Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq
GAO Audit Approach and Findings Gao ID: GAO-07-385T January 18, 2007GAO provided a strategic overview of GAO's work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In our statement today, as requested, GAO highlighted (1) GAO's scope, authority, and coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our work in Iraq; and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO uses to ensure relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our work. This testimony is based upon extensive work spanning several years. Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For example, GAO sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key issues for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq. Although many of our sources are classified, we strive to report information to the Congress in a public format to promote greater transparency and accountability of U.S. government policies, programs, and activities. As provided for in our congressional protocols, most of our work in Iraq has been performed under my authority to conduct evaluations on my own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both chambers. Our work also helped inform the deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; the Comptroller General personally briefed this group on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. GAO also provided significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its use.
GAO and the Inspectors General (IG) of individual departments and agencies have different roles and responsibilities. GAO's broad audit authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work spans the security, political, and economic prongs of the U.S. national strategy in Iraq. The broad, cross-cutting nature of this work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by any individual Inspector General. Based on our work, we have made some unique contributions to Congress. Our past and ongoing work has focused on the U.S. strategy and costs of operating in Iraq, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, governance issues, the readiness of U.S. military forces, and acquisition outcomes. Some highlights from our work follow. Our analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq recommended that the National Security Council improve the strategy by articulating clearer roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In our examination of the cost of U.S. military operations abroad, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense improve the transparency and reliability of Department of Defense's (DOD) Global War on Terror (GWOT) obligation data. We also recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more predictable. In assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, we found that overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated despite increases in the numbers of trained and equipped security forces. A complete assessment of Iraqi security forces' capabilities is dependent on DOD providing GAO with the readiness levels of each Iraqi unit. We found that DOD faces significant challenges in maintaining U.S. military readiness for overseas and homeland missions and in sustaining rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of current operations continue at the present pace. In assessing the impact of ongoing military operations in Iraq on military equipment, we found that the Army and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace) equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. In reviewing efforts to secure munitions sites and provide force protection, we recommended that DOD conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment of unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate storage site security into strategic planning efforts. In assessing acquisition outcomes, we found that DOD often entered into contract arrangements with unclear requirements, which posed additional risks to the government. DOD also lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance system a clean opinion--only the second time a national audit institution has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress and the American people can have confidence that GAO's work is independent, objective, and reliable.
GAO-07-385T, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and Findings
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, January 18, 2007:
Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq:
GAO Audit Approach and Findings:
Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States:
Audit Approaches in Iraq:
GAO-07-385T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to provide a strategic overview of GAO's
work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In my
statement today, as requested, I will highlight (1) GAO's scope,
authority, and coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our
work in Iraq; and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO
uses to ensure relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our
work.
My statement today is based upon extensive work spanning several years.
Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For
example, I sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key
issues for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and
rebuild Iraq.[Footnote 1] Although many of our sources are classified,
we strive to report information to the Congress in a public format to
promote greater transparency and accountability of U.S. government
policies, programs, and activities. As provided for in our
congressional protocols, most of our work in Iraq has been performed
under my authority to conduct evaluations on my own initiative since it
is a matter of broad interest to the entire Congress and numerous
committees in both chambers. Our work also helped inform the
deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; I personally briefed this group
on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. We also provided
significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its use.
The work supporting this statement is based on our analysis of agency
plans and documents and discussions with relevant senior officials from
the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy, State, and the Treasury; the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Army Corps of
Engineers; the multinational force; the Defense Intelligence Agency;
and the Central Intelligence Agency. We conducted our reviews in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
GAO and the Inspectors General (IG) of individual departments and
agencies have different roles and responsibilities. GAO's broad audit
authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of
issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of
funding. Our work spans the security, political, and economic prongs of
the U.S. national strategy in Iraq. The broad, cross-cutting nature of
this work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by
any individual Inspector General.
Based on our work, we have made some unique contributions to Congress.
Our past and ongoing work has focused on the U.S. strategy and costs of
operating in Iraq, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces,
governance issues, the readiness of U.S. military forces, and
acquisition outcomes. Some highlights from our work follow:
* Our analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq recommended
that the National Security Council improve the strategy by articulating
clearer roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions,
and identifying current costs and future resources.
* In our examination of the cost of U.S. military operations abroad, we
recommended that the Secretary of Defense improve the transparency and
reliability of DOD's Global War on Terror (GWOT) obligation data. We
also recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget
once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more
predictable.
* In assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, we found that
overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated despite increases
in the numbers of trained and equipped security forces. A complete
assessment of Iraqi security forces' capabilities is dependent on DOD
providing GAO with the readiness levels of each Iraqi unit.
* We found that DOD faces significant challenges in maintaining U.S.
military readiness for overseas and homeland missions and in sustaining
rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and
intensity of current operations continue at the present pace.
* In assessing the impact of ongoing military operations in Iraq on
military equipment, we found that the Army and the Marine Corps have
initiated programs to reset (repair or replace) equipment and are
likely to incur large expenditures in the future.
* In reviewing efforts to secure munitions sites and provide force
protection, we recommended that DOD conduct a theaterwide survey and
risk assessment of unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and
incorporate storage site security into strategic planning efforts.
* In assessing acquisition outcomes, we found that DOD often entered
into contract arrangements with unclear requirements, which posed
additional risks to the government. DOD also lacked the capacity to
provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other
personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts.
In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality
assurance system a clean opinion--only the second time a national audit
institution has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus,
the Congress and the American people can have confidence that GAO's
work is independent, objective, and reliable.
GAO's Work in Iraq Is Broad and Coordinated with Other Audit
Authorities:
While the IGs are designed to focus primarily on exposing fraud, waste,
and abuse in individual federal agency programs, GAO's broad audit
authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of
issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of
funding. Although the IGs report to the heads of their respective
departments and make periodic reports to Congress, GAO reports directly
to Congress on a continuous basis. GAO consults regularly with its
oversight committees and relevant committees of jurisdiction regarding
key issues of national importance, such as U.S. fiscal solvency,
emergency preparedness, DOD transformation, global competitiveness, and
emerging health care and other challenges for the 21st century.
The Congress established the GAO in 1921 to investigate all matters
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds.
Since then, Congress has expanded GAO's statutory authorities and
frequently calls upon it to examine federal programs and their
performance, conduct financial and management audits, perform policy
analysis, provide legal opinions, adjudicate bid protests, and conduct
investigations. In 2006, the GAO issued more than 1,000 audit products
and produced a $105 return for each dollar invested in the
agency.[Footnote 2]
GAO has developed substantial expertise on security and reconstruction
issues, as well as having long-term relationships with State, Defense,
and USAID. Our work spans several decades and includes evaluations of
U.S. military and diplomatic programs and activities, including those
during and following contingency operations in Vietnam, the Persian
Gulf (Operations Desert Shield and Storm), Bosnia, and Afghanistan.
We also have many years of expertise in evaluating U.S. efforts to help
stabilize regions or countries; we have, for example, monitored U.S.
assistance programs in Asia, Central America, and Africa. The depth and
breadth of our work and the expertise we have built has helped
facilitate our ability to quickly gather facts and provide insights to
the Congress as events unfold, such as the conflict in Iraq. Our
current work draws on our past work and regular site visits to Iraq and
the surrounding region, such as Jordan and Kuwait. Furthermore, we plan
to establish a presence in Iraq beginning in March 2007 to provide
additional oversight of issues deemed important to Congress. Our plans,
however, are subject to adequate fiscal 2007 funding of GAO by the
Congress.
Our work in Iraq spans the three prongs of the U.S. national strategy
in Iraq--security, political, and economic. The broad, cross-cutting
nature of our work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and
duplication by individual IGs. We and other accountability
organizations take steps to coordinate our oversight with others to
avoid duplication and leverage our resources. In that regard, the
ability of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR) to provide in-country oversight of specific projects and
reconstruction challenges has enabled us to focus our work on more
strategic and cross-cutting national, sector, and interagency issues.
The expansion of SIGIR's authority underscores the need for close
coordination. We coordinate our work in Iraq through various forums,
including the Iraq Inspectors General Council (IIGC) and regular
discussions with the IG community. Established by what is now SIGIR,
IIGC provides a forum for discussion and collaboration among the IG and
staff at the many agencies involved in Iraq reconstruction activities.
Our work is coordinated through regular one-on-one meetings with SIGIR,
DOD, State, and USAID. We also coordinate our work with other
accountability organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) public corruption unit.
Key Findings and Recommendations from GAO's Work in Iraq:
Let me highlight some of the key findings and recommendations we have
made as a result of our continuing work in Iraq.
Assessment of the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
and the U.S. Military Campaign Plan:
In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's strategy
for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The
U.S. goals included establishing a peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq.
Our July 2006 report assessed the extent to which the NSVI and its
supporting documents addressed the six characteristics of an effective
national strategy.[Footnote 3] While we reported that the NSVI was an
improvement over previous U.S. planning efforts for stabilizing and
rebuilding Iraq, we concluded that the strategy fell short in at least
three key areas. First, it only partially identified the agencies
responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it
did not fully address how the United States will integrate its goals
with those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it did
not detail Iraq's anticipated contribution to its future needs. Third,
it only partially identified the current and future costs of U.S.
involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations,
building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding critical
infrastructure.
We recommended that the NSC improve the current strategy by
articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future
contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In
addition, our report urged the United States, Iraq, and the
international community to (1) enhance support capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces, (2) improve the capabilities of the national and
provincial governments, and (3) develop a comprehensive anti-corruption
strategy. In our view, congressional review of the President's 2007
plan for Iraq should consider whether it addresses the key elements of
a sound national strategy identified in our July 2006 report.
In October 2005, we issued a classified report on the military's
campaign plan for Iraq.[Footnote 4] In that report, we discussed the
military's counterinsurgency plan for Iraq and the conditions and
phases in the plan. The report contained a recommendation to link
economic, governance, and security indicators to conditions for
stabilizing Iraq. Congress acted on our recommendation in the 2006
National Defense Authorization Act and required DOD to report on
progress toward meeting the conditions referred to in GAO's report. We
have supplemented this work with a series of classified briefings to
the Congress on changes to the campaign plan and U.S. efforts to train
and equip Iraqi security forces and protect weapons caches throughout
Iraq. We will continue to provide Congress these classified briefings.
Limited Transparency on the Costs of the Global War on Terror:
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $495 billion to U.S.
agencies for military and diplomatic efforts in support of the global
war on terrorism; the majority of this amount has gone to stabilize and
rebuild Iraq. Efforts in Iraq involve various activities such as
combating insurgents, conducting civil affairs, building capacity,
reconstructing infrastructure, and training Iraqi military forces. To
date, the United States has reported substantial costs for Iraq and can
expect to incur significant costs in the foreseeable future, requiring
decision-makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an
increasing number of long-range fiscal challenges. Funding for these
efforts has been provided through annual appropriations, as well as
supplemental appropriations that are outside the annual budget process.
In our view, moving more funding into baseline budgets, particularly
for DOD, would enable decision-makers to better weigh priorities and
assess trade-offs.
As of September 30, 2006, DOD had reported costs of about $257.5
billion for military operations in Iraq.[Footnote 5] In addition, as of
October 2006, about $29 billion had been obligated for Iraqi
reconstruction and stabilization efforts. However, problems with the
processes for recording and reporting GWOT costs raise concerns that
these data may not accurately reflect the true dollar value of war-
related costs.
U.S. military and diplomatic commitments in Iraq will continue for the
foreseeable future and are likely to involve hundreds of billions of
additional dollars. The magnitude of future costs will depend on
several direct and indirect variables and, in some cases, decisions
that have not been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by
the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to
support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of military
equipment to be repaired or replaced. Although reducing the number of
troops would appear to lower costs, we have seen from previous
operations in the Balkans and Kosovo that costs could rise--if, for
example, increased numbers of contractors replace military personnel.
With activities likely to continue into the foreseeable future,
decision-makers will have to carefully weigh priorities and make
difficult decisions when budgeting for future costs.
Over the years, we have made a series of recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense intended to improve the transparency and
reliability of DOD's GWOT obligation data, including recommendations
that DOD (1) revise the cost-reporting guidance so that large amounts
of reported obligations are not shown in "miscellaneous" categories,
and (2) take steps to ensure that reported GWOT obligations are
reliable. We also have recommended that DOD build more funding into the
baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and
costs are more predictable. In response, the department has implemented
many of our previous recommendations.
Progress in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraq Has Not Led
to Improved Security Conditions:
Overall security conditions in Iraq continued to deteriorate in 2006
and have grown more complex despite recent progress in transferring
security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi
government. The number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces
has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to about 323,000 in
December 2006, at the same time as more Iraqi army units have taken the
lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific geographic areas.
Despite this progress, attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi security
forces, and civilians have all increased, reaching record highs in
October 2006. Because of the poor security in Iraq, the United States
could not draw down U.S. force levels in Iraq as planned in 2004 and
2006, and U.S. forces have continued to conduct combat operations in
urban areas, especially Baghdad.
Transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces and
provincial governments is a critical part of the U.S. government's
strategy in Iraq and key to allowing a drawdown of U.S. forces. Since
2003, the United States has provided about $15.4 billion to train,
equip, and sustain Iraqi security forces and law enforcement. However,
it is unclear whether U.S. expenditures and efforts are having their
intended effect in developing capable forces and whether additional
resources are needed. A key measure of the capabilities of Iraqi forces
is the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports prepared by
coalition advisors embedded in Iraqi units. These reports serve as the
basis for the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) determination of when a
unit is capable of leading counterinsurgency operations and can assume
security responsibilities for a specific area.
The TRA reports provide the coalition commander's professional judgment
on an Iraqi unit's capabilities and are based on ratings in personnel,
command and control, equipment, sustainment and logistics, training,
and leadership. To conduct future work on this issue, GAO has made
multiple requests for full access to the unit-level TRA reports over
the last year. However, DOD has not yet complied with our requests.
This serves to seriously and inappropriately limit congressional
oversight over the progress achieved toward a critical U.S. objective.
DOD May be Unable to Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached
Iraqi Security Forces:
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $15.4 billion for
Iraqi security forces and law enforcement. According to Multinational
Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) records, MNF-I has issued
about 480,000 weapons, 30,000 vehicles, and 1.65 million pieces of gear
(uniforms, body armor, helmets, and footwear), among other items, to
the Iraqi security forces as of October 2006.
Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside
traditional security assistance programs, which, according to DOD
officials, provided DOD with a large degree of flexibility in managing
the program. Since the funding did not go through traditional security
assistance programs,[Footnote 6] the accountability requirements
normally applicable to these programs did not necessarily apply,
according to DOD officials. It is currently unclear what accountability
measures, if any, DOD has chosen to apply to the train-and-equip
program for Iraq, as DOD officials have expressed differing opinions on
this matter. As part of our ongoing work, we have asked DOD to clarify
what accountability measures it has chosen to apply to the program.
While it is unclear which regulations DOD has chosen to apply,
beginning in early 2004, MNF-I established requirements to control and
account for equipment provided to the Iraqi security forces by issuing
orders that outlined procedures for its subordinate commands. These
included obtaining signed records for equipment received by Iraqi units
or individuals and recording weapons serial numbers. Although MNF-I
took initial steps to establish property accountability procedures,
limitations such as the initial lack of a fully operational equipment
distribution network, staffing weaknesses, and the operational demands
of equipping the Iraqi forces during war hindered its ability to fully
execute critical tasks outlined in the property accountability orders.
Since late 2005, MNSTC-I has taken additional steps to improve its
property accountability procedures, including establishing property
books[Footnote 7] for equipment issued to Iraqi Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior forces. According to MNSTC-I officials, MNSTC-I
also recovered existing documentation for equipment previously issued
to Iraqi forces. However, according to our preliminary analysis, DOD
and MNF-I may not be able to account for Iraqi security forces' receipt
of about 90,000 rifles and about 80,000 pistols that were reported as
issued before early October 2005. Thus, DOD and MNF-I may be unable to
ensure that Iraqi military forces and police received all of the
equipment that the coalition procured or obtained for them.
In our ongoing review, we will continue to assess MNF-I records for
Iraqi equipment distributed to Iraqi forces. We plan on issuing a final
report on these and related intelligence matters by March 2007. Our
work focuses on the accountability requirements[Footnote 8] for the
transportation and distribution of U.S.-funded equipment and did not
review any requirements relevant to the procurement of this equipment.
Challenges in Improving Governance and Spending Budgeted Capital
Project Funds:
The U.S. government faces significant challenges in improving the
capabilities of Iraq's central and provincial governments so that they
can provide security and deliver services to the Iraqi people.
According to State, the Iraqi capacity for self-governance was
decimated after nearly 30 years of autocratic rule. In addition, Iraq
lacked competent existing Iraqi governmental organizations. Since 2003,
the United States has provided the Iraqis with a variety of training
and technical assistance to improve their capacity to govern. As of
December 2006, we identified more than 50 capacity development efforts
led by at least six U.S. agencies. However, it is unclear how these
efforts are addressing core needs and Iraqi priorities in the absence
of an integrated U.S. plan.
Iraq also faces difficulties in spending budgeted funds for capital
goods and projects in the security, oil, and electricity sectors. When
the Iraqi government assumed control over its finances in 2004, it
became responsible for determining how more than $25 billion annually
in government revenues would be collected and spent to rebuild the
country and operate the government. However, unclear budgeting and
procurement rules have affected Iraq's efforts to spend capital budgets
effectively and efficiently. Since most of the U.S. reconstruction
funds provided between fiscal years 2003 and 2006 have been obligated,
unexpended Iraqi funds represent an important source of additional
financing. Iraq had more than $6 billion in unspent capital project
funds as of August 2006. For example, Iraq's Oil Ministry spent only $4
million of $3.6 billion in budgeted funds to repair Iraq's dilapidated
oil infrastructure.
The inability to spend this money raises serious questions for the
government, which has to demonstrate to citizens who are skeptical that
it can improve basic services and make a difference in their daily
lives. The U.S. government has launched a series of initiatives in
conjunction with other donors to address this issue and improve
ministry budget execution.
Impact of the War on U.S. Military Readiness:
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. military forces have experienced a high
pace of operations to support homeland security missions, Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and various combat and
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. These operations have required
many units and personnel to deploy for multiple tours of duty and, in
some cases, to remain for extended tours. DOD faces significant
challenges in maintaining readiness for overseas and homeland missions
and sustaining rotational deployments of duty, especially if the
duration and intensity of current operations continue at the present
pace.
Ongoing military operations in Iraq are inflicting heavy wear and tear
on military equipment. Some equipment items used by U.S. forces are
more than 20 years old, and harsh combat and environmental conditions
over time have further exacerbated equipment condition problems. The
Army and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or
replace) equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the
future. We are currently assessing these programs, including the extent
to which the military services are tracking reset costs and the extent
to which their reset plans maintain unit equipment readiness while
meeting ongoing operational requirements.
Problems in Securing Munitions Sites and Providing Force Protection:
U.S. ground forces in Iraq have come under frequent and deadly attacks
from insurgents using weapons such as improvised explosive devices
(IED), mortars, and rocket launchers. IEDs, in particular, have emerged
as the number one threat against U.S. forces. Because of the
overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in
Iraq, combined with prewar planning assumptions that proved to be
invalid, there were an insufficient number of U.S. and coalition troops
on the ground to prevent the widespread looting of those sites. The
human, strategic, and financial costs of the failure to provide
sufficient troops on the ground have been high, since IEDs made from
looted explosives have caused about half of all U.S. combat fatalities
and casualties in Iraq and have killed hundreds of Iraqis. In addition,
unsecured conventional munitions sites have helped sustain insurgent
groups and threatened the achievement of the Operation Iraqi Freedom's
(OIF) strategic goal of creating a stable Iraqi nation.[Footnote 9]
DOD's actions to date have primarily focused on countering IEDs and not
on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic
planning and priority-setting consideration for future operations.
Although good first steps, these actions do not address what we believe
is a critical OIF lesson learned: If not secured during initial combat
operations, an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites can
represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that remain in country.
In December 2006, we recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Staff
conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured
conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate conventional munitions
storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels of
planning policy and guidance. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations.
Efforts to protect U.S. ground forces with increased body and truck
armor have been characterized by shortages and delays, which have
reduced operational capabilities and forced combat commanders to accept
additional risk in completing their missions.[Footnote 10] We are
currently reviewing force protection measures, including body armor,
for current operations, as well as the organization and management of
the Joint IED Defeat to counter the IED threat.
In prior reports, we recommended that the process for identifying and
funding urgent wartime requirements be improved and that funding
decisions be based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority
requirements. More recently, we have recommended actions to ensure that
the services make informed and coordinated decisions about materiel
solutions developed and procured to address common urgent wartime
requirements. DOD generally agreed with these recommendations.
Improving DOD Acquisition Outcomes:
DOD has relied extensively on contractors to undertake major
reconstruction projects and provide logistical support to its troops in
Iraq. Despite making significant investments through reconstruction and
logistics support contracts, this investment has not always resulted in
the desired outcomes. Many reconstruction projects have fallen short of
expectations, and DOD has yet to resolve long-standing challenges in
its management and oversight of contractors in deployed locations.
These challenges often reflect shortcomings in DOD's capacity to manage
contractor efforts, including having sufficiently focused leadership,
guidance, a match between requirements and resources, sound acquisition
approaches, and an adequate number of trained contracting and oversight
personnel.
The challenges encountered in Iraq are emblematic of the systemic
issues that DOD faces. In fact, GAO designated DOD's contract
management activities as a high-risk area more than a decade ago and
have reported on DOD's long-standing problems with its management and
oversight of support contractors since 1997.[Footnote 11] For example,
because information on the number of contractor employees and the
services they provide is not aggregated within DOD or its components,
DOD cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which it relies
on contractors to support its operations. DOD recently established an
office to address contractor support issues, but the office's specific
roles and responsibilities are still being defined.
In assessing acquisition outcomes government-wide over many years, we
have applied a framework of sound acquisition practices that recognizes
that a prerequisite to having good outcomes is to match well-defined
requirements and available resources. Shifts in priorities and funding
invariably have a cascading effect on individual contracts. Further, to
produce desired outcomes with available funding and within required
time frames, DOD and its contractors need to clearly understand DOD's
objectives and needs and how they translate into the contract's terms
and conditions; they need to know the goods or services required, the
level of performance or quality desired, the schedule, and the cost.
When such requirements were not clear, DOD often entered into contract
arrangements that posed additional risks. Managing risks when
requirements are in flux requires effective oversight, but DOD lacked
the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics,
and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. With a
considerable amount of DOD's planned construction work remaining and
the need for continued logistical support for deployed forces, it is
essential to improve DOD's capacity to manage its contractors if the
department is to increase its return on its investment.
GAO's Quality Assurance Framework:
GAO's value to the Congress and the American people rests on its
ability to demonstrate professional, independent, objective, relevant,
and reliable work. To achieve this outcome, we set high standards for
ourselves in the conduct of our work. Our core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability describe the nature of our
work and, most importantly, the character of our people. In all
matters, GAO takes a professional, objective, and nonpartisan approach
to its work. GAO's quality assurance framework is designed to ensure
adherence to these principles.
The framework is designed around people, processes, and technology and
applies to all GAO work conducted under generally accepted government
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Concluding Observations:
Our work highlights the critical challenges that the United States and
its allies face in the ongoing struggle to help the Iraqis stabilize,
secure, and rebuild their country. Forthright answers to the oversight
questions we posed in our report of January 9, 2007, are needed from
the U.S. agencies responsible for executing the President's strategy.
Congress and the American people need complete and transparent
information on the progress made toward achieving U.S. security,
economic, and diplomatic goals in Iraq to reasonably judge our past
efforts and determine future directions. For future work, GAO will
continue to provide this committee and Congress with independent
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programs and spending.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. Christoff
at (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were
Nanette Barton, Donna Byers, David Bruno, Dan Cain, Lynn Cothern, Tim
DiNapoli, Mike Ferren, Rich Geiger, Tom Gosling, Whitney Havens, Lisa
Helmer, Patrick Hickey, Henry L. Hinton Jr., John Hutton, Steve Lord,
Judy McCloskey, Tet Miyabara, Mary Moutsos, Ken Patton, Sharon Pickup,
Jason Pogacnik, Jim Reynolds, Donna Rogers, and William Solis.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2007).
[2] GAO, Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, GAO-
07-2SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2006).
[3] The six characteristics are (1) a clear purpose, scope,
methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and
threats the strategy intends to address; (3) the desired goals and
objectives, and outcome-related performance measures; (4) a description
of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a clear
delineation of the U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and
mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a description of how the strategy
is integrated internally among U.S. agencies and externally with the
Iraqi government and international organizations. See Rebuilding Iraq:
More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals,
GAO-06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).
[4] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance,
and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq. GAO-06-217C
(title is unclassified, Washington D.C.: Oct. 31, 2005).
[5] DOD's reported costs in Iraq do not include the costs of classified
activities.
[6] Traditional security assistance programs operate under State
authority and are managed in country by DOD through security assistance
organizations under the direction and supervision of the Chief of the
U.S. Diplomatic Mission.
[7] A property book is a formal set of property accounting records and
files.
[8] DOD defines accountability as the obligation imposed by law, lawful
order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping
accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents or funds,
with or without physical possession (DODI 5000.64, Accountability and
Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,
E2.2).
[9] These issues are discussed in a classified GAO report, Operation
Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for
Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations
Planning, GAO-07-71C (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2006). We plan to
issue an unclassified version of this report.
[10] For further information on these issues, see GAO, Defense
Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items
during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 8, 2005); Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the
Production and Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime
Operations, GAO-06-160 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006); and Defense
Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Marine Corps and
Army Affected the Timely Production and Installation of Marine Corps
Truck Armor, GAO-06-274 (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2006).
[11] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006).
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