Military Personnel
DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link between Its Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements Gao ID: GAO-07-397T January 30, 2007The war in Iraq along with other overseas operations have led to significant stress on U.S. ground forces and raised questions about whether those forces are appropriately sized and structured. In 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with GAO's recommendation that it review military personnel requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) concluded in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the number of active personnel in the Army and Marine Corps should not change. However, the Secretary of Defense recently announced plans to increase these services' active end strength by 92,000 troops. Given the long-term costs associated with this increase, it is important that Congress understand how DOD determines military personnel requirements and the extent of its analysis. GAO has issued a number of reports on DOD's force structure and the impact of ongoing operations on military personnel, equipment, training, and related funding. This statement, which draws on that prior work, focuses on (1) the processes and analyses OSD and the services use to assess force structure and military personnel levels; (2) the extent to which the services' requirements analyses reflect new demands as a result of the changed security environment; and (3) the extent of information DOD has provided to Congress to support requests for military personnel.
Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of complex and interrelated analyses. Decisions reached by OSD during the QDR and the budget process about planning scenarios, required combat forces, and military personnel levels set the parameters within which the services can determine their own requirements for units and allocate military positions. Using OSD guidance and scenarios, the Army's most recent biennial analysis, completed in 2006, indicated that the Army's total requirements and available end strength were about equal. The Marine Corps' most recent assessment led to an adjustment in the composition and mix of its units. Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that may not have been fully reflected in OSD guidance, the QDR, or in recent service analyses. First, the Army's analysis did not fully consider the impact of converting from a division-based force to modular units, partly because modular units are a new concept and partly because the Army made some optimistic assumptions about its ability to achieve efficiencies and staff modular units within the QDR-directed active military personnel level of 482,400. Second, the Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time to support worldwide operations. However, the Army's global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future. The Marine Corps' analyses reflected some new missions resulting from the new security environment. However, the Commandant initiated a new study following the 2006 QDR partly to assess the impact of requirements for a Special Operation Command. Prior GAO work has shown that DOD has not provided a clear and transparent basis for military personnel requests that demonstrates how they are linked to the defense strategy. GAO believes it will become increasingly important to demonstrate a clear linkage as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation and DOD attempts to balance competing priorities for resources. In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide answers to the following questions: What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition? What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how does DOD plan to fund this increase? Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new equipment?
GAO-07-397T, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link between Its Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Tuesday, January 30, 2007:
Military Personnel:
DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link between Its Defense Strategy and
Military Personnel Requirements:
Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-07-397T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-397T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The war in Iraq along with other overseas operations have led to
significant stress on U.S. ground forces and raised questions about
whether those forces are appropriately sized and structured. In 2005,
the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with GAO‘s recommendation that
it review military personnel requirements. The Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) concluded in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
that the number of active personnel in the Army and Marine Corps should
not change. However, the Secretary of Defense recently announced plans
to increase these services‘ active end strength by 92,000 troops. Given
the long-term costs associated with this increase, it is important that
Congress understand how DOD determines military personnel requirements
and the extent of its analysis.
GAO has issued a number of reports on DOD‘s force structure and the
impact of ongoing operations on military personnel, equipment,
training, and related funding. This statement, which draws on that
prior work, focuses on (1) the processes and analyses OSD and the
services use to assess force structure and military personnel levels;
(2) the extent to which the services‘ requirements analyses reflect new
demands as a result of the changed security environment; and (3) the
extent of information DOD has provided to Congress to support requests
for military personnel.
What GAO Found:
Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force
structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of
complex and interrelated analyses. Decisions reached by OSD during the
QDR and the budget process about planning scenarios, required combat
forces, and military personnel levels set the parameters within which
the services can determine their own requirements for units and
allocate military positions. Using OSD guidance and scenarios, the
Army‘s most recent biennial analysis, completed in 2006, indicated that
the Army‘s total requirements and available end strength were about
equal. The Marine Corps‘ most recent assessment led to an adjustment in
the composition and mix of its units.
Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that
may not have been fully reflected in OSD guidance, the QDR, or in
recent service analyses. First, the Army‘s analysis did not fully
consider the impact of converting from a division-based force to
modular units, partly because modular units are a new concept and
partly because the Army made some optimistic assumptions about its
ability to achieve efficiencies and staff modular units within the QDR-
directed active military personnel level of 482,400. Second, the Army‘s
analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19
brigades at any one time to support worldwide operations. However, the
Army‘s global operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades
and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the
foreseeable future. The Marine Corps‘ analyses reflected some new
missions resulting from the new security environment. However, the
Commandant initiated a new study following the 2006 QDR partly to
assess the impact of requirements for a Special Operation Command.
Prior GAO work has shown that DOD has not provided a clear and
transparent basis for military personnel requests that demonstrates how
they are linked to the defense strategy. GAO believes it will become
increasingly important to demonstrate a clear linkage as Congress
confronts looming fiscal challenges facing the nation and DOD attempts
to balance competing priorities for resources. In evaluating DOD‘s
proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps personnel
levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should carefully weigh
the long-term costs and benefits. To help illuminate the basis for its
request, DOD will need to provide answers to the following questions:
What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases
are linked to the defense strategy? How will the additional personnel
be allocated to combat units, support forces, and institutional
personnel, for functions such as training and acquisition? What are the
initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the force and how
does DOD plan to fund this increase? Do the services have detailed
implementation plans to manage potential challenges such as recruiting
additional personnel, providing facilities, and procuring new
equipment?
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-397T].
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or
stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's
(DOD) processes for determining force structure and military personnel
requirements for the Army and Marine Corps. The war in Iraq, along with
continuing operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world, have
led to significant stress on U.S. ground forces and have raised
questions about whether they are appropriately sized and structured to
meet the demands of the new security environment. Units are being
tasked to stay in theater longer than anticipated, and some personnel
are now embarking on their third overseas deployment since 2001.
Although the department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
concluded that the Army and Marine Corps should plan to stabilize at a
level of 482,400 and 175,000 active military personnel respectively,
the Secretary of Defense recently announced plans to permanently
increase the size of the active Army and Marine Corps by a total of
92,000 troops over the next 5 years. Given the significant long-term
costs associated with such an increase, it is important to understand
how DOD determines military personnel requirements and the extent to
which requirements are based on rigorous analysis. As our prior work
has shown, valid and reliable data about the number of personnel
required to meet an agency's needs are critical because human capital
shortfalls can threaten an organization's ability to perform missions
efficiently and effectively. This is particularly true for the DOD,
where the lack of rigorous analysis of requirements could have
significant consequences for military personnel called upon to execute
military missions or, alternatively, could lead to inefficiencies in
allocating funds within the defense budget.
My testimony today will focus on three issues: (1) the processes and
analyses used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the
Army and Marine Corps to assess force structure and military personnel
levels; (2) the extent to which the services' recently completed
requirements analyses reflect new demands resulting from the changed
security environment; and (3) the extent of information provided to
Congress to support the department's requests for military personnel.
In light of the recent proposal to permanently increase the size of the
Army and Marine Corps, my comments will focus largely on requirements
for active personnel, although the service requirements process I will
be discussing apply to both the active and reserve components, and our
prior work has shown that ongoing operations have taken a toll on the
reserve components as well. A congressionally-mandated commission has
been tasked to conduct a comprehensive examination of how the National
Guard and Reserve are used in national defense. This commission's work
is still ongoing.
My testimony today is based primarily on our past work on Army and
Marine Corps force structure and military personnel issues as well as
our work on human capital and military personnel issues defensewide. A
list of our past reports can be found in the Related GAO Products
section at the end of this statement. We updated some of our
information during recent discussions with Army and Marine Corps
officials. To obtain these updates we interviewed officials and
obtained documents from Headquarters, Department of the Army; the U.S.
Army Center for Army Analysis; Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and
Reserve Affairs; and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. To
assess the processes and analyses used by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Army and Marine Corps to assess force structure and
military personnel levels, we relied on our past reports on these
subjects, as well as updated information from Total Army Analysis 08-13
and Marine Corps force structure plans from the sources noted. To
assess the extent to which the services' recently completed
requirements analyses reflect new demands resulting from the changed
security environment, we relied on our past work, DOD's February 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review report, the Secretary of Defense's
congressional testimony announcing his proposal to increase Army and
Marine Corps force levels, and Total Army Analysis 08-13 and Marine
Corps force structure plans. To assess the extent of information
provided to Congress to support the department's requests for military
personnel, we relied on our past reporting on human capital and end
strength issues.
Summary:
Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force
structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of
complex and interrelated processes and analyses--rather than one
clearly documented process. Decisions reached by OSD in the QDR, and in
budget and planning guidance, often set the parameters within which the
services can determine their own force structure requirements and
allocate military personnel to meet operational and institutional
needs. For example, the 2006 QDR determined that the Army would have 42
active combat brigades and 482,400 active military personnel, and these
numbers are a "given" in the Army's biennial force structure analysis.
A major purpose of the Army's biennial analysis is to determine the
number and types of support forces, such as transportation companies
and military police units, to support combat forces. Also, if total
support force requirements exceed available military personnel levels
approved by OSD, the process helps the Army determine where to accept
risk. The Army's most recent biennial force structure analysis
indicated that its total requirements and available military personnel
levels (for all components) were about equal, although the Army decided
to reallocate many positions to create more high-demand units, such as
military police, and reduce numbers of lesser needed units. Similarly,
the Marine Corps uses a number of modeling, simulation, and other
analytical tools to identify gaps in its capabilities to perform its
missions, to identify the personnel and skills needed to provide the
capabilities using professional judgment, and to assess where to accept
risk. The Marine Corps has also made changes to the composition and mix
of its units as a result of its analyses.
Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that
may not have been fully reflected in the 2006 QDR or in recent service
analyses that were based on OSD guidance. These analyses predate the
Secretary of Defense's recent announcement to increase Army and Marine
Corps forces by 92,000. However, some of this work, and our own
assessments, are only months old and should provide a useful baseline
for helping the committee understand what has changed since the 2006
QDR and service analyses were completed. First, the Army's most recent
analysis did not fully consider the impact of converting from a
division-based force to modular brigades. The Army's recent analysis
recognized that modular units would require greater numbers of combat
forces than its prior division-based force and assumed this could be
accomplished by reducing military positions in the Army's institutional
forces, such as its command headquarters and training base, rather than
increasing the size of the active force. In September 2006, we
questioned whether the Army could reduce sufficient numbers of military
positions in the institutional force and meet all of its modular force
requirements with the QDR-directed active end strength of 482,400.
Second, the Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to
provide 18 to 19 brigades at any one time (including 14 active and 4 to
5 National Guard brigades) to support worldwide operations. However,
the Army's global operational demand for forces is currently 23
brigades and Army officials believe this demand will continue for the
foreseeable future. The Marine Corps is also supporting a high pace of
operations that may not have been fully reflected in its recent
analyses. For example, the 2006 QDR directed the Marine Corps to stand
up a Special Operations Command requiring about 2,600 military
personnel, but did not increase the size of the Marine Corps to reflect
this new requirement. The Marines also are experiencing a higher
operational tempo than anticipated and standing up specialized units to
train Iraqi forces, which may not have been fully envisioned in their
earlier analyses.
Our past work has also shown that DOD has not provided a clear and
transparent basis for its military personnel requests to Congress that
demonstrates how these requests are linked to the defense strategy. We
believe that it will become increasingly important to demonstrate a
clear linkage as Congress confronts looming fiscal challenges facing
the nation and DOD attempts to balance competing priorities for
resources in personnel, operations, and investments accounts. DOD's
February QDR 2006 report did not provide much insight into the basis
for its conclusion that the size of today's forces is appropriate to
meet current and projected operational demands. Further, the Marine
Corps' decision to initiate a new study to assess its active military
requirements shortly after the QDR report was issued is an indication
that the QDR did not achieve consensus on required military personnel
levels. In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active
Army and Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years,
Congress should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. While
the Army and Marine Corps are currently experiencing a high operating
tempo, increasing personnel levels will entail billions of dollars for
both start-up and recurring costs, not just for the personnel added to
the force, but for related equipment and training. Given the
significant implications of this request, DOD should be prepared to
fully explain and document the basis for the proposed increases and how
the additional positions will be used. To help illuminate the basis for
DOD's request, Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to answer
the following questions: What analysis has been done to demonstrate how
the proposed increases are linked to the defense strategy? How will the
additional personnel be allocated to combat units, support forces, and
institutional personnel, for functions such as training and
acquisition? What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the
size of the force and how does DOD plan to fund this increase? Do the
services have detailed implementation plans to manage potential
challenges, such as recruiting additional personnel, providing
facilities, and procuring new equipment? Our prior work on recruiting
and retention challenges, along with our prior reports on challenges in
equipping modular units, identify some potential challenges that could
arise in implementing an increase in the size of the Army and Marine
Corps at a time when the services are supporting ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Background:
The 2005 National Defense Strategy provided the strategic foundation
for the 2006 QDR and identified an array of traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive challenges that threaten U.S. interests.
To operationalize the defense strategy, the 2006 QDR identified four
priority areas for further examination: defeating terrorist networks,
defending the homeland, shaping the choices of countries at strategic
crossroads, and preventing hostile state and non-state actors from
acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. These areas illustrated
the types of capabilities and forces needed to address the challenges
identified in the defense strategy and helped DOD to assess that
strategy and review its force planning construct. Changes in the
security environment and the force planning construct may require DOD
and the services to reassess force structure requirements--how many
units and of what type are needed to carry out the national defense
strategy. Likewise, changing force structure requirements may create a
need to reassess active end strength---the number of military personnel
annually authorized by Congress which each service can have at the end
of a given fiscal year.
The services allocate their congressionally authorized end strength
among operational force requirements (e.g., combat and support force
units), institutional requirements, and requirements for personnel who
are temporarily unavailable for assignment. Operational forces are the
forces the services provide to combatant commanders to meet mission
requirements, such as ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Institutional forces include command headquarters, doctrine writers,
and a cadre of acquisition personnel, which are needed to prepare
forces for combat operations. Personnel who are temporarily unavailable
for assignment include transients, transfers, holdees, and students.
The Secretary of Defense's recent proposal to permanently increase the
size of the Army and Marine Corps represents a significant shift in
DOD's plans, as reflected in the 2006 QDR. In fiscal year 2004, the
Army's authorized end strength was 482,400 active military personnel.
Since that time, the Army has been granted authority to increase its
end strength by 30,000 in order to provide flexibility to implement its
transformation to a modular force while continuing to deploy forces to
overseas operations. Rather than return the Army to the 482,400 level
by fiscal year 2011, as decided in the 2006 QDR, DOD's new proposal
would increase the Army's permanent end strength level to 547,000 over
a period of 5 years. DOD's plans for Marine Corps end strength have
also changed. In fiscal year 2004, the Marine Corps' was authorized to
have 175,000 active military personnel. For the current fiscal year,
Marine Corps end strength was authorized at 180,000, although DOD's
2006 QDR planned to stabilize the Marine Corps at the 175,000 level by
fiscal year 2011. The Secretary's new proposal would increase permanent
Marine Corps end strength to a level of 202,000 over the next 5 years.
In terms of funding, DOD is currently authorized to pay for end
strength above 482,400 and 175,000 for the Army and Marine Corps,
respectively, with emergency contingency reserve funds or from
supplemental funds used to finance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Until Congress receives the President's budget request, it is unclear
how DOD plans to fund the proposed increases.
In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure
itself from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force--an
undertaking it considers the most extensive reorganization of its force
since World War II. This initiative, according to Army estimates, will
require an investment exceeding $52 billion through fiscal year 2011.
The foundation of the modular force is the creation of standardized
modular combat brigades in both the active component and National
Guard. The new modular brigades are designed to be self-sufficient
units that are more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint
and expeditionary operations than their larger division-based
predecessors. The Army planned to achieve its modular restructuring
without permanently increasing its active component end strength above
482,400, in accordance with a decision reached during the 2006 QDR. The
February 2006 QDR also specified that the Army would create 70 active
modular combat brigades in its active component and National Guard.
According to the Army, the modular force will enable it to generate
both active and reserve component forces in a rotational manner. To do
this, the Army is developing plans for a force rotation model in which
units will rotate through a structured progression of increased unit
readiness over time. For example, the Army's plan is for active service
members to be at home for 2 years following each deployment of up to 1
year.
Determination of Force Structure and Military Personnel Requirements Is
A Complex Process Involving Both OSD And The Services:
Both OSD and the military services play key roles in determining force
structure and military personnel requirements and rely on a number of
complex and interrelated process and analyses--rather than on one
clearly documented process. Decisions made by OSD can have a ripple
effect on the analyses that are conducted at the service level, as I
will explain later.
OSD is responsible for the QDR--the official strategic plan of DOD--and
provides policy and budget guidance to the services on the number of
active personnel. The QDR determines the size of each services'
operational combat forces based on an analysis of the forces needed to
meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy. For example,
the 2006 QDR specified the Army's operational force structure would
include 42 active Brigade Combat Teams and that the Army should plan
for an active force totaling 482,400 personnel by fiscal year 2011. The
QDR also directed the Marine Corps to add a Special Operations Command
and plan for an active force totaling 175,000 military personnel by
fiscal year 2011.
In order to provide a military perspective on the decisions reached in
the QDR, Congress required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
conduct an assessment of the review including an assessment of risk. In
his assessment of the 2006 QDR, the Chairman concluded that the Armed
Forces of the United States stood "fully capable of accomplishing all
the objectives of the National Defense Strategy." In his risk
assessment, he noted that the review had carefully balanced those areas
where risk might best be taken in order to provide the needed resources
for areas requiring new or additional investment.
Another area where the Office of the Secretary of Defense plays an
important role is in developing various planning scenarios that
describe the type of missions the services may face in the future.
These scenarios are included in planning guidance that the Office of
the Secretary of Defense provides the services to assist them in making
more specific decisions on how to allocate their resources to
accomplish the national defense strategy. For example, these scenarios
would include major combat operations, stability operations, domestic
support operations, and humanitarian assistance operations.
GAO examined whether DOD had established a solid foundation for
determining military personnel requirements. While we are currently
reviewing the plans and analyses of the 2006 QDR, our February 2005
assessment of DOD's processes identified several concerns that, if left
uncorrected, could have hampered DOD's QDR analysis.[Footnote 1] First,
we found that DOD had not conducted a comprehensive, data-driven
analysis to assess the number of active personnel needed to implement
the defense strategy. Second, OSD does not specifically review the
services' requirements processes to ensure that decisions about
personnel levels are linked to the defense strategy. Last, a key reason
why OSD had not conducted a comprehensive analysis was that it has
sought to limit personnel costs to fund competing priorities such as
transformation.
The Army Has a Biennial Process to Assess Force Structure and Allocate
Military Personnel Positions to Units:
The Army uses a biennial, scenario-based requirements process to
estimate the number and types of operational and institutional forces
needed to execute Army missions. This process involves first
determining the number and type of forces needed to execute the
National Military Strategy based on OSD guidance, comparing this
requirement with the Army's present force structure, and finally
reallocating military positions to minimize the risks associated with
any identified shortfalls. Taken together, this process is known as
"Total Army Analysis." The Army has conducted this analysis for many
years and has a good track record for updating and improving its
modeling, assumptions, and related processes over time, as we noted in
our last detailed analysis of the Army's process.[Footnote 2] Active
and reserve forces are included in this analysis in order to provide a
total look at Army requirements and the total end strength available to
resource those requirements. Also, the number of combat brigades is
specified by OSD in the QDR and is essentially a "given" in the Army's
requirements process. The Army's process is primarily intended to
assess the support force structure needed to meet the requirements of
the planning scenarios, and to provide senior leadership a basis for
better balancing the force.
In the first phase of the Army's requirements determination process,
the Army uses several models, such as a model to simulate warfights
using the scenarios provided by OSD and the number of brigades OSD
plans to use in each scenario. The outcomes of the warfighting analyses
are used in further modeling to generate the number and specific types
of units the Army would need to support its brigade combat teams. For
example, for a prolonged major war, the Army needs more truck companies
to deliver supplies and fuel to front line units. For other types of
contingencies, the Army may use historical experience for similar
operations to determine requirements since models are not available for
all contingencies. The Army also examines requirements for the Army's
institutional force, such as the Army's training base, in order to
obtain a total bottom line requirement for all the Army's missions.
In the second phase of the Army's process--known as the "resourcing
phase"--the Army makes decisions on how to best allocate the active and
reserve military personnel levels established by OSD against these
requirements. In order to provide the best match, the Army will develop
a detailed plan to eliminate lower priority units, and stand up new
units it believes are essential to address capability gaps and meet
future mission needs. For example, in recent years, the Army has made
an effort to increase units needed for military police, civil affairs,
engineers, and special operations forces. These decisions are
implemented over the multiple years contained in DOD's Future Years
Defense Program. For example, the intent of the Army's most recent
analysis was used to help develop the Army's budget plans for fiscal
years 2008-2013.
Historically, the Army has had some mismatches between the requirements
it estimated and its available military personnel levels. When
shortfalls exist, the Army has chosen to fully resource its active
combat brigades and accept risk among it support units, many of which
are in the reserve component.
The Marine Corps Conducts a Variety of Analyses to Assess Force
Structure and Military Personnel Requirements:
The Marine Corps uses a number of modeling, simulations, spreadsheet
analyses, and other analytical tools to periodically identify gaps in
its capabilities to perform its missions, and identify the personnel
and skills needed to provide the capabilities based largely on the
professional judgment of manpower experts and subject-matter experts.
The results are summarized in a manpower document, updated as needed,
which is used to allocate positions and personnel to meet mission
priorities. This document is an assessment of what core capabilities
can and cannot be supported within the authorized end strength, which
may fall short of the needed actual personnel requirements. For
example, in 2005, we reported that the Marine Corps analysis for fiscal
year 2004 indicated that to execute its assigned missions, the Corps
would need about 9,600 more personnel than it had on hand. At the time
of this analysis, OSD fiscal guidance directed the Marine Corps to plan
for an end strength of 175,000 in the service's budget submission.
New Demands on Services Have Not Been Fully Reflected In Recent
Requirements Analyses:
Both the Army and Marine Corps are coping with additional demands that
may not have been fully reflected in the QDR or their own service
requirements analyses, which have been based on OSD guidance. While the
Army's most recent analysis, completed in 2006, concluded that Army
requirements were about equal to available forces for all three
components, this analysis did not fully reflect the effects of
establishing modular brigades--the most significant restructuring of
the Army's operational force structure since World War II. In addition,
OSD-directed planning scenarios used by the Army in its analysis to
help assess rotational demands on the force may not have reflected real-
world conditions such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the
requirements phase of the Army's analysis, completed in the mid-2005
time frame, may have been based on the best information available at
the time, the Army's transformation concepts have continued to evolve
and the mismatch between the planning scenarios and actual operations
are now more apparent. The Marine Corps is also undergoing a high pace
of operations, as well as QDR-directed changes in force structure. This
has caused the Marine Corps to initiate a new post-QDR analysis of its
force structure requirements.
The service analyses I am about to discuss all preceded the Secretary
of Defense's announcement of his intention to increase Army and Marine
Corps end strength by 92,000. However, some of GAO's reporting on these
plans is only months old and should provide a baseline to help the
committee understand what has changed since the 2006 QDR and service
analyses were completed.
Army's Most Recent Biennial Analysis Did Not Fully Consider
Requirements for Modular Units and Force Rotation Demands:
The Army's most recent requirements analysis, which examined force
structure and military personnel needs for fiscal years 2008 through
2013, considered some of the Army's new transformation concepts, such
as the Army's conversion to a modular force. However, the Army did not
consider the full impact of this transformation in its analysis, in
part because these initiatives were relatively new at the time the
analysis was conducted. The Army's recent analysis recognized that
modular units would require greater numbers of combat forces than its
prior division-based force and assumed this could be accomplished by
reducing military positions in the Army's institutional forces, such as
its command headquarters and training base, rather than increasing the
size of the active force. However, in our September 2006 report
discussing the Army's progress in converting to a modular force, we
questioned whether the Army could meet all of its modular force
requirements with a QDR-directed, active component end strength of
482,400.[Footnote 3] Under its new modular force, the Army will have 42
active brigades compared with 33 brigades in its division-based force.
In total, these brigades will require more military personnel than the
Army's prior division-based combat units. Therefore, as figure 1
illustrates, the Army planned to increase its active component
operational force--that is, its combat forces--from 315,000 to 355,000
personnel to fully staff 42 active modular brigade combat teams. To
accomplish this with an active end strength level of 482,400, the Army
had hoped to substantially reduce the size of its active component
institutional force--that is, its training base, acquisition workforce,
and major command headquarters--from 102,000 to 75,000 military
personnel. The Army also planned to reduce the number of active Army
personnel in a temporary status at any given time, known as transients,
transfers, holdees, and students, or TTHS. In fiscal year 2000, this
portion of the force consisted of 63,000 active military personnel and
the Army planned to reduce its size to 52,400.
Figure 1: A Comparison of Active Army End Strength Allocations before
and after the Modular Force Conversion:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of figure]
While the Army has several initiatives under way to reduce active
military personnel in its institutional force, our report questioned
whether those initiatives could be fully achieved as planned. The Army
had made some progress in converting some military positions to
civilian positions, but Army officials believed additional conversions
to achieve planned reductions in the noncombat force would be
significantly more challenging to achieve and could lead to difficult
trade-offs. In addition, cutting the institutional force at a time when
the Army is fully engaged in training forces for overseas operations
may entail additional risk not fully anticipated at the time the
initiatives were proposed. Last, we noted that the Army is still
assessing its modular unit concepts based on lessons learned from
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other analyses led by the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command, and the impact on force structure
requirements may not yet be fully known.
We should note that, at the time of our report, the Army did not agree
with our assessment of its personnel initiatives. In written comments
on a draft of our report, the Army disagreed with our analysis of the
challenges it faced in implementing its initiatives to increase the
size of the operational force within existing end strength, noting that
GAO focused inappropriate attention on these challenges. The Army only
partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the
Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a
report on the status of its personnel initiatives, including executable
milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat forces. The Army
stated that this action was already occurring on a regular basis and
another report on this issue would be duplicative and irrelevant.
However, the reports the Army cited in its response were internal to
the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The comments did
not address the oversight needs of Congress. We stated in our report
that we believe that it is important for the Secretary of Defense and
Congress to have a clear and transparent picture of the personnel
challenges the Army faces in order to fully achieve the goals of
modular restructuring and make informed decisions on resources and
authorized end strength.
Another factor to consider is that the Army's most recent requirements
analysis was linked to planning scenarios directed by OSD and did not
fully reflect current operational demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Army's analysis assumed that the Army would be able to provide 18 to 19
brigades at any one time (including 14 active and 4 to 5 National Guard
brigades) to support worldwide operations. However, the Army's global
operational demand for forces is currently 23 brigades and Army
officials believe this demand will continue for the foreseeable future.
The Marine Corps Is Also Facing New Demands That May Not Have Been
Fully Reflected in Recent Requirements Analyses:
The Marine Corps is also experiencing new missions and demands as a
result of the Global War on Terrorism. However, these new requirements
do not appear to have been fully addressed in its requirements
analyses. The following is a summary of the principal analyses that
were undertaken to address Marine Corps force structure personnel
requirements in the past few years.
* In 2004, the Marine Corps established a Force Structure Review Group
to evaluate what changes in active and reserve capabilities needed to
be created, reduced, or deactivated in light of personnel tempo trends
and the types of units in high demand since the Global War on
Terrorism. As a result of this review, the Marine Corps approved a
number of force structure changes including increases in the active
component's infantry, reconnaissance, and gunfire capabilities and
decreases in the active component's small-craft company and low-
altitude air defense positions. However, this review was based on the
assumption that the Marine Corps would need to plan for an end strength
of 175,000 active personnel. As a result, the Marine Corps' 2004 review
focused mostly on rebalancing the core capabilities of the active and
reserve component rather than a bottom-up review of total personnel
requirements to meet all 21st century challenges.
* In March 2006, shortly after the QDR was issued, the Marine Corps
Commandant formed a Capabilities Assessment Group to assess
requirements for active Marine Corps military personnel. One of the
group's key tasks was to determine how and whether the Marine Corps
could meet its ongoing requirements while supporting the QDR decision
to establish a 2,600 personnel Marine Corps Special Operations Command.
The group was also charged with identifying what core capabilities
could be provided at a higher end strength level of 180,000. We
received some initial briefings on the scope of the group's work.
Moreover, Marine Corps officials told us that the group completed its
analysis in June 2006. However, as of September 2006 when we completed
our work, the Marine Corps had not released the results of its
analysis. Therefore, it is not clear whether and to what extent this
review formed the basis for the President's recent announcement to
permanently expand the size of the active Marine Corps.
DOD Has Not Clearly Demonstrated the Basis For Military Personnel
Requests:
Our past work has also shown that DOD has not provided a clear and
transparent basis for its military personnel requests to Congress,
requests that demonstrate a clear link to military strategy. Ensuring
that the department provides a sound basis for military personnel
requests and can demonstrate how they are linked to the military
strategy will become increasingly important as Congress confronts
looming fiscal challenges facing the nation. During the next decade,
Congress will be faced with making difficult trade-offs among defense
and nondefense-related spending. Within the defense budget, it will
need to allocate resources among the services and their respective
personnel, operations, and investment accounts while faced with
multiple competing priorities for funds. DOD will need to ensure that
each service manages personnel levels efficiently since personnel costs
have been rising significantly over the past decade. We have previously
reported that the average cost of compensation (including cash, non-
cash, and deferred benefits) for enlisted members and officers was
about $112,000 in fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 4] The growth in military
personnel costs has been fueled in part by increases in basic pay,
housing allowances, recruitment and retention bonuses, incentive pay
and allowances, and other special pay. Furthermore, DOD's costs to
provide benefits, such as health care, have continued to spiral upward.
As noted earlier, we have found that valid and reliable data about the
number of personnel required to meet an agency's needs are critical
because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency's ability to
perform its missions efficiently and effectively. Data-driven
decisionmaking is one of the critical factors in successful strategic
workforce management. High-performing organizations routinely use
current, valid, and reliable data to inform decisions about current and
future workforce needs. In addition, they stay alert to emerging
mission demands and remain open to reevaluating their human capital
practices. In addition, federal agencies have a responsibility to
provide sufficient transparency over significant decisions affecting
requirements for federal dollars so that Congress can effectively
evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks.
DOD's record in providing a transparent basis for requested military
personnel levels can be improved. We previously reported that DOD's
annual report to Congress on manpower requirements for fiscal year 2005
broadly stated a justification for DOD's requested active military
personnel, but did not provide specific analyses to support the
justification. In addition, DOD's 2006 QDR report did not provide
significant insight into the basis for its conclusion that the size of
today's forces--both the active and reserve components across all four
military services--is appropriate to meet current and projected
operational demands. Moreover, the Marine Corps' decision to initiate a
new study to assess active military personnel requirements shortly
after the 2006 QDR was completed is an indication that the QDR did not
achieve consensus in required end strength levels.
In evaluating DOD's proposal to permanently increase active Army and
Marine Corps personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress
should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits. It is clear
that Army and Marine Corps forces are experiencing a high pace of
operations due to both the war in Iraq and broader demands imposed by
the Global War on Terrorism that may provide a basis for DOD to
consider permanent increases in military personnel levels. However, it
is also clear that increasing personnel levels will entail significant
costs that must be weighed against other priorities. The Army has
previously stated that it costs about $1.2 billion per year to increase
active military personnel levels by 10,000. Moreover, equipping and
training new units will require billions of additional dollars for
startup and recurring costs.
DOD has not yet provided a detailed analysis to support its proposal to
permanently increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Given the
significant implications for the nation's ability to carry out its
defense strategy along with the significant costs involved, additional
information will be needed to fully evaluate the Secretary of Defense's
proposal.
To help illuminate the basis for its request, DOD will need to provide
answers to the following questions:
* What analysis has been done to demonstrate how the proposed increases
are linked to the defense strategy? To what extent are the proposed
military personnel increases based on supporting operations in Iraq
versus an assessment of longer-term requirements?
* How will the additional personnel be allocated to combat units,
support forces, and institutional personnel, for functions such as
training and acquisition?
* What are the initial and long-term costs to increase the size of the
force and how does the department plan to fund this increase?
* Do the services have detailed implementation plans to manage
potential challenges such as recruiting additional personnel, providing
facilities, and procuring new equipment?
Our prior work on recruiting and retention challenges, along with our
prior reports on challenges in equipping modular units, identify some
potential challenges that could arise in implementing an increase in
the size of the Army and Marine Corps at a time when the services are
supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, we
have reported that 19 percent of DOD's occupational specialties for
enlisted personnel were consistently overfilled while other
occupational specialties were underfilled by 41 percent for fiscal
years 2000 through 2005.[Footnote 5] In addition, we have reported that
the Army is experiencing numerous challenges in equipping modular
brigades on schedule, in part due to the demands associated with
meeting the equipment needs of units deploying overseas.[Footnote 6]
Such challenges will need to be carefully managed if Congress approves
the Secretary of Defense's proposal.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402. Other individuals making key contributions to this
statement include: Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant Director; Kelly
Baumgartner; J. Andrew Walker; Margaret Morgan; Deborah Colantonio;
Harold Reich; Aisha Cabrer; Susan Ditto; Julie Matta; and Terry
Richardson.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy
With Some Risks. GAO/NSIAD-97-66. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 1997.
Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional
Forces Have Produced Few Results. GAO/NSIAD-98-65. Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 26, 1998.
Force Structure: Opportunities Exist for the Army to Reduce Risk in
Executing the Military Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-99-47. Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 15, 1999.
Force Structure: Army is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces,
but Challenges Remain. GAO/NSIAD-00-162. Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2000.
Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency
Operations. GAO-01-198. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2001.
Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well
Established. GAO-01-485. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of
Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense
Strategy. GAO-05-200. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005.
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement
and Fund Modular Forces. GAO-05-443T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926. Washington,
D.C.: Sep. 29, 2005.
Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain
Uncertain. GAO-06-548T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006.
Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force
Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for
High-Demand Support Forces. GAO-06-962. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 5, 2006.
Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans. GAO-06-
745. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 6, 2006.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven
Analysis of Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the
Defense Strategy, GAO-05-200 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).
[2] GAO, Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces
Not Well Established, GAO-01-485 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001).
[3] GAO, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation
Plans, GAO-06-745 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[4] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Improve the Transparency and
Reassess the Reasonableness, Appropriateness, Affordability, and
Sustainability of its Military Compensation System, GAO-05-798
(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005).
[5] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).
[6] GAO-06-745.
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