Force Structure
Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-07-211 January 26, 2007Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts for projecting and sustaining forces without relying on immediate access to nearby land bases and could be the source of billions of dollars of investment. In future security environments, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to encounter situations of reduced or denied access to areas of operation. Even where forward operating bases are otherwise available, their use may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) DOD has employed a comprehensive management approach to joint seabasing, (2) DOD has developed a joint experimentation campaign plan for joint seabasing, and (3) DOD and the services have identified the costs of joint seabasing options. For this review, GAO analyzed joint requirements documents, experimentation efforts, and service acquisition plans.
While DOD has taken action to establish a joint seabasing capability, it has not developed a comprehensive management approach to guide and assess joint seabasing. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices for developing capabilities include involving top leadership, dedicating an implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy. DOD is developing a joint seabasing concept and various DOD organizations are sponsoring seabasing initiatives. However, DOD has not provided sufficient leadership to guide joint seabasing development and service initiatives are outpacing DOD's analysis of joint requirements. DOD also has not established an implementation team to provide day-to-day management to ensure joint seabasing receives the focused attention needed so that efforts are effective and coordinated. Also, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that shares information among the organizations involved in seabasing. Without a comprehensive management approach containing these elements, DOD may be unable to coordinate activities and minimize redundancy among service initiatives. DOD has not developed a joint experimentation campaign plan, although many seabasing experimentation activities--including war games, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations--have taken place across the services, combatant commands, and other defense entities. No overarching joint seabasing experimentation plan exists to guide these efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation, although it has been tasked with developing a biennial joint experimentation campaign plan for future joint concepts. While the U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing the plan, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing or will be able to guide joint seabasing experimentation efforts. Without a plan to direct experimentation, DOD and the services' ability to evaluate solutions, coordinate efforts, and disseminate results could be compromised. While service development efforts tied to seabasing are approaching milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing options. Joint seabasing is going through a capabilities-based assessment process that is intended to produce preliminary cost estimates for seabasing options. However, DOD has not yet begun the specific study that will identify potential approaches, including changes to doctrine and training as well as material solutions, and produce preliminary cost estimates. DOD officials expect the study will not be complete for a year or more. Meanwhile, the services are actively pursuing a variety of seabasing initiatives, some of which are approaching milestones which will guide future program investments. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-211, Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2007:
Force Structure:
Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach
and Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New
Capabilities:
GAO-07-211:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-211, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts for projecting and
sustaining forces without relying on immediate access to nearby land
bases and could be the source of billions of dollars of investment. In
future security environments, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects
to encounter situations of reduced or denied access to areas of
operation. Even where forward operating bases are otherwise available,
their use may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted.
GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) DOD has employed a
comprehensive management approach to joint seabasing, (2) DOD has
developed a joint experimentation campaign plan for joint seabasing,
and (3) DOD and the services have identified the costs of joint
seabasing options. For this review, GAO analyzed joint requirements
documents, experimentation efforts, and service acquisition plans.
What GAO Found:
While DOD has taken action to establish a joint seabasing capability,
it has not developed a comprehensive management approach to guide and
assess joint seabasing. GAO‘s prior work showed that sound management
practices for developing capabilities include involving top leadership,
dedicating an implementation team, and establishing a communications
strategy. DOD is developing a joint seabasing concept and various DOD
organizations are sponsoring seabasing initiatives. However, DOD has
not provided sufficient leadership to guide joint seabasing development
and service initiatives are outpacing DOD‘s analysis of joint
requirements. DOD also has not established an implementation team to
provide day-to-day management to ensure joint seabasing receives the
focused attention needed so that efforts are effective and coordinated.
Also, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that shares
information among the organizations involved in seabasing. Without a
comprehensive management approach containing these elements, DOD may be
unable to coordinate activities and minimize redundancy among service
initiatives.
DOD has not developed a joint experimentation campaign plan, although
many seabasing experimentation activities”including war games, modeling
and simulation, and live demonstrations”have taken place across the
services, combatant commands, and other defense entities. No
overarching joint seabasing experimentation plan exists to guide these
efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not taken the lead in
coordinating joint seabasing experimentation, although it has been
tasked with developing a biennial joint experimentation campaign plan
for future joint concepts. While the U.S. Joint Forces Command is in
the process of developing the plan, it is unclear the extent to which
this plan will address joint seabasing or will be able to guide joint
seabasing experimentation efforts. Without a plan to direct
experimentation, DOD and the services‘ ability to evaluate solutions,
coordinate efforts, and disseminate results could be compromised.
While service development efforts tied to seabasing are approaching
milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will
complete development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of
joint seabasing options. Joint seabasing is going through a
capabilities-based assessment process that is intended to produce
preliminary cost estimates for seabasing options. However, DOD has not
yet begun the specific study that will identify potential approaches,
including changes to doctrine and training as well as material
solutions, and produce preliminary cost estimates. DOD officials expect
the study will not be complete for a year or more. Meanwhile, the
services are actively pursuing a variety of seabasing initiatives, some
of which are approaching milestones which will guide future program
investments. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing
options are developed and made transparent to DOD and Congress,
decision makers will not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
individual service initiatives.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD develop a management approach that includes
senior leadership involvement, a dedicated implementation team, and a
communications strategy; and develop an experimentation campaign plan
and total ownership cost estimates for seabasing options. DOD agreed
with the recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated
implementation team.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-211].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to
Guide Joint Seabasing and Integrate Service Initiatives:
DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan to Inform
Decisions About Joint Seabasing:
Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cost Estimates
is Uncertain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process:
Figure 2: Illustrative Connectors for Use in Joint Seabasing:
Figure 3: Navy Forces Use a Barge to Move Construction Vehicles During
a Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore Exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian
Island, Washington:
Figure 4: Ships in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Squadron:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 26, 2007:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Young:
Future security environments are expected to become increasingly
complicated through unstable international political relationships,
increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of nonstate actors,
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a complicated
operational environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) may encounter
situations of reduced or denied access to desired areas of operation.
Even where overseas bases are otherwise available, their use may be
politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use,
or a commander may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the
joint force in a host nation. As a result, the capability to project
and sustain forces in such antiaccess environments could become
increasingly important in enabling DOD to confront unexpected threats
and deter aggression or seize the initiative.
Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts describing how
commanders in the future will project and sustain forces for conducting
joint military operations without relying on immediate access to nearby
land bases. Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly,
command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat
power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment,
and force projection to select expeditionary joint forces without
reliance on land bases within the joint operations area. Joint
seabasing is a scalable concept with many potential options for
achieving its desired capability. These options range from a single
ship to a larger family of amphibious and logistics ships, with
supporting surface and air connectors, as well a concept of operations
and employment options. Enhancing a seabasing capability is expected to
be costly, in light of the many options that could be developed to
support joint seabasing, and could be the source of billions of dollars
of investment if DOD chooses an option involving the development of new
ships. While joint seabasing is one option for how the joint force
commander could conduct joint military operations in the future, other
means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment
exist and continue to evolve. These include rapid strategic airlift and
fast sealift of forces from the United States to the area of operation,
airfield and port seizure, rapid base construction, and several others.
At a time when DOD is under pressure to control costs, it is
increasingly important for decision makers to evaluate competing
priorities and alternatives to determine the most cost-effective
solutions for conducting future military operations.
Joint seabasing represents a major change in the way DOD would manage
its forces. Inherent in implementing an organizational transformation
such as joint seabasing are possible changes in force structure,
acquisition, logistics concepts, command and control, training, and
other factors important to successful military operations. The concept
could also have a significant effect on near-and long-term funding
priorities.
You asked us to conduct a review of DOD's assessments and plans to
implement joint seabasing, with particular attention to the following
three questions: (1) To what extent has DOD employed a comprehensive
management approach for developing a joint seabasing capability? (2) To
what extent has a joint experimentation campaign plan been developed,
implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint seabasing options?
(3) To what extent have DOD and the services identified the cost of
joint seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed, cost-
effective decisions?
To assess DOD's management oversight and leadership approach for joint
seabasing, we obtained and analyzed briefings and studies on joint
seabasing, reviewed joint requirements policies and procedures,
interviewed DOD and service officials, and compared DOD's approach with
our prior work on best practices for transformations of large
organizations. To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation
campaign plan has been developed, implemented, and used to inform
decisions on joint seabasing options, we obtained briefings from and
interviewed DOD and service officials on their experimentation efforts,
and examined DOD and service guidance on conducting and leading
experimentation campaigns. To assess the development of cost estimates
for joint seabasing, we obtained and analyzed key briefings, reports,
data, and plans from DOD and the services that included information and
analysis regarding estimated costs related to joint seabasing and
conducted interviews with relevant DOD and service officials. We
compared the cost estimates for joint seabasing to DOD instructions for
developing cost estimates, along with best practices on developing
total ownership costs. We conducted our review from February 2006
through October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards and determined that any data used were sufficiently
reliable for our objective. The scope and methodology used in our
review are described in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While DOD has taken several actions to establish a joint seabasing
capability, it has not provided sufficient leadership to integrate
service initiatives and guide the development of joint seabasing.
Specifically, DOD's management approach has not fully incorporated key
sound management practices or integrated service initiatives. In our
prior work, we identified several key sound management practices at the
center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These
key sound management practices include (1) ensuring top leadership
drives the transformation, (2) dedicating an implementation team to
manage the transformation process, and (3) establishing a communication
strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress. DOD
has developed a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept and is currently
assessing the concept within DOD's joint requirements process. However,
the services have their own seabasing concepts and approaches and there
are a number of ongoing service initiatives. While some service
initiatives are in the early stages of concept development, others are
outpacing joint seabasing in development and are expected to cost
billions of dollars. However, DOD has not provided sufficient
leadership to ensure these initiatives are fully leveraged, properly
focused, and complement each other. In addition, despite
recommendations for a joint office to manage and lead joint seabasing
by DOD officials, the Defense Science Board, and the Naval Studies
Board, an overarching, dedicated implementation team has not been
established. Without such an implementation team, DOD has no single
entity that can provide day-to-day management of joint seabasing and
help to reach agreement on work priorities. Furthermore, in the absence
of a formal mechanism for communicating joint seabasing information,
officials from the Navy and Marine Corps told us they face challenges
in determining what other DOD and research organizations are involved
in joint seabasing and what they are doing. Without a comprehensive
management approach, DOD may not be able to evaluate seabasing options
or develop the joint seabasing capability in an efficient and cost-
effective manner.
While DOD has conducted some seabasing experiments, it has not
developed or implemented an overarching joint experimentation campaign
plan to inform decisions about joint seabasing. According to defense
best practices, key aspects of an experimentation campaign plan include
(1) designated leaders, (2) clear focus and objectives, (3) a spectrum
of experiments, (4) data collection and analysis, (5) broad
dissemination of results, and (6) a feedback mechanism to discuss and
interpret results. Many seabasing experimentation activities have taken
place across the services, combatant commands, and defense entities,
including war games, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations.
However, no overarching joint seabasing experimentation plan exists
within DOD to guide these efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces
Command, which has primary responsibility for joint warfighting
experimentation, has not taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing
experimentation. While the U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the process
of developing an experimentation plan for joint concepts, it is unclear
the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing. Moreover,
it is also unclear the extent to which this plan will be able to guide
joint seabasing experimentation efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces
Command does not have the authority to direct the experimentation
activities of the services. Furthermore, while some data collection and
analyses has been done on seabasing experimentation activities, an
overall data collection and analysis plan does not exist to ensure data
were captured and interpreted into findings. Additionally, DOD lacks a
systematic means to communicate and disseminate findings and
observations on joint seabasing experimentation, and obtain feedback.
Without an overarching experimentation plan, DOD may not have a strong
analytical basis to evaluate joint seabasing options.
While service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching milestones
for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete
development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint
seabasing options. Total ownership cost estimates include the cost to
develop, acquire, own, operate, and dispose of weapon and support
systems and help organizations analyze and compare options. DOD policy
stresses the importance of identifying the total costs of ownership,
including major cost drivers, while considering the affordability of
establishing new capability requirements. Joint seabasing is currently
going through an assessment within DOD's requirements process that will
examine potential approaches and develop preliminary cost assessments
for seabasing options. However, according to DOD officials, DOD has not
yet begun or established a firm reporting milestone for completing this
assessment and it is not clear whether it will be completed before the
services reach upcoming milestones on programs tied to joint seabasing.
For example, the Navy plans to procure a Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future)--a squadron of ships designed to project and sustain Marine
forces--at an estimated cost of $14.5 billion, along with several
supporting surface and air connectors, as a means to develop a
seabasing capability. Furthermore, the Army is exploring its own
initiatives to establish a seabasing capability, such as modified
commercial cargo ships with flight decks. Some of these service
initiatives, such as the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), are
scheduled for milestones in fiscal year 2008 that will guide future
investment decisions. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint
seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and
Congress, decision makers may not be able to evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of individual service initiatives.
To facilitate cost-effective evaluation of the joint seabasing concept
as an option for force projection and sustainment in an antiaccess
environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish
an implementation team to provide oversight and develop a management
plan for joint seabasing, (2) direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to
lead and coordinate joint seabasing experimentation efforts, with
oversight by the joint seabasing implementation team, and (3) direct
the implementation team or other appropriate entity to synchronize the
development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint
seabasing options so decision makers have sufficient information to
make informed, cost-effective investment decisions regarding seabasing
initiatives.
DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with
our recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation
team to provide oversight of seabasing initiatives. In its comments,
DOD stated that it is premature to establish additional oversight at
this time but that it will determine if additional oversight is needed
after DOD defines the joint seabasing capabilities needed. DOD also
stated that in the interim the Force Management Joint Capabilities
Board, which includes the services, combatant commands, and other
organizations, is providing an appropriate level of management
oversight. We disagree that DOD's current approach is sufficient to
provide effective oversight because (1) DOD has already begun a number
of acquisition programs that support seabasing even though it has not
yet established joint seabasing requirements and (2) the Force
Management Joint Capabilities Board's oversight does not go far enough
in providing comprehensive management oversight of numerous, disparate
service and defense organization initiatives related to joint
seabasing. While the Board is responsible for leading the joint
seabasing capabilities-based assessment, the Board's responsibilities
do not constitute the type of oversight needed to ensure ongoing or
planned service initiatives that may support joint seabasing are
coordinated and complement each other. Because of this, we continue to
believe that DOD should establish an implementation team to provide day-
to-day management oversight of joint seabasing as soon as possible
rather than considering this as an option once joint seabasing
capabilities are defined. DOD's comments and our evaluation of them are
on page 33.
Background:
In 2002, the Navy's Sea Power 21[Footnote 1] vision stated that shore-
based capabilities would be transformed to seabased capabilities
whenever practical to improve the reach, persistence, and
sustainability of systems that are already afloat. The objective for
the United States to maintain global freedom of action is a consistent
theme throughout the National Defense Strategy and National Military
Strategy.[Footnote 2] DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report[Footnote 3] further stated that the future joint force will
exploit the operational flexibility of seabasing to counter political
antiaccess and irregular warfare challenges.
The joint seabasing concept is currently going through the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), a DOD decision
support process for transforming military forces. Figure 1 shows the
JCIDS process, including the major elements of a capabilities-based
assessment. The purpose of JCIDS is to identify, assess, and prioritize
joint military capability needs. Capabilities represent warfighting
needs that are studied as part of the system's capabilities-based
assessment process. The process identifies warfighter skills and
attributes for a desired capability (Functional Area Analysis), the
gaps to achieving this capability (Functional Needs Analysis), and
possible solutions for filling these gaps (Functional Solution
Analysis). The results of this assessment are used as the basis for
identifying approaches for delivering the desired capability. When
identifying these approaches, cost is one factor that is considered.
One way costs are used to evaluate potential approaches is by
developing total ownership cost estimates. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council[Footnote 4] has overall responsibility for JCIDS and
is supported by eight Functional Capabilities Boards (Command and
Control, Battlespace Awareness, Focused Logistics, Force Management,
Force Protection, Force application, Net-Centric, and Joint Training),
which lead the capabilities-based assessment process. DOD's anticipated
timeframe for an operational joint seabasing capability as currently
envisioned in the Joint Integrating Concept is 2015-2025.
Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: The Joint Staff.
[A] DOTMLPF = Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel, and facilities.
[End of figure]
The services are either considering or actively pursuing material
solutions to support seabasing. According to service officials and
documentation, these solutions will play a critical role in enhancing
current seabasing capabilities. For example, the Navy and Marines plan
to acquire the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) along with
several supporting connectors needed for it to be able to achieve its
mission. As part of the seabase, the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) will be a squadron of ships to transport and deliver the
personnel, combat power, and logistic support of the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. The connectors, which are envisioned to provide
both intertheater lift to the seabase and intratheater lift within the
seabase, include sealift, such as the Joint High Speed Vessel, Joint
High Speed Sealift, and Joint Maritime Assault Connector (this vessel
is intended to replace the Landing Craft Assault Connector), and
airlift, such as the V-22 Osprey and CH-53K heavy lift helicopter.
Figure 2 illustrates and describes several sealift and airlift
connectors. The Army is also exploring new capability initiatives for
establishing a seabasing capability. In conjunction with the Navy and
Marine Corps, the Army is developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and
Joint High Speed Sealift ships. Furthermore, the Army is also in the
early stages of development of its Afloat Forward Staging Base, which
is a ship concept whose mission would be providing aerial maneuver with
Army forces from the sea. One option the Army is exploring for the
Afloat Forward Staging Base is to add flight decks to a commercial
container ship, along with other alterations, as a means to provide
aerial maneuver to Army forces.
Figure 2: Illustrative Connectors for Use in Joint Seabasing:
[See PDF for images]
Source: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.
[End of figure]
DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to
Guide Joint Seabasing and Integrate Service Initiatives:
Although DOD has taken action to begin the development of joint
seabasing, DOD has not fully established a comprehensive management
approach to effectively guide and assess joint seabasing as an option
for projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment and
integrate service initiatives. Specifically, DOD has not fully
incorporated sound management practices--such as providing leadership,
dedicating an implementation team, and establishing a communications
strategy--that our prior work has shown are found at the center of
successful transformations.[Footnote 5]
DOD Has Taken Action to Develop Joint Seabasing:
DOD has taken action to develop joint seabasing by pursuing it within
DOD's Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).
JCIDS is a key DOD decision support process that uses a capabilities-
based approach to assess existing capabilities, identify capability
gaps, and develop new warfighting capabilities. Within JCIDS, future
capability needs are intended to be developed from top-level strategic
guidance such as the National Military Strategy, a "top-down" approach.
Under the former process, requirements grew out of the individual
services' unique strategic visions, a "bottom-up" approach. In January
2006 we reported that JCIDS is not yet functioning as envisioned to
define gaps and redundancies in existing and future military
capabilities across the department and to identify solutions to improve
joint capabilities.[Footnote 6] We reported that requirements continue
to be defined largely from the "bottom up"--by the services--although
DOD uses the JCIDS framework to assess the services' proposals and push
a joint perspective.
According to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics officials, seabasing is going through the
JCIDS process to become more of a joint concept that is developed
through input from the services, combatant commands, and other DOD
organizations. DOD has produced a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept
that outlines the concept for joint seabasing and identifies essential
capabilities. Under JCIDS, the capabilities-based assessment follows a
structured, four-step process. The first step in this process, the
Functional Area Analysis, dated October 2005, identified the seabasing
tasks, conditions, and standards needed to meet military objectives.
The Functional Area Analysis identified such critical joint seabasing
tasks as providing for maintenance of equipment in the joint operations
area, attacking operational targets, and building and maintaining
sustainment bases in the joint operations area. The second step of the
capabilities-based assessment, the Functional Needs Analysis, dated
November 2006, provided a prioritized list of joint seabasing
capabilities and capability gaps, and identifies potential mitigation
areas from which the identified capability gaps may be addressed. The
17 seabasing capability gaps include at-sea assembly, forcible entry,
and conducting operational movement and maneuver. The analyses that are
currently being developed are intended to further define and organize
the capability gaps identified in the Functional Needs Analysis and
recommend potential solutions for consideration in future analyses.
DOD's Management Approach Has Not Fully Incorporated Sound Management
Principles or Integrated Service Initiatives:
Despite pursuing joint seabasing within JCIDS, DOD has not fully
incorporated key sound management practices into its approach for
managing the development of joint seabasing requirements and
integrating service initiatives. In our prior work, we identified
several key sound management practices at the center of successful
mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These key sound management
practices include (1) ensuring top leadership drives the
transformation, (2) dedicating an implementation team to manage the
transformation process, and (3) establishing a communication strategy
to create shared expectations and report related progress. Without a
management approach that contains these elements, DOD may be unable to
guide and assess joint seabasing in an efficient and cost-effective
manner. Moreover, without central coordination, it is unclear whether
DOD will be able to effectively manage billions of dollars of potential
service investments in interdependent complex platforms, connectors,
and logistics technologies that will need to be coordinated using a
common set of standards, requirements, timeframes, and priorities.
First, although joint seabasing capability development is underway, DOD
has not provided sufficient leadership to integrate service initiatives
and guide the development of joint seabasing. While the joint seabasing
JCIDS process is still in the early stages of assessing needed
capabilities, the services have developed their own concepts and
approaches for seabasing, and in some cases systems that will support
joint seabasing are further along than the concept in JCIDS
development. For example, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
and the Joint High Speed Vessel are approaching their second major
milestone, or decision point, within DOD's acquisition system, which
will initiate systems-level development, whereas the joint seabasing
concept is still being refined. Preliminary cost estimates for both
these systems range from nearly $12 billion to over $15 billion. The
2005 National Research Council Committee's report, Sea Basing,
concluded that developing a system of systems such as seabasing that is
comprised of complex platforms, connectors, and logistics technologies
will require a common set of standards, requirements, timeframes, and
priorities.[Footnote 7] Various ship, airlift, and sealift connector
components of the seabase will need to interface, and the capabilities
of some of these components will be interdependent. In addition, joint
operations from a seabase will require robust logistics technologies
and command and control. Prematurely developing such systems to meet
individual service requirements rather than joint requirements may
result in initiatives that duplicate each other and systems that are
not interoperable and compatible. Moreover, in addition to the billions
of dollars being spent to procure these systems, it may be costly to
realign or adjust the efforts of the services in the future if they do
not meet the joint requirements of seabasing.
In addition, DOD leadership has not provided an official, unified
vision for joint seabasing to guide the transformation, ensure that
focus is maintained on providing a capability that is the best option
for projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment, and
ensure that joint seabasing is evaluated against competing options.
Joint Staff officials told us that the joint seabasing JCIDS process
has been addressing how seabasing can be used to counter the problem of
projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment, rather
than examining specific solutions. We reported in 2003 that key
practices and implementation steps for successful transformations
include ensuring top leadership drives the transformation.[Footnote 8]
We found that leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone for the
transformation. Concerns have been raised by other organizations about
the lack of leadership to guide the development of joint seabasing. For
example, the National Research Council Committee's report, Sea Basing,
stated that "given the complexity of [the process for developing a
joint seabasing capability] and the long-term nature of the major
capital investments by Services in new platforms, development of
advanced technologies, and the introduction of appropriate joint
doctrine, such a unifying vision will be essential in order to best
leverage existing currently programmed and future Service
capabilities."[Footnote 9] Also, in 2003 the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Sea Basing found that developing the seabase requires
persistent, top-down leadership to coordinate the numerous initiatives-
-including concepts of operations, ships, aircraft, weapons, and
transportations systems--that support the seabase.[Footnote 10] Absent
leadership, DOD can not be certain joint seabasing has been evaluated
against competing options for projecting and sustaining forces in an
antiaccess environment. Moreover, without leadership that has the
authority, responsibility, and accountability to guide joint seabasing
and integrate service initiatives, DOD cannot be sure that ongoing or
planned initiatives are cost-effective, fully leveraged, properly
focused, and complement each other.
Second, DOD has not established a dedicated implementation team to
provide day-to-day management oversight. We reported in 2003 that a
dedicated implementation team should be responsible for the day-to-day
management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are
integrated.[Footnote 11] Such a team would ensure that joint seabasing
receives the focused, full-time attention necessary to be sustained and
effective, by establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities,
helping to reach agreement on work priorities, and keeping efforts
coordinated. There are several groups and DOD organizations tasked with
specific responsibilities for developing joint seabasing within JCIDS;
however, none of these organizations have the overall authority,
responsibility, and accountability to coordinate initiatives and the
acquisition of systems that may support joint seabasing. For example,
the Navy was designated the sponsor of the Seabasing Joint Integrating
Concept and is responsible for all common documentation, periodic
reporting, and funding actions required to support the seabasing
capabilities development and acquisition process. The Force Management
Functional Capabilities Board is responsible for leading the seabasing
capabilities-based assessment and oversees the sponsor (the Navy) in
developing documents. The Seabasing Working Group was organized and
tasked by the Joint Staff to assist the Force Management Functional
Capabilities Board in completing the joint seabasing analyses. The
Seabasing Working Group is comprised of members from the Joint Staff,
combatant commands, the services, and other organizations, and serves
as a source of expertise and as a joint sounding board for
collaboration and focusing the direction of the analyses. According to
Joint Staff officials, the working group can ask the services and
combatant commands to participate and provide input to the analyses,
but they have no authority to force their participation in the
development of the analyses nor do they have authority over service
initiatives that may support joint seabasing.
Recommendations have been made for a joint office to manage and lead
joint seabasing by DOD officials, the Defense Science Board Task Force
on Sea Basing, and the Naval Studies Board,[Footnote 12] but a
leadership body has not been established. In November 2003, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
directed that a terms of reference be developed for a Joint
Expeditionary Force Projection/Seabasing Capabilities Office. According
to the Terms of Reference, the office would organize all joint
seabasing-related DOD activities--ranging from experimentation efforts
to solutions development to training--into a coherent direction. In
addition, the office would be comprised of members from each of the
four services and the U.S. Joint Forces Command and would have limited
contract authority. However, DOD officials decided to forgo the joint
office and pursue joint seabasing within the JCIDS process. According
to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, one reason a joint office was
not set up for joint seabasing was because there was no staff available
at the time. According to Joint Staff officials, one downfall to joint
seabasing being developed under the JCIDS process is that consensus is
required on all decisions before moving forward, which may result in
compromising solutions. Although use of the JCIDS process has
encouraged the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to participate with
the Navy in the development of the Joint Integrating Concept and JCIDS
analyses, the services continue to pursue their own initiatives. As
previously mentioned, some of these initiatives are still in the early
stages of concept development, whereas other initiatives are further
along in the acquisition process ahead of joint seabasing. A key
official from the Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing told
us that the need for a joint office to coordinate efforts between the
services still exists. According to the official, the lack of action in
setting up a joint seabasing office makes achieving compatible systems
to support joint seabasing more difficult considering some supporting
systems are ahead of joint seabasing in the development process. The
Naval Studies Board also recommended a joint planning office be set up
to "correlate Service requirements and advise Service procurements" so
common capabilities among the services can be taken advantage of and
incompatible acquisitions will not be made.[Footnote 13] We and the DOD
Office of the Inspector General have found similar management
challenges[Footnote 14] in DOD's efforts to field other joint
capabilities such as the Global Information Grid and network-centric
warfare.[Footnote 15] Without formally designating a dedicated
leadership body to provide day-to-day management oversight by providing
a coherent direction for related activities, establishing clearly
defined roles and responsibilities, helping to reach agreement on work
priorities, and keeping efforts coordinated, DOD's ability to develop a
joint seabasing capability in an efficient manner may be hindered.
Furthermore, without a dedicated implementation team, it may be
difficult for DOD to sustain joint seabasing development over a long
period of time.
Third, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that
encourages communication, shares knowledge, and provides information to
DOD organizations involved in joint seabasing initiatives. We
previously reported that creating an effective, ongoing communication
strategy is central to forming the partnerships that are needed to
develop and implement the organization's strategies.[Footnote 16] As
previously mentioned, there are numerous groups and DOD organizations
involved in joint seabasing and various initiatives that may affect
joint seabasing. The seabasing working group hosts meetings that
provide a forum for discussion on joint seabasing among members. In
addition, it has established a Web site that posts meeting minutes and
various joint seabasing JCIDS analysis documents. While this Web site
provides some transparency into the analysis process, it does not serve
as a central repository for communicating information on joint
seabasing because it does not provide information on joint seabasing
efforts conducted by the services and combatant commands outside of the
JCIDS process. In addition, we found no evidence of a formal mechanism
that communicated joint seabasing information. Officials from the Navy
and Marine Corps told us they face challenges in determining what
organizations are involved in joint seabasing and what they are doing.
According to Marine Corps officials, this impedes their ability to
leverage activities and minimize redundancy. Furthermore, Joint Staff
officials have acknowledged that the lack of a central, authoritative
source of information significantly hindered timely completion of
analyses. For example, the data management tool used to associate
essential seabasing capabilities with the appropriate functional area
did not provide a systematic method for identifying relevant
information and some data was missing. Moreover, they also recognized
that a means for identifying DOD-wide initiatives that affect joint
seabasing needs to be established. In the absence of clear
communication of joint seabasing information throughout DOD via an
overall communications strategy, joint seabasing participants may not
be able to effectively leverage activities and minimize redundancy, and
the overall development of joint seabasing may be impeded.
DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan to Inform
Decisions About Joint Seabasing:
DOD has not developed, implemented, or used an overarching joint
experimentation campaign plan to inform decisions about joint
seabasing. Experimentation campaign plans play an important role in
developing transformational concepts by coordinating and guiding
experimentation efforts using a series of related experiments that
develop knowledge about a concept or capability. Many seabasing
experimentation activities have taken place across DOD and the
services; however, an overarching experimentation campaign plan to
coordinate and guide joint seabasing experimentation does not exist
because the U.S. Joint Forces Command--DOD's leader of joint
warfighting experimentation--has not taken the lead in coordinating
joint seabasing experimentation efforts. Additionally, DOD lacks a
systematic means to analyze, communicate, and disseminate information
on joint seabasing experimentation. Moreover, DOD lacks a feedback
mechanism to interpret and clarify results from joint seabasing
experimental activities.
Experimentation Campaign Plans Coordinate and Guide Experimentation
Efforts:
According to military experimentation guides, experimentation campaign
plans play an important role in developing transformational concepts by
coordinating and guiding experimentation efforts using a series of
related experiments that develop knowledge about a concept or
capability. Taken together, the results of these experiments can inform
decisions about future research and technology programs, acquisition
efforts, risk, organizational changes, and changes in operational
concepts. A well-planned experimentation campaign provides a framework
for much of what needs to be known about a new concept or capability.
According to defense best practices, key aspects of an experimentation
campaign include: (1) designated campaign leaders; (2) clear campaign
focus and objectives; (3) a spectrum of well-designed and sequenced
experimental activities, including studies and analyses, seminars and
conferences, war games, modeling and simulation, and live
demonstrations; (4) data collection and analyses; (5) broad
dissemination of results; and (6) a feedback mechanism to discuss and
interpret results. Experimentation campaigns that include these aspects
can reduce the risk in developing and fielding a new concept or
capability by addressing a spectrum of possibilities and building upon
experimentation activities systematically, with continual analyses and
feedback to interpret the results into useful information.
Single experiments alone are insufficient to develop transformational
concepts because they can only explore a limited number of variables,
and their contributions are limited unless their findings can be
replicated in other experiments. Campaigns can provide conclusive and
robust results through their ability to replicate findings and conduct
experiments in a variety of scenarios and operating environments. A
well-planned experimentation campaign can mitigate the limitations of a
single experiment by synthesizing outputs from a series of activities
into coherent advice to decision makers.
Many Seabasing Experimentation Activities Have Taken Place but an
Overarching Experimentation Campaign Plan to Guide These Activities
Does Not Exist:
Many experimentation activities involving seabasing have taken place;
however, an overarching DOD experimentation campaign plan to guide and
coordinate these activities does not exist. All of the services,
combatant commands, and some defense entities have been involved with
seabasing experimentation through war games, studies, workshops,
modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations. For example, in 2004
the Joint Chiefs of Staff led a war game called Nimble Viking that
brought the services together and addressed gaps in their understanding
of the joint seabasing concept. The services conducted studies
addressing gaps in the joint seabasing concept, such as the Navy's 40
Knot Marine Expeditionary Brigade study, which identified gaps in
conducting forcible entry operations with Marine Corps forces using
seaborne lift capable of speeds of 40 knots. Moreover, the Marine Corps
modeled plans for landing seabased forces from amphibious ships, the
results of which, according to the Marine Corps, shaved hours off the
landing of forces from amphibious ships. In addition, the U.S. Joint
Forces Command and services worked together in cosponsoring several war
games involving joint seabasing, including Unified Course 2004, Joint
Urban Warrior 2004, Pinnacle Impact 2003, and Sea Viking 2004. While
many of the reports from these war games recognized joint seabasing as
a potential concept for addressing antiaccess and force projection
issues, they stated that further experimentation was needed before
joint seabasing moved forward.
Additionally, material solutions being developed to support joint
seabasing have undergone planned experimentation and testing
activities. For example, U.S. Transportation Command officials believe
that DOD's Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore program[Footnote 17] could
support joint seabasing logistical operations, such as heavy cargo
transfer at sea. To that end, in June 2006 they sponsored a Joint-
Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise to transfer equipment and bulk
materials from large ships to the beach using smaller landing craft.
Figure 3 shows forces using a barge to move construction vehicles from
ships to shore during a Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise at
Naval Magazine, in Indian Island, Washington.
Figure 3: Navy Forces Use a Barge to Move Construction Vehicles During
a Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore Exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian
Island, Washington:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Navy's Program Executive Office for Ships, which manages the
Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed Vessel
programs, reports that the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)
program has planned and is executing a series of jointly coordinated
tests involving modeling and simulation and live demonstrations.
According to the Program Manager, demonstrations included at-sea
evaluation of the Mobile Landing Platform concept[Footnote 18] and its
ability to interface with other vessels supporting the joint seabase.
Additionally, the Navy's Office of Naval Research is developing a
number of technologies, such as internal ship cargo handling and ship-
to-ship cargo transfers, to address capability gaps in joint seabasing
operations.
Although joint seabasing experimental activities have taken place, an
overarching experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide these
activities does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not
taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts.
Moreover, involvement in these activities by the services, combatant
commands, and defense entities has been inconsistent due to budget
restraints, other competing priorities, and the lack of timely
coordination and advance notice of events. In May 1998, the Secretary
of Defense designated the U.S. Joint Forces Command as the DOD
executive agent for joint warfighting experimentation. In this role the
command is responsible for conducting joint experimentation on new
warfighting concepts and disseminating the results of these activities
to the joint concept community, which includes the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, services, and
defense agencies. The U.S. Joint Forces Command is also responsible for
coordinating joint experimentation efforts by developing a biennial
joint concept development and experimentation campaign plan. In January
2006, a memo from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further
underscored this responsibility by providing explicit direction to the
U.S. Joint Forces Command on developing a campaign plan that provided
guidance to the joint concept community on coordinating joint
experimentation efforts, and capturing and disseminating the results of
these efforts.[Footnote 19] While the U.S. Joint Forces Command said it
is in the process of developing the plan, it is unclear the extent to
which this plan will address joint seabasing. According to the U.S.
Joint Forces Command, other more near-term priorities, such as
improvised explosive devices and urban warfare, have prevented them
from focusing on joint seabasing during the past few years.
Once the U.S. Joint Forces Command develops and implements the plan,
which it intends to do by fiscal year 2008, it is also unclear the
extent to which this plan will be able to guide and coordinate joint
seabasing experimentation efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command
does not have the authority to direct service and other DOD
organizations' experimentation plans. The services and combatant
commands are responsible for working with the U.S. Joint Forces Command
in executing the joint concept development and experimentation campaign
plan, and for providing them with observations, insights, results, and
recommendations related to all joint experimentation efforts. However,
the services and combatant commands are not required to go through the
U.S. Joint Forces Command before executing their own experimentation
activities. Moreover, the U.S. Joint Forces Command says it does not
have authority to make the services and combatant commands take
specific joint actions. Additionally, there are many entities within
the services involved in joint seabasing experimentation and there are
no formalized leaders coordinating service efforts. As a result, these
entities operate independently and do not coordinate their efforts with
the U.S. Joint Forces Command. This lack of coordination poses risks of
duplicating experimentation efforts and conducting experimentation that
does not build upon previous activities.
Furthermore, no overarching campaign plan to guide joint seabasing
experimentation exists within any other DOD entity. While the Navy and
Marine Corps have seabasing experimentation campaign plans, officials
told us these plans are not overarching within each of the services and
it is unclear the extent to which they are being implemented. For
example, a seabasing experimentation plan exists as part of the Navy's
Sea Trial Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign
Plan[Footnote 20]; however, Navy officials said there is not a lot of
joint seabasing experimentation being conducted within this plan and
the plan does not encompass all of the Navy's efforts. In addition, the
Marine Corps has a plan that broadly focuses on issues that need to be
addressed for seabasing capabilities such as the Maritime Pre-
positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed Vessel. However,
its plan does not identify designated leaders and specific
experimentation activities that should take place, nor does the plan
identify timelines, resources, or staff to conduct experimentation. It
also does not contain plans for data collection and analysis or any
provisions for disseminating results. In addition, according to Marine
Corps officials, the plan is not being fully executed due to lack of
funding and staff.
Many service officials expressed concern over the lack of coordination
and guidance on joint seabasing experimentation. They stated that the
U.S. Joint Forces Command has not shown much interest in
experimentation for future concepts such as joint seabasing, instead
focusing experimentation efforts on short-term concepts and immediate
priorities such as improvised explosive devices. One service official
commented that there is no single point of contact for joint seabasing
at the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff states in the Functional Needs Analysis that more joint
experimentation is needed to inform and further refine capability gaps
in the joint seabasing concept.
DOD Lacks a Systematic Means to Analyze, Communicate, and Disseminate
Information on Joint Seabasing Experimentation:
DOD also lacks a systematic means to analyze, communicate, and
disseminate information about joint seabasing experimentation across
the department. According to military experimentation guides, a
significant part of an experiment consists of gathering data,
interpreting it into findings, and combining it with already known
information. Additionally, data collection and analysis plans are
important to experimentation because they ensure valid and reliable
data are captured and understood, and that the analysis undertaken
addresses the key issues in the experiment. However, we found no
overarching data collection and analysis plan to guide the analysis of
joint seabasing experimentation results. Furthermore, officials in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Program Analysis and Evaluation
division described a lack of analysis in joint seabasing to inform the
capabilities-based assessment, which could lead to inaccurately
identifying gaps in implementing the concept. They said that no
comprehensive analytical framework was ever established to guide
development of the joint seabasing concept; consequently, the value
joint seabasing will bring to the warfighter is unknown. Without an
overarching campaign plan, experimental results for joint seabasing are
being obtained and interpreted using different data collection and
analysis methods, which may lead to inconsistent reporting methods. As
a result, experimentation data may be analyzed, interpreted, and shared
inconsistently and with little transparency across the community.
Additionally, DOD and service officials commented on the lack of
sufficient modeling and simulation tools available to provide valid
data on joint seabasing. Modeling and simulation tools play an
important role in experiments. Unlike live demonstrations, modeling and
simulation techniques can inexpensively vary the values of variables to
represent a wide variety of conditions. They also provide a great deal
of control over the variables in the experiment, which allows for
replication. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the absence of high-level
modeling tools capable of end-to-end modeling of seabasing[Footnote 21]
in the Functional Needs Analysis, saying that the absence of this type
of modeling precluded effective and meaningful data to validate
warfighter needs and thus limited the depth of their analysis.
Furthermore, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
Program Analysis and Evaluation division also commented that the lack
of modeling could result in missing critical gaps in the joint
seabasing concept that have not yet been identified. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff identified the U.S. Joint Forces Command as a possible lead
for end-to-end modeling and simulation of joint seabasing because of
its role in joint concept development and experimentation, and its
expertise in developing comprehensive modeling and simulation tools.
While some communication takes place among the entities involved with
developing the seabasing concept, there is no established method for
communicating observations, insights, and upcoming events across the
entire community. DOD and service officials described the joint
seabasing community as an informal community of practice, where the
services, combatant commands, and defense entities invite each other to
participate in their experimentation activities. The U.S. Joint Forces
Command and the services track to some degree the experimental efforts
of the joint seabasing community. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces
Command says it tries to leverage off the services' efforts by
partnering with them in experimental activities. However, despite this
informal community, DOD and service officials describe a lack of
coordination and awareness of experimental activities. A Marine Corps
official stated that some officials are more aware than others are; but
no one is completely aware of what is going on across the entire
community. In fact, many officials we spoke with were either unaware or
had very little advance notice of an upcoming war game involving
seabasing. Without an established communication method, joint seabasing
experimentation efforts are not transparent to the entire community,
which can contribute to a lack of consensus on the types of activities
that take place, conflicts in scheduling events, and duplication of
efforts.
Additionally, there is no overarching system to disseminate
observations and results on joint seabasing experimentation. The U.S.
Joint Forces Command has a database containing documents and reports
from experimentation activities; however, the database contains
different levels of information based on what the services choose to
publish. As a result, the database is not a comprehensive resource of
joint experimentation information. The Navy's Warfare Development
Command[Footnote 22] also maintains a Web site of information
pertaining to its Sea Trial campaign, which other entities within the
Navy contribute to, but it is not overarching within the Navy. In
response to a January 2006 memo from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is developing an online
knowledge management portal to disseminate information on
experimentation activities across the joint concept community.[Footnote
23] The portal contains a repository of information on experimentation
concepts, projects, and documents; a bulletin board to post insights
and observations; hotlinks to other sites; and a calendar function for
upcoming experimentation activities. The portal also contains a section
on activities relating to joint logistics, and joint deployment and
sustainment; however, it does not yet contain information on joint
seabasing. Furthermore, while the portal has the ability to disseminate
information, it may not be successful in increasing communication
across the joint seabasing community because the services have not been
directed to use the portal in planning their activities.
DOD Lacks a Feedback Mechanism to Interpret Results From Joint
Seabasing Experimentation:
DOD lacks a feedback mechanism to interpret and clarify results from
joint seabasing experimental activities. Feedback on analyses and
findings produced from experimental activities provides the joint
seabasing experimentation community an opportunity to comment on the
results and ask questions. It also gives the experiment sponsor an
opportunity to see how the work was received, assist in interpreting
results, and provide further advice on how the results should be used.
In the context of an experimentation campaign, it may also give the
sponsor an opportunity to clarify how the results affect the
overarching campaign concept. While individual seabasing experiments
may have had some form of feedback, the lack of an overarching joint
seabasing experimentation campaign plan that includes procedures for
providing and obtaining feedback may prevent the joint seabasing
experimentation community from fully realizing how the results of
individual experiments affect the development of joint seabasing.
Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cost Estimates
is Uncertain:
While some service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching
milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will
complete development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of
joint seabasing options. Understanding estimated total ownership costs
helps decision makers measure the whole cost of owning and operating
assets and make comparisons between competing options. The joint
seabasing capability is being assessed in the JCIDS analysis process.
However, DOD has not yet begun a key study of approaches and their
associated costs and may not complete this study for at least a year.
In the meantime, the services are considering or pursuing systems to
enhance seabasing capabilities. For example, a major Navy-Marine Corps
initiative is scheduled to undergo a major milestone review in fiscal
year 2008. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing
options are developed and made transparent to DOD and Congress,
decision makers will not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
individual service initiatives.
Total Ownership Cost Estimates Help Decision Makers Evaluate Options:
In order to evaluate options and make informed, cost-effective
decisions, decision makers must have an understanding of the total
ownership costs for establishing a desired capability. A total
ownership cost estimate includes the costs to develop, acquire,
operate, maintain, and dispose of all systems required to establish a
seabasing capability. Understanding total ownership cost estimates
helps organizations measure the whole cost of owning and operating
assets by providing a consistent framework for analyzing and comparing
options. Total ownership cost estimates can be used to assess the
possible return on investment of new initiatives. According to DOD
guidance,[Footnote 24] all parties involved in the defense acquisition
system must be cognizant of the reality of fiscal constraints and treat
cost as an independent variable when developing systems. Furthermore,
the policy stresses the importance of identifying the total costs of
ownership, including major cost drivers, while considering the
affordability of establishing needed capabilities. Even with future
concepts, such as joint seabasing, where uncertainty exists, total
ownership cost estimates can be developed. According to DOD cost
analysis guidance, in such cases, areas of uncertainty can be
quantified using ranges of cost, thereby giving decision makers, at a
minimum, a rough estimate of the total costs to achieving a desired
capability. For systems of systems, such as seabasing, a total
ownership cost estimate should include research, acquisition,
operation, maintenance, and disposition costs of all systems, primary
and support, needed to achieve the desired end state. Understanding the
estimated total ownership costs of seabasing options can help decision
makers make informed decisions to determine the most cost-effective
method of achieving a seabasing capability. Furthermore, they can be
used to more effectively evaluate joint seabasing against alternative
methods of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess
environment.
JCIDS Has Not Yet Produced Cost Estimates for Joint Seabasing
Capability Options and Timeframes Are Uncertain:
Joint seabasing is currently going through the capabilities-based
assessment phase of the JCIDS analysis process. One part of the JCIDS
analysis process is the Functional Solutions Analysis--an operationally
based assessment of all potential approaches, including changes to
doctrine, organization, training, as well as material solutions, to
solve identified capability gaps. According to Joint Chiefs of Staff
guidance, this process will assess the costs of potential approaches to
joint seabasing. For any material approaches that are developed, the
cost to develop, procure, and sustain each approach will be estimated.
These estimates should provide decision makers with some understanding
of the costs of these approaches. However, the timeframe for when these
cost assessments will take place is unclear. According to DOD
officials, cost assessments for joint seabasing approaches have not yet
begun and may not be completed for a year or more. Furthermore, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance does not provide a specific methodology
for what level of cost assessment should take place. Rather, the
guidance only states that the process should "roughly assess" the costs
of each identified approach.[Footnote 25]
Service Acquisitions May Outpace Joint Seabasing Cost Analysis:
Although DOD has not yet begun its analysis of joint seabasing
approaches and costs, the services are either considering or actively
pursuing systems to develop enhanced seabasing capabilities. For
example, the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2007 Budget includes
funding for the development of seabasing ships, including ships for the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and Joint High Speed Vessels.
Furthermore, the Navy has included eleven ships for its Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future), three Joint High Speed Vessels, and one
Joint High Speed Sealift ship in its Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2007 report to
Congress.[Footnote 26] Although the plan could change as the Navy
continues to assess its requirements and address affordability issues,
the Navy estimates that these investments will cost nearly $12
billion.[Footnote 27] The ships the Navy has programmed for the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) do not include the cost of a
Landing Helicopter Deck (LHD) amphibious assault ship, which is planned
to be part of the squadron.[Footnote 28] The Congressional Research
Service has reported that this ship has an estimated cost of $2.2
billion, and that the estimated cost of the entire Maritime
Prepositioning Squadron is about $14.5 billion.[Footnote 29] However,
unknown factors remain that could affect these estimates. Furthermore,
the number of connectors required to support the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) is yet to be determined. Within the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron, several factors that
could influence cost--such as manning and ship survivability levels--
remain in flux. Figure 4 shows the ships of the Maritime Prepositioning
Force (Future).
Figure 4: Ships in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Squadron:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Navy and Marine Corps have not yet estimated the total ownership
costs of their preferred options for establishing a seabasing
capability. However, both the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
and the Joint High Speed Vessel, which will play a critical role in
establishing a joint seabasing capability, are in development and
progressing through DOD's acquisition system. The Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) is approaching its second major
milestone, which initiates system development and demonstration, in mid-
2008. Prior to this milestone, a total ownership cost estimate will be
required in order for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) to be
validated and approved before program initiation. Although a total
ownership cost estimate may be available for the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron for this milestone, according to
service documentation, the costs of the supporting vehicles and vessels
needed for the squadron to operate as planned for use in joint
seabasing will not be included. Furthermore, one of the ships in the
squadron--the Mobile Landing Platform--is going through its own
acquisition process with its second milestone scheduled in fiscal year
2008. Furthermore, because the JCIDS analysis process for Joint
Seabasing will not produce any cost assessments for at least 1 year,
decision makers risk making substantial investment concerning the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) without knowledge of the
potential costs of other joint seabasing options. The Navy plans to
acquire the first ship for the squadron in 2009.
The Army is also exploring new initiatives for establishing a seabasing
capability. In conjunction with the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army is
developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Sealift
ships. Although not being developed specifically for seabasing,
according to service documentation, these systems will have a
significant role in establishing a seabasing capability. The Army plans
to acquire five Joint High Speed Vessels beginning in fiscal year 2008,
with a total acquisition cost of $210 million for the first ship and
$170 million for the remaining ships. The Navy's long-range
shipbuilding plan estimates the Joint High Speed Sealift ship to cost
around $920 million. Furthermore, the Army is also in the early stages
of exploring ideas for its Afloat Forward Staging Base to provide
aerial maneuver to Army forces. One option the Army is exploring for
the Afloat Forward Staging Base is to add flight decks to a commercial
container ship, along with other alterations, as a means to provide
aerial maneuver to Army forces. Several research organizations also
recommended this option, because it is seen as a potentially low-cost
means of establishing a seabasing capability. A rough order of
magnitude estimate of the cost to convert a commercial cargo ship is
approximately $300 million to $600 million.[Footnote 30]
Options Cannot Be Compared without Cost Estimates:
In addition to the options in development, additional means for
projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment exist.
However, they cannot effectively be compared when total ownership costs
are not known. For example, the U.S. Transportation Command is working
to enhance the military's joint logistics over-the-shore capabilities,
which utilize existing assets, such as the Army's Logistics Support
Vessel and the Navy's Improved Navy Lighterage System,[Footnote 31] to
deploy and sustain forces by allowing strategic sealift ships to
discharge through austere or damaged ports, or over a bare beach.
Furthermore, the Air Force has developed its Expeditionary Airbase
Operating Enabling Concept. This concept is a methodology and plan for
rapid airbase seizure, establishment, and operation to support the
joint force commander in sustaining forces. Other possibilities include
Army air-dropped or air-landed operations to roll-back enemy shore-
based defense or joint special operations forces to attack high-value
coastal defense assets prior to or in concert with naval strikes from
the sea. Some of these options represent existing capabilities, which
could prove to be a more cost-effective means of projecting and
sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment. Until total ownership
costs are developed, the cost-effectiveness of these options cannot be
effectively evaluated.
Conclusions:
While DOD's ability to project and sustain forces in an antiaccess
environment is expected to become increasingly important, DOD has not
taken all of the steps needed to effectively manage joint seabasing
initiatives across the department and evaluate competing options for
force projection and sustainment. Without a comprehensive management
approach to guide and assess joint seabasing, DOD may be unable to
ensure that ongoing or planned joint seabasing initiatives are properly
focused and complement each other and the capability is being developed
in an efficient and cost-effective manner. One consequence of this lack
of effective management is the absence of a joint experimentation
campaign plan. Without a campaign plan to direct experimentation for
joint seabasing, DOD and the services' ability to evaluate and validate
their solutions, coordinate efforts, perform analysis, and disseminate
results could be compromised. As a result, the services risk
duplicating experimentation efforts and developing and fielding
seabasing capabilities that are not compatible or interoperable, and
they will be unable to leverage the results of individual experiments
across the joint seabasing experimentation community to maximize
synergies. Furthermore, establishing a joint seabasing capability could
be the source of significant investment by DOD. Given the challenging
fiscal environment facing DOD and the rest of the federal government,
decision makers must make investment decisions that maximize return on
investment at the best value for the taxpayer. By understanding the
estimated total ownership costs of options for establishing a seabasing
capability, decision makers would be in a better position to make
informed decisions about what options are most cost-effective, and
evaluate the costs and benefits of establishing a seabasing capability
against other competing priorities. However, while it is unclear when
DOD will complete its analysis of joint seabasing approaches and costs,
the services are pursuing initiatives and systems to develop a
seabasing capability, some of which are approaching milestones for
investment decisions. If individual systems that support seabasing are
allowed to move forward through the acquisition process before total
ownership cost of seabasing options are developed and made transparent
to DOD and Congress, there is a risk that DOD could make significant
investments to develop a capability that may not be the most cost-
effective means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess
environment.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist decision makers in developing a comprehensive management
approach to guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for force
projection and sustainment in an antiaccess environment and integrate
service initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take
the following actions to incorporate sound management principles into
DOD's management of joint seabasing:
* assign clear leadership and accountability for developing a joint
seabasing capability and coordinating supporting initiatives;
* establish an overarching, dedicated implementation team to provide
day-to-day management oversight over the services, combatant commands,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint seabasing; and:
* develop and implement a communications strategy to ensure
communication between and among the services, combatant commands,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
to provide information on all joint seabasing activities across DOD.
To better guide joint seabasing experimentation and inform decisions on
joint seabasing as an option for force projection and sustainment in an
antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense do
the following:
* Direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead and coordinate joint
seabasing experimentation efforts, under the purview of the joint
seabasing implementation team. U.S. Joint Forces Command should be
responsible for developing and implementing a joint seabasing
experimentation campaign plan to guide the evaluation of joint
seabasing as a capability for force projection and sustainment. Such an
experimentation plan should include the following elements:
- a clear focus and objectives for joint seabasing that encompass near-
, mid-, and long-term experimentation plans;
- a near-term plan for joint seabasing experimentation that includes
events for the next fiscal year, participants, timelines, and resources
that will be used to support the events;
- a spectrum of joint experimentation activities that include
wargaming, comprehensive modeling and simulation, live demonstrations,
workshops, symposiums, and analysis;
- a data collection and analysis plan to capture and evaluate results;
and:
- a method for communicating observations, results, upcoming
activities, and feedback across the joint seabasing experimentation
community.
* Direct that the services collaborate with the U.S. Joint Forces
Command in developing, implementing, and using the joint seabasing
experimentation campaign plan.
* Direct that the services utilize and contribute to the U.S. Joint
Forces Command's knowledge management portal by providing their
observations, insights, results, and planned activities to the portal
for use by the joint seabasing experimentation community.
To assist decision makers in evaluating the costs of joint seabasing
options against the capabilities that joint seabasing could provide the
joint warfighter as a means for force projection and sustainment in an
antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the implementation team or other appropriate entity to
synchronize development of total ownership cost estimates for the range
of joint seabasing options so decision makers have sufficient
information to use in making investment decisions on service seabasing
initiatives.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our
recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation
team. In its comments, DOD stated that it is premature to establish
additional oversight at this time and that in the interim the Force
Management Joint Capabilities Board is providing an appropriate level
of management oversight. As discussed below, in view of the magnitude
of potential DOD investments in seabasing and DOD's need to efficiently
manage future resources and distinguish between needs and wants, we
continue to believe that an implementation team is needed to coordinate
disparate service and defense organization initiatives related to
seabasing and urge the department to further consider the need for
action now rather than waiting until after it establishes joint
requirements. In addition, although DOD partially agreed with our other
recommendations, its comments did not indicate that it would take
specific actions beyond those it has already begun and which we
evaluated as part of our review. In light of DOD's stated agreement
with the intent of our recommendations, we urge the department to
develop specific actions and plans to implement our recommendations.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding leadership and
accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and
coordinating supporting initiatives. DOD stated that the Joint Staff is
assigned responsibility to develop the Joint Seabasing Concept and the
resulting capability and that there is clear and accountable leadership
established within the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the
Joint Capabilities Board to accomplish this development. While the
Joint Staff, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Joint
Capabilities Board have oversight and responsibilities within JCIDS, we
found that none of these organizations have the overall authority,
responsibility, and accountability to coordinate joint seabasing
initiatives and the service acquisitions that may support joint
seabasing. As discussed in the report, the services have their own
seabasing concepts and some service initiatives are outpacing joint
seabasing in development. DOD has not provided sufficient leadership to
ensure these initiatives are fully leveraged, properly focused, and
complement each other. Because of the potential for billions of dollars
to be spent to procure these systems, we continue to believe our
recommendation has merit and that assignment of clear leadership and
accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and
coordinating supporting initiatives is needed.
DOD did not agree with our recommendation that an overarching,
dedicated implementation team be established to provide day-to-day
management oversight over the services, combatant commands, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint seabasing. DOD commented
that the joint seabasing concept is still being developed within the
JCIDS and the Force Management Functional Capabilities Board is
providing the appropriate level of management oversight. DOD stated
that it is premature to establish additional oversight at this time and
that after the needed joint seabasing capabilities have been defined,
the department will determine if additional oversight is necessary. We
believe that the Force Management Functional Capabilities Board's
oversight does not go far enough in providing comprehensive management
oversight for joint seabasing. While the Board is responsible for
leading the joint seabasing capabilities-based assessment and oversees
the sponsor (the Navy) in developing documents, the Board's
responsibilities do not constitute the type of oversight needed to
ensure ongoing or planned service initiatives that may support joint
seabasing are coordinated and complement each other. We continue to
believe that our recommendation has merit and that creation of an
implementation team to provide day-to-day management oversight of joint
seabasing is needed. Therefore, we urge the department to create such a
team now rather than waiting until needed joint seabasing capabilities
are defined.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding
implementing a communications strategy for all joint seabasing
activities in DOD. DOD stated that the JCIDS process, Joint
Capabilities Boards, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
provide for communication between the Joint Staff, all four services,
the combatant commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD). However, as discussed in our report, we found that while the
Joint Staff, all four services, the combatant commands, OSD, and others
participate in the JCIDS process, the information shared is not all
inclusive and it is not always clear who is involved in joint seabasing
and what they are doing. A DOD-wide communication strategy that
provides a framework to effectively manage activities can support the
overall development of joint seabasing by (1) providing better
information for the participants in organizing and planning initiatives
and (2) enabling the participants to minimize redundancy by leveraging
activities being conducted by others. We continue to believe, as we
have recommended, that a communications strategy should be developed
and implemented.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations regarding coordination of
joint seabasing experimentation efforts and development of a joint
experimentation campaign plan. DOD stated that the Joint Staff, with
service, combatant command, and OSD support, is developing a draft
Joint Capabilities Document that recommends a joint seabasing
experimentation plan. However, DOD's comments did not address which
organization would be responsible for developing the experimentation
campaign plan. As we recommended, we continue to believe that the U.S.
Joint Forces Command should be charged with developing and implementing
the joint seabasing experimentation campaign plan. As noted in our
report, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is the DOD executive agent for
joint warfighting experimentation. In this role the command is
responsible for conducting joint experimentation on new warfighting
concepts, disseminating the results of these activities, and
coordinating joint experimentation efforts.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding the U.S.
Joint Forces Command's knowledge management portal. DOD concurs that a
common portal should be established and used by the services. DOD
stated that the U.S. Joint Forces Command's knowledge management portal
is one option that will be considered in order to share joint seabasing
experimentation observations, insights, results, and planned
activities. While we support DOD's plans to establish a knowledge
management portal for joint force projection and sustainment
experimentation, we continue to believe our recommendations merit
action and that DOD should direct the services to use the U.S. Joint
Forces Command's knowledge management portal to share information on
joint seabasing rather than consider it an option.
Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding
development of total ownership costs for joint seabasing options. DOD
stated that once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council defines the
required joint seabasing capabilities, total ownership costs for the
options to satisfy the needed capability gaps will be developed as part
of the DOD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution and
acquisition processes. We support DOD's plans to develop total
ownership costs; however, as our report points out, we do not believe
that these actions alone will sufficiently ensure that total ownership
costs for all joint seabasing options are synchronized. While total
ownership costs will be estimated and synchronized for those options
being developed in DOD's JCIDS process for joint seabasing, the
services are either considering or actively pursuing systems to develop
their own seabasing capabilities. Some of these systems are approaching
major milestone reviews for investment consideration. Requiring that
total ownership cost estimates be developed for only those options
developed in DOD's joint seabasing JCIDS will provide decision makers
with an incomplete picture of all joint seabasing options. Without
ensuring that total ownership cost estimates are developed as we
recommended for both joint seabasing options being developed in JCIDS
and those options being developed by the services, DOD will risk making
investment decisions that may not be the most cost-effective means of
establishing a joint seabasing capability.
DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix
II of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
employed a sound management approach for developing a joint seabasing
capability, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the joint staff, two combatant commands, the four military
services, and the private sector; received briefings from relevant
officials; and reviewed key documents. We compared DOD's approach with
best practices for managing and implementing major efforts. To identify
these best practices, we reviewed our prior work including GAO, Results-
Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations. In the absence of a comprehensive
planning document, we used relevant questions derived from the
identified best practices in interviews with officials and in analyzing
pertinent documents such as the August 2005 Seabasing Joint Integrating
Concept, and instructions and manuals on DOD's Joint Capability
Integration and Development System (JCIDS), including (1) the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005); (2) the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005); and (3)
the Joint Chiefs of Staff White Paper on Conducting a Capabilities-
Based Assessment (CBA) Under the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) (January 2006). We also interviewed
officials involved in the development of the joint seabasing to obtain
information on how involved the services, combatant commands, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in
developing joint seabasing, what their respective roles and
responsibilities were, the level of authority available to direct the
services and combatant commands to participate in the JCIDS analyses,
how information on joint seabasing development efforts and initiatives
was shared, how initiatives that may support joint seabasing were
coordinated, and other issues. In addition, we examined the Seabasing
Working Group Web site to identify what information was being
communicated through the Web site.
To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation campaign plan has
been developed, implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint
seabasing options, we obtained briefings and interviewed officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
U.S. Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, and the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. We also discussed the status
of joint seabasing experimentation efforts and the extent to which they
coordinated with each other in conducting joint seabasing
experimentation. We examined DOD guidance to identify and clarify roles
and responsibilities for leading joint warfighting experimentation. To
identify key aspects for conducting experimentation campaigns, we
reviewed books and publications on experimentation campaigns, including
Code of Best Practice: Campaigns of Experimentation; Code of Best
Practice: Experimentation; Guide for Understanding and Implementing
Defense Experimentation; and The Role of Experimentation in Building
Future Naval Forces. We obtained and reviewed DOD and service reports
and briefings containing the analyses and findings of experimentation
activities. We also attended an Army Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore
exercise demonstrating the unloading and loading of equipment to the
shore when port facilities are inadequate, unavailable, or nonexistent.
To assess the extent to which DOD and the services identified the cost
of joint seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed,
cost-effective decisions, we reviewed official statements, obtained
briefings from, and interviewed officials from, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, Defense Science Board, and Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments. We examined DOD documents and data including,
but not limited to, the President's Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Budget,
the Department of the Navy Ships and Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables,
and the Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction
of Naval Vessels for FY 2007. We assessed the reliability of the data
used through discussions with knowledgeable officials. We determined
that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. We
reviewed statements by the Congressional Budget Office and Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. We also reviewed reports on
seabasing including, but not limited to, Thinking About Seabasing: All
Ahead, Slow by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Sea
Basing by the Defense Science Board, Sea Basing by the Naval Research
Advisory Committee, and Seabasing: Ensuring Joint Force Access From the
Sea by the National Research Council. To identify guidance on cost
estimating and total ownership costs, we reviewed DOD documentation,
including DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System (May 12,
2003), DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System (April 5, 2002), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (May 11, 2005), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (May 11, 2005). We also reviewed our prior work on
cost estimating and total ownership cost.
We conducted our review from February 2006 to October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards at the
following locations:
* Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
- Office of Force Transformation:
- Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation:
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics:
* The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
- Office of Force Structure Resources and Assessment--Studies,
Analysis, and Gaming Division:
* U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia:
- Joint Experimentation Directorate:
- Joint Futures Lab:
* U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois:
* Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
- Office of Expeditionary Warfare:
- Office of Assessments, Seabasing Pillar:
* Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:
* Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island:
* Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia:
* Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island:
* Marine Corps Combatant Development Command, Quantico, Virginia:
- Capabilities Development Directorate, Seabasing Integration Division:
- Operations Analysis Division, Mission Area Analysis Branch:
- Marine Corps Warfighting Lab:
* Offices of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans:
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics:
* Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia:
- Army Capabilities Integration Center:
* Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia:
- Deployment Process Modernization Office:
* Headquarters United States Air Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Air, Space, and Information Operations Plans, and
Requirements, Washington, D.C.
- Concepts, Strategy, and Wargaming Division:
* Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia:
* Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C.
* LMI Government Consulting, McLean, Virginia:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Dec 21 2006:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, "Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit From a
Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation Before
Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities," dated November 21, 2006
(GAO Code 350793/GAO-07-211). The Department's comments on the
recommendations are attached.
The Department partially concurs with recommendations 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
and 7. Recommendation 1 relates to the assignment of leadership and
accountability for joint seabasing development. Recommendation 3
relates to the development and implementation of a communications
strategy to support information sharing for all joint seabasing
activities. Recommendations 4, 5, and 6 relate to U.S. Joint Forces
Command developing, leading and managing a joint seabasing
experimentation plan and associated informAtion sharing plan to further
the development of the joint seabasing concept. Recommendation 7
relates to the development of joint seabasing total ownership cost
estimates for investment decision making activities.
The Department does not concur with recommendation 2, which relates to
the establishment of an overarching implementation team to provide day-
to-day joint seabasing management oversight over the Services,
Combatant Commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others involved in
joint seabasing.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Technical comments were provided separately. For further
questions concerning this report, please contact Darlene Costello,
Deputy Director, Naval Warfare, at (703) 697-2205.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
GAO Draft Report - Dated November 21, 2006 GAO Code 350793/GAO-07-211:
"Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit From a Comprehensive
Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation Before Services Spend
Billions on New Capabilities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
assign clear leadership and accountability for developing a joint
seabasing capability and coordinating supporting initiatives.
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. The
Joint Staff is assigned responsibility to develop the Joint Seabasing
Concept and the resulting capability. There is clear and accountable
leadership established within the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) and Joint Capabilities Board (FCB) to accomplish this
development. The Force Management Functional Capabilities Board under
authority of the JROC is providing the leadership for the Joint
Seabasing Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) and formulation of the
Seabasing Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). The Joint Staff works with
all the Services as part of the on-going CBA and development of the
JCD. The Services are exploring seabasing initiatives to enhance their
current seabasing capability. As these are refined, the Service will
work with the Joint Staff to implement them in updated joint tactics,
training, and procedures. The Joint Staff is using the information and
lessons learned from ongoing efforts to further the Joint Seabasing
Concept.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
establish an overarching, dedicated implementation team to provide day-
to-day management oversight over the Services, Combatant Commands, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint seabasing.
DOD Response: The DoD does not concur with this recommendation. As the
GAO noted, the Joint Seabasing Concept is still being developed within
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The
Department considers it premature to establish additional oversight at
this time. After the Joint Requirements Oversight Council defines the
joint seabasing capabilities needed, then the Department will determine
if additional oversight is necessary to satisfy the requirement. Until
then, the Force Management Joint Capabilities Board (which includes the
Joint Staff, all four Services, the Combatant Commands, and OSD) is
providing the appropriate level of management oversight for development
of the Joint Seabasing Concept.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop and implement a communications strategy to ensure communication
between and among the Services, Combatant Commands, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to provide
information on all joint seabasing activities across DoD.
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. The
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, Joint
Capabilities Boards, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
provide for communication between the Joint Staff, all four Services,
the Combatant Commands, and OSD. All of these organizations are
participating in the current Joint Seabasing Capabilities Based
Assessment. Information is exchanged through the Joint Staff Knowledge
Management and Decision Support Tool and the Joint Staff Decision
Support Environment. These systems will enhance strategic
communications for joint seabasing and other capabilities based
analyses.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead and coordinate joint
seabasing experimentation efforts, under the purview of the joint
seabasing implementation team. U.S. Joint Forces Command should be
responsible for developing and implementing a joint seabasing
experimentation campaign plan to guide the evaluation of joint
seabasing as a capability for force protection and sustainment. Such an
experimentation plan should include the following elements:
* Clear focus and objectives for joint seabasing that encompass near-,
mid-, and long-term experimentation plans;
* A near-term plan for joint seabasing experimentation that includes
events for the next fiscal year, participants, timelines, and resources
that will be used to support the events;
A spectrum of joint experimentation activities that include wargaming,
comprehensive modeling and simulation, live demonstrations, workshops,
symposiums, and analysis;
* A data collection and analysis plan to capture and evaluate results;
and:
* A method for communicating observations, results, upcoming
activities, and feedback across the joint seabasing experimentation
community.
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. The
Joint Staff, with Service, Combatant Command, and OSD support, is
developing a draft Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) that recommends a
joint seabasing experimentation plan to complement and inform the
Capabilities Based Assessment. While the JCD is in draft, the Combatant
Commanders have been working with the Joint Staff to identify clear,
appropriate objectives and timelines for experimentation in this area.
The experimentation will encompass a wide range of joint activities
including wargaming, modeling and simulation, live demonstrations, and
other forums. The Joint Staff is working with the Services, OSD, and
the Combatant Commanders to identify appropriate sponsorship,
participation, data collection, analysis efforts, and feedback
mechanisms as part of the joint experimentation plan.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct that the Services collaborate with the U.S. Joint Forces Command
in developing, implementing, and using the joint seabasing
experimentation campaign plan.
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. The
draft Seabasing Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) recommends the Joint
Staff, in conjunction with the Services, the Combatant Commanders, and
OSD, develop and implement a joint experimentation plan. This JCD, when
approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, will provide the
Department with the appropriate guidance for continuing Joint Seabasing
Concept development, experimentation, and implementation.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct that the Services utilize and contribute to the U.S. Joint
Forces Command's knowledge management portal by providing their
observations, insights, results, and planned activities to the portal
for use by the joint seabasing experimentation community.
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. The
Department concurs that a common portal should be established and used
by the Services. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council will identify
a lead for the seabasing experimentation plan when it approves the
Joint Capabilities Document. The organization that leads the
experimentation effort should identify the common knowledge management
system to be used. The U.S. Joint Forces Command's knowledge management
portal is one option that will be considered in order to share joint
seabasing experimentation observations, insights, results, and planned
activities for use by the joint seabasing community.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the implementation team or other appropriate entity to
synchronize development of total ownership cost estimates for the range
of joint seabasing options so decision makers have sufficient
information to use in making investment decisions on Service seabasing
initiatives.
DOD Response: The DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. Once
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council defines the required joint
seabasing capabilities, total ownership costs for the options to
satisfy the needed capability gaps will be developed as part of the
Department's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) and
DoD 5000 Acquisition processes. Total ownership cost estimates for
proposed solutions will be developed to support all Department
investment decisions. These estimates would be generated for costs that
are new or unique to seabasing capability gaps. The joint seabasing
capability leverages many existing Department assets and programs which
are needed to meet warfighting requirements separate from seabasing.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant
Director; Sarah Baker; Renee Brown; Nicole Harms; Margaret G. Holihan;
Ian Jefferies; Kevin L. O'Neill; Roderick Rodgers, Analyst-in-Charge;
and Rebecca Shea made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Admiral Vern Clark, USN, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint
Capabilities," Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2002).
[2] Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America (Washington, D.C.: March 2005) and Joint Chiefs of
Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America
(Washington, D.C.: 2004).
[3] Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006).
[4] The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Chairman of the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, though the functions of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council chairman are delegated to the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council is the Joint Staff Director for Force
Structure, Resources, & Assessment.
[5] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes
Not Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid, GAO-
06-211 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2006).
[7] Committee on Sea Basing, Naval Studies Board, National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Sea Basing: Ensuring Joint
Force Access From the Sea (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies
Press, 2005).
[8] GAO-03-669.
[9] Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing.
[10] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea
Basing (Washington, D.C.: August 2003).
[11] GAO-03-669.
[12] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea
Basing; Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing.
[13] Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing.
[14] In GAO-06-211, we state that because the Global Information Grid
will comprise a system of interdependent systems, it needs clearly
identified leadership that has the authority to enforce decisions that
cut across organizational lines. The report found that without a
management approach optimized to enforce decisions across the
department, DOD is at risk of continuing to develop and acquire systems
in a stovepiped and uncoordinated manner. The Inspector General's
report, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Joint
Warfighting and Readiness: Management of Network Centric Warfare Within
the Department of Defense, D-2004-091 (Washington, D.C.: June 22,
2004), recommended that DOD formalize roles, responsibilities, and
processes for the overall development, coordination, and oversight of
DOD network-centric warfare efforts to ensure that ongoing or planned
initiatives are properly focused and complement each other. According
to the report, DOD management agreed with the need for leadership
improvements.
[15] Network-centric warfare is collaborative information sharing
linking sensors, decision makers, and shooters, which is intended to
result in increased mission effectiveness.
[16] GAO-03-669.
[17] Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore is a joint logistical operation to
load or unload ships through inadequate or damaged ports or over a bare
beach when facilities are not available or nonexistent. It is a system
of systems involving sealift, shipboard cranes, ramps, and interfaces,
and lighters. The U.S. Transportation Command oversees developmental
and acquisition efforts for this program.
[18] The Mobile Landing Platform is a vessel in the planned Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron that would facilitate at-sea
cargo transfer by partially submerging in water to allow cargo to float
on and off of it. The Mobile Landing Platform will link large roll-on/
roll-off cargo ships to smaller ships.
[19] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Joint
Experimentation (JE) Guidance for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 9, 2006).
[20] Sea Trial is the Navy's process for formulating and testing
innovative operational concepts. At its core is the Sea Trial Concept
Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan, which outlines plans to
rapidly mature concept, technology, and doctrine. Sea Trial supports
Sea Power 21, the Navy's vision for how it will organize, integrate,
and transform itself in the 21st century.
[21] End-to-end modeling involves modeling seabasing throughout the
employment, sustainment, and reconstitution phases.
[22] The Navy Warfare Development Command mission is to focus and
champion Navy warfare innovation, operating concepts, and concept of
operations development in a naval, joint, and coalition environment.
[23] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Joint
Experimentation (JE) Guidance for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 9, 2006).
[24] Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition
System, Section E1.1.4 (May 12, 2003).
[25] CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2005).
[26] According to 10 U.S.C. § 231, the Secretary of Defense is required
to submit with the Defense Budget, an annual long range plan for the
construction of naval vessels. One requirement of this plan is to
include a detailed program for the construction of combatant and
support vessels for Navy over the next 30 fiscal years.
[27] Based on fiscal year 2007 dollars.
[28] The Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
Fiscal Year 2007 assumes the transfer of one steam-powered LHD from the
expeditionary warfare ship force to the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) squadron, which could affect the Marine Corps's lift
requirement of 10 operationally available large-deck aviation-capable
ships.
[29] Congressional Research Service, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues
for Congress (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006).
[30] According to the Naval Research Advisory Committee report Sea
Basing, Maersk Line, Ltd., in a proposal to the Military Sealift
Command, estimated the cost of converting an S-class container ship at
$300 million.
[31] The Logistics Support Vessel carries cargo and equipment
throughout a theater of operations. This vessel can carry up to 2,000
tons of cargo. The Improved Navy Lighterage System enables the transfer
of cargo from strategic sealift ships to barges and ferries so cargo
can be moved to shore in cases where ships are unable to offload at
ports. The system is portable and can be stored on the decks of many
strategic prepositioning ships.
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