
through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology
is presented in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Because the AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational
factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know
how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as
efficiently as possible. According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, high
demand for limited airlift assets requires the department to use
airlift as efficiently as possible while still meeting combatant
commanders' delivery time frames. Although the AMC collects data about
short tons transported and information about operational factors, such
as weather and runway length, as it plans and executes airlift
missions, the command does not capture data about these factors in a
manner that allows officials to determine historically whether DOD used
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. Historical mission
planning files and the Global Air Transportation Execution System, a
database that is used to track mission data, could provide some
information about operational factors that impact mission payloads for
individual missions. However, limitations associated with these data
sources--such as the completeness and format of mission files and
unknown accuracy of a Global Air Transportation Execution System data
field--prevent using these for analysis of aircraft capacity used.
Without information about operational factors that impacted payloads on
these airlift missions, we are unable to determine whether DOD used
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data
about operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions, we
calculated the average payloads for each type of aircraft and compared
these to payload planning factors--the historical average payloads
transported on each type of aircraft. Our analysis of 14,692 strategic
airlift missions flown in support of OIF and OEF showed that over 97
percent of C-5 missions and more than 81 percent of C-17 missions
carried payloads below the relevant payload planning factors for these
types of aircraft. Also, nearly 19 percent of the missions did not meet
the minimum requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers to qualify
for use of strategic airlift. However, AMC is required to provide
airlift whenever cargo and passengers are approved for movement, even
if minimum requirements for using strategic airlift are not met or the
requirement will not use an aircraft's available capacity as
efficiently as possible if this is the only way to accomplish the
mission. Given the absence of information about operational factors
that could explain why heavier payloads were not transported on
specific missions, command officials do not know the extent to which
opportunities exist to use aircraft capacity more efficiently.
Potentially inefficient use of aircraft could cause higher operational
tempo and may increase costs as well as wear and tear on aircraft. In
addition, this lack of information could cause DOD to understate or
overstate future lift requirements for planning purposes, and the right
mix and number of aircraft may not be available for future
contingencies.
We are making recommendations to improve the department's collection
and analysis of information on operational factors that impact payloads
transported on aircraft used for strategic airlift. DOD provided
written comments on a draft of this report and concurred with each of
our recommendations. Based on DOD's written comments, we modified one
recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments on this report,
and we made changes where appropriate. We have reprinted DOD's comments
in appendix IV.
Background:
TRANSCOM, located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is a unified
combatant command that provides air, land, and sea transportation for
DOD, both in peacetime and wartime.[Footnote 4] AMC, one of TRANSCOM's
three component commands, provides strategic airlift, among other
services--such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet through which contracted
commercial aircraft support DOD airlift requirements in emergencies
when the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft-
-for deploying, sustaining, and redeploying U.S. forces
worldwide.[Footnote 5] Strategic airlift moves cargo and passengers
between the continental United States and overseas theaters or between
overseas theaters. AMC operates military aircraft that constitute the
U.S. strategic airlift fleet, including the C-5, C-17, and C-141
aircraft (app. II describes each aircraft).[Footnote 6] In addition,
AMC can use aerial refueling aircraft, such as the KC-10 and KC-135,
for transporting cargo. Although the C-130 is primarily used for
intratheater airlift missions, AMC sometimes uses it in a strategic
airlift role to transport cargo from the United States to Iraq and
Afghanistan, especially if the aircraft is being moved into the theater
and assigned to the United States Central Command. AMC's Tanker Airlift
Control Center plans, schedules, and tracks tanker and airlift
worldwide. The Fusion Cell, a division within AMC's Tanker Airlift
Control Center, was created following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, to provide senior decision makers with information
about the movement of air mobility assets, especially for those
missions associated with contingency operations. The Fusion Cell is
charged with collecting and analyzing cargo and passenger data from
completed missions using TRANSCOM-and AMC-owned and controlled
databases, such as the Global Transportation Network, GATES, and the
Global Decision Support System, and ensuring data quality.[Footnote 7]
TRANSCOM uses the combatant commander's delivery date at the final
destination as well as information about the number and type of troops
and cargo--the requirement--needed to accomplish a specific mission to
determine the appropriate type of transportation needed to meet that
date, develop feasible transportation schedules for deploying forces,
assign ports of embarkation, and determine the best mode of
transportation. AMC uses 15 short tons or 100 passengers as the minimum
requirement for strategic airlift and may combine cargo loads to meet
this requirement. However, AMC is required to provide airlift whenever
cargo and passengers are approved for movement even if minimum
requirements for using strategic airlift are not met or the requirement
will not use an aircraft's available capacity as efficiently as
possible if this is the only way to accomplish the mission. If airlift
is required, TRANSCOM tasks AMC with assigning and scheduling airlift.
TRANSCOM reserves the use of airlift for (1) short notice and emergency
requirements, (2) intelligence-related or sensitive cargo, and (3) when
operational security considerations preclude the use of sealift. AMC
assigns aircraft to move cargo and passengers based on (1) mission
urgency and sensitivity, (2) cargo and passenger characteristics, and
(3) other special factors. Currently, DOD transports the majority of
cargo by sealift, as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Percentage of Cargo Transported by Sealift and Airlift for
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, September 2001 to
December 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
AMC officials use the average historical payload transported on each
type of aircraft (see table 1), known as payload planning factors, to
develop broad estimates of the types and number of aircraft initially
needed to meet mission requirements. The payload planning factors are
generally less than the maximum payload capacity, including the weight
of unit personnel, equipment, and material that an aircraft can carry,
known as the allowable cabin load.
Table 1: Payload Planning Factors and Allowable Cabin Loads for
Strategic Aircraft:
In short tons.
Aircraft type: C-5;
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 61.3;
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 10.2;
Allowable cabin load: 89.0.
Aircraft type: C-17;
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 45.0;
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 18.0;
Allowable cabin load: 65.0.
Aircraft type: C-130;
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 12.0;
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 16.0;
Allowable cabin load: 17.0.
Aircraft type: C-141;
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 19.0;
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 24.0;
Allowable cabin load: 30.0.
Aircraft type: KC-10;
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 32.6;
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 13.6;
Allowable cabin load: 60.0.
Aircraft type: KC-135;
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 13.0;
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 9.2;
Allowable cabin load: 18.0.
Source: United States Air Force.
Notes: The payload planning factor assumes loads contain only cargo or
only passengers, not a mixture. For all aircraft types except the C-5,
mixed loads usually would have payload planning factors in between the
cargo and passenger payloads listed above. Because C-5s have separate
compartments for passengers and cargo, the mixed payload planning
factor would be the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads (71.5 short
tons). Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered
strategic airlift aircraft, we have included them in our analysis in
those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift
roles.
[End of table]
The Extent to Which AMC Used Capacity as Efficiently as Possible on
Strategic Military Aircraft Cannot Be Readily Ascertained:
Because AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational
factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know
how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as
efficiently as possible. Historical mission planning files have
limitations that prevent DOD officials from using the files to
determine whether AMC used aircraft efficiently. In addition, data on
operational factors captured in the GATES database are not useful
because codes that could provide AMC officials with information about
why aircraft flew with the payloads they did are neither well-defined
nor comprehensive, and the accuracy and reliability of the data cannot
be determined. In the absence of data about operational factors that
impact payloads on individual missions, we calculated the average
payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to the
payload planning factors. Our analysis of AMC data showed that more
than 86 percent of these missions flew with payloads that were lighter
than established payload planning factors, and some of these did not
meet the minimum requirement of 15 short tons or 100 passengers needed
to qualify for use of strategic airlift. However, because AMC lacks
data to determine how operational factors impact payloads, we are not
able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of an
aircraft's capacity.
Historical Mission Planning Files Have Limitations That Prevent Their
Use to Determine Whether AMC Used Aircraft Capacity as Efficiently as
Possible:
Historical mission planning files identify mission data and operational
factors that may impact aircraft payloads, but we found limitations
with using these files to determine whether AMC used an aircraft's
capacity as efficiently as possible. We reviewed 25 historical mission
planning files for OEF and OIF to gain an understanding of how
operational factors could impact payloads. We found these files were
not retained in a format that facilitates manipulation of data for
analysis to determine whether an aircraft's capacity was used
efficiently, and the files were not always complete or accurate.
Although the historical mission planning files contain some information
that could help identify operational factors that impacted aircraft
payloads, the data are not easy to manipulate for analysis because the
historical mission planning files are paper based. Currently, AMC
stores the files in binders and boxes categorized by the operation,
such as OEF, and the month and year of the flight. Officials told us
that this organization system makes it difficult to access data for
specific missions.
We also found that some of the files we reviewed were incomplete or
inaccurate. For instance, 3 of the 25 mission files we reviewed were
missing load plans that AMC officials use to identify appropriate
aircraft with which to transport cargo and passengers. According to a
command official, time constraints, among other factors, can impact
whether load plans were sent to AMC. An official told us that units
sometimes make changes to the load plans and do not inform AMC, which
could cause aircraft to be underutilized if the allowable cabin load of
the available and scheduled aircraft is too large for the size and
weight of the requirement to be moved. AMC officials did not provide
data on the frequency with which units make such changes. However,
because of concerns about the accuracy of load plans, especially from
units that do not deploy frequently, AMC officials told us that they
always call units before scheduling aircraft to request load plans and
confirm the accuracy of validated Time Phased Force and Deployment Data
that identify the forces, sequence, and priority of unit deployments;
the locations of ports of debarkation for a specific unit; and the
number of pieces of cargo, cargo dimensions, and numbers and weights of
passengers.
Despite these limitations, the mission planning files are the only
combined source of mission information that includes load plans,
diplomatic clearances, and air refueling requests and shows what was
planned to be transported on an aircraft used for OEF and OIF. An AMC
official told us that the historical mission planning files capture
operational data that could be valuable for helping DOD understand the
implications of moving to a lighter and faster force and projecting
airlift assets needed to transport this force.
One AMC Database Is Also Not Useful for Assessing Whether Aircraft
Capacity Was Used as Efficiently as Possible:
Operational data captured in one of AMC's databases, GATES,--the
"system of record" database that provides AMC with automated capability
to process and track cargo and passenger airlift data and facilitates
payment for services--is also not useful for assessing whether AMC used
an aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible. When GATES was
automated in 2000, command officials retained a data field called "Load
Message Utilization" that consists of 13 codes that could provide AMC
officials with information about why an aircraft flew with the payloads
it did. AMC requires GATES users to manually enter a primary and, if
relevant, a secondary code from the 13 codes presented in table 2
before transmitting mission data to AMC, although the command does not
review or use this information for analysis.
Table 2: Load Message Utilization Data Field Codes and Definitions:
Code: A;
Pallet positions or seats not fully used due to substitute aircraft
that provided more pallet positions or seats than the aircraft
originally scheduled.
Code: B;
Excess seats. Scheduled or programmed passenger airlift capability in
excess to station requirements.
Code: C;
Gained from previous station. All programmed seats used. Additional
capability available to an en route station due to previous stations
not using allocated seats.
Code: D; Late passenger cancellations or no-show passengers.
Code: E;
Insufficient processed or palletized cargo on hand for downline
stations, including cargo for other destinations that is authorized to
be transshipped at downline stations (to be used if sufficient cargo is
in the port, but not yet processed or movement ready).
Code: F;
Low port level. Insufficient cargo in port (both processed and
unprocessed), for downline stations, including cargo for other
destinations which is authorized to be transshipped at downline
stations.
Code: G;
Additional crew members. Used when additional crew members preclude use
of installed passenger seats or pallet positions.
Code: H;
Unsuitable cargo. Hazardous or other special handling cargo which
precludes optimum utilization of cargo space or passenger seats.
Code: J;
Light pallets or cargo. All pallet positions used, but allowable cabin
load not fully utilized due to light pallets or rolling stock or
pallets with overhang which precludes full utilization of space.
Code: K;
Space block. Space not fully used due to passenger or cargo space
blocks for downline stations.
Code: V;
Aircraft fully utilized, cargo mission only. Used when the percent
utilized is 95 to 100 percent. Use the following formula:
Payload/Allowable cabin load x 100 = percent utilized.
Code: W;
Aircraft fully utilized, passenger missions only. Used when 95 percent
or more of available passenger seats were used for space required
(duty) passengers.
Code: Z;
No other code applies. Provide short explanation in remarks.
Source: GATES Data Dictionary.
[End of table]
Although command officials could use some information captured in the
"Load Message Utilization" data field to understand why aircraft flew
with specific payloads, codes in this data field are neither well
defined nor comprehensive, and the accuracy and reliability of the data
are not known. There may be similar data fields in other transportation
information systems such as the Global Transportation Network and
Global Decision Support System that could be used to capture
operational data. However, we are unaware of similar fields in these
databases that could be modified for this use.
According to AMC officials, some of the codes are not well defined and
are inconsistently interpreted and applied by users. For example, the
"V" code indicates that the aircraft is considered fully utilized only
if the payload is 95 to 100 percent of the allowable cabin load.
However, as we previously reported, an aircraft may be fully utilized
with lighter payloads if the maximum volume of cargo that will fit into
an aircraft is reached before the maximum cargo weight is
reached.[Footnote 8] AMC officials told us that most airlifted cargo
loads reach maximum volume before reaching maximum weight.
Additionally, an AMC official who reviewed the "Load Message
Utilization" codes believes that users may have inappropriately applied
the codes. We were not able to determine the extent to which users may
have done this because we could not determine the reliability of data.
We also found that the codes are not as comprehensive as they could be.
For example, there are no codes to indicate that an aircraft was fully
utilized because the maximum volume of cargo that could fit into the
aircraft was reached before the maximum cargo weight was reached. In
addition, there are no codes that indicate if payloads were decreased
to accommodate poor weather conditions; airfield characteristics, such
as short runways; or aircraft characteristics, such as structural
fatigue. Finally, no codes identify whether an aircraft's capacity was
underutilized because the only available aircraft was too large for the
size and weight of the requirement to be moved within the time frame
required. Although GATES users could enter such information using the
"Z" code and associated remarks, this would not guarantee consistent
remarks or allow for AMC officials to manipulate these data for
analysis.
Finally, we were unable to assess the reliability or accuracy of "Load
Message Utilization" data. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Manual recognizes that data quality is directly linked to data
collection and entry at the port of embarkation and requires
appropriate commander emphasis to ensure accuracy, aerial port
supervisors are not required to review the "Load Message Utilization"
code for accuracy prior to transmission to AMC. AMC officials told us
that although they require this data field to be completed by users,
AMC does not use this information and officials do not verify or
validate the data entered in this data field. According to AMC
officials, GATES users frequently use the "Z" code (no other code
applies) as a placeholder.
Analysis of AMC Data Showed That a Significant Number of Strategic
Airlift Missions Flew with Payloads Lighter Than Established Planning
Factors:
Our analysis of 14,692 strategic airlift missions for OEF and OIF
showed that more than 86 percent flew with payloads that were lighter
than established payload planning factors; nearly 19 percent did not
meet the minimum requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers needed
to qualify for use of strategic airlift; and average payloads for
strategic airlift missions were less than historical average payloads.
For example, we found that over 97 percent of missions on C-5 aircraft,
nearly 98 percent of missions on C-130 aircraft, and 80 percent of
missions on KC-135 aircraft had payloads that were below the payload
planning factors for these types of aircraft, as shown in table 3. In
contrast, almost 19 percent of C-17 missions, about 18 percent of KC-10
missions, and 26 percent of C-141 missions met or exceeded the relevant
payload planning factors.
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding
Payload Planning Factors, by Plane Type, October 2001 to September
2004:
Type of aircraft: C-5;
Number of missions: 4,425;
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 71.5;
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 4,305;
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 97.3%;
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor:
120;
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning
factor: 2.71%.
Type of aircraft: C-17;
Number of missions: 8,909;
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 45.0;
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 7,263;
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 81.5%;
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor:
1,646;
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning
factor: 18.5%.
Type of aircraft: C-130;
Number of missions: 551;
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 12.0;
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 539;
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 97.8%;
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor:
12;
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning
factor: 2.2%.
Type of aircraft: C-141;
Number of missions: 511;
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 19.0;
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 378;
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 74.0%;
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor:
133;
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning
factor: 26%.
Type of aircraft: KC-10;
Number of missions: 186;
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 32.6;
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 152;
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 81.7%;
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor:
34;
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning
factor: 18.3%.
Type of aircraft: KC-135;
Number of missions: 110;
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 13.0;
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 88;
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 80.0%;
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor:
22;
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning
factor: 20%.
Total;
Number of missions: 14,692;
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 12,725;
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor:
1,967.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: This analysis does not consider operational factors used for
mission planning because data were not available. Although the C-130,
KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift aircraft, we
have included them in our analysis in those instances when AMC used
these aircraft in strategic airlift roles. Because C-5 aircraft have
separate compartments for passengers and cargo, we use a 71.5 payload
planning factor (the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads) rather
than the 61.3 short tons published in Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403. For a
C-5 aircraft to be fully utilized, DOD would need to fully utilize
available space in both the cargo and passenger compartments.
[End of table]
However, because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors
impact payloads (see app. III for details on some of these factors), we
are not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use
of an aircraft's capacity.
Our analysis also showed that about 4 percent (524) of strategic
airlift missions carried no cargo and nearly 19 percent (2,734) of all
strategic airlift missions transporting cargo and passengers for OEF
and OIF did not meet the minimum requirements for use of strategic
airlift, resulting in light payloads and, potentially, underutilization
of aircraft (see table 4). Missions that did not meet minimum
requirements for strategic airlift carried an average of about 5 short
tons of cargo and 26 passengers.
Table 4: Missions Carrying No Cargo and Not Meeting the Minimum
Requirements for Use of Strategic Airlift:
Type of aircraft: C-5;
Number of missions: 4,425;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 49;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 123;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 21;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 131.
Type of aircraft: C-17;
Number of missions: 8,909;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 185;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 1,175;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 36;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 468.
Type of aircraft: C-130;
Number of missions: 551;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 80;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 48;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 112;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 237.
Type of aircraft: C-141;
Number of missions: 511;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 4;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 175;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 6;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 181.
Type of aircraft: KC-10;
Number of missions: 186;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 2;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 20;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 3;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 99.
Type of aircraft: KC-135;
Number of missions: 110;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 21;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 46;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 5;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 31.
Total;
Number of missions: 14,692;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 341;
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 1,587;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 183;
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum
requirement for strategic airlift: 1,147.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered
strategic airlift aircraft, we have included them in our analysis in
those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift
roles.
[End of table]
However, because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors
impact payloads, we are not able to determine whether these payloads
indicate efficient use of an aircraft's capacity.
Although aerial port officials may know why individual flights flew
empty or with light payloads, AMC does not collect these data, and
available data collected by AMC were not sufficient to determine why
this occurred. AMC officials told us that data show that some aircraft
flew empty, possibly because the command tracks mission data for
aircraft without cargo on board that were moved into the theater and
assigned to the United States Central Command. According to these
officials, the lack of technology at austere locations also prevents
capturing mission data, including payloads transported. AMC officials
further explained that although their databases also track classified
missions, they do not capture payloads or other data for these
missions.
There may be legitimate reasons why AMC flew missions that did not meet
minimum requirements for the use of strategic airlift. For instance,
aircraft transporting light but bulky cargo could have light payloads.
Charleston Air Force Base officials told us that they had transported
rolls of bubble wrap to package Patriot missiles for return to the
United States by airlift. For this mission, the payload was light, but
the aircraft was fully utilized because the rolls used all available
locations where cargo can be placed. AMC officials also told us that
they attempt to use capacity as efficiently as possible by scheduling
an aircraft that is sufficient for the size and weight of the
requirement to be moved, scheduling en route stops to consolidate
smaller loads, and negotiating delivery dates when possible. However,
unlike commercial cargo carriers such as Federal Express, AMC officials
cannot decline to deliver a customer's order if it does not fully
utilize the aircraft. AMC is required to provide airlift whenever cargo
and passengers are approved for movement even if minimum requirements
for using strategic airlift are not met or the requirement will not
fully utilize an aircraft's available capacity. A command official also
told us that DOD guidance permits the use of strategic airlift even if
the minimum requirements of 100 passengers or 15 short tons of cargo
are not met if this is the only way to accomplish the mission.
Therefore, AMC may fly aircraft with reduced payloads in order to meet
combatant commanders' delivery time frames. While we believe this may
cause aircraft to be underutilized, AMC officials emphasized that the
command's primary objective is to deliver "the right items to the right
place at the right time" and that optimizing capacity is a secondary
goal. Furthermore, according to a command official, DOD established
these minimum requirements as a way to identify large enough loads to
justify sending a C-141 or C-17 aircraft to complete a mission.
However, without information about operational factors that impacted
the payloads on these airlift missions, we are unable to determine
whether DOD used an aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible. In
the absence of such data, we calculated the average payloads for each
type of aircraft and compared these to relevant payload planning
factors to get an indication as to how well AMC utilized aircraft. We
found that aircraft payloads for OEF and OIF were, on average, less
than historical average payloads. Table 5 shows the average payloads
transported for both OEF and OIF by each type of strategic aircraft and
how they compare to each aircraft's payload planning factor.
Table 5: Payloads Transported by Type of Aircraft, October 2001 to
September 2004:
In short tons.
Type of aircraft: C-5;
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 47.8;
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 48.0;
Average payload for both operations: 47.9;
Payload planning factor: 71.5[A].
Type of aircraft: C-17;
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 27.5;
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 29.8;
Average payload for both operations: 28.3;
Payload planning factor: 45.0.
Type of aircraft: C-130;
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 4.5;
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 5.4;
Average payload for both operations: 5.0;
Payload planning factor: 12.0.
Type of aircraft: C-141;
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 15.7;
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 16.6;
Average payload for both operations: 16.5;
Payload planning factor: 19.0.
Type of aircraft: KC-10;
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 12.9;
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 17.9;
Average payload for both operations: 17.3;
Payload planning factor: 32.6.
Type of aircraft: KC-135;
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 6.5;
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 7.6;
Average payload for both operations: 6.9;
Payload planning factor: 13.0.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered
strategic airlift aircraft, we have included them in our analysis in
those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift
roles.
[A] The payload planning factor assumes loads contain only cargo or
only passengers, not a mixture. For all aircraft types except the C-5,
mixed loads usually would have payload planning factors in between the
cargo and passenger payloads listed in table 1. Because C-5s have
separate compartments for passengers and cargo, the mixed payload
planning factor would be the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads
(71.5 short tons).
[End of table]
Because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors impact
payloads, we are not able to determine whether these payloads indicate
efficient use of an aircraft's capacity.
In general, in the absence of information about operational factors
that could explain why heavier payloads were not transported, command
officials do not know whether and where opportunities existed to use an
aircraft's capacity more efficiently or if there is the opportunity to
reduce operational tempo, costs, and wear and tear on aircraft. By not
collecting information about and analyzing the factors that impact
aircraft capacity utilized, DOD officials could also be understating
lift requirements for planning purposes, and the right mix and number
of aircraft may not be available for future contingencies.
Conclusions:
Because DOD emphasizes delivering the "right items to the right place
at the right time" over the efficient use of an aircraft's capacity,
AMC has a reason for underutilizing aircraft capacity on some missions.
However, we believe that AMC officials need more data about operational
factors, which can also impact aircraft capacity, and that these data
need to be maintained in a manner allows officials to determine whether
DOD used an aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible.
Furthermore, we believe it is important that reliable and complete data
are collected to allow DOD and the Congress to make informed decisions
about future airlift requirements. We have reported that a key factor
contributing to the usefulness of data is the degree to which officials
are confident that information is credible.[Footnote 9] Useful
practices for helping decision makers assess the quality and value of
data include assessing the reliability and verifying and validating
data to ensure that they adequately represent actual performance. Such
data could help officials make informed decisions about the capacity of
aircraft utilized when transporting cargo on strategic missions as well
as planning for future strategic lift requirements. Because they do not
collect information about and analyze the factors that impact payloads,
DOD officials do not have adequate information about aircraft capacity
and do not know whether capacity is utilized to the maximum extent
possible. Potentially inefficient use of aircraft capacity could cause
higher operational tempo and may increase cost as well as wear and tear
on aircraft. In addition, this lack of information could cause DOD to
understate or overstate future lift requirements for planning purposes,
and the right mix and number of aircraft may not be available for
future contingencies.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help officials determine whether they used an aircraft's capacity as
efficiently as possible and improve the reliability and completeness of
data on operational factors that can impact payloads, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to
direct the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to take the following two
actions:
* Revise and clarify relevant data fields in GATES, and work with DOD
entities that support other transportation information systems, such as
the Global Transportation Network and service deployment systems, to
capture comprehensive, well-defined data on operational factors that
impact payloads for individual missions, and require supervisors to
review these data fields for accuracy. These factors include--but are
not limited to--number of pallet positions used, cargo dimensions,
fueling decisions, and altitude constraints.
* Systematically collect and analyze information on operational factors
that impact payloads transported on strategic airlift missions to
identify ways that DOD may be able to use an aircraft's capacity as
efficiently as possible.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix IV. In commenting on a draft
of this report, DOD concurred with both recommendations. It also
provided technical comments, which we included in the report as
appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to revise and clarify GATES data
fields to capture a more comprehensive, well-defined list of
operational factors that impact payloads for individual missions. In
concurring with our recommendation, DOD made two additional comments.
First, DOD noted that some contingency missions are often processed
through service deployment systems and that other systems are also used
to collect data regarding aircraft utilization. We agree with DOD that
contingency missions are processed through systems other than GATES.
However, as noted in our report, we used data on completed missions
obtained from the Tanker Airlift Control Center's Fusion Cell database,
which compiles and validates data obtained from GATES as well as the
Global Transportation Network and the Global Decision Support System.
AMC officials agreed with this methodology and these sources for our
analysis. Second, DOD stated that data shortfalls are not only in GATES
and that data such as altitude constraints, fueling decisions, and
other operational decisions conducted outside the aerial ports do not
belong in GATES. We agree with DOD that GATES is not a full-spectrum
airfield and airlift planning and execution system, and that GATES may
not be the only system that could capture the necessary information
needed for a more comprehensive analysis of aircraft utilization.
During the course of this review, we were not made aware of data fields
in other information systems that captured information similar to the
"Load Message Utilization" field in GATES. As a result, we focused our
recommendation on GATES to identify how improvements could be made to
transportation information systems to capture data on operational
factors that could provide a more comprehensive picture of how well AMC
and the combatant commanders are utilizing aircraft. In response to
DOD's comments, we also reviewed user guides and data dictionaries for
these other systems and identified a number of data fields that could
provide additional operational data. However, in further discussions,
DOD officials told us that data in these fields are not always easily
accessible or complete and reliable. Therefore, to recognize that there
may be other systems that could also be used to capture operational
data, we have revised our recommendation for DOD to revise and clarify
data fields in GATES and any other transportation information systems.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation to systematically collect
and analyze information on operational factors that impact payloads
transported on strategic airlift missions and stated that AMC's Tanker
Airlift Control Center already collects and analyzes mission data from
several transportation information systems, including allowable cabin
load utilization by aircraft type. As noted in our scope and
methodology, for our analysis of aircraft utilization we used data
obtained from the Tanker Airlift Control Center's Fusion Cell database,
which compiles data obtained from GATES as well as the Global
Transportation Network and the Global Decision Support System. However,
this database did not include the operational data we believe is needed
by DOD to analyze and better understand how operational factors impact
these payloads, to determine whether all available space and weight on
these aircraft was used in light of such operational factors, and to
plan for future airlift transportation needs.
DOD also stated that any audit of contingency aircraft utilization must
include the Time Phased Force Deployment Data validation process. We
acknowledge that this process plays an integral role in determining
what needs to be moved and how it is moved. However, our objective was
to determine how efficiently AMC utilized its airlift assets after that
validation process is completed; therefore, the process is outside of
the scope of our review. As we discuss in the background and appendix
III, AMC is required to provide airlift whenever cargo and passengers
are approved for movement even if minimum requirements for using
strategic airlift are not met or the requirement will not use an
aircraft's available capacity as efficiently as possible, if this is
the only way to accomplish the mission. This means that if a combatant
commander puts forward a requirement through the Time Phased Force
Deployment Data validation process and it is designated by TRANSCOM for
airlift, AMC will fly the mission, even if it does not meet the minimum
requirements or allow the most efficient use of capacity.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement on actions taken to address our
recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the
House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the
date of this report. A written statement must also be submitted to the
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first
request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of
this report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force;
the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5140 or [Hyperlink, solisw@gao.gov]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Sincerely yours,
William Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) used an
aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible while transporting cargo
and passengers for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and defense transportation
regulations and interviewed knowledgeable officials from the following
offices, commands, and services:
* 13th Corps Support Command, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas.
* 3rd Army Corps, Directorate of Logistics, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas.
* 437th Aerial Port Squadron, Charleston Air Force Base, South
Carolina.
* 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas.
* 819th Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron
Engineer, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana.
* Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
* I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California.
* II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, Arlington,
Virginia.
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation,
Arlington, Virginia.
* United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa,
Florida.
* United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia.
* United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
* United States Army Installation Management Agency, Arlington,
Virginia.
* United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
To gain an understanding of how operational realities can affect
aircraft payloads, we reviewed a limited number of historical mission
planning files. The files that we reviewed were sometimes missing load
plans that would assist in explaining operational factors that may have
impacted payloads. When load plans were present in the mission files,
AMC officials were able to identify a number of factors that could
plausibly impact mission payloads; however, they could not be certain
that these factors did impact payloads when the mission was executed.
We also reviewed information about the "Load Message Utilization" data
field in the Global Air Transportation Execution System and discussed
the reliability and accuracy of these data with AMC and aerial port
officials. We determined that this data field was not sufficiently
reliable for this purpose. We also met with officials concerning AMC's
Global Transportation Network and Global Decision Support System.
We limited our review of airlift missions to strategic contingency
missions and special assignment airlift missions for the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps as well as joint missions flown on AMC-
owned and AMC-operated aircraft in support of OEF and OIF. The U.S.
strategic airlift fleet includes the C-5, C-17, C-130, and C-141
aircraft. Because aerial refueling aircraft, such as the KC-10 and KC-
135, are also capable of transporting cargo for strategic airlift
missions, we also included these aircraft in our analyses. We initially
obtained mission data for 37,622 airlift missions[Footnote 10]occurring
from October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2004 from AMC's Fusion Cell.
Because we focused on strategic missions, we excluded intratheater
missions from our analyses. In addition, we excluded channel missions-
-regularly scheduled flights on government-owned or chartered aircraft
under the operational control of AMC that are used for cargo and troop
movements--because these occur on a regular schedule, and it is
possible that payloads would regularly be light. We also excluded
missions on commercial aircraft because these are not owned by AMC. By
applying our selection criteria identified earlier, we narrowed the
number of missions that we reviewed to 14,692. To assess the
reliability of these data, we (1) reviewed existing documentation
related to the data sources, (2) electronically tested the data to
identify obvious problems with completeness or accuracy, and (3)
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the data. We
determined that the Fusion Cell's data were sufficiently reliable to
summarize the actual cargo and passenger payloads. We then compared
Fusion Cell average payload data for OEF and OIF strategic aircraft
with payload planning factors and determined whether payloads for OEF
and OIF met the payload planning factors. We also calculated the
average total short tons transported on each type of aircraft, and
determined the percentage of aircraft that carried short tons in excess
as well as below the payload planning factors. Additionally, we
determined the number of missions that did not meet the minimum
strategic airlift requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers. DOD
guidance permits the use of strategic airlift even if minimum payload
and passenger requirements are not met if this is the only way to
accomplish the mission. Furthermore, AMC is required to provide airlift
whenever cargo and passengers are validated for movement even if the
minimum requirement to use strategic airlift is not met. However, we
were not able to determine the reasons why the minimum requirement was
waived for nearly 19 percent of all missions we reviewed. We also
identified a number of missions that carried no cargo or passengers;
however, we were not able to identify all of the reasons why these
aircraft flew empty.
We conducted our review from September 2004 through July 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for Strategic Airlift:
The AMC is responsible for providing global airlift services and air
refueling operations. To carry out its mission, the command has a
strategic airlift fleet comprised of the C-5, C-17, and C-141. In
addition, AMC can use aerial refueling aircraft, such as the KC-10 and
KC-135, for transporting cargo. Although the C-130 is primarily used
for intratheater airlift missions, AMC sometimes uses it in a strategic
airlift role to transport cargo from the United States to Iraq and
Afghanistan, especially if the aircraft is being moved into the theater
and assigned to the United States Central Command. This appendix
briefly describes these aircraft (figs. 2 through 7 are photographs of
the various aircraft).
C-5 Aircraft:
Figure 2: C-5 Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The C-5 is one of the largest aircraft in the world. It can carry
outsize and oversize cargo over intercontinental ranges and can take
off or land in relatively short distances. A C-5 with a cargo load of
135 short tons can fly 2,150 nautical miles, off-load, and fly to a
second base 500 nautical miles away from the original destination
without aerial refueling. With aerial refueling, the aircraft's range
is limited only by crew endurance. The C-5 can carry nearly all of the
Army's combat equipment, including large heavy items such as the 74-ton
mobile scissors bridge. Ground crews can load and off-load the C-5
simultaneously at the front and rear cargo openings. The landing gear
system permits lowering of the parked aircraft so the cargo floor is at
truck bed height or to facilitate vehicle loading and unloading. The
aircraft length is about 247 feet, its height is approximately 65 feet,
and its wing span is about 223 feet.
C-17 Aircraft:
Figure 3: C-17 Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The C-17 aircraft is capable of transporting substantial payloads over
long ranges without refueling. The C-17 is intended to deliver cargo
and troops directly to forward airfields near the front lines or to
main operating bases; fly into small, austere airfields; land on short
runways; transport outsize cargo, such as tanks; and air-drop troops
and equipment. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as
3,000 feet long and 90 feet wide. With a payload of 80 short tons and
an initial cruise altitude of 28,000 feet, the C-17 has an unrefueled
range of approximately 2,400 nautical miles. The aircraft length is 174
feet, its height is about 55 feet, and its wing span is almost 170
feet. The C-17 will be AMC's primary military airlift aircraft once the
C-141s are retired from service.
C-141 Aircraft:
Figure 4: C-141 Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The C-141 was AMC's first jet aircraft designed to meet military
standards as a troop and cargo carrier, and is used to airlift combat
forces over long distances, deliver those forces and their equipment
either by landing or airdrop, resupply forces, and transport the sick
and wounded from a hostile area to medical facilities. The aircraft
length is approximately 168 feet, its height is about 39 feet, and the
wing span is 160 feet. The Air Force retired its C-141s from the active
duty inventory in September 2004 and began transferring C-141s to the
Air Reserve and Air National Guard forces in July 1986. DOD plans to
retire C-141s used by the Air Reserves and Air National Guard before
2006.
C-130 Aircraft:
Figure 5: C-130 Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The C-130 is the primary transport aircraft for air-dropping troops and
equipment into hostile areas. Other roles include airlift support,
Antarctic ice resupply, and aeromedical missions. Using its aft loading
ramp and door, the C-130 can accommodate oversized cargo, including
utility helicopters and six-wheeled armored vehicles, as well as
standard palletized cargo and military personnel. Additionally, the C-
130 can be rapidly reconfigured for various types of cargo, such as
palletized equipment, floor-loaded material, airdrop platforms,
container delivery system bundles, vehicles and personnel, or
aeromedical evacuation. In an aerial delivery role, it can airdrop
loads up to 21 short tons or use its high-flotation landing gear to
land and deliver cargo on rough, dirt strips. The C-130 has a length of
about 97 feet, a height of approximately 38 feet, and a wing span of
about 132 feet. Depending on the aircraft model, the C-130 can carry a
maximum of 6 to 8 pallets, 92 to 128 combat troops, or a combination of
any of these up to the cargo compartment capacity or maximum allowable
weight.
KC-10 Aircraft:
Figure 6: KC-10 Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although the KC-l0's primary mission is aerial refueling, it can
combine the tasks of a tanker and cargo aircraft by refueling fighters
and simultaneously carrying the fighter support personnel and equipment
on overseas deployments. The KC-10 can transport up to 75 people and
nearly 85 short tons of cargo a distance of about 4,400 miles without
refueling. The large cargo-loading door can accommodate most Air Forces
fighter unit support equipment. Powered rollers and winches inside the
cargo compartment permit moving heavy loads. The cargo compartment can
accommodate loads ranging from 27 pallets to a mix of 17 pallets and 75
passengers. The aircraft's length is almost 182 feet. It has a height
of approximately 58 feet and a wing span of about 165 feet.
KC-135 Aircraft:
Figure 7: KC-135 Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The KC-135's principal mission is air refueling. However, a cargo deck
above the refueling system can transport a mixed load of passengers and
cargo. The KC-135 can carry up to 41.5 short tons of cargo or 37
passengers. The aircraft length is about 136 feet, its height is
approximately 42 feet, and it has a wing span of nearly 131 feet.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft Capacity
Utilized:
The extent to which an aircraft's capacity is utilized on any mission
depends on the interrelationship of a number of operational factors,
including (1) operating constraints, such as the flight distance and
aircraft availability; (2) environmental factors, such as airfield
altitude and temperature; and (3) DOD policies, including regulations
for use of strategic airlift and initiatives to improve the supply
distribution process. This appendix describes some of these factors.
Operational Constraints:
There are several operational factors that can affect the capacity
utilized, including (1) aircraft availability, (2) aircraft
characteristics, (3) cargo characteristics and loading configuration,
and (4) route and fuel needs, among other factors. According to AMC
officials, these factors, among others, contribute to capacity
limitations.
Aircraft Availability:
Because airlift aircraft are normally in high demand and usually highly
tasked, they are reserved for movement of forces and cargo critical to
the successful execution of campaign plans. However, competing demands
can limit the availability of aircraft to meet specific mission needs,
forcing AMC planners to potentially use larger aircraft, such as the C-
5, to transport payloads that cannot maximize the available space.
Operational tempo and the number of aircraft undergoing maintenance and
assigned for training needs and crew certification drive the total
number of aircraft available to AMC officials at any given time. User
requirements and threat situations may allow little or no flexibility
in the delivery times, locations, and load configurations. Although
exact numbers fluctuate daily, AMC generally has about 85 C-5 and C-17
aircraft available daily for strategic airlift missions. However,
special events and maintenance problems can reduce the number and type
of aircraft available for these missions. Officials told us that at the
beginning of OEF, 17 C-5 aircraft were broken and grounded at Guam for
maintenance. Efforts to improve the readiness rate of C-5 aircraft from
65 percent reduce the availability of these aircraft further and
increase the need for C-17s. According to an AMC official, three C-17s
are needed to replace each C-5. Because C-17 aircraft are also being
used for intratheater airlift in Iraq, United States Central Command
officials expressed concern about having enough C-17s to meet strategic
airlift demands.
Aircraft Characteristics:
Aircraft characteristics, such as the size and shape of the aircraft's
cargo compartment and strength of the aircraft floors and ramps,
operational tempo, and chronological age, can impact an aircraft's
capacity and the payload that can be transported. Aircraft have weight,
height, and width restrictions that can limit the amount or type of
cargo that can be transported. For example, the maximum weight limit on
a C-5 ramp is 7.5 short tons, and some locations within the aircraft
require a 14-inch safety aisle to allow aircrew members clearance while
securing cargo. Our review of mission planning files showed that
sometimes cargo was not placed on the aircraft ramps because of weight
constraints, thereby leaving some available space unused. Moreover,
aircraft differ on what they can carry. For instance, the C-5 and C-17
can carry all cargo types as well as troops, while the C-141 can carry
troops, cargo loaded on a standard-sized pallet (bulk), and oversized
cargo--nonpalletized cargo that is larger than bulk, such as vehicles.
In addition, an aircraft's contours can limit the height of pallets and
rolling cargo placed in certain areas. For example, the KC-10 has a
rounded cargo compartment that requires pallets be built to accommodate
this shape; as a result, the pallets may have less cargo on them than
they could theoretically transport.
The high operational tempo, number of flying hours, and the
chronological age of aircraft can limit the payload that an aircraft
can carry because these factors contribute to structural fatigue,
corrosion, cracking, wear and tear on systems, and aircraft
obsolescence. For example, United States Central Command officials told
us that C-17 aircraft are being used extensively for both intratheater
and strategic airlift for OIF, causing the aircraft to wear out and
reach their retirement dates sooner than expected. As a result, these
aircraft cannot carry payloads as heavy as would be expected.
Cargo Characteristics and Loading Configuration:
Cargo dimensions, characteristics, and placement in an aircraft can
impact capacity utilized. AMC categorizes cargo as (1) bulk--liquid or
dry cargo that can be loaded on a standard-sized pallet without
exceeding the pallet's dimensions; (2) oversized--nonpalletized rolling
stock that is larger than bulk that exceeds the dimensions of a
standard-sized pallet, but can be transported on a C-5, C-17, C-141, C-
130, or KC-10; and (3) outsized--cargo that exceeds dimensions of
oversized cargo and requires the use of a C-5 or C-17 aircraft. When
scheduling airlift, AMC attempts to match cargo dimensions with the
appropriate type of aircraft; however, a specific type of aircraft may
not be available. Cargo characteristics can also affect aircraft
capacity utilized. For example, ammunition is dense cargo that can be
loaded with little wasted space, but helicopters are large, light, and
irregularly shaped, and thus use cargo space less efficiently, as shown
in figure 8.
Figure 8: Unloading of a HH-60G Pave Hawk Helicopter from a C-17 in
Support of OIF:
[See PDF for image]
Note: A single Pave Hawk helicopter takes up most of a C-17's cargo
compartment and uses multiple pallet positions. Thus, the helicopter's
dimensions do not permit loading the C-17 to its maximum allowable
cabin load.
[End of figure]
Further, if hazardous material is transported, other types of cargo and
passengers may not be loaded on the aircraft. If enough hazardous
material is not available at the aerial port, payloads may be lighter.
Each aircraft also has a specific number of positions--referred to as
pallet positions--where cargo or passengers can be placed. For example,
the C-5 aircraft has 36 pallet positions, and the C-17 has 18. Aerial
ports--airfields that have been designated for the sustained air
movement of personnel and cargo as well as authorized ports for
entrance into or departure from the country where located--track the
placement of cargo and passengers on the aircraft and the number of
pallet positions used for each mission. The dimensions and type of
cargo can require the use of more than one position, decreasing the
amount of cargo or number of passengers that can be transported.
Although all pallet positions on an aircraft may be used, the pallets
may still have space for additional cargo to be placed on them. As a
result, all pallet positions may appear to be used, but the pallets may
not have met weight or volume limits. Cargo dimensions may also require
the use of multiple partial pallet positions. In addition, all
airlifted cargo must be secured in place using rollers and tie-downs,
as shown in figure 9.
Figure 9: Loadmasters Chain Down Cargo on a C-17:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Some cargo must be transported in containers or with two or more
pallets linked together. To secure these items, additional space on the
aircraft may be needed, thus limiting the placement of additional cargo
on board. Also, large equipment, such as helicopters, can take up a lot
of space and result in lighter payloads. For example, in figure 10 (an
actual load plan used during OEF), the total payload for cargo and
passengers was approximately 30 short tons. Of this, the two
helicopters took up about half of the C-17's cargo hold and accounted
for about 19 short tons of the C-17's payload. Also, one helicopter's
tail hangs over the ramp, preventing the use of this area. According to
this load plan, it appears that the space available on the aircraft was
efficiently used assuming that there was no additional cargo available
to be loaded that would meet the ramp's weight limitations.
Figure 10: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting How Placement of Cargo Can
Decrease Payloads:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 11 (an actual load plan used during OEF) shows how the presence
of passengers can impact aircraft capacity utilized. When passengers
are present, cargo must be placed down the center of the aircraft to
provide an aisle for passengers. For this load plan, the total payload
was approximately 23 short tons.
Figure 11: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting Placement of Cargo to
Accommodate Passengers:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Fuel Considerations:
Aircraft range and payloads are greatly affected by a mission's fuel
requirements. As the distance increases, the fuel requirements increase
and the allowable payload decreases. For instance, if an aircraft must
divert around a country because it does not have permission to fly over
that nation's airspace or it must fly at higher altitudes due to
security concerns, the aircraft may need to carry more fuel and less
cargo and passengers. We have reported that an aircraft's range is
significantly reduced with only minimal additional weight or due to
security concerns. For example, for Stryker brigades every additional
1,000 tons of weight to be airlifted reduces aircraft range by 250
nautical miles and adds 15 aircraft loads.[Footnote 11] We have also
reported that a C-130 aircraft's range may be reduced if operational
conditions such as high-speed takeoffs and threat-based route
deviations exist because more fuel would be consumed under these
conditions. Even under ideal flight conditions, such as daytime, low
headwind, moderate air temperature, and low elevation, adding just a
ton onboard the aircraft for associated cargo such as mission
equipment, personnel, or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft's
takeoff-to-landing range to 500 miles. Sometimes, the amount of cargo
and distances involved in strategic airlift operations make air
refueling necessary. AMC officials told us that air refueling is
routinely done for aircraft flying to Iraq; Afghanistan; and Ramstein
Air Base, Germany. Air refueling may reduce the aircraft's initial fuel
requirement, allow for heavier cargo loads, increase aircraft range,
and reduce the need for ground refueling. If refueling is not possible
at the off-load station, such as in Khandahar, Afghanistan, potential
payloads could be reduced or additional enroute stops could be
required.
Environmental Factors:
Environmental factors, such as altitude, pressure, weather, and
temperature, can also affect the capacity utilized on an aircraft by
forcing planners and operators to adjust mission payloads and timing to
ensure effective, efficient, and safe mission accomplishment. High
altitudes could prevent the use of certain types of aircraft or require
lighter payloads and less fuel so that the aircraft can take off. For
example, the Sierra Army Depot in Amadee, California, is located at a
high altitude, and it is difficult for C-5s to get the lift they need
to take off if carrying more than 30 short tons; this payload is about
42 short tons less than the payload planning factor. As a result, AMC
officials try not to use C-5 aircraft at this and similar locations
unless C-17 aircraft are not available. AMC also needs to consider
temperature changes during the winter and summer months. For instance,
the allowable cabin load for aircraft flying into Rota Naval Base,
Spain during the summer decreases by about 10 to18 short tons because
the temperature is too high for aircraft to maintain enough lift.
DOD Policies:
Some DOD transportation-related policies, such as the pure pallet
initiative and the primacy of commanders' decisions, may result in
lighter payloads. DOD officials told us that the lighter payloads are
acceptable in some instances because initiatives reduce risk and
customer wait time in theater and AMC must meet commanders' time frames
for delivery of cargo and passengers.
Pure Pallet Initiative:
While DOD's pure pallet initiative delivers palletized cargo to
customers in the theater more quickly, it can result in lighter pallets
and payloads. Initiated in March 2004 at Dover Air Force Base,
Delaware; Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina; and Ramstein Air
Base, Germany, DOD's pure pallet initiative is intended to simplify and
speed up airlift shipments into the United States Central Command's
area of responsibility by building and shipping individual aircraft
pallets with cargo for a single customer. The pure pallet initiative
decreases the time needed on the receiving end to distribute palletized
cargo to individual customers by transferring the sorting of cargo to
the originating aerial port. Normally, a customer's cargo is loaded
onto an aircraft pallet with cargo for other customers within the same
region. Under this system, a single pallet could contain cargo for
dozens of customers. The pallet would be broken down when it arrived at
the destination aerial port, sorted, repalletized, and distributed to
individual customers. When a pure pallet arrives at the deployed aerial
port, it can be pulled from the aircraft and immediately handed off to
the customer or placed on a truck or another aircraft for transport to
remote locations. In addition, the initiative recognizes that in Iraq
and Afghanistan, aerial ports are restricted as to the amount of cargo
processing facilities, amount of equipment, and number of people
because of the threat of attack. However, DOD officials acknowledge
that having enough cargo to fill an entire pallet is problematic. To
maximize pallet and aircraft utilization, the aerial ports can hold
cargo for up to 5 days for the Army and up to 3 days for the Marine
Corps. However, cargo is palletized when it reaches 120 hours of port
hold time or enough cargo is available to fill a pallet causing it to
either cube out or weigh out. As we reported in April 2005,[Footnote
12] the result is potentially longer processing times at the
originating aerial ports in order to reduce customer wait time in
theater. AMC tracks pure pallet weights each week, aiming for an
average of 1.4 short tons per pallet. AMC data show that all three
aerial ports generally met or surpassed the average pure pallet weight
goals.
Combatant Commander Decisions:
According to AMC officials, the most efficient way to move passengers
and cargo is not always the most appropriate during contingency
operations. During OEF and OIF, combatant commanders frequently
required AMC to transport troops with their equipment on the same
aircraft. According to AMC officials, it would have been more efficient
to move the troops on one aircraft and transport their equipment on a
second aircraft immediately following the first. However, commanders
fear that passengers would arrive at their destinations and equipment
sent on the second aircraft would be delayed due to maintenance
problems or, if sent on a military aircraft, the mission might be
canceled. As a result, AMC may fly aircraft with reduced payloads in
order to meet combatant commanders' delivery time frames. However,
these decisions take into account the expected situation at the
destination; some units, such as special operations forces and the
Marines, immediately require their equipment, so separating passengers
and equipment is not the preferred transportation method. Although the
aircraft may be underutilized, AMC is meeting its primary objective to
deliver "the right items to the right place at the right time."
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS:
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500:
SEP 12 2005:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION: Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect
and Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization," dated August
11, 2005 (GAO Code 350587/GAO-05-819).
The DoD concurs with the draft report recommendations. We agree to the
benefits of improving the Global Air Transportation and Execution
System (GATES), but emphasize other systems also are used to collect
data regarding aircraft utilization. We also feel that Time Phased
Force Deployment Data process should be included in an audit of
aircraft utilization.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact
Colonel Michael Friedlein, Deputy, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, Transportation Policy, 703-601-4461 ext 109.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jack Bell:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT -DATED AUGUST 11, 2005 GAO CODE 350587/GAO-05-819:
"DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION: Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and
Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the Commander, Air
Mobility Command, to revise and clarify relevant Global Air
Transportation and Execution System (GATES) data fields to capture a
more comprehensive, well-defined list of operational factors that
impact payloads for individual missions, and require supervisors to
review those data fields for accuracy. Those factors include -but are
not limited to -number of pallet positions used, cargo dimensions,
whether pallets were heavy or light, fueling decisions, and altitude
constraints. (Pages 18-19/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. It should be noted that all contingency missions
are not processed through GATES. They are also processed through
Service deployment systems. Additionally, GAO Report Data shortfalls
for contingency missions can't be isolated to GATES. Altitude
constraints, fueling decisions and other operational decisions
conducted outside the aerial ports do not belong in GATES. GATES serves
as an aerial port cargo and passenger management manifesting system,
not as a full-spectrum airfield and airlift planning and execution
system.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the Commander, Air
Mobility Command, to systematically collect and analyze information on
operational factors that impact payloads transported on strategic
airlift missions to identify ways that DoD may be able to use an
aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible. (Page 19/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Tanker/Airlift Control Center (TACC) already
monitors and collects data on every contingency mission under Air
Mobility Command's operational control. After aircraft departure,
personnel in the TACC Fusion Cell are analyzing and gathering cargo and
passenger data from several systems including the Global Transportation
Network (GTN), GATES, and the Global Decision Support System (GDSS) to
compile mission accomplishment data that includes Allowable Cabin
Limits utilization by aircraft type. This further highlights that GATES
is not the only system for information on aircraft utilization.
Additionally, any audit of contingency aircraft utilization must
include Time Phased Force Deployment Data validation process.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis (202) 512-5140:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact name above, Ann Borseth, Assistant Director;
Krislin M. Bolling; Virginia A. Chanley; Karen N. Harms; Linda S.
Keefer; Ronald La Due Lake; Renee McElveen; Maria-Alaina I. Rambus;
Vanessa R. Taylor; and Robert K. Wild also made key contributions to
this report.
(350587):
FOOTNOTES
[1] OEF began in October 2001 in Afghanistan and OIF began in March
2003 in Iraq.
[2] A short ton is equivalent to 2,000 pounds.
[3] Contingency missions involve deployment, sustainment, and
redeployment by airlift. Special assignment airlift missions are
aircraft operated to satisfy a requirement needing special pickup or
delivery at locations other than those with regularly scheduled service
or to satisfy a requirement needing special consideration because of
the number of passengers, weight or size of the cargo, urgency, or
sensitivity of movement.
[4] An unified combatant command is composed of forces from two or more
services and has a broad and continuing mission.
[5] TRANSCOM's other component commands are the Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command that is responsible for providing global surface
distribution services, and the Military Sealift Command that provides
ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies and ammunition to
sustain U.S. forces worldwide.
[6] The Air Force retired its C-141s from the active duty inventory in
September 2004. DOD plans to retire C-141s used by the Reserves and Air
National Guard before 2006.
[7] TRANSCOM's Global Transportation Network collects and integrates
information from a number of transportation systems to support
transportation planning and decision-making. GATES provides AMC with
automated capability to process and track cargo and passenger airlift
data and facilitates payment for services. AMC's Global Decision
Support System provides aircraft schedules, arrival and departure, and
aircraft status data to support in-transit visibility of aircraft and
aircrews.
[8] GAO, C-17 Globemaster: Support of Operation Joint Endeavor, GAO-97-
50 (Washington, D.C. Feb. 14, 1997).
[9] GAO, Defense Management: Tools for Measuring and Managing Defense
Agency Performance Could Be Strengthened, GAO-04-919 (Washington, D.C.
Sept. 13, 2004).
[10] When selecting missions to analyze, we used the mission leg with
the greatest short tons on board, including passenger weight. The
approximately 170,000 mission legs that AMC flew during this time frame
resulted in 37,622 unique missions prior to application of our
selection criteria. Based on discussions with Fusion Cell staff
clarifying our analysis results, we eliminated 6 missions from our
analysis that showed improbably high payloads.
[11] GAO, Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines
Needed for Army Stryker Brigades, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C. June 30,
2003), and Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles
Is Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130
Aircraft Need to Be Clarified, GAO-04-925 (Washington, D.C. Aug. 12,
2004).
[12] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C. Apr. 8, 2005).
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