Chemical and Biological Defense
Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National Priorities Gao ID: GAO-07-143 January 19, 2007The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks at home or overseas. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature and potential requests for military capabilities needed to respond to 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council. The Army's chemical units are key players in this mission. GAO was asked to evaluate the preparedness of the Army's chemical and biological units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units also tasked with a homeland defense mission--especially National Guard and Reserve units--are adequately prepared for this mission. During this review, we analyzed readiness data and other preparedness indicators for 78 Army chemical units.
Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform their missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and current operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at home and abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological defenses since 2001 and plans to increase funding for this program during fiscal years 2006 through 2011, there is a misalignment between the high priority DOD states that it places on chemical and biological defense and the current low level of chemical unit readiness. Most of the Army's chemical and biological units, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve, are reporting the lowest readiness ratings--meaning that they are not considered sufficiently qualified for deployment. This situation reflects critical personnel shortages, particularly in their key occupational specialty--chemical operations--and shortages of mission-critical equipment, such as decontamination equipment. Lacking key personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train for their wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army chemical unit readiness problems have historically been attributed to personnel and equipment shortages, and recently these have been greatly exacerbated by personnel and equipment transfers to other types of units in support of current operations. Moreover, the Army does not have a specific plan in place to resolve long-standing shortages in personnel and equipment. Until the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and decontamination equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical operations specialists to deploying units, adequate chemical defense forces may not be available in the event of a WMD attack at home or abroad. Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council involve chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response, the ability of Army chemical and biological units, especially National Guard and Reserve units, to concurrently perform both their original warfighting chemical and biological defense mission and their homeland defense mission is doubtful. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list contains a limited number of chemical and biological units that must be ready to perform homeland defense missions, the forces on this list, according to United States Northern Command planning documents, are intended only to be an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting the transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list to deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is an adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission because no criteria have been established to determine how many and which chemical units are needed. In the event of multiple near-simultaneous WMD attacks in the United States, additional chemical units would be required--but most chemical and biological units are already at a low state of readiness and DOD has not updated doctrine for addressing the new homeland defense missions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-143, Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National Priorities
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Relations, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2007:
Chemical And Biological Defense:
Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical
Unit Preparedness and Stated National Priorities:
GAO-07-143:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-143, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the Department
of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the
effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks at home or
overseas. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. military
to define the nature and potential requests for military capabilities
needed to respond to 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the
Homeland Security Council. The Army‘s chemical units are key players in
this mission.
GAO was asked to evaluate the preparedness of the Army‘s chemical and
biological units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with
providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units
also tasked with a homeland defense mission”especially National Guard
and Reserve units”are adequately prepared for this mission. During this
review, we analyzed readiness data and other preparedness indicators
for 78 Army chemical units.
What GAO Found:
Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform
their missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and
current operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at
home and abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and
biological defenses since 2001 and plans to increase funding for this
program during fiscal years 2006 through 2011, there is a misalignment
between the high priority DOD states that it places on chemical and
biological defense and the current low level of chemical unit
readiness. Most of the Army‘s chemical and biological units,
particularly in the National Guard and Reserve, are reporting the
lowest readiness ratings”meaning that they are not considered
sufficiently qualified for deployment. This situation reflects critical
personnel shortages, particularly in their key occupational
specialty”chemical operations”and shortages of mission-critical
equipment, such as decontamination equipment. Lacking key personnel and
equipment, some units have not been able to train for their wartime
chemical and biological defense missions. Army chemical unit readiness
problems have historically been attributed to personnel and equipment
shortages, and recently these have been greatly exacerbated by
personnel and equipment transfers to other types of units in support of
current operations. Moreover, the Army does not have a specific plan in
place to resolve long-standing shortages in personnel and equipment.
Until the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and
decontamination equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical
operations specialists to deploying units, adequate chemical defense
forces may not be available in the event of a WMD attack at home or
abroad.
Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the
Homeland Security Council involve chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response, the ability of Army
chemical and biological units, especially National Guard and Reserve
units, to concurrently perform both their original warfighting chemical
and biological defense mission and their homeland defense mission is
doubtful. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list
contains a limited number of chemical and biological units that must be
ready to perform homeland defense missions, the forces on this list,
according to United States Northern Command planning documents, are
intended only to be an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting
the transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment
list to deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this
is an adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission
because no criteria have been established to determine how many and
which chemical units are needed. In the event of multiple near-
simultaneous WMD attacks in the United States, additional chemical
units would be required”but most chemical and biological units are
already at a low state of readiness and DOD has not updated doctrine
for addressing the new homeland defense missions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends actions to address long-standing chemical unit personnel
and equipment shortages; and better enable Army chemical units to
perform wartime and homeland defense missions. DOD generally agreed
with two recommendations and disagreed with those to address unit
personnel and equipment shortages. GAO continues to believe its
recommendations have merit.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and
Trained to Perform Their Missions:
Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and
Warfighting Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component:
Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System:
Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System:
Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System:
Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance
System:
Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System:
Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type:
Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military
Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006:
Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component,
2000 through 2006:
Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System:
Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System:
Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to
Army Units, as of July 2006:
Abbreviations:
BIDS: Biological Integrated Detection System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield
Explosive:
CERFP: CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages:
COTS: commercial off-the-shelf:
CST: Civil Support Teams:
HMMWV: high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle:
NBC: nuclear, biological, chemical:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 19, 2007:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Shays:
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that the United States is
likely to be faced with adversaries abroad who possess a wide range of
asymmetric capabilities, including chemical and biological weapons,
which challenge our military forces' ability to fight and win conflicts
overseas. Additionally, the United States continues to believe that
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in
the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the
greatest security challenges facing our country.[Footnote 1] The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review report states that DOD must be prepared to
respond to and mitigate the effects of WMD attacks at home or overseas.
All of the military services--the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps--plan and execute chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
defense programs, ranging from basic research to procurement and
sustainment.
The Army, however, is the only service[Footnote 2] that includes
dedicated chemical and biological units[Footnote 3] as a standard part
of its force structure. The Army's chemical units provide the following
capabilities: chemical and biological detection, decontamination,
reconnaissance, and smoke screening.[Footnote 4] Additionally, certain
Reserve component chemical units have been given the mission of
providing hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty
decontamination in the event of a WMD attack on the homeland. These
designated units are rotated annually on the Joint Task Force-Civil
Support's[Footnote 5] force deployment list. These units' personnel and
equipment remain with the unit; they are not reassigned to deploying
units in support of ongoing operations overseas.
The National Guard is creating a new regionally based force that would
support the WMD-Civil Support Teams (CST) in the event of a WMD attack
on the homeland. WMD-CSTs are federally funded, state-controlled
National Guard units whose mission is to assist civil authorities in
the United States in responding to incidents involving WMD, including
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive
(CBRNE) weapons and agents. Specifically, the WMD-CSTs are to identify
CBRNE agents and substances, assess current or projected consequences,
and advise civil authorities on response measures. They do not perform
any decontamination functions. Unlike traditional National Guard units,
each team is composed of 22 members who are on full-time duty.[Footnote
6] The new National Guard regional forces, called CBRNE Enhanced
Response Force Packages (CERFP), are composed of Army and Air National
Guard units who will support local, state, and federal agencies in
managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by providing capabilities to
conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical services, and
casualty search and rescue.[Footnote 7] Existing Army National Guard
chemical companies will perform the personnel decontamination function.
All of the services' chemical and biological defense training, except
for medical courses, is located at the U.S. Army Chemical School at
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The U.S. Army Chemical School Doctrine
Division is responsible for joint, multiservice, and Army doctrine
development for operations related to nuclear/biological/chemical
contamination avoidance, protection, decontamination, and smoke
screening.
The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, as well as other
DOD publications, have emphasized the need to address the increasing
threat posed by WMD, including chemical and biological weapons. Toward
this end, DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological
defenses since 2001, and it is increasing funding for its Chemical and
Biological Defense Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20 percent)
for the next 5 years beginning in fiscal year 2006. The department
plans to use these funds primarily for improving its research,
development, and testing infrastructure as well as expanding efforts to
improve defenses against emerging chemical and biological threats.
However, experiences during preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom
exposed continuing weaknesses in the preparedness of U.S. forces to
defend against a chemical or biological attack that were identified
during the Persian Gulf War. We and DOD's Inspector General have
published multiple reports addressing continued problems in aspects of
DOD's chemical and biological defense preparedness. While potential
opponents have been assessed to be technologically capable of
sustaining certain levels of chemical and biological warfare, there is
still disagreement on the specific extent to which this capability has
actually been developed.
At your request, we evaluated the preparedness of Army chemical units.
Specifically, we determined the extent to which (1) units tasked with
providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and
commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units
also tasked with the homeland defense mission--especially Army National
Guard and Army Reserve chemical units--are adequately prepared for this
mission.
To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical
and biological defense support to combat units and commands are
adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from
the office of the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the
National Guard Bureau, and officials from a nonprobability sample of
Army chemical companies. We selected companies from each Army component
and from each type of chemical company. Results from nonprobability
samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because
some elements of the population have no chance of being selected. We
obtained readiness data from the Army Readiness Management System and
reviewed readiness reports for all 78 chemical companies from fiscal
years 2000 through 2006. To assess whether Army chemical companies are
adequately staffed to perform their missions, we obtained personnel
data from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and
compared personnel authorized with personnel on-hand for all of the
chemical companies and Army-wide. We determined that the readiness and
personnel data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To assess the extent to which active, National Guard, and Reserve Army
chemical companies have the equipment needed to perform their missions,
we obtained chemical equipment requirements from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR
Database, and compared those requirements to what the data indicated
that the chemical units had on-hand. We also obtained and analyzed data
on other types of mission-essential items and compared authorizations
to what the data indicated were on hand in chemical units and Army-
wide. The data from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database were of
undetermined reliability because we received them close to our
reporting deadline and, therefore, were not able to conduct a full
reliability assessment. However, we corroborated the system data we
used with officials from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff
for Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the National Guard Bureau, and
selected Army chemical units.
To assess the extent to which units also tasked with the homeland
defense mission--especially Army National Guard and Reserve chemical
units--are adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data
obtained in the first objective, contacted officials from the U.S.
Northern Command, and obtained planning documents that describe the use
of Army chemical units to perform chemical and biological homeland
defense missions. We also discussed this mission with some National
Guard and Reserve chemical units who had been given this mission. We
reviewed and analyzed current and planned chemical and biological
defense doctrine and discussed the applicability of this doctrine to
the newly emerging homeland defense missions with officials from the
U.S. Army Chemical School and U.S. Army Reserve Command. We conducted
our review from July 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Our assessments of
data reliability, other than that for the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database,
showed that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for this
report. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is
contained in appendix I.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated
September 29, 2006.[Footnote 8] That report provides additional details
on the readiness of the Army's chemical units.
Results in Brief:
Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense
support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform
their missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and
current operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at
home and abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and
biological defenses since 2001, there is a misalignment between the
high priority DOD places on chemical and biological defense and the
current low level of preparedness characterizing Army chemical
companies, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve. Problems
occurring primarily as the result of personnel shortages related to
current operations are now causing most of the Army chemical units
expected to perform these missions to report low readiness ratings--in
other words, they are not considered sufficiently qualified for
deployment. The low readiness ratings reflect critical personnel
shortages, particularly in the key occupational specialty--chemical
operations. Army chemical unit readiness is also being compromised by
shortages of mission-critical equipment, such as decontamination
equipment. For example, Army chemical units, particularly in the
National Guard and Reserve, currently lack a substantial portion of
their authorized light decontamination equipment. Because they lack key
personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train for
their wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army National
Guard and Reserve chemical unit readiness problems have historically
been attributed to personnel and equipment shortages, and recently
these have been greatly exacerbated by personnel and equipment
transfers to other types of units in support of current operations.
Moreover, the Army does not have a specific plan in place to resolve
long-standing shortages in chemical defense personnel and equipment.
Until the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and
decontamination equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical
operations specialists to deploying units, adequate chemical defense
forces may not be available in the event of a WMD attack at home or
abroad.
Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the
Homeland Security Council involve CBRNE response, the ability of Army
chemical units, especially National Guard and Reserve units, to be
concurrently prepared to perform either their original warfighting
chemical and biological defense mission or their homeland defense
mission is doubtful. According to Army Reserve Command officials, no
criteria have thus far been established for determining how many and
which units are needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE
attacks on the United States. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support
deployment data list contains a limited number of chemical units that
must be ready to perform homeland defense missions, this list,
according to U.S. Northern Command planning documents, is intended to
provide only an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting the
transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list
to deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is an
adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission,
because no criteria have been established to determine how many and
which chemical units are needed. Since most chemical units are already
at a low state of readiness, their ability to respond in the event of a
mass casualty WMD attack on the United States is doubtful. Given DOD's
emphasis on planning for WMD events at home and abroad, we believe that
leaving chemical units in such a low state of readiness and dual
tasking them will result in an increasing operational risk to both the
homeland defense and warfighting missions. Further, although some Army
National Guard and Reserve chemical units are currently being trained
and equipped to meet both new homeland defense and ongoing wartime
chemical and biological defense missions, the Army has not updated
doctrine for addressing these new missions, and Army Chemical School
officials told us that this doctrine would not be completed until at
least June 2007. However, it is unclear whether officials will meet
this date, given the low priority updating the doctrine has received in
the past.
We are recommending several actions to align DOD's stated emphasis on
responding to and mitigating effects from WMD incidents at home and
abroad with the actual readiness of the Army's chemical units. However,
in written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
with two recommendations but disagreed with our recommendations to
address long-standing chemical unit personnel and equipment shortages.
Specifically, DOD disagreed with our recommendation to develop a
specific plan to address chemical unit personnel shortfalls. In
general, the department stated that we did not fully consider the
Army's current accession and recruitment plan as a solution to chemical
unit personnel shortfalls and questioned our method for measuring unit
readiness for homeland defense missions. As discussed in this report,
we did consider the recruitment plan and found it has had a limited
effect on personnel shortfalls, and we used the only available DOD
metric because there is no other metric available to measure readiness
of chemical units. The department also disagreed with our
recommendation to develop a plan to address decontamination equipment
shortages until new joint systems are fielded because the department
believes these issues are addressed in its Fiscal Years 2008-2013
Program Objective Memorandum. In our view, that approach does not
address many of the issues we highlight in our recommendation, such as
training and logistics support. We continue to believe our
recommendations have merit. DOD's comments and our evaluation of them
are discussed in the agency comments section of this report.
Background:
The Army Chemical Corps is comprised of brigades, battalions,
companies, and detachments that perform a variety of chemical and
biological defense missions. However, the chemical company is the
primary operative unit that performs the majority of these missions. Of
the Army's 78 chemical companies, about three-fourths (74 percent) are
located in the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. Two of these
companies are actually multicomponent--composed of both active and
Reserve platoons--but are counted as Reserve companies because their
headquarters platoons are part of the Army Reserve. Figure 1
illustrates the division of the Army's chemical companies between the
active, Reserve, and National Guard components.
Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of figure]
The Army's chemical companies provide the following capabilities:
1. Biological detection-Biological detection units provide monitoring,
sampling, detection, and identification of biological agents through
the use of a detector suite in a Lightweight Multipurpose Shelter
mounted on a dedicated, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle
(HMMWV). The detector suite is called the Biological Integrated
Detection System (BIDS), and hence these units are commonly referred to
as BIDS units (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense.
[End of figure]
2. Decontamination-Decontamination units perform decontamination
operations in direct support of either fighting forces or operations at
fixed sites, such as strategic ports of embarkation and debarkation.
The decontamination mission is performed using primarily either heavy
or light decontamination equipment. The M12 Heavy Decontamination
System consists of a pump, tank, and water heater mounted on a 5-ton
truck, and it performs both equipment and terrain decontamination (see
fig. 3).
Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense.
[End of figure]
The M17 Light Decontamination System is a portable, lightweight,
compact, engine-driven pump and water heating system used to perform
mostly personnel and equipment decontamination (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and biological
Defense.
[End of figure]
3. Reconnaissance-Chemical reconnaissance companies perform
reconnaissance--that is, they conduct surveillance, monitoring, and
sampling in hostile territory--often using the lightly armored, wheeled
FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (see
fig. 5) or a similar system mounted on other vehicles such as a HMMWV.
Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance
System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense.
[End of figure]
4. Smoke screening-Smoke companies use smoke-generating equipment (see
fig. 6) to provide large-area obscurant screening intended to enhance
the commander's ability to conceal and thus deploy and maneuver forces.
Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense.
[End of figure]
Most of the Army's chemical companies are multifunctional-- that is,
the company may perform a combination of capabilities, such as
reconnaissance and decontamination; smoke and decontamination; and
smoke, decontamination, and reconnaissance. Most of the Army's chemical
companies are smoke/decontamination companies, as shown in figure 7.
Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of figure]
In addition to their wartime chemical and biological defense missions,
certain Army National Guard and Army Reserve chemical units have also
been given homeland defense missions. The Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act of 1996 mandated the enhancement of domestic
preparedness and response capability for terrorist attacks involving
nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.[Footnote 9] In
response to this mandate, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested an
assessment for integrating the National Guard and the Army Reserve into
ongoing WMD domestic preparedness programs. This assessment, led by the
Under Secretary of the Army, was completed in January 1998. The
assessment recommended the training of Reserve component chemical
companies for domestic nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
reconnaissance and decontamination and specified additional equipment
lists to enable the needed capabilities. It also required the creation
of Military Support Detachments, now known as WMD-CSTs. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense approved this plan in January 1998 and directed
its implementation.
According to an Army official, the fiscal year 1999 Army budget
included funds for addressing the increased support requirements
associated with terrorist use of WMD in the United States.
Specifically, the support requirement included the establishment of 10
WMD-CSTs (later increased to 55 authorized) to perform identification
of CBRNE agents and substances, assess current or projected
consequences, and advise civil authorities on response measures; the
establishment of WMD patient decontamination teams within existing
standard National Guard and Reserve chemical companies; and the
training and equipping of standard National Guard and Reserve units to
conduct WMD reconnaissance. A March 1999 U.S. Army Forces Command
message required the training and equipping of standard National Guard
and Reserve chemical units to perform NBC reconnaissance and mass
casualty decontamination. Additionally, in October 2001, the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans directed that U.S. Army
Forces Command, with support from Army Training and Doctrine Command
and the Director of Military Support, refine the domestic
reconnaissance and casualty decontamination mission for standard Army
chemical units and develop operational requirements documents and
training support packages. However, by 2005, the Army was still in the
process of designing and implementing its response to these tasks, and
the needed doctrine and training support packages had not been
completed. This and other problems raised questions regarding the
readiness of the Army's chemical units to perform their assigned
missions and led to a 2005 congressional request that we perform this
review.
In response to an initiative from the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau, the National Guard is in the process of creating additional
regional forces to support WMD-CSTs in the event of a WMD attack.
According to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the mission of the
17 currently authorized CERFPs is to support local, state, and federal
agencies managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by providing
capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical
services, and casualty search and rescue. Army National Guard chemical
companies will perform the decontamination function of the CERFPs.
Both Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies perform their
homeland defense missions in support of civil authorities under the
direction of the U.S. Northern Command. One of the U.S. Northern
Command's missions is, when requested by civil authorities and directed
by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to provide support to
civil authorities for response and recovery from incidents such as
CBRNE events.
Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and
Trained to Perform Their Missions:
The vast majority of the Army's chemical companies, particularly in the
National Guard and Reserve, are currently reporting readiness levels so
low that their ability to perform their mission is in doubt. Our
analysis of Army active duty, National Guard, and Reserve chemical unit
readiness and personnel data determined that most of these units'
readiness is currently being affected by severe personnel shortages,
especially in key chemical occupational specialties. They are also
experiencing key equipment shortages, and both these factors are
adversely affecting chemical unit training. Under these conditions it
is questionable whether most of these units would be able to respond
effectively to significant wartime or terrorist CBRNE events, and the
Army appears to lack a specific plan for remedying this condition.
Army Chemical Company Readiness Is Low:
As of March 2006, most of the Army's chemical companies, particularly
in the National Guard and Reserve, were reporting the two lowest states
of readiness measured by the Army's Unit Status Reporting
System.[Footnote 10] In fact, the overall readiness of the Army's
chemical companies began to decline precipitously from already low
levels in early 2004. According to Army officials, this decline in
readiness was primarily attributable to the transfer of resources from
chemical units to other types of units deploying to support Operations
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Army chemical companies reporting
the lowest level of readiness doubled from March 2000 to March 2006.
Specific details on the readiness ratings and readiness trends of the
Army's chemical companies are included in the classified version of
this report.[Footnote 11]
Personnel Shortages Are Driving Chemical Companies' Low Readiness
Rates:
Severe personnel shortages created primarily by the transfer of
chemical unit personnel to other types of units deploying in support of
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are the primary reason
why Army chemical companies, particularly in the National Guard and
Reserve, are reporting low readiness levels. Long-standing shortages in
key occupational specialties are now becoming worse and further
exacerbating chemical company personnel shortages.
Chemical companies are not staffed to authorized levels:
The impact of these shortages on chemical companies is demonstrated by
comparing the staffing levels authorized with the staffing levels
actually filled. Army units are designed to perform certain defined
missions and are authorized a specific number of personnel in order to
be able to conduct their missions. Active Army chemical units are
relatively well-staffed in relation to their authorized levels.
However, about 74 percent of the Army's chemical companies are located
in the National Guard and Reserve, and these companies are presently
staffed far below their authorized levels.
Current operational plans for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom have little or no requirement for chemical companies. As a
result, soldiers from chemical companies are being reassigned to
address personnel shortages in deploying units. For example, in one
state we contacted, three Army National Guard chemical companies are
currently staffed at 22-45 percent of their authorized levels due to
the transfer of 141 soldiers to other deploying Army National Guard
units, such as military police units, from that state. These units were
already suffering low fill rates before the transfer of soldiers to
deploying units. The three companies together were authorized 401
soldiers, but only 275 soldiers had been assigned--a fill rate of 69
percent. Currently, the only soldiers in these three chemical companies
who are not deployed are those ineligible for deployment because they
either (1) have not received the training required for deployment or
(2) do not meet deployment standards due to medical reasons.
Active Army chemical companies have significantly better personnel fill
rates than Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies. Overall,
active Army chemical companies do not need to be supplemented with
soldiers transferred from other units in order to deploy. However, our
data show that Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies will
require extensive personnel increases in order to deploy. According to
Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the overall fill rates for
these companies will not improve until Army personnel requirements for
Operation Iraqi Freedom are significantly reduced. As long as the Army
National Guard and Reserve are tasked to provide a significant portion
of the units deployed to Iraq, chemical companies as well as other low
demand units will be used as a source of soldiers to fill deploying
units. In addition, these officials stated that concrete plans to bring
their chemical company fill rates back to pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom
levels are not currently in place, or being developed, due to the
Army's focus on supporting current operations.
Army chemical companies have shortages in their key specialties:
Chemical company personnel fill problems are being exacerbated by Army-
wide shortages in occupational specialties that are key to chemical
units. The Army classifies the jobs its soldiers perform as military
occupational specialties. Army units are comprised of many occupational
specialties, such as mechanics, supply personnel, and truck drivers.
The primary specialty in chemical companies is the chemical operations
specialist. We determined, based on interviews with Army chemical
officials, that three occupational specialty groups are critical to
chemical companies in the performance of their missions: chemical
operations specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics (that is,
chemical equipment repairer, wheeled vehicle mechanic, tracked vehicle
mechanic, and fuel and electrical repairer). These specialties are also
found in other types of Army units. For example, most combat units have
an assigned chemical officer or noncommissioned officer to advise their
commander on chemical and biological defense matters.
Chemical companies are staffed significantly below their authorized
levels for chemical operations specialists, chemical officers, and
mechanics, and these shortages exist Army-wide. However, as shown in
figure 8, these shortages are greater for the chemical companies than
for the Army as a whole.
Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military
Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of the Total Army Authorizations Document System
and the Total Army Personnel Database.
[End of figure]
Army officials told us that the primary reason for the greater shortage
in chemical companies is that very few chemical companies are deployed;
therefore, as the need for deployable personnel has arisen, many of
these soldiers have been transferred to deploying units.
Chemical operations specialist shortages have worsened:
The Army has historically had difficulty recruiting and retaining the
primary chemical company occupational specialty, the chemical
operations specialist, but shortages of this occupational specialty are
currently worsening despite Army efforts to reverse this trend. Army
officials told us that staff for the chemical occupational specialty
has always been difficult to recruit and retain because of the high
aptitude scores required. In addition, they said that chemical unit
training with real and simulated agents is limited, chemical unit
personnel are often assigned nonchemical additional duties, and
chemical unit equipment often is also used for more mundane tasks. For
example, decontamination equipment such as the M17 and M12 can also be
used for washing vehicles and operating showers for troops in the
field. Officials also told us that there are limited promotion
opportunities in the chemical operations career field, making it
difficult to retain personnel in this specialty.
The military services have offered enlistment or reenlistment bonuses
to critical specialties in order to attract and retain personnel in
these specialties. Although bonuses offered to chemical operations
specialists led to some improvement in fill rates in the past, this has
perpetually been one of the Army's underfilled military occupational
specialties.[Footnote 12] Fill rates for chemical operations
specialists were on the increase between 2000 and 2003. According to
Army officials, this increase was due to (1) enlistment and
reenlistment bonuses for personnel who selected the chemical operations
specialty as their primary military occupational specialty and (2) the
efforts of Army recruiters. However, as shown in figure 9, the fill
rates for this specialty began a steady decline in 2004, especially in
the Army National Guard and Reserve.
Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component,
2000 through 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of the Total Army Authorizations Document System
and the Total Army Personnel Database.
[End of figure]
According to Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the subsequent
decline in chemical operations specialist fill rates is directly
attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, as operations continued
in Iraq, certain critical, nonchemical specialties were required due to
the declining security situation. As a result, chemical operations
specialists were often retrained, reclassified, and assigned to other
units, such as military police units. Second, the fill rate for
chemical operations specialists declined because, according to Army
officials, this specialty is considered by recruits to be less
attractive than other military occupational specialties. Recruits have
historically been drawn to combat military occupational specialties,
such as infantrymen, and to specialties, such as military police and
mechanics, which more directly correspond to civilian jobs.
Furthermore, many recruits want the opportunity to serve in Iraq, and
they have a much better chance of doing so if they enlist as
infantrymen or military police.
In addition, the shortage of chemical operations specialists has
worsened in part because once transferred, retrained, or reclassified,
these specialists often opt not to return to chemical units or
specialties. For example, as discussed earlier, three Army National
Guard chemical companies in one state lost a significant number of
personnel to deploying units from that state. Of the 275 soldiers
assigned to these three companies, 141 soldiers (51 percent) of those
assigned were transferred to other deploying units. Of the 141
transferred, 129 went to military police companies, and most of these
soldiers were retrained and reclassified as military police. The
remaining 12 soldiers were transferred to a support battalion that
deployed to Kuwait. National Guard officials from this state are not
expecting many of these soldiers to return to their former chemical
companies when their military police companies return because,
according to these officials, these soldiers will have developed new
camaraderies within their current units and as a result will not
transfer back to their former chemical companies. Consequently, unless
DOD requires soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to
units requiring those specialties, National Guard officials will need
to recruit additional soldiers into chemical operations specialties in
order to address personnel shortfalls.
In one case, an entire Army National Guard chemical company from a
different state was retrained and reclassified as military police and
deployed to Germany as a military police company in order to assume the
mission of an active duty military police company deploying to support
the global war on terrorism. According to National Guard officials from
that state, when this unit returns, it will remain a military police
company. Other chemical companies from this state have lost personnel
due to their transfer to other deploying units, including military
police units. Army National Guard officials from this state also told
us that increased recruitment of chemical operations specialists would
be needed to refill these units with the required number of personnel.
Some Chemical Companies Lack Equipment Needed to Perform Their
Missions:
After personnel shortages, the second major reason for Army chemical
companies' reporting low readiness rates is the shortage of key
equipment, thus hampering their ability to perform their missions. Army
chemical doctrine states that chemical units will perform both heavy
and light decontamination functions. But the heavy and light
decontamination equipment in use today by Army chemical companies is
old and difficult or costly to maintain, previous attempts to replace
it have failed, and the fielding of new replacement equipment is not
scheduled to begin until at least fiscal year 2009.
The M12 Heavy Decontamination System and the M17 Light Decontamination
System are the two primary types of decontamination equipment currently
found in Army chemical units. The M12 is 35 years old and is scheduled
to be replaced by a joint system beginning in fiscal year 2012. Army
chemical company personnel told us that while recently refurbished and
adequate to perform most functions, the M12 is inadequate to support
all of the Army's heavy decontamination requirements. This has recently
resulted in emergency purchases of alternate heavy decontamination
equipment from commercial sources to meet standard operational
requirements. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, heavy
chemical companies equipped with the M12 were tasked with performing
fixed-site (such as seaport and airfield) decontamination, including
spraying decontaminant on buildings or large pieces of equipment, if
needed. However, according to a Corps chemical officer, the M12 cannot
effectively reach higher than a one-story building or the upper
surfaces of large aircraft. As a result, U.S. Central Command submitted
an Operational Needs Statement requesting a different mobile
decontamination system to provide the heavy decontamination support
needed for terrain, large area, and fixed-site decontamination
operations. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the
same new systems for U.S. Army forces in Korea in order to enhance the
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense preparedness in this theater.
These requests were approved, and DOD subsequently purchased new
commercial heavy decontamination equipment--116 Falcon Fixed Site
Decontamination Systems costing $14.2 million--to meet these
requirements (see fig. 10).
Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense.
[End of figure]
Light decontamination companies are assigned the M17 Light
Decontamination System to perform tactical personnel and equipment
decontamination. This system is also typically fielded to Army combat
units to enable them to decontaminate their own personnel and equipment
(see fig. 4).
The M17 is also an old system (20 years old) that has reached the end
of its service life. This system has been seriously affected by long-
standing maintenance problems, and it has been difficult for the Army
to obtain the needed repair parts. The Army consequently implemented a
modernization program to replace the M17's engine and upgrade the
system's hose/wand assembly. However, this effort was terminated
because its costs were greater than those to purchase a new commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) replacement system, called the Karcher
Multipurpose Decontamination System (see fig. 11).
Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense.
[End of figure]
Figure 25: With the termination of the M17 overhaul program, the
decontamination system program manager determined that any future
lightweight decontamination system requirements would be filled by the
Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System until the replacement
system is fielded, currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. As
with the M12, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, one Army Corps
submitted an Operational Needs Statement requesting a new, improved
light decontamination system, due to the mission capability problems of
the M17. Subsequently, another Army corps, an Army organization in
Korea, and the Marine Corps all submitted Operational Needs Statements
requesting the procurement of an alternative to the M17. Consequently,
DOD purchased 410 Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination Systems, costing
approximately $8.2 million, to provide the required light
decontamination capability.
Furthermore, the Army--particularly the National Guard and Reserve--
does not have sufficient M17s to meet the numbers currently authorized.
As shown in figure 12, the fill rate of M17s for the Army as a whole is
less than 52 percent; the fill rates for the National Guard and Reserve
are about 13 percent and 56 percent, respectively. For the chemical
companies we reviewed, the fill rate for M17s is about 65 percent,
since it is a mission-critical piece of equipment, but that is still
well below required levels. Five Army National Guard chemical companies
we visited had never received their authorized M17s or Karcher
Multipurpose Decontamination System substitute equipment, even though
these units had been activated in 2002 and this piece of equipment is a
mission-critical item.
Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to
Army Units, as of July 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army EQUIPFOR database.
Note: These data are of undetermined reliability.
[End of figure]
DOD has long recognized the need to replace its aging decontamination
systems. However, the Modular Decontamination System, an attempted
replacement program for both the M12 and M17 begun in 1993, was
unsuccessful and was officially terminated in 2003. According to an
Army Chemical School memorandum, this system did not keep up with the
emerging requirements of the Army's transformation, and the planned
replacement system continued to be plagued with reliability
deficiencies. According to officials from the Joint Program Executive
Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, the M17 and M12 will not be
replaced by new, joint systems until at least fiscal years 2009 and
2012, respectively. In the meantime, the Army will resort to equipping
units with commercial systems, in limited quantities, as an interim
solution. However, the suitability of these commercial off-the-shelf
systems for serving as interim replacements for the M12 and M17 has not
been fully determined. For example, as commercial-off-the-shelf
systems, they have not been ruggedized or tested for suitability in a
tactical field environment. Since they have not been type-classified as
standard military equipment, they are not recognized as standard issue
items or included on chemical unit equipment lists. Furthermore,
questions remain regarding logistical support issues, such as spare
parts, maintenance, and training support. It is presently unclear how
many commercial decontamination systems will be required in the
interim, how these will be integrated with the new systems planned for
delivery after fiscal year 2009, or how effectively the Army will be
able to address its near-term decontamination mission requirements. At
the time of our review, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical
and Biological Defense had identified several options for addressing
the replacement of M12s and M17s with interim commercial equipment, but
no decision had yet been reached. After we completed our work on this
assignment, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
Biological Defense told us that they are now evaluating steps that
would ensure that the commercial decontamination equipment and existing
M12s and M17s will be integrated with the new, joint systems currently
under development. A recommendation in this report on this subject
remains, however, since these actions have not yet been completed.
Chemical companies are low on other pieces of key equipment:
A further contributing factor to the chemical companies' readiness
problem is the Army-wide shortage of other key equipment. The Army
chemical companies we visited, especially in the National Guard and
Reserve, reported shortages of other key pieces of equipment that
hamper their ability to perform their mission. Military units cannot
deploy without other mission-critical equipment, including chemical
monitors, weapon night-vision sights, and radio sets. Since these items
are in short supply across the Army, nondeploying units have
transferred them to deploying units to support current operations. We
previously reported on the extent of this problem in the National Guard
and concluded that growing equipment shortages resulting from the need
to fully equip deploying units (1) make it unclear whether units will
be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for
missions overseas or at home and (2) hamper the ability of nondeployed
forces to train for future missions.[Footnote 13]
Chemical Company Mission Training Is Suffering:
Personnel and equipment shortages, as well as other priority
requirements, have had an adverse impact on some chemical companies'
ability to train collectively for their wartime chemical defense
mission. Chemical companies are required to train for the tasks on
their Mission Essential Task Lists[Footnote 14] as well as complete
other priority training as designated by their headquarters. For
example, due to the high pace of current operations, all Army soldiers
are required to train on "warrior skills," the individual skills in
which all soldiers need to be proficient if deployed.
Transferring soldiers from nondeploying units to deploying units to
support current operations has had a negative impact on chemical
companies' ability to train for their chemical mission-essential tasks.
For example, two Army National Guard chemical companies that we visited
have been unable to conduct unit-level training because of the
requirement to transfer soldiers to other deploying National Guard
units from that state. Further, another National Guard chemical company
we visited told us they were unable to train for their mission-
essential tasks due to the transfer of 44 soldiers to a deploying unit.
We visited four active-duty chemical companies at one Army installation
that had not been able to train together as a unit for their chemical
and biological defense mission because they were being used as trainers
for other Army units that were deploying from that installation for
Operation Iraqi Freedom. This training consisted of tasks such as
convoy operations, individual readiness training, and live-fire
training. One unit also operated the equipment movement site, where
deploying units' equipment was located prior to being shipped to the
port of debarkation. Performing these missions was a full-time
responsibility, and as a result, these companies told us they had not
trained for their mission-essential tasks since June 2005. However, as
of April 2006, three of the four units had recently resumed unit-level
training for their chemical and biological missions. The fourth unit
still had not been able to train due to personnel shortages. This unit
had only about 50 percent of its authorized personnel, and as a result
the unit was unable to train for its mission-essential tasks. This
unit's headquarters battalion transferred the company's soldiers to
other active-duty chemical companies so that those units, which were
also short of personnel due to the transfer of personnel to deploying
units, were able to conduct their unit-level mission training.
Equipment shortages have similarly adversely affected chemical
companies' ability to train for their mission-essential tasks. For
example, three Army National Guard chemical companies we contacted from
one state have a chemical decontamination mission, but only two of them
had received any decontamination equipment; in this case, they received
only 4 of the 54 decontamination systems authorized. As a result, these
three companies, activated in September 2003, have never had the
opportunity to conduct unit-level decontamination training.
Additionally, five Army National Guard chemical companies we visited
from another state have similar equipment shortages that impede their
ability to train for their mission. All these chemical companies have a
chemical decontamination mission, but none have been issued M17 light
decontamination systems. To improvise, one company conducted annual
training using M12 heavy decontamination systems and commercial
sprayers. But since these substitute decontamination systems are
markedly different from the authorized light decontamination system in
performance and application, company personnel told us that the
training experience was not nearly as effective as it would have been
if conducted with the authorized decontamination systems.
Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and
Warfighting Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful:
Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units' ability to perform not
only their original warfighting chemical and biological defense mission
but also their homeland defense mission is doubtful. DOD is currently
tasked with planning how the U.S. military will support the response to
the Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios, 12 of
which involve a CBRNE response. Selected National Guard and Reserve
chemical units are being trained and equipped for homeland defense
missions, and a limited number of active duty and Reserve units have
been placed on the Joint Task Force-Civil Support's deployment list to
be prepared to respond to a range of CBRNE incidents, including
multiple, near-simultaneous mass casualty attacks on the United States.
The Army is prohibiting the transfer of personnel and equipment from
units on this deployment list to units that are deploying overseas.
However, it is unclear whether this is an adequate number of units to
support the homeland defense mission because no criteria have been
established to determine how many and which chemical units are needed.
Further, the poor readiness of these units, as described above, and
inadequate doctrine to guide these units in the procedures needed for
operating in the homeland defense environment, may compromise their
ability to perform these missions.
Lack of Criteria and Poor Overall Readiness Will Likely Compromise Unit
Preparedness for Homeland Defense Missions:
DOD's strategy for homeland defense and civil support calls for its
warfighting forces to be trained and equipped for domestic CBRNE
consequence management to support its interagency partners in
responding to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple,
simultaneous mass casualty attacks within the United States, in
addition to their warfighting chemical and biological defense
missions.[Footnote 15] The standing consequence management execute
order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically
directs the U.S. Northern Command to be prepared to execute multiple,
near-simultaneous CBRNE consequence management operations for up to
three incidents within the U.S. Northern Command area of
responsibility. Moreover, in the spring of 2006, the Secretary of
Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature and potential
requests for DOD capabilities needed to support its response to 15
National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security
Council.[Footnote 16] Twelve of these scenarios involve a CBRNE
response, and 6 involve a specifically chemical or biological response.
Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies have been given the
hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination
portions of the homeland defense mission. However, according to Army
Reserve Command officials, no criteria have thus far been established
for determining how many and which units are needed to perform this
mission. Without such criteria, it is uncertain whether adequate
chemical units will be available to respond to near-simultaneous mass
casualty attacks on the United States.
In fiscal year 2000, the U.S. Army Reserve Command began training and
equipping selected standard chemical units for domestic reconnaissance
and mass casualty decontamination missions. As of April 2006, 12
platoons in 4 companies had been trained and equipped for hazardous
materials reconnaissance. Additionally, 178 additional Army Reserve
chemical soldiers have been trained for hazardous materials
reconnaissance, for a total of 430 trained and certified hazardous
materials technicians. Further, 75 platoons in 25 companies have been
trained and equipped for mass casualty decontamination, and about 3,500
Army Reserve chemical and medical soldiers have been trained to perform
mass casualty decontamination operations. The National Guard has
designated certain standard chemical companies to provide the personnel
decontamination function for the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages
(CERFP). These companies are also expected to continue to maintain the
skills necessary to perform their wartime mission. Consequently, the
Army must ensure that the chemical units tasked with performing
homeland defense missions are ready to perform them, along with their
warfighting missions. However, the Unit Status Report is designed only
to address unit readiness for major combat operations. DOD currently
does not have readiness measures designed to assess unit readiness to
conduct domestic missions. We previously reported, though, that
traditional readiness measures are likely adequate for some types of
units to determine their preparedness to successfully conduct their
domestic missions.[Footnote 17] As of July 2006, five National Guard
decontamination companies, about 375 personnel, had been trained and
equipped to provide personnel decontamination as part of their homeland
defense mission. The National Guard Bureau plans to train and equip an
additional five decontamination companies during the remainder of
fiscal year 2006.
The Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list contains
certain chemical units that must be ready to perform CBRNE consequence
management operations in support of civil authorities. Specifically,
one Reserve chemical company, two active duty platoons, and two Reserve
platoons are currently on this deployment list. As such, the Army is
not allowing the reassignment of personnel or equipment from these
units to units deploying in support of current operations. To provide
additional surge capacity, Army Reserve Command officials have
unofficially designated two additional companies as exempt from the
reassignment of personnel and equipment to support ongoing operations.
The force structure identified is strictly an initial response
capability; additional forces will be required and will have to be
requested using established request-for-forces processes. However,
other Reserve chemical companies with a homeland defense mission that
are not currently on the deployment list have lost personnel due to
transfers to deploying units. Unless DOD prohibits the transfers of
personnel from all chemical units with homeland defense missions into
units supporting other operations, there may not be sufficient Reserve
chemical units available to provide surge capacity if needed.
Since many chemical units are already stressed due to their support of
ongoing operations and are reporting low readiness levels, it is
unclear whether they would be ready to support consequence management
operations in the event of a catastrophic WMD attack in the United
States. We have previously reported that although DOD has met the
Northern Command requirements for forces to be made available should a
CBRNE event occur, DOD acknowledges that it has become increasingly
difficult to meet all expected requirements because of the high pace of
operations, which may include the forces that would be requested or
directed to support civil authorities for CBRNE events.[Footnote 18]
Additionally, we reported that Northern Command officials are
particularly concerned about a domestic CBRNE attack and have asked for
forces to be dedicated to this mission. We also reported that DOD still
plans to continue with its present practice of trying to balance the
competing demands of the various combatant commanders and the use of
dual-purpose units to accomplish CBRNE missions both at home and
abroad. Further, the Quadrennial Defense Review states that military
forces are also to be prepared for conducting a "long war" in the
future. Given DOD's emphasis on planning for WMD events at home and
abroad, we continue to believe there is operational risk to both the
homeland defense and the warfighting missions in not only leaving
chemical units in such a low state of readiness but also dual tasking
them.
Current Chemical and Biological Defense Doctrine Does Not Adequately
Reflect Homeland Defense Missions:
The Army published doctrine in December 2001[Footnote 19] on nuclear,
biological, and chemical consequence management that mentions the
reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination capabilities of the
National Guard and Army Reserve. According to an Army Reserve Command
senior official, however, this doctrine was published in the early
stages of developing the Army Reserve's CBRNE domestic response
capabilities, and consequently this doctrine is now out of date. In the
past 3 years, the Army Reserve has made progress in this area, having
completely revised and improved the tactics, techniques, and procedures
for these missions. For example, in 2001, it took approximately 1-½
hours for a single mass casualty decontamination line to be set up and
become operational. By the summer of 2005, Army Reserve soldiers were
able to perform the same operation with the latest procedures and
equipment in an average of 20 minutes.
However, the Army Chemical School has not updated the doctrine needed
for addressing these homeland defense missions. A 2001 memorandum from
the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans specifically
states that Army chemical units have a mission to provide nuclear,
biological, and chemical reconnaissance and mass casualty
decontamination in support of domestic emergencies involving WMD. The
memorandum goes on to list several other defense directives and
publications that identify this mission. Further, it specifically
directs Army Forces Command, along with Training and Doctrine Command
and the Director of Military Support, to refine the homeland defense
mission and develop operational requirements documents and training
support packages. However, according to an official from the Army
Chemical School's homeland security office and documents provided by
the school, DOD has not been told what military capabilities are
required to support civil authorities in the event of a terrorist
attack involving WMD, making it more difficult to write doctrine. In
addition, the Army did not provide funding for the school to update its
doctrine or provide training for the Reserve component homeland defense
missions until fiscal year 2006. Since the Army did not consider these
missions to be warfighting missions, it gave them a low priority for
funding, even though DOD considers defending against a chemical and
biological attack to be a national priority. Once the funding was
received, the Army Chemical School began exploring options to revise
current doctrine to include comprehensive tactics, techniques, and
procedures on the hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty
decontamination homeland defense missions. The school finalized its
plan to update its doctrine in March 2006.
Army Chemical School officials told us that it typically takes 24-36
months to update doctrine to incorporate a new mission, but they are
accelerating this process and plan to complete revised doctrine, to
include the homeland defense missions, by June 2007. The chemical
companies we visited with homeland defense missions told us that they
need updated doctrine to provide guidance on how to operate effectively
in the unique homeland defense environment because of differences
between homeland defense and tactical wartime missions. Further, the
new equipment that has been fielded to these units is nonstandard
equipment and, therefore, the chemical companies lack guidance on how
to properly integrate it with their standard wartime military
equipment. As a result, without doctrine to guide their efforts, Army
National Guard and Reserve chemical companies cannot ensure that they
are meeting DOD needs, prioritizing their training requirements
appropriately, and properly integrating new equipment with existing
items.
Conclusions:
The readiness of Army chemical units--particularly in the National
Guard and Reserve--is so low that it is doubtful whether most of these
units can now perform their missions. The absence of a plan to address
the personnel and equipment shortfalls that are primarily responsible
for these readiness problems makes it unclear whether and when these
problems will be corrected. Consequently, we believe there is a
misalignment between DOD's stated national priorities, especially the
Secretary of Defense's requirement for military forces to be able to
respond to the Homeland Security Council's 12 National Planning
Scenarios requiring a CBRNE response, and the current readiness of Army
chemical units. Moreover, it is unclear whether Army chemical units
affected by low readiness, but tasked with both wartime and homeland
defense chemical and biological missions, can perform both effectively,
especially given the lack of criteria to determine how many and which
units are needed to support civil authorities in the event of multiple,
near-simultaneous attacks on the United States. Even though DOD
considers responding to and mitigating the effects of WMD attacks on
the United States to be a national priority, the Army did not consider
funding the completion of doctrine for the Reserve component homeland
defense mission to be a priority. Consequently, the U.S. Army Chemical
School has not yet updated the doctrine needed for performing homeland
defense missions, leaving chemical units assigned these missions with
only limited guidance on how to accomplish them. Unless DOD takes the
steps needed to address long-standing gaps in chemical unit readiness
and doctrine, we question whether these units will be able to perform
either their warfighting or homeland defense missions effectively.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To align DOD's stated emphasis on responding to and mitigating the
effects from WMD incidents at home and abroad with the readiness of
Army chemical units, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Army to take the following actions:
* Develop a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit
personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing operations,
particularly for chemical operations specialists.
* This plan should specifically address and discuss options such as:
- the need for temporarily prohibiting the transfer of personnel from
chemical units with homeland defense missions into units supporting
other operations;
- requiring soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to
assignments requiring that specialty after deployments, as long as
shortages continue in that specialty;
- other steps designed to mitigate the loss of these personnel; and:
- the risks associated with not taking such steps.
* Determine how many and which active, National Guard, and Army Reserve
chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense missions,
including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE attacks on
the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure that for these units,
the homeland defense mission is given priority over other missions.
* Develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's decontamination
equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded beginning in
fiscal year 2009. This plan should determine:
- the total number of systems needed during the interim period, by type
of system (M12, M17, Karcher, or Falcon) to maintain the needed
decontamination capability;
- how the interim systems will be integrated with retained M12 and M17
systems;
- how training and logistical support for the interim systems will be
addressed; and:
- whether the interim systems should be type-classified and
standardized as official military equipment with a national stock
number, and added to units' official equipment lists.
* Set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and biological
defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our
recommendation to direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a
specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit personnel
shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing operations,
particularly for chemical operations specialists, and cited several
reasons as a basis for their position. First, DOD stated that we are
discounting the Army's accession and recruitment plan, which strives
for 100 percent fill of all units. We acknowledge that the Army does
have an agencywide accession and recruitment plan, and the goal is 100
percent fill of all units. However, as we discuss in this report, that
plan by itself has not been fully successful and has had little
positive long-term impact on chemical unit personnel shortages.
Specifically, while the recruitment and retention bonuses--which are a
part of the Army's plan--were helping to alleviate chemical operations
specialist shortages to some extent, the transfer of chemical unit
personnel to other deploying units for Operation Iraqi Freedom negated
those gains. Second, DOD disagreed with our use of the Unit Status
Report to gauge the readiness of the chemical forces to support a
homeland defense mission. In their comments, the department points out
that the Unit Status Report is designed to evaluate an organization's
ability to support wartime missions, not a homeland defense mission,
and that the Army is developing improved readiness metrics in support
of evolving DOD and Joint Staff reporting requirements, which will
include the readiness for contingency operations such as homeland
defense missions. We agree that the Unit Status Report is designed to
address readiness for major combat operations. However, DOD also
acknowledges there is no other metric currently available to measure
readiness for homeland defense missions. DOD also stated that some unit
personnel who are not available for a major combat operations
deployment are available for a homeland defense mission. Our analysis
shows that chemical unit personnel shortages are severe and primarily a
result of personnel transfers to deploying units; therefore, DOD's
statement that unit personnel could be available for a homeland defense
mission is in our opinion, invalid. Because of the severe personnel
shortages in most chemical units, we continue to believe our
recommendation has merit and is an important step that should be taken
by the Army.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of
the Army to determine how many and which active, National Guard, and
Army Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense
missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE
attacks on the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure that for
these units, the homeland defense mission is given priority over other
missions. DOD agreed that the capability requirements for homeland
defense, including the number and type of chemical units, must be
identified in the context of an interagency, DOD, and Army assessment
process. DOD further states that the Chief of Staff of the Army has
identified improvement of homeland defense as a focus area with the
intent of identifying Army contributions to homeland defense as well as
gaps and shortfalls where Army capabilities could be improved to
support the joint force. However, DOD then stated that, with some
exceptions, the Army generally does not develop force structure to
identify specific units for specific missions beyond those supporting
the Joint Task Force-Civil Support because such designation limits the
pool of units that can be deployed for overseas requirements, greatly
increasing the burden on the deployable units. While we believe the
above DOD actions are good first steps, we do not believe DOD's
comments address the overall intent of our recommendation, which was to
ensure DOD identified all forces needed to respond to homeland defense
missions and develop a plan to ensure that these forces are available
and ready for those missions. Specifically, as we highlight in this
report, the units designated to support the Joint Task Force-Civil
Support are only intended to be an initial response capability, and
additional forces would be required to support multiple, near-
simultaneous attacks on the homeland. The low readiness levels of units
not associated with the Joint Task Force, combined with the potential
deployment of personnel from other units in support of overseas
operations, could inhibit DOD's ability to provide the planned surge
capacity needed for supporting DOD's execute order on multiple, near-
simultaneous homeland defense missions. DOD's response does not
indicate how, or to what extent, this homeland defense requirement will
be prioritized compared with other missions, and our recommendation to
do this is both valid and important to accomplish. Without a clear set
of priorities for chemical unit response capabilities, DOD increases
the risk that it may not be able to provide the forces required to
respond to its own stated homeland defense requirements.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's decontamination
equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded. DOD stated
that while the equipment information contained in the report is
generally correct as of the time the information was collected, our
recommendation does not accurately depict the current situation. Since
a draft of this report was provided to DOD for comment, the Joint
Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense developed
a plan that addresses replacement and future fielding of
decontamination equipment and this plan was funded in the Fiscal Years
2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum. Although we have not analyzed
this plan in-depth, it appears to be a good first step in meeting the
Army's decontamination needs as long as the procurement and fielding of
replacement systems stays on track. However, in its comments, DOD did
not discuss whether its plan will address the specifics of our
recommendation, including how training and logistics support for the
interim systems will be addressed and whether the interim systems
should be type-classified and standardized as official military
equipment with a national stock number and added to units' official
equipment lists. We maintain that these steps are necessary so that
appropriate training and logistical support will be available and
accountability over these interim systems can be maintained.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to set a definitive deadline for
completing chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect new
homeland defense missions. Although DOD agreed that updated chemical
and biological defense doctrine to reflect homeland defense missions is
a high priority, they did not set a deadline because they believe any
deadline must account for the impact on other high-priority doctrine
development projects, particularly those supporting ongoing combat
operations. We continue to believe that without a deadline, development
of this doctrine will be uncertain, leaving chemical units without much-
needed doctrine to address the unique requirements associated with
their homeland defense missions.
DOD's comments are included in appendix II. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretaries of Defense and the Army. If you have any questions about
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical
and biological defense support to combat units and commands are
adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from
the office of the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, U.S. Army Forces Command, National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army
Reserve Command to define the population of Army chemical units. Using
the information provided, we determined that in fiscal year 2006, the
Army had 78 chemical companies tasked with providing chemical and
biological defense support to combat units and commands. We did not
include command and control units (brigades and battalions) and units
smaller than companies, such as detachments, in our population since
the actual chemical and biological defense mission is largely performed
at the company level.
To determine the overall readiness levels of Army chemical companies in
our population and reasons why units were reporting low readiness
rates, we obtained and analyzed data from the Army Readiness Management
System for fiscal years 2000 through 2006. We determined that these
data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes by comparing the
system data with the readiness data reports submitted by the companies
we visited (see below). We also reviewed reliability assessments
conducted by other GAO teams. To further assess the preparedness of
Army chemical companies to perform their missions, we visited five
active duty Army chemical companies located at Fort Hood, Texas; five
Army National Guard chemical companies in Alabama and Texas; and five
Army Reserve chemical companies in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. We
selected units to visit from each Army component--active, National
Guard, and Reserve--and from each type of chemical unit--biological
detection, decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke screening. We
discussed personnel fill rates, the adequacy of decontamination
equipment, fill rates for mission-essential equipment items, and
training issues with officials from each of these companies. We also
discussed chemical company mission preparedness with officials from the
Kentucky Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve's 81st and 90th
Regional Readiness Commands.
To assess whether Army chemical companies are adequately staffed to
perform their missions, we obtained and analyzed data provided by
officials from the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. This
office provided us with personnel data for the entire Army, which
includes our universe of 78 chemical companies. It included authorized
and assigned soldiers segregated by grade and military occupational
specialty as of February 2006. To assess the reliability of the
personnel data, we reviewed data reliability assessments prepared on
the same data system by another GAO team and performed electronic
testing of the data. We also corroborated system data with officials at
selected sites and interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data.
We determined that the personnel data we used were sufficiently
reliable for our reporting purposes.
To determine the extent to which the Army chemical companies have the
equipment needed to perform their mission, we obtained and analyzed
data as of July 2006 from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database. We
determined the equipment fill rates by comparing the equipment
authorized to the equipment on-hand of selected chemical and other
mission-essential equipment for the 78 chemical companies and compared
this with overall Army equipment fill rates. Because we received the
Army EQUIPFOR Database data close to our reporting deadline, we were
not able to conduct a full reliability assessment. Consequently, these
data are of undetermined reliability. However, as noted above, we used
the Army EQUIPFOR Database as only one source of information for
findings about equipment readiness. In addition, we corroborated system
data with officials at the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, National Guard Bureau, and
selected Army chemical units. We also discussed decontamination
equipment issues with officials at the chemical units we visited and
with officials from the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Programs; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; and the Joint Program Executive
Office for Chemical and Biological Defense.
To determine the extent to which units with the additional homeland
defense mission--especially National Guard and Reserve chemical units-
-are adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data collected
in the first objective, contacted officials from U.S. Northern Command,
and obtained planning documents that describe the use of Army chemical
units to perform chemical and biological decontamination and
reconnaissance functions for homeland defense. We discussed these
missions with officials from the Army Reserve Command and National
Guard Bureau. We also reviewed and analyzed current chemical and
biological defense doctrine and discussed the applicability of this
doctrine to the newly emerging homeland defense missions with officials
from the Army Chemical School and Army Reserve Command. We also
discussed the chemical and biological homeland defense doctrine that is
being developed with Army Chemical School officials and discussed
homeland defense doctrine needs with officials from the chemical
companies we visited that had been assigned homeland defense missions.
We performed our work from July 2005 through June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs:
Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense:
3050 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3050:
Sep 13 2006:
Ms. Davi D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Chemical And Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed
To Close The Gap Between Chemical Unit Preparedness And Stated National
Priorities," dated August 1, 2006 (GAO Code 350714/GAO-06-867C).
The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Army to:
1. develop a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit
personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing operations,
2. determine how many and which Active, National Guard (NG), and Army
Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense
missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous attacks
on the homeland, and set forth a plan to ensure that for these units,
and the homeland defense mission is given priority over other missions,
3. develop and approve a plan for addressing DoD's decontamination
equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded beginning in
fiscal year 2009, and:
4. set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and biological
defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions.
The Department non-concurs with recommendations 1 and 3, partially
concurs with recommendation 2, and concurs with recommendation 4.
Detailed comments on the report are enclosed.
Signed by:
Jean D. Reed:
Special Assistant:
Chemical and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated August 1, 2006 GAO Code 350714/GAO-06-867C:
"Chemical And Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to
Close the Gap between Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National
Priorities"
Department Of Defense (DOD) Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a specific plan to address
the long-standing chemical unit personnel shortages that have been
exacerbated by ongoing operations, particularly for chemical operations
specialists. This plan should specifically address and discuss options
such as: (1) the need for temporarily prohibiting the transfer of
personnel from chemical units with homeland defense missions into units
supporting other operations; (2) requiring soldiers in chemical
occupational specialties to return to assignments requiring that
specialty after deployments, as long as shortages continue in that
specialty; (3) other steps designed to mitigate the loss of these
personnel; and (4) the risks associated with not taking such steps.
DOD Response: DoD non-concurs. The report states that the Army does not
have a plan to fix personnel readiness; this statement discounts the
Army's accession and recruitment plan which strives for 100% fill of
all units. Promotion, reclassification and incentive programs are
constantly adjusted to react to the changing needs of the Army. The
language of the report also treats the active and reserve components as
the same, when in fact they are very different when it comes to
personnel lifecycle management.
The Army is engaged in active combat operations in overseas
environments where demand for CBRNE capabilities is low and demand for
other, more basic ground combat capabilities is much higher. While
operating within fixed fiscal and end strength toplines, the Army is
internally transforming to meet current and anticipated challenges.
This has resulted in the tradeoffs noted in the GAO report.
Overall the report only uses one metric (Unit Status Reports) to gauge
the readiness of the Chemical Forces to support a Homeland Defense
(HLD) mission. The Unit Status Report is a metric that evaluates an
organization's ability to support a wartime mission. Many areas
reflected in a USR report do not crosswalk from Major Combat Operation
(MCO) to a HLD mission. For example, some equipment needed for an MCO
would not be needed for a HLD mission; likewise some unit personnel who
would not be available for a MCO deployment are available for
employment during a Homeland Defense Mission. The Army is developing
improved readiness metrics in support of evolving DoD and Joint Staff
reporting requirements. The metrics will include readiness for
contingency operations such as HLD missions.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to determine how many and which
Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve chemical units will be needed
to perform homeland defense missions, including responding to multiple,
near-simultaneous Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-
Yield Explosive (CBRNE) attacks on the homeland, and set forth a plan
to ensure that for these units, the homeland defense mission is given
priority over other missions.
DOD Response: DoD partially concurs. The DoD agrees that the capability
requirements for homeland defense, including the number and type of
chemical units, must be identified in the context of an Interagency,
DoD, and Army assessment process. The Army is participating in ongoing
DoD assessments of support to civil authorities including CBRNE
response. An example is the ongoing Multi-Service Force Deployment
assessments and a Consequence Management Capabilities-Based Assessment.
The Chief of Staff of the Army has identified "Improvement of Homeland
Defense" as one of twenty focus Areas (Focus Area #18). The intent is
currently to identify Anny contributions to Homeland Defense (HLD), as
well as gaps and shortfalls where Army capabilities could be improved
to support the Joint force in HLD.
With some exceptions, the Army does not develop force structure to
identify specific units for specific missions. As part of the Total
Army Analysis (TAA) process, the Army uses a model with scenario
vignettes to determine requirements for the number and type of various
units (including Chemical units). The Army does not assign forces by
name beyond those supporting Joint Task Force-Civil Support because
such designation limits the pool of units that can be deployed for
overseas requirements, greatly increasing the burden on the deployable
units. The Army maintains flexibility to rotate units to support the
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and approve a plan for
addressing DOD's decontamination equipment shortages until new joint
systems are fielded beginning in FY 2009. This plan should determine:
(1) the total number of systems needed during the interim period, by
type of system (M12, M17, Karcher, or Falcon), to maintain the needed
decontamination capability; (2) how the interim systems will be
integrated with retained M12 and M17 systems; (3) how training and
logistical support for the interim systems will be addressed; and (4)
whether the interim systems should be type-classified and standardized
as official military equipment with a national stock number, and added
to units' official equipment lists.
DOD Response: The DoD non-concurs. While the equipment information
contained in this report is generally correct as of the time the
information was collected, the recommendation does not accurately
depict the current situation. The Chemical and Biological Defense
Program, in coordination with the Services, including the Army, has
developed a plan from validated requirements that addresses replacement
and future fielding of Department of Defense's decontamination
equipment, including joint systems scheduled to begin fielding prior to
FY 2009 (FY09). This plan is contained in the FY 2008-2013 Program
Objectives Memorandum (FY 08-13 POM). This comprehensive plan includes
next-generation replacement systems meeting joint small scale and large
scale decontamination requirements to replace the M17 Light
Decontamination System and the M12 Heavy Decontamination System,
respectively. These two systems are the primary types of
decontamination equipment currently used to solve the small and large
scale requirements, respectively, in Army chemical units. As an interim
measure until these new systems are fielded, the small scale
requirement will be covered by the existing M17 systems, augmented by
410 already fielded Multi-Purpose Decontamination Systems and 115
Lightweight Multipurpose Decontamination Systems that will start
fielding in October 2006. The Joint Service Transportable
Decontamination System (JSTDS-SS) will start fielding in 2nd Quarter
FY08.
To cover the large scale requirement until the Joint Service
Transportable Decontamination System-Large Scale (JSTDS-LS) system
starts fielding in FYI 2, the recently completely refurbished and fully
mission capable M12 systems will continue service. Of the entire M12
fleet, 505 have been completely over-hauled and converted to diesel
fuel. An additional 13 more will be completed before the end of FY06
and an additional 32 will be converted in FY07. Furthermore, 103
recently fielded FALCON systems augment this large scale capability.
The FY08-13 plan also funds future decontamination systems to round out
Service decontamination capabilities. These new capabilities include a
man-portable (back-packed) decontamination system, human remains
decontamination, and sensitive equipment (e.g., avionics and night
vision devices) and platform interior (aircraft, ship, and vehicle)
decontamination. There is also funding in the FY08-13 POM for continued
fielding of skin decontamination kits.
Recommendation 4: Set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and
biological defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions.
DOD Response: The DoD concurs with Recommendation 4. The publication of
updated chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect homeland
defense missions is a high priority. However, any deadline must account
for the impact on other high priority doctrine development projects,
particularly those supporting ongoing combat operations.
[End of section]
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, William W. Cawood, Assistant
Director; Hamid Ali; Jane Ervin; Robert Malpass; Enemencio Sanchez;
Kimberly Seay; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this
report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this report, the term weapons of mass
destruction means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the
capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant
number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of (1)
toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors, (2) a disease
organism, or (3) radiation or radioactivity. 50 U.S.C. § 2302 (1).
[2] One exception is that the Marine Corps has a Chemical Biological
Incident Response Force that, when directed, is to deploy and/or
respond to a credible threat of a chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in order to assist
local, state, or federal agencies and unified combatant commanders in
the conduct of consequence management operations. This force
accomplishes its mission by providing capabilities for agent detection
and identification; casualty search, rescue, and personnel
decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of
contaminated personnel. However, chemical and biological defense in the
Marine Corps is generally considered an additional duty performed by
regular marines rather than by specialized chemical or biological
units. We recently reported that this force had some operational
challenges. See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Marine Corps
Response Force Has Developed Many Capabilities, but Critical
Operational Challenges Remain, GAO-05-2C (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3,
2004).
[3] Hereinafter referred to as "chemical units."
[4] Smoke screening is the act of providing large-area obscurant
screening intended to enhance a commander's ability to conceal and
therefore deploy and maneuver forces.
[5] The Joint Task Force-Civil Support, part of U.S. Northern Command,
will provide dedicated domestic CBRNE command and control in support of
the responsible lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE consequence
management operations.
[6] We recently issued a report on these teams' mission and management:
GAO, Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil
Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges, GAO-06-498
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006).
[7] The National Guard has already placed 12 certified force packages
on the ground. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006 increased the Army National Guard end strength and, in the
conference report, the conferees recommended that this end strength
include 5 additional certified force packages. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-
360, at 687 (2005).
[8] GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed
to Close the Gap between Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National
Priorities, GAO-06-867C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006).
[9] Public Law 104-201, § 1411 (1996).
[10] The Unit Status Report is the Army's primary mechanism for
measuring and reporting a unit's readiness, i.e., the unit's ability to
perform its wartime mission. The Unit Status Report provides a snapshot
of the status of the unit's overall readiness (C rating). Unit Status
reports are submitted monthly by active Army units, and quarterly by
Army National Guard and Reserve units. The Army measures four areas of
readiness: personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness, and
training. There are five levels for rating readiness. The highest
level, C1, indicates that the unit is prepared to undertake its full
wartime mission. At C2 the unit is able to undertake most of its
wartime mission and at C3 the unit is able to undertake many, but not
all, portions of its wartime mission. C4 is the lowest level and, at
this level, the unit is not prepared and requires additional resources
or training to conduct its wartime mission. In addition, the C5 level
indicates that the unit is undergoing an Army-directed resource action
and is not prepared, at the time of the report, to perform its wartime
mission.
[11] GAO-06-867C.
[12] See GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address
Enlisted Personnel and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).
[13] GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4,
2005).
[14] The Mission Essential Task List is a statement of the tasks a unit
is required to accomplish in order to perform its wartime missions. For
example, tasks on a biological detection company's task list include
conducting mobilization and deployment operations, biological
surveillance operations, and force protection/antiterrorism operations.
[15] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005).
[16] Department of Defense, Strategic Planning Guidance Fiscal Years
2008-2013 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006).
[17] GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve
Northern Command's Mission, but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-622C
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004).
[18] GAO-04-622C.
[19] U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-11.21: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of
Consequence Management (Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo: Dec. 2001).
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