Reserve Forces
Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness Gao ID: GAO-07-60 January 26, 2007The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the same time it faces an expanded array of threats at home. The massive state-led, federally funded response to Hurricane Katrina illustrates the Guard's important role in responding to the effects of large-scale, multistate events as well as the difficulty of working with multiple state and federal agencies. To address congressional interest in the Guard's domestic preparedness, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Guard's domestic equipment requirements have been identified, (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) measures and reports to Congress the equipment readiness of non-deployed Guard forces for domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the Guard's domestic equipping challenges. GAO examined the National Guard's plans and equipment status and included case studies in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia.
The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale terrorist events and natural disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated their plans. The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 catastrophic scenarios to guide federal and state governments in planning their response activities. While DOD is responsible for equipping the Guard for its federal missions and states plan for the National Guard's activities within their borders, neither is comprehensively planning for the Guard's role in responding to events like the national planning scenarios that may involve more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed primarily because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating planning for the Guard's role in large-scale events. As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. The bureau has facilitated some limited interstate planning for multistate events, although neither its charter nor its civil support regulation identifies this activity as its responsibility. Until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for multistate events, such planning for the National Guard's role in these events may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as possible. DOD does not routinely measure or report to Congress the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions. DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not address the Guard's domestic missions. While DOD has recognized the need for greater visibility over the Guard's domestic capabilities, its process and measures for assessing the Guard's domestic readiness have not yet been fully defined. Until DOD reaches agreement on a specific approach for measuring readiness for domestic missions and requirements are defined, it will remain unclear whether the Guard is equipped to respond effectively to the consequences of a large-scale terrorist attack or natural disaster. DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment challenges but the extent to which these actions will improve the Guard's domestic capabilities is uncertain because DOD has not finalized specific plans to implement and fund several initiatives. Some officials in case study states expressed concerns about the adequacy of equipment for nondeployed units under current Army plans. For example, until the Army defines the types and amounts of equipment that nondeployed Army National Guard units can expect to retain on hand within the United States, National Guard officials in the states may be hampered in their ability to plan and train for responding to large-scale domestic events.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-60, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
National Security and International Relations, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2007:
Reserve Forces:
Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment
Requirements and Readiness:
Reserve Forces:
GAO-07-60:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-60, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has
reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the
same time it faces an expanded array of threats at home. The massive
state-led, federally funded response to Hurricane Katrina illustrates
the Guard‘s important role in responding to the effects of large-scale,
multistate events as well as the difficulty of working with multiple
state and federal agencies. To address congressional interest in the
Guard‘s domestic preparedness, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the
Guard‘s domestic equipment requirements have been identified, (2) the
Department of Defense (DOD) measures and reports to Congress the
equipment readiness of non-deployed Guard forces for domestic missions,
and (3) DOD actions address the Guard‘s domestic equipping challenges.
GAO examined the National Guard‘s plans and equipment status and
included case studies in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West
Virginia.
What GAO Found:
The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to
respond to large-scale terrorist events and natural disasters have not
been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies
that would have roles in responding to such events have not completed
and integrated their plans. The Homeland Security Council has developed
15 catastrophic scenarios to guide federal and state governments in
planning their response activities. While DOD is responsible for
equipping the Guard for its federal missions and states plan for the
National Guard‘s activities within their borders, neither is
comprehensively planning for the Guard‘s role in responding to events
like the national planning scenarios that may involve more than one
state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed
primarily because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating
planning for the Guard‘s role in large-scale events. As a liaison
between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard
Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National
Guard forces. The bureau has facilitated some limited interstate
planning for multistate events, although neither its charter nor its
civil support regulation identifies this activity as its
responsibility. Until the bureau‘s charter and its civil support
regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state
planning for multistate events, such planning for the National Guard‘s
role in these events may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may
not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as possible.
DOD does not routinely measure or report to Congress the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions.
DOD‘s legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard
equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not
address the Guard‘s domestic missions. While DOD has recognized the
need for greater visibility over the Guard‘s domestic capabilities, its
process and measures for assessing the Guard‘s domestic readiness have
not yet been fully defined. Until DOD reaches agreement on a specific
approach for measuring readiness for domestic missions and requirements
are defined, it will remain unclear whether the Guard is equipped to
respond effectively to the consequences of a large-scale terrorist
attack or natural disaster.
DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment
challenges but the extent to which these actions will improve the
Guard‘s domestic capabilities is uncertain because DOD has not
finalized specific plans to implement and fund several initiatives.
Some officials in case study states expressed concerns about the
adequacy of equipment for nondeployed units under current Army plans.
For example, until the Army defines the types and amounts of equipment
that nondeployed Army National Guard units can expect to retain on hand
within the United States, National Guard officials in the states may be
hampered in their ability to plan and train for responding to large-
scale domestic events.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends updating the National Guard Bureau‘s charter and civil
support regulation and improved reporting of the Guard‘s domestic
readiness. DOD partially agreed to report on plans to assess domestic
readiness but disagreed with our other recommendations. GAO reiterates
the need for changes in matters for congressional consideration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions Not Fully
Identified:
DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedness for
Domestic Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet Complete:
DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equipment
Challenges, but Long-term Effect on Domestic Preparedness Is Unclear:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Appendix V: Related Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles:
Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard
Bureau as Essential to Support Domestic Missions:
Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards
Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical
State Missions:
Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where
the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized
for Warfighting Missions, Including Substitutes:
Table 5: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios and
Summary Descriptions:
Figures:
Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including
Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National Guard Forces as of
November 3, 2006:
Figure 2: The Army's Proposed Force Generation Model:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 26, 2007:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The global security environment has changed significantly since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the nation now faces
adversaries who are committed to attacking American interests both
overseas and at home. The National Guard with its dual federal and
state roles has been in demand to meet both evolving overseas
operations and emerging homeland security[Footnote 1] requirements.
Since the launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has
experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II. At
the same time, the Guard's domestic missions have expanded from routine
duties, such as responding to hurricanes and forest fires, to include
activities such as flying armed air patrols over U.S. cities, providing
radar coverage for the continental United States, protecting critical
infrastructure against terrorist threats, and securing U.S. borders.
Multiple state and federal agencies have roles in planning the response
to the broad range of domestic events to which the National Guard may
be called with the federal government providing more than 90 percent of
the Guard's funding. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for
planning for the Guard's use and the services for equipping its units
for federal missions performed under the command of the President. In
addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has
been established to supervise DOD's homeland defense activities and the
U.S. Northern Command is responsible for planning, organizing, and
executing DOD's civil support missions within the continental United
States. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
developing a system to integrate federal, state, and local domestic
emergency response and provides grants to the states to build their
emergency response capabilities. Also at the federal level, the
President's Homeland Security Council[Footnote 2] provides strategic
guidance on terrorism prevention and has developed 15 national planning
scenarios to guide federal, state, and local planning for catastrophic
events (see app. I). States are responsible for planning for National
Guard missions performed under the command of the governors. National
Guard units are generally expected to perform their state missions
using the equipment DOD has provided for federal missions. However, the
National Guard's equipment inventories in the United States have
significantly decreased because of overseas operations, particularly in
the Army National Guard, at a time when the nation faces an increasing
array of threats at home.
We have previously reported that the high pace of operations has caused
a strain on the Army National Guard's equipment inventories that could
be used for domestic missions and that planning for the military's
response to large-scale, catastrophic events is not complete. In
October 2005, we reported that nondeployed Army National Guard units
had only about one-third of the equipment they needed for their
overseas missions.[Footnote 3] We also reported on the National Guard's
response to help manage the consequences of Hurricane Katrina, a large-
scale catastrophic event.[Footnote 4] Over 50,000 National Guard
members from all 50 states were activated to assist in the Katrina
response effort, demonstrating the pivotal role National Guard forces
play in responding to large-scale, multistate events. However, we noted
a number of serious deficiencies in planning for such events on the
federal and state levels. Two significant shortfalls of DOD's pre-
Katrina planning were that (1) the capabilities DOD could be called
upon to provide had not been assessed and (2) planning did not fully
address the division of tasks between National Guard resources under
the governors' control and federal resources under presidential
control. DOD is now considering steps to address some of the
deficiencies identified in Hurricane Katrina lessons learned reports. A
list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report.
Because of the National Guard's important role in homeland security,
you asked us to assess whether the National Guard has the equipment it
needs to train and maintain readiness for the full range of its
domestic missions. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1)
the National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions have
been identified using an analytically based process, (2) DOD measures
and reports to Congress the equipment readiness of nondeployed National
Guard forces for domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the
National Guard's domestic equipment challenges.
To determine the extent to which the National Guard's equipment
requirements for domestic missions have been identified using an
analytically based process, we reviewed the status of requirements
planning for National Guard forces. We also conducted case studies in
four states--California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia--which
face a range of homeland security threats to understand the status of
the National Guard's equipment and state planning efforts for the
National Guard's state missions. We also met with U.S. Northern
Command, National Guard Bureau, and Department of Homeland Security
officials to discuss planning processes for the Guard's missions. To
assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions,
we reviewed documentation on DOD's readiness reporting systems and its
annual report to Congress on National Guard equipping, analyzed the
inventory status of equipment items determined by the Army National
Guard as having a high value for domestic missions, reviewed state
assessments of domestic capability shortfalls, and discussed these
issues with state National Guard officials in four case study states.
Further, we reviewed documentation on DOD, Army, Air Force, and
National Guard Bureau actions to address National Guard equipping
challenges to determine the extent to which they were derived from
approved requirements and focused on high-priority needs. We conducted
our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards and determined that
the data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope
and methodology used in our review are described in further detail in
appendix II.
Results in Brief:
The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to
perform its domestic missions have not been fully identified using an
analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate
natural disasters and terrorist attacks, because states and federal
agencies have not completed an integrated set of plans identifying the
capabilities the National Guard would be expected to provide in
response to events like those described in the Homeland Security
Council's 15 national planning scenarios. The Department of Homeland
Security, through the National Response Plan, has established a
framework for federal, state, and local agencies to use in planning for
domestic emergencies. While DOD is developing plans for the use of
federal military forces in domestic missions, it assumes that the
National Guard will respond to large-scale, multistate events such as
Hurricane Katrina under the command of the governors and therefore does
not prepare plans for the Guard's use in those types of events. States
plan for the National Guard's use in the missions they will lead within
their borders, such as responding to wildfires and floods. However,
neither the states nor DOD have comprehensively planned and identified
requirements for the National Guard's role in responding to events such
as the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios that may
involve more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has
not been completed in part because there is no formal mechanism for
facilitating state planning across borders for the Guard's role in
large-scale events. As the response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated,
the National Guard Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating
National Guard support among states. As the liaison between the Army,
the Air Force, and the states' National Guard forces, the bureau is
well positioned to facilitate interstate planning for the use of
National Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events. However,
neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation on
military support to civil authorities specifically defines a role for
it in working with the states to facilitate the kind of comprehensive,
pre-event planning that is needed for a coordinated, efficient, and
effective response to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover, neither
the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its regulation on military
support to civil authorities has been updated to reflect the post-
September 11, 2001, security environment, including the bureau's role
with respect to new organizations such as the Department of Homeland
Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, and the U.S. Northern Command. Unless the National Guard
Bureau's charter and regulation on military support to civil
authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland
security issues the National Guard faces, the extent to which the
National Guard Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist
states with planning for and responding to these events will likely
remain uneven. As a result, planning that fully identifies the Guard's
requirements for domestic missions and is integrated with plans for
using other military and civilian forces is likely to remain
incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to
domestic events, such as those described in the national planning
scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as possible. We are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the Army and Air Force to (1) revise the National Guard Bureau's
charter to clearly define its roles in facilitating interstate planning
for the National Guard's role in large-scale, multistate events, such
as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and monitoring
the Guard's status to perform those missions, and (2) update the
National Guard's civil support regulation. We are also recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army and
Air Force to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination
with DOD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and
other civilian authorities, to facilitate and coordinate interstate
National Guard planning to identify the capabilities and equipment the
National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events,
consistent with the Homeland Security Council's national planning
scenarios and state and federal plans.
DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of nondeployed
National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or report
this information to Congress. The Secretary of Defense is required by
law to establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system with which
DOD can measure in an objective, accurate and timely manner the
military's capability to carry out the National Security Strategy,
defense planning guidance, and the National Military Strategy. Until
recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard could perform its
typical state missions with the equipment it had on hand for its
federal missions. However, the equipment demands for overseas
operations have decreased the supply of equipment available to
nondeployed National Guard units, particularly in the Army National
Guard. DOD has recognized the need to have more visibility over the
capability that the National Guard has for its domestic missions and
has begun to collect data on units' preparedness; however, these
efforts are not yet fully mature. DOD is implementing a new readiness
reporting system that will include readiness information on the Guard's
federally funded state-led missions, but this system is not fully
operational and it is not clear how equipment readiness will be
assessed without fully identified domestic mission requirements. The
National Guard Bureau has developed a database to collect domestic
capability assessments from the states, but in the absence of fully
identified requirements for domestic missions the system relies on the
subjective assessments of state National Guard officials and does not
provide detailed information on National Guard equipping for large-
scale, multistate events. Our analysis of these data found that a
majority of state National Guard leaders assessed the capability of
resources within their states to respond to typical state missions as
adequate, although the Army National Guard has shortages of some
equipment, such as generators and trucks, which could be useful for
domestic events. In addition, National Guard officials in states we
visited expressed concerns about whether they would have enough
equipment to respond to large-scale natural or manmade disasters such
as Hurricane Katrina or those described in the Homeland Security
Council's national planning scenarios. Until DOD's efforts to improve
its readiness measures and reports are mature, decision makers will
lack information on whether the National Guard has the equipment it
needs to respond effectively to the consequences of a large-scale,
multistate event. Further, Congress will have limited information
making it more difficult to mitigate risks and prioritize investments
for the Guard's missions. We are recommending actions intended to
improve congressional visibility over DOD's efforts to assess the
readiness of National Guard forces for their domestic missions. In
addition, we are suggesting for congressional consideration the
revision of the annual National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report
requirements to include an assessment of the Guard's equipping
preparedness to provide support to civil authorities, the risks to
those missions associated with any shortfalls, and mitigation
strategies and investment priorities.
DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment
challenges; however, it is not clear how these initiatives will affect
the Guard's preparedness for domestic missions since some of the
initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and specific
plans are still being developed. DOD plans to procure additional Army
National Guard and Air National Guard equipment, such as trucks and
communications gear, using $900 million that Congress provided in the
2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. In addition, the
National Guard Bureau has begun implementing several initiatives, such
as establishing joint force headquarters within each state and
expanding chemical and biological response capabilities. However, these
initiatives were recently approved by DOD and have not yet been
included in DOD's Future Years Defense Program. The Army has also
budgeted $21 billion for fiscal years 2005 through 2011 to modernize
the Army National Guard and augment its equipment inventory. However,
this equipment may be deployed to meet overseas demands and the Army
has not specified how much equipment will remain in the United States
to be available for domestic missions because it has not finalized
plans for allocating equipment to nondeployed units under its new
cyclical readiness and deployment model. In the absence of a specific
plan that outlines how Army National Guard equipment will be allocated
among nondeployed units, state National Guards may be hampered in their
ability to plan for responding to large-scale domestic events. We are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop a plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed
Army National Guard baseline equipment sets.
In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our
recommendation to report to Congress on its plans for assessing
National Guard domestic readiness, but disagreed with our
recommendations to update the National Guard Bureau's charter and civil
support regulation for the new security environment, to direct the
National Guard Bureau to facilitate and coordinate interstate planning
for the use of Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events, and for
the Army to provide a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline
equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. DOD stated
that the National Guard Bureau's existing charter authorizes a planning
role for the bureau for large-scale, multistate events. However,
because we found that planning for multistate events is currently
uneven and the charter does not clearly define the bureau's role in
planning, we believe that clarifying the language in the charter to
highlight the importance of these activities would improve preparedness
for such emergencies. Further, DOD stated that it did not see a need to
update its civil support regulation and that it is not appropriate for
the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other federal
agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of the
Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders and would infringe on
the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and the
governors. Our recommendation was not intended to designate the
National Guard Bureau as the DOD entity to coordinate with other
federal agencies or infringe on the governor's role in coordination
with federal agencies. However, the current regulation does not
specifically address how coordination with organizations established
since September 11, 2001, should occur or how new planning tools should
be used, and we believe that updating the regulation is an important
step in strengthening pre-event planning and minimizing confusion about
the use of National Guard forces. DOD further stated in its comments
that it does not see a need for a report to Congress on the Army's
plans to equip nondeployed Army National Guard units, and it did not
specify any actions the department would take to measure and report to
Congress on the National Guard's equipment readiness for domestic
missions. We continue to believe that the actions we recommend are
important to improve interstate planning and visibility of National
Guard readiness for domestic missions. Therefore, we are suggesting
that Congress consider amending the statute prescribing the National
Guard Bureau's charter to include coordinating and facilitating
interstate planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale,
multistate events such as those contained in the national planning
scenarios and requiring DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil
support regulation to reflect this change. In addition, to provide
information on what equipment will be available for the National
Guard's domestic missions under the Army's force generation model, we
are also suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of
Defense to include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Report a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline equipment
sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. DOD's comments and our
evaluation are discussed in detail in the Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation section of this report.
Background:
The National Guard performs a range of domestic and overseas missions
in its dual roles as a federal reserve of the Army and Air Force and as
a state militia. DOD is responsible for planning and equipping the
National Guard for its federal missions conducted under the command and
control of the President. Within DOD, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense[Footnote 5] supervises DOD's
homeland activities, including the execution of domestic military
missions and military support to U.S. civil authorities, and develops
policies, conducts analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations
for these activities to the Under Secretary for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense is also the DOD office responsible for coordinating with the
Department of Homeland Security. While the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense supervises DOD's homeland
activities, U.S. Northern Command is the unified military command
responsible for planning, organizing, and executing DOD's homeland
defense and federal military support to civil authorities' missions
within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial
waters.[Footnote 6]
The services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping
military forces, including the National Guard. The Army and the Air
Force have different strategies for structuring and providing resources
for their Guard components that reflect each service's planned use and
available resources. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard
units are provided varying levels of equipment according to their
unit's priority for resources, which generally increases as a unit
nears availability for overseas deployment. Prior to the beginning of
current overseas operations, the majority of the Army National Guard's
combat forces were supplied with 65 to 79 percent of their required
equipment. Our prior work (see Related GAO Products) has shown that in
order to fully equip units deploying overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Army National Guard had to transfer large quantities of items from
nondeployed units, which depleted the inventories of equipment
available for the Guard's domestic missions. In addition, operational
requirements to leave equipment overseas for follow-on forces and DOD's
lack of approved plans to replace these items have further compounded
the Army National Guard's equipment shortages and threaten its ability
to maintain readiness for future missions. In contrast, the Air
National Guard has been integrated into the Air Force's operational
force and is maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active
component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard
units to be ready to deploy on short notice and its units have not been
as negatively affected by recent overseas operations as Army National
Guard units.
As a state militia, the National Guard responds to domestic events
under the command and control of a state governor. When not
participating in DOD's federal missions, National Guard members and
equipment are available to their respective state governors to perform
state missions, such as responding to emergencies, disasters, civil
disturbances, and other events authorized by state laws. National Guard
state-unique equipment requirements are funded by the state. In some
circumstances, National Guard personnel can also perform duty under
state control that is federally funded.[Footnote 7] Since September 11,
2001, the President has authorized federal funding for several National
Guard domestic missions conducted under the command of the governors,
such as providing security at the nation's airports in the immediate
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, assisting the Gulf
Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and providing security
along the southwest border in 2006. Table 1 compares some differences-
-including differences in command and control responsibility, where the
National Guard has been deployed, and how the National Guard was
funded--in its different state and federal roles.
Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles:
Command and control entity;
State role: State funded: Governor;
State role: Federally funded: Governor;
Federal role: Federally funded: President.
Mobilization authorities used;
State role: State funded: In accordance with state law;
State role: Federally funded: Title 32 (32 U.S.C 502(f));
Federal role: Federally funded: Various Title 10 authorities.
Where deployed;
State role: State funded: In accordance with state law;
State role: Federally funded: United States;
Federal role: Federally funded: Worldwide.
Mission types;
State role: State funded: In accordance with state law;
State role: Federally funded: Training and other federally authorized
missions;
Federal role: Federally funded: Overseas training and as assigned after
mobilization.
Examples of domestic missions;
State role: State funded: Forest fires, floods, civil disturbances;
State role: Federally funded: Post-9/11 airport security, Hurricane
Katrina, southwest border security;
Federal role: Federally funded: Air sovereignty, missile defense,
guarding DOD infrastructure.
Support law enforcement activities;
State role: State funded: Yes;
State role: Federally funded: Yes;
Federal role: Federally funded: As limited by Posse Comitatus[A].
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, prohibits the direct
use of federal military troops for domestic civilian law enforcement
except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. This
act applies to the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard,
which are reserve components of the armed forces under 10 U.S.C.
§10101.
[End of table]
Although it is equipped by the Army and the Air Force for its federal
role, the National Guard can use its equipment and capabilities, such
as airlift, transportation, engineering, communications, logistics,
medical, maintenance, and security capabilities, to support state and
local officials in its domestic role. For example, in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard supported response and recovery
operations in a number of ways. Among other activities, National Guard
units performed helicopter search-and-rescue missions, augmented
security efforts, supplied satellite phone communications, and provided
humanitarian and medical treatment for victims of the disaster. The
National Guard also can provide capabilities for responding to domestic
weapons of mass destruction events, such as detection, assessment, and
decontamination capabilities.
In its domestic role, the National Guard works with the multiple state
and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects
of homeland security. The National Guard works with state emergency
management agencies to provide military support to state civilian
authorities. In addition, the states have entered into mutual
assistance agreements to provide cross-border assistance, including
National Guard forces, when an event exceeds a state's capacity to
respond. The National Guard Bureau, established by statute[Footnote 8]
as a joint bureau of the Army and the Air Force, is responsible for the
administration of the National Guard, including participating with Army
and Air Force staff in developing and coordinating policies, programs,
and plans affecting Army National Guard and Air National Guard
personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication between the
Army and the Air Force and the National Guard in the several states.
The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are directed by statute to
jointly develop and prescribe a charter for the National Guard Bureau
that sets out the bureau's responsibilities.[Footnote 9] The Chief of
the National Guard Bureau has overall responsibility for the National
Guard's military support to civil authorities programs. As was
demonstrated in the response to Hurricane Katrina, during civil support
missions the National Guard Bureau provides policy guidance and
facilitates National Guard assistance to the executing adjutants
general who lead National Guard forces within the states under the
command and control of the governors. National Guard forces also have
some federal domestic missions, such as air and missile defense
activities, that are federally funded and conducted under the command
of the President.
Also at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Homeland Security Council both have responsibilities that could affect
the National Guard's domestic role. The Department of Homeland
Security, which was established in 2002[Footnote 10] to reduce
America's vulnerability to terrorism and to prevent terrorist attacks
as well as respond to attacks that might occur, is the lead federal
agency responsible for preventing, preparing for, and responding to a
wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies. In
December 2004, the department issued the National Response
Plan,[Footnote 11] which provides a framework for federal, state, and
local agencies to use in planning for domestic emergencies. To assist
in integrating state and federal responses to domestic emergencies, the
Homeland Security Council developed 15 national planning scenarios in
2004 whose purpose was to form the basis for identifying the
capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The
scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local
first responders may have to address and are intended to illustrate the
scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergencies for which
the nation needs to be prepared. The 15 scenarios include a wide range
of terrorist attacks involving nuclear, biological, and chemical
agents, as well as catastrophic natural disasters, such as an
earthquake or hurricane, and a large-scale cyber attack. These
scenarios are described in further detail in appendix I.
National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions Not Fully
Identified:
The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to
perform domestic missions have not been fully identified using an
analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate
natural disasters and terrorist attacks, because state and federal
agencies have not completed an integrated set of plans identifying the
capabilities the National Guard would be expected to provide in
response to events like those described in the Homeland Security
Council's national planning scenarios. DOD is developing plans for the
use of federal military forces in domestic missions, but assumes the
National Guard will respond to large-scale, multistate events such as
Hurricane Katrina under the command of the governors. States plan for
the National Guard's use in missions within their borders, but have
only planned to a limited extent for the Guard's use in large-scale,
multistate events such as those described in the Homeland Security
Council's national planning scenarios. While neither the National Guard
Bureau's charter nor its civil support regulation explicitly defines
its role in working to facilitate comprehensive and integrated planning
for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, the
bureau has taken steps to facilitate limited interstate planning for
potential domestic events like hurricanes, wildfires, and an influenza
pandemic. However, without a formal mechanism to facilitate the
development of comprehensive plans for the National Guard's role in
large-scale, multistate events, such plans are unlikely to be
developed. As a result, the National Guard may not be prepared to
respond to large-scale, multistate events as efficiently and
effectively as possible.
DOD and State Planning for the National Guard's Use in Domestic
Missions Is Incomplete:
The multiple state and federal agencies likely to be involved in the
response to a large-scale, multistate event are a factor that
complicates planning for how the National Guard should be used and
equipped to respond to domestic events, particularly for events such as
terrorist attacks and natural disasters described in the Homeland
Security Council's national planning scenarios. DOD, Department of
Homeland Security, and National Guard documents, as well as our prior
work on Hurricane Katrina, indicate that comprehensive pre-event
planning that is coordinated and integrated to take into account the
roles of federal and state responders, including the National Guard, is
a key step in facilitating an effective, efficient, and well-
coordinated response to unexpected domestic emergencies. As was
illustrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the response to
large-scale, multistate events may involve a combination of state and
local civilian authorities; National Guard forces from across the
nation operating in state status; federal civilian agencies, such as
the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and federal military forces,
such as active duty Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces
operating under the command of the President. However, the number of
state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different
aspects of emergency response combined with their divided and
decentralized planning responsibilities complicate the task of
comprehensive planning and identification of the equipment the National
Guard would need for the full range of potential domestic missions.
National Guard assistance to civil authorities is normally provided
when an event is so severe and widespread that local and state
governments are overwhelmed and civil resources are exhausted. As a
result, in order to identify the capabilities the Guard will be
expected to provide for domestic response efforts, state National Guard
plans must be integrated with other responders' plans and account for
the contributions expected to be made by civil authorities as well as
federal military forces.
DOD plans for the domestic use of federal military forces--which may
include National Guard units in federal status--in the homeland defense
missions it leads, such as air defense of the United States and missile
defense, and the federal military support it provides to civil
authorities as a result of natural or man-made disasters. The
department, through the U.S. Northern Command, is currently developing
a group of plans to address homeland defense missions and the missions
federal forces may undertake in support of civilian authorities.
However, DOD assumes that National Guard forces will respond to most
domestic events, including large-scale, multistate events such as
Hurricane Katrina and those described in the Homeland Security
Council's national planning scenarios, under the command of the
governors. Therefore, the department does not plan for the types of
Guard units or establish equipment requirements for the National
Guard's use under state control in responding to these types of events.
Moreover, a DOD directive prohibits the procurement of equipment
exclusively for providing support to civilian authorities in civil
emergencies unless specifically directed by the Secretary of
Defense.[Footnote 12] Consistent with this directive, DOD's 2005
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that DOD will
continue to rely on forces with both warfighting and domestic mission
capabilities for consequence management and other defense support of
civil authorities.[Footnote 13]
States are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency plans
for the employment of the National Guard in response to civil
disturbances; natural, man-made, or technological disasters; and other
potential emergencies within their borders, such as wildfires and
floods. In responding to such events, states generally have relied on
the equipment that DOD has provided to their National Guard units for
their federal missions. The degree to which states have developed plans
for the use of National Guard forces and identified equipment
requirements for the range of the National Guard's missions, including
large-scale, multistate events, varies. A recent Department of Homeland
Security review of state emergency operations plans, which are the
basis for state National Guard plans, found that a majority of state
plans and planning processes are not fully adequate, feasible, or
acceptable to manage catastrophic events.[Footnote 14] According to the
report, many state plans are created in isolation and are
insufficiently detailed, and the states do not conduct adequate
collaborative planning as a part of normal preparedness efforts.
Further, the report asserted that the lack of specificity and poorly
defined resource requirements in state plans would hinder the timely
identification, deployment, and employment of equipment, personnel, and
other resources to support emergency response efforts.
States have not completed the comprehensive and integrated planning
necessary to identify National Guard requirements for responding to
large-scale events that may involve more than one state and be
federally funded, such as the Homeland Security Council's national
planning scenarios, for a number of reasons, including limited state
National Guard planning resources and the lack of a formal mechanism to
facilitate planning across state borders for the Guard's role in these
events. In some of the states we visited, National Guard officials
stated that their planning resources are limited, and this affects
their ability to develop detailed, integrated plans for the Guard's use
in domestic events. For example, the West Virginia National Guard had a
single planning officer who was tasked with other duties, while
California National Guard officials stated they lacked funding for full-
time planners. States must work with each other to conduct planning for
the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events and have
done so to a limited extent for events like hurricanes and wildfires.
In some cases, states have used mutual assistance agreements to
supplement their National Guard forces when such events occur. However,
there is no formal mechanism to facilitate comprehensive interstate
planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale domestic events
that is integrated with the plans of the multiple federal and state
agencies expected to be involved in response efforts. In the absence of
such a mechanism, planning is likely to remain incomplete and the
Guard's full equipment requirements for domestic missions will remain
unknown.
National Guard Bureau Charter and Civil Support Regulation Do Not
Clearly Define National Guard Bureau's Role in Facilitating
Comprehensive Planning for the Guard's Domestic Roles:
While the National Guard Bureau is charged with performing a liaison
function between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, neither its
charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities
specifically defines its role in working with the states to facilitate
comprehensive and integrated planning for the National Guard's use in
large-scale, multistate events, such as those described in the Homeland
Security Council's national planning scenarios.
The National Guard Bureau's charter, signed by the Secretaries of the
Army and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau responsibility for facilitating and supporting the training of
members and units of the National Guard to meet state requirements, as
well as responsibility for facilitating and coordinating with the
Departments of the Army and the Air Force on the use of National Guard
personnel and resources for several functions, including natural
disasters and military support to civil authorities.[Footnote 15] The
National Guard Bureau's regulation on military support to civil
authorities, last updated in 1996, describes the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau's overall responsibility for National Guard civil support
programs and for issuing planning guidance on the National Guard's role
in providing military support to civil authorities. The regulation also
provides guidance to the states on preparing emergency plans for the
use of National Guard forces in a civil support role, including
coordination for external assistance beyond state
capabilities.[Footnote 16] In its role as a liaison between the Army,
the Air Force, and the states and territories on National Guard issues,
the National Guard Bureau played a significant role in facilitating
Guard support among states during Hurricane Katrina. For example, the
bureau acted as a conduit for communicating requirements for assistance
in Louisiana and Mississippi to state National Guard leaders in the
rest of the country.
In line with these existing roles, the National Guard Bureau is well
positioned to facilitate state planning for the use of National Guard
forces in large-scale, multistate events. However, neither the bureau's
charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities
specifically defines a role for it in working with the states to
facilitate comprehensive and integrated pre-event planning for the use
of National Guard forces in responding to large-scale, multistate
events. Moreover, neither the National Guard Bureau's charter nor its
regulation on military support to civil authorities has been updated to
reflect the post-September 11, 2001, security environment or how the
state National Guards and the National Guard Bureau will work with new
organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S.
Northern Command in facilitating planning for the National Guard's
response to domestic events. In addition, the bureau's regulation on
military support to civil authorities does not provide guidance on how
the National Guard state leadership and the National Guard Bureau
should use the new planning tools that have been developed since 2001,
to facilitate national preparedness, such as the National Response Plan
and the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios.
In the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for facilitating
state planning, the National Guard Bureau has taken some steps to
facilitate limited interstate planning for the use of National Guard
forces and equipment in large-scale, multistate events. For example,
according to state and National Guard Bureau officials, during the past
year the National Guard Bureau has helped facilitate a conference of
southeastern states to discuss how those states can cooperate and share
equipment in response to a hurricane as well as a similar conference of
western states to address response efforts for the wildfire season. The
National Guard Bureau has also facilitated state planning for the
Guard's role in an influenza pandemic, and is coordinating the
development of state National Guard plans to support U.S. Northern
Command's new homeland defense plan and providing general planning
guidance. While we believe these are positive steps, they do not
provide the comprehensive and integrated planning that would help
identify the specific equipment the National Guard would need to
respond to the types of events described in the Homeland Security
Council's national planning scenarios. Unless the National Guard
Bureau's charter and its regulation on military support to civil
authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland
security issues the National Guard faces and the roles the bureau will
play in facilitating state planning for and the Guard's response to
large-scale, multistate events, the extent to which the National Guard
Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist states with
planning for and responding to large-scale, multistate events will
likely remain uneven. As a result, comprehensive planning that fully
identifies equipment requirements for the National Guard's use in
domestic missions and is integrated with plans for using other military
and civilian forces may remain incomplete.
DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard Preparedness for
Domestic Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet Complete:
DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual report to
Congress on National Guard equipment provide information about the
National Guard's readiness for its warfighting missions, but do not
include reporting on its preparedness for its domestic missions. While
DOD is taking steps to better assess the National Guard's preparedness
for its domestic missions, these efforts are not yet complete and are
limited by the lack of fully identified requirements for the Guard's
domestic missions. Although DOD cannot quantify the degree to which the
National Guard has the equipment it needs to respond to domestic
missions, our analyses of the limited data collected by the department
and the National Guard Bureau on the National Guard's capability for
domestic missions found that most state National Guard leaders assessed
their forces' capability as adequate to respond to typical state
missions. National Guard officials in the four states we visited
expressed views that were consistent with our analyses, but some
officials expressed concern about whether they have sufficient
equipment to respond to large-scale, multistate events. Until the
National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions are fully
identified and DOD collects and reports information that compares
equipment on hand to those requirements, the department cannot provide
Congress with detailed information on the National Guard's equipment
status for its domestic missions, and decision makers lack information
to both assess whether the National Guard is appropriately equipped to
respond to a large-scale domestic event and to target resources to
assist the National Guard in mitigating any shortfalls.
Current Readiness Assessments and Reports on National Guard Equipment
Do Not Address Domestic Mission Requirements:
The Secretary of Defense is required by law to establish a
comprehensive readiness reporting system for DOD to use to measure in
an objective, accurate and timely manner the military's capability to
carry out the National Security Strategy, defense planning guidance,
and the National Military Strategy.[Footnote 17] The Secretary is
required to measure the capability of military units to conduct their
assigned warfighting missions, identify any critical warfighting
deficiencies in those units' capabilities, and measure the risk those
shortfalls pose to the units' ability to carry out their federal
warfighting missions. DOD's legacy readiness reporting system--the
Global Status of Resources and Training System--contains data that
enable DOD to assess the capability of National Guard forces to carry
out their warfighting missions. However, the system does not contain
data that would enable DOD to assess the preparedness of National Guard
forces for domestic civil support missions, including the extent to
which those forces have the equipment they need, because DOD's focus is
on its units' readiness to perform their warfighting missions.
The Secretary of Defense is also required to submit an annual report to
Congress on the equipment the National Guard and reserve components
have and how DOD plans to meet the wartime equipment requirements of
its reserve components.[Footnote 18] The report, known as the National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, is required to include:
* recommendations on the type and quantity of major equipment items
that should be in the National Guard's and the reserves'
inventory;[Footnote 19]
* a list of each type of major equipment item required by the National
Guard and reserves, indicating their full requirement for warfighting
missions and the amount of that equipment in the inventory, as well as
a separate list of deployable and nondeployable substitute equipment
for that item; and:
* a narrative explaining the Secretary of Defense's plan to fill
warfighting requirements for each type of major equipment.
DOD is not currently required to include in the report information on
the adequacy of the equipment that nondeployed National Guard forces
have available to perform the full range of their domestic missions.
Without this information, the report provides Congress with limited
information to help it prioritize investments for the full range of
National Guard missions, warfighting and domestic. The readiness of
units for these two different types of missions might vary widely. For
example, a National Guard armor unit might not have the tanks it
requires to successfully perform its warfighting mission and therefore
be assessed as not ready in the Global Status of Resources and Training
System, but still have adequate equipment to provide support to civil
authorities for a domestic event like a hurricane. Conversely, a
National Guard unit may be assessed as ready for its warfighting
missions but not have the equipment, such as trucks, generators,
communications gear, and engineering equipment, needed for its domestic
missions. Until recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard
could perform its typical state missions with the equipment it had on
hand for its federal missions. However, some Guard units, particularly
in the Army National Guard, may be less ready for domestic missions
than they were 2 or 3 years ago because, as we have previously
reported, large quantities of equipment have been sent overseas to
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, decreasing the supply of
equipment available to nondeployed units.
Some Efforts Are Under Way to Better Assess National Guard Preparedness
for Domestic Missions:
DOD has recognized the need to have greater visibility over the
National Guard's capabilities for domestic missions and has begun
taking steps to assess the Guard's preparedness for those missions. In
a September 2005 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Secretary of Defense called for improved visibility over the
readiness of National Guard forces operating in state status with
federal funds. To achieve this improved visibility, DOD has decided to
include information on the National Guard's readiness to perform both
its federal warfighting missions and its state-led, federally funded
missions in the department's new Defense Readiness Reporting
System.[Footnote 20] Additionally, the National Guard Bureau has
developed the Joint Capabilities Database as a mechanism to collect
information on state capabilities, including those of the National
Guard, to respond to domestic events. Both efforts are being
implemented and refined, but the lack of requirements for the full
range of the National Guard's domestic missions limits their usefulness
as a basis for identifying shortfalls and targeting future equipment
investments.
DOD's new readiness reporting system, which will replace the Global
Status of Resources and Training System, is expected to be fully
operational by the end of fiscal year 2007. In contrast to the Global
Status of Resources and Training System, which focuses on resource
levels, the new system reports on assessed mission capabilities.
Commanders will use their military judgment to assess readiness based
on unit performance as well as the availability of resources, such as
personnel and equipment. The system will also contain measures
describing the status of major equipment items, including the
quantities of those items units require for their missions, the
equipment units are authorized to have, and the equipment they have on
hand, as well as its condition and location. DOD officials plan to use
that information to identify equipment deficiencies.
DOD has directed National Guard units to report in the Defense
Readiness Reporting System on their capabilities to perform state-led
but federally funded domestic missions, such as border security. As a
step toward assessing these capabilities, the National Guard Bureau has
begun to identify the essential tasks that National Guard forces need
to be capable of performing for their domestic roles and missions. For
example, the bureau is developing lists of essential tasks for state
joint force headquarters, state joint task forces, and weapons of mass
destruction civil support teams. Commanders will use these task lists
to assess the readiness of their units to perform assigned domestic
missions, such as counterdrug operations and hurricane response.
However, in the absence of equipment requirements based on events like
those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning
scenarios to include in the Defense Readiness Reporting System, the
system may not enable DOD or the states to fully assess whether
nondeployed National Guard forces have an appropriate amount of
equipment to respond to those missions.
In addition to the information that will be available in the Defense
Readiness Reporting System, the National Guard Bureau has developed a
database that captures information on state capabilities to support
domestic missions. This unclassified database, introduced in 2005 and
called the Joint Capabilities Database, is a voluntary reporting by the
states' National Guard leaders to identify capability gaps in each
state and help the states and the National Guard Bureau develop
appropriate mitigation strategies. The database compiles subjective
assessments from state National Guard leaders on whether their states
have sufficient capabilities in their Army National Guard and Air
National Guard units to effectively respond to state missions. In
reporting on their state's capabilities for domestic missions, state
National Guard leaders assess whether their Army National Guard and Air
National Guard units collectively can provide adequate amounts of 10
core capabilities the National Guard Bureau has identified as being
essential to supporting domestic missions. Table 2 lists these
capabilities and provides examples of the type of tasks they represent.
Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard
Bureau as Essential to Support Domestic Missions:
Core capability: Aviation/airlift;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Provide aircraft to transport personnel and cargo during times of
emergency;
* Provide aircraft to facilitate reconnaissance, command and control,
and communications during emergencies;
* Support first responders using air assets.
Core capability: Engineering;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Provide engineer units to assist local and state agencies in debris
removal; construction of roads, bridges, and emergency housing; search
and rescue; water purification and distribution; and power generation.
Core capability: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-
yield explosive;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Maintain a certified civil support team;
* Identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive agents and substances;
* Assess consequences, advise responders, and assist with requests for
more support.
Core capability: Communications;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Establish and maintain interoperable communications with local,
state, and federal agencies, and volunteer organizations as necessary
for domestic missions.
Core capability: Command and control;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Operate a Joint Operations Center to process information and serve as
a focal point for the National Guard response;
* Provide reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for
arriving forces;
* Coordinate and act as a liaison with state and federal agencies.
Core capability: Logistics;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Plan for and provide sustainment support to civil authorities to
ensure continuity of operations;
* Rapidly deploy and monitor movement and placement of forces and
equipment during support operations;
* Sustain deployed forces.
Core capability: Medical;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Support civilian emergency medical system during mass casualty
operations;
* Assist the public health system in distributing and administering
vaccines and antidotes to the public.
Core capability: Maintenance;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Ensure equipment is available for state missions;
* Sustain equipment during all phases of state missions.
Core capability: Security;
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Provide a military force capable of assisting civil law enforcement
agencies in maintaining law and order;
* Provide security to critical infrastructure.
Core capability: Transportation (surface);
Examples of tasks associated with core capability:
* Deploy the force and support first responders using ground
transportation assets;
* Provide transportation assets to remove civilian personnel from
affected areas and move supplies.
Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data.
[End of table]
State National Guard leaders are asked to assess the adequacy of their
state's capabilities for two levels of events: (1) state missions that
have been routinely conducted by the Army National Guard and Air
National Guard in the past 10 years and (2) larger, nonroutine events
that are expected to rapidly overwhelm state assets and require
immediate external National Guard or federal assistance. State National
Guard leaders' subjective assessments are to be based on the state's
unique needs for National Guard capabilities as described in its
emergency response plan and consider factors such as equipment on hand,
training, and unit availability, although the assessments do not
provide detailed information on the status of National Guard equipment.
State National Guard leaders rate a capability as adequate if they
think their National Guard units possess the resources and assets
necessary to accomplish their missions; they rate a capability as
inadequate if they do not think their National Guard units possess the
resources and assets required to complete the mission without external
assistance and explain the reasons why the capability is rated as
inadequate. The National Guard Bureau has requested that state National
Guards submit new assessments quarterly or when events change their
capability assessment.
Data Indicate the Majority of State National Guards Have Capability for
Typical Missions, but Shortages Exist and Concerns Remain about Ability
to Respond to Large-Scale, Multistate Events:
Without analytically based equipment requirements for the National
Guard's domestic missions to compare against the National Guard's
current inventory of available equipment, we could not determine the
extent to which nondeployed National Guard forces have the equipment
they need to perform their full range of domestic missions. However, we
collected and examined information from two sources--the National Guard
Bureau's Joint Capabilities Database and an Army National Guard
equipment inventory--as rough substitute measures of the adequacy of
National Guard equipping for domestic missions. To supplement this
information, we visited four states--California, Florida, New Jersey,
and West Virginia--and discussed the capabilities, including equipment,
that would be available within the states for their typical missions as
well as large-scale, multistate events.
National Guard Capability to Respond to Typical State Missions:
Our analysis indicated that the majority of states report having the
National Guard capabilities they need to respond to typical state
missions; however, some states and territories report capability
shortfalls in one or more areas.[Footnote 21] As of July 2006, 34 of
the 54 states and territories (63 percent) reported having adequate
amounts of all 10 core domestic mission capabilities for responding to
typical state missions.[Footnote 22] Of the 20 states and territories
(37 percent) that reported an inadequate capability, 13 reported being
inadequate in only one capability, and 4 reported being inadequate in
two capabilities. Table 3 shows the number and percentage of states and
territories reporting either adequate or inadequate for each of the
National Guard Bureau's core domestic mission capabilities. Aviation;
engineering; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-
yield explosive capabilities were most frequently reported by state
National Guards as being inadequate for responding to typical state
missions. Most states and territories that rated their chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive capability
as inadequate did so because their weapons of mass destruction civil
support teams had not been certified or were in the process of being
established.[Footnote 23] For all other capabilities, the deployment of
units was the most common reason state National Guard leaders gave for
rating a capability as inadequate.
Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards
Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical
State Missions:
Aviation;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 46 (85);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 8 (15).
Engineering;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 48 (89);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 6 (11).
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 43 (80);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 11 (20).
Communications;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 52 (96);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 2 (4).
Command and control;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 54 (100);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 0 (0).
Logistics;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 54 (100);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 0 (0).
Medical;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 52 (96);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 2 (4).
Maintenance;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 53 (98);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 1 (2).
Security;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 53 (98);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 1 (2).
Transportation;
Adequate capability, number and (percentage): 53 (98);
Inadequate capability, number and (percentage): 1 (2).
Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data in the Joint
Capabilities Database as of July 2006.
Note: Typical state missions are those missions that have routinely
been conducted by the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of
each individual state or territory in the past 10 years. State National
Guard leader assessments consider factors such as equipment on hand,
training, and unit availability.
[End of table]
Equipment Available for Warfighting and Domestic Missions:
We also used the Army National Guard's equipment inventory to determine
the extent to which the Army National Guard has particular types of
equipment, referred to as dual-use items, which units are authorized
for their warfighting missions but could be highly useful in responding
to domestic events. In 2005, the Army National Guard, in coordination
with the Army and the National Guard Bureau, used military judgment and
historical experience to identify more than 300 of these dual-use
items. The list of equipment the Army National Guard identified
includes types of trucks, generators, radios, medical gear, and
engineering equipment.
Our analysis of the Army National Guard's equipment inventory as of
November 2006 showed that nondeployed Army National Guard forces had
less dual-use equipment overall than they were authorized and small
available quantities of some specific types of dual-use equipment.
However, since requirements have not been fully identified for the
amount of equipment National Guard units need to respond to domestic
events like those described in the Homeland Security Council's national
planning scenarios, the extent to which amounts of equipment authorized
for warfighting meet or exceed domestic requirements is unknown.
According to Army National Guard officials, having the full amount of
equipment authorized for their warfighting missions would leave their
units well positioned to respond effectively to domestic events.
As of November 2006, nondeployed Army National Guard forces nationwide
had about 64 percent of the total amount of dual-use equipment they are
authorized to have based on their warfighting missions.[Footnote 24]
However, inventory levels of the different types of dual-use equipment
varied widely, from 0 to 100 percent.[Footnote 25] The average
inventory level by type of equipment was roughly 42 percent
nationwide.[Footnote 26] As figure 1 illustrates, the average inventory
level of dual-use equipment items also varied by state and territory,
from under 40 percent in New Mexico, Washington, D.C., and Virginia to
more than 60 percent in Georgia and Colorado. On average, states and
territories had about 50 percent of their authorized inventory of dual-
use equipment available for domestic missions.
Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including
Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National Guard Forces as of
November 3, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO analysis of Army National Guard Data, Copyright Corel
Corp. All rights reserved; mapArt (map).
[End of figure]
Percentages of dual-use equipment available to nondeployed Army
National Guard units vary significantly by equipment type. Table 4
provides examples of some of the dual-use equipment items for which the
national inventory is at 15 percent or less of the authorized amount
for warfighting missions, including substitute items. Items at 15
percent or less of their authorized amount include types of trucks,
generators, communications equipment, and chemical protective gear.
Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where
the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized
for Warfighting Missions, Including Substitutes:
Chemical biological protective shelter;
Number of items authorized: 168;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 0.
Radio set (AN/PRC-148 urban version);
Number of items authorized: 468;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 0.
Dump truck (MTV W/E);
Number of items authorized: 733;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 0.
Diesel generator set (28 volt);
Number of items authorized: 267;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 2.
Navigation set: GPS receiver;
Number of items authorized: 25,382;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 5.
Electromagnetic radiation meter (ME-513/U);
Number of items authorized: 33;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 9.
Thermal sight (AN/PAS-13A);
Number of items authorized: 7,647;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 9.
High mobility cargo trailer (3/4 ton);
Number of items authorized: 5,656;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 9.
Satellite communications terminal (AN/TSC-154);
Number of items authorized: 40;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 10.
Expanded capacity HMMWV (4x4, W/E, M1113)[A];
Number of items authorized: 2,591;
Percentage available to nondeployed forces: 15.
Source: GAO analysis of Army National Guard data as of November 2006.
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.
[A] A high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle is a type of utility
truck.
[End of table]
However, without clearly defined requirements for the National Guard's
domestic missions based on events like those described in the Homeland
Security Council's national planning scenarios, there is no benchmark
to judge how many of these items Army National Guard units need to
effectively respond. Amounts required for domestic missions may differ
significantly from the amounts required for the National Guard's
warfighting missions. For example, a nondeployed National Guard force
in a state may have only a small percentage of the amount of a type of
truck required for its warfighting missions, reflecting a shortfall.
However, it may still have enough of that type of truck to perform its
domestic missions, or may have other types of trucks it could use.
National Guard officials in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West
Virginia generally expressed the opinion that, while stressed by
overseas operations, their forces have the capability and equipment to
address typical state missions. For example, New Jersey National Guard
officials said their units had enough equipment to respond to all state
missions that took place during the peak of the state National Guard's
overseas deployments in 2004. Officials noted that nondeployed Army
National Guard units continue to face equipment shortages caused by the
need to transfer significant quantities of equipment to units deploying
overseas.[Footnote 27] While reduced equipment levels caused by
overseas operations complicated its response, the New Jersey National
Guard adapted and used the equipment it had available to effectively
respond to its missions. National Guard officials in California,
Florida, and West Virginia expressed similar levels of confidence in
their forces' ability to respond to typical state missions using
currently available equipment. However, some state National Guard
officials expressed concerns about whether they would have enough
equipment to respond to large-scale events similar to Hurricane Katrina
or those described in the Homeland Security Council's national planning
scenarios.
DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard Equipment
Challenges, but Long-term Effect on Domestic Preparedness Is Unclear:
We have previously reported that ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have significantly decreased the amount of equipment
available to nondeployed Guard units to respond to domestic events.
Moreover, the Guard's experience with Hurricane Katrina helped to
illustrate the types of equipment that are valuable in responding to
domestic disasters. In response to these events, DOD is taking some
actions to address National Guard equipment challenges and improve the
Guard's preparedness for both overseas and domestic missions. However,
the long-term effect of these initiatives is unclear because some
initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and specific
plans are still being developed. For example, the Army plans to procure
additional equipment for National Guard units during the next few years
but has not clearly defined how much equipment will be available for
nondeployed units.
DOD Is Procuring Items and Transforming Units to Increase National
Guard's Equipment Readiness:
To improve the equipment readiness of National Guard units, DOD has
several initiatives under way. For example, DOD plans to use $900
million Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act[Footnote 28] to procure equipment for the Army
National Guard and Air National Guard that are useful for both
warfighting and domestic missions, such as communications gear,
tactical vehicles, trucks, and engineering equipment. In addition, DOD
also plans to use $290 million Congress provided in the 2007 Department
of Defense Appropriations Act to procure additional National Guard and
Reserve equipment.[Footnote 29]
The National Guard Bureau has also begun implementing four initiatives
intended to improve coordination and training of nondeployed National
Guard units for domestic missions. These four initiatives, which
involve both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard,
include establishing (1) a joint force headquarters in each state and
territory to provide military command and control capabilities; (2) 12
National Guard teams trained and equipped to deploy within 6 hours to
respond to domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
high-yield explosive incidents;[Footnote 30] (3) 10 detachments--one
for each Federal Emergency Management region--trained and equipped to
conduct mission assessments of defense industrial-base critical
infrastructure; and (4) at least one joint interagency training
capability to provide training to National Guard personnel on domestic
missions. To date, the National Guard Bureau has funded these
initiatives on a yearly basis by reprogramming funds, but it has
submitted formal proposals to DOD to incorporate the initiatives into
DOD's departmentwide programming and budgeting process. At the time of
our report, DOD had formally approved the joint force headquarters and
the establishment of 12 National Guard chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident response teams.
Formal approval from DOD means that these two initiatives were approved
by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which approves all new DOD
requirements, and may now compete to be included in DOD's Future Years
Defense Program. However, because DOD's priority remains its overseas
warfighting mission, the extent to which these domestically focused
initiatives will be funded remains uncertain.
Army Plans for Balancing Equipment for Deployed and Nondeployed
National Guard Units Are Not Well Defined:
The Army has budgeted approximately $21 billion for fiscal years 2005
through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its
equipment inventory. These funds are intended to facilitate the Army
National Guard's conversion to modular brigades as well as to help fill
long-standing equipment shortages. According to Army officials, items
procured will be standard warfighting equipment and may be deployed to
meet overseas demands and therefore may not always be available for
domestic missions. The Army plans to manage all of its equipment for
the active and reserve units using a new cyclical readiness and
deployment model for its forces, including Army National Guard forces,
which has implications for the National Guard's readiness for its
homeland missions. Under this model, Army National Guard units will
have access to three types of equipment sets over time as they prepare
for possible deployment once every 6 years: (1) a baseline set that
would vary by unit type and assigned mission; (2) a training set that
would include more of the equipment units would need to be ready for
deployment; and (3) a deployment set that would include all equipment
needed for deployment, including theater-specific equipment and
equipment from Army prepositioned stock. Figure 2 illustrates the
movement of units through the reset and train, ready, and available
phases of the force generation model.
Figure 2: The Army's Proposed Force Generation Model:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: The Army's force generation model proposes that Army National
Guard units will be available for deployment 1 year in every 6 years.
[End of figure]
Army plans call for the baseline set to provide Army National Guard
units in the reset/train pool, at a minimum, the equipment they would
need for their domestic missions. As of September 2006, the Army was
still developing proposals for what would be included in each of the
three equipment sets. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the risks or
the ability of units in the earlier stages of the cycle to respond to
unforeseen domestic crises, such as large-scale natural disasters or
terrorist attacks. Although the Army has worked with the Army National
Guard to identify warfighting equipment that is highly useful for
domestic missions, it is not clear whether nondeployed Army National
Guard units will have sufficient quantities of such equipment during
the early phases of the Army's force generation model to respond
effectively to their domestic missions. State National Guard officials
in California and Florida expressed concerns that their Army National
Guard units will not have enough equipment for their domestic missions
during the first 3 years of the Army's new force generation model,
which is when units' equipment levels would be at their lowest. The
Army has taken some temporary actions to mitigate this concern. In
preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the Army directed the
temporary transfer of equipment such as trucks, night vision goggles,
and floodlights from active Army units to Army National Guard units in
the coastal states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. However, these
states' Army National Guard units were expected to return this
equipment no later than the end of the 180-day loan period. Moreover,
until the Army makes decisions as to what equipment should be included
in the baseline equipment set for nondeployed Army National Guard
units, National Guard officials in the states may be hampered in their
ability to plan and respond to large-scale, multistate events.
Conclusions:
With the challenging nature of the new security environment and
potential for large-scale, multistate events depicted in the national
planning scenarios, the nation expects the National Guard to be
prepared to provide an efficient and effective response to domestic
events. Without a designated agency to serve as a mechanism to
facilitate interstate planning for the National Guard's role in large-
scale, multistate events, the National Guard may lack plans that are
complete and integrated with other DOD, state, and federal plans so
that risks are identified and mitigated efficiently. Currently, the
National Guard Bureau has facilitated limited multistate planning, but
comprehensive planning that identifies equipment requirements and is
integrated with plans for using civilian and federal military forces
may remain incomplete unless the bureau's charter and civil support
regulation are updated to reflect this facilitation role. As a result,
the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to domestic events,
particularly large-scale, multistate events such as those described in
the national planning scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as
possible.
DOD's current readiness measures and reports do not provide a rigorous
assessment of the extent to which the National Guard's nondeployed
units have the equipment they need to respond to the full range of
their domestic missions. While DOD has begun to collect data on the
readiness of nondeployed National Guard units using proxy measures and
subjective assessments of military commanders, this effort is not fully
mature and faces limitations. Without validated requirements for the
types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs for domestic
missions, it will be difficult to measure units' preparedness for those
missions. Until DOD's efforts to improve its measures and reports are
mature and the Guard's required capabilities are better defined and
tracked, decision makers will lack information on whether the Guard has
the equipment it needs to respond effectively to large-scale,
multistate events. Moreover, Congress and federal and state decision
makers will have limited information with which to mitigate risks and
prioritize investments for the National Guard's missions.
While DOD is taking steps to address the Army National Guard's and the
Air National Guard's equipment challenges, the effectiveness of these
initiatives to improve the National Guard's domestic preparedness is
not clear. Moreover, unless DOD, in coordination with other federal and
state agencies that will be involved in responding to large-scale
events such as the national planning scenarios, defines the
requirements for nondeployed National Guard forces, there is no
benchmark with which to assess the effectiveness of the initiatives. In
addition, because the Army has not yet defined the amount and types of
equipment that will be available to nondeployed Army National Guard
units, state and federal agencies lack information they could use to
plan to respond to domestic emergencies. Specifically, they lack
information on whether the Army National Guard will have sufficient
quantities of equipment during the early phases of the Army's force
generation model to respond effectively to domestic missions. Until the
Army makes decisions as to what equipment nondeployed Army National
Guard forces can expect to have on hand, it will remain unclear whether
the National Guard has the equipment it needs to successfully perform
its domestic missions, including responding to large-scale, multistate
events.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:
* Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to add clarifying
language to the National Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define its
roles in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the
National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those
contained in the national planning scenarios, and monitoring the
Guard's status to perform these missions.
* Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief,
National Guard Bureau, to update the National Guard Bureau's 1996 civil
support regulation to reflect the National Guard Bureau's role in
coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for large-scale,
multistate events. The regulation should also be updated to formalize
procedures for coordination with organizations that have been
established since the regulation was last updated, such as the
Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern Command, as well as
for the use of new planning tools like the National Response Plan and
the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios.
* Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief,
National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S. Northern Command,
U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian authorities, to
take actions to facilitate and coordinate interstate National Guard
planning to identify the capabilities, including equipment, the
National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events,
consistent with the Homeland Security Council's national planning
scenarios and state and federal plans.
* Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
submit a report to Congress on DOD's plans for assessing and reporting
on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions
in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. This report
should include:
- DOD's progress to date in incorporating these missions into the
Defense Readiness Reporting System;
- the specific missions for which National Guard units will report
their readiness; and:
- the standards, including any equipment measures, given to National
Guard unit commanders to consider when making their readiness
assessments for these missions.
* Direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a
plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National
Guard baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the plan should include:
- a timeline for defining the requirements of nondeployed Army National
Guard baseline equipment sets,
- the analytical basis and domestic mission requirements used to
determine the equipment required in the baseline set,
- readiness standards and measures that will be used to track the
status of the baseline equipment sets, and:
- the Army's plan for funding and filling baseline equipment sets.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Congress should consider amending the statute prescribing the National
Guard Bureau's charter to require language clarifying the National
Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating interstate
planning for the National Guard's use in large-scale, multistate
events, such as those contained in the national planning scenarios, and
require DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support
regulation to reflect the clarification in the charter.
In addition, to ensure that it is kept informed of the National Guard's
equipment status for its domestic missions, Congress should consider
revising the statutory requirement for the annual National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Report to include an assessment of (1) the Guard's
equipping preparedness to provide support to civil authorities,
particularly for large-scale, multistate events; (2) the risks to those
missions associated with any equipment shortfalls; and (3) mitigation
strategies and investment priorities. Further, to provide information
on what equipment will be available for the National Guard's domestic
missions under the Army's force generation model, Congress should
consider requiring the department to include in the 2009 National Guard
and Reserve Equipment Report a plan and funding strategy for providing
baseline equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department partially agreed
with our recommendation that the department report to Congress on DOD's
plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National Guard
units to perform domestic missions in response to natural disasters or
terrorist events. The department disagreed with our recommendations
that (1) the National Guard Bureau's charter be revised to include
language clarifying the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating
and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard's use in
large-scale, multistate events, (2) the National Guard Bureau's 1996
civil support regulation be updated to reflect the change to the
National Guard Bureau's charter and to establish procedures for state
National Guards and the National Guard Bureau to use to coordinate with
new organizations and for using new planning tools, (3) the National
Guard Bureau take actions to facilitate interstate Guard planning to
identify capabilities the National Guard would need to respond to large-
scale, multistate events, and (4) the Secretary of the Army develop and
submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing
nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. As we
discussed in our report, state planning for the Guard's role in
catastrophic events contained in the national planning scenarios has
not been consistent or thorough. We continue to believe that the
actions we recommend are important to improve interstate planning and
visibility of the National Guard's readiness for domestic missions.
Therefore, we have included these actions as matters for congressional
consideration. Specifically, Congress should consider (1) amending the
statute prescribing the National Guard Bureau's charter to include
coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National
Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained
in the national planning scenarios, (2) requiring DOD to revise the
National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation to implement this
change, and (3) in addition to requiring DOD to report on the National
Guard's equipment readiness for domestic missions, require DOD to
submit the Army's plans and funding strategy for providing equipment to
nondeployed Army National Guard forces for domestic missions in its
2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report.
In its written comments on a draft of this report, the department
stated that our recommendation to change the National Guard Bureau's
charter is not needed because the current charter already authorizes
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and
facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large-
scale, multistate events. As our report discusses in detail, the
charter, signed by the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force in
1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard Bureau responsibility for
facilitating and supporting the training of members and units of the
National Guard to meet state requirements as well as responsibility for
facilitating and coordinating with the Departments of the Army and the
Air Force the use of National Guard personnel and resources for several
functions, including natural disasters and military support to civil
authorities. Despite the fact that the department believes that the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau has a key role in coordinating and
facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large-
scale, multistate events, the charter does not contain language
specifically defining this role. Since the charter was last updated,
the security environment in which the National Guard operates has
changed significantly, with the National Guard now being used
extensively for overseas military operations while needing to remain
prepared for additional threats at home. Furthermore, new planning
tools, such as the National Response Plan and the national planning
scenarios, have been developed to guide federal, state, and local
planning for large-scale domestic emergencies. As the response to
Hurricane Katrina illustrated, there is a need for detailed planning
for the Guard's use in large-scale natural or man-made domestic
emergencies. As we discussed in this report, planning for the National
Guard's use in responding to events such as the national planning
scenarios is currently uneven. Although this interstate planning role
is not clearly defined in its charter, the National Guard Bureau has
taken some steps to perform this role to a limited extent. Our
recommendation to add clarifying language to the National Guard
Bureau's charter to clearly define the bureau's role in coordinating
and facilitating multistate planning is intended to highlight the
importance of these activities so that the National Guard is prepared
to respond to multistate events as efficiently and effectively as
possible. We continue to believe that this role is important and that
making this activity an explicit responsibility of the National Guard
Bureau would further the goal of facilitating multistate planning and
would increase the states' and the nation's capability to respond to
large-scale incidents. Therefore, we have included as a matter for
congressional consideration amending the statute prescribing the
National Guard Bureau's charter to include language clarifying this
role.
The department also disagreed with our recommendation that the Chief,
National Guard Bureau, should update the National Guard Bureau's 1996
civil support regulation to include the National Guard Bureau's role in
facilitating interstate planning and to address the creation of new
organizations and planning tools. In its comments, the department
raised two major concerns. First, the department asserted that the
direction to update the regulation should come from the Secretaries of
the Army and the Air Force. Therefore, we have modified our report to
direct the recommendation to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force
to direct the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to update the regulation.
Second, the department also commented that it is not appropriate for
the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other federal
agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of the
Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders--in the case of
homeland missions, U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Pacific Command--and
would infringe on the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense over homeland activities. We understand the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant
Commanders with regard to coordinating with federal agencies, and we
understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
has authority over the department's homeland defense activities and
responsibility for representing DOD on homeland defense-related matters
in the interagency environment and for coordinating federal military
support to civil authorities. Further, we agree with the comment that
governors have responsibility for the coordination and use of National
Guard forces in state status and that the governors could coordinate
with federal agencies if necessary. Our recommendation was not intended
to designate the National Guard Bureau as the DOD entity to coordinate
with other federal agencies or to infringe on the governors' role in
coordination with federal agencies. Our intent was to recommend that
the National Guard's civil support regulation be updated in order to
more accurately reflect the National Guard Bureau's role in
coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National
Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events, and to formalize
procedures for state and National Guard Bureau coordination with
organizations established since September 11, 2001 and for the use of
new planning tools. We have changed the language of our recommendation
in the final report accordingly. Since September 11, 2001, many changes
have occurred in the security environment, including the creation of
entities such as the Department of Homeland Security as well as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern
Command within DOD. Planning tools have also been created, including
the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council's national
planning scenarios. The National Guard Bureau's civil support
regulation sets out the Chief of the National Guard Bureau's overall
responsibility for civil support programs and for issuing planning
guidance on the National Guard's role in providing military support to
civil authorities, and provides guidance to the states on preparing
emergency plans for the use of National Guard forces in a civil support
role, including coordination for assistance beyond state capabilities.
This regulation, last updated in 1996, pre-dates the changes to the
security environment and does not specifically address how coordination
with these organizations should occur or how these planning tools
should be used. The changed security environment since September 11,
2001, has increased the need for federal, state, and local authorities
to work together to enhance preparedness. As the response to Hurricane
Katrina illustrated, the nation relies on the National Guard to respond
to the effects of large-scale, multistate emergencies and the National
Guard Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating Guard support
among the states when such an event takes place. The Katrina response
also showed that there is a lack of pre-event planning and
understanding among federal and state responders about the type of
assistance and capabilities that the National Guard can provide.
Updating the regulation is an important step to minimize confusion
about how the bureau and state Guard forces should work with
organizations and planning tools established since September 11, 2001,
how coordination of planning efforts for the Guard's use among federal,
state, and local authorities should take place, and where the
accountability for coordination lies. The National Guard Bureau's
position as a channel of communication between the states and the Army
and Air Force makes it uniquely positioned to facilitate interstate
planning for events that may require support from multiple states or
across state boundaries; we agree with the department that it does play
a key role in this capacity. We continue to believe that updating the
National Guard Bureau's regulation to reflect changes to the security
environment and to clarify how the state National Guards and the
National Guard Bureau will work with new organizations and use national
planning tools to strengthen pre-event planning for large-scale,
multistate events is needed. Therefore, we have included as a matter
for congressional consideration a requirement for the department to
revise the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation.
In its comments, the department also disagreed that the National Guard
Bureau should take actions to facilitate and coordinate state National
Guard planning to identify capabilities the Guard would need to respond
to multistate events and asserted that the responsibility for overall
supervision of homeland defense activities within DOD resides with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. First, while we
understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
is in charge of federal defense support to civilian authorities, the
Assistant Secretary is not charged with planning for National Guard
activities that will likely be conducted under the command and control
of the state governor. We are not recommending that the National Guard
Bureau undertake the responsibilities of the state governors, but
rather provide a facilitating and coordinating function between states
for those events that may involve the use of National Guard forces from
multiple states. Second, in its comments, DOD said that the overall
supervision of homeland defense activities within DOD is a function
that should remain with a civilian official rather than a military
officer. We agree and are not recommending that the National Guard
Bureau supervise either federal or state-led forces but rather that the
bureau facilitate and coordinate interstate planning for domestic
emergencies that involve Guard forces from multiple states and which
may be federally funded. Third, in its comments, DOD also stated that
training and equipping the National Guard is the responsibility of the
Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. As we stated in this report, DOD
is responsible for planning for DOD's federal missions and training and
equipping the National Guard for these missions. As mentioned, training
for the Guard's federal missions is also federally funded. We did not
recommend changes to the responsibilities for training and equipping
the National Guard. Rather, our recommendation is directed to improving
interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces for large-
scale domestic events in their state roles that are likely to be
federally funded. As DOD acknowledges in its comments on our first
recommendation, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, plays a key role in
coordinating and facilitating state-level planning for the employment
of National Guard forces to meet large-scale disasters. We agree with
this assessment and therefore continue to believe that the National
Guard Bureau is well-positioned to facilitate planning and promote
cooperation in identifying regional and national assets needed for
response efforts so that decision makers can prioritize investments to
mitigate risks. This recommendation is consistent with a recommendation
we made in our previous report examining the response to Hurricane
Katrina with which the department agreed. In that report, we
recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should work with the
state governors and state Guards to identify capabilities the National
Guard will likely provide for homeland security missions and make that
information available to other organizations with federal military
support to civil authorities planning responsibilities.[Footnote 31] We
have raised as a matter for congressional consideration amending the
statute that prescribes the National Guard Bureau's charter to include
this interstate planning role.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness submit a report to Congress on
DOD's plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National
Guard units to perform domestic missions. DOD agreed that readiness
reporting and tracking is critical to ensuring the execution of the
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, but commented that
this includes the readiness to perform domestic missions of all 10
military components, not just the Army National Guard and Air National
Guard. We agree that readiness reporting and tracking are critical and
recognize that all 10 military components may participate in homeland
defense and civil support missions; however, the scope of our review
was limited to the Army National Guard and Air National Guard.
Moreover, in recognition that the National Guard has a unique role in
domestic response, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness' guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System
specifically directed the National Guard to include assessments of its
readiness for state-led, federally-funded missions in the new readiness
reporting system. This information on the National Guard's domestic
readiness would be useful to Congress as it deliberates improvements to
national preparedness. As a result, we continue to believe that the
department should report to Congress on the status of efforts to
measure National Guard readiness for domestic missions.
DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that the Army should develop
and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing
nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. The department
asserted that such a report would be unnecessary because Reserve
component requirements are evaluated and prioritized within the
department's budget process and presented to Congress as part of the
department's overall budget. We did not recommend changes to the
department's budgeting process. Rather, our recommendation that the
Army provide Congress a separate report on nondeployed forces'
equipment is based on the fact that Congress does not have visibility
over the effects of the recent high use of National Guard equipment for
overseas operations and the risks that depleted domestic equipment
inventories pose to the National Guard's ability to respond to domestic
missions. Because nondeployed National Guard forces rely on the
equipment they have on hand to respond to domestic events, the
equipment they can expect to have available at all times is of primary
importance to the state National Guard's ability to plan for their
domestic missions. Therefore, we continue to believe the Congress
should be informed of the specifics of the department's plans,
including timelines and funding strategies, to enable it to consider
current and future risks against proposed investments. As a result, we
have included as a matter for congressional consideration a requirement
for the department to include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Report the Army's plan and funding strategy for providing
equipment for nondeployed Army National Guard units.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to
the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air
Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
on the GAO website at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4402. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios:
The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 national planning
scenarios, whose purpose is to form the basis for identifying the
capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The
scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local
first responders will have to address and are intended to illustrate
the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic events for which
the nation needs to be prepared. Table 5 summarizes the 15 scenarios
that have been developed to assess the emergency response and
preparedness capabilities of federal, state, local, and tribal
governments as well as the private sector and describes their projected
consequences. These scenarios have not been developed to identify
events that are likely to occur; instead, they facilitate efforts by
all government agencies to assess the full range of needs that might be
required if events similar to these scenarios take place.
Table 5: Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios and
Summary Descriptions:
Threat: Nuclear detonation;
Description summary: Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear device in
a large city;
Projected consequences[A]: 450,000 or more evacuees, 3,000 square miles
contaminated, and hundreds of billions of dollars in economic impact.
Threat: Biological attack;
Description summary: Terrorists spray anthrax spores in a city using a
concealed spray device;
Projected consequences[A]: 13,000 fatalities and injuries, extensive
contamination, and billions of dollars in economic impact.
Threat: Biological disease outbreak--pandemic influenza;
Description summary: Natural outbreak of pandemic influenza that begins
in China and spreads to other countries;
Projected consequences[A]: 87,000 fatalities, 300,000 hospitalizations,
and $70 billion to $160 billion impact.
Threat: Biological attack--plague;
Description summary: Terrorists release pneumonic plague into three
areas of a large city;
Projected consequences[A]: 2,500 fatalities, 7,000 injuries, millions
of dollars in economic impact, and possible evacuations.
Threat: Chemical attack--blister agent;
Description summary: Terrorists spray a combination of blister agents
into a crowded football stadium;
Projected consequences[A]: 150 fatalities, 70,000 hospitalized, more
than 100,000 persons evacuated, and $500 million in economic impact.
Threat: Chemical attack--toxic industrial chemicals;
Description summary: Terrorists use grenades and explosive devices at
petroleum facilities;
Projected consequences[A]: 350 fatalities, 1,000 hospitalizations, 50
percent of facility damaged, and up to 700,000 persons evacuated.
Threat: Chemical attack--nerve agent;
Description summary: Terrorists spray Sarin into the ventilation system
of three commercial buildings in a city;
Projected consequences[A]: 6,000 fatalities in buildings, 350 injuries
downwind, evacuation of unknown number of people, and $300 million in
economic impact.
Threat: Chemical attack--chlorine tank explosion;
Description summary: Terrorists use explosives to release a large
quantity of chlorine gas;
Projected consequences[A]: 17,500 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations,
up to 70,000 persons evacuated, and contamination at site and
waterways.
Threat: Natural disaster--major earthquake;
Description summary: A 7.2 magnitude earthquake occurs in a major
metropolitan area;
Projected consequences[A]: 1,400 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations,
150,000 buildings destroyed, and hundreds of billions of dollars in
economic impact.
Threat: Natural disaster--major hurricane;
Description summary: Category 5 hurricane strikes a major city;
Projected consequences[A]: 1,000 fatalities, 5,000 hospitalizations, 1
million people evacuated, and millions of dollars in economic impact.
Threat: Radiological attack--radiological dispersal device (RDD);
Description summary: Terrorists detonate "dirty bombs" in three cities
in close proximity;
Projected consequences[A]: 180 fatalities, 20,000 detectible
contaminations in each city, and billions of dollars in economic
impact.
Threat: Explosives attack--bombing using improvised explosive devise
(IED);
Description summary: Terrorists detonate IEDs in a sports arena, use
suicide bombers in a public transit concourse, and in a parking
facility;
Projected consequences[A]: 100 fatalities, 450 hospitalizations, local
economic impact, and minimal evacuations.
Threat: Biological attack--food contamination;
Description summary: Terrorists contaminate food with anthrax in
processing facilities;
Projected consequences[A]: 300 fatalities, 400 hospitalizations, and
millions of dollars in economic impact.
Threat: Biological attack--Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth
Disease);
Description summary: Terrorists infect livestock at specific locations;
Projected consequences[A]: No casualties, huge loss of livestock, and
hundred of millions of dollars in economic impact.
Threat: Cyber attack;
Description summary: Terrorists conduct cyber attacks on U.S. financial
infrastructure;
Projected consequences[A]: No casualties, millions of dollars in
economic impact.
Source: Congressional Research Service.
[A] These hypothetical results are among those presented in the
scenarios. They are intended to be illustrative to use in identifying
the types of situations responding units should be prepared to address.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed
documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern
Command, Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Air Force North
(previously First Air Force), the National Guard Bureau, the Army
National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Department of Homeland
Security. We also developed case studies of four states: California,
Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia. These states were selected
because they had an average to high number of disaster declarations in
the last 53 years, are geographically dispersed across the United
States, reported varying levels of National Guard domestic response
capability, faced a range of homeland security risks, and were involved
in National Guard Bureau domestic capability initiatives.
To identify the extent to which the National Guard's equipment
requirements for its full range of domestic missions have been
identified, we reviewed domestic operational planning documents,
including the Department of Defense's (DOD) Strategic Planning
Guidance, the Army Campaign Plan, planning documents provided by case
study states, and the National Response Plan. We supplemented this
information by interviewing officials in DOD, U.S. Northern Command,
the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Homeland Security, and our
case study states to review their planning processes for the full range
of the National Guard's domestic mission. In each case study state, we
reviewed plans for the use of National Guard forces and assessed the
extent to which they addressed the national planning scenarios and the
extent to which these plans identified specific equipment requirements.
We also discussed with state National Guard leaders processes for
planning and coordinating with multiple state and federal agencies and
challenges to planning for large-scale, multistate emergencies. We did
not review case study state budget documents to independently verify
the level of planning resources available to their state National
Guards.
To assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for the full range of
their domestic missions, we reviewed documentation on DOD's readiness
reporting system, the Global Status of Resources and Training System,
as well as the new system DOD plans to have fully operational in late
2007, the Defense Readiness Reporting System. We also analyzed data,
reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials about the National
Guard Bureau's state capability tracking system, the Joint Capabilities
Database. Specifically, using data from the National Guard's Joint
Capabilities Database, we determined the number of states that reported
adequate capabilities for typical state missions, the capabilities most
frequently reported as inadequate, and the reasons why. In addition,
using Army National Guard data on equipment useful for both warfighting
and domestic missions, we compared the amount of equipment available
for Army National Guard forces by state and item against the amount
they are authorized for warfighting missions. Further, we examined
DOD's annual report to Congress on National Guard equipping, the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report.
To determine the extent to which DOD is taking actions to address the
National Guard's domestic equipment challenges, we reviewed and
analyzed information about steps being taken to enhance the National
Guard's capabilities and increase equipment for nondeployed National
Guard units. Information we reviewed included DOD appropriations
documents, Army budget information, and National Guard Bureau change
request packages. Further, we reviewed and analyzed relevant DOD, Army,
Air Force, and National Guard equipping strategies and policies and
discussed the impact of the Army transformation plans on nondeployed
forces. We also reviewed Army documentation on plans for implementing
its force generation model to determine the extent to which the plans
define equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units for
domestic missions.
We conducted our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our
objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they
ensured their own data reliability and reviewed their data collection
methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control
measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and when
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and
reliability.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
1500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-1500:
Dec 18 2006:
Reserve Affairs:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, Northwest:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness", dated November 21,
2006, (GAO Code 350768/GAO-07-60).
The Department appreciates the insightful and thorough approach that
your team has taken with this important issue. The National Guard plays
a critical role in performing both federal and state missions, and we
are taking positive steps to address equipment challenges to ensure our
soldiers are the very best equipped and trained. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide the enclosed comments.
The point of contact for this office is Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Burke,
OASD/RA, at 703-693-4207.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas F. Hall:
GAO Draft Report - Dated November 21, 2006 GAO Code 350768/GAO-07-60:
"RESERVE FORCES: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to revise the National
Guard Bureau's charter to clearly define its roles in coordinating and
facilitating state planning for the National Guard's use in large-
scale, multistate events such as those contained in the national
planning scenarios and monitoring the Guard's status to perform these
missions.
DOD Response: Non-concur. This function is already authorized in the
existing Charter, as signed by the two Service Secretaries. The Chief
of the National Guard Bureau, although not in command of Army or Air
National Guard forces, does play a key role in coordinating and
facilitating state-level planning for the employment of National Guard
forces to meet large-scale domestic disasters.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to update the National
Guard Bureau's civil support regulation to reflect both the National
Guard Bureau's role in coordinating and facilitating state planning for
large-scale, multistate events and coordinating with new organizations
that have been established since the regulation was last updated in
1996, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern
Command, as well as new planning tools like the National Response Plan
and the Homeland Security Council's national planning scenarios.
DOD Response: Non-concur. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau does
not work for the Secretary of Defense, but for the Secretaries of the
Army and the Air Force. Therefore, it is appropriate that any direction
to update the National Guard Bureau's civil support regulation will
come directly from them.
It is not appropriate for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to
coordinate directly with other Federal agencies. This is the
responsibility, if required, of the Secretary of Defense and the
Combatant Commanders. Further, this infringes on the authority of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense over the homeland
defense activities of the Department of Defense under 10 U.S.C.
138(b)(3). It would also infringe on the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense's responsibility to represent the Department of
Defense on homeland matters, including defense support to civil
authorities, in dealings with the Executive Office of the President,
the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal departments and
agencies, and State and local authorities.
If National Guard forces are used to respond to a natural disaster or
provide support to civil authorities in a Federal status, the National
Guard Bureau should continue to be the channel of communications as
currently prescribed in its charter. This is working well and need not
be changed. If National Guard forces are used in a State duty status,
the coordination of the use of those forces would be the responsibility
of the governor of the State, not the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau, and the governor could coordinate with the Department of
Homeland Security, if other federal agencies are involved.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in coordination with
DoD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other
civilian authorities, to take actions to facilitate and coordinate
state National Guard planning to identify the capabilities, including
equipment, the National Guard would need nationally to respond to large-
scale, multistate events, consistent with the Homeland Security
Council's national planning scenarios and state and federal plans.
DOD Response: Non-concur. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau plays
a key role in coordinating National Guard domestic disaster response.
However, by law, the responsibility for overall supervision of Homeland
Defense activities within the Department of Defense resides with
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. As written, the
recommendation would infringe upon the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense's responsibility regarding defense support to
civil authorities. This function should remain with a civilian official
rather than a military officer, especially here at home. The Chief of
the National Guard Bureau already coordinates with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as the Assistant Secretary
carries out his responsibilities.
Also, by law, the responsibility for training and equipping the
National Guard resides with the Secretaries of the Anny and the Air
Force. These responsibilities should not be split depending upon the
type of activity that the National Guard might perform.
These functions should remain with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense, and the Secretaries of the respective Military
Department, in consultation with the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
submit a report to Congress on DoD's plans for assessing and reporting
on the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions
in response to natural disasters or terrorist events. This report
should include:
* DoD's progress to date in incorporating these missions into the
Defense Readiness Reporting System;
* The specific missions on which National Guard units will report their
readiness; and,
* The standards, including any equipment measures, given to National
Guard unit commanders to consider when making their readiness
assessments for these missions.
DOD Response: Partially concur. Readiness reporting and tracking is
critical to ensuring the execution of the Department's Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support. This includes the readiness to
perform domestic missions by all ten military components, not just the
Army and Air National Guard.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a
plan and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National
Guard baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the plan should include:
* A timeline for defining the requirements of nondeployed Army National
Guard baseline sets;
* The analytical basis and domestic mission requirements used to
determine the equipment required in the baseline set;
* Readiness standards and measures that will be used to track the
status of the baseline equipment sets; and:
* The Army's plan for funding and filling baseline equipment sets.
DOD Response: Non-concur. Another report to Congress is deemed to be
unnecessary. The National Guard's needs and requirements are presented,
debated, validated and prioritized right along with all organizations
in the Department. All of the Reserve components (RCs), including the
National Guard, are integrated into their respective parent Service's
Planning Programming and Budgeting process. The Services all utilize a
layered resource review process, with various boards and panels that
rigorously prioritize funding requirements from the lower to the higher
levels, so that in the end, those requirements deemed highest priority
are funded above those deemed of lesser priority. At the start of the
process, each RC is given a portion of the parent Service's top-line to
fund their programs; such as, pay and allowances, recruiting, training,
and equipping. Many requirements compete for funding within each RC's
budget, and when the RC's estimates are completed, they are forwarded
to their parent Service for review and integration with Service-wide
priorities.
The Services' proposals, including the RCs, are then provided to OSD
for analysis and balancing across the Defense Department. During this
phase, OSD reviews each Service's estimates, prioritizes with other DoD
requirements to ensure that the Defense Department's highest priorities
are resourced, and coordinates with OMB. The end product presented to
the Congress is one that specifically integrates the Reserve
components, has been reviewed at many levels, usually multiple times,
and represents the Department's best judgment of the resources needed
to accomplish DOD's assigned overall mission.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Alissa Czyz; Matthew Dove; Paul Gvoth; Nicole Harms;
Catherine Humphries; David Marroni; Kenneth Patton; Jerome Sandau; Jay
Smale; and Suzanne Wren made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Related Products:
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st
Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington D.C.: September 21, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans. GAO-06-
745. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but
Accountability Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and
Focused Departmentwide. GAO-06-1042 Washington, D.C.: September 21,
2006.
Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support
Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498.
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643.
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation
Initiatives. GAO-06-111. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2005.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926. Washington,
D.C.: September 29, 2005.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.:
November 10, 2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. Washington,
D.C.: April 29, 2004.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2003.
FOOTNOTES
[1] According to the Office of Homeland Security's National Strategy
for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security
is a broad term that encompasses efforts to reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as
respond to an attack that might occur. DOD refers to its contributions
to the overall homeland security efforts it expects to lead as
"homeland defense" and activities DOD will perform in support of
efforts led by other federal, state, or local agencies as "defense
support of civil authorities."
[2] The Homeland Security Council is composed of cabinet-level
officials and coordinates homeland security-related activities among
executive departments and agencies.
[3] GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4,
2005).
[4] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[5] The office was established by the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 902
(2002).
[6] U.S. Pacific Command has homeland defense and civil support
responsibilities for Hawaii and the U.S. territories in the Pacific
Ocean.
[7] National Guard members train for their federal missions under state
control with federal funding. Federal laws also authorize federal
funding for some other state-controlled missions, such as the National
Guard's counterdrug support operations and weapons of mass destruction
civil support teams.
[8] 10 U.S.C. §10501.
[9] 10 U.S.C. §10503.
[10] The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101
(2002).
[11] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the Department of
Homeland Security to consolidate existing federal government emergency
response plans into a single integrated and coordinated national
response plan.
[12] DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, par.
4.4.8.2 (Jan. 15, 1993). DOD is developing a new directive for defense
support to civil authorities that will supersede several existing
directives, including its current military support to civil authorities
directive.
[13] Two exceptions to this are the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (a
dedicated command and control element) and the National Guard's weapons
of mass destruction civil support teams.
[14] Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2
Report (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). The report presents the
results of reviews and assessments of the status of state emergency
operations plans as well as the emergency operations plans of 75 of the
nation's largest urban areas. For the purposes of this report, we have
focused on report findings as they relate to state emergency operations
plans.
[15] Army Regulation 130-5/Air Force Mission Directive 10, Organization
and Functions of National Guard Bureau (Jan. 30, 2002). The National
Guard Bureau Charter, dated September 1, 1995, is contained within this
regulation.
[16] National Guard Regulation 500-1, Military Support to Civil
Authorities (Feb. 1, 1996).
[17] 10 U.S.C. § 117.
[18] 10 U.S.C. § 10541.
[19] Specifically, the language in the statute refers to equipment
requirements for the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve of each
component of the armed forces, including the Army National Guard and
Air National Guard. The Selected Reserve includes individual
mobilization augmentees--individuals who train regularly, for pay, with
active component units--as well as members who participate in regular
training as members of National Guard and Reserve units.
[20] The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is
responsible for overseeing the fielding of the Defense Readiness
Reporting System.
[21] We did not analyze state assessments in the Joint Capabilities
Database of their National Guard capabilities for responding to larger,
nonroutine events because National Guard Bureau officials did not
consider these data to be fully mature at the time of our audit.
[22] The Joint Capabilities Database includes assessments from all 50
states as well as Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.
[23] Civil support teams are designed to support civil authorities in
the event of a domestic weapons of mass destruction event by
identifying weapons of mass destruction agents and substances,
assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response
measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional
support. There are 55 civil support teams--two in California and one in
every other state as well as Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and Guam. Thirty-six of these teams had been certified
as fully capable as of May 2006; the remaining 19 will be certified by
the end of fiscal year 2007.
[24] This figure includes substitute equipment authorized by Army
regulation. Army Regulation 700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and
Sustainability (Feb. 26, 2004), defines substitute items as items
authorized for issue instead of authorized standard items when the
authorized standard items are not available for issue to the unit.
[25] At the time of our analysis, the Army National Guard had
identified a total of 342 types of dual-use equipment. Of these, 319
had available data and were included in our analysis.
[26] The Army National Guard has over 90 percent of its authorized
amount of 19 types of dual-use equipment. For some of these types of
equipment, such as rifles, the Guard is authorized large numbers of
individual items. These large numbers of individual items make up
nearly half of the Guard's inventory of dual-use equipment. When these
large numbers are included in the Guard's inventory, the overall
percentage of equipment available is greater than the average of many
of the other types of equipment.
[27] GAO-06-111.
[28] Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-148 (2005) provided $1 billion for National Guard and
Reserve equipment. The conference report accompanying that act
specified that of the $1 billion, $700 million should go to the Army
National Guard and $200 million should go to the Air National Guard.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-359, at 483 (2005).
[29] Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
289 (2006). The conference report accompanying the act states that the
conferees intend for $150 million of the $290 million to go toward
equipping the National Guard. In addition, the conferees directed that
$2.94 billion of procurement funds provided in Title IX of the act
shall be available for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve,
and that $500 million of these funds should be used specifically to
meet the 10 core capabilities identified by the National Guard Bureau
as essential to support domestic missions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-676,
at 223, 372 (2006).
[30] Section 412 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163 (2006), authorized end strengths for
reserves on active duty in support of the reserves. In the accompanying
conference report, the conferees specified that the end strength would
include five additional teams. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at 687
(2005).
[31] GAO-06-643.
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