DOD Business Transformation
Preliminary Observations on the Defense Travel System Gao ID: GAO-05-998T September 29, 2005The Department of Defense (DOD) has been working to develop and implement a standard end-to-end travel system for the last 10 years. Congress has been at the forefront in addressing issues related to DOD's travel management practices with the hearing today being another example of its oversight efforts. Because of widespread congressional interest in the Defense Travel System (DTS), GAO's current audit is being performed under the statutory authority given to the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO's testimony is based on the preliminary results of that audit and focuses on the following three key questions: (1) Has DOD effectively tested key functionality in DTS related to flights and fare information? (2) Will DTS correct the problems related to DOD travel previously identified by GAO and others? and (3) What challenges remain in ensuring that DTS achieves its goal as DOD's standard travel system? In addition, the Subcommittee asked that GAO provide a description of the intellectual property rights of DOD in DTS. Subsequent to this testimony, GAO plans to issue a report that will include recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at improving the department's implementation of DTS.
DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in the area of testing key functionality to ensure that the system will perform as intended. Consequently, critical flaws have been identified after deployment, resulting in significant schedule slippages. GAO's recent analysis of selected requirements disclosed that system testing was ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability has been delivered as intended. For example, GAO found that DOD did not have reasonable assurance that DTS properly display flight and airfare information. This problem was not detected prior to deployment, since DOD failed to properly test system interfaces. Accordingly, DOD travelers might not have received accurate information which, could have resulted in higher travel costs. DTS has corrected some of the previously reported travel problems but others remain. Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased with the centrally billed accounts. However, problems remain related to improper premium class travel, unused tickets that are not refunded, and accuracy of traveler's claims. These remaining problems cannot be resolved solely within DTS and will take departmentwide action to address. GAO identified two key challenges facing DTS in becoming DOD's standard travel system: (1) developing needed interfaces and (2) underutilization of DTS at sites where it has been deployed. While DTS has developed 32 interfaces with various DOD business systems, it will have to develop interfaces with at least 17 additional systems--not a trivial task. Furthermore, the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems results in underutilization of DTS and affects the savings that DTS was planned to achieve. Components incur additional costs by operating two systems with the same function--the legacy system and DTS--and by paying higher processing fees for manual travel vouchers as opposed to processing the travel vouchers electronically through DTS.
GAO-05-998T, DOD Business Transformation: Preliminary Observations on the Defense Travel System
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-998T
entitled 'DOD Business Transformation: Preliminary Observations on the
Defense Travel System' which was released on September 29, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST:
Thursday, September 29, 2005:
Testimony:
Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
DOD Business Transformation:
Preliminary Observations on the Defense Travel System:
Statement of McCoy Williams:
Director, Financial Management and Assurance:
Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Applied Research and Methods,
Center for Engineering and Technology:
GAO-05-998T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-998T, a testimony to the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been working to develop and
implement a standard end-to-end travel system for the last 10 years.
The Subcommittee has been at the forefront in addressing issues related
to DOD‘s travel management practices with the hearing today being
another example of its oversight efforts. Because of widespread
congressional interest in the Defense Travel System (DTS), GAO‘s
current audit is being performed under the statutory authority given to
the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO‘s testimony is based
on the preliminary results of that audit and focuses on the following
three key questions: (1) Has DOD effectively tested key functionality
in DTS related to flights and fare information? (2) Will DTS correct
the problems related to DOD travel previously identified by GAO and
others? and (3) What challenges remain in ensuring that DTS achieves
its goal as DOD‘s standard travel system?
In addition, the Subcommittee asked that GAO provide a description of
the intellectual property rights of DOD in DTS. This issue is addressed
in appendix. I.
Subsequent to this testimony, GAO plans to issue a report that will
include recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at improving
the department‘s implementation of DTS.
What GAO Found:
DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in
the area of testing key functionality to ensure that the system will
perform as intended. Consequently, critical flaws have been identified
after deployment, resulting in significant schedule slippages as shown
below.
DTS Schedule Slippages:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GAO‘s recent analysis of selected requirements disclosed that system
testing was ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability has
been delivered as intended. For example, GAO found that DOD did not
have reasonable assurance that DTS properly display flight and airfare
information. This problem was not detected prior to deployment, since
DOD failed to properly test system interfaces. Accordingly, DOD
travelers might not have received accurate information which, could
have resulted in higher travel costs.
DTS has corrected some of the previously reported travel problems but
others remain. Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to
duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased with the centrally
billed accounts. However, problems remain related to improper premium
class travel, unused tickets that are not refunded, and accuracy of
traveler‘s claims. These remaining problems cannot be resolved solely
within DTS and will take departmentwide action to address.
GAO identified two key challenges facing DTS in becoming DOD‘s standard
travel system: (1) developing needed interfaces and (2)
underutilization of DTS at sites where it has been deployed. While DTS
has developed 32 interfaces with various DOD business systems, it will
have to develop interfaces with at least 17 additional systems”not a
trivial task. Furthermore, the continued use of the existing legacy
travel systems results in underutilization of DTS and affects the
savings that DTS was planned to achieve. Components incur additional
costs by operating two systems with the same function”the legacy system
and DTS”and by paying higher processing fees for manual travel vouchers
as opposed to processing the travel vouchers electronically through
DTS.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-998T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact McCoy Williams at (202)
512-6906 or Keith Rhodes at (202) 512-6412.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our preliminary results of the
Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to develop and implement a new
standard end-to-end travel system.[Footnote 1] Over 10 years ago, the
DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel issued a report that pinpointed
three principal causes for DOD's inefficient travel system: (1) travel
policies and programs were focused on compliance with rigid rules
rather than mission performance, (2) travel practices did not keep pace
with travel management improvements implemented by industry, and (3)
the travel system were not integrated. To address these concerns, DOD
established the Project Management Office--Defense Travel System (PMO-
DTS) to acquire travel services that would be used DOD-wide. This
Subcommittee has been at the forefront in addressing issues related to
DOD's travel management practices. Continued oversight activities such
as this hearing can help ensure that DOD achieves its long-standing
goal of successfully implementing a standard travel management system.
We look forward to continuing to work with the Subcommittee.
Because of widespread congressional interest in the Defense Travel
System (DTS), our current audit is being performed under the statutory
authority given to the Comptroller General of the United States. Our
testimony today is based on the preliminary results of that audit.
Although we discussed the preliminary findings included in our
testimony with DOD officials, we have not yet provided the department
with our draft report for comment. Subsequent to this testimony, we
plan to issue a report that will include recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense aimed at improving the department's management and
oversight of DTS.
Today, our testimony will focus on the following three key questions:
* Has DOD effectively tested key DTS functionality related to flights
and fare information?
* Will DTS correct the internal control weaknesses and improper
payments previously identified?
* What challenges remain in ensuring that DTS achieves its goal as
DOD's standard travel system?
In addition, for the hearing today, you asked us for a description of
DOD's property rights in DTS. We address this issue in appendix I.
To address the first key question, we reviewed two key DTS flight-
related requirements and the related testing to determine if the
desired functionality was effectively implemented. To address the
second key question, we analyzed (1) our prior reports and testimonies,
(2) selected Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, and
(3) DOD congressional testimonies to identify the specific problems
that DTS was intended to resolve. We also randomly selected for
detailed review travel vouchers and transactions drawn from the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005 (October-December 2004) to determine if DTS
calculation problems identified by DFAS had been resolved.[Footnote 2]
To address the third key question, we discussed with the PMO-DTS the
deployment of DTS as it relates to the transmission of data such as
finance and accounting information, between DTS and the other systems
belonging to DOD, as well as the private sector.
We also analyzed DOD data related to the utilization of DTS throughout
DOD. We determined that the DOD data we used as the basis for the
preliminary evaluation in the testimony were sufficiently reliable by
(1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2)
reviewing existing information about the data and the system that
produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable
about the data. We performed our work from October 2004 through
September 2005 in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government
auditing standards. Details of our scope and methodology are included
in appendix II.
Summary:
DTS's development and implementation have been problematic, especially
in the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure
that the system would perform as intended. Thus, it is not surprising
that critical flaws have been identified after deployment, resulting in
significant schedule slippages. As originally envisioned, the initial
deployment of DTS was to commence within 120 days after the effective
date of contract award in September 1998, with complete deployment to
approximately 11,000 locations by April 2002. However, that date has
been changed to September 2006--a slippage of over 4 years. Our recent
analysis of selected requirements for one key area disclosed that
system testing was ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability
was delivered as intended. For example, we found that DOD did not have
reasonable assurance that flight information was properly
displayed.[Footnote 3] This problem was not detected prior to
deployment since DOD failed to properly test the system interfaces
through which the data is accessed. Accordingly, DOD travelers might
not have received accurate information on available flights, which
could have resulted in higher travel costs. PMO-DTS officials have
acknowledged that the problem has existed since the implementation of
the system. PMO-DTS officials have indicated that the problem was
corrected in an August 2005 release of the software. We are in the
process of following up to determine whether the corrective actions
have resolved the problem and will include the results in our report
that will be issued subsequent to the testimony.
DTS has corrected some of the previously reported internal control
weaknesses, while others remain. We previously reported that as a
result of a breakdown in internal controls and a weak control
environment, DOD has (1) paid for improper premium class travel, (2)
failed to redeem unused airline tickets, and (3) paid twice for the
same airline ticket when using the centrally billed accounts (CBA).
[Footnote 4] In commenting on our reports and in congressional
testimony, the department has stated that DTS, to varying degrees, will
help resolve these problems. In addition to our audit related issues,
DFAS's Kansas City Statistical Operations and Review Branch has
previously reported inaccuracies with DTS's travel payments of airfare,
lodging, meals, and incidental expenses.[Footnote 5] First, although
DOD has taken numerous actions to improve existing guidance and
controls related to premium class travel, including system changes in
DTS, our preliminary results indicate that unauthorized premium class
travel continues. This continuing problem is not the fault of DTS but
rather the lack of adherence to departmental policy. Second, as
currently designed, DTS cannot determine whether a traveler has not
used all or a portion of an airline ticket, unless the traveler
requests that the commercial travel office (CTO) process a credit for
the unused portion of the airline ticket. To address the problem, the
department now requires certain CTOs to run unused ticket reports that
identify tickets that were not used within a specified time period,
usually 30 days past the trip date. Third, in regard to duplicate
payment for the same ticket, we have observed that DTS is designed to
ensure that tickets purchased through the CBA cannot be claimed on the
individual's travel voucher as a reimbursement to the traveler, thus
eliminating this problem.
Finally, we randomly sampled 170 travel vouchers[Footnote 6] for the
period October 1, 2004, to December 31, 2004,[Footnote 7] to ascertain
if the problems previously reported by DFAS had been resolved. From our
preliminary results for the attributes tested, we found that DTS
calculated the lodging and meal reimbursements correctly based upon
information provided by the traveler. However, we identified instances
in which human error, either by the travelers or the authorizing
officials (AO), resulted in the amount of reimbursement to the traveler
being questionable. For example, the department's policy prescribes the
use of a compact car as the norm, unless otherwise authorized by the
AO. We found eight cases in which the traveler rented a vehicle other
than a compact without the proper authorization. We found no evidence
that the AOs questioned why departmental policy was not followed.
To become the standard travel system within DOD, DTS has faced and will
continue to face challenges--some of which are beyond the control of
the DTS program. Our testimony today focuses on two of those
challenges: (1) developing needed interfaces and (2) underutilization
of DTS at sites where it has been deployed. To date, DTS has developed
32 interfaces with various DOD business systems and going forward
interfaces will have to be developed with 17 additional business
systems. According to the PMO-DTS, a reported $30 million has been
spent on developing and testing the interfaces. Some of these systems,
such as the Army's General Fund System, are critical to DOD's
modernization of business systems and operations. According to the PMO-
DTS, the availability of funding to develop the interfaces is
uncertain. Unless these interfaces are successfully developed and
implemented, it will be virtually impossible for DTS to be a truly end-
to-end business system.
The continued use of the existing legacy travel systems at locations
where DTS is already deployed underutilizes DTS and reduces the savings
the DTS was planned to achieve. For example, the Army has acknowledged
that legacy systems are operating at locations where DTS has been
deployed. As a result, DOD is spending funds on duplicative systems--
legacy systems and DTS. Additionally, because of the continued
operation of the legacy systems at locations where DTS has been fully
deployed, DOD components may pay DFAS a higher processing fee for
processing manual travel vouchers as opposed to processing the travel
voucher electronically through DTS. For example, for the period October
1, 2004, to February 28, 2005, the Army paid DFAS approximately $6
million to process 177,000 travel vouchers manually--$34 per travel
voucher, versus about $186,000 to process 84,000 travel vouchers
electrically--$2.22 per voucher. Overall, for this 5-month period, it
cost the Army about $5.6 million more to process these travel vouchers
manually as opposed to electronically using DTS.
Background:
Twelve years ago, in September 1993, the National Performance Review
called for an overhaul of DOD's temporary duty (TDY) travel system. In
response, DOD created the DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel to
examine the process. In January 1995, the task force issued the Report
of the Department of Defense Task Force to Reengineer Travel.[Footnote
8] The Task Force's report pinpointed three principal causes for DOD's
inefficient travel system: (1) travel policies and programs were
focused on compliance with rigid rules rather than mission performance,
(2) travel practices did not keep pace with travel management
improvements implemented by industry, and (3) the travel system was not
integrated.
On December 13, 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer issued a memorandum,
"Reengineering Travel Initiative," establishing the PMO-DTS to acquire
travel services that would be used DOD-wide. Additionally, in a 1997
report to the Congress, the DOD Comptroller pointed out that the
existing DOD TDY travel system was never designed to be an integrated
system.[Footnote 9] Furthermore, the report stated that because there
was no centralized focus on the department's travel practices, the
travel policies were issued by different offices and the process had
become fragmented and "stove-piped." The report further noted that
there was no vehicle in the current structure to overcome these
deficiencies, as no one individual within the department had specific
responsibility for management control of the TDY travel system.
To address these concerns and after the use of competitive procedures,
the department awarded a firm fixed-price, performance-based services
contract to BDM International, Inc. (BDM) in May 1998. In September
1998, we upheld the department's selection of BDM.[Footnote 10] Under
the terms of the contract, the contractor was to start deploying a
travel system and to begin providing travel services for approximately
11,000 sites worldwide, within 120 days of the effective date of the
contract, completing deployment approximately 38 months later. The
contract specified that, upon DTS's achieving initial operational
capability (IOC),[Footnote 11] BDM was to be paid a one-time deployment
fee of $20 for each user and a transaction fee of $5.27 for each travel
voucher processed. The estimated cost for the contract was
approximately $264 million. Prior to commencing the work, BDM was
acquired by TRW Inc. (TRW), which became the contractor of record.
The operational assessment of DTS at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri,
from October through December 2000, disclosed serious failures. For
example, the system's response time was slower than anticipated, the
result being that it took longer than expected to process a travel
order/voucher. Because of the severity of the problems, in January
2001, a joint memorandum was issued by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics) directing a functional and technical assessment
of DTS. The memorandum also directed that a determination be made of
any future contract actions that would be necessary, based on the
assessment results. In July 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics) approved proceeding with the DTS program and
restructuring the contract with TRW.
The TRW contract was restructured through a series of contract
modifications which were finalized on March 29, 2002. The Government
agreed to provide TRW consideration in the amount of about $44 million
for restructure of the contract. TRW agreed to release and discharge
the Government from liability and agreed to waive any and all
liabilities, obligations, claims and demands related to or arising from
its early performance efforts under the original contract. Northrop
Grumman subsequently acquired TRW in December 2002, and, as such, is
now the contractor of record.
The first deployment of DTS was at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South
Dakota, in February 2002. As of September 2005, DTS has been deployed
to approximately 5,600 locations. The department currently estimates
that DTS will be fully deployed to all 11,000 locations by the end of
fiscal year 2006, with an estimated total development and production
cost of approximately $474 million. Of this amount, the contract for
the design, development, and deployment of DTS, as restructured is
worth approximately $264 million--the same amount as specified in the
original contract that was agreed to with BDM. The remaining costs are
DOD internal costs associated with areas such as the operation of the
program management office, the voucher payment process, and management
of the numerous CTO contractors.
Previously Reported DOD Travel Issues:
Over the past several years, we have reported pervasive weaknesses in
DOD's travel program. These weaknesses have hindered the department's
operational efficiencies and have left it vulnerable to fraud, waste,
and abuse. These weaknesses are highlighted below.
* On the basis of statistical sampling, we estimated that 72 percent of
the over 68,000 premium class airline tickets DOD purchased for fiscal
years 2001 and 2002 were not properly authorized and that 73 percent
were not properly justified. During fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD
spent almost $124 million on airline tickets that included at least one
leg of the trip in premium class--usually business class. Because each
premium class ticket costs the government up to thousands of dollars
more than a coach class ticket, unauthorized premium class travel
resulted in millions of dollars of unnecessary costs annually.[Footnote
12]
* Because of control breakdowns, DOD paid for airline tickets that were
neither used nor processed for refund--amounting to about 58,000
tickets totaling more than $21 million for fiscal years 2001 and 2002.
DOD was not aware of this problem before our audit and did not maintain
any data on unused tickets. Based on limited data provided by the
airlines, it is possible that the unused value of the fully and
partially unused tickets that DOD purchased from fiscal year 1997
through fiscal year 2003 with DOD's CBA could be at least $100
million.[Footnote 13]
* We found that DOD sometimes paid twice for the same airline ticket--
first to the Bank of America for the monthly DOD credit card bill, and
second to the traveler, who was reimbursed for the same ticket. Based
on our mining of limited data, the potential magnitude of the improper
payments was 27,000 transactions for over $8 million. For example, DOD
paid a Navy GS-15 civilian employee approximately $10,000 for 13
airline tickets he had not purchased.[Footnote 14]
Ongoing DTS Testing Remains a Concern:
DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in
the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure that
the system would perform as intended. Given the lack of adherence to
such a key practice, it is not surprising that critical flaws have been
identified after deployment, resulting in significant schedule
slippages. As originally envisioned, the initial deployment of DTS was
to commence 120 days after the effective date of the contract award in
September 1998, with complete deployment to approximately 11,000
locations by April 2002. However, that date has been changed to
September 2006--a slippage of over 4 years. Our recent analysis of
selected requirements disclosed that the testing of DTS is not always
adequate prior to updated software being released for use by DOD
personnel. System testing is a critical process utilized by
organizations to improve an entity's confidence that the system will
satisfy the requirements of the end user and will operate as intended.
Additionally, an efficient and effective system testing program is one
of the critical elements that need to be in place in order to have
reasonable assurance that an organization has implemented the
disciplined processes[Footnote 15] necessary to reduce project risks to
acceptable levels in software development. In one key area, our results
to date have identified instances in which the testing of DTS was
inadequate, which precluded DOD from having reasonable assurance that
DTS displayed the proper flights and airfares. This occurred because
the PMO-DTS failed to ensure that the appropriate system interfaces
were tested. Additionally, because a system requirement covering this
had never been defined, there was not reasonable assurance that DTS
displayed the accurate number of flights and related airfares within a
given flight window.[Footnote 16] As a result of these two weaknesses,
DOD travelers might not have received accurate information on available
flights and airfares, which could have resulted in higher travel costs.
Specific details on these two weaknesses are discussed below.
* The DOD tests for determining whether DTS displayed the proper
flights and airfares did not provide reasonable assurance that the
proper (1) flights were displayed and (2) airfares for those flights
were displayed. DTS uses a commercial product to obtain information
from the database that contains the applicable flight and airfare
information (commonly referred to as a Global Distribution System or
[GDS]). In testing whether DTS displayed the proper flights and
airfares, the information returned from the commercial product was
compared with the information displayed in DTS and was found to be in
agreement. However, the commercial product did not provide all of the
appropriate flights or airfares to DTS that were contained in the GDS.
Since the PMO-DTS neither performed an end-to-end test[Footnote 17] nor
made sure that the information returned from this commercial product
was in agreement with the information contained in the GDS, it did not
have reasonable assurance that DTS was displaying the proper flights
and airfares information to the users. According to DOD officials, this
system weakness was detected by users complaining that DTS did not
display the proper flights and airfares.
* DOD officials stated that prior to the August 2005 system update, DTS
should have displayed 12 flights, if that many flights were available,
within a flight window.[Footnote 18] DTS program officials and Northrop
Grumman personnel acknowledged that this particular system requirement
had never been tested because DOD failed to document the requirement
until January 2005. Therefore, DOD did not have reasonable assurance
that DTS displayed the required number of flights and related airfare
information. The inability to ensure that the proper number of flights
was displayed could have caused DOD to incur unnecessary travel cost.
As we have noted in previous reports, requirements that are not defined
are unlikely to be tested.[Footnote 19]
PMO-DTS officials acknowledged that these two problems have been
ongoing since the initial implementation of DTS. PMO-DTS officials have
stated that the two problems were corrected as part of the August 2005
DTS system update. We are in the process of verifying whether the
actions taken by DOD will correct the problems.
DTS Has Corrected Some Previously Reported Travel Problems:
Of the four previously reported DOD travel problems, DTS has corrected
one of the problems while the others remain. However, the remaining
problems are not necessarily within the purview of DTS and may take
departmentwide action to fully address.
Improper Premium Class Travel:
While DOD has taken actions to improve existing guidance and controls
related to premium class travel, including system changes in DTS, we
identified instances in which unauthorized premium class travel
continues. In November 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel
and Readiness) formed a task force to address our prior
recommendations[Footnote 20] that focused on three major areas: (1)
policy and controls of travel authorization, (2) ticket issuance and
reporting, and (3) internal control and oversight. Subsequently,
several policy changes were made to improve the control and
accountability over premium class travel. For example, the approval
level for first class travel was elevated to a three-star general and
for business class travel to a two-star general or civilian equivalent.
Other changes included strengthening the description of circumstances
when premium class travel may be used to more clearly show that it is
an exceptional circumstance and not a common practice. In all cases,
approving officials must have their own premium class travel approved
at the next level. These changes also set a broad policy that CTOs are
not to issue premium class tickets without proper authorization. In
September 2004, the PMO-DTS made system changes to DTS that blocked
seven fare codes that were considered to be premium class fare codes
from being displayed or selected by the traveler through DTS. According
to the PMO-DTS, the airline industry does not have standardized fare
code indicators to identify first class, business class, and economy
class. Subsequently, DOD found that economy class fare codes were being
blocked using the seven codes and in May 2005, reduced the list to
three codes.
Despite these various changes in policy and to DTS, we continue to
identify instances in which premium class travel is occurring without
the proper authorization. To date, our preliminary analysis disclosed
at least 68 cases that involved improperly approved premium class
travel.[Footnote 21] In one case, we found that a Department of the
Army civilian employee (GS-12) flew from Columbia, South Carolina via
Atlanta, Georgia to Gulf Port, Mississippi to attend a conference. On
the return trip, one leg included first class accommodations. From our
review and analysis of Bank of America data and the travel voucher, DOD
paid $1,107 for the airfare. The cost of a GSA city pair round trip
airfare was $770. According to information provided by the Army, the
traveler informed the Army that he was meeting another traveler at the
destination and they were going to share a rental car and there were no
seats available on the flight the other traveler had booked. Therefore,
the individual selected a flight arriving as close as possible to the
time of the traveler he was meeting. This is not a valid justification,
and the premium class fare was not approved by the appropriate
official. Additionally, the premium class fare occurred on the return
flight. Furthermore, based upon our review to date, none of the 68
cases that involved improper premium class travel had the required
approval.
Unused Airline Tickets:
DTS still does not have the capability to determine whether a traveler
does not use all or a portion of an airline ticket. To address this
problem, DOD directed that all new CTO contract solicitations require
CTOs to prepare that unused ticket reports which identify tickets that
were not used within a specified time period, usually 30 days past the
trip date, so that they can be cancelled and processed for refund.
Additionally, the various DOD components were directed to modify
existing CTO contracts to require the CTOs to process refunds for
unused airline tickets. At the five locations we visited[Footnote 22]
we found that the Army and Air Force CTOs prepared daily and monthly
reports. The Navy CTOs produced the unused ticket report on a weekly
basis, and the Marine Corps CTOs prepared the report monthly. However,
according to DOD officials, this requirement has not yet been
implemented in all the existing CTO contracts.
Duplicate Payments Related to Centrally Billed Accounts (CBA).
Our preliminary observations indicate that DTS was designed to ensure
that tickets purchased through the CBA cannot be claimed on the
individual's travel voucher as a reimbursement to the traveler. As part
of our statistical sample discussed later, we found 14 travel vouchers
in which an airline ticket purchased with the CBA was included on the
voucher; however, the traveler did not receive reimbursement for the
claim.
Accuracy of Travel Vouchers:
DFAS has previously reported problems with the accuracy of DTS travel
payments. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, DFAS reported a 14
percent inaccuracy rate in the DTS travel payments of airfare, lodging,
and meals, and incidental expenses. Our preliminary analysis of 170
travel vouchers[Footnote 23] disclosed that for the two attributes that
are directly related to the operation of the DTS system--computation of
lodging reimbursement and meals and incidental expenses (per diem)--the
DTS calculations were correct in all instances on the basis of the
information provided by the traveler. However, we continue to identify
numerous instances in which employee errors led to inaccurate
reimbursements. In some cases, errors occurred because incorrect data
were entered into DTS by the traveler. In other cases, the reviews by
the AOs were inadequate. In regard to the AO reviews, our preliminary
analysis indicates that approximately 66 travel vouchers or 39 percent
were paid even though there was not reasonable assurance that the
amount of the reimbursement was accurate. More specifically, 49 of 66
travel vouchers lacked adequate receipts for the amounts claimed.
Receipts are required for all expenses of $75 or more and for lodging,
regardless of the amount. However, for the 49 vouchers, we saw no
evidence that the AO was provided with the appropriate receipts by the
traveler. In one case, the traveler was reimbursed for expenses claimed
in excess of $500, even though none of the required receipts were
available for review and approval by the AO. According to DOD
regulations, "the AOs signature on the expense report certifies that
the travel was taken, that the charges are reasonable—and that the
payment of the authorized expenses is approved." While the signature of
the AO signifies that the payment is approved, it falls short of
ensuring that amounts claimed are reasonable in the cases in which
receipts for airfare and lodging are not provided. Until the overall
review process is improved, travel payment problems will continue to
occur.
DTS Faces Challenges in Achieving the Goal of a Standard DOD Travel
System:
DOD's goal of making DTS the standard travel system within the
department depends upon the development, testing, and implementation of
system interfaces with the myriad of related DOD systems, as well as
private-sector systems such as the system used by credit card company
that provides DOD military and civilian employees with travel cards.
While DOD has developed 32 interfaces, the PMO-DTS is aware of at least
17 additional DOD business systems for which interfaces must be
developed. To date, the development and testing of the interfaces has
cost DOD reportedly over $30 million. Developing the interfaces is time
consuming and costly. Additionally, the underutilization of DTS at the
sites where it has been deployed is also hindering the department's
efforts to have a standard travel system throughout the department.
Furthermore, the underutilization impacts the estimated savings that
are to be derived from the use of DTS departmentwide.
Interfaces Are Critical to Implementing an End-to-End System:
One of DOD's long-standing problems has been the lack of integrated
systems. To address this issue and minimize the manual entry of data,
interfaces between existing systems must be developed to provide the
exchange of data that is critical for day-to-day operations. For
example, DTS needs to know before permitting the authorization of
travel that sufficient funds are available to pay for the travel--
information that comes from a non-DTS system--and once the travel has
been authorized, another system needs to know this information so that
it can record an obligation and provide management and other systems
with information on the funds that remain available. Interfaces are
also needed with private-sector systems, such as the credit card
company that provides DOD personnel with travel cards. Figure 1
illustrates the numerous DTS system interfaces that have already been
developed and implemented with the department's business systems.
Figure 1: DTS System Interfaces Operating Today:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2 shows the DTS system interfaces that must be developed in the
future with the department's business systems.
Figure 2: Future DTS System Interfaces That Need to be Developed:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
While DOD was able to develop and implement the interfaces with the 32
systems, the development of each remaining interface will present the
PMO-DTS with challenges. For example, the detailed requirements for
each of the remaining interfaces have not yet been defined. Such
requirements would define (1) what information will be exchanged and
(2) how the data exchange will be conducted. This is understandable in
some cases such as the Army General Fund Financial enterprise resource
planning (ERP),[Footnote 24] which is a relatively new endeavor within
the department and it will be some time before DOD is in position to
start development of the interface. Additionally, the development of
the DTS interfaces depends on other system owners' achieving their time
frames for implementation. For example, the Navy ERP is one of the DOD
systems with which DTS is to interface and exchange data. Any
difficulties with the Navy's ERP implementation schedule could
adversely affect DTS's interface testing and, thereby, result in a
slippage in the interface being implemented. The above two factors also
affect DTS's ability to develop reliable cost estimates for the future
interfaces.
Underutilization of DTS Affects Estimated Savings:
Another challenge for DTS in achieving its goal of a standard travel
system within DOD is the continued use of the existing legacy travel
systems, which are owned and operated by the various DOD components.
Currently, at least 31 legacy travel systems are continuing to be
operated within the department. As we have previously reported, because
each DOD component receives its own funding for the operation,
maintenance, and modernization of its own systems, there is no
incentive for DOD components to eliminate duplicative travel systems.
[Footnote 25] We recognize that some of the existing travel systems,
such as the Integrated Automated Travel System version 6.0, cannot be
completely eliminated because it performs other functions, such as
permanent change of station travel claims that DTS cannot process.
However, in other cases, the department is spending funds on
duplicative systems that perform the same function as DTS. The funding
of multiple systems that perform the same function is one of the
reasons why the department has 4,150 business systems.[Footnote 26]
Since these legacy systems are not owned and operated by DTS, the PMO-
DTS does not have the authority to discontinue their operation. This is
an issue that must be addressed from a departmentwide perspective.
Because of the continued operation of the legacy systems at locations
where DTS has been fully deployed, DOD components pay DFAS higher
processing fees for processing manual travel vouchers as opposed to
processing the travel vouchers electronically through DTS. According to
an April 13, 2005, memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Financial Management and Comptroller), DFAS was charging the Army $34
for each travel voucher processed manually and $2.22 for each travel
voucher processed electronically--a difference of $31.78. The
memorandum further noted that for the period October 1, 2004, to
February 28, 2005, at locations where DTS had been deployed, the Army
paid DFAS approximately $6 million to process 177,000 travel vouchers
manually--$34 per travel voucher, versus about $186,000 to process
84,000 travel vouchers electronically--$2.22 per voucher. Overall, for
this 5-month period, the Army reported that it spent about $5.6 million
more to process these travel vouchers manually as opposed to
electronically using DTS.
The military services have recognized the importance of utilizing DTS
to the fullest extent possible. The Army issued a memorandum in
September 2004 directing each Army installation to fully disseminate
DTS to all travelers within 90 to 180 days after IOC at each
installation. The memorandum included a list of sites that should be
fully disseminated and the types of vouchers that must be processed
through DTS. Furthermore, the memorandum noted that travel vouchers
that could be processed in DTS should not be sent to DFAS for
processing. In a similar manner, in February 2005, the Marine Corps
directed that upon declaration of DTS's IOC at each location, commands
will have DTS fully fielded within 90 days and will stop using other
travel processes that have the capabilities of DTS. The Air Force
issued a memorandum in November 2004 that stressed the importance of
using DTS when implemented at an installation. The Navy has not issued
a similar directive.
Despite these messages, DTS remains underutilized by the military
services. The military services, and in particular, the Army, have
taken steps to monitor DTS's usage, but others, such as the Marine
Corps, do not capture the data necessary to assess the extent to which
DTS is being underutilized. The lack of pertinent data hinders
management's ability to monitor its progress toward the DOD vision of
DTS as the standard TDY system.
Concluding Remarks:
Overhauling DOD's financial management and business operations--one of
the largest and most complex organizations in the world--represents a
daunting challenge. DTS, intended to be the department's end-to-end
travel management system, illustrates some of the obstacles that must
be overcome by DOD's array of transformation efforts. With over 3.3
million military and civilian personnel as potential travel system
users, the sheer size and complexity of the undertaking overshadows any
such project in the private sector. Nonetheless, standardized business
systems across the department will be the key to achieving billions of
dollars of annual savings through successful DOD transformation. As we
have previously reported, because each DOD component receives its own
funding for the operation, maintenance, and modernization of its own
systems, nonintegrated, parochial business systems have proliferated--
4,150 business systems throughout the department by a recent count. The
elimination of "stove-piped" legacy systems and cheaper electronic
processing, which could be achieved with the successful implementation
of DTS, are critical to realizing the anticipated savings.
In closing, we commend the Subcommittee for holding this hearing as a
catalyst for improving the department's travel management practices. We
also would like to reiterate that following this testimony, we plan to
issue a report that will include recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense aimed at improving the department's implementation of DTS.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
prepared statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions you
may have.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Department of Defense Rights to Property in the Defense
Travel System:
DOD has taken several steps to address its needs for the use of
intellectual and tangible property in the DTS, but it has not yet
completed the exercise of the rights it determined necessary for long-
term development and implementation of the DTS. While the original
contract awarded to BDM did not specifically address intellectual
property rights, TRW, as the successor to BDM, acquired in 2001
perpetual rights to use three key commercial software programs to
accommodate technology decisions that necessitated modifying some
software for use in DTS. When DOD and TRW agreed to restructure the DTS
contract, they modified the contract to include several key provisions
that provided DOD with rights to various categories of intellectual and
tangible property. As set out below, DOD officials told us that they
have yet to complete the exercise of some of DOD's intellectual
property rights and to secure title to hardware necessary to meet its
long-term acquisition needs, but those steps are in progress.
Property Rights Under the Original DTS Contract:
The original DTS contract awarded in 1998 did not specifically address
the Government's intellectual property rights because the contract was
structured primarily as a fixed-priced travel services contact rather
than as a government-funded development effort. As such, the contractor
was responsible for securing the necessary intellectual property rights
in the commercial software and other products being used, except for
those pertaining to existing DOD systems or used by DOD under other
agreements.[Footnote 27] The fixed price for the services would include
the cost to the contractor to obtain or develop the necessary software,
hardware, and technical data[Footnote 28] in order to provide the
required travel services to DOD.
According to DOD officials, DOD and TRW determined in 2001 that three
key commercial software programs used in DTS would not meet DOD's
requirements without modification.[Footnote 29] Accordingly, in
September 2001, TRW executed a license agreement with the firm holding
the copyright to the software programs[Footnote 30] for TRW to use in
developing and deploying DTS within DOD.[Footnote 31] The firm charged
TRW with a one-time fee for the rights under the agreement.
Under the license agreement, TRW obtained a perpetual and exclusive
license to use the three software programs and related software
documentation to develop and deploy software and services for use in
the DTS. This license includes the authority to modify the source code
to one of the software programs. The license agreement authorizes the
assignment of TRW's rights under the agreement to DOD for the DTS
project. The license agreement does not expressly condition such an
assignment on payment of a fee. According to DOD officials, DOD has
approached Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Systems Corp. (Northrop
Grumman), as the successor to TRW, requesting assignment of those
rights to DOD. In a September 22, 2005, letter to the DTS contracting
officer, Northrop Grumman represented that they would assign its rights
under the license agreement to DOD at the conclusion of the contract,
if requested.
The license agreement also provides that Northrop Grumman may
sublicense its rights under the agreement to other entities in support
of DTS. DOD officials told us that they believe Northrop Grumman's
assignment of these rights to DOD would include the authority for DOD
to sublicense the rights to other DOD contractors for use in providing
services related to DTS. The DOD officials noted that they are in the
process of modernizing the DTS application to include a potential
complete replacement of the licensed software with custom developed
software. The officials stated that they are still evaluating whether
an assignment of rights and issuance of any sublicenses actually would
be needed in light of these changes.
Property Rights Under the Restructured Contract:
In the restructuring of the DTS contract, DOD and TRW agreed to address
a number of intellectual and tangible property categories under the
contract that DOD officials told us would satisfy DOD's long-term DTS
development and implementation plans. The restructured contract
incorporated several standard DOD intellectual property rights clauses,
but DOD is still evaluating ownership rights related to key hardware
used in the DTS.
The restructured contract incorporates standard DOD intellectual
property rights clauses for a system being developed at government
expense and it specifically gives DOD perpetual rights to DTS software.
The perpetual rights for different categories of intellectual property
generally depend upon the source of the funding of their development.
In particular, the contract requires Northrop Grumman to "provide a
perpetual license for DOD use worldwide for DTS software" in accordance
with certain standard clauses or in accordance with standard commercial
terms for commercial software.[Footnote 32] Also, the contract
incorporates a clause that requires Northrop Grumman to grant or obtain
for the government royalty free, world-wide, nonexclusive, irrevocable
license rights in technical data.[Footnote 33] Further, these clauses
include provisions that permit Northrop Grumman to assert restrictions
on the government's use, release or disclosure of technical data and
computer software, depending upon the funding of their
development.[Footnote 34] For commercial software used in the DTS,
Northrop Grumman has asserted restrictions applicable to commercial
software licenses. Some of the licenses Northrop Grumman obtained for
use of commercial software may be neither perpetual nor assignable to
DOD, but DOD officials told us that this does not cause risk to the
project since there are available alternative methods to acquire
similar licenses. Table 1 sets out DOD's rights in these categories.
Finally, the contract incorporated a standard clause governing
restrictions DOD may place on information it provides to Northrop
Grumman for use under the contract.[Footnote 35]
Table 1: DOD Rights to Intellectual Property Under the DTS Contract:
Category: Noncommercial Technical Data -Government funded;
Intellectual Property in DTS: All technical data delivered to DOD under
the DTS contract;
DOD Rights: Perpetual Unlimited Rights[A].
Computer Software & Documentation:
Category: Noncommercial -Government Funded;
Intellectual Property in DTS: Software developed under Task Order
Numbers 10, 18, 20, and 26;
DOD Rights: Perpetual Unlimited Rights.
Category: Commercial -Privately Funded (excluding 3 key programs
discussed above); Intellectual Property in DTS: Several dozen software
programs;
DOD Rights: Northrop Grumman has restricted rights[B] for use in DTS as
set out in individual commercial licensesc.
Source: GAO analysis based upon information provided by and discussions
with the PMO-DTS.
[A] "Unlimited rights" means the government's rights to use computer
software or technical data in any way and to authorize others to do so.
[B] "Restricted rights" means, generally, the right to use the software
on one computer at a time. TRW has more liberal rights than restricted
rights in some of these programs.
[C] According to DOD officials, Northrop Grumman has obtained perpetual
and assignable licenses for only some of these programs and DOD intends
to assess its needs and alternative acquisition methods available for
all commercial software as part of its long-term development and
implementation plans.
[End of table]
The restructured contract requires Northrop Grumman to provide all
hardware (and other equipment) necessary to deliver services under the
contract, but DOD officials told us that they are discussing delivery
schedules and ownership rights to hardware items, principally
configuration items. In a September 23, 2005, letter to the DTS
contracting officer, Northrop Grumman represented that they would
assign title to certain hardware at the conclusion of the contract, if
requested. Finally, DOD has leased some hardware items necessary to
interface with the airline Global Distribution Systems and it will need
to evaluate the terms of those leases.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To determine if the Department of Defense (DOD) effectively tested key
Defense Travel System (DTS) functionality associated with flights and
airfares, we reviewed the applicable requirements and the related
testing prior to the August 2005 release to determine if the desired
functionality was effectively implemented.
To determine if DTS will correct the problems previously identified
with DOD travel, we analyzed past GAO reports and testimonies, selected
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, and DOD
congressional testimonies. In this regard, we focused on how DTS
addresses issues related to premium class travel, unused tickets, and
centrally billed accounts. We also randomly sampled 170 travel
vouchers[Footnote 36] to ascertain if some of the problems previously
reported upon by DFAS have been resolved. To be included within the
selected sample, the travel vouchers had to be for trips that were in
DTS and for travel started on or after October 1, 2004, and ended on or
before December 31, 2004. We have not yet finalized our projections for
the sample. To assess the use of premium class travel, we obtained
databases from Bank of America and the Project Management Office-
Defense Travel System (PMO-DTS), which provided information on the
actual travel transactions and traveler information for the period
October-December 2004. The Bank of America's database contained all DOD
transactions for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, and the PMO-DTS
database contained all vouchers processed by DTS for the same time
period. We removed all transactions that were not specifically airline
charges, such as rail charges and commercial travel office fees, and
then selected all fare codes that corresponded to the potential
issuance of a premium class ticket. This resulted in 419 instances in
which a premium class ticket could have been issued. We have not
finalized our analysis.
To identify some of the challenges confronting the department in making
DTS the department's standard travel system, we discussed with PMO-DTS
officials their implementation strategy and reviewed past GAO reports
and testimonies related to the department's efforts to improve the
accuracy and reliability of the information in its business systems.
We briefed DOD officials on the contents of this testimony. We assessed
the reliability of the DOD data we used for our preliminary evaluation
by (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2)
reviewing existing information about the data and the system that
produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable
about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
for the purpose of this testimony. We performed our audit work from
October 2004 through September 2005, in accordance with U.S. generally
accepted government auditing standards.
To describe DOD's property rights in the DTS we reviewed the DTS
contract, applicable acquisition regulations, DOD intellectual property
guidance, key DTS license agreements, and written responses from PMO-
DTS to our questions, and we met with PMO-DTS and contracting officials
and with their legal counsel.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future information about this testimony, please contact McCoy
Williams at (202) 512-6906 or williamsm1@gao.gov or Keith A. Rhodes at
(202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov.
Our contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. In
addition to the above contacts, the following individuals made key
contributions to this testimony: Darby Smith, Assistant Director; J.
Christopher Martin, Senior Level Technologist; Beatrice Alff; Francine
DelVecchio; Francis Dymond; Thomas Hackney; Gloria Hernandezsaunders;
Wilfred Holloway; Jason Kelly; Sheila Miller; Robert Sharpe; Patrick
Tobo; and Adam Vodraska.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD expects DTS to perform all functions related to travel or
ensure that other systems are provided with adequate information to
provide this functionality. For example, obligating funds associated
with travel is a necessary function and DTS is expected to (1) make
sure that adequate funds are available before authorizing travel either
through information contained in its system or by obtaining the
necessary information from another system, (2) obligate funds through
issuance of approved travel orders, and (3) provide DOD's financial
management systems with the necessary information so that those systems
can record the obligation. Since DTS is required to ensure that all
travel related functionality is properly performed, DOD commonly refers
to DTS as an "end-to-end system."
[2] Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Statistical Operations and
Review Branch, Military and Civilian Pay Services Defense Travel
System: Results of Post Payment Reviews, 1st Quarter, FY 2004 (Kansas
City, Mo.: undated).
[3] Flight information includes items such as departure and arrival
times, airports, and the cost of the airline ticket.
[4] GAO, Travel Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses at DOD Led to
Improper Use of First and Business Class Travel, GAO-04-88 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 24, 2003); GAO, Travel Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses at
DOD Led to Improper Use of First and Business Class Travel, GAO-04-229T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2003); GAO, DOD Travel Cards: Control
Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars Wasted on Unused Airline Tickets,
GAO-04-398 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004); GAO, DOD Travel Cards:
Control Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars of Improper Payments, GAO-
04-576 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004); GAO, DOD Travel Cards: Control
Weaknesses Led to Millions in Fraud, Waste, and Improper Payments, GAO-
04-825T (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004).
[5] Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Statistical Operations and
Review Branch, Military and Civilian Pay Services Defense Travel
System: Results of Post Payment Reviews, 1st Quarter, FY 2004 (Kansas
City, Mo.: undated).
[6] We randomly selected 173 travel vouchers for detailed review, but
at the time of our review, 3 vouchers had not yet been completed and
submitted for review.
[7] The vouchers selected for review were those trips in DTS where (1)
the trip started on or after October 1, 2004, and (2) the trip ended on
or before December 31, 2004.
[8] DOD, Report of the Department of Defense Task Force to Reengineer
Travel (Washington, D.C.: January 1995).
[9] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller): Department
of Defense Travel Reengineering Pilot Report to Congress (June 1997).
[10] The competitor, Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS), had
alleged that the department improperly evaluated the two offers by: (1)
undervaluing the estimated savings to the department by EDS's proposed
accelerated DTS deployment schedule; (2) failing to hold "discussions"
with EDS on the proposed accelerated deployment schedule; and (3)
omitting from consideration certain department evaluation team members'
concerns about EDS's staffing level for operation and maintenance of
the DTS. Matter of Electronic Data Systems Corporation, B-280133; B-
280133.2 (Sept. 3, 1998).
[11] IOC represents the first attainment of the minimum capability to
effectively employ a system of approved specific characteristics.
[12] GAO-04-88 and GAO-04-229T.
[13] GAO-04-398.
[14] GAO-04-576.
[15] Disciplined processes for software development and implementation
include a wide range of activities, including project planning and
oversight, requirements management, risk management, and testing.
[16] A flight window is the amount of time before and after a specified
time and is used for determining the flights that should be displayed.
For example, if the flight window is 4 hours and estimated departure
time is 9:00 a.m., then the flight window that is used for displaying
available flights is from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.
[17] The purpose of end-to-end testing is to verify that a defined set
of interrelated systems, which collectively support an organizational
core business area or function, interoperate as intended in an
operational environment.
[18] Prior to the August 2005 system update, DTS used a 4-hour flight
window for domestic flights and a 12-hour flight window for foreign
flights. The current window is 12-hours for domestic flights and 24-
hours for foreign destinations.
[19] GAO, Indian Trust Funds: Challenges Facing Interior's
Implementation of New Trust Asset and Accounting Management System,
GAO/T-AIMD-99-238 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 1999).
[20] GAO-04-88.
[21] To assess the use of premium class travel, we obtained databases
from Bank of America and the PMO-DTS, which provided information on the
actual travel transactions and traveler information for the period
October-December 2004. The Bank of America database contained all DOD
transactions for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, and the PMO-DTS
database contained all vouchers processed by DTS for the same time
period. We identified potentially 419 cases that could involved premium
class travel. We are still in the process of reviewing information
requested from DOD to ascertain if there are other cases of improper
premium class travel.
[22] Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md; Buckley Air Force Base, Colo;
Defense Logistics Agency, Va; Headquarters Marine Corps, Va; and Naval
Operations Headquarters, Va.
[23] We randomly selected 173 travel vouchers for detail review, but at
the time of our review 3 vouchers had not yet been completed and
submitted for review. The selected vouchers were drawn from the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005 (October-December 2004).
[24] An ERP solution is an automated system consisting of multiple,
integrated functional modules that perform a variety of business-
related tasks such as payroll, general ledger accounting, and supply
chain management.
[25] GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested
without Adequate Oversight, GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29,
2005).
[26] GAO-05-381.
[27] Some software and technical data on existing DOD systems to be
connected to DTS were provided to the contractor as government-
furnished equipment or information.
[28] "Technical data" means recorded information, regardless of the
form or method of the recording, of a scientific or technical nature
(including computer software documentation). The term does not include
computer software or data incidental to contract administration, such
as financial and/or management information.
[29] In September 2001, DOD and TRW agreed to Modification No. 4 to
Task Order No. 10 to require software development work and, under this
modification, TRW was to provide DOD with a perpetual license for DTS
software.
[30] The firm represented that it holds the copyright and title to one
commercial software program and acted as an authorized licensee with
respect to the other software programs and certain related data.
[31] The license agreement also authorized limited use of the software,
source code and documentation on similar terms by the U.S. Treasury
Department and included terms for use of the software and executable
code by non-DOD federal government entities under the authority of "the
Economy Act."
[32] Specifically, these rights must be in accordance with Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clauses 252.227-7014,
Rights in Noncommercial Computer Software and Noncommercial Computer
Software Documentation, 252.227-7019, Validation of Asserted
Restrictions -Computer Software, and 252.227-7037, Validation of
Restrictive Markings, or consistent with publicly available licenses
for commercial computer software and documentation.
[33] DFARS clause 252.227-7013, Rights in Technical Data -Noncommercial
Items.
[34] DFARS clauses 252.227-7013 and 252.227-7014.
[35] DFARS clause 252.227-7025, Limitations on the Use or Disclosure of
Government-Furnished Information Marked with Restrictive Legends. This
clause was added to the contract in June 2002.
[36] We randomly selected 173 travel vouchers for detail review, but at
the time of our review 3 vouchers had not yet been completed and
submitted for review.
