Chemical and Biological Defense
Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to Guide Investments in Collective Protection Gao ID: GAO-07-113 January 19, 2007For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for funding. In conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify critical sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in overseas high threat areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile attack.
The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of chemical and biological threat information. Generally, the two key chemical and biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile nations using missiles, or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using devices to release chemical or biological agents. DOD expects these threats to grow. The intelligence community has recognized the need to communicate more candidly about the uncertainties in intelligence regarding the type and amount of agents, the number of missiles likely armed with chemical and biological warheads, and the method of dissemination. Communicating these uncertainties helps in understanding the actual threat posed by our adversaries and in making risk management decisions on investments. However, while the intelligence community, under the Director of National Intelligence, has issued a new 2006 intelligence estimate regarding the uncertainties in the biological warfare threat, it has not issued an update on the chemical warfare threat since 2002 due to evolving assessment and communication policies. Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical overseas facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets (e.g., infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and inconsistent. Nearly 80 percent of overseas sites identified as critical by combatant commanders based on criteria GAO provided them, did not have collective protection equipment--including about two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas. At the same time, GAO found problems such as often vague and inconsistent guidance on the use of collective protection. DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection but does not prescribe specific standards to guide strategic decisions on its use. Military service guidance, except the Air Force, was also vague and inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether decisions on the need for the equipment should be left to local commanders' discretion, (2) when the various types of collective protection are most appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be protected. Thus, commanders have difficulty determining the need for collective protection. DOD's framework for managing collective protection and other related installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, which affects DOD's ability to ensure that collective protection resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. Prior GAO and DOD reports have highlighted continuing problems with fragmented policies and operating concepts among the many and varied programs and organizations involved. These problems result in unresolved conflict about issues, such as which critical facilities should receive priority for funding improvements, and make it difficult for DOD to balance competing warfighting and other needs and ensure that funding resources are prudently allocated. Previously, GAO and others have recommended DOD designate a single authority to integrate and coordinate installation protection policies and activities, and DOD agreed. However, despite a new ongoing reorganization, it has not yet done so.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-113, Chemical and Biological Defense: Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed to Guide Investments in Collective Protection
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Relations, House:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2007:
Chemical and Biological Defense:
Updated Intelligence, Clear Guidance, and Consistent Priorities Needed
to Guide Investments in Collective Protection:
GAO-07-113:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-113, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Why GAO Did This Study:
For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical
and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected
environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent
problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high
threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined
(1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological
threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection
at critical overseas facilities and major expeditionary warfighting
assets, and (3) DOD‘s framework for managing installation protection
policies and prioritizing critical installations for funding. In
conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify critical
sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in
overseas high threat areas”areas at high risk of terrorist or missile
attack.
What GAO Found:
The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security
environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of
chemical and biological threat information. Generally, the two key
chemical and biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile
nations using missiles, or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using
devices to release chemical or biological agents. DOD expects these
threats to grow. The intelligence community has recognized the need to
communicate more candidly about the uncertainties in intelligence
regarding the type and amount of agents, the number of missiles likely
armed with chemical and biological warheads, and the method of
dissemination. Communicating these uncertainties helps in understanding
the actual threat posed by our adversaries and in making risk
management decisions on investments. However, while the intelligence
community, under the Director of National Intelligence, has issued a
new 2006 intelligence estimate regarding the uncertainties in the
biological warfare threat, it has not issued an update on the chemical
warfare threat since 2002 due to evolving assessment and communication
policies.
Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical
overseas facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets
(e.g., infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and
inconsistent. Nearly 80 percent of overseas sites identified as
critical by combatant commanders based on criteria GAO provided them,
did not have collective protection equipment”including about two-thirds
of the critical sites in high threat areas. At the same time, GAO found
problems such as often vague and inconsistent guidance on the use of
collective protection. DOD guidance encourages the use of collective
protection but does not prescribe specific standards to guide strategic
decisions on its use. Military service guidance, except the Air Force,
was also vague and inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether
decisions on the need for the equipment should be left to local
commanders‘ discretion, (2) when the various types of collective
protection are most appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be
protected. Thus, commanders have difficulty determining the need for
collective protection.
DOD‘s framework for managing collective protection and other related
installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, which
affects DOD‘s ability to ensure that collective protection resources
are allocated efficiently and effectively. Prior GAO and DOD reports
have highlighted continuing problems with fragmented policies and
operating concepts among the many and varied programs and organizations
involved. These problems result in unresolved conflict about issues,
such as which critical facilities should receive priority for funding
improvements, and make it difficult for DOD to balance competing
warfighting and other needs and ensure that funding resources are
prudently allocated. Previously, GAO and others have recommended DOD
designate a single authority to integrate and coordinate installation
protection policies and activities, and DOD agreed. However, despite a
new ongoing reorganization, it has not yet done so.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) update
the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate and that DOD take
actions to provide clearer, more consistent policies that guide the
funding and placement of collective protection and other installation
preparedness activities. In comments on a draft of this report, the DNI
and DOD generally agreed with of all of our recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-113].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above.For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key Aspects of
Chemical and Biological Threat:
Collective Protection Vulnerabilities Are Not Widely or Consistently
Addressed:
Fragmented Approach to Overall Installation Protection Policies
Undermines Decision Making on Critical Priorities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Secretary of Defense:
Appendix III: DOD Response to GAO Letter of Inquiry:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: Comments from the Director of National Intelligence:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Critical Overseas Sites with Collective Protection Equipment:
Table 2: Collective Protection at Selected Expeditionary Warfighting
Assets:
Table 3: Navy Ships Required to Have Collective Protection:
Figures:
Figure 1: SCUD B Missile with Launcher:
Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Protective Shelter:
Figure 3: Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical Support:
Figure 4: Installation Protection Activities Spread across Multiple DOD
Organizations:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
JPEO: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 19, 2007:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Shays:
The U.S. security environment has changed markedly in recent years.
Once focused on the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union, with its
nuclear arsenal and massive conventional forces, the Department of
Defense (DOD) and intelligence community now face a more diverse
threat. The new security environment includes not only hostile nation
states, but also terrorist organizations around the world who may
possess asymmetric capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction
such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Many of these
weapons can be difficult to detect, since much of the technology,
equipment, and materials needed to develop them also have legitimate
commercial applications. DOD has repeatedly emphasized the growing
threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons against U.S.
forces both at home and abroad, and recently reported that it is
continuing to increase funding for defenses against such
weapons.[Footnote 1] Understanding the nature of the chemical and
biological threat from adversaries, and the dangers this threat poses
to U.S. forces, is fundamental to DOD's ability to make risk management
decisions regarding where and how to focus investments in defending
U.S. forces.
In the event of chemical or biological weapons use, DOD policy
emphasizes avoidance of contaminated areas. When avoidance is not
possible, DOD normally provides protective suits for military personnel
required to operate in contaminated environments. However, while DOD
has made improvements, these suits limit mobility and are difficult to
wear for long periods. For this reason, collective protection areas,
which are specially constructed environments such as portable tent
systems or rooms with equipment designed to provide a pressurized and
filtered environment for groups of personnel, may be needed at some
fixed facilities and expeditionary warfighting assets, including
ground, naval, and air assets. Such collective protection equipment
enables individuals to remove their individual protective gear and
still perform essential activities, such as operational command and
control, medical, and certain logistics functions; or simply rest. In
prior reports on chemical and biological defense, we have reported
persistent problems regarding the provision and effectiveness of
collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas.
DOD states that American interests abroad will be the most likely
targets in the coming decade. The department operates numerous overseas
facilities that are critical to U.S. ability to project, support, and
sustain military forces and operations worldwide during war time.
DOD's approach to risk management requires commanders to combine
assessments of the threats to facilities, their vulnerabilities, and
critical assets into an overall assessment of risk, which is then used
to allocate resources to correct vulnerabilities. DOD introduced its
risk management approach in 2001. However, we recently reported that it
was facing difficulties in its implementation.[Footnote 2] For example,
we found that DOD's organizational culture resists department-level
approaches to priority setting and investment decisions. In addition,
DOD also faced challenges in integrating its management framework and
reform initiatives into a coherent, unified management approach. DOD is
currently examining a series of management reforms to help unify and
improve operations. You asked that we review the effectiveness of DOD's
program to provide collective protection for U.S. forces. In this
report, we examine (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and
biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective
protection against vulnerabilities at critical fixed facilities
overseas and major warfighting expeditionary assets, and (3) DOD's
framework for managing overall installation protection policies and
prioritizing critical installations for funding. This report is an
unclassified version of our December 2006 classified report.
To examine the current intelligence assessments of chemical and
biological threats to DOD facilities, we reviewed briefings and other
intelligence products, and we interviewed officials from a variety of
national and DOD intelligence organizations. These organizations
included the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and each of the four
regional combatant commands with critical overseas facilities in their
areas of operations. For the purposes of our review, we defined high
threat areas to be those within missile range of three nation states
with some chemical and biological warfare capabilities or those at high
risk of terrorist attack. To determine the levels of collective
protection provided to critical facilities, in the absence of a DOD
critical installation priority listing across the services, we worked
with a number of DOD offices to develop the criteria needed to
determine which sites were considered critical. The criterion called
for DOD to identify those sites that must remain operational during a
chemical or biological event, such as command and control nodes, rest
and relief areas, emergency medical locations, and intelligence sites
in order for DOD to complete its mission; and where there would be no
capability to transfer the function or capability to an alternate
location. The Joint Staff then assisted us in requesting information
from the responsible combatant commands regarding which installations
and facilities overseas were considered critical from their warfighting
perspectives using our criteria, and the amount and type of collective
protection equipment available at each site. We also worked with
military service and department-level offices to obtain detailed
listings of the type and amount of equipment provided in major
expeditionary assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and
aircraft. To examine DOD's framework for managing overall installation
protection activities and for prioritizing critical installations for
funding, we reviewed applicable regulations, policies, and reports by
GAO and DOD. We also conducted interviews with responsible officials at
the department and military services levels, as well as at the U.S.
Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands. We assessed the
reliability of data used in this report and determined that they were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our review from
September 2005 through August 2006 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. More detailed information on
our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security
environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to
provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the
significant uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and
biological threat. These problems challenge the ability of the
intelligence community to develop assessments--such as the national
intelligence estimate on chemical warfare, which has not been updated
since 2002--to help guide DOD and other governmental risk assessments
and investment decisions. Generally, the two primary chemical and
biological threats facing DOD installations are from adversarial
nations using missiles with chemical or biological warheads and from
terrorists using explosive devices or other means to release and spread
chemical or biological agents. Although several nations are assessed to
have chemical and biological warfare capability, the threat is
currently assessed with varying levels of confidence to stem primarily
from a handful of countries. Three countries are assessed to have the
capability to develop at least some chemical and biological agents and
possess the missiles to deliver them. DOD expects this threat to
increase in coming years as these countries continue to improve their
missile programs. The terrorist threat stems primarily from al Qaeda,
and while presently limited regarding chemical and biological weapons,
this threat is also expected to increase as al Qaeda continues to try
to acquire chemical and biological agents. Despite these threat
assessments, the intelligence community has recognized significant
uncertainties in the quality and depth of intelligence about those
threats. Such uncertainty raises questions about the actual level of
damage that might be sustained during an attack and the actual threat
posed by our adversaries, and is thus critical information for
officials making risk management decisions on investments to protect
U.S. forces, and those approving funding for such investments. However,
while the National Intelligence Council, under the leadership of the
Director of National Intelligence, has been able to work together and
issue a new 2006 national intelligence estimate assessing and
recognizing the uncertainties in the biological warfare threat to help
decision makers, it has not been able to issue a revised national
intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare threat since 2002. We are
recommending that the Director of National Intelligence identify the
impediments interfering with his ability to update the chemical warfare
National Intelligence Estimate, and take the necessary steps to bring
the report to issuance.
Collective protection vulnerabilities at both critical overseas
facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets are not
widely or consistently addressed with operational capabilities. For
example, nearly 80 percent (97 of 125) of overseas sites identified as
critical by combatant commanders, based on criteria we provided them,
did not have collective protection equipment available. Moreover, while
collective protection equipment was limited across all four regional
combatant commands, it also was not consistently fielded in high threat
areas. About two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas did
not receive collective protection. In addition to the uncertainties in
assessing key aspects of the chemical and biological threat, the
reasons for the limited and inconsistent fielding of collective
protection at critical overseas fixed facilities appear to be rooted in
the often unclear and inconsistent guidance on its use. While DOD
guidance encourages the use of collective protection, it does not
prescribe specific criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on
its use. In addition, guidance provided by the individual services--
except for the Air Force-is often vague and inconsistent on key issues
such as (1) whether decisions on the need for collective protection
should be left to local commanders' discretion or prescribed by the
services, (2) when the various types of collective protection are most
appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be protected. Similarly, we
also found collective protection shortages and inconsistent guidance
affected some major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry
units, naval vessels, and medical units. For example, despite the Army
and Marine Corps infantry often operating in similar environments, the
Army called for its ground units to have collective protection while
the Marine Corps did not. In addition, while Navy guidance has for many
years required ships, such as aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates,
and some supply ships, to have collective protection, about 47 percent
of these ships had the required equipment. Small medical units and
large hospital systems designed to be set up in rear areas also
exhibited shortages and inconsistent requirements. The intelligence
uncertainties and vague and inconsistent guidance all combine to make
it difficult for commanders to make clear risk management assessments
of the need for collective protection and of the risks of not providing
it. Given the intelligence uncertainties discussed above and the
challenges commanders face in making decisions regarding the need for
collective protection, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Defense direct the development of clear and consistent criteria to
guide overarching strategic decisions on the use of collective
protection at DOD facilities. We are also recommending that the
department and military services review their current policies and,
where appropriate, develop consistent guidance on when such equipment
is required for naval, ground, and air forces, and that the services
establish consistent criteria on requirements for collective protection
at military service medical units.
DOD's framework for managing collective protection and other related
installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, making
it difficult for the department to ensure that collective protection
resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. More specifically,
opportunities to target funds to improve preparedness and protect
critical military personnel, facilities, and capabilities from attacks
using weapons of mass destruction may be lost. As we have previously
reported, a large number of DOD organizations are engaged in efforts to
improve installation preparedness, but no single entity has been given
the authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate all
aspects of installation preparedness. In past reports, we and others
have recommended the department designate a single integrating
authority for installation preparedness, which the department agreed to
do, but has not yet implemented. As a result, this lack of an
integrated approach and clear lines of authority and responsibilities
exacerbates an already complex challenge of balancing warfighting needs
associated with the collective protection program with other competing
needs. For example, the department has not formally established a
methodology to identify facilities and infrastructure that are critical
to protect, and therefore has not identified facilities that should
receive priority for collective protection or other installation
protection improvements. Without an integrated approach, along with
clear lines of authority, responsibility and accountability, collective
protection resources may continue to be applied inconsistently, and
facilities of a lower priority may be afforded protective measures that
are needed for more critical facilities. At the close of our review in
August 2006, DOD announced that it was beginning a major new
reorganization of its policy directorate to respond to the changing
security threat and to better support the warfighting commands in this
environment. We believe the reorganization provides DOD with an
excellent opportunity to realign responsibilities in an effort to
correct its long-standing problems in this area. To address these
challenges, we believe the Secretary of Defense--as part of the new
reorganization--needs to appoint a single authority with responsibility
for coordinating and integrating worldwide installation preparedness
policies and operating concepts, as previously recommended. We further
recommend that this authority also oversee efforts to gain DOD-wide
agreement on a criterion for identifying critical facilities and
infrastructure and to develop a system for prioritizing critical
facilities for funding protection improvements. In written comments on
a draft of this report, DOD and the Director of National Intelligence
both generally agreed with all of our recommendations. Their written
comments and our evaluation of them are on page 33 of this report.
Background:
DOD's program to provide collective protection is managed by the Joint
Project Manager for Collective Protection under the Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO).[Footnote
3] The JPEO has overall responsibility for research, development,
acquisition, fielding, and other aspects of support for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear defense equipment, as well as
medical countermeasures and installation protection in support of the
National Military Strategy.[Footnote 4] As one of eight project
managers in the JPEO, the mission of the Joint Program Manager for
Collective Protection is to develop, procure, and field collective
protection equipment that protects U.S. forces from chemical,
biological, and radiological contamination.
Between fiscal years 2002 to 2005 DOD's procurement budget for the
overall chemical and biological defense program totaled about $2.4
billion, including about $218 million for collective protection. During
fiscal year 2006, the procurement budget for collective protection
totaled about $31.4 million. Most of these funds, about $16.2 million,
were budgeted for the procurement of expeditionary medical shelters;
another $10.4 million was budgeted for installation of collective
protection equipment on certain classes of Navy ships; and another $5
million was budgeted to provide collective protection for field
hospitals. The Joint Program Manager for Collective Protection has no
program to fund the integration of collective protection systems into
buildings. Funds for this type of collective protection often come from
military service construction or operations and maintenance program
funds. Although the Guardian Installation Protection Program under the
JPEO was originally designed to provide some funding for collective
protection and other installation protection improvements, this program
was primarily focused on domestic installations and its funding has
been substantially reduced.
In making decisions regarding whether to seek funding for collective
protection under DOD's risk management approach, commanders first
conduct threat assessments to identify and evaluate potential threats
to their facilities and forces, such as terrorist attacks, using
intelligence assessments of such factors as capabilities, intentions,
and past activities. The intelligence community continuously assesses
the chemical and biological warfare threats to U.S. interests around
the world, and the individual agencies issue finished intelligence
products with those assessments. Under the leadership of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, the National Intelligence
Council coordinates and issues periodic national intelligence
assessments reflecting the overall intelligence community's assessments
and judgments on the current and future threat from chemical and
biological warfare and other threats.
Following the threat assessments, commanders also use vulnerability and
criticality assessments as additional inputs to the decision-making
process for making investments. Vulnerability assessments are conducted
to identify weaknesses that may be exploited by the identified threats
and to suggest options that address those weaknesses. For example, a
vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in security systems,
computer networks, or unprotected water supplies. Criticality
assessments are conducted to evaluate and prioritize important assets
and functions for funding in terms of factors such as mission and
significance as a target, helping to reduce the potential for expending
resources on lower priority assets.
Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key Aspects of
Chemical and Biological Threat:
The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security
environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to
provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the
significant uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and
biological threat. These problems have challenged the community's
development of assessments--such as the National Intelligence Estimate
on chemical warfare, which has not been updated since 2002--to help
guide DOD and other government agencies' risk assessments and
investment decisions. Generally, the two primary chemical and
biological threats facing DOD installations are from adversarial
nations using missiles with chemical or biological warheads and from
terrorists using explosive devices or other means to release and spread
chemical or biological agents. The missile threat is currently assessed
with varying levels of confidence to stem primarily from a handful of
countries, and DOD expects this threat to increase in coming years as
these countries continue to improve their missile programs. The
terrorist threat stems primarily from al Qaeda, and while presently
limited regarding chemical and biological weapons, this threat is also
expected to increase as al Qaeda continues to try to acquire chemical
and biological agents. Despite these assessments, the intelligence
community has recently recognized significant uncertainties in the
quality and depth of intelligence about those threats. Such uncertainty
raises questions about the operational impact that might be sustained
during an attack and the actual threat posed by our adversaries, and is
thus critical information for officials making risk management
decisions on investments to protect U.S. forces. However, while the
intelligence community has been able to work together and issue a new
2006 National Intelligence Estimate assessing and recognizing the
uncertainties in the biological warfare threat to help decision makers,
it has not been able to issue a revised national intelligence estimate
on the chemical warfare threat since 2002.
Current Assessed Threat of Missile Attack Stems Mainly from Three
Countries and Is Expected to Increase:
The possibility of attack from nation states using missiles--or, in
some cases, artillery or Special Forces--to spread chemical or
biological agents is viewed as posing a significant threat to U.S.
overseas installations. DOD intelligence assessments indicate that the
current threat stems mainly from a handful of countries and DOD expects
this threat to increase. Intelligence estimates assess that several
other countries also have chemical and biological warfare capability
and the missiles to deliver agents. However, these countries are not
assessed as major threats since our relationships with them are not as
adversarial as with the primary threat countries. The intelligence
community assesses that the primary threat countries have the
capability to produce at least some types of chemical or biological
agents, although there is considerable uncertainty regarding many
important aspects of these countries' chemical and biological warfare
programs. They are also assessed to possess the missiles to deliver
them, even though in most cases it is unclear whether they have
actually produced, weaponized, or stockpiled any agent. Reports also
indicate that the missile inventories of these countries are composed
primarily of SCUDs or their variants, with ranges of 300 kilometers to
700 kilometers. Figure 1 shows a SCUD B missile with launcher.
Figure 1: SCUD B Missile with Launcher:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
In addition, the three primary threat countries are assessed not only
to be actively pursuing technological improvements to these SCUDs and
other ballistic missiles to increase accuracy, range, and survivability
but also pursuing the development of new missile systems. For example,
intelligence reports indicate that one country is trying to extend the
range and accuracy of some of its existing ballistic missiles and is
also developing a solid propellant medium range missile with a range of
at least 2,000 kilometers. Similarly, intelligence reports indicate
that another of the primary threat countries continues to pursue an
intercontinental ballistic missile and continues to develop extended
range SCUDs and variants for its medium range missiles that will likely
enhance its warfighting capabilities and complicate U.S. missile
defense systems.
Terrorist Threat to U.S. Installations Also Is Expected to Increase:
Intelligence officials believe that terrorists, primarily al Qaeda,
continue to try to acquire chemical and biological agents and therefore
pose a threat to overseas DOD installations. While the actual status of
al Qaeda's acquisition and development of chemical and biological
agents is unclear and its access to effective delivery methods
presently is limited, some intelligence agencies expect this threat to
increase. For example, some intelligence reporting projects that over
the next decade terrorists are likely to conduct a chemical attack
against United States' interests either at home or overseas. Future
delivery methods could include such devices as balloons, crop sprayers,
mortars, or unmanned aerial vehicles. During our review, 22 countries
overseas were assessed as being at high risk of some type of terrorist
attack.
Significant Uncertainties Exist regarding Key Aspects of the Terrorist
and Missile Threat:
DOD expects both adversarial nation states and terrorists to increase
their chemical and biological warfare capabilities. However, as
acknowledged by intelligence agencies and officials, and highlighted by
the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in its report to the
President,[Footnote 5] the intelligence community has struggled to
handle the changing security environment. These struggles include
significant uncertainty regarding important aspects of the chemical and
biological threat and how to communicate assessments of those threats.
These problems can undermine the ability of the intelligence community
to develop assessments--such as the National Intelligence Estimate on
chemical warfare, produced under the leadership of the Director of
National Intelligence. The Estimate has not been updated since 2002 and
would help guide DOD and other government agencies' risk assessments
and investment decisions.
As discussed in the Commission's report, many of the intelligence
community's assessments on secretive nations like Iran and North Korea
rely largely on inherently ambiguous indicators, such as capabilities
assessments, indirect reports of intentions, deductions based on denial
and deception efforts associated with suspect weapons of mass
destruction sites, and ambiguous or limited pieces of "confirmatory"
evidence. As a result, significant uncertainty arises regarding
important aspects of states' actual ability to employ chemical and
biological warfare agents in ways needed to cause large-scale
casualties. However, as noted in the Commission's report, in past years
the intelligence community may not have clearly communicated that
uncertainty and dissenting opinions about assessments based on that
information, to decision makers in an attempt to provide a "consensus"
assessment. According to intelligence officials, in the wake of the
intelligence failures in Iraq, the community is attempting to develop
reforms such as providing better assessments that more candidly
recognize the uncertainties in the intelligence, and dissenting views
regarding the meaning of such information; as well as reforms in areas
such as the terms and definitions used to describe the severity of the
threat. According to these officials, notwithstanding the attempts at
reforms, there are continuing difficulties in gaining agreement on such
issues which can delay issuance of assessment information. For example,
we were able to obtain the recent 2006 national intelligence estimate
on the biological warfare threat. However, we were not able to obtain a
recent national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare threat
because it remains in development. The chemical warfare estimate was
last updated in 2002.
With respect to specific chemical and biological warfare capabilities
of individual nation states, we found significant uncertainties
regarding the ability of the primary threat countries to use
sophisticated dissemination techniques to effectively disperse chemical
and biological agents and cause large scale casualties. Most ballistic
missiles currently in their arsenals, such as the SCUD and its
variants, are relatively inaccurate, and this inaccuracy increases with
the range to the target. Accordingly, techniques such as "air bursting"
or "submunition" warhead loads may be used to compensate for this
inaccuracy. Air bursting, which is literally the bursting of a warhead
filled with chemical or biological agents in the air, can dramatically
increase the area of contamination compared to the use of warheads
bursting on the ground. Similarly, submunitions--which are small
bomblets inside a warhead--also improve agent dissemination by covering
an area more evenly than bulk filled munitions. Submunitions also
provide the opportunity to deliver agents such as sarin that are not
robust enough to survive release subsequent to a ground detonation or
supersonic airburst.
There is also significant uncertainty regarding terrorists' ability to
acquire and disseminate chemical and biological agents. Unclassified
intelligence information states that al Qaeda is interested in
acquiring or producing chemical warfare agents such as mustard gas and
Sarin, but it is unclear if it has actually acquired any chemical or
biological agents. However, as we reported in 1999,[Footnote 6] there
are many technical challenges that terrorist groups such as al Qaeda
would have to overcome in order to cause mass casualties using
sophisticated chemical and biological warfare agents. For example,
while terrorists do not need specialized knowledge or dissemination
methods to use simple toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine, they
would need a relatively high degree of expertise to successfully cause
mass casualties with sophisticated agents, such as VX and anthrax. As
such, some intelligence reporting concludes that given our limited
access to the al Qaeda organization and its heightened sense of
operational security, the U.S. intelligence community may not be able
to confirm that it has that capability until it is actually used.
Collective Protection Vulnerabilities Are Not Widely or Consistently
Addressed:
Combined with the uncertainty of the threat as previously discussed,
commanders face the difficulty of identifying their vulnerability to
that threat and how best to protect against it. In judging the
vulnerability of his or her command to that threat, the commander
determines whether to have collective protection, and if so, what type
of protection is most appropriate and what functions need to be
protected. At the critical facilities identified by the combatant
commanders, we found that collective protection equipment was not
widely or consistently available. The reasons for the limited and
inconsistent fielding of collective protection appear to be rooted in
unclear and inconsistent guidance on the use of collective protection.
For example, while DOD guidance encourages the use of collective
protection, it does not prescribe specific criteria to guide strategic
decisions on its use. Moreover, guidance provided by the individual
military services--excepting the Air Force--is often vague,
inconsistent, or both with respect to key issues. Such issues include
whether local commanders make the decision to provide or not provide
the protection or the services prescribe those decisions, as is done in
the Air Force; what type of collective protection is most appropriate;
and what functions need to be protected. Similarly, we also found
collective protection equipment shortages and inconsistent guidance
affected some major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry
units, naval vessels, and medical units. The intelligence uncertainties
and vague and inconsistent guidance all combine to make it difficult
for commanders to make clear risk management assessments of the need
for collective protection and the risks of not providing it.
Most Critical Fixed Facilities in High Threat Areas Do Not Have
Collective Protection:
Officials from the four regional combatant commands responsible for
overseas operations identified 125 critical sites in 19 countries as
critical to their operations, 97 of which did not have collective
protection. Moreover, two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat
areas did not receive collective protection. In addition, the
department did not have an overall DOD-wide list of sites formally
identified as critical despite long-standing requirements to identify
and prioritize such sites. As a result, in conjunction with several DOD
offices, we developed a definition of the term critical and requested
that the four regional combatant commanders identify sites meeting that
definition.
The 125 sites identified as critical by the combatant commanders are
located on 64 large installations and other facilities and included
many command and control centers; many intelligence, communications,
logistics, and medical facilities; and a number of air bases. These
facilities were spread across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the
Pacific and were largely concentrated in four countries. As shown in
table 1, 28 of these sites (22 percent) had collective protection
equipment available to allow personnel to continue operations in case
of attack. The limited amount of collective protection we found is
consistent with the findings of our earlier reports dating back to at
least the late 1990s. For example in 1997, we reported that few defense
facilities in Southwest Asia and South Korea had collective protection.
Table 1: Critical Overseas Sites with Collective Protection Equipment:
Total number of critical sites: 125;
Critical sites with collective protection equipment: 28 (22%);
Critical sites in countries with high terrorist threat or within range
of missiles from primary threat countries: Sites with collective
protection: 24;
Critical sites in countries with high terrorist threat or within range
of missiles from primary threat countries: Sites without collective
protection: 47.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
While collective protection was limited in all commands, it was also
not consistently fielded in high threat areas. As shown in table 1, 24
of the 28 sites with collective protection equipment were located in
areas assessed to be at high risk of attack by terrorists or within
range of missile attack by the primary threat countries. However, the
24 sites with collective protection totaled about one-third of the
total of 71 critical fixed facilities in high threat areas. For
example, 12 of the sites with collective protection were located in one
country, which is assessed to have a moderate threat of attack from
terrorists, but is within range of attack from a nearby hostile nation.
The Army identified 4 of its sites in this country as critical to its
mission, but only 2 of the sites had collective protection.
Additionally, a 2004 DOD security assessment identified 1 of those 2
sites as having major shortcomings in collective protection equipment,
which raised questions about the command post's viability as a
warfighting command center. The Air Force provided all 10 of the
critical sites on its air bases in this country with collective
protection, but critical air bases in another nearby country did not
have collective protection despite also being in range of missile
attack by the hostile neighbor. Air Force officials told us they view
the threat in this country as moderate.
Similarly, the Navy provided collective protection to its five critical
sites in one country in the Middle East, which is assessed as being at
high threat of terrorist attack and within range of missile attack from
a nearby hostile country. However, none of the four critical sites on a
key air base in another nearby country were provided with collective
protection, despite also being assessed at high threat of terrorist
attack and being within range of missile attack from the same hostile
country. According to Air Force officials, while there is no collective
protection currently at the base, they plan to provide such equipment
in the future.
Guidance on the Use of Collective Protection Was Often Unclear and
Inconsistent:
While it is difficult to precisely specify the ultimate reasons for the
limited and inconsistent fielding of collective protection, the quality
of guidance on the use of the equipment appears to have been a
contributing factor since it was often unclear and inconsistent. DOD
does not provide clear overarching strategic guidance on many key
issues that would help commanders make decisions on the use of
collective protection. Military services and installation commanders
are generally expected to address key issues that include what level of
threat justifies the investment in collective protection. DOD guidance
generally encourages the use of collective protection and provides
information on, among other things, the nature of the chemical and
biological threat to installations and forces, the types of equipment
available, and the pros and cons of using each, but it does not
prescribe criteria to guide the use of collective protection. For
example, in determining what level of threat justifies the investment
in collective protection, the commander assesses vulnerability from
both terrorist attack and missile attack. However, as discussed
earlier, intelligence on these threats does not make clear whether
terrorists, such as al Qaeda, possess the capability to produce mass
casualties through the use of chemical or biological weapons. A number
of officials told us that they believed the provision of collective
protection equipment should be targeted only at installations at high
risk of missile attack, given limited DOD resources and the likelihood
that terrorist attacks alone lack the capability to produce large-scale
damage. However, the guidance does not establish criteria
differentiating between the two types of attacks, which would help
guide decision making.
In addition to DOD's lack of guidance, military service guidance on the
use of collective protection, excepting the Air Force, is often vague,
inconsistent, or both. For example, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps do not require collective protection to be provided at their
critical fixed facilities or other fixed facilities. Rather, these
services rely on the discretion of their local installation commanders
to determine whether to have the protection, what type of collective
protection should be provided, and which functions should be protected.
In contrast, Air Force policy requires that in the absence of guidance
from higher commands, Air Force commanders should plan to provide
collective protection for 30 percent of the personnel on their bases in
areas judged by the intelligence community to be at high risk of attack
from terrorists or other non state actors or attack from missiles
launched by adversarial nations. Consistent with the Air Force
requirement for collective protection, it had the most critical sites
with the equipment. Of the 50 critical sites the Air Force operated, 16
had collective protection. Meanwhile, the Army operated 51 critical
sites and provided 7 sites with collective protection, while the Navy
operated 23 critical sites and provided 5 with collective protection.
Once the decision to provide collective protection equipment is made,
the services--again excepting the Air Force--lack specific guidance to
determine what type of protection is most appropriate and what
functions need to be protected. The critical facilities identified in
our review used both integrated systems--with overpressure and
filtration systems built in to existing buildings--as well as simple
portable tent systems. Eighteen of the 28 sites had the overpressure
and filtration systems integrated into the construction of the
buildings, while 10 sites had portable systems such as tents with
liners and filtration systems, which could be erected inside the
buildings or set up at locations around the installations. While both
can provide protection for groups of various sizes, costs vary
significantly depending upon factors such as square footage to be
protected and other construction elements. According to officials, the
portable tent systems may cost as little as $18,000 depending on the
configuration. However, a recent installation of an integrated system
at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland cost about $1.8 million. In
addition, local commands must divert existing operations and
maintenance funds to pay for the replacement filters and other costs to
sustain the integrated collective protection systems over time.
According to officials, this creates a significant disincentive to the
initial procurement of integrated collective protection equipment.
Finally, we also found little clear guidance regarding which functions
should be protected. Commanders generally do not have guidance to help
them determine whether to provide protection for command and control
functions, medical treatment facilities, areas for rest and relief, and
other base functions, or to cover only parts of these functions. Only
the Air Force provided clear guidance on this issue. As discussed
above, Air Force regulations state that commanders should plan to
provide collective protection for at least 30 percent of base
personnel. These regulations also describe requirements for coverage of
specific functions, including command and control, medical facilities,
and dormitories and dining facilities, and the level of protection
required for each. During our discussions at the combatant commands we
noted that the other services often had different views on the costs
and benefits of the Air Force requirement.
The intelligence uncertainties and vague and inconsistent guidance all
contribute to the difficulty commanders face in making clear risk
management assessments of the need for collective protection or of the
risk of not providing it. In the absence of clear guidance to aid such
decisions, the potential for inconsistent and inefficient allocation of
DOD resources increases.
Inconsistent Guidance and Limited Resources Affected Some Major
Expeditionary Warfighting Assets:
Similar to the inconsistent availability of collective protection for
critical overseas fixed facilities, collective protection equipment
shortages and inconsistent requirements also affected some major
expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval
vessels, and medical units (see table 2).
Table 2: Collective Protection at Selected Expeditionary Warfighting
Assets:
Asset: Light infantry units: Army;
Percentage of required/Authorized: 70%.
Asset: Light infantry units: Marine Corps;
Percentage of required/Authorized: Not required.
Asset: Navy ships;
Percentage of Required/: Authorized: 47%.
Asset: Air Force aircraft;
Percentage of Required/: Authorized: Not required.
Asset: Medical units: Small Army units;
Percentage of Required/Authorized: 18%.
Asset: Medical units: Small Marine Corps units;
Percentage of Required/Authorized: Not required.
Asset: Medical units: Army hospital systems;
Percentage of Required/Authorized: 61%.
Asset: Medical units: Navy hospital systems;
Percentage of Required/Authorized: 21%.
Asset: Medical units: Air Force Hospital Systems;
Percentage of Required/Authorized: 96%.
Asset: Medical units: Marine Corps hospital systems;
Percentage of Required/Authorized: Not required.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
While differing missions and other factors may explain inconsistencies
in the use of collective protection, no clear guidance was evident in
many cases to explain why forces operating in similar environments were
not provided the same level of protection against chemical or
biological attack.
Infantry Units Operating in Similar Environments Have Different
Guidance for Collective Protection:
Despite operating in similar environments in areas such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, Army and Marine Corps infantry units had different
requirements for collective protection. For example, according to Army
officials, the Army requires its light infantry units at the battalion
level to provide collective protection equipment (M20/M20A1 Simplified
Collective Protection Equipment Shelters), but the unit commander must
make the decision to actually request this equipment. Army officials
told us that as of August 2006, commanders had requested and received
2,506 of the total Army authorization of 3,558 (70 percent). However,
they could not provide details on the units requesting the shelters
because their systems do not track non major end items.
In contrast, Marine Corps officials stated that they had no requirement
for collective protection and no systems on hand. According to these
officials, the current systems that are available are too large and
bulky to be carried with their fast-moving infantry units. They
preferred to depend on avoidance and decontamination techniques to
mitigate any potential chemical or biological threat. However, Marine
Corps officials also acknowledged their potential vulnerability and the
need for collective protection in documents dating back to at least
2002.[Footnote 7] Despite the acknowledged need for the systems,
concerns were subsequently raised that analyses of the workload
requirements for setup, installation, and maintenance requirements, as
well as formal techniques and tactics on their use, would be needed
before any collective protection systems could be fielded. According to
Marine Corps officials, these requirements had not been completed at
the time of our review.
About One-Half of Navy Ships Are Not Meeting Requirements:
Navy guidance has for many years required ships, such as aircraft
carriers, destroyers, frigates, and some supply ships to have
prescribed levels of collective protection equipment.[Footnote 8]
However, as shown in table 3, about 47 percent of naval vessels
required to have collective protection have such protection actually
installed. According to Navy officials, many of these ships were built
prior to the requirement for collective protection, and funds to
retrofit these ships have been limited.
Table 3: Navy Ships Required to Have Collective Protection:
Ship class: Aircraft Carriers;
Total number of ships: 12;
Number of ships with collective protection: 0.
Ship class: Amphibious Warfare Ships;
Total number of ships: 36;
Number of ships with collective protection: 21.
Ship class: Cruisers;
Total number of ships: 23;
Number of ships with collective protection: 0.
Ship class: Destroyers;
Total number of ships: 45;
Number of ships with collective protection: 45.
Ship class: Fast Combat Support Ships (Military Sealift Command);
Total number of ships: 4;
Number of ships with collective protection: 4.
Ship class: Frigates;
Total number of ships: 29;
Number of ships with collective protection: 0.
Ship class: Totals;
Total number of ships: 149;
Number of ships with collective protection: 70 (47%).
Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center.
[End of table]
Navy guidance requiring collective protection also appears outdated,
inconsistent, or both in some areas. For example, according to Navy
officials, funding limitations have required them to focus existing
resources on those ships operating closer in to shore in "littoral"
waters, since these ships are more likely to be exposed to chemical or
biological agents than ships operating further out in deeper "blue
water." However, the Navy guidance continues to require that aircraft
carriers, which generally operate in deep water far from shore, have
collective protection installed. Navy officials told us that they
believed that the requirement was originally based on the threat of
Cold War Soviet naval tactics, and that the guidance had not yet been
updated to reflect the current threat environment. We also found
inconsistencies in the guidance regarding supply ships, such as station
ships (required) and shuttle ships (not required), operating in
littoral waters.
Inconsistent Guidance and Shortages of Collective Protection Found at
Medical Units:
We also found inconsistencies and shortages of collective protection at
medical units, such as small units that travel with their parent
infantry units and large hospital systems designed to be set up in rear
areas. These problems create military limitations and increase risks to
U.S. forces and capabilities.
For example, Army infantry units contain medical support groups, such
as battalion aid stations, that deploy with the parent unit into
battlefield areas. Army guidance requires these medical units to have a
certain number of Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters
consisting basically of tents with protective linings and overpressure
systems attached to the backs of transport vehicles (see fig. 2). In
contrast, the Marine Corps had not established any requirements for its
medical units to have these systems. According to Marine Corps
officials, avoidance and decontamination strategies are their preferred
method for handling chemical or biological events while operating on
the battlefield. In addition, according to DOD officials, the Marine
Corps often moves in small air and sea transports with little room for
collective protection equipment, consistent with its traditional
strategic mission. As a result, Marine Corps units may use Army medical
support in the areas where they are deployed. However, the increasing
use of joint operations, where both operate in the same geographic area
at the same time, may be blurring traditional missions.
Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Protective Shelter:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
While the Army requires its medical support units to have collective
protection systems, Army figures indicate that only 191 of the 1,035
required systems (18 percent) were on hand as of the end of fiscal year
2005. This situation is similar to that found in our 2002 review of
Army medical units in South Korea, when we found that only about 20
percent of the required systems were scheduled to be purchased. The
JPEO, which procures these systems for the military services, has plans
to procure additional systems through fiscal year 2014. However, the
planned funding for these systems is lagging behind requirements, and
the office will not be able to procure all the needed systems by 2014.
Officials told us that only about 60 percent of the funding needed has
been budgeted, and they need an additional $323 million to fulfill all
requirements.
Collective protection for larger expeditionary hospital operations is
provided by large portable tent systems with liners and pressurized
interiors, which may be combined to provide 200 to 300 beds or more.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force all have versions of these mobile
hospitals (see fig. 3). However, while the Air Force generally met its
goal, shortages and other serious problems continue to affect Army and
Navy medical facility collective protection.
Figure 3: Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical Support:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
According to Army officials, the Army acquisition goal was to have 23
of these systems on hand, but it was only able to obtain 14 because of
funding limitations. Similarly, Navy officials told us that they only
had enough tent liners to protect about 460 beds of the approximately
2,220 total bed spaces currently required. Moreover, the collective
protection liners used to make the hospital tent systems resistant to
chemical and biological attack were not located with the tents, which
were prepositioned at various sites around the world. The liners were
located at a site in Virginia and would need to be moved to the same
locations as the hospital tent systems in order to provide a collective
protection capability. According to Navy officials, the Navy is aware
of this shortfall and is in the process of redesigning the requirements
to provide collective protection for its mobile fleet hospital tent
systems. We reported similar shortfalls in collective protection
equipment at Army, Navy, and Air Force portable hospital systems in
South Korea in our 2002 report.
Our current review found that the Air Force generally met its goal for
the transportable hospital systems. According to data provided by the
Air Force, as of May 31, 2006, it had 156 of 162 (96 percent) required
systems on hand. Marine Corps officials told us that the Corps does not
establish such large transportable hospital operations and it has no
systems in stock, instead relying on the Navy to provide for Marine
needs in this area.
Fragmented Approach to Overall Installation Protection Policies
Undermines Decision Making on Critical Priorities:
Our prior work and that of several DOD offices has highlighted DOD's
fragmented framework for managing the strategic use of collective
protection and other installation protection activities. This, combined
with the lack of agreed upon installation priorities guided by the
robust application of risk management principles, makes it difficult
for the department to ensure that funding resources are allocated
efficiently and effectively. More specifically, opportunities to target
funds to improve preparedness and protect critical military personnel,
facilities, and capabilities from attacks using weapons of mass
destruction may be lost. Responsibilities for installation protection
activities are spread over a variety of DOD organizations and programs.
These programs are designed to address protection from threats ranging
from terrorist attacks to industrial accidents; however, with their
different operating definitions and evolving concepts, gaps and
inefficiencies in collective protection program coverage are created.
In a 2004 report, we recommended that DOD designate a single authority
with responsibility for unifying and coordinating installation
protection policies. However, despite DOD's agreement with that
recommendation it has not yet implemented it. These problems also
prevent DOD from reaching agreement regarding departmentwide standards
to identify which facilities and infrastructure are critical and
compile an overall list of critical facilities prioritized for
receiving funds for protection improvements.
Overall Installation Protection Activities Are Fragmented and
Disjointed:
DOD policies and resulting management activities that direct the
strategic use of collective protection and other installation
protection activities are fragmented and disjointed. Responsibilities
for key installation protection activities such as (1) policy and
oversight, (2) installation threat and vulnerability assessments and
risk management decisions on appropriate protections, and (3) funding
programs for installation protection improvements are spread across a
variety of programs and DOD organizations, as shown in figure 4. No
single DOD organization has responsibility for developing unified
policy and coordinating these activities.
Figure 4: Installation Protection Activities Spread across Multiple DOD
Organizations:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD regulations.
[End of figure]
The variety of DOD organizations bring their own approaches to policy
and programs for installation protection, and these different
approaches can result in unresolved conflict and inefficient
application of resources. For example, responsibilities for
installation protection (including collective protection) reside
primarily with installation commanders, regional combatant commanders,
the military services, and the Joint Staff. At the same time,
responsibilities for policy and oversight of installation protection
activities, such as the antiterrorism program, are spread among the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and
others. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict developed
worldwide antiterrorism policies and standards. However, Homeland
Defense is responsible for providing policy and oversight of domestic
antiterrorism activities.
Responsibilities for making installation threat and vulnerability
assessments and risk management decisions on collective protection or
other needed improvements are also spread across multiple organizations
and levels. For example, local installation commanders have basic
responsibility for these activities, but the military services,
combatant commanders, and others with responsibilities for missions
taking place at the installations are also involved. At the same time,
organizations such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Joint
Staff are involved in providing over 20 different types of formal
assessments of installation vulnerabilities. For example, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency conducts Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability
Assessments, which examine the vulnerability of large installations
with 300 or more personnel to a terrorist attack and the potential for
mass casualties and large-scale loss of life. The agency as well as
others may also conduct "full spectrum vulnerability assessments." As
the name implies, these assessments examine an installation's
vulnerability to a wide range of threats that could interrupt its
ability to fulfill its mission, including attacks using chemical or
biological agents, attacks against information networks, and attacks
against supporting non-DOD infrastructure.
Similarly, funding for installation protection improvements also
involves a variety of organizations. For example, the combatant
commanders have no programs of their own to fund improvements at
overseas facilities important to their warfighting needs. According to
combatant command officials, much of the funding for improvements at
the overseas installations comes from the construction or operations
and maintenance programs of the military services that operate them.
The JPEO Guardian Installation Protection program provided another
potential source of funding, but the program has faced a number of
problems. The Guardian program was initiated in 2004 to provide
improvements to protect critical facilities from attacks ranging from
terrorists to nation states using chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear weapons. The program was initially provided approximately
$1.2 billion in funding for improvements at 185 domestic and 15
overseas sites from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. However, DOD
recently cut funding for the program by about $760 million. According
to officials, because of the cuts, they stopped funding for collective
protection and other such improvements while the role of the program
and its list of projects were being reviewed by DOD. Antiterrorism
programs also provide some potential funding. Oversight of resources
used for overall antiterrorism activities is conducted by the Assistant
Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, while
oversight of resources used for domestic antiterrorism activities is
conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland
Defense.
We and several DOD offices have reported on problems associated with
the fragmented installation protection program structure. For example
in August 2004,[Footnote 9] we reported that the large number of
organizations engaged in efforts to improve installation preparedness,
and the lack of centralized authority and responsibility to integrate
and coordinate departmentwide installation preparedness efforts were
hindering overall preparedness efforts and DOD's ability to ensure that
its resources were applied efficiently and effectively. Officials at
the department, Joint Staff, service, and installation levels told us
that the lack of a single focal point to integrate departmentwide
installation preparedness efforts among the many involved organizations
adversely affected their ability to resolve disagreements and develop
needed overarching guidance, concepts of operations, and chemical and
biological defense standards. Because of the absence of departmentwide
standards, military services and installations faced problems in
prioritizing requirements for funding and personnel resources, since
such standards provided the basis for calculating requirements. We
recommended that DOD designate a single authority with the
responsibility to coordinate and integrate worldwide installation
preparedness improvement efforts at the department, service, and
installation levels.
In May 2006, the DOD Inspector General reported that the problems with
the fragmented and disjointed program structure were
continuing.[Footnote 10] According to the report, responsibilities for
installation protection activities continued to be spread across
multiple programs and organizations, with no single DOD organization
responsible for unifying and coordinating these activities. Problems
such as inadequate program structure, inadequately coordinated program
concepts, and a lack of generally accepted terminology describing
concepts and doctrine resulted in confusion and disagreement in
attempts to establish policy and assign responsibilities, inefficient
application of resources, and the lack of a strategic vision balancing
all areas of program responsibility. For example, the report found that
the lack of clear lines of authority and responsibilities for
installation protection activities between the Assistant Secretary for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense was causing confusion and
inefficiency. In this regard, coincident with the establishment of the
Homeland Defense office in 2003, the Secretary of Defense called for
development of a chartering DOD Directive within 45 days to formalize
the responsibilities of the new Assistant Secretary and clarify the
relationship between Homeland Defense and other offices, such as
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. However, according to
officials in Homeland Defense, the chartering directive was never
formalized because of problems in coordinating with the many DOD
offices involved, the continuing evolution of their responsibilities,
and the focusing of resources on developing the June 2005 Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support.
In June 2006, DOD's Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Programs and the Joint Requirements Office
also issued a study on installation protection confirming many of the
problems identified earlier by us and the DOD Inspector
General.[Footnote 11] This study was called for as a result of the
funding cuts in the Guardian Installation Protection Program. The study
pointed out that problems with the alignment of antiterrorism, chemical
and biological defense, critical infrastructure protection, and other
programs create difficulty in providing military installations with
capabilities for all-hazard planning, preparedness, response, and
recovery. The study also noted that DOD organizations were not
developing guidance to sufficiently resolve problems related to
inadequate policy, standards, and doctrine in these areas. Moreover, it
also reported that despite agreement with our 2004 recommendation
calling for designation of a single authority responsible for
coordinating and integrating overall installation protection efforts,
DOD still had not done so. This study made a series of recommendations
designed to integrate and unify installation protection and emergency
preparedness programs and concepts. This study also developed a plan to
improve installation protection at DOD facilities, recommending that
some $560 million be provided for installation protection improvements
over 4 years, with priority given to overseas facilities. However, the
amount of funding approved by DOD was sufficient only for the lowest
levels of improvements and did not include funding for collective
protection and chemical and biological detection improvements.
At the close of our review in August 2006, DOD announced a new
reorganization that will affect some of the organizations involved in
installation protection activities. The need for reorganization was
identified in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report as
necessary to respond to the changing security threat by reshaping DOD
offices to better support the warfighting combatant commands and
respond to the new threat environment. According to DOD officials, the
specific policy and organizational changes that will result from the
reorganization will develop over the coming months.
Priorities for Allocation of Installation Protection Resources Were Not
Identified:
Program fragmentation can also prevent DOD from reaching agreement in
prioritizing facilities for protection funding. A long-standing series
of directives and instructions, as well as DOD's June 2005 "Strategy
for Homeland Defense and Civil Support," have recognized the importance
of prioritizing installations in light of constrained resources and
called on DOD to identify critical infrastructure and to prioritize
these assets for funding improvements.[Footnote 12] Accordingly, early
in our review, we requested a list of critical overseas facilities from
the Directors for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Combating
Terrorism, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, as well as from other offices throughout DOD and the military
services. However, DOD was unable to provide us with such a list.
According to DOD officials, there are a variety of listings of critical
facilities and other infrastructure. However, each is compiled from the
limited perspective of the military service or other DOD organization
responsible for the asset, and not from an overall DOD strategic
perspective. According to these officials, gaining agreement on DOD-
wide priorities is difficult because of the fragmented organizational
structure, as well as policy and program changes following September
11, 2001. According to the May 2006 DOD Inspector General report, a
lack of stable funding and centralized prioritization and oversight for
critical infrastructure improvements has created problems throughout
the combatant commands. According to the report, determining which
assets were critical depended on mission requirements that varied with
the level of command. Thus, an effort to protect an asset critical to a
combatant commander from his or her warfighting perspective could
receive a low priority from an installation commander who may be
focused on a different, non-warfighting perspective. Similarly, DOD's
June 2006 study of installation protection was directed to create a
prioritized list of installations to receive funding for protective
measures, but was unable to do so. According to the report, it could
not develop the list because of the short time frame allowed for
completion of the study and the controversial nature of installation
prioritization.
In recognition of this problem, we sent a letter to the Secretary of
Defense in November 2005 requesting clarification of the situation and
DOD actions to correct the problem (see app. II). DOD's response (see
app. III) acknowledged the importance of prioritizing its critical
assets and stated that it published DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense
Critical Infrastructure Program, in August 2005. This directive called
for the development of policy and program guidance for DOD-wide
critical infrastructure, including criteria and methodology to identify
and prioritize these assets. At the time of our review, this effort was
being conducted through the Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection
Program under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland
Defense. In addition, this office was also directed to conduct an
assessment of all of the activities that contribute to the department's
ability to achieve mission assurance to identify program gaps and other
problems that could interfere with mission assurance. According to
program officials, the framework for prioritizing DOD's critical
infrastructure was expected to be published in August 2006 but has not
yet been formally adopted. It is unclear when the assessment of program
gaps will be completed. It is also unclear to what extent the Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Defense will address aspects of critical
infrastructure protection related to overseas facilities identified as
critical to warfighting missions.
Conclusions:
As we and others have observed for several years, notwithstanding the
emergence of adversaries that can use chemical and biological weapons,
the fielding of collective protection equipment at both critical
overseas fixed facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets
remains limited and inconsistent. Assessing the need and priority for
such equipment is difficult because of the significant uncertainties in
the intelligence about the nature of the chemical and biological
threat. While the intelligence community recognizes the need to assess
and communicate these uncertainties about the chemical warfare threat,
this information has not been available to the agencies that need it.
Specifically, the intelligence community, under the leadership of the
Director of National Intelligence, has not been able to complete an up-
to-date National Intelligence Estimate on chemical warfare in part due
to changing assessment and communication policies, as well as issues
surrounding the basis or evidence for the assessments. In our view, an
updated chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate is needed to
provide a critical input and basis for decisions on investments in
chemical warfare defenses, including collective protection.
Uncertainty about the threat can lead to resources being invested in
assets where they may not be needed. Conversely, not providing
collective protection where it may be needed can place military
personnel and operations at increased risk. In addition, allowing the
current fragmented and disjointed framework for managing installation
protection policies to continue without agreed-upon priorities for
funding or clear requirements and service guidance on the appropriate
use of collective protection, further increases the likelihood that
limited DOD resources will be used inefficiently and ineffectively.
DOD's ongoing reorganization provides a good opportunity to review the
policy and programmatic gaps and inconsistencies, gain the agreement of
the competing organizations needed to integrate the policies and
operating concepts, and correct the long-standing need for an
overarching authority in this area.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In light of the need for the most current intelligence estimates to
help guide the government's--including DOD's--risk assessments and
investment decisions, we are recommending that the Director of National
Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to
update the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take
the necessary steps to bring the report to issuance.
To ensure that the problems in the overall installation protection and
collective protection policies and programs do not continue to place
military personnel and operations at increased risk and undercut the
efficiency and effectiveness of DOD resource allocations, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense--as part of the ongoing
reorganization--take the following four actions to ensure better
coordination and integration of these activities and clearer guidance
on key operating concepts. To ensure better coordination and
integration of the overall installation protection activities, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense:
* designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to
coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness policies
and operating concepts and:
* assign this single authority with the responsibility to oversee
efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on criteria for identifying critical
facilities and to develop a system for prioritizing critical facilities
and infrastructure for funding protection improvements.
To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in the chemical and
biological collective protection program, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense:
* direct the Joint Staff and military services to develop clear and
consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on the use
of collective protection at DOD facilities, including issues such as
whether decisions on the need for collective protection should be
prescribed or left to commanders' discretion, the use of integrated
overpressure and filtration systems versus portable structures, and
what mission functions must be protected, and:
* direct the Joint Staff and military services to review their current
policies and, where appropriate, develop consistent requirements on
when collective protection is required for medical units, and naval,
ground, and air forces.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a classified version of our draft report, DOD
and the Director of National Intelligence both generally agreed with
all five of our recommendations. Their unclassified comments on the
classified version are reprinted in appendices IV and V. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Regarding our first recommendation that the Director of National
Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his ability to
update the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate, and take
the necessary steps to bring the report to issuance; the Director's
office stated that the National Intelligence Council began the process
of developing that estimate several months ago, and expects the update
to be published in early 2007. In this regard, DOD also called for the
Director of National Intelligence to prepare an integrated, worldwide
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive
threat assessment. DOD stated that current assessments are fragmented
and not consistent across geographic areas. We agree that better
coordinated and integrated threat assessments, consistent across
geographic regions could help improve DOD's decisions regarding
investments in the security needs of U.S. forces worldwide. We
encourage DOD to make this recommendation directly to the Director of
National Intelligence.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense designate a single integrating authority with the
responsibility to coordinate and integrate worldwide installation
preparedness policies and operating concepts. DOD acknowledged that as
currently practiced, installation preparedness is not a formal program
within the department. DOD also noted that while it agreed with our
recommendation, it believed that the combatant commanders should be
responsible for their respective areas of responsibility and determine
collective protection requirements based on operational needs. We agree
that the combatant commanders should have flexibility to recognize
special operational needs in the fielding of collective protection in
their areas of responsibility. However, as our report clearly points
out such determinations should take place within an agreed-upon,
coordinated, and integrated framework of DOD-wide installation
preparedness policies and operating concepts.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, that the
integrating authority discussed in our second recommendation also be
given responsibility to oversee efforts to gain DOD-wide agreement on
criteria for identifying critical facilities and for developing an
overall prioritized list of critical facilities and infrastructure for
funding protection improvements. The department agreed with our
recommendation to assign oversight responsibility to a single
integrating authority; however, it suggested that rather than develop
an overall prioritized list, DOD should develop a "system" to
prioritize the critical facilities for funding protective improvements.
DOD stated that this "system" to prioritize facilities does not have to
be a list "from 1 to n", but instead may be tiers or bands of assets
based on the strategic impact if that asset was lost or degraded, using
the all hazards approach to vulnerability assessments. We agree that
the identification of prioritized tiers or types/bands of assets could
satisfy DOD's needs in this area, if done appropriately. However, we
believe the danger with this approach is the identification of tiers or
types of assets so broad as to invite continued disagreement and
gridlock, leaving the situation essentially unchanged. Nonetheless, to
provide the department with flexibility to implement this key action as
a system, we adjusted our recommendation to reflect DOD's suggestion.
DOD concurred without comment with our fourth and fifth recommendations
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff and Military
Services to develop clear and consistent criteria to guide overarching
strategic decisions on the use of collective protection; and that those
offices review their current policies and develop consistent
requirements on the use of collective protection at medical units, and
naval, ground, and air forces.
As we agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this
report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send
copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of
National Intelligence, and to interested congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the current assessments of chemical and biological threats
to Department of Defense facilities located overseas, we interviewed
intelligence officials from a variety of national and DOD intelligence
organizations, and reviewed briefings and other intelligence products
generated by these organizations. Specifically, we met with officials
from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and
National Ground Intelligence Center and DOD intelligence officials from
each of the four regional combatant commands with critical overseas
facilities located in their area of operations. During our meetings, we
obtained detailed briefings and other intelligence products, which
described the nature and likelihood of a chemical or biological attack
on U.S. troops and installations, as well as other documents that
described the capabilities of terrorist organizations and adversarial
nation states. Although we could not independently verify the
reliability of the information, we obtained explanations of the basis
for the assessments from intelligence analysts and other officials. We
also requested access to and briefings on the most recent national
intelligence estimates for both chemical and biological threats from
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although the
office provided us with the latest intelligence estimate on biological
warfare, we were unable to obtain the latest national intelligence
estimate on chemical warfare. At the close of our review in August
2006, the estimate remained in draft status and we were unable to
schedule a briefing with officials to discuss its contents.
To determine the levels of collective protection provided to critical
overseas facilities we worked with several DOD offices, first to
develop criterion needed to determine which DOD sites were considered
critical, and second, to identify the type and amount of any collective
protection equipment at each site. During the time of our review DOD
had not developed an overall agreed-upon methodology and listing of
facilities considered to be critical. As a result, we were required to
develop our own criterion for the purposes of this review. To develop
this criterion we reviewed existing DOD regulations and discussed
potential options with officials from a variety of DOD offices,
including the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, the Joint Staff
Office for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense, the Joint Requirements
Office, the Joint Program Manager for Collective Protection, and the
Guardian Installation Protection Program office. The criterion called
for DOD to identify those sites that must remain operational to
complete its mission during a chemical or biological event, such as
command and control nodes, rest and relief areas, emergency medical
locations, and intelligence sites, and where there would be no
capability to transfer the function or capability to an alternate
location. The Joint Staff then assisted us by forwarding our criterion
to the regional combatant commanders for the U.S. Central, European,
Pacific, and Southern Commands, and requesting that they identify their
critical facilities and the type and amount of any collective
protection equipment currently located at those sites. Our method of
quantifying the critical sites counted the number of individual
buildings identified as critical sites on DOD installations, when
identified separately by DOD officials. Following receipt of the
responses from the combatant commands, we verified the accuracy of
those lists with officials from each command.
To determine the levels of collective protection provided to major
expeditionary warfighting assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels,
and aircraft, we reviewed DOD's Annual Report on Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs and interviewed contractors and officials
from each service component, the Tank and Automotive Command, and the
Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to
obtain detailed listings of the type and amount of collective
protection equipment currently fielded by each service component. Once
we obtained these listings, we verified the information with officials
from each service and the Joint Program Executive Office. Based on
these efforts and our discussions with department and military service
officials, we believe that the information we obtained is sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report.
To examine DOD's framework for managing overall installation protection
activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, we
reviewed applicable regulations, policies, and prior GAO and DOD
reports and interviewed officials from a variety of DOD offices
responsible for program management and oversight. Specifically, we met
with officials from the following offices:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict:
* Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs:
* Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense:
* Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Defense:
* Joint Staff, Anti-Terrorism/Homeland Defense:
* Office of the Inspector General:
* Regional combatant commands (Central Command, European Command,
Pacific Command, and Southern Command):
* Military service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps):
* Defense Threat Reduction Agency:
* U.S. Army Chemical School:
We conducted our review from September 2005 through August 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Letter of Inquiry to the Secretary of Defense:
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 21, 2005:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld:
The Secretary of Defense:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We are currently reviewing the Department of Defense's (DOD) program
for providing collective protection measures to critical overseas
facilities in order to guard against attack from chemical or biological
weapons (GAO code 350721). This work is being performed in response to
a request by the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations. For purposes of this review we
have requested a list of critical overseas facilities from the
Directors for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Combating
Terrorism, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for
Homeland Defense, as well as from other offices throughout DOD and the
military services. However, no one in DOD or the individual military
services was able to provide us with such a list despite the existence
of directives and instructions dating back at least to the late 1980s
calling for DOD to identify critical facilities and to develop a
methodology for prioritizing them for funding. The purpose of this
letter is to obtain DOD confirmation of our understanding of the
reasons why this problem has occurred, and to determine the current
status of efforts to address this problem.
DOD Directives 5160.54 (1/20/98, now superseded) and 3020.40 (8/19/05)
have long called on DOD to identify critical assets/infrastructure and
take steps to protect those assets against attack from chemical,
biological, and other weapons. DOD Instruction 2000.18 (12/4/02) also
calls on DOD to identify critical infrastructure nodes and to consider
developing a methodology for prioritizing such installations for
funding. Beginning in 2003, proponency for that regulation-as well as
the more recent DODD 3020.40--was transferred from the OASD for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to the OASD for Homeland Defense.
DOD's June 2005 "Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support" also
cited the need to identify critical infrastructure and prioritize the
protection of assets because of limitations on resources.
In discussions with officials from the OASD for Homeland Defense, the
Joint Requirements Office, the Joint Program Executive Office for
Chemical and Biological Defense, and others we were informed that DOD
has not been able to compile such a list of "critical" facilities
because of difficulties in gaining agreement on which of the many DOD
facilities worldwide were, in fact, critical. Only the Navy was able to
identify a methodology for prioritizing installations for funding.
According to Navy officials, they have been designated as the lead
agency for developing a methodology for prioritizing installations for
all of the services and combatant commands. They have developed a draft
prioritization methodology based on risk-management concepts and its
DOD-wide adoption has been agreed upon, in principle, but it has not
yet been formalized.
The Department's inability to come up with a listing of critical
overseas facilities and their priorities for funding improvements
appears to be partially rooted in problems with the Department's
attempts to change its programs and organization to incorporate
Homeland Defense as a new priority. According to a recent DOD Inspector
General evaluation of the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
(DCIP)[Footnote 13] the addition of the U.S. homeland as a significant
element in the Global War on Terrorism necessitated changes to DOD
policy and organization, but attempts to assign responsibility and
develop programs were hindered by the lack of generally accepted
terminology, concepts, and requirements.
According to Inspector General briefings on this evaluation, the
activities associated with critical asset protection are generally
defined by "force protection" and "mission assurance" programs.
However, responsibilities for these activities are spread across a
variety of programs and among multiple Under, Assistant, and Deputy
Under Secretaries of Defense. This unclear alignment has resulted in a
lack of concise and generally accepted concepts and doctrine, including
the lack of standardized definitions and criteria for determining asset
criticality; confusion over geographic responsibilities; and non-
concurrence with attempts to draft controlling Directives. Similarly,
according to this evaluation, while the DCIP program provides limited
funding for vulnerability assessments at critical facilities, it makes
no provision for prioritizing and funding improvements to mitigate the
vulnerabilities identified. As a result, requests for DCIP mitigation
funding have to compete with all other requirements through the regular
budget process. Decentralized funding without centralized
prioritization and oversight have, in turn, discouraged effective
mitigation efforts. The determination of which assets are critical
depends on mission requirements which vary with the level of command.
As a result, a mitigation effort to protect an asset critical to a
combatant commander may receive a low priority from an installation
commander and, consequently, not receive funding.
While the need to redefine and reprioritize among competing assets
since 9/11 is relatively recent, we have found no evidence that a
comprehensive DOD-wide, prioritized listing of critical overseas (and
homeland) facilities was ever formalized before 9/11. From our
discussions with various officials, it appears that a number of
listings of critical facilities were put together from the individual
perspectives of combatant commanders, military services, and other
functional or programmatic proponents. However, no overall DOD-wide,
prioritized listing was ever compiled despite requirements to identify
critical or key assets and prioritize them dating back to at least the
late 1980's. For example, DOD Directive 5160.54, Critical Asset
Assurance Program (dated Jan. 1998), states that it has been DOD policy
to identify assets deemed critical to DOD, prioritize those assets, and
"provide a comprehensive and integrated decision support environment"
to protect those assets. This directive updated apparently similar
policies laid out in its predecessor DOD Directive 5160.54, DoD Key
Asset Protection Program, dated June 1989.
We have attempted to obtain clarification of these issues from a
variety of DOD offices with responsibilities in this area, but we have
been unsuccessful to date. To help ensure that we have a clear
understanding of the current situation at DOD, we are requesting that
your office respond to the following questions:
1. Is the above description of the current situation at DOD correct,
and why have we been unable to obtain a current, accurate listing of
overseas facilities critical to DOD operations?
2. What actions has DOD planned to correct this situation, and when
will they be completed?
To help ensure that we can be responsive to our requestors, we would
appreciate having your response by December 6, 2005. If you or your
staffs have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or
DAgostinoD@GAO.GOV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix III: DOD Response to GAO Letter of Inquiry:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2600 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2600:
Homeland Defense:
JAN 1 9 2006:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Angostino:
Thank you for your November 21, 2005 letter to the Secretary of Defense
regarding GAO code 350'721. The Secretary has directed that I respond
on his behalf.
In your letter, you outlined the unsuccessful effort to obtain a list
of overseas facilities critical to DoD operations. You asked our
Department to respond with the reasons for our inability to produce
this list and to identify the actions planned to correct the situation.
The Joint Staff forwarded your request for information to SOUTHCOM,
EUCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM. Each combatant command has now provided your
office with its list of overseas critical facilities.
Recognizing the importance of this issue, my office published
Department of Defense Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program in August 2005. This publication directed the
development of policy and program guidance for defense critical
infrastructure, including standards to identify and prioritize critical
infrastructure. In addition, my office developed a methodology that
will provide a uniform system of identifying and prioritizing DoD
critical infrastructure and facilities. This methodology is in
coordination and will be provided to you when it has been approved.
You also commented that there appeared to be an unclear alignment of
the activities and programs associated with mission assurance. In June
2005, my office published the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support. In the accompanying implementation memorandum, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense directed us to conduct an assessment of all
activities that contribute to the Department's ability to achieve
mission assurance. My office developed the attached Mission Assurance
Framework to guide the assessment effort.
You may contact Mr. William Bryan, Director, Critical Infrastructure
Protection, OASD(HD)/FP&E, 703-614-8330 for additional information.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul McHale:
Enclosures:
As stated:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Portions of this correspondence have been deleted for security reasons.
Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs:
Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense:
3050 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3050:
DEC 01 2006:
Ms. Davi D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report,
dated October 12, 2006 (GAO Code 350721).
The Department concurs with recommendations 4 and 5, and concurs with
comment on recommendations 1-3. Detailed comments on the report, its
recommendations, and its security classification are enclosed.
Signed by:
Arthur T. Hopkins:
Acting:
Enclosures:
As stated:
Upon Removal Of Attachments This Document Becomes Unclassified:
This Page Unclassified When Removed From The Rest of the Document GAO
Draft Report - Dated October 12, 2006:
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
(U) Recommendation 1: In light of the need for the most current
intelligence estimates to help guide the government's - including DoD's
- risk assessments and investment decisions, we recommend that Director
of National Intelligence identify the impediments interfering with his
ability to update the chemical warfare National Intelligence Estimate
and take the necessary steps to bring the report to issuance.
(U) DoD Response: Concur with comment. DoD needs the chemical
assessment referenced, but also recommends the Director of National
Intelligence prepare an integrated, overall, worldwide Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE)
threat assessment. Current assessments are fragmented and not
consistent across geographic areas.
(U) Recommendation 2: To ensure better coordination and integration of
the overall installation protection activities, the GAO recommended
that the Secretary of Defense designate a single integrating authority
with the responsibility to coordinate and integrate worldwide
installation preparedness policies and operating concepts.
(U) DoD Response: Concur with comments. DoD agrees there should be a
single integrating authority within the Department to coordinate and
integrate worldwide installation preparedness policies and operating
concepts. Installation preparedness, as used in the 2003 Report to
Congress on Preparedness of Military Installations for Preventing and
Responding to Terrorist Incidents, is only an integrating concept and
is not a formal program within the Department. During fielding, though,
COCOMs should be responsible for their respective Areas of
Responsibility and determine collective protection requirements based
on operational needs.
(U) Recommendation 3: To ensure better coordination and integration of
the overall installation protection activities, the GAO recommended
that the Secretary of Defense assign this single authority with
responsibility to oversee efforts to gain DoD-wide agreement on
criteria for identifying critical facilities and to develop an overall
prioritized list of critical facilities and infrastructure for funding
protection improvements.
(U) DoD Response: Concur in part. Change recommendation to read: "To
ensure better coordination and integration of the overall installation
protection activities, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
assign a single policy authority the responsibility to oversee efforts
to gain DoD-wide agreement on criteria for identifying critical
facilities and develop a system to prioritize the critical facilities
for funding protective improvements. The prioritization does not have
to be a list from 1 to "n," but it may be 'tiers' or bands' of assets
based on strategic impact if lost/degraded utilizing the all hazards
approach of mission assurance.
(U) Recommendation 4: To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in
the chemical and biological collective protection program, the GAO
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff and
the Military Services to develop clear and consistent criteria to guide
overarching strategic decisions on the use of collective protection at
DoD facilities, including issues such as whether decisions on the need
for collective protection should be prescribed or left to commander's
discretion, the use of integrated overpressure and filtration systems
versus portable structures, and what mission functions must be
protected.
(U) DoD Response: Concur.
(U) Recommendation 5: To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in
the chemical and biological collective protection program, the GAO
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff and
Military Services to review their current policies and, where
appropriate, develop consistent requirements on when collective
protection is required for medical units, and naval, ground, and air
forces.
(U) DoD Response: Concur:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Director of National Intelligence:
Portions of this correspondence have been deleted for security reasons.
Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence:
Washington, DC 20511:
November 3, 2006:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft GAO study:
Regarding the draft study's recommendation concerning an updated
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on chemical warfare, several
months ago, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) began the process
of assembling, drafting, and coordinating such an NIE. This process is
ongoing. The NIC currently expects the updated NIE to be published in
early 2007.
If you have further questions about this or any other matter please
contact Peter Petrihos in the Office of Legislative Affairs at (202)
201-1156.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Kathleen Turner:
Director of Legislative Affairs:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood,
Assistant Director (retired); Robert Repasky, Assistant Director;
Lorelei St. James, Assistant Director; Shawn Arbogast; Angela
Bourciquot; Grace Coleman; Jason Jackson; John Nelson; Rebecca Shea;
Karen Thornton; and Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk-
Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. GAO-06-13. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness
Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive
Planning. GAO-04-855. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2004.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments
of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 1999.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006).
[2] GAO, Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's
Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions, GAO-06-13,
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).
[3] The Joint Program Executive Office is under the overall leadership
of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs.
[4] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
directed DOD to centralize the overall coordination and integration of
the chemical and biological warfare defense program and the chemical
and biological medical defense program. Pub. L. No. 103-160 § 1701.
[5] Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[6] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 1999).
[7] U.S. Marine Corps memorandum, Statement of Need for the Interim
Collective Protection System, November 5, 2002.
[8] OPNAV Instruction 9070.1, Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of
the U.S. Navy, Enclosures (2) and (3) (Sept. 23, 1988).
[9] GAO, Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation
Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and
Comprehensive Planning, GAO-04-855 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2004).
[10] Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General: Evaluation of
Defense Installation Vulnerability Assessments, Report No. IE-2005-001
(Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2006).
[11] Department of Defense, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Installation Protection Study Report
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006).
[12] See Department of Defense Directive 5160.54, Critical Asset
Assurance Program (Jan. 20, 1998) (canceled by DODD 3020.40);
Department of Defense Instruction 2000.18, Department of Defense
Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-
Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines, paragraph E3.1.8 (Dec.
4, 2002); and Department of Defense Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program, sections 4 and 5 (Aug. 19, 2005).
[13] DOD IG Evaluation of the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program,
and report on Defense Installation Vulnerability Assessments (Project
No. D-2004-DIPOE2-0157).
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