Defense Acquisitions
DOD Needs to Exert Management and Oversight to Better Control Acquisition of Services
Gao ID: GAO-07-359T January 17, 2007
The Department of Defense (DOD) is relying more and more on contractors to provide billions of dollars in services. Congress has been concerned about DOD's ability to prudently manage these funds, and this subcommittee in particular has pushed DOD to employ sound business practices when using the private sector for services. Nevertheless, DOD may not have always obtained good value while spending billions of dollars on services at a time when serious budget pressures are facing the nation. This testimony discusses DOD's (1) increasing reliance on contractors; (2) failure to consistently follow sound business practices when acquiring services; and (3) opportunities for DOD to improve its management of services. The testimony is based on GAO's work from the past decade as well as recent reports issued by the Inspectors General.
Numerous persistent problems have resulted in reduced efficiencies and effectiveness and have exposed DOD to unnecessary risks when acquiring services. Knowing the defense acquisition landscape helps put the magnitude of these problems in perspective. DOD's obligations on service contracts have jumped from $82.3 billion in fiscal year 1996 to $141.2 billion in fiscal year 2005. DOD's acquisition workforce has been downsized during this time frame without sufficient attention to requisite skills and competencies. These events have occurred as DOD has become more reliant on contractors to provide services for DOD's operations and as longstanding problems with contract management continue to adversely impact service acquisition outcomes. The lack of sound business practices--poorly defined requirements, inadequate competition, inadequate monitoring of contractor performance, and inappropriate uses of other agencies' contracts and contracting services--exposes DOD to unnecessary risk and wastes resources. Moreover, DOD's current management structure to oversee service acquisition outcomes has tended to be reactive and its processes suffer from the absence of several key elements at both a strategic and transactional level. To produce desired outcomes, DOD and its contractors need to clearly understand acquisition objectives and how they translate into a contract's terms and conditions. GAO has found cases in which the absence of well-defined requirements and clearly understood objectives complicates efforts to hold DOD and contractors accountable for poor service acquisition outcomes. Likewise, obtaining reasonable prices depends on the benefits of a competitive environment, but we have continually reported on cases in which DOD sacrificed competition for the sake of expediency. Monitoring contractor performance to ensure DOD receives and pays for required services is another control we have found lacking. Many of these problems show up in DOD's use of other agencies' contracts or contracting services, which adds complexity as the number of parties in the contracting process increases. DOD has taken some steps to improve its management of services acquisition, and it is developing an integrated assessment of how best to acquire services. DOD leadership will be critical for translating this assessment into policy and, most importantly, effective frontline practices. At this point, however, DOD does not know how well its services acquisition processes are working, which part of its mission can best be met through buying services, and whether it is obtaining the services it needs while protecting DOD's and the taxpayer's interests.
GAO-07-359T, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Exert Management and Oversight to Better Control Acquisition of Services
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee
on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST:
January 17, 2007:
Defense Acquisitions:
DOD Needs to Exert Management and Oversight to Better Control
Acquisition of Services:
Statement of Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Director Acquisition and
Sourcing Management:
GAO-07-359T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-359T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is relying more and more on contractors
to provide billions of dollars in services. Congress has been concerned
about DOD‘s ability to prudently manage these funds, and this
subcommittee in particular has pushed DOD to employ sound business
practices when using the private sector for services. Nevertheless, DOD
may not have always obtained good value while spending billions of
dollars on services at a time when serious budget pressures are facing
the nation.
This testimony discusses DOD‘s
(1) increasing reliance on contractors; (2) failure to consistently
follow sound business practices when acquiring services; and (3)
opportunities for DOD to improve its management of services.
The testimony is based on GAO‘s work from the past decade as well as
recent reports issued by the Inspectors General.
What GAO Found:
Numerous persistent problems have resulted in reduced efficiencies and
effectiveness and have exposed DOD to unnecessary risks when acquiring
services. Knowing the defense acquisition landscape helps put the
magnitude of these problems in perspective”
* DOD‘s obligations on service contracts have jumped from $82.3 billion
in fiscal year 1996 to $141.2 billion in fiscal year 2005.
* DOD‘s acquisition workforce has been downsized during this time frame
without sufficient attention to requisite skills and competencies.
These events have occurred as DOD has become more reliant on
contractors to provide services for DOD‘s operations and as
longstanding problems with contract management continue to adversely
impact service acquisition outcomes. The lack of sound business
practices”poorly defined requirements, inadequate competition,
inadequate monitoring of contractor performance, and inappropriate uses
of other agencies‘ contracts and contracting services”exposes DOD to
unnecessary risk and wastes resources. Moreover, DOD‘s current
management structure to oversee service acquisition outcomes has tended
to be reactive and its processes suffer from the absence of several key
elements at both a strategic and transactional level.
To produce desired outcomes, DOD and its contractors need to clearly
understand acquisition objectives and how they translate into a
contract‘s terms and conditions. GAO has found cases in which the
absence of well-defined requirements and clearly understood objectives
complicates efforts to hold DOD and contractors accountable for poor
service acquisition outcomes. Likewise, obtaining reasonable prices
depends on the benefits of a competitive environment, but we have
continually reported on cases in which DOD sacrificed competition for
the sake of expediency. Monitoring contractor performance to ensure DOD
receives and pays for required services is another control we have
found lacking. Many of these problems show up in DOD‘s use of other
agencies‘ contracts or contracting services, which adds complexity as
the number of parties in the contracting process increases.
DOD has taken some steps to improve its management of services
acquisition, and it is developing an integrated assessment of how best
to acquire services. DOD leadership will be critical for translating
this assessment into policy and, most importantly, effective frontline
practices. At this point, however, DOD does not know how well its
services acquisition processes are working, which part of its mission
can best be met through buying services, and whether it is obtaining
the services it needs while protecting DOD‘s and the taxpayer‘s
interests.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making no recommendations in this testimony. However, GAO has
made numerous recommendations through the years to help improve DOD‘s
contract management. DOD has generally concurred with these
recommendations and is taking or plans to take action to improve the
acquisition of services, but much remains to be done.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-359T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine V. Schinasi at
(202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges the Department of
Defense (DOD) faces in acquiring services to support its operations.
Although many of these challenges are long-standing, they have become
more apparent in recent years as the department's reliance on
contractors has grown in size and scope. In fiscal year 2005, DOD
obligated more than $141 billion on service contracts, a 72-percent
increase since fiscal year 1996. As you know, however, DOD does not
always use sound contracting practices when acquiring these services
and the department is operating with a deficit of people with the right
skills to support its acquisitions. Consequently, DOD may not have
always obtained good value when buying billions of dollars of services
at a time when serious budget pressures face the nation.
This subcommittee has explored new approaches and supported legislation
to improve DOD's acquisition of services. It has emphasized the use of
sound business practices and competition to obtain services at
reasonable prices for DOD and ultimately the taxpayer. In addition, it
has encouraged DOD to establish a structure to better manage its
acquisition of services. Despite these efforts, many improvements are
still needed. The recurring nature of DOD's problems is evidenced by
the fact that DOD contract management has been on GAO's list of high-
risk areas since 1992.[Footnote 1] In January 2005, we added the
management of interagency contracting to the list. In July 2006, we
reported on DOD's vulnerabilities to contracting fraud, waste, and
abuse.[Footnote 2]
Today, I would like to discuss DOD's (1) increasing reliance on
contractors, (2) failure to consistently follow sound business
practices when acquiring services, and (3) opportunities for DOD to
improve its management of services. My statement is based on work that
GAO has completed over the past decade, which was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Additionally, my statement draws on recent reports issued by the DOD
Inspector General and General Services Administration Inspector
General.
Summary:
Negative outcomes should be no surprise given the convergence of DOD's
growing reliance on contractors to provide services and long-standing
problems with contract management. These problems--ill-defined
requirements, inadequate competition, ineffective management and
surveillance of contractor performance, and inappropriate uses of other
agencies' contracts--have resulted in outcomes that have cost the
department valuable resources. These problems are not new and, if they
remain unresolved, will only continue to waste DOD's resources.
However, the department is not in a good position to address these long-
standing problems. DOD does not know where it wants service
acquisitions to be in the next few years or how to get there. DOD is
taking some steps to address these problems but much remains to be
done.
DOD Increasingly Relies on Contractor-Provided Services:
Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to
provide a range of mission-critical services from operating information
technology systems to providing logistical support on the battlefield.
The growth in spending on services clearly illustrates this point.
DOD's obligations on service contracts rose from $82.3 billion in
fiscal year 1996 to $141.2 billion in fiscal year 2005 (see table 1).
DOD committed 20 percent of its obligations on services in fiscal year
2005 for professional, administrative, and management support
contracts. Overall, according to DOD, the amount obligated on service
contracts exceeded the amount the department spent on supplies and
equipment, including major weapon systems. To a large degree, this
growth simply happened and was not a managed outcome.
Table 1: Changes in DOD's Use of Service Contracts, Fiscal Years 1996
to 2005 (fiscal year 2005 dollars in billions):
Service category: Professional, administrative, and management support;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: $10.8;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: $28.3;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 20.0;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 161.
Service category: Construction of facilities;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 7.3;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 11.7;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 8.3;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 62.
Service category: Maintenance and repair of equipment;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 6.6;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 11.4;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 8.1;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 74.
Service category: Information technology;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 4.9;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 10.3;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 7.3;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 110.
Service category: Medical services;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 1.6;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 8.0;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 5.6;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 412.
Service category: Transportation, travel, and relocation;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 2.4;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 6.2;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 4.4;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 154.
Service category: Housekeeping services;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 2.4;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 4.8;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 3.4;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 98.
Service category: All other services, excluding research and
development[A];
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 22.7;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 23.6;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 16.7;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 4.
Service category: Research and development;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: 23.7;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: 37.0;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 26.2;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 56.
Service category: Total, all service contracts;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 1996: $82.3;
Service obligations Fiscal year: 2005: $141.2;
Percentage of service obligations, fiscal year 2005: 100.0;
Percentage change, fiscal years 1996 to 2005: 72.
Source: DOD's DD350 database for all actions exceeding $25,000 (data);
GAO (analysis).
[A] Other services include photographic, mapping, and printing;
education and training; and social services, among others.
[End of table]
As service acquisition spending has grown, the size of the civilian
workforce has decreased. More significantly, DOD carried out this
downsizing without ensuring that it had the specific skills and
competencies needed to accomplish DOD's mission. For example, the
amount, nature, and complexity of contracting for services have
increased, which has challenged DOD's ability to maintain a workforce
with the requisite knowledge of market conditions and industry trends,
the ability to prepare clear statements of work, the technical details
about the services they procure, and the capacity to manage and oversee
contractors. In addition, new skills have been required to use
alternative contracting approaches introduced by acquisition reform
initiatives.
Participants in an October 2005 GAO forum on Managing the Supplier Base
for the 21st Century commented that the current federal acquisition
workforce significantly lacks the new business skills needed to act as
contract managers. In June 2006, DOD issued a human capital strategy
that acknowledged that DOD's civilian workforce is not balanced by age
or experience. DOD's strategy identified a number of steps planned over
the next 2 years to more fully develop a long-term approach to managing
its acquisition workforce. Many personnel, however, are involved in
acquiring services. In the broadest sense, these personnel include not
only the contracting officers who award contracts, but also those
personnel who define the requirements, receive or benefit from the
services obtained, monitor contractor performance, and pay for the
services.
A report we issued in November 2006 on DOD space acquisition provides
an example of downsizing in a critical area--cost estimating.[Footnote
3] In this case, there was a belief within the government that cost
savings could be achieved under acquisition reform initiatives by
reducing technical staff, including cost estimators, since the
government would be relying more on commercial-based solutions to
achieve desired capabilities. According to one Air Force cost-
estimating official we spoke with, this led to a decline in the number
of Air Force cost estimators from 680 to 280. According to this
official, many military and civilian cost-estimating personnel left the
cost-estimating field, and the Air Force lost some of its best and
brightest cost estimators. In turn, because of the decline in in-house
resources, space program offices and Air Force cost-estimating
organizations are now more dependent on support from contractors. For
example, at 11 space program offices, contractors accounted for 64
percent of cost-estimating personnel. The contractor personnel now
generally prepare cost estimates while government personnel provide
oversight, guidance, and review of the cost-estimating work. Reliance
on support contractors raises questions from the cost-estimating
community about whether numbers and qualifications of government
personnel are sufficient to provide oversight of and insight into
contractor cost estimates.
DOD also relies extensively on contractors to undertake major
reconstruction projects and provide logistical support to troops in
Iraq. DOD is responsible for a significant portion of the more than $30
billion in appropriated reconstruction funds and has awarded and
managed many of the large reconstruction contracts, such as the
contracts to rebuild Iraq's oil, water, and electrical infrastructure,
and to train and equip Iraqi security forces. Further, U.S. military
operations in Iraq have used contractors to a far greater extent than
in prior operations to provide interpreters and intelligence analysts,
as well as more traditional services such as weapons systems
maintenance and base operations support. These services are often
provided under cost-reimbursement type contracts, which allow the
contractor to be reimbursed for reasonable, allowable, and allocable
costs to the extent prescribed in the contract. Additionally, after the
September 2001 terrorist attacks, increased security requirements and
the deployment of active duty and reserve personnel resulted in DOD
having fewer military personnel to protect domestic installations. For
example, the U.S. Army awarded contracts worth nearly $733 million to
acquire contract guards at 57 installations.
Other factors have contributed to the growth in service contracts. For
example, DOD historically bought space launch vehicles, such as the
Delta and Titan rockets as products. Now, under the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle program, the Air Force purchases launch services using
contractor-owned launch vehicles. Similarly, the Air Force and Army
turned to service contracts for simulator training primarily because
efforts to modernize existing simulator hardware and software had lost
out in the competition for procurement funds. Buying training as a
service meant that operation and maintenance funds could be used
instead of procurement funds.[Footnote 4]
DOD Does Not Consistently Use Sound Business Practices:
Our work, along with that of the Inspectors General, has repeatedly
found problems with the practices DOD uses to acquire services. Too
often, the department obtains services based on poorly defined
requirements and inadequate competition. Similarly, it does not always
oversee and manage contractor performance once a contract is in place.
All of these problems show up in the department's use of other
agencies' contracts. Collectively, these problems expose DOD to
unnecessary risk and poor outcomes.
Poorly Defined Requirements:
Poorly defined or broadly described requirements have contributed to
undesired service acquisition outcomes. To produce desired outcomes
within available funding and required time frames, DOD and its
contractors need to clearly understand acquisition objectives and how
they translate into the contract's terms and conditions. The absence of
well-defined requirements and clearly understood objectives complicates
efforts to hold DOD and contractors accountable for poor acquisition
outcomes. For example,
* In June 2004, we found that during Iraqi reconstruction efforts, when
requirements were not clear, DOD often entered into contract
arrangements that introduced risks.[Footnote 5] We reported that DOD
often authorized contractors to begin work before key terms and
conditions and the work to be performed and its projected costs were
fully defined. In September 2006, we reported that, under this
approach, DOD contracting officials were less likely to remove costs
questioned by auditors if the contractor had incurred these costs
before reaching agreement on the work's scope and price.[Footnote 6] In
one case, the Defense Contract Audit Agency questioned $84 million in
an audit of a task order for an oil mission. In that case, the
contractor did not submit a proposal until a year after the work was
authorized, and DOD and the contractor did not negotiate the final
terms of the contract until more than a year after the contractor had
completed the work.
* The DOD Inspector General found similar problems with DOD's use of
letter contracts. While this type of contract may be necessary to
initiate work quickly to meet urgent operational needs, costs on letter
contracts are more difficult to control because the requirements and
costs are undefined. In August 2004, the Inspector General reported
that contracting officials did not adequately definitize the
acquisition requirements within the required time frames. Further, the
Inspector General noted officials did not document the reasonableness
of the profit rates charged by the contractors.[Footnote 7] We are
continuing to do work in this area.
* In July 2004, we noted that personnel using the Army's Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract in Iraq, including those
that may be called upon to write statements of work and prepare
independent government cost estimates, had not always received the
training needed to accomplish their missions.[Footnote 8] We noted, for
example, the statement of work required the contractor to provide water
for units within 100 kilometers of designated points but did not
indicate how much water needed to be delivered to each unit or how many
units needed water. Without such information, the contractor may not be
able to determine how to meet the needs of the Army and may take
unnecessary steps to meet the customer's needs.
* In July 2005, we reported that other agencies that DOD relied on to
provide contracting services did not define desired outcomes or
requirements.[Footnote 9] We found that required outcomes were not well-
defined in the cases we reviewed at franchise funds at the Departments
of the Interior and the Treasury--GovWorks and FedSource-- that
acquired a range of services for DOD. The GovWorks and FedSource files
we reviewed lacked clear descriptions of requirements the contractor
was supposed to meet. Orders generally described work in broad terms
and documentation sometimes specifically indicated that work would be
defined more fully after an order was placed.
Inadequate Competition:
Competition is a fundamental principle underlying the federal
acquisition process. Nevertheless, we have reported on the lack of
competition in DOD's acquisition of services since 1998. We have
reported that DOD has, at times, sacrificed the benefits of competition
for expediency. For example, we noted in April 2006 that DOD awarded
contracts for security guard services supporting 57 domestic bases, 46
of which were done on an authorized, sole-source basis.[Footnote 10]
The sole-source contracts were awarded by DOD despite recognizing it
was paying about 25 percent more than previously paid for contracts
awarded competitively.
DOD has also misused the contracts available on the General Services
Administration's multiple-award schedules. Although DOD is required to
foster competition and provide all contractors a fair opportunity to be
considered for each order placed on the schedules, unless certain
exceptions apply,[Footnote 11] DOD officials have on numerous occasions
avoided the time and effort necessary to compete individual orders and
instead awarded all the work to be performed to a single contractor.
GAO work shows that this practice resulted in the noncompetitive award
of many orders that have not always been adequately justified.
Inadequate Management and Assessment of Contractor Performance:
GAO has reported on numerous occasions that DOD did not adequately
manage and assess contractor performance to ensure that the business
arrangement was properly executed. Managing and assessing post-award
performance entails various activities to ensure that the delivery of
services meets the terms of contract and requires adequate surveillance
resources, proper incentives, and a capable workforce for overseeing
contracting activities. If surveillance is not conducted, not
sufficient, or not well documented, DOD is at risk of being unable to
identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner and
potentially paying too much for the services it receives.
Our work has found, however, that DOD is often at risk. In March 2005,
for example, we reported instances of inadequate surveillance on 26 of
90 DOD service contracts we reviewed.[Footnote 12] In each instance, at
least one of the key factors to ensure adequate surveillance did not
take place. These factors are (1) training personnel in how to conduct
surveillance, (2) assigning personnel at or prior to contract award,
(3) holding personnel accountable for their surveillance duties, and
(4) performing and documenting surveillance throughout the period of
the contract. Officials we met with during our review expressed
concerns about support for surveillance. The comments included those of
Navy officials who told us that surveillance remains a part-time duty
they did not have enough time to undertake and, consequently, was a low-
priority task.
More recently, in December 2006 we reported that DOD does not have
sufficient numbers of contractor oversight personnel at deployed
locations, which limits its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that
contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and
effectively.[Footnote 13] For example, an Army official acknowledged
that the Army is struggling to find the capacity and expertise to
provide the contracting support needed in Iraq. A LOGCAP program
official noted that, if adequate staffing had been in place, the Army
could have realized substantial savings on the LOGCAP contract through
more effective reviews of new requirements. A Defense Contract
Management Agency official responsible for overseeing the LOGCAP
contractor's performance at 27 locations noted that he was unable to
visit all of those locations during his 6-month tour to determine the
extent to which the contractor was meeting the contract's requirements.
Our review of GovWorks and FedSource also found that both DOD and
franchise fund officials were not monitoring contracts. Further, these
organizations lacked criteria against which contractor performance
could be measured to ensure that contractors provided quality services
in a timely manner.[Footnote 14] Similarly, in 2004, the General
Services Administration Inspector General reported on problems with
surveillance when DOD used the General Services Administration's
Federal Technology Service (FTS). For example, in reviewing task orders
DOD placed through FTS, the Inspector General found that payments were
made for substandard work or for work that was incomplete or never
delivered, for bills that contained incorrect labor rates or did not
adhere to contract pricing terms, and for bills that included
unsubstantiated costs.
Inappropriate Use of Interagency Contracts:
In January 2005, we identified management of interagency contracts as a
high-risk area because of their rapid growth, limited expertise of
users and administrators, and unclear lines of accountability. Since
DOD is the largest user of interagency contracts in the government, it
can ill-afford to expose itself to such risks. Relying on other
agencies for contracting support requires sound practices. The problems
in clearly defining requirements, inadequate competition, and
monitoring contractor performance to ensure that the government is
getting good value are also evident in interagency contracting, as I
have previously discussed. However, under an interagency arrangement,
the number of parties in the contracting process increases and so too
does the need to ensure accountability. Ensuring the proper use of
these contracting arrangements must be viewed as a shared
responsibility that requires agencies to define clearly who does what
in the contracting process. Additionally, DOD pays a fee to other
agencies when using their contracts or contracting services, which
could potentially increase DOD costs.
In April 2005, we reported that a lack of effective management
controls--in particular insufficient management oversight and a lack of
adequate training--led to breakdowns in the issuance and administration
of task orders for interrogation and other services in Iraq by the
Department of the Interior on behalf of DOD.[Footnote 15] These
breakdowns included:
* issuing 10 out of 11 task orders that were beyond the scope of
underlying contracts, in violation of competition rules;
* not complying with additional DOD competition requirements when
issuing task orders for services on existing contracts;
* not properly justifying the decision to use interagency contracting;
* not complying with ordering procedures meant to ensure best value for
the government; and:
* not adequately monitoring contractor performance.
Because officials at Interior and the Army responsible for the orders
did not fully carry out their responsibilities, the contractor was
allowed to play a role in the procurement process normally performed by
government officials. Further, the Army officials responsible for
overseeing the contractor, for the most part, lacked knowledge of
contracting issues and were not aware of their basic duties and
responsibilities.
Similarly, our work on DOD's use of franchise funds managed by the
Departments of the Treasury and the Interior found that sound
management practices for ensuring competition, analyzing contracting
alternatives, and defining outcomes were not in place. For example,
GovWorks did not receive competing proposals for work. GovWorks also
added substantial work to the orders without determining that prices
were fair and reasonable. FedSource generally did not ensure
competition for work, did not conduct price analyses, and sometimes
paid contractors higher prices for services than established in
contracts with no justification in the contract files. DOD also did not
analyze contracting alternatives and lacked information about purchases
made through these arrangements.
We identified several causes for the lack of sound practices. In some
cases, there was a lack of clear guidance and contracting personnel
were insufficiently trained on the use of interagency contracting
arrangements. In many cases, DOD users chose the speed and convenience
of an interagency contracting arrangement to respond and meet needs
quickly. Contracting service providers, under a fee-for-service
arrangement, sometimes inappropriately emphasized customer satisfaction
and revenue generation over compliance with sound contracting policies
and procedures requirements. These practices put DOD at risk of not
getting required services at reasonable prices and unnecessarily
wasting resources. Further, DOD does not have useful information about
purchases made through other agencies' contracts, making it difficult
to assess the costs and benefits and make informed choices about the
alternatives methods available.
DOD Needs a Management Structure to Oversee Service Acquisition
Processes and Outcomes:
Congress and GAO have identified the need to improve DOD's overall
approach to acquiring services for several years. In 2002, we noted
that DOD's approach to buying services was largely fragmented and
uncoordinated, with responsibility for acquiring services spread among
individual military commands, weapon system program offices, or
functional units on military bases, with little visibility or control
at the DOD or military department level. Despite taking action to
address the deficiencies and implement legislative requirements, DOD's
actions to date have not equated to progress. DOD's current approach to
acquiring services suffers from the absence of key elements at the
strategic and transactional levels and does not position the department
to make service acquisitions a managed outcome.
Considerable congressional effort has been made to improve DOD's
approach to acquiring services. For example, in 2001, Congress passed
legislation to ensure that DOD acquires services by means that are in
the best interest of the government and managed in compliance with
applicable statutory requirements. In this regard, sections 801 and 802
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required
DOD to establish a service acquisition management approach, including
developing a structure for reviewing individual service transactions
based on dollar thresholds and other criteria.[Footnote 16] Last year,
Congress amended requirements pertaining to DOD's service contracting
management structure, workforce, and oversight processes, among
others.[Footnote 17]
We have issued several reports that identified shortcomings in DOD's
approaches and its implementation of legislative requirements. For
example, we issued a report in January 2002 that identified how leading
commercial companies took a strategic approach to buying services and
recommended that DOD evaluate how a strategic reengineering approach,
such as that employed by leading companies, could be used as a
framework to guide DOD's reengineering efforts.[Footnote 18] In
September 2003, we reported that DOD's actions to implement the service
acquisition management structure required under Sections 801 and 802
did not provide a departmentwide assessment of how spending for
services could be more effective and recommended that DOD give greater
attention to promoting a strategic orientation by setting performance
goals for improvements and ensuring accountability for achieving those
results.[Footnote 19]
Most recently, in November 2006, we issued a report that identified a
number of actions that DOD could take to improve its acquisition of
services.[Footnote 20] We noted that DOD's overall approach to managing
services acquisitions suffered from the absence of several key elements
at both a strategic and transactional level. The strategic level is
where the enterprise, DOD in this case, sets the direction or vision
for what it needs, captures the knowledge to enable more informed
management decisions, ensures departmentwide goals and objectives are
achieved, determines how to go about meeting those needs, and assesses
the resources it has to achieve desired outcomes. The strategic level
also sets the context for the transactional level, where the focus is
on making sound decisions on individual service acquisitions. Factors
for good outcomes at the transactional level include valid and well-
defined requirements, appropriate business arrangements, and adequate
management of contractor performance.
DOD's current approach to managing services acquisition has tended to
be reactive and has not fully addressed the key factors for success at
either the strategic or the transactional level. At the strategic
level, DOD has not developed a normative position for gauging whether
ongoing and planned efforts can best achieve intended results. Further,
good information on the volume and composition of services is still
wanting, perpetuating the circumstance in which the acquisition of
services tends to happen to DOD, rather than being proactively managed.
For example, despite implementing a review structure aimed at
increasing insight into service transactions, DOD is not able to
determine which or how many transactions have been reviewed.[Footnote
21] The military departments have only slightly better visibility,
having reviewed proposed acquisitions accounting for less than 3
percent of dollars obligated for services in fiscal year 2005.
Additionally, most of the service acquisitions the military services
review involved indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts.
DOD's policy for managing service acquisitions had no requirement,
however, to review individual task orders that were subsequently issued
even if the value of the task order exceeded the review threshold.
Further, the reviews tended to focus more on ensuring compliance with
applicable statutes, regulations, and other requirements, rather than
on imparting a vision or tailored method for strategically managing
service acquisitions. Our discussions with officials at buying
activities that had proposed service acquisitions reviewed under this
process revealed that, for the most part, they did not believe the
review significantly improved those acquisitions. These officials
indicated that the timing of the review process--which generally
occurred well into the planning cycle--was too late to provide
opportunities to influence the acquisition strategy. These officials
told us that the reviews would be more beneficial if they were
conducted earlier in the process, in conjunction with the program
office or customer, and in the context of a more strategic approach to
meeting the requirement, rather than simply from a secondary or
tertiary review of the contract.
At the transactional level, DOD tended to focus primarily on those
elements associated with awarding contracts, with much less attention
paid to formulation of service acquisition requirements and to
assessment of the actual delivery of contracted services. Moreover, the
results of individual acquisitions were generally not used to inform or
adjust strategic direction. As a result, DOD is not in a position to
determine whether investments in services are achieving their desired
outcomes. Further, DOD and military department officials identified
many of the same problems in defining requirements, establishing sound
business arrangements, and providing effective oversight that I
discussed previously. For example,
* DOD and military department officials consistently identified poor
communication and the lack of timely interaction between the
acquisition and contracting personnel as key challenges to developing
good requirements.
* An Army contracting officer issued a task order for a product that
the contracting officer knew was outside the scope of the service
contract. The contracting officer noted in an e-mail to the requestor
that this deviation was allowed only because the customer needed the
product quickly and cautioned that no such allowances would be granted
in the future.
* Few of the commands or activities could provide us reliable or
current information on the number of service acquisitions they managed,
and others had not developed a means to consistently monitor or assess,
at a command level, whether such acquisitions were meeting the
performance objectives established in the contracts.
To address these issues, we made several recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense. DOD concurred with our recommendations and
identified actions it has taken, or plans to take to address them. In
particular, DOD noted that it is reassessing its strategic approach to
acquiring services, including examining the types and kinds of services
it acquires and developing an integrated assessment of how best to
acquire such services. DOD expects this assessment will result in a
comprehensive, departmentwide architecture for acquiring services that
will, among other improvements, help refine the process to develop
requirements, ensure that individual transactions are consistent with
DOD's strategic goals and initiatives, and provide a capability to
assess whether service acquisitions are meeting their cost, schedule,
and performance objectives. DOD expects its assessment will be
completed in early 2007.
That assessment, however, will have little meaning unless DOD's
leadership can translate its vision into changes in front line
practices. In our July 2006 report on vulnerabilities to fraud, waste,
and abuse, we noted that leadership positions are sometimes vacant,
that the culture to streamline acquisitions for purposes of speed may
have not been in balance with good business practices, and that even in
newly formed government-industry partnerships, the government needs to
maintain its oversight responsibility. Understanding the myriad causes
of the challenges confronting DOD in acquiring services is essential to
developing effective solutions and translating policies into practices.
While DOD has generally agreed with our recommendations intended to
improve contract management, much remains to be done. At this point,
DOD does not know how well its services acquisition processes are
working, which part of its mission can best be met through buying
services, and whether it is obtaining the services it needs while
protecting DOD's and the taxpayer's interests.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
Scope and Methodology:
In preparing this testimony, we relied principally on previously issued
GAO and Inspectors General reports. We conducted our work in January
2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
Katherine V. Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
can be found on the last page of this testimony. Key contributors to
this testimony were Lily Chin, David E. Cooper, Timothy DiNapoli, James
E. Fuquay, Matthew Lea, Sara Margraf, Kenneth Patton, Sylvia Schatz,
and Amelia Shachoy.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[2] GAO, Contract Management: DOD Vulnerabilities to Contracting Fraud,
Waste, and Abuse, GAO-06-838R (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2006).
[3] GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address
Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems, GAO-07-96
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
[4] Various funds can be used to acquire services, depending on the
nature of service.
[5] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures
and Management Challenges, GAO-04-605 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2004).
[6] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming
Contract Management Challenges, GAO-06-1130T (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
28, 2006); see also Iraq Contract Costs: DOD Consideration of Defense
Contract Audit Agency's Findings, GAO-06-1132 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
25, 2006).
[7] Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Audit
Report: Undefinitized Contractual Actions. Report Number D-2004-112
(Arlington, VA.: Aug. 30, 2004).
[8] GAO, Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support
Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight, GAO-04-854 (Washington,
D.C.: July 19, 2004).
[9] GAO, Interagency Contracting: Franchise Funds Provide Convenience,
but Value to DOD Is Not Demonstrated, GAO-05-456 (Washington, D.C.:
July 29, 2005).
[10] GAO, Contract Security Guards: Army's Guard Program Requires
Greater Oversight and Reassessment of Acquisition Approach, GAO-06-284
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3, 2006).
[11] 10 U.S.C. 2304c.
[12] GAO, Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on
Department of Defense Service Contracts, GAO-05-274 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 17, 2005).
[13] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006).
[14] GAO-05-456.
[15] GAO, Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's
Orders to Support Military Operations, GAO-05-201 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 29, 2005).
[16] Pub. L. No. 107-107, §§ 801, 802 (2001)(section 801 added new
sections 2330 and 2330a to title 10, U.S. Code).
[17] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 812 (2006)(section 812 amended 10 U.S.C. §
2330).
[18] GAO, Best Practices: Taking A Strategic Approach Could Improve
DOD's Acquisition of Services, GAO-02-230 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18,
2002).
[19] GAO, Contract Management: High-Level Attention Needed to Transform
DOD Services Acquisition, GAO-03-935 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,
2003).
[20] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve
Service Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9,
2006).
[21] The management structure has three review levels: (1) review by
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
for services acquisitions valued over $2 billion; (2) review by the
component or designated acquisition executive for service acquisitions
valued between $500 million and $2 billion; and (3) review by a
component-designated official for the acquisition of services valued at
less than $500 million. The Air Force, Army, and Navy each developed
review processes and authorities to support the DOD review
requirements.
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