Defense Logistics
Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor Gao ID: GAO-06-274 June 22, 2006The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has led to widespread interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment. GAO initiated a series of engagements under the Comptroller General's authority to address these concerns. In March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the production and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy trucks. This engagement examines issues affecting the production and installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.
The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation of add-on truck armor in September 2004--8 months after the requirements were identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps installed interim armor that did not provide sufficient IED protection, which Marine Corps officials acknowledged, stating that their intent was to field some level of protection until a more robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with armor that provided enhanced IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading to integrated armor for its 7-ton trucks, which provides improved protection because the armor is built into the body of the vehicle. They expect to complete installation by May 2006. Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army. Consequently, this delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004--2 months after the Army began its truck armor program in November 2003. According to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. Second, mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor. The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine Corps is alsotaking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to address the availability of truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established a joint requirements process to improve coordination and accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions. However, it is unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development of new technology solutions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-274, Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2006:
Defense Logistics:
Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and Army
Affected the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck
Armor:
GAO-06-274:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-274, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has
led to widespread interest by Congress and the public regarding the
availability of critical force protection equipment. GAO initiated a
series of engagements under the Comptroller General‘s authority to
address these concerns. In March 2006, GAO reported on factors that
affected the production and installation of armor for the Army‘s medium
and heavy trucks. This engagement examines issues affecting the
production and installation of armor for the Marine Corps‘ medium and
heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which
truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements,
(2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and
(3) identify what actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to
improve the timely availability of truck armor.
What GAO Found:
The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and
installation of add-on truck armor in September 2004---8 months after
the requirements were identified in January 2004. In addressing its
truck armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased
approach. In the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial
requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection
against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the
need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps installed
interim armor that did not provide sufficient IED protection, which
Marine Corps officials acknowledged, stating that their intent was to
field some level of protection until a more robust armor solution
became available. In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its
armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that
requirement in September 2004 with armor that provided enhanced IED
protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading to
integrated armor for its 7-ton trucks, which provides improved
protection because the armor is built into the body of the vehicle.
They expect to complete installation by May 2006.
Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor
requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army.
Consequently, this delay may have limited the Marine Corps‘ ability to
field interim armor that met IED protection requirements in the first
phase, and may have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck
armor to deployed Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine
Corps did not officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did
not begin seeking out armor materials from industry until January
2004”2 months after the Army began its truck armor program in November
2003. According to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed
for sufficient IED protection was not available from suppliers in time
to meet the Marine Corps‘ deployment timeline of March 2004. As a
result, the Marine Corps fielded the interim armor with only limited
IED protection. Second, mission needs restricted the rate at which the
Marine Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on armor and
install integrated armor.
The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely
availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For
example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for
integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The
Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions, such as developing a
plan to address the availability of truck armor for future operations.
In addition, DOD established a joint requirements process to improve
coordination and accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime
solutions. However, it is unclear whether this process applies to
urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development
of new technology solutions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD (1) establish a process for sharing
information on developing materiel solutions and (2) clarify the point
at which the joint requirements process should be utilized. DOD
concurred with the second recommendation but believes communication is
sufficient to satisfy the first recommendation. GAO disagrees. DOD also
provided comments related to the context and accuracy of the report,
which we incorporated as appropriate.
[Hyperlink. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-274].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004:
Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs
Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces:
Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring Efforts:
Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks:
Logistics Vehicle System:
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor:
Figures:
Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim Armor
Protection:
Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-
on Armor Protection:
Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated
Armor:
Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck:
Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim and Add-on Armor:
Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System:
Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and
Add-on Armor:
Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement:
Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 22, 2006:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization
operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since
that time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from
insurgents using a variety of weapons--including improvised explosive
devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers--and there have been
numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and
equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has
become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one
killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist
mainly of dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells, or other types of
military ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic
routes, and are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military
personnel.
As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the
protection of military forces operating in the region. Among these is
the fielding of new capabilities to counter emerging threats
encountered in Iraq, to include such improvements as add-on and
integrated armor for trucks, body armor, and systems for detecting and
defeating IEDs.
In response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the
public regarding the availability of critical force protection
equipment for deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we
initiated a series of engagements under the authority of the
Comptroller General of the United States to examine this issue. In
April 2005 we reported on shortages of a number of critical items
during OIF, to include certain protective items such as body armor and
armored HMMWVs.[Footnote 1] We identified a number of systemic causes
for these shortages, including inaccurate requirements, delayed
funding, and ineffective distribution processes. As a result, we made
several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense calling for
actions, such as ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements
and developing and exercising deployable distribution capabilities, to
improve DOD's system for supplying items to U.S. forces. In March 2006,
we reported on several factors that affected the production and
installation of Army truck armor during OIF and other current wartime
operations.[Footnote 2] These factors included the Army's failure to
fully capitalize on previously identified truck armor requirements and
awarding contracts for amounts less than total requirements due to
increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. In our report,
we made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense calling for the
Army to establish a process for documenting and communicating all
urgent wartime funding requirements for supplies and equipment when
they are identified and the disposition of funding decisions.
This current engagement examines issues affecting the production and
installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Marine Corps
forces during OIF and other ongoing operations in the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.[Footnote 3] Our objectives
were to (1) determine the extent to which Marine Corps truck armor was
produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify
what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify
what actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely
availability of truck armor.
In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical
trucks used by Marine Corps forces in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, which included those in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote
4] To identify the extent to which truck armor was produced and
installed to meet identified requirements and what factors affected the
time to provide armor, we visited Marine Corps organizations to obtain
data on the requirements, funding, production, and installation of
truck armor kits. We considered the armor requirement as met for each
type of truck when the quantity of add-on and integrated armor produced
and installed on vehicles equaled the requirement. Based on the
information gathered, we identified factors that affected the time to
provide truck armor to deployed forces. We also identified the Marine
Corps' short-term and long-term efforts to improve the availability of
truck armor. We assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and
determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. We performed our review from April 2005 to March 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is located in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and
installation of add-on truck armor in September 2004--8 months after
that requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its
truck armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased
approach. In the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial
requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection
against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the
need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed
this initial requirement by installing interim armor on all 1,169
trucks. However, the interim armor did not meet requirements because it
did not provide sufficient protection from the fragmentation effects of
IEDs. Marine Corps officials acknowledged that the interim armor
provided protection against the prevalent ballistic threat at the time
but offered only limited protection against IEDs. These officials
stated that their intent was to field some level of protection until a
more robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the
Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April
2004 and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor
that provided the required IED protection. In the third phase, the
Marine Corps is upgrading armor protection from add-on armor to
integrated armor for 900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which
were included in the 1,438 trucks armored in the second phase. As of
March 2006, 803 integrated armor kits have been installed, and the
Marine Corps expects to complete installation of integrated armor by
May 2006. The other trucks (5-ton truck and 22-ton bulk hauler) are not
receiving integrated armor because they are at the end of their
economic life cycle and will be replaced.
Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor
requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army.
This delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim
armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may
have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed
Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not
officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin
seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004. According
to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient
IED protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the
Marine Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the
Marine Corps fielded the interim armor with only limited IED
protection. However, the Army identified its initial truck armor
requirement in November 2003 and begun developing armor kits using the
preferred type of steel at this time. Had the Marine Corps began
seeking armor solutions in November 2003, it might have been able to
acquire the preferred type of steel in time for its March 2004
deployment to Iraq given the average lead times for this steel during
this time and the willingness of industry to work with the Marine Corps
to expedite the availability. Second, mission needs restricted the rate
at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on
armor and install integrated armor. As a result, the fielding of add-on
armor and integrated armor was stretched out over a longer period,
placing troops at greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in
vehicles without the preferred level of protection.
The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the
timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime
equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of
installation for integrated armor by expanding its armor installation
capacity. The Marine Corps also is taking longer-term actions, such as
developing a plan to address the availability of truck armor for future
operations. While we did not evaluate this plan, we did note that it is
aimed at identifying long-term requirements for truck armor and
developing solutions to address these requirements. In addition, DOD
established the Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent
Operational Needs (JUONS) process to improve coordination of wartime
combatant commander requirements, and to accelerate the process of
fielding urgent wartime solutions that are outside the services'
established requirement processes. However, it is unclear whether this
process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it
excludes the development of new technology solutions.
To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions
about what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address
common urgent wartime requirements, we are making recommendations that
the Secretary of Defense (1) direct the service secretaries to
establish a process to share information on developed or developing
materiel solutions and (2) clarify the point at which the JUONS process
should be utilized when materiel solutions require research and
development. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with the second recommendation, but stated it believes that
multiple layers of communication already exist between the Marine Corps
and the Army to satisfy the first recommendation. However, as evidenced
in our report, these various layers of communication were not
sufficient to bring the services' two truck armor programs together in
a more uniform and coordinated approach from the beginning to ensure
that requirements were identified and solutions developed for both
services at the same time. DOD also provided additional comments
related to the context and accuracy of the report, which we
incorporated as appropriate. The department's written comments and our
evaluation of them are discussed in appendix III.
Background:
Marine Corps convoys carrying supplies and equipment in CENTCOM's area
of responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents
using IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Marine
Corps has undertaken several force protection measures, such as adding
armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM locations. The Marine Corps fielded
truck armor after identifying requirements and then designing and
procuring three different levels of armor and fielding that armor in
three different phases.
Deployed U.S. Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs:
Military convoys operating in CENTCOM's area of responsibility have
been subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular,
attacks in Iraq by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and
personnel at tremendous risk as they carry supplies and equipment
throughout the region. In May 2003, U.S. and coalition forces began
stabilization operations in Iraq that continue today. However, since
that time, the United States has incurred more casualties than during
major combat operations, mostly due to ambushes and IED attacks by
insurgents operating in Iraq. The threat from IEDs has grown
progressively, from single mortar rounds, to multiple explosives linked
together, to suicide car bombs. In the spring of 2004, nearly every
attack from an IED resulted in a coalition casualty. In particular,
U.S. military convoys have been the targets of these types of attacks.
In addition to Iraq, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan also have
been subjected to IED attacks.
IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a
number of different ways. They can contain commercial or military
explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance
components. For example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been
employed as IEDs in Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many
vehicles--from small sedans to large cargo trucks--stationed along the
roadways. Furthermore, "person-borne" suicide bombs have also been
used, with explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is
specifically modified to conceal and carry this material.
Outfitting Marine Corps Trucks with Armor:
In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars
and rocket launchers, the Marine Corps has undertaken several force
protection measures, including adding armor to a number of medium and
heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM
locations.[Footnote 5] The trucks being armored by the Marine Corps
include the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck),
the multipurpose 5-ton truck, and the 22-ton Logistics Vehicle System
(LVS). The MTVR and 5-ton are multipurpose medium trucks that transport
all types of supplies. The LVS is a heavy truck that transports a
variety of supplies and equipment such as bulk liquids (fuel and
water), ammunition, bulk and palletized cargo, and bridging equipment.
Appendix II contains a detailed description of each Marine Corps
vehicle and a discussion of armor production and installation.
Processes for Developing Wartime Requirements and Solutions:
The Marine Corps identified wartime truck armor requirements and
initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions, which
involved seeking funding from a variety of sources, identifying and
contracting with suppliers for armor materials and components,
designing and testing armor solutions, and installing armor onto
trucks.
Process for Developing Wartime Requirements:
When a need for new equipment is identified by Marine Corps
warfighters, units make official requests through the Marine Corps'
requirements process by submitting a universal needs statement, which
acts as a "work request" for current and future wartime capabilities.
For example, the universal needs statements for truck armor described
an urgent need to protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the
fragmentation effects of IEDs and other threats and specified the
numbers and types of trucks to be armored. Universal needs statements
are forwarded from units to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command
at Quantico, Virginia, where they are validated and approved for
funding by the Marine Requirements Oversight Council.[Footnote 6] Upon
validation, the statements are forwarded to the Program and Review
office at Marine Corps headquarters to obtain funding and to Marine
Corps Systems Command for procurement. The Marine Corps validated its
first requirement for truck armor in January 2004 prior to the
deployment of the First Marine Expeditionary Force to Southwest Asia.
Development of Truck Armor Solutions:
To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Marine Corps
initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions for its
deployed trucks. The Marine Corps obtained funding for its armor
program from a variety of sources. While the services can reprogram a
small amount of funds from one program budget to another, the majority
of funding had to be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) and, in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to
obtain funding for truck armor, the Marine Corps sought approval from
the DOD Comptroller and Congress to reprogram funding from other
procurement or appropriations accounts,[Footnote 7] requested funding
from the DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,[Footnote 8] and requested
funding through supplemental appropriations.
The Marine Corps Systems Command was the activity responsible for
developing truck armor solutions to address validated Marine Corps
requirements. Systems Command's armoring efforts consisted of a phased
approach to develop and field three distinct levels of armor: interim
armor components, add-on armor kits, and integrated armor. Table 1
shows the Marine Corps' armoring phases with the type of armor used in
each phase.
Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor:
Phase I: Interim armor;
Phase II: Add-on armor;
Phase III: Integrated armor.
Phase I: Kevlar/ceramic and 3/16-inch high hard steel (HHS);
Phase II: 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor (RHA);
Phase III: Armor integrated into the body of the vehicle.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
[End of table]
The phase one interim armor consisted of commercial off-the-shelf and
Marine Corps depot-produced armor components, such as 3/16-inch high
hard steel (HHS)[Footnote 9] armor doors, ballistic blankets, and
Kevlar/ceramic panels. Recognizing that the interim armor provided
limited protection from IED fragments, the Marine Corps subsequently
produced a more robust solution of add-on armor for phase two that
provided greater protection against IEDs and roadside bombs. This add-
on armor initially included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor
(RHA)[Footnote 10] steel doors and side panels, and ballistic glass.
Later, as the threat became more lethal, the Marine Corps began
producing and installing additional add-on armor coverage for phase two
that included underbodies, roofs, tailgates, rear cab plates, and
gunner shields. To produce add-on armor kits, Systems Command used its
own Logistics Command to produce and ship the add-on armor kits. The
Logistics Command obtained the armor panels and components directly
from suppliers and manufactured some parts in its depot, and shipped
kits directly to CENTCOM's area of responsibility for installation.
As an improvement over add-on armor already fielded, in phase three the
Marine Corps is currently installing an integrated armor kit for the
MTVR. Unlike add-on armor, integrated armor is a permanent modification
and is designed for the life of the vehicle. Integrated armor provides
the greatest level of protection through more comprehensive coverage.
The integrated truck armor kits are produced by Oshkosh Truck
Corporation. Installing integrated armor is much more complex than add-
on armor because it requires stripping the truck to its frame and
rebuilding. It takes a five-person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle
to complete the installation of integrated armor.
Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004:
The Marine Corps met its requirements for production and installation
of add-on truck armor in September 2004---8 months after that initial
requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck
armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In
the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in
January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and
other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy
forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed this initial
requirement by installing interim armor on all 1,169 trucks. However,
the interim armor did not meet requirements because it did not provide
sufficient protection from the fragmentation effects of IEDs. In the
second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438
trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September 2004
with add-on armor that provided the required IED protection. In the
third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading armor protection from add-on
armor to integrated armor for 900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan,
which were included in the 1,438 trucks armored during the second
phase.
First Phase Requirement Addressed with Interim Armor:
In its first phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps validated its
initial requirement to armor 1,169 trucks in January 2004. However,
they addressed the requirement by installing interim armor that did not
provide sufficient protection against IED fragments. Figure 1 shows
Marine Corps production and installation of the interim armor
protection over the 2-month period taken to address the initial
requirement.
Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim Armor
Protection:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the line in the graph simply indicates that sufficient
purchase, production, and installation occurred to meet the
requirements.
[End of figure]
Due to the immediacy of the need for armor and because forces were
preparing to deploy in 2 months, in January 2004 Marine Corps officials
purchased truck armor that was readily available, could be quickly
shipped to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, and was easily installed.
This interim solution consisted of a mix of Kevlar/ceramic armor plates
purchased off the shelf from commercial companies to protect doors, and
3/16-inch HHS armor plates produced by a Marine Corps depot to protect
doors and cargo areas. Officials said the interim armor protected
against the prevalent ballistic threat at the time and was readily
available off the shelf from industry. However, this interim armor did
not meet the validated requirements. Part of this requirement was to
address an urgent need to protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the
fragmentation effects of IEDs. Marine Corps officials said an integral
part of the Marine Corps' armoring strategy was to procure and install
armor on all vehicles prior to going to CENTCOM's area of
responsibility, using the best materials readily available at the time.
According to congressional testimony by the Systems Command's
Commanding General, the Marine Corps always made clear the fact that
they would pursue a more robust solution as better raw material steel
became available.[Footnote 11] As a result, the interim armor fielded
by the Marine Corps offered limited protection from IEDs and troops
were placed at greater risk as they conducted operations in vehicles
equipped with insufficient protection.
Second Phase Requirement Met with Add-On Armor:
The second phase of truck armoring began in April 2004, when a second
requirement to armor 1,438 trucks with 3/8-inch RHA steel was validated
and then met 5 months later using add-on armor that provided the
required IED protection. To meet this requirement, the Marine Corps had
to re-armor the existing 1,169 trucks that had interim armor, plus
armor an additional 269 trucks with the required IED protection.
Installation of add-on armor on the trucks was completed in September
2004, 5 months after establishment of the April requirement and 8
months after establishment of the initial requirement. Figure 2 shows
Marine Corps production and installation of the add-on armor protection
over the 5-month period needed to meet the April requirement.
Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-
on Armor Protection:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the line in the graph simply indicates that sufficient
production and installation occurred to meet the requirements. Dotted
line over the graph indicates some overproduction occurred.
[End of figure]
Since the time the Marine Corps met its second phase armor requirement
with the installation of 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor, it continued to
make improvements to that armor during the second phase to better
protect against IED fragments. According to officials, the upgrades
included expanding armor coverage to the underbodies, tailgates, roofs,
and gunner shields of the trucks. For example, the Marine Corps
installed underbodies on 87 of the 5-ton trucks[Footnote 12] and
underbodies on all 235 LVS trucks. Upgraded add-on armor has also been
installed on the MTVRs until the MTVRs with integrated armor could be
fielded. According to Marine Corps officials, this improved add-on
armor offers significant protection of vehicles, including coverage for
the seams to better shield against explosive blasts and fragments.
Third Phase Requirements To Be Met with Integrated Armor:
In the third phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps established two
requirements to armor MTVRs with integrated armor. The first
requirement to armor 1,018 MTVRs was validated in October 2004, but was
reduced to 900 in June 2005 primarily due to the rotation of fewer
troops and trucks in and out of CENTCOM's area of responsibility. The
Marine Corps plans to install armor on 900 MTVRs for forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan by May 2006. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps had
completed installation of integrated armor on 803 MTVRs. Figure 3 shows
Marine Corps production and installation of the integrated armor
protection.
Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated
Armor:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates the
amount of armor produced by March 2006 to meet the requirements.
[End of figure]
According to Marine Corps officials, since the MTVR is at the beginning
of its economic life cycle, the Marine Corps decided to armor this
truck with armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Marine
Corps officials said that only the MTVR trucks will receive the
integrated armor because both of the other types of trucks used (the 5-
ton and 22-ton bulk hauler) are at the end of their economic life cycle
and are expected to be replaced over the next 5 years by the MTVRs and
the Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR).
Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs
Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces:
Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine
Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the
Marine Corps and the Army on truck armor requirements and solutions
resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements
and seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. Second,
mission needs also affected the Marine Corp's ability to replace its
interim armor with add-on armor and to install integrated armor. As a
result, the total length of time to field add-on armor and integrated
armor was stretched out over a longer period, placing troops at greater
risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles without the
preferred level of protection.
Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in
Identifying Truck Armor Requirements and Developing Solutions May Have
Affected Armor Availability For Deploying Units:
A lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in
identifying truck armor requirements and coordinating an armor solution
from industry may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field
interim armor that met IED protection requirements and may have
contributed to the time to provide the second phase armor protection to
deployed Marine Corps forces. The Marine Corps began procuring 3/8-inch
RHA armor for effective protection against IED fragments in late
February 2004--3 months after the Army identified this armor as a
solution for IED protection in November 2003. After testing many types
of armor materials to protect against IEDs, the Army subsequently
issued armor protection guidance in December 2003 recognizing HHS and
Kevlar/ceramic plates, which the Marine Corps purchased for its interim
armor solution in January 2004, as ineffective against IED fragments.
The guidance also stated that 3/8-inch RHA steel offered good
protection against IED blasts and fragments. Marine Corps officials
said they were aware of the Army's armor protection guidance and had
pursued acquiring 3/8-inch RHA steel in January, but it was not
available from industry to meet their needs. As a result, as an interim
solution to meet deployment deadlines, they purchased the best armor
steel available, although it did not provide sufficient IED protection.
To verify whether a shortage of 3/8-inch RHA steel occurred during the
January and March 2004 time frame, we asked several steel suppliers who
had supplied steel to an Army and Marine Corps steel distributor
whether 3/8-inch RHA was in short supply. Industry officials told us
that if the Marine Corps had requested 3/8-inch RHA steel directly from
them, they could have made it available sooner despite a lead time that
varied from 30 days to 4 months. In fact, according to industry
officials, both the 3/16-inch HHS and 3/8-inch RHA steel required the
same amount of lead time. Ultimately, in early February 2004, the
Marine Corps approached industry with the assistance of congressional
staff, and by the end of February, 3/8-inch RHA steel became available.
By March 2004, the Marine Corps began producing 3/8-inch RHA add-on
armor for their second phase armor effort.
A formal process did not exist to require the military services to
coordinate when developing common wartime requirements, such as truck
armor, or share information on research, development, and procurement
efforts supporting solutions to those requirements. Both the Marine
Corps and Army have separate and distinct requirements determination
processes to address their warfighters' urgent needs. The two services
share information only through informal communication channels, which
may not always occur in the timeliest manner. For example, the Marine
Corps validated its first requirement to armor vehicles against IEDs
and other explosive devices in January 2004, 2 months after the Army
had validated a similar requirement in November 2003. In addition, in
November 2003, the Army had built a prototype armor kit for production
made out of 3/8-inch RHA steel, which is what the Marine Corps
officials said they began seeking 2 months later but were unable to
obtain. If both the Marine Corps and Army had coordinated requirements
earlier and had worked together to purchase 3/8-inch RHA steel from
industry in November 2003, the Marine Corps might have had 3/8-inch RHA
available for its first armor phase instead of the 3/16-inch HHS it
used for interim armor, or might have completed its second armor phase
sooner than September 2004. Without a formal process for coordinating
common urgent wartime requirements and the development of materiel
solutions across military services, the Army and Marine Corps could
continue to develop different solutions with varying degrees of
effectiveness in response to the same warfighter needs.
Mission Needs Affected Production and Installation of Truck Armor:
The production and installation of truck armor was also affected by
mission needs. Specifically, mission needs restricted the rate at which
armor could be installed onto vehicles in the theater of operations.
According to Marine Corps officials, the need to install armor without
jeopardizing theater missions limited the number of vehicles that could
be taken out of action at any one time. As a result, installation rates
for the Marine Corps' add-on and integrated armor were paced with the
rotation of trucks into the maintenance area as they returned from
missions. In addition, the installation of integrated armor on the MTVR
trucks also has been constrained by lengthy installation times--on
average it takes a five-person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to
install a single kit. As a result of these constraints, the
installation of add-on and integrated truck armor was stretched out
over a longer period, and the Marine Corps provided funding and set
production rates for add-on armor components to match the limited rate
of installation. Consequently, troops were placed at greater risk as
they conducted operations in vehicles that were equipped with the
interim armor that provided limited protection from IEDs.
Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability:
The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the
timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime
equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of
installation for integrated armor by expanding its armor installation
capacity. The Marine Corps is also developing a longer-term plan to
address the availability of truck armor for future operations. In
addition, DOD established the Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint
Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) process to improve coordination of
combatant commander wartime requirements common to multiple services
and to accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions that
are outside the services' established requirements processes. However,
it is unclear whether this policy applies to urgent wartime needs such
as armor because it excludes the development of new technology
solutions.
Marine Corps Is Taking Short-and Long-Term Actions to Improve Armor
Availability:
The Marine Corps is taking short-term and long-term actions to improve
the availability of truck armor. In the short term, to address current
armor needs for deployed forces in Iraq and other CENTCOM locations,
the Marine Corps accelerated the rate of installation by increasing the
number of installation sites for integrated armor kits. For example, as
of August 2005, the Marine Corps had installed integrated armor on 41
MTVRs using one installation site in Iraq, and as of October 2005 it
had installed armor on 177 MTVRs using two sites--one in Iraq and one
in Kuwait. The Marine Corps opened a third site in November 2005 at the
Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany, Georgia to further increase
installation rates. As a result of the increased number of installation
sites, total installation of integrated armor increased to 803 MTVRs as
of March 2006.
The Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions to improve the
availability of truck armor for future operations. For example, the
Marine Corps has developed a strategic plan for tactical wheeled
vehicles that addresses future truck armor needs. According to Marine
Corps officials, the plan involves ongoing assessments of the Marine
Expeditionary Force concept of warfare--the need to stay light and
expeditionary--and limitations of available airlift and seabasing that
impact the amount of armor applied to a vehicle. In addition, the
Marine Corps is also investigating future kit-armoring strategies with
the Army using the "A" kit and "B" kit concept identified in the Army's
long-term strategy. Under this strategy, the Army's plan for add-on
armor for trucks requires two kits. The A kit provides a basic
framework of fixtures for all trucks ready to accept armor and includes
hard-to-install parts and permanent mounting provisions for the B kit.
The B kit contains the actual armor to be applied to all trucks fitted
with an A kit and includes modular components that can be installed and
removed by two people. The Marine Corps currently plans to incorporate
this A kit/B kit armor concept onto its LVSR and MTVR as new vehicles
are produced. Marine Corps officials told us that this concept
addresses some of the concerns raised by Marine Corps officials, such
as wear and tear on the vehicles due to the additional weight of the
armor. Other long-term Marine Corps efforts underway include studies on
future armoring needs and solutions. These studies are evaluating the
ground transportation needs of the Marine Corps in an expeditionary
context and will make recommendations regarding the value of current
vehicle systems and necessary changes to develop and maintain a
tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that meets Marine Corps requirements
through 2020. While we did not evaluate these studies, we did note that
they are aimed at identifying longer-term requirements for truck armor
and developing solutions to address these requirements.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Coordination of Requirements across
Services:
DOD has taken steps to improve coordination of urgent wartime needs
across the services by developing the JUONS process. DOD established
the JUONS process in July 2005 to improve coordination of combatant
commanders' urgent wartime requirements that are outside the services'
established processes to accelerate the fielding of wartime solutions
that may be purchased off the shelf or warrant minor modification.
However, according to Army officials, it is not clear whether the JUONS
process addresses urgent wartime needs that may emerge in the same
fashion as armor. The acquisition of an armor solution was in part an
off-the-shelf purchase combined with some level of research and
development of new technology. According to the JUONS instructions,
solutions that involve the development of a new technology or
capability should not be processed under the instruction's procedures.
However, the instruction also allows the minor modification of an
existing system to adapt to a new or similar mission. Army officials
said they were unclear whether urgent wartime requirements such as
armor should be processed under JUONS given that the armor solution can
be described as both an off-the-shelf solution with minor modification
and a solution that required the development of new technology. For
example, according to Army officials, the recently fielded armor
solutions were readily available off the shelf and required some
modification. However, officials also said that the armor solutions can
be described as new and developing technology because research was
needed to identify effective armor protection standards and new
technology was necessary to integrate and apply armor onto vehicles. As
a result, it is not clear if similar future requirements are to be
processed under JUONS or other requirements generation processes. Until
the types of solutions about which the JUONS process applies are more
clearly defined, it is uncertain whether this process would apply to
joint urgent wartime requirements for items needing some level of
research and development, such as truck armor.
Conclusions:
The results of our work on Marine Corps truck armor indicate a broader
systemic problem with a lack of synchronization between the Marine
Corps and Army in identifying common urgent wartime requirements and
developing solutions to those requirements. Because there was no formal
process requiring a synchronized approach between the two services for
identifying requirements or developing solutions, the Marine Corps did
not identify a requirement for truck armor or begin developing armor
solutions until 2 months after the Army had done so. A more unified and
coordinated approach between the Marine Corps and the Army might have
allowed the Marine Corps to field a better interim armor solution that
provided sufficient protection against IEDs. In addition, earlier
coordination may also have enabled the Marine Corps to begin developing
and fielding its second phase of armor, which provided the required IED
protection, sooner. Further, due to the lack of a formal process for
sharing requirements information between the services, official
documentation was not available to determine whether the Marine Corps
made informed decisions about the materials it selected for its interim
armor or to assess the basis for these decisions. While the work we
performed focused on the Marine Corps and Army, the lack of a DOD-wide
framework for coordinating wartime requirements and solutions impacts
on all of the military services.
Subsequent to the procurement and installation of Marine Corps add-on
truck armor, DOD established a new joint process, called JUONS, to
ensure that the development of wartime requirements common to the
Marine Corps, Army, and other services are coordinated. However,
because this new process does not apply to the development of new
technologies, it is not clear whether it will improve interservice
coordination when solutions involve some level of research and
development, like truck armor. Without a formal process for
coordinating all common wartime requirements and the development of
materiel solutions across military services, the Army, Marine Corps,
and other services could continue to develop different solutions with
varying degrees of effectiveness in response to the same warfighter
needs. It is likely that DOD will again face urgent wartime
requirements common to multiple services to rapidly develop materiel
solutions to improve force capability or protection of deployed forces.
The effective coordination of common requirements and sharing of
information on materiel solutions in development are critical to ensure
the needs of the warfighter are met in the timeliest and most effective
manner possible. Without improved coordination, deployed military
personnel and their missions may be placed at significant risk because
they lack the appropriate equipment at the critical times it may be
needed. Furthermore, until a formal process for coordinating and
sharing information on all common urgent wartime requirements and
solutions is established, Congress and the Secretary of Defense may be
unable to exercise effective oversight of decisions made to address
urgent wartime requirements.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions
about what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address
common urgent wartime requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense take the following two actions: (1) direct the service
secretaries to establish a process to share information between the
Marine Corps and the Army on developed or developing materiel
solutions, and (2) clarify the point at which the JUONS process should
be utilized when materiel solutions require research and development.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
with our recommendations. Regarding the first recommendation that DOD
direct the services to establish a process to share information between
the services on materiel solutions in development, DOD partially
concurred, and stated that it believes that multiple layers of
communication already exist between the Marine Corps and the Army. For
example, DOD cited the Marine Corps' participation in the Army's armor
kit working group. DOD also noted that the Marine Corps coordinated
with the Army Research Lab and the Army's Aberdeen Test Center on armor
kit design and testing. While we agree that the coordination between
the Marine Corps and Army on truck armoring was beneficial to the
Marine Corps' program, these processes were generally informal in
nature. As evidenced in our report, these various layers of
communication were not sufficient to bring the services' two truck
armor programs together in a more uniform and coordinated approach from
the beginning to ensure that requirements were identified and solutions
developed for both services at the same time. Instead, the Army
identified its first truck armor requirements and began developing
solutions in November 2003, while the Marine Corps did not begin its
program until January 2004. As we reported, had the Marine Corps began
seeking truck armor solutions in November 2003, if might have been able
to acquire the preferred type of steel in time for its March 2004
deployment to Iraq given the average lead times for this steel during
this time period and the willingness of industry to work with the
Marine Corps to expedite its availability.
DOD further stated that it believes it met the intent of our
recommendation with the creation of the Army-Marine Corps Board and the
Navy-Marine Corps Board. As noted by DOD, these Boards address issues
at the 3-star level and provide a means to share information between
the services. According to DOD, the Army-Marine Corps Board was not
mature enough to influence the initial development of truck armor, but
in 2005 it was used to coordinate production delivery priority between
the Army and Marine Corps for the up-armored HMMWV. While we agree that
these Boards enhance the coordination between the two services, they
represent an agreement between the services, initiated by the services.
The intent of our recommendation is for DOD to develop a more
comprehensive DOD-wide process that requires synchronization and
coordination between the services in identifying common urgent wartime
requirements and developing solutions to those requirements.
In response to our second recommendation to clarify the point at which
the JUONS process should be utilized, DOD concurred, stating that the
Joint Staff is working on an update to the JOUNS process instruction.
According to DOD, this update will clarify when and if the JOUNS
process can be used when materiel solutions require development of a
new technology or capability. The update is expected to be completed by
September 2006.
DOD provided additional comments related to the context of the report.
Specifically, DOD noted that it believes the Marine Corps exhibited due
diligence in providing armor protection for its deployed tactical
wheeled vehicle fleet. It further described in detail the Marine Corps'
approach to first develop an interim solution using commercially
available materials, including 3/16-inch HHS, to ensure all vehicles
entering Iraq would have at least some protection until armor with a
better level of protection could be fielded. We agree that the Marine
Corps exercised diligence in armoring its trucks for Iraq and other
deployed locations given the circumstances and we believe this
information is accurately presented in the report. However, as noted in
the report, a more unified and synchronized approach between the Army
and the Marine Corps may have improved the availability of the
preferred 3/8-inch RHA for the Marine Corps' interim armor.
DOD also provided additional comments related to the accuracy of the
report which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate. The
department's specific comments and our responses to them are discussed
in detail in appendix III. In summary, the department disagreed with
our statements regarding the (1) lack of coordination between the
Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
solutions, (2) lack of a formal department wide process to ensure
interservice coordination, and (3) delays in the Marine Corps'
identification of the requirement for 3/8-inch RHA and its attempts to
acquire and install this improved armor. While we acknowledge that the
Marine Corps made attempts to coordinate with the Army through various
informal processes, evidence showed that the lack of a synchronized
approach between the services led to differing processes within the
services for generating armor requirements and solutions. Similarly,
while we agree that the department had a number of interservice working
groups and committees designed to enhance interservice coordination, we
continue to believe that the lack of a more formal interservice
coordination process precluded the Marine Corps and the Army from
identifying armor requirements and solutions for both services at the
same time. Lastly, while the department refuted our evidence that the
Marine Corps did not identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until
April 2004, it was unable to adequately document its position. See
appendix III for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army and
the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on:
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we examined the Marine Corps' programs to
provide armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled
vehicles, or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
area of responsibility.[Footnote 13] The Marine Corps trucks we
examined included the 5-ton, Logistics Vehicle System, and Marine
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement. Descriptions of each of these
trucks along with detailed information on the availability of armor for
each truck are included in appendix II.
To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed
to meet identified requirements and the factors that affected the time
to provide armor, we interviewed Marine Corps officials involved in
identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and acquiring truck
armor for deployed forces. We conducted interviews at the Marine Corps
Systems Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command in
Quantico, Virginia; the Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany,
Georgia; Army headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and the U.S. Army
Development Test Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We also
collected and analyzed armor supply data such as requirements, funding
levels, production levels, and installations for the period between
January 2004 (when truck armor requirements were first formally
identified) and March 2006, which we obtained from Marine Corps bases
or source documents. We considered the armor requirement as met for
each type of truck when the quantity of add-on or integrated armor
produced and installed on vehicles equaled the requirement. We did not,
however, visit CENTCOM's area of responsibility to validate the extent
to which armor had been installed and was actually in use by trucks.
Based on the information gathered, we identified factors that affected
the time to provide truck armor to deployed forces.
To determine what actions the Marine Corps and the Department of
Defense took to improve the availability of truck armor for current and
future operations, we interviewed Marine Corps and Joint Staff
personnel to identify short-and long-term efforts. We also reviewed the
service's studies related to addressing future truck armor needs.
However, we did not evaluate the identified solutions' potential for
success.
We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained
for this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about
the data and corroborating them with other information gathered from
other Marine Corps organizations. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our
audit from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring Efforts:
We examined the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed
to meet identified requirements for the following vehicles: the
multipurpose 5-ton truck, the logistics vehicle system (LVS), and the
medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck). This
appendix provides an assessment for each of these three truck types.
Each assessment presents a general description of each truck and our
evaluation of the extent to which armor kits were produced and
installed when required.
Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks:
The Marine Corps multipurpose 5-ton trucks provide transportation,
hauling, and towing of just about everything in the equipment
inventory. These trucks transport troops, supplies, ammunition,
construction materials, and other items. These trucks also tow many
types of trailers, artillery guns, and vans. Almost all Marine Corps
units are equipped with 5-ton trucks. As the primary truck transport
asset of the Marine Corps, it is available in cargo, dump, tractor, and
wrecker configurations. Figure 4 shows an example of the 5-ton truck in
a cargo configuration.
Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command.
[End of figure]
To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for
the 5-ton trucks in two phases. The first phase of armoring used
interim armor, which included 3/16-inch HHS doors, Kevlar/ceramic
panels, and ballistic blankets, and offered limited protection against
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The second phase of armoring used
add-on armor, which offered better protection against IEDs because it
included a better grade steel (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous steel),
ballistic glass, and additional protection for the underbody, tailgate,
roof, and other components. There is also an additional type of armor
protection used by the Marine Corps, called integrated armor. However,
integrated armor requirements were not established for the 5-ton truck
because the 5-ton truck is at the end of its life cycle and is being
replaced by MTVRs, or 7-ton trucks. In addition, according to Marine
Corps officials, the 5-ton trucks make poor candidates for integrated
armor because the added weight of the armor significantly reduces the
payload capacity and usefulness of the trucks.
Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
The Marine Corps armored its 5-ton trucks in two phases, responding to
two validated requirements. The requirement addressed in the first
phase, to armor 171 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps
officials said they met this requirement 2 months later, in March 2004,
by installing an interim armor solution before the First Marine
Expeditionary Force was deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps
officials were unable to provide monthly data on the number of
installations completed. Our analysis showed that, at a minimum, the
Marine Corps produced 123 door sets between April and September 2004 at
the Marine Corps Logistics Command Maintenance Center in Albany,
Georgia, and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from commercial
sources to address the requirement. According to Marine Corps
officials, some of these Kevlar/ceramic panels were used to armor the 5-
ton trucks. Due to the immediate need for armor prior to deployment,
the Marine Corp met armor needs with the best available materials at
the time--3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, the armor
did not provide sufficient IED protection.
The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 185 5-ton trucks
(including re-armoring the 171 trucks with interim armor), was
validated in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this
requirement 5 months later, in September 2004, by installing add-on
armor kits that met requirements for IED protection, but they were
unable to provide monthly data on the number of installations
completed. Our analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps
produced 199 5-ton armored door sets between April and September 2004
to meet the requirement. Figure 5 shows the requirements and
installation levels for both interim armor and add-on armor for the 5-
ton truck over time. As of September 2005, the Marine Corps had 123 add-
on armored 5-ton trucks operating outside forward bases in CENTCOM's
area of responsibility. Eighty-seven of them also received underbody
armor.[Footnote 14]
Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim and Add-on Armor:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the
requirements, but is not representative of actual production quantities
at given points in time. Dotted line over the graph also indicates some
overproduction occurred.
[End of figure]
Logistics Vehicle System:
The Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) is a heavy tactical transport
vehicle system for fuels and bulk cargos that was first fielded in the
mid-1980s. It is a modular system consisting of a front power unit
(cab) that is designed to have interchangeable rear body units. The
truck has an off-road payload of 12.5-tons and an on-road payload of
22.5-tons. Figure 6 shows the front body unit, which can tow five
different rear body units. Rear body units include a wrecker, a fifth-
wheel semitrailer adapter, a dropside cargo unit, a self-loading
container, and bridge transporter.
Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command.
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps installed armor protection on the LVS in two phases to
meet requirements. The first phase of armoring used interim armor,
which included Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and
ballistic blankets, and offered limited protection against IEDs. The
second phase of armoring used add-on armor, which offered better
protection against IEDs because it included a better grade (3/8-inch
rolled homogeneous) steel, ballistic glass, and additional protection
for the underbody, tailgate, roof, and other components. There is an
additional type of armor protection established by the Marine Corps,
called integrated armor, but, as with the 5-ton truck, a requirement
for this type of protection was not established for the LVS because it
will ultimately be replaced by a new truck called the Logistic Vehicle
System Replacement during the 2008-2009 time frame.
Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
The Marine Corps armored the LVS in two phases, responding to two
requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor
204 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corp officials said
they met this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2
months later, in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary
Force was deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable
to provide monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our
analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 105
armored door sets at the Marine Corps Logistic Command Maintenance
Center between April and September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/
ceramic panels from a commercial company, some of which were used to
armor the LVS. Due to the immediate need for armor prior to deployment,
the Marine Corps met armor needs with the best available materials at
the time--3/16-inch HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, this armor
did not provide sufficient protection against the fragmentation effects
of IEDs.
The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 221 trucks (including
re-armoring the 204 trucks with interim armor), was established in
April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5
months later, in September 2004, with add-on armor kits that met the
validated requirements for protection from IEDs, but they were unable
to provide monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our
analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 261
armored door sets between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps
Logistic Command Maintenance Center and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic
panels from a commercial company to meet the requirement. According to
Marine Corps officials, some of the Kevlar/ceramic doors were used to
armor the LVS. As of January 2006, Marine Corps fielding data revealed
that 235 LVS trucks operating outside forward bases in CENTCOM's area
of responsibility had add-on armor. Figure 7 shows the requirements,
production, and installation levels for both interim armor and add-on
armor for the LVS over time.
Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and
Add-on Armor:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the
requirements, but is not representative of actual production quantities
at given points in time. Dotted line over the graph indicates some
overproduction occurred.
[End of figure]
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement:
The Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is designed
to replace the existing fleet of 5-ton trucks with a new and more
robust fleet of 7-ton trucks. Figure 8 shows the MTVR as a troop
carrier; however, it is also used as a wrecker, dump truck, cargo
carrier, and convoy escort. According to a Marine Corps official, the
service needed to replace its existing medium 5-ton truck fleet with a
vehicle capable of carrying larger payloads, at a faster speed, over
more difficult terrain, and that can be airlifted. A contract was
awarded to Oshkosh Truck Corporation in December 1998, and production
is underway.
Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command.
[End of figure]
To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for
the MTVR in three phases. The first phase used interim armor, which
includes Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic
blankets, and offers limited protection against IEDs. The second phase
used add-on armor, which provides greater protection from IEDs than the
interim armor because it included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor,
ballistic glass, and additional protection for the underbody, side
panels, tailgate, and other components. The Marine Corps continues to
design and produce improvements to this add-on armor. The final armor
phase used integrated armor that is installed on the vehicle chassis
and provides overlapping seams that prevent penetration from ballistics
and IEDs. Figure 9 shows the requirements, production, and installation
of each type of armor on the MTVR.
Extent Truck Armor Was Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements:
The Marine Corps is armoring the MTVR in three phases, responding to
four requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to
armor 794 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials
said they met this requirement by installing an interim armor solution
2 months later, in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary
Force was deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable
to provide data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis
showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 174 doors between
April and September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from
a commercial company for the requirement. An unspecified number of
these Kevlar/ceramic panels were used to armor the MTVR. Due to the
immediate need for armor prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met armor
needs with the best available materials at the time--3/16-inch HHS and
Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, this armor did not provide sufficient
protection against the fragmentation effects of IEDs.
The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 1,032 MTVRs
(including re-armoring the 794 trucks armored with interim armor), was
validated in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this
requirement 5 months later, in September 2005, by installing add-on
armor kits that met the validated requirements for protection from
IEDs. However, they were unable to provide data on the number of
installations completed. Our analysis showed that, at a minimum, the
Marine Corps produced 1,966 armored doors between April and September
2004 to meet the requirement. The Marine Corps also produced 962 cargo
panel sets (i.e., which were steel plated to protect the sides of the
cargo unit) to protect transported troops.
The armor protection installed in the third phase had two requirements.
The first requirement, to armor 1,018 MTVRs (trucks that were already
provided with add-on armor) with integrated armor, was validated in
October 2004. However, in June 2005 this requirement was reduced to
installing integrated kits on 900 MTVRs by May 2006, because fewer
trucks than initially anticipated will be rotated into theater in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Since the MTVR is at the beginning of its economic
life cycle, the Marine Corps made the decision to armor this truck with
armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Integrated armor
is a permanent modification that requires stripping the truck to its
frame and rebuilding. It takes a five-person crew more than 300 hours
to complete a single installation. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps
has installed 803 integrated kits on the MTVRs.
Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of
Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.
Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were
unavailable, so the dotted line in the graph simply indicates that
sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the
requirements, but is not representative of actual production quantities
at given points in time. Dotted line over the graph indicates some
overproduction occurred.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
May 26 2006:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
Defense Logistics: Lack of Coordination between Marine Corps and Army
Affected the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck
Armor, dated April 25, 2006 (GAO Code 350785/GAO-06-274).
The Department partially concurs with the recommendations in the draft
report. Our comments concerning the recommendations, context and
accuracy of the report are provided in the enclosure.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Signed by:
Darlene J. Costello:
Acting Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED APRIL 25, 2006 GAO CODE 350785/GAO-06-274:
"DEFENSE LOGISTICS: Lack of Coordination between Marine Corps and Army
Affected the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps Truck
Armor"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: To ensure that the services make informed and
coordinated decisions about what materiel solutions are developed and
procured to address common urgent wartime requirements, the GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the service secretaries
to establish a process to share information between the Marine Corps
and the Army on developed or developing materiel solutions.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. Multiple layers of communication
already exist between the Marine Corps and the Army. For example, the
Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) Armor Project Officer joined the
Army's Armor Kit Working Group Integrated Process Team in early
December 2003. This working group was a pivotal link between the
services in coordinating initial efforts. Additionally, all the Marine
Corps vehicle hardening tests were conducted at the Army's Aberdeen
Test Center (ATC). The ATC Test Director ensured that Marine Corps
efforts received priority placement (a result of close, continuous
coordination). Further, the Marine Armor Kit (MAK) designs were based
on technical drawings and engineering calculations from the Army
Research Lab (ARL) designs.
As appropriate, Major General Catto (CG, MCSC) maintained close contact
with his counterpart at the Army's Program Executive Office Combat
Support & Combat Service Support (PEO CS & CSS), Brigadier General
O'Reilly.
At the Service level, the Army-Marine Corps Board (AMCB) and the Navy-
Marine Corps Board (NMCB) address issues at the 3-star level. While the
AMCB was not mature enough during the winter 2003/spring 2004 to
influence the initial up-armor issue, it provides a suitable venue for
similar topics, provides a means to share information, and meets the
"spirit and intent" of the GAO recommendation. For example, in the fall
of 2005, the AMCB was used to establish an equitable production
delivery priority between the two Services for the Up-Armored Humvee MI
114.
Recommendation 2: To ensure that the services make informed and
coordinated decisions about what materiel solutions are developed and
procured to address common urgent wartime requirements, the GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Defense clarify the point at which the
JUONS process should be utilized when materiel solutions require
research and development.
DOD Response: Concur. The Joint Staff, J8 is currently working on an
update to CJCSl 3470.01, "Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint
Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution". This update
will clarify when and if the JUONS process can be used when materiel
solutions require development of a new technology or capability. The
update is expected to be complete by September 2006.
Additional Comments:
Report Context: The Department offers the following additional comments
in response to the draft report: The Marine Corps exhibited due
diligence in providing armor protection to its tactical wheeled vehicle
fleet in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), and the Horn of Africa (HOA).
In January 2004, the Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC)
validated the requirement to armor all 1 Marine Expeditionary Force's
(MEF) tactical wheeled vehicles before entering Iraq for OIF 2. The
Marine Corps tackled this task with a dual prong approach.
They worked with industry to identify all readily available solutions,
i.e., Simula half doors (HHS), Foster-Miller appliqué panels, O'Gara
Hess (OGH) kits. Since procurement of readily available industry
solutions alone would not meet the total I MEF requirement of 3,049
vehicles (trucks included), a concurrent augmenting approach was begun.
In order to provide the best armor protection available in time to meet
the March 2004 OIF II deployment timeline, Marine Corps Logistics
Command (MCLC) and Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) teamed together
to field the MCLC 3/16" HHS armor. The combination of OGH kits, Simula
half doors, Foster-Miller panels, and MCLC 3/16" armor was our 1 st
generation approach to the vehicle armor solution. During the
development of the first generation approach, they sought 3/8" RHA as
the preferred armor solution for IED blast/fragmentation protection.
However, 3/8" RHA was NOT available from industry in order to meet the
I MEF March 2004 timeline. Nonetheless, there was some level of IED
protection afforded to 100% of the Marine Corps' vehicles entering to
Iraq when involvement with OIF II began.
Working with industry and the assistance of senior HASC staffers, in
late spring of 2004, the Marine Corps were able to procure 3/8" RHA,
beginning the transition from the first generation solutions to the
second generation, i.e., MCLC 3/8" RHA zonal armor. They completed
fielding the second generation armor in August 2004. They completed the
fielding of our third generation or integrated solutions (Marine Armor
Kit (MAK) and MTVR Armor System (MAS)) in November 2005 for our HMMWVs,
in December 2005 for the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS), and as of 11
May, have completed the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
nearly five months ahead of schedule.
In addition, every generation of vehicle armor was subjected to blast
tests, to the requirements, before MCSC would approve fielding
solutions. Their motto was to be sure that we "do no harm" when trying
to address the armoring situation.
Report Accuracy: In general the information in the report is accurate,
however, we do not agree with the following statements for the reasons
stated:
Page 2 - We identified a number of systemic causes for these shortages,
including inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and ineffective
distribution processes.
1) "...inaccurate requirements..." is misleading; it implies that the
Marine Corps did not consider the current threat analysis. Armor
protection requirements increased quickly over time, measured in weeks
and months. The predominant threat migrated from a predominantly small
arms ballistic focus to a fragmentation focus, as the lethality of IEDs
encountered increased. In December 2003, both the Army and Marine Corps
recognized that IEDs, RPGs, 7.62mm projectiles, and mines were the
predominant threats; however, there was not a consensus among the users
as to the proper tradeoffs and specifications to counter the threat. In
addition, specific testing data formulated from in-theater operational
scenarios did not yet exist, making it very difficult to articulate
specific and emerging requirements. Without such specific data, it was
difficult to arrive at a production solution that would meet emerging
requirements in the timeframe required.
Page 4 - Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by
March 2004, the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by
installing interim armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim
armor did not meet requirements because it did not provide sufficient
protection from the fragmentation effects of IEDs. Marine Corps
officials acknowledged that the interim armor provided protection
against the prevalent ballistic threat at the time but offered only
limited protection against IEDs.
2) "...did not meet requirements..." As mentioned previously, armor
protection requirements increased quickly over time, measured in weeks
and months. The predominant threat migrated from a small arms ballistic
focus to a fragmentation focus, as the lethality of IEDs encountered
increased. As both the Marine Corps and Army experienced, when a
vehicle armor solution was developed and fielded, the enemy changed
tactics, techniques, and procedures to mitigate the protection level
just fielded. We are in an environment in which we have to continually
validate and re-define requirements.
Page 4 - Two factors affected the timely production and installation of
Marine Corps truck armor. First, a lack of coordination between the
Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
solutions caused the Marine Corps to make decisions about the types of
armor to use without having all the information that was available on
the protective capabilities of various types of armor.
3) "...lack of coordination..." The Army and Marine Corps shared
information and coordinated efforts between the services in several
different ways, most often via working groups, PHONCONs, VTCs, and e-
mails. In the October/November 2003 timeframe the Army stood up its
Armor Kit Working Group Integrated Process Team (AKWG IPT). The Marine
Corps Systems Command Armor Project Officer joined the AKWG IPT in
early December 2003. This working group was a pivotal link between the
services in coordinating initial efforts. Marine Corps Logistics
Command (MCLC) Maintenance Center Albany and Contracts personnel
attended the AKWG IPTs starting in the spring of 2004.
Additionally, all the Marine Corps vehicle hardening testing efforts
were conducted at Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) in Maryland. The ATC Test
Director personally ensured that Marine Corps efforts received priority
placement (a result of close, continuous coordination).
Further, the Marine Armor Kit (MAK) designs were based on technical
drawings and engineering calculations based on the Army Research Lab
(ARL) designs. MCLC was provided the Technical Design Package (TDP) of
the Army Add on Armor (AoA) door and rocker panel kits in January 2004.
The TDP was used in the design and development of the MCLC first
generation and subsequent generations of armor kits. The TDP reduced
the design effort required to develop doors and underbodies to meet
Marine Corps operational requirements. Without the sharing of
information and coordination received from the Army, the Marine Corps
vehicle hardening efforts would not have progressed rapidly.
Page 5 - The Marine Corps did not officially identify a requirement for
318-inch rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) steel until April 2004, which
it determined was necessary for effective IED protection.
4) "The Marine Corps did not officially identify a requirement for 3/8
RHA until April 2004." As the Marine Corps developed interim solutions
in coordination with efforts undertaken by the Army, they recognized
the need for 3/8 RHA in December 2003. Participation in the AKWG IPT in
early December 2003 was critical to this recognition. The Marine Corps
first tried to order 3/8" RHA with Clifton steel in January 2004, but
lack of supply prevented order completion and delivery. In addition,
Contracts (MCLC) queried all known vendors, distributors and steel
mills in North America for availability of all types and thickness of
armor plate starting in January 2004 and throughout armor production.
Page 5 - Because there is no formal process in place to ensure
interservice coordination on the development of materiel solutions such
as truck armor, the Marine Corps was not aware of the Army's
identification of the type of steel needed for effective IED protection
when it developed its interim armor. Instead, the Marine Corps fielded
an armor solution of 3/16-inch steel and Kevlar/ceramic plates that did
not adequately address the IED threat.
5) "...no formal process..." Though no standing joint activity
addressed specific service wide vehicle hardening requirements at the
time, as previously mentioned, participation on the AKWG IPT and formal
coordination with ATC and ARL to facilitate testing and design proved
instrumental in the incorporation of RHA into our vehicle hardening
kits. The Marine Corps continues to use the Army-Marine Corps Board
(AMCB) and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) as forums to work
vehicle hardening issues and requirements in the development of
solutions. As noted previously, they processed the first purchase order
for 3/8" RHA on January 12, 2004. They developed and fielded vehicle
hardening kits in successive generations for two primary reasons; 1)
availability of RHA ballistic steel was in limited supply, and 2) upon
validating current and emerging requirements, they developed successive
material solutions as the threat changed and migrated to a focus on
fragmentation and mines (over ballistic projectiles). The decision to
field 3/16" ballistic steel and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
solutions was made deliberately, given the less than optimum options
available to meet the current timelines of the warfighter.
Page 5 - Second, mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine
Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on armor and install
integrated armor. As a result, the fielding of add-on armor and
integrated armor was stretched out over a longer period, placing troops
at greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles
without the required level of protection.
6) "...placing troops at greater risk..." Operational commanders in-
theater made the ultimate decision as to when they could afford to
place vehicles out of service in order to install armor. It was a
decision based on combat needs in a combat environment, not on
production timelines in a benign environment. It's misleading to state
that Marines were placed at greater risk. For example, if the
Operational Commanders placed a large preponderance of vehicles out of
service at one time, it would leave the remaining forces engaged in
combat operations without a significant proportion of their combat
assets, which represents an inherent high risk. Without addressing the
specific combat needs in theater during the timeframe mentioned, it is
misleading to state that Marines were placed at greater risk.
Page 11 - However, the interim armor did not meet requirements because
it did not provide sufficient protection from the fragmentation effects
of IEDs.
7) "...did not meet requirements..." See note (1) and note (2).
Page 13 - As a result, the interim armor fielded by the Marine Corps
offered little protection from IEDs and troops were placed at greater
risk as they conducted operations in vehicles equipped with limited
protection.
8) "...offered little protection..." See note (6).
Page 17 - Lack of Coordination between the Services and Mission Needs
Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Deployed Forces.
9) "Lack of Coordination..." See note (3) and note (5).
Page 18 - However, Marine Corps officials said they were not aware of
the Army's armor protection guidance or what type of armor was needed
for IED protection when they began purchasing truck armor in January
2004.
10) "...not aware of the Army's armor protection guidance..." See note
(3) and note (4).
Page 18 - However, these information sessions were not well attended by
Marine Corps officials, and Army acquisition and laboratory officials
said they were not sure whether information about 3/8-inch RHA armor
was shared in late 2003 or early 2004 because no official records were
kept or were readily available.
11) "...information sessions were not well attended..." Information
sharing between the Army and Marine Corps regarding vehicle hardening
programs has been well established and well documented through
participation in working groups, IPTs, PHONCONs, VTC's, and e-mails. In
particular, e-mail traffic is well-documented, from the Commanding
General of MCSC on down.
Page 18 - One Marine Corps Systems Command official estimated that the
Marine Corps learned about 318-inch RHA in February 2004 but no
documentation was available to substantiate this estimate.
12) "...Marine Corps learned about 3/8" RHA in December 2003..." See
note (4).
Page 20 - In addition, the Marine Corps is also investigating future
kit-armoring strategies with the Army using the "A" kit and "B" kit
concept established in the Army's long-term strategy. Under this
strategy, the Army's plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two
kits. The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks
ready to accept armor and includes hard-to-install parts and permanent
mounting provisions for the B kit.
13) "...A kit and B kit concept..." The Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle
Replacement (LVSR) will be the first military vehicle to incorporate
the A and B kit concept into the design and production of the vehicle.
Source selection for the LVSR will be completed in May and a production
contract will be awarded in the May/June timeframe. This survivability
requirement was not identified in the original requirement for the
vehicle; however, it has been introduced into the design and production
plan as requirements changed and migrated. We have developed and will
produce MTVRs "ready-to-accept" armor in the 1 st and 2nd quarter FY07.
These MTVRs will have the critical armor components installed and all
suspension upgrades completed, coming off the production line.
GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments:
1. DOD stated that our statement identifying a number of systemic
causes for shortages in armor such as inaccurate requirements is
misleading and that it implies that the Marine Corps did not consider
the current threat analysis. However, this statement does not refer to
the Marine Corps's truck armor program. Rather, the statement is from
the introduction of the report, where we discussed our prior work
leading up to this review. Specifically, we noted that in April 2005 we
reported on a number of critical supply shortages during OIF--including
armored HMMWVs, body armor, and other items--and inaccurate
requirements was one of the systemic causes identified in the April
2005 report.
2. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps' interim
armor did not meet requirements, noting that armor protection
requirements changed quickly over time and migrated from a small arms
ballistic focus to a fragmentation focus, as the lethality of IEDs
encountered increased. However, the December 2003 requirement document
that the Marine Corps provided to us during our review clearly stated
the need to protect all vehicles from improvised explosive devices,
mines, and other explosive ordnances. Documents we obtained from both
the Marine Corps and Army recognized IEDs as a significant threat at
the time. In fact, in DOD's comments to this report, it noted that "in
December 2003, both the Army and Marine Corps recognized that IEDs,
RPGs, 7.62mm projectiles, and mines were the predominate threats."
Further, in November 2003, the Army had identified a requirement to
protect vehicles from IEDs and recognized a need to purchase rolled
homogenous armor (RHA), a type of armor that proved effective against
both the ballistic and IED threat after testing many armor types.
3. DOD disagreed with our statement that a lack of coordination between
the Marine Corps and Army on addressing truck armor requirements and
solutions caused the Marine Corps to make decisions about the types of
armor to use without having all the information that was available on
protective capabilities of various armor types. We acknowledge that the
Marine Corps made attempts to coordinate through various informal
processes, such as the Armor Kit Working Group Integrated Process Team.
However, evidence showed that a lack of a synchronized approach among
the services was due to each service having separate and distinct
processes that generated the requirements to armor vehicles. The
individual requirements processes led to the Marine Corps validating a
requirement to armor vehicles 2 months after the Army validated a
similar requirement to armor its vehicles. Ultimately, the Marine Corps
began seeking RHA armor in February 2004--3 months after the Army began
producing armor kits made out of RHA armor. Marine Corps officials told
us that they began seeking RHA armor from industry earlier--in January
2004--but were told it was in short supply. However, Marine Corps
officials have not provided documentary evidence to substantiate this
claim. For example, in DOD's comments to this report, it stated that
the first purchase order for 3/8-inch RHA was on January 12, 2004.
However, when we subsequently requested to see the purchase order, the
Marine Corps noted that it was actually an Army purchase order.
According to the Marine Corps, they made a phone inquiry to a steel
vendor in January 2004, but have not provided documentation to support
this assertion. In addition, we spoke with other steel suppliers about
the availability of RHA during the January and March 2004 time frame.
These industry officials told us that despite lead times for RHA that
ranged from 30 days to 4 months, they could have made RHA available to
the Marine Corps quicker if the Marine Corps had approached them
directly. Moreover, although we agree that formal processes are in
place for the Marine Corps to test armor types through the Army's
Testing Center (ATC), the Marine Corps coordination with the Army to
install RHA armor kits on vehicles did not occur until the Marine
Corps' second phase of armoring. Furthermore, while the Marine Corps
cited the Army-Marine Corps Board (AMCB) and the Joint IED Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) as other examples of Army and Marine Corps
coordination in the development of armor solutions, these additional
avenues for communication were not sufficient to bring the services'
two truck armor programs together in a synchronized approach to ensure
that requirements were identified and solutions developed for both
services at the same time. We further clarified this position in the
report.
4. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps did not
identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until April 2004. It stated
that the need for RHA armor was identified earlier but was in short
supply from industry. While some Marine Corps officials told us that
the Marine Corps was not seeking 3/8-inch RHA for its interim armor,
other Marine Corps officials subsequently told us they became aware of
the need for 3/8-inch RHA in December 2003 and first inquired about the
availability of RHA steel with industry in January 2004. However, these
officials have not provided adequate documentation to support the
assertion or that RHA was not available from industry (see note (3)
above). Further, a Marine Corps Logistics Command report on its
armoring efforts indicated that the Marine Corps did not make the
decision to use 3/8-inch RHA until March 2004. However, it was not
until April 2004 that the Marine Corps officially identified a need for
3/8-inch RHA when it validated the requirement for the second armor
phase. Due to the conflicting information, it remains unclear exactly
when the Marine Corps became aware of the need for RHA.
5. DOD disagreed with our statement that no formal process was in place
to ensure interservice coordination. DOD acknowledged that there was no
standing joint activity that addressed specific servicewide vehicle
hardening requirements at the time, and cited participation in and
coordination with the AKWG IPT, ATC, AMCB and JIEDDO as instrumental in
developing the Marine Corps' truck armor solutions. While we agree that
these organizations may have provided valuable information to the
Marine Corps, as stated previously, this coordination was not
sufficient to bring the services together to identify requirements and
develop solutions for both services at the same time.
6. DOD disagreed with our statement that troops were placed at greater
risk as a result of the time required to replace the interim armor with
add-on RHA armor and integrated armor. It noted that to accelerate the
replacement of interim armor by taking a larger amount of vehicles out
of service would create inherent risk to the operational commanders. We
did not intend to suggest that the Marine Corps should have made this
decision or that it could have done anything different given the
operational conditions in the theater. Rather, we were simply stating
that because of the time needed to replace the interim armor with the
second generation RHA armor coupled with mission requirements, the
vehicles were operating with less than the preferred armor solution.
7. See note (1) and note (2).
8. See note (6).
9. See note (3) and note (5).
10. See note (3) and note (4).
11. We agree that attempts were made to share information between the
Army and Marine Corps, but we recommended a DOD-wide formal process to
require interservice coordination (see also note 5).
12. See note (4).
13. In response to our discussion on the Marine Corps' investigating
future-kit armoring strategies using the "A" kit and "B" kit concept
for armor kits, DOD added that the Marine Corps is now planning to
incorporate this concept on its Logistics Vehicle Replacement (LVSR)
and the MTVR. DOD further noted that the LVSR will be the first
military vehicle to incorporate the A and B kit concept. We
incorporated the current status of this program into the report.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant
Director; Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard
G. Payne, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell,
Patricia Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, John D. Strong, and Gerald Winterlin
also made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[2] GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Procurement and
Installation of Army Truck Armor During Current Wartime Operations, GAO-
06-160 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).
[3] CENTCOM is one of DOD's five geographic combatant commands, whose
area of responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia,
South and Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. In addition to
Operation Iraqi Freedom, CENTCOM is involved in Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. The other four geographic combatant commands
are U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command,
and U.S. Northern Command.
[4] The Marine Corps also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical
wheeled vehicle. We examined availability of armor for HMMWVs in our
prior report on wartime supply availability, so we did not include them
in this review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve
the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future
Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[5] Other force protection measures taken include the fielding of
personal body armor and electronic IED countermeasures, as well as
changes to unit-level training.
[6] The Marine Requirements Oversight Council advises the Commandant of
the Marine Corps on policy matters related to concepts, force
structure, and requirements validation. It is chaired by the Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps and is composed of permanent and
associate members. At the direction of the Commandant, the council is
to: (1) conduct comprehensive reviews of critical issues and programs
to develop optimal, balanced Marine Corps positions by considering
current operational needs, desired future capabilities, and feasible
alternatives based on resource constraints; (2) review, prioritize, and
approve Mission Need Statements, Operational Requirements Documents,
and force structure recommendations; and (3) develop recommendations
for Marine Corps requirements, related strategies, and positions that
are supported and funded by external agencies and other services.
[7] The services are allowed to reprogram, without DOD approval, a
total of up to $20 million per year into the procurement account that
includes armor kits. However, because the funding needed for armor kits
exceeded this amount, the services had to request approval from the DOD
Comptroller for any reprogramming of funds in excess of the $20
million, which in turn had to be approved by Congress.
[8] The Iraqi Freedom Fund is a special account providing funds for use
of military forces in Iraq and those operations authorized by Pub. L.
No. 107-40 (2001), Authorization for use of Military Force, and other
operations and related activities in support of the global war on
terrorism.
[9] High hard steel has a high surface hardness level which provides
good protection against projectiles.
[10] Rolled homogeneous steel has a lower surface hardness than high
hard steel and provides good protection against both projectiles and
the fragmentation effects of IEDs.
[11] "Marine Corps Vehicle Armoring," Testimony Before the House Armed
Services Committee by Major General (Sel) William D. Catto, Commanding
General, Marine Corps Systems Command, May 5, 2005.
[12] The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks, but because the 5-ton
trucks are being phased out of theater operations, 87 will receive
upgraded protection, such as underbody kits, because the remaining
trucks will not be used outside the forward operating bases.
[13] The Marine Corps also developed armor for the high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), a light tactical wheeled vehicle.
We examined availability of armor for HMMWVs in our prior report on
wartime supply availability, so we did not include them in this review.
See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[14] The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks in theater, but because the
5-ton trucks are being phased out of theater operations, 87 received
upgraded protection such as underbody kits while the rest will not be
used off the forward operating bases.
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