Military Personnel
Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges Gao ID: GAO-07-224 January 19, 2007Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of the all volunteer force's greatest challenges. The military services use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military academies, (2) the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers, the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current operational needs and the services' transformation initiatives. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers' foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans.
The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs, the Army's traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1) academy and ROTC shortfalls, (2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army's three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army's ability to meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more deployable, modular units is uncertain. All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers, such as majors, because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. It projects a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually through FY 2013. While the Army is implementing and considering initiatives to improve officer retention, the initiatives are not integrated and will not affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are unfunded. As with its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an integrated strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; but each experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as medical officers. DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. For example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have demanding workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host institutions. The services recognize these impediments and are drafting plans to implement DOD's foreign language objectives.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-224, Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2007:
Military Personnel:
Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and
Retention Challenges:
GAO-07-224:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-224, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current
environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of
the all volunteer force‘s greatest challenges. The military services
use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military
academies, (2) the Reserve Officers‘ Training Corps (ROTC), and (3)
Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers,
the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current
operational needs and the services‘ transformation initiatives.
GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing
and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also
identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services
have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers‘
foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual
accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001,
2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO
reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans.
What GAO Found:
The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for
newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing
enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air
Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession
needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like
flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not
meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to
struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs,
the Army‘s traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and
academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs
by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army
nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1)
academy and ROTC shortfalls,(2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a
need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its
capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and
classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army‘s
three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally
coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using
its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate
resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without
a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession
goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army‘s ability to
meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more
deployable, modular units is uncertain.
All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall
officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily
involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many
retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall
of mid-level officers, such as majors, because it commissioned fewer
officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. It
projects a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually through FY 2013.
While the Army is implementing and considering initiatives to improve
officer retention, the initiatives are not integrated and will not
affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are unfunded. As with
its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an integrated
strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is
most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air
Force generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005;
but each experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as
medical officers.
DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language
proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome
to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior
officers. For example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have
demanding workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host
institutions. The services recognize these impediments and are drafting
plans to implement DOD‘s foreign language objectives.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army develop and implement a strategic plan to
address its emerging officer accession and retention problems. DOD
partially concurred with GAO‘s recommendation.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-224].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
This Report is Temporarily Restricted Pending Official Public Release:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned
Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army Faces Unique Problems with
Future Accessions:
All Services Except Army Generally Met Past Officer Retention Needs,
but All Face Challenges Retaining Certain Officer Groups:
Steps Are Being Taken to Improve the Foreign Language Proficiency of
Junior Officers, but Many Impediments Could Slow Progress:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Army Commissioned Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and
2005, by Commissioning Program:
Table 2: Marine Corps Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005,
by Commissioning Program:
Table 3: Navy Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Table 4: Air Force Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Table 5: Physician Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Table 6: Physician Scholarships Awarded Compared to Service Goals for
Selected Years, by Service:
Table 7: Dentist Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Table 8: Nurse Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Table 9: Percent of Officer Accessions by Race and Ethnicity for Each
Military Service:
Table 10: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Army Commissioned
Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal Years and Key
Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 11: Army's Projected Percentages of Overfilled and Underfilled
Positions for Majors in Specified Specialty Areas in FY 2007:
Table 12: Service-Specific Continuation Pays and Incentives Awarded to
Officers in FY 2005:
Table 13: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Marine Corps
Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal
Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 14: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Navy Commissioned
Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal Years and Key
Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 15: Overall Continuation Rates in Percent for Air Force
Commissioned Officers by Commissioning Program for Selected Fiscal
Years and Key Retention-Related Years in Officers' Careers:
Table 16: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for African-
American and White Officers for Selected Fiscal Years:
Table 17: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent for Hispanic
and Non-Hispanic Officers for Selected Fiscal Years:
Table 18: Service-Specific Continuation Rates in Percent by Gender for
Selected Fiscal Years:
Table 19: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Officer Accessions:
Table 20: Installations and Offices Where GAO Obtained Documentary
Evidence and Officials' Views Pertaining to Officer Retention:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOPMA: Defense Officer Personnel Management Act:
FY: fiscal year:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
OCS: Officer Candidate School:
OTS: Officer Training School:
OUSD (P&R): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel &
Readiness:
ROTC: Reserve Officers' Training Corps:
USAFA: U.S. Air Force Academy:
USMA: U.S. Military Academy:
USNA: U.S. Naval Academy:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 19, 2007:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Ensuring the availability of sufficient numbers of trained, high-
quality personnel in an environment of increasing deployments and armed
conflict may prove to be one of the greatest personnel challenges faced
by the U.S. military since the inception of the all volunteer force in
1973. Unlike the civilian sector, the military recruits, accesses, and
trains all of its own leaders. Therefore, today's policy decisions and
efforts on officer recruiting influence the future availability of
officers. In addition, all of the services must retain sufficient
numbers of experienced, skilled, and qualified officers to meet their
current and future needs.
Before officers can be commissioned at the most junior level,
candidates must complete training programs, some of which take up to 4
years. The military services use three types of programs that award
commissions to officer candidates after they graduate from a program:
(1) military academies, (2) Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC),
and (3) Officer Candidate School (OCS) for the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps or Officer Training School (OTS) for the Air Force.
* Military academies: The U.S. Military Academy (USMA), U.S. Naval
Academy (USNA),[Footnote 1] and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) each run
4-year programs that provide successful candidates with bachelor's
degrees and commissions as military officers. In addition to completing
their academic courses, the approximately 12,000 officer candidates who
attend the academies each year participate in rigorous military
training activities and mandatory athletic activities. In return for
their free education, the graduates must serve on active duty for 5
years after graduation.
* ROTC: The services' ROTC units are located at civilian colleges and
universities throughout the country, with some academic institutions
offering ROTC from more than one service. Currently, Army ROTC is
located at 273 academic institutions, Navy ROTC at 71, and Air Force
ROTC at 144. Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet all
graduation requirements of their academic institutions and complete
required military training to receive commissions as officers, usually
after 4 years. All officers who received Army or Navy ROTC scholarships
and all Air Force officers who graduated from ROTC must typically
commit to 4 years of active duty military service after graduation,
while Army and Navy officers who did not receive ROTC scholarships must
serve 3 years on active duty.
* OCS/OTS: These officer commissioning programs are designed to augment
the services' other commissioning programs. Because these programs
focus only on military training, they are short, ranging from 6 weeks
(Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program) to 14 weeks (Army
OCS). Many, but not all, graduates have prior undergraduate degrees and
are obligated to serve a minimum of 2 years on active duty as officers.
Compared to the other services, the Marine Corps makes more extensive
use of its OCS commissioning program.
The general approach that the services use to meet their accession
needs has been to first depend on the service academy and ROTC program.
When these programs are unable to meet a service's needs for newly
commissioned officers, the service turns to its OCS/OTS program to
bridge the gap. Conversely, during periods of drawdown, all of the
commissioning sources may cut back on their numbers of officer
candidates, but the OCS/OTS program provides the most immediate means
for achieving the downsizing. Unlike the academy and ROTC programs that
take up to 4 years to produce an officer, the OCS/OTS program can
quickly expand or retract. In addition, under Title 10, each service
directly commissions officers with particular professional skills, like
physicians, dentists, nurses, lawyers, and chaplains who do not need to
attend the major commissioning programs.
Since its enactment in 1980, the Defense Officer Personnel Management
Act (DOPMA)[Footnote 2] as codified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code has
provided the basis for the services' officer career management systems.
The original objectives for DOPMA were to "maintain a high-quality,
numerically sufficient officer corps, [that] provided career
opportunities that would attract and retain the numbers of high-caliber
officers needed, [and] provide reasonably consistent career opportunity
among the services."[Footnote 3] While DOPMA and other provisions of
Title 10 outline requirements for managing the officer corps, the
services' manpower and reserve affairs offices use additional types of
data--including historical continuation rates[Footnote 4] and projected
changes in the services' size and missions--to identify officer
accession and retention needs. In addition, the services attempt to
attract an officer corps that reflects the racial and ethnic
composition of the United States. Finally, a new emphasis for officer
training is the focus on foreign language and cultural skills. As
outlined in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and
other Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, the department aims to
develop a broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding,
which it identified as critical in prevailing in the Global War on
Terrorism and meeting 21ST century challenges.
Within the last decade, DOD has experienced both downsizing and
increases in the size of the forces, including officers. During the
1990s, each service decreased its number of officers as the Cold War
came to a close. However, post-September 11, 2001, operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan and assignments to other homeland and global
commitments have placed strains on the all volunteer force. In
recognition of the demands placed on the Army and Marine Corps, which
have provided the majority of forces for recent operations, Congress
increased the authorized end strength of the Army by 30,000 since 2004
and the Marine Corps by more than 7,000 since 2002. While these
services' OCS programs offer a means for increasing the numbers of
newly commissioned officers in a relatively short period to address a
change in end strength, it takes years to grow experienced leaders,
which presents a different officer career management challenge--officer
retention.
We have issued a number of reports that provide policymakers with
information for making informed decisions about the all volunteer
force. For example, in September 2005, we reported on the demographics
of servicemembers in the active and reserve components; and in November
2005, we reported on challenges DOD faces in recruiting and retaining
sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel.[Footnote 5] In response to
your request, this report assesses the extent to which the services are
(1) accessing the numbers and types of commissioned officers required
to meet their needs, and (2) retaining the numbers and types of
officers they need. We also identified steps that DOD and the services
have taken and the impediments that they face as they attempt to
increase foreign language proficiency among junior officers.
We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty DOD services:
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also, we examined actual
accession and continuation rates for fiscal years (FY) 2001, 2003, and
2005 as well as projections for FY 2006, the year when we began our
work, and later years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present
immediately before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and FY
2005 data represented the most recent fiscal year for which the
services had complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on
interim conditions and allowed us to examine the data for trends and
other patterns. To accomplish our work, we reviewed reports, laws, and
DOD-wide and service-specific officer management guidance--including
DOPMA and other provision of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, defense
authorization acts, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and policies
and directives--to gain a comprehensive understanding of officer
recruitment, commissioning, training, and retention. We obtained
documents and met with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD [P&R]), the services'
headquarters, personnel and manpower commands, service academies, ROTC
commands, and OCS/OTS commands to obtain an integrated understanding of
the three officer-related issues that we were asked to evaluate. We
obtained and analyzed accessions and continuation data from DOD's
Defense Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data's
reliability identified incorrect information that was severe enough to
prevent those data from being used for this report.[Footnote 6] As a
result, we subsequently obtained accession and continuation information
from the services. While we did not conduct independent analyses using
the services' databases, our assessment of their data's reliability,
including a review of relevant documentation, and a comparison of
service-provided information to similar information from other sources
and for other time periods. We determined that the service-provided
data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. For our
assessment of officer accessions, we examined information showing the
numbers of officers commissioned from the services' officer programs
during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 for trends and other patterns and
compared the numbers of officers produced to the staffing needs of the
services' occupational specialty areas. We found that the services
determined their accession needs for each general category of specialty
but did not develop a servicewide total accession goal for each year.
Also, we reviewed internal service documents to identify potential
causes and effects of staffing gaps. In our examination of officer
retention, we performed similar analyses of quantitative continuation
information and reviews of documents to identify patterns, gaps, and
potential causes and effects. Our continuation analyses focused on four
key points in officers' careers--years 3, 4, 5, and 10--that service-
retention experts helped us to identify as when retention decisions are
most likely to occur. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD
officials, including representatives at the officer commissioning
programs, and received a wide variety of reports and other documents to
obtain an understanding of efforts to improve foreign language
training. We then used the information to identify challenges the
services face in providing additional training in their officer
commissioning programs. We assessed the reliability of the data we used
and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our report. We conducted our review from September 2005 through
November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I contains more detail on our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for
newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing
enough officers to meet its future needs. Each service must commission
enough junior officers from its major commissioning programs
(academies, ROTC, and OCS/OTS) each year to meet the requirements of
current and future operations while striving to maintain an officer
corps that reflects the racial and ethnic composition of the nation's
population. The Army did not meet its need for newly commissioned
officer in FY 2001 and 2003 because it did not commission enough
officers in its basic branches, or specialty areas, such as infantry
and signal officers. However, the Army did meet its needs in FY 2005.
In contrast, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall
FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but each experienced
challenges accessing specific officer groups, for example, flight
officers. The services have also struggled to access enough physicians,
dentists, and nurses. In addition, the services have been challenged to
access officers of racial and ethnic minorities, particularly African
Americans and Hispanics. Moreover, the Army expects to struggle with
future accessions. The Army's current approach is to first focus on its
ROTC program and academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then
compensate for accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS
accessions. However, the Army has not been accessing enough officers
from ROTC and USMA. Army officials stated that to meet their current
ROTC goal they need at least 31,000 participants in the program, but in
FY 2006 they had 25,100 participants in the program. Fewer Army ROTC
participants may reflect the decrease in Army-awarded scholarships to
officer candidates in recent years, an outcome that Army officials
attribute to budget constraints. Additionally, USMA's class of 2005
commissioned 912 graduates, short of the Army's goal of 950, while the
class of 2006 commissioned 846 graduates, missing its goal of 900
graduates. Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC
program, as well as the Army's need to expand its new officer corps,
have required OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it
commissions. However, OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007,
and resource limitations (such as housing, classroom space, and base
infrastructure) may prevent its further expansion, limiting the
viability of the Army's traditional approach of using OCS to compensate
for shortfalls in the other officer accession programs. In addition,
officer accession programs are decentralized and do not formally
coordinate with one another, preventing the Army from effectively
compensating for the shortfalls in some officer accession programs. For
example, while Army personnel officials attempt to ensure that any
commissioning shortfalls (program outputs) are covered through
alternative commissioning sources such as OCS, the Army does not
coordinate its recruiting efforts (the input to these programs) to
ensure that officer accession programs meet Army needs. The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993[Footnote 7] and the Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 8] provide federal
agencies with a results-oriented framework that includes developing a
strategic plan that incorporates overall goals, risk analysis, and
resource utilization. A strategic plan would give the Army greater
visibility over its decentralized accession programs and improve its
ability to address officer shortfalls. However, the Army has not
developed a strategic plan to manage its shrinking accessions pipeline
at a time when the force is expanding and its needs for commissioned
officers are increasing. Without such a plan, the Army's ability to
meet future mission requirements and achieve its transformation
initiatives is uncertain.
All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall
officer retention needs, but each service encountered retention
challenges for certain specialties and ranks. The Army, which continues
to be heavily involved in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
faces multiple retention challenges, particularly among junior officers
who graduated from its academy or received ROTC scholarships. For
example, USMA's continuation rate in FY 2005 was 62 percent, which was
20 to 30 percentage points lower than the other service academies'
continuation rates for the same fiscal year. Since officers who
received ROTC scholarships are eligible to leave after 4 years of
service and that group represents the largest number of officers
commissioned into the Army, that career point had the lowest or next to
the lowest continuation rate for Army officers in all 3 of the fiscal
years that we examined. Furthermore, the Army is experiencing a
shortfall of mid-level officers because it commissioned fewer officers
10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. While Army
officials told us that the current levels of retention among junior
officers are consistent with historical trends, the Army projections
show that it will have a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually
through FY 2013 because of actions such as recent measures to expand
the size of the Army. These shortages suggest that the Army might have
to retain officers at higher than historical levels to address this
shortfall. Moreover, the Army projects that it will have 83 percent of
the majors that it needs in FY 2007, and likewise, projects that the
positions for majors in 14 Army general specialty areas (termed
branches by the Army) will be filled at 85 percent or less--a level
that the Army terms a critical shortfall. While the Army has identified
steps to improve officer retention, these will have no immediate effect
on retention. For example, the Army has offered new officers their
choice of specialty area in exchange for longer service commitments,
but this incentive does not affect officers who are able to separate.
The Army has not formulated a strategic plan to address retention
issues. However, based on its analysis of a survey of junior officers,
which identified factors that might improve retention, the Army is
considering a menu of incentives to increase retention of junior
captains. Despite those analyses, the Army has not made a final
decision on these incentives and, therefore, has not approved the
approaches or strategies needed to meet its long-term objectives, an
essential element in a strategic plan. While the Army is challenged in
retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met
their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and they often had
higher continuation rates from the academies and ROTC programs.
Although the Navy and Air Force currently have additional flexibilities
in filling positions due to their current downsizing efforts, all
services faced retention challenges within certain officer branches or
communities and ranks. Finally, while the services had high retention
rates for African American and Hispanic officers, they did not do as
well retaining women. For example, overall, the services had lower
continuation rates among female officers when compared with male
officers for the fiscal years and years of service studied.
DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language
proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome
to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior
officers. During the last 2 years, DOD has issued overall guidance to
achieve greater linguistic capabilities and cultural understanding
among officers in documents such as the 2005 Defense Language
Transformation Roadmap. Two of DOD's broad objectives include
developing a recruiting plan for attracting university students with
foreign language skills and requiring that junior officers complete
added language training by 2013. To address DOD's objectives, the
Marine Corps developed a foreign language training plan, while the
other services are still drafting their plans. In addition, the service
academies, among other things, have requested additional funding and
teaching positions to improve foreign language training. However, there
are a number of impediments that could affect progress, including an
already demanding academic workload for academy and ROTC officer
candidates and the ROTC's inability to control curricula at the
colleges and universities that host ROTC units. For example, each
service academy requires its officer candidates to complete at least
137 semester credit hours over 4 years, in contrast to the
approximately 120 credit hours required to graduate from many other
colleges. Also, ROTC programs do not control the languages offered at
the colleges where their officer candidates attend classes and thus
cannot ensure that candidates are offered languages such as Arabic,
Chinese, and Persian Farsi that DOD has deemed critical for national
security. Service officials recognize these impediments and are in the
process of developing their foreign language training plans.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to develop and implement a strategic plan to address
current and projected Army officer accession and retention challenges.
In its review of a draft of our report, DOD partially concurred with
our recommendations. DOD's comments and our evaluation of them are
discussed at the end of the letter.
Background:
For over 30 years, the United States has relied on an all volunteer
force to defend the nation at home and abroad. Before that, the nation
relied on the draft to ensure that it had enough soldiers, sailors,
Marines, and airmen in wartime. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the United States, DOD has launched three major operations
requiring significant numbers of military servicemembers: Operation
Noble Eagle, which covers military operations related to homeland
security; Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing military
operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries; and Operation
Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in Iraq and
the Persian Gulf area. These operations have greatly increased overseas
deployments. Moreover, they are the first long-term major overseas
combat missions since the advent of the all volunteer force in 1973.
To ensure that sufficient forces are available for the services to
accomplish their missions, Congress authorizes an annual year-end
authorized personnel level for each service component. To function
effectively, the services must, among other things, access and retain
officers at appropriate ranks and in the occupational specialties
needed to enable its units to contribute to the services' missions. The
services rely on monetary and nonmonetary incentives, where needed, to
meet their accession and retention needs.
The careers of military officers are governed primarily by Title 10,
which has incorporated the DOPMA legislation, giving the services the
primary authority to recruit, train, and retain officers. Title 10
specifies the active duty and reserve service obligations for officers
who join the military:
* graduates of the service academies must serve a minimum of 5 years on
active duty; and up to an additional 3 years on active duty or in the
reserves;
* ROTC scholarship recipients must serve a minimum of 4 years on active
duty and an additional 4 years on active duty or in the reserves; and:
* other types of officers have varying service obligations (for
example, pilots must serve 6 to 8 years on active duty, depending on
the type of aircraft, and navigators and flight officers must serve 6
years on active duty).
Similarly, Title 10 authorizes the services to directly commission
medical specialists and other professionals to meet their needs.
Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned
Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army Faces Unique Problems with
Future Accessions:
The services generally met most their past needs for newly commissioned
officers;
but the Army faces some unique problems accessing enough officers to
meet its needs and has not developed a strategic plan to address these
challenges. The Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force generally met
their needs for accessing newly commissioned officers in FYs 2001,
2003, and 2005. However, all services experienced problems recruiting
enough medical professionals in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and most had
problems accessing racial and ethnic minorities to diversify their
officer corps.
Services Generally Met Most Overall Accession Needs for Newly
Commissioned Officers But Some Shortfalls Found for Each Service:
Our analysis of documentary evidence confirmed[Footnote 9] the
services' reports that their accession programs generally met their
officer needs in selected recent years, but each experienced some
shortfalls in certain ranks and specialties. The services do not
develop overall yearly goals for the total number of commissioned
officers needed. Instead, they adjust the enrollment in OCS/OTS
throughout the year to meet higher or lower than expected demands for
newly commissioned officers by the various occupational specialty
groups of importance to the service. The Army and the Marine Corps are
increasing their numbers of newly commissioned officers because of
their growing end strengths, whereas the Navy and the Air Force are
accessing fewer officers because they are reducing their end strengths.
The Army did not meet its overall accession needs for newly
commissioned officers in FYs 2001 and 2003, though it met its needs in
2005. The Army has two distinct types of commissioned officers. Most
officers are commissioned in its basic branches or specialty areas,
such as infantry or signal, and are commissioned through major
accession programs. The second type of officers are and those who are
directly commissioned, such as medical professionals. In FY 2001, the
Army needed 4,100 of these officers in its basic branches and instead
it commissioned 3,791, in FY 2003 it needed 4,500 and instead
commissioned 4,433. In FY 2005, it exceed it goal of commissioning
4,600 of and instead accessed 4,654 in it basic branches.
During those years it was increasing the number of commissioned
officers entering the service (see table 1). Specifically, the Army
commissioned 5,540 officers in FY 2001, 5,929 in FY 2003, and 6,045 in
FY 2005. In each of the examined fiscal years, the Army's ROTC program
accounted for around half of all newly commissioned officers, with
nearly 1,000 of those officers being accessed annually into the Army
despite not being awarded a scholarship. The Army increased total
accessions from FY 2001 to FY 2005 by nearly doubling the number of
officers commissioned through OCS.
Table 1: Army Commissioned Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and
2005, by Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy[B]: 930;
ROTC[A]: Scholarship: 2,017;
Nonscholarship: 938;
OCS: 752;
Direct/ other[C]: 903;
Total: 5,540.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy[B]: 878;
ROTC[A]: Scholarship: 2,132;
Nonscholarship: 935;
OCS: 1,060;
Direct/ other[C]: 924;
Total: 5,929.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy[B]: 954;
ROTC[A]: Scholarship: 2,069;
Nonscholarship: 998;
OCS: 1,352;
Direct/ other[C]: 672;
Total: 6,045.
Source: United States Army.
[A] While Army ROTC provides officers to both the active and reserve
components, the information listed here reflects only the officers
commissioned into the active duty Army from ROTC.
[B] This category includes graduates from other service academies, such
as the Merchant Marine and Coast Guard academies, who are commissioned
into the Army.
[C] This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical
professionals, chaplains, and lawyers, as well as interservice
transfers, returns to active duty, and officers whose accession sources
are unknown.
[End of table]
Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from
the commissioning sources found that the Army does not recruit officers
to fill a specific specialty, and instead, officers are placed in
general specialty areas based on the needs of the Army. Some general
specialty areas are more popular than others, and the Army attempts to
match an officer candidate's preference to the needs of the Army.
However, the service's needs prevail, and some officers may be placed
in specialty areas outside of their preferences if shortfalls are
present.
In contrast, the Marine Corps met its overall accession needs for newly
commissioned officers for the examined fiscal years, while increasing
the number of officers it commissioned in FY 2005 (see table 2).
Increasing accessions by 241 from FY 2003 to FY 2005 represents about
an 18 percent increase in the number of newly commissioned officers.
Relative to the other services, the Marine Corps commissioned a larger
percentage of its officers through programs other than the academy or
ROTC program. For example, in FY 2005, 76 percent of the Marine Corps's
newly commissioned officers came from OCS or other sources. However,
the Marine Corps has also been increasing the number of officers
commissioned from USNA. The Marine Corps does not have a separate ROTC
program and instead, commissions officers through the Navy ROTC
program.
Table 2: Marine Corps Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005,
by Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy: 168;
ROTC: Scholarship: 166;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 21;
OCS[A]: 499;
Other[B]: 495;
Total: 1,349.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy: 178;
ROTC: Scholarship: 187;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 10;
OCS[A]: 240;
Other[B]: 705;
Total: 1,320.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy: 213;
ROTC: Scholarship: 148;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 12;
OCS[A]: 460;
Other[B]: 728;
Total: 1,561.
Source: United States Marine Corps.
[A] OCS includes Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program and
Officer Candidate Course.
[B] This category does not include direct commissioned officers in the
Marine Corps, though it does include officers commissioned through the
Marine Corps's Platoon Leader's Class, interservice transfers, returns
to active duty, and officers whose accession sources are unknown. The
Marine Corps does not directly commission officers;
instead, it relies on the Navy to provide it with the types of
professionals--such as chaplains, physicians, dentists, and nurses--who
receive direct commissions.
[End of table]
Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from
the commissioning sources and Marine Corps headquarters identified some
areas where the Marine Corps was challenged to access newly
commissioned officers for some occupational specialties. While the
Marine Corps officials stated that they were challenged in accessing
enough naval flight officers because officer candidates were not
familiar with the position (which involves assisting pilots with
aircraft and weapons systems), the service still recruited the number
it needed based upon our examination of the data.
The Navy also reported meeting its overall needs for commissioned
officers during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. Since FY 2001, the total
number of newly commissioned officers decreased from 4,784 to 3,506, a
decline of nearly 27 percent (see table 3). A large portion of that
decrease was accomplished by reducing the number of officers being
commissioned through OCS, the program that can most easily and quickly
be altered to reflect changing demands for producing commissioned
officers.
Table 3: Navy Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy: 760;
ROTC: Scholarship: 670;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 217;
OCS: 1,281;
Direct/other[A]: 1,856;
Total: 4,784.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy: 812;
ROTC: Scholarship: 841;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 73;
OCS: 1,018;
Direct/other[A]: 1,295;
Total: 4,039.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy: 749;
ROTC: Scholarship: 756;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 69;
OCS: 586;
Direct/other[A]: 1,346;
Total: 3,506.
Source: United States Navy.
[A] This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical
professionals, interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and
officers whose accession sources are unknown.
[End of table]
Despite generally meeting its overall accession needs for newly
commissioned officers, the Navy experienced accession challenges in
some specialty areas. Our independent review and analysis of data and
other materials from the commissioning sources, Navy headquarters, and
accession programs identified some areas where there were gaps between
the numbers of newly commissioned officers needed and the numbers
supplied to specialties by some of the commissioning programs. For
example, USNA did not meet its quota for submarine officers in FY 2005,
but other commissioning programs were able to compensate for the
shortfall. Like the Marine Corps, the Navy faced a challenge in
accessing enough naval flight officers, but the Navy met its overall
need for newly commissioned officers by shifting the number of officers
sent to that specialty by some commissioning sources. For example, Navy
ROTC met its goal for naval flight officers in FY 2005 but not FY 2001
and FY 2003. The Navy's OCS made up the difference in those years.
According to Navy officials, some officers who may previously have gone
into this specialty because of poor eyesight have their vision
surgically corrected and instead become pilots.
Like the Marine Corps and the Navy, the Air Force generally met its
overall officer accession needs for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. As with
the Navy, the Air Force decreased the number of newly commissioned
officers in FY 2005 (see table 4). Specifically, the Air Force
commissioned over 1,000 fewer officers in FY 2005 than it did in FY
2003, and it is working toward a plan to have about 9,000 fewer
officers servicewide by FY 2011. The recent decrease in the number of
newly commissioned Air Force officers was largely accomplished by
commissioning fewer officers from OTS. Overall, the Air Force relied on
its ROTC scholarship program for most of its officers and provided
scholarships for the vast majority of the ROTC officer candidates.
Table 4: Air Force Officer Accessions in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, by
Commissioning Program:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Academy: 890;
ROTC: Scholarship: [B];
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 281;
OTS: 1,628;
Direct/other[A]: 2,473;
Total: 5,922.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Academy: 996;
ROTC: Scholarship: 2,211;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 159;
OTS: 1,593;
Direct/other[A]: 1,150;
Total: 6,109.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Academy: 918;
ROTC: Scholarship: 2,330;
ROTC: Nonscholarship: 61;
OTS: 790;
Direct/other[A]: 891;
Total: 4,990.
Source: United States Air Force.
[A] This category includes direct commissioned officers such as medical
professionals, interservice transfers, returns to active duty, and
officers whose accession sources are unknown.
[B] Air Force officials stated that the original data provided to GAO
for this year did not reflect the actual commission rates for ROTC and
have asked that we not use this data.
[End of table]
Despite meeting its overall needs for newly commissioned officers, the
Air Force encountered challenges in some specialties. Our analyses and
discussions with Air Force accessions officials identified air battle
manager as an area where the Air Force has been challenged. USAFA
expected to provide the Air Force with 10 air battle managers in FY
2005, but instead, three USAFA graduates became air battle managers.
The other seven positions were filled by Air Force ROTC.
All Services Had Problems Accessing Officers for Medical Occupations:
All of the services have experienced problems accessing enough medical
professionals, including physicians, medical students, dentists, and
nurses. The Army, Navy (which supplies the Marine Corps), and Air Force
provide direct commissions to medical professionals entering the
service.
Physicians. All of the services had difficulties meeting their
accession needs for physicians (see table 5) in at least 2 of the 3
fiscal years that we examined. The Army and the Navy achieved 91 or
more percent of their goals in each year studied, while the Air Force
achieved 47 to 65 percent of its goal during the same 3 years. For each
year, the Air Force had a higher goal than the other two services but
accessed fewer physicians.
Table 5: Physician Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Army: Goal: 391;
Army: Accessed: 376;
Army: Percent of goal: 96;
Navy[A]: Goal: 391;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 395;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 101;
Air Force: Goal: 547;
Air Force: Accessed: 313;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 57.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Army: Goal: 389;
Army: Accessed: 355;
Army: Percent of goal: 91;
Navy[A]: Goal: 354;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 338;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 96;
Air Force: Goal: 663;
Air Force: Accessed: 313;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 47.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Army: Goal: 419;
Army: Accessed: 416;
Army: Percent of goal: 99;
Navy[A]: 317;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 295;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 93;
Air Force: 429;
Air Force: Accessed: 280;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 65.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
Our review of the numbers of medical students participating in the
services' Health Professions Scholarship Program showed that additional
physician-accession problems may appear in future years (see table 6).
The services set their goals for awarding the scholarships based on
their needs for fully trained medical professionals in the future. A
medical student who accepts a scholarship will be commissioned into a
military service upon completion of graduate school. While each service
awarded scholarships to a sufficient number of the medical students who
began their 4-year training in FY 2003 and will be ready for an officer
commission upon graduation in FY 2007, the Army and Navy did not
achieve their goals for awarding scholarships in FY 2005, and they may
not access enough physicians in FY 2009.
Table 6: Physician Scholarships Awarded Compared to Service Goals for
Selected Years, by Service:
Fiscal year training began: 2001;
Army: Goal: 270;
Army: Accessed: 271;
Army: Percent of goal: 100;
Navy[A]: Goal: 300;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 300;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 100;
Air Force: Goal: 226;
Air Force: Accessed: 247;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 109.
Fiscal year training began: 2003;
Army: Goal: 284;
Army: Accessed: 319;
Army: Percent of goal: 112;
Navy[A]: Goal: 290;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 289;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 100;
Air Force: Goal: 201;
Air Force: Accessed: 225;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 112.
Fiscal year training began: 2005;
Army: Goal: 307;
Army: Accessed: 237;
Army: Percent of goal: 77;
Navy[A]: Goal: 291;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 162;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 56;
Air Force: Goal: 191;
Air Force: Accessed: 224;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 117.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
Dentists. Similar to the situation with physicians, the services have
been challenged to access enough dentists in recent years (see table
7). No service met its goals for recruiting dentists in FYs 2001, 2003,
or 2005. Both the Army and the Air Force, however, accessed more
dentists in FY 2005 than they had 2 years before, and the Air Force
showed improvement in FY 2005 over their FY 2003 accessions.
Table 7: Dentist Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Fiscal year accessed: 2001;
Army: Goal: 120;
Army: Accessed: 101;
Army: Percent of goal: 84;
Navy[A]: Goal: 147;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 120;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 82;
Air Force: Goal: 188;
Air Force: Accessed: 97;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 52.
Fiscal year accessed: 2003;
Army: Goal: 107;
Army: Accessed: 98;
Army: Percent of goal: 92;
Navy[A]: Goal: 145;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 103;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 71;
Air Force: Goal: 184;
Air Force: Accessed: 123;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 67.
Fiscal year accessed: 2005;
Army: Goal: 125;
Army: Accessed: 105;
Army: Percent of goal: 84;
Navy[A]: Goal: 90;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 81;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 90;
Air Force: Goal: 204;
Air Force: Accessed: 142;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 70.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
Nurses. All of the services have struggled to access enough nurses (see
table 8). Although the Navy exceeded its goal for accessing nurses in
2001, no service achieved its goal for any other period. In FY 2005,
the services accessed a total of 738 of the 975 nurses (about 76
percent) that they needed.
Table 8: Nurse Accession Goals and Actual Accessions for Selected
Years, by Service:
Fiscal year Accessed: 2001;
Army: Goal: 333;
Army: Accessed: 288;
Army: Percent of goal: 86;
Navy[A]: Goal: 256;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 274;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 107;
Air Force: Goal: 349;
Air Force: Accessed: 228;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 65.
Fiscal year Accessed: 2003;
Army: Goal: 373;
Army: Accessed: 323;
Army: Percent of goal: 87;
Navy[A]: Goal: 235;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 218;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 93;
Air Force: Goal: 366;
Air Force: Accessed: 265;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 72.
Fiscal year Accessed: 2005;
Army: Goal: 375;
Army: Accessed: 312;
Army: Percent of goal: 83;
Navy[A]: Goal: 243;
Navy[A]: Accessed: 223;
Navy[A]: Percent of goal: 92;
Air Force: Goal: 357;
Air Force: Accessed: 203;
Air Force: Percent of goal: 57.
Source: GAO analysis of data from services' medical personnel offices.
[A] The Navy provides medical personnel for both the Navy and Marine
Corps.
[End of table]
While some service officials have stated that medical professional
recruiting is challenging because of concerns over overseas
deployments, other service officials told us that it is also affected
by the lack of income parity compared to the civilian sector. As part
of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Congress approved an increase in the recruiting bonus for fully
trained physicians and dentists, allowed the services to detail
commissioned officers to attend medical school, extended the authority
for undergraduate student loan repayment for medical professionals,
increased the financial benefits student may receive as part of the
Health Professions Scholarship Program, and required the services to
report to Congress on this program and their success in meeting the
scholarship program's goals.[Footnote 10] Another step that DOD has
taken to reduce the medical professional shortfalls is to convert
uniformed medical positions to positions occupied by civilian medical
professionals.[Footnote 11] In addition, DOD is considering asking for
legislative authority to shorten the service commitment for medical
professionals from the required 8 years of service on active or reserve
duty, to encourage more medical professionals to join the military.
However, these efforts have not yet been funded and their effect on
medical recruiting is uncertain.
All Services Had Problems Accessing Newly Commissioned Officers from
Some Racial and Ethnic Groups:
All services had problems accessing newly commissioned minority
officers to meet DOD's goal of maintaining a racially and ethnically
diverse officer corps.[Footnote 12] For every service, African
Americans were a smaller percentage--by either 1 or 2 percentage
points--of the accessed officers in FY 2005 than they were in FY 2003,
but the representation of Asians/Pacific Islanders increased between
the same two periods for every service except the Navy (see table 9).
As points of comparison, we noted in a September 2005 report[Footnote
13] that the representation of African Americans in the officer corps
DOD-wide was about 9 percent, as was the representation of African
Americans in the college-educated workforce. Therefore, the percentages
shown in the table indicate that only the Army met or exceeded the
African-American DOD-wide and college-educated-workforce representation
levels.
Table 9: Percent of Officer Accessions by Race and Ethnicity for Each
Military Service:
Army;
Services, by FY: 2001;
Race: White: 76;
Race: African American: 13;
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander: 4;
Race: American Indian/Alaskan Native:
