Defense Acquisitions
Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-08-13 October 12, 2007The Navy initiated a move away from traditional minesweepers in favor of putting new kinds of anti-mine capabilities aboard ships with a variety of missions--most recently, the Littoral Combat Ship. In addition to a new ship, this approach includes several new systems and new operational concepts. GAO assessed the Navy's progress in (1) developing new mine countermeasures systems, including the Littoral Combat Ship, and (2) introducing these new capabilities to the fleet. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed Navy and program documents and previous GAO work. GAO supplemented its analysis with discussions with Navy and Department of Defense officials and contractors.
The Navy has made progress developing individual mine countermeasures systems and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy expects 3 of the 19 systems it is developing to be ready for fleet use by the end of 2007, and recent test results have been promising. However, significant challenges remain to fielding new capabilities. Operational testing plans for four systems in limited production will not provide a complete understanding of how the systems will perform when operated from the Littoral Combat Ship. Other ships will be used in testing to inform full-rate production decisions on the individual systems. While other ships may serve as platforms for the anti-mine systems, the Littoral Combat Ship is their primary platform, and it will have different launch, recovery, and handling systems. In addition, Navy plans call for testing these systems in smooth, uncluttered environments, although operating environments are expected to be less favorable. The first two Littoral Combat Ships have encountered design and production challenges. Costs are expected to more than double from initial estimates, and the Navy anticipates lead ship delivery nearly 18 months later than first planned. This may slow the planned transition from current mine countermeasures platforms. The Navy has reduced its investments in intelligence preparation of the environment capabilities--including the capability to locate and map minefield boundaries--even though improvements in this area could reduce mine countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent. These capabilities are especially important for the Littoral Combat Ship, as it must stand clear of suspected minefields. The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat Ship, increasing awareness of operational needs. However, the Navy has not yet reconciled these concepts with the ship's physical constraints, and the trade-offs involved ultimately will determine the ship's capabilities. For example, operation of mine countermeasures systems is currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the ship, which could affect the ship's ability to execute this mission. In addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only limited capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However, because the Navy recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems from two to one per ship, operational availability for these systems may decrease below current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures mission package currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require the Navy to accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and the concepts of operation it can likely execute.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-13, Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities
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Report to the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2007:
Defense Acquisitions:
Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures
Capabilities:
Defense Acquisitions:
GAO-08-13:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-13, a report to the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy initiated a move away from traditional minesweepers in favor
of putting new kinds of anti-mine capabilities aboard ships with a
variety of missions”most recently, the Littoral Combat Ship. In
addition to a new ship, this approach includes several new systems and
new operational concepts. GAO assessed the Navy‘s progress in (1)
developing new mine countermeasures systems, including the Littoral
Combat Ship, and (2) introducing these new capabilities to the fleet.
To accomplish this, GAO reviewed Navy and program documents and
previous GAO work. GAO supplemented its analysis with discussions with
Navy and Department of Defense officials and contractors.
What GAO Found:
The Navy has made progress developing individual mine countermeasures
systems and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy expects 3 of the 19
systems it is developing to be ready for fleet use by the end of 2007,
and recent test results have been promising. However, significant
challenges remain to fielding new capabilities.
* Operational testing plans for four systems in limited production will
not provide a complete understanding of how the systems will perform
when operated from the Littoral Combat Ship. Other ships will be used
in testing to inform full-rate production decisions on the individual
systems. While other ships may serve as platforms for the anti-mine
systems, the Littoral Combat Ship is their primary platform, and it
will have different launch, recovery, and handling systems. In
addition, Navy plans call for testing these systems in smooth,
uncluttered environments, although operating environments are expected
to be less favorable.
* The first two Littoral Combat Ships have encountered design and
production challenges. Costs are expected to more than double from
initial estimates, and the Navy anticipates lead ship delivery nearly
18 months later than first planned. This may slow the planned
transition from current mine countermeasures platforms.
* The Navy has reduced its investments in intelligence preparation of
the environment capabilities”including the capability to locate and map
minefield boundaries”even though improvements in this area could reduce
mine countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent. These
capabilities are especially important for the Littoral Combat Ship, as
it must stand clear of suspected minefields.
The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat
Ship, increasing awareness of operational needs. However, the Navy has
not yet reconciled these concepts with the ship‘s physical constraints,
and the trade-offs involved ultimately will determine the ship‘s
capabilities. For example, operation of mine countermeasures systems is
currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the ship,
which could affect the ship‘s ability to execute this mission. In
addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only limited capability to
conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However, because the Navy
recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems from two to one
per ship, operational availability for these systems may decrease below
current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures mission package
currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require the Navy to
accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned for the
Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these
uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine
countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and
the concepts of operation it can likely execute.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Department of Defense analyze intelligence
preparation capabilities, determine if Littoral Combat Ship concepts of
operation can be reconciled, examine the need for and feasibility of
fielding mine countermeasures systems on other ships, and delay full-
rate production of certain systems. The Department of Defense concurred
or partially concurred with the first three recommendations. It did not
agree to delay full-rate production of systems, citing training needs
and production efficiencies. GAO maintains that a delay is warranted as
long as the Littoral Combat Ship remains the systems‘ main platform.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-13]. For more information, contact Paul
Francis at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Current Acquisition and Testing Challenges Could Affect the Navy's
Ability to Transition to New Mine Countermeasures Systems:
The Capabilities Envisioned by the Concepts of Operation Have Not Been
Reconciled with the Capabilities of the Ship Design:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Review:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat Ship Design and Production
Challenges:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package
Configurations (Quantities of Individual Mission Systems Identified in
Parentheses):
Table 2: Navy's Progress Developing and Fielding Systems Intended to
Hunt, Neutralize, and Sweep Sea Mines:
Table 3: Dates of Operational Test and Evaluation and Initial Littoral
Combat Ship Testing for Mine Countermeasures Systems in Development:
Table 4: Mine Countermeasure Systems That Will Perform the Intelligence
Preparation of the Environment Mission:
Table 5: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe and Mine Countermeasures Mission
Package Characteristics:
Table 6: Reductions to System Quantities within the Baseline Littoral
Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package:
Figure:
Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Designs:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 12, 2007:
The Honorable Gene Taylor:
Chairman:
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Sea mines offer potential enemies a low-cost, simple-to-deploy, and
sometimes highly effective weapon against U.S. Navy ships. These mines
currently exist in more than 300 different forms and are possessed by
over 50 countries. Since 1950, enemy sea mines have directly caused
damage to or destruction of 15 Navy ships--more than all other weapons
combined. After mines damaged two U.S. ships during Operation Desert
Storm, the Navy renewed its focus on defeating enemy sea mines and
began to develop several new mine countermeasures systems. It initiated
a move away from traditional minesweepers--ships dedicated chiefly to
mine countermeasures--in favor of putting anti-mine capabilities aboard
other ships. Initial plans called for these systems to be deployed from
aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, surface combatants, and
submarines.
More recently, the Navy has decided to employ the Littoral Combat Ship
as its primary platform for conducting mine countermeasures. The
Littoral Combat Ship is envisioned as a new kind of vessel that will be
able to be reconfigured to meet three different missions including mine
countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. To
execute its mine countermeasures mission, the Littoral Combat Ship will
transport manned and unmanned systems to suspected minefields and
deploy them while the ship remains clear of the minefield. The ship
will rely upon "intelligence preparation of the environment"--an
approach used to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,
environment, and terrain--to designate minefield boundaries. The Navy
currently plans to invest over $9 billion in Littoral Combat Ships.
In recent years, the Navy's required annual update of its master plan
outlining its progress developing new mine countermeasures capabilities
has begun to reflect tightening fiscal constraints across mine
countermeasures programs and increasing mission responsibilities for
the Littoral Combat Ship. In light of these developments, you asked us
to review the Navy's acquisition plans for mine countermeasures
systems. In response to your request, we assessed the Navy's progress
and identified remaining challenges in (1) developing new mine
countermeasures systems, including the Littoral Combat Ship, and (2)
introducing these new capabilities to the fleet.
To assess the Navy's progress and identify remaining challenges to
developing new mine countermeasures systems, we reviewed program
documents, including acquisition strategies, requirements documents,
test plans and reports, and cost and schedule performance reports. To
supplement our analysis, we held discussions with a number of Navy
offices, Department of Defense agencies, and contractor officials
responsible for acquiring and testing the Littoral Combat Ship, its
mine countermeasures mission package, and other mine countermeasures
systems external to the Littoral Combat Ship. We also drew from our
prior work on these systems. To assess progress and identify remaining
challenges associated with introducing new mine countermeasures systems
to the fleet, we analyzed concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat
Ship and mine warfare campaign analyses. We corroborated this
information through discussions with Navy operational forces and
commands, the Navy's assessments directorate, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. For more information on the methodology used in
this report, see appendix I. We conducted our analysis from October
2006 to August 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The Navy has made progress developing individual mine countermeasures
systems and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy has authorized
production for 5 of the 19 systems it is developing, 3 of which it
expects to be ready for fleet use by the end of 2007. Several of these
new systems have shown promising performance in recent testing.
However, significant challenges remain to fielding these new
capabilities.
* Operational testing for four systems in limited production--all
planned to deploy from the Littoral Combat Ship--will not provide a
complete understanding of how the systems will perform when they are
operated from the ship. Ships other than the Littoral Combat Ship will
be used in this testing and will serve as the basis for making full-
rate production decisions on the individual systems. While other ships
may be capable of serving as platforms for the mine countermeasures
systems, the Littoral Combat Ship is their primary platform, and it
will have different launch and recovery systems from the other ships.
In addition, Navy plans call for testing of these systems in smooth,
uncluttered sea environments, which represent favorable conditions for
conducting mine countermeasures, while the Navy expects undersea
operating environments to be more rocky and cluttered.
* The first two Littoral Combat Ship seaframes have encountered design
and production challenges, resulting in significant cost growth. The
Navy expects the ships to exceed their initial budgets by over 100
percent and anticipates lead ship delivery will occur nearly 18 months
later than initially planned. These issues may slow the Navy's planned
transition from current mine countermeasures platforms to the Littoral
Combat Ship.
* The Navy has reduced its investments in intelligence preparation
capabilities--including the capability to locate and map minefield
boundaries--even though improvements in this area could reduce mine
countermeasures mission timelines by 30 to 75 percent. These
capabilities are especially important for the Littoral Combat Ship, as
it must stand clear of suspected minefields.
The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat
Ship. This has produced a better understanding of operational needs. At
the same time, the physical constraints of the ship have become better
understood, and they may limit the Navy's ability to implement the
operational concepts, resulting in less capability than currently
expected. For example, the ship's ability to complete operations within
desired operational timelines remains unclear. The physical
characteristics of the seaframe have yet to be fully reconciled with
manning and sustainment concepts. Operation of mine countermeasures
systems is currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe. In addition, many of the systems within
this mission package were designed for fielding from larger platforms
with more robust onboard maintenance facilities than those offered by
the Littoral Combat Ship. The Littoral Combat Ship will have a limited
capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. Furthermore, the
Navy has recently reduced some mission system quantities from two to
one per ship. These quantity reductions may decrease operational
availability for these systems below current projections. Moreover, the
mine countermeasures mission package currently exceeds its weight
limitation, a fact that may require the Navy to accept a reduction in
speed and endurance capabilities planned for the Littoral Combat Ship.
Alternatively, the Navy could alter its concepts of operation.
Acknowledging these challenges, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
recently directed the Navy to revisit its planned number of mission
packages and associated system spares.
We are making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed
at improving the department's transition to the Littoral Combat Ship,
including the following: (1) analyzing whether capabilities resulting
from current intelligence preparation investments will enable the
Littoral Combat Ship to meet required mission timelines, (2)
determining the extent to which concepts of operation and the likely
performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and other assets can be
reconciled to provide the needed mine countermeasures capability, (3)
evaluating the need for and feasibility of fielding mine
countermeasures systems on other platforms in addition to the Littoral
Combat Ship, and (4) delaying approval of full-rate production for
systems within the mine countermeasures mission package until
operational testing is successfully completed from their primary
platform, presently identified as the Littoral Combat Ship. The
Department of Defense agreed or partially agreed with most of our
recommendations, but did not agree with our recommendation aimed at
ensuring an accurate understanding of operational suitability for new
mine countermeasures systems. The department stated that delaying full-
rate production for these systems would result in gaps in industrial
production, cost increases, and delays in delivering mine warfare
capability to operational forces. However, we do not believe full-rate
production of new mine countermeasures systems is warranted until the
Department of Defense has ensured they are compatible with the unique
operating environment posed by their primary platform, the Littoral
Combat Ship.
Background:
Mine countermeasures involves detecting, classifying, localizing,
identifying, and neutralizing enemy sea mines in areas ranging from
deep water through beach zones against the full spectrum of bottom,
moored, floating, buried, stealthy, contact, and influence mines. The
Navy's mine countermeasures strategy focuses on closing identified
capability gaps, measurably reducing timelines for deployment and the
detect-to-engage sequence for mine countermeasures systems, and
removing the sailor from the minefield. To achieve these goals, the
Navy is transitioning from current dedicated mine countermeasures
ships, helicopters, and manned undersea assets to the Littoral Combat
Ship as its primary mine countermeasures platform of the future.
Mine countermeasures missions can require mine hunting, mine
neutralization, and minesweeping. Mine hunting involves towing sonar
devices that detect and classify objects in the ocean and on the ocean
bottom. The Navy marks the coordinates of any objects classified as
minelike for later destruction. Mine neutralization requires placing an
explosive charge near the mine target in order to destroy the mine in
place. This task is currently performed by Navy explosive ordnance
disposal divers, marine mammals, or mechanical systems. Minesweeping
includes towing devices that either (1) mechanically cut the lines
holding mines in place or (2) simulate the magnetic or acoustic
signatures of a passing ship, resulting in mine detonation. Mines that
have been mechanically swept are typically destroyed by divers after
severing.
For more than a decade, the Navy has pursued a transformation in the
way it conducts mine countermeasures operations. Until now, the Navy
has relied on 14 MCM 1 Avenger-class ships and 12 MHC 51 Osprey-class
vessels to conduct surface mine countermeasures operations. These ships
are slow-moving, requiring transport to theater by another ship, but
designed with features such as fiberglass-sheathed wooden hulls that
enable them to operate within minefields.[Footnote 1] While the Navy
has retired all but four of its Osprey-class ships, it plans to
maintain its full complement of Avenger-class ships until 2017 to
enable the Littoral Combat Ship and its mine countermeasures systems to
be fielded in sufficient quantities. To support these plans, the Navy
is currently upgrading Avenger-class combat systems and mechanical
equipment to improve the mission effectiveness of these ships.
The Navy also relies upon the MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter to perform
airborne mine countermeasures missions. The MH-53E is a large aircraft
that operates from shore bases or ships of opportunity--often
amphibious ships with flight decks. The Navy's 31 MH-53E helicopter
airframes are rapidly approaching the end of their planned service
lives. To sustain this capability, the Navy has, to date, funded a
fatigue life extension program for 20 MH-53E aircraft, which will
enable these airframes to be structurally reinforced. The Navy plans to
retire its MH-53E helicopters from service beginning in 2015.
The Littoral Combat Ship represents the Navy's mine countermeasures
platform of the future. It is fast-moving and designed to transport
manned and unmanned mine countermeasures systems to the vicinity of the
minefield and deploy them while remaining clear of the minefield. Its
design concept consists of two distinct parts--the ship itself and the
mission package it carries and deploys. For the Littoral Combat Ship,
the ship is referred to as the seaframe and consists of the hull;
command and control systems; automated launch, recovery, and handling
systems; and certain core systems like the radar and 57-millimeter gun.
The Navy is designing the seaframe to meet speed, endurance, weight,
manning, and cost parameters. The Littoral Combat Ship's mine
countermeasures capability will be embedded within its mission package.
The Navy is also developing and procuring systems to support anti-
submarine warfare and surface warfare mission packages. The Navy's
acquisition approach is to populate initial versions of these mission
packages with a mixture of developmental and production-representative
systems, gradually moving to all production-representative systems that
constitute the baseline configuration for each package. Table 1 shows
how the Navy is employing this approach for its first four mine
countermeasures mission packages.
Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package
Configurations (Quantities of Individual Mission Systems Identified in
Parentheses):
Planned delivery date: Production-representative mission systems
included;
Mission package 1: Fiscal year 2007:
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (2);
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (1);
Mission package 2: Fiscal year 2009:
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (3);
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (2);
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (2);
* Remote Multi- Mission Vehicle (2);
Mission package 3: Fiscal year 2010:
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (3);
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (1);
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (1);
* Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (2);
* Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep System (1);
* Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System (1);
Mission package 4 (baseline configuration): Fiscal year 2011:
* AN/AQS-20A Sonar (3);
* Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (1);
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (1);
* Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (2);
* Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep System (1);
* Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System (2);
* Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (1);
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1);
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1).
Planned delivery date: Engineering development models included;
Mission package 1: Fiscal year 2007:
* Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (2);
* Airborne Mine Neutralization System (1);
* Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (1);
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1);
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1);
Mission package 2: Fiscal year 2009:
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1);
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1);
Mission package 3: Fiscal year 2010:
* Unmanned Surface Vehicle (1);
* Unmanned Surface Sweep System (1);
Mission package 4 (baseline configuration): Fiscal year 2011: [Empty].
Planned delivery date: Estimated unit cost;
Mission package 1: Fiscal year 2007: $37.7 million;
Mission package 2: Fiscal year 2009: $66.0 million;
Mission package 3: Fiscal year 2010: $65.3 million;
Mission package 4 (baseline configuration): Fiscal year 2011: $76.2
million.
Source: Navy.
Note: Mission package cost figures are in fiscal-year 2005 dollars and
do not include procurement costs for the Littoral Combat Ship mission
package computing environment, mission package backfit costs, stowage
containers, MH-60S helicopter, or Vertical Take-off and Landing
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
[End of table]
The mine countermeasures mission package capability is made up of
airborne mine countermeasures systems employing the MH-60S helicopter,
unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned
surface vehicles. To operate these mission package systems, the Navy
will deploy additional crew members with the Littoral Combat Ship and
plans to assign each mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat
Ship an MH-60S helicopter sourced from an expeditionary squadron. The
full suite of Littoral Combat Ship countermine systems will be used to
hunt, neutralize, and sweep mines as the operational need dictates.
In addition to the mine countermeasures capability resident on the
Littoral Combat Ship, the Navy is developing unmanned underwater
vehicles launched from submarines. These vehicles will provide
clandestine minefield mapping capability, enabling advance intelligence
preparation of the environment, and detection of changes within the
ocean environment. Intelligence gathering of suspected waters is a
necessary precursor to deploying the Littoral Combat Ship, as the ship
itself must stay clear of the mined area. Intelligence preparation of
the environment is necessary to determining appropriate tactics,
planning mine countermeasures missions, managing and evaluating the
performance of sensors and systems, and assessing battle damage.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics is statutorily required to be primarily responsible for
developing and testing naval mine countermeasures.[Footnote 2] The
Secretary of Defense may waive this requirement if he certifies certain
matters to the congressional defense committees to include that the
Secretary of the Navy submitted a master plan outlining its progress
toward developing new mine countermeasures capabilities and the budget
provides sufficient resources for executing the updated mine
countermeasures master plan.[Footnote 3]
Current Acquisition and Testing Challenges Could Affect the Navy's
Ability to Transition to New Mine Countermeasures Systems:
The Navy has made progress in developing new mine countermeasures
systems and platforms, including the Littoral Combat Ship, but
significant challenges remain to fielding these capabilities. Current
test plans for systems that will be operated from the Littoral Combat
Ship do not require testing from this platform prior to entering full-
rate production. In addition, planned test environments for these
systems may not be realistic as compared to current threat
environments. As a result, the Navy may develop an incomplete
understanding of the operational suitability and effectiveness of mine
countermeasures systems it plans to field on the Littoral Combat Ship.
Also, unanticipated design and production challenges with the first two
Littoral Combat Ships have increased program costs and required the
Navy to delay purchase of additional seaframes. This may slow the
Navy's planned transition from current mine countermeasures platforms
to the Littoral Combat Ship. Finally, limited planned investment for
new intelligence preparation of the environment capabilities, including
capability to locate and map minefield boundaries, increases risk to
the safety of the Littoral Combat Ships operating inside minefields and
extends the amount of time required to complete mine countermeasures
missions.
The Navy Has Made Progress Developing New Mine Countermeasures Systems:
The Navy is in the process of developing 16 new systems to provide
future mine hunting, mine neutralization, and minesweeping capability
to the joint forces. To date, the Navy has authorized production for
five new systems, three of which are expected to enter the fleet by the
end of 2007. Beyond these, six systems are in varying stages of system
development, while the Navy continues science and technology efforts
for another five systems. Table 2 outlines the Navy's progress
developing and fielding these capabilities.
Table 2: Navy's Progress Developing and Fielding Systems Intended to
Hunt, Neutralize, and Sweep Sea Mines:
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: Coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system;
Description: Provides intelligence preparation of the battlefield
information, which accurately depicts tactical objectives, minefields,
and obstacles in the surf zone, on the beach, and through the beach
exit during amphibious and expeditionary operations;
future increments planned will provide active (day/night), surf zone,
buried minefield detection, and real-time processing capabilities;
Host platform: MQ-8B Fire Scout vertical takeoff and landing tactical
unmanned aerial vehicle on the Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: Low-rate initial production;
Planned fielding date: 2007.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: AN/AQS-20A sonar;
Description: Provides for identification of bottom mines in shallow
water and detection, localization, and classification of bottom, close-
tethered, and volume mines in deep water;
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter and/or the Remote Multi-Mission
Vehicle on the Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: Low-rate initial production;
Planned fielding date: 2007.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: Remote minehunting system;
Description: Underwater vehicle towing the AN/AQS-20A sonar to detect,
classify, locate, and identify minelike objects;
Host platform: Littoral Combat Ship primarily, but six Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers (DDG 91-96) are also capable;
Development status: Low-rate initial production;
Planned fielding date: 2008.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: SQQ-32 with high-frequency wideband;
Description: Detects, classifies, and localizes bottom, close-tethered,
and volume mines in deep water using high-frequency broadband sonar;
Host platform: MCM 1 Avenger class ships;
Development status: System development;
Planned fielding date: 2009.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: Airborne laser mine detection system;
Description: Detects, classifies, and localizes floating and near-
surface moored mines in deep water;
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: Low-rate initial production;
Planned fielding date: 2011.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: Surface mine countermeasures unmanned undersea vehicle with low-
frequency broadband;
Description: Detects bottom and buried mines in shallow water using low-
frequency broadband sonar;
Host platform: MCM 1 Avenger class ships and Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: Science and technology;
Planned fielding date: 2011.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: Search-classify-map unmanned undersea vehicle;
Description: Performs mine reconnaissance and maps near-shore areas of
the littorals for mines and minefields;
Host platform: Small boats;
Development status: Science and technology;
Planned fielding date: TBD.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: Inspect/identify unmanned undersea vehicle;
Description: Provides detection of capability of floating, near-
surface, and volume mines in very shallow water environments;
Host platform: To be determined;
Development status: Science and technology;
Planned fielding date: TBD.
Mission: Mine hunting;
System: Joint direct attack munitions assault breaching system;
Description: Neutralizes surface-laid mines and obstacles in the beach
and surf zones;
Host platform: Air Force bombers or naval tactical aircraft;
Development status: Production;
Planned fielding date: 2007.
Mission: Mine neutralization;
System: Expendable mine neutralization system;
Description: Neutralizes volume, close-tethered, and bottom mines in
shallow water;
Host platform: MCM 1 Avenger class ships;
Development status: System development;
Planned fielding date: 2008.
Mission: Mine neutralization;
System: Airborne mine neutralization system;
Description: Positively identifies and explosively neutralizes unburied
bottom and moored sea mines in shallow water that are impractical or
unsafe to counter using existing minesweeping systems;
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: System development;
Planned fielding date: 2009.
Mission: [Empty];
System: Rapid airborne mine clearance system;
Description: Mounted 30-millimeter gun firing supercavitating
projectiles to neutralize near-surface and floating moored mines;
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: System development;
Planned fielding date: 2010.
Mission: [Empty];
System: Countermine system;
Description: Neutralizes buried and surface-laid surface mines in the
beach and surf zones;
Host platform: Air Force bombers or naval tactical aircraft;
Development status: System development;
Planned fielding date: 2016.
Mission: [Empty];
System: Autonomous unmanned undersea vehicle;
Description: Provides neutralization of floating and near-surface mines
in very shallow water environments;
Host platform: To be determined;
Development status: Science and technology;
Planned fielding date: TBD.
Mission: [Empty];
System: Organic airborne and surface influence sweep system;
Description: Provides organic, high-speed magnetic/acoustic influence
minesweeping capability where mine hunting is not feasible (adverse
environmental conditions);
Host platform: MH-60S helicopter on the Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: System development;
Planned fielding date: 2010.
Mission: Mine sweeping;
System: Unmanned surface vehicle sweep system;
Description: Micro-turbine-powered magnetic towed cable and acoustical
signal generator towed from a rigid hull inflatable boat;
Host platform: Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: Science and technology;
Planned fielding date: 2010.
Source: Navy.
[End of table]
Recent Navy testing of several of these new mine countermeasures
systems has produced encouraging results. The Navy has completed over
1,000 hours of offshore vehicle operations using the Remote Minehunting
System--demonstrating performance in several key performance
parameters--and has installed this system on the USS Bainbridge for
operational test and evaluation. The Navy has also completed initial
integration for four of the five new airborne systems it plans to
deploy using the MH-60S helicopter. Sensor performance during testing
for these airborne systems has met or exceeded Navy expectations--
particularly for the AN/AQS-20A sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection
System, and Airborne Mine Neutralization System, which have
demonstrated significant progress toward achieving their key
performance parameters.
Testing Limitations Could Preclude a Full Understanding of System
Suitability and Effectiveness:
Several of the mine countermeasures systems have begun or are planned
to shortly begin operational testing. These tests aim at assessing
operational suitability and operational effectiveness. Operational
suitability is concerned with placing and sustaining the system when
fielded and is concerned with, for example, how long a system can
operate before failing and how quickly a system can be repaired.
Operational effectiveness measures the overall ability of a system to
accomplish a mission; in the case of a mine countermeasures system,
effectiveness measures may be concerned with the frequency of
accurately detecting the presence of a mine or the speed at which a
system can cover a particular area.
Of the 16 mine hunting, neutralization, or sweeping systems in
development, the Navy plans to field at least 9 on the Littoral Combat
Ship as part of its mine countermeasures mission package. The Navy
approved many of these nine systems to enter system development on the
basis of earlier plans to field them on aircraft carriers, amphibious
ships, and guided missile destroyers. As a result, the Navy's
acquisition and testing plans for these systems do not require
operational test and evaluation onboard the Littoral Combat Ship prior
to entering full-rate production. Table 3 outlines these plans.
Table 3: Dates of Operational Test and Evaluation and Initial Littoral
Combat Ship Testing for Mine Countermeasures Systems in Development:
System: AN/AQS-20A sonar;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2007;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Remote minehunting system;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Airborne laser mine detection system;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Airborne mine neutralization system;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2008[B];
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Organic airborne and surface influence sweep system;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2009;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Rapid airborne mine clearance system;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2010;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Surface mine countermeasures unmanned undersea vehicle with low-
frequency broadband;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: Fiscal year 2010;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: Fiscal
year 2009.
System: Unmanned surface sweep system;
Expected date of operational test and evaluation: To be determined;
Expected date of first testing from Littoral Combat Ship[A]: To be
determined.
Source: Navy.
[A] This testing will demonstrate systems interface and usage aboard
ship as part of the planned Littoral Combat Ship operational
assessment.
[B] Represents date of operational assessment for first increment.
[End of table]
The Navy plans to make full-rate production decisions for many of these
systems using performance data collected during operational testing
aboard existing ships. For example, the Navy intends to operationally
test and evaluate the Remote Minehunting System using an Arleigh Burke-
class guided missile destroyer. Similarly, the Navy plans to test
airborne mine countermeasures systems using their intended aircraft--
the MH-60S helicopter--but will service and base these tests from
existing fleet assets or shore.
While existing ships may serve as platforms for these systems, the
Littoral Combat Ship is the primary platform. The other ships cannot
replicate the unique conditions that will be found onboard the Littoral
Combat Ship, a fact that could place the Navy at risk for
overestimating the operational suitability of its new mine
countermeasures systems. For instance, the Navy plans to move, load,
and deploy all Littoral Combat Ship mine countermeasures systems using
an automated launch, recovery, and handling system. This system is
newly designed and is necessary to achieve reduced manning onboard each
Littoral Combat Ship. Because the launch, recovery, and handling system
is fully integrated with each seaframe, the Navy will not be able to
test this system with mine countermeasures systems until a Littoral
Combat Ship is delivered to the fleet in 2009. As a result, the Navy
may not have a complete understanding of the suitability of these
systems to operate from the Littoral Combat Ship.
Also, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, noted in a fiscal year 2006 report that the
delivery schedule for the first Littoral Combat Ship omits significant
events normally associated with lead ships, including analysis of
performance characteristics. The report also noted that the delivery
schedule does not allow for an adequate initial operational test and
evaluation of the ship to make informed decisions. Because the Navy has
not proposed a test and evaluation strategy that allows acquisition
decisions to be informed by timely reporting of adequate operational
test results, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has not
yet approved the Navy's test and evaluation master plan for the
Littoral Combat Ship.
Further, the Navy is testing the performance of new mine
countermeasures systems in an A-1 environment, which is the least
stressing environments for these systems to detect, identify,
neutralize, and/or sweep for mines.[Footnote 4] While this testing
approach is consistent with achieving threshold performance levels, as
outlined in each system's key performance parameters, the Littoral
Combat Ship is expected to perform its mine countermeasures mission in
more rocky and cluttered underwater environments that contain rugged
terrain and many different objects that could be mistaken for mines.
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has reported that the
testing of subsurface systems associated with the Littoral Combat Ship
needs to be conducted in operationally realistic littoral environments.
Testing in unrealistic environments increases risk that systems may not
perform effectively when operated from the Littoral Combat Ship.
In addition, the AN/AQS-20A sonar, Airborne Laser Mine Detection
System, Airborne Mine Neutralization System, Organic Airborne and
Surface Influence Sweep System, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance
System will perform their missions from an MH-60S Block 2A or 2B
helicopter the Navy intends to assign to each Littoral Combat
Ship.[Footnote 5] The Navy plans to acquire 69 Block 2A aircraft and
148 Block 2B capable aircraft, which will support a variety of
missions, including mine countermeasures. In addition, the Navy has
identified funding to retrofit 42 Block 2A aircraft to the Block 2B
configuration, minus the capability to employ the Rapid Airborne Mine
Clearance System. However, due to strong demand for the MH-60S across
the fleet, as well as the Block 2B version only recently entering
production, the Navy has had difficulty allocating operationally
representative helicopters to complete developmental testing of mine
countermeasures systems. As a result, the Navy has used surrogate
platforms including the MH-53E helicopter to complete developmental
tests for many of these systems. However, the Navy may not be able to
replicate the level of performance demonstrated in these tests when the
systems are operated from the MH-60S. Furthermore, because previous
technical challenges have delayed the fielding of new mine
countermeasures systems, several systems will be competing for MH-60S
flight testing at the same time, potentially requiring the Navy to
further modify its test plans for these systems, a possibility that
could affect their planned fielding dates within the fleet.
Continuing technical challenges with the MH-60S carriage, stream, tow,
and recovery system could further affect Navy test plans for mine
countermeasures systems. The carriage, stream, tow, and recovery system
includes a winch, tow cable, and an external carriage/docking mechanism
and is used by the MH-60S to lower the AN/AQS-20A sonar, the Airborne
Mine Neutralization System, and the Organic Airborne and Surface
Influence Sweep System into the water, and then later to recover the
systems. According to Navy officials, the system's tow cable has not
worked properly in recent testing with the Organic Airborne and Surface
Influence Sweep System. If this cable continues to malfunction in
testing, the Navy may have to redesign the tow cable and/or the
carriage, stream, tow, and recovery system, possibly further delaying
operational testing of mine countermeasures systems from MH-60S
aircraft.
Slower Delivery of Littoral Combat Ships May Affect the Navy's Planned
Transition from Legacy Mine Countermeasures Platforms:
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe construction has progressed on both lead
ship designs, although both seaframes have substantial design changes,
schedule delays, and cost growth. The Navy expects the first two
Littoral Combat Ships to exceed their combined budget of $472 million
by over 100 percent and anticipates lead ship delivery will occur
nearly 18 months later than initially planned. An expanded discussion
of Littoral Combat Ship design and production challenges can be found
in appendix III. As a result of these challenges, the Navy canceled
construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship after failing to reach
agreement with the prime contractor to modify the existing cost basis
contract to a fixed price contract. Also, Littoral Combat Ship cost
growth has required the Navy to defer construction of additional
seaframes. The Navy plans to use funds previously appropriated for
construction of the fifth and sixth Littoral Combat Ships to instead
pay for cost growth on the remaining three ships under contract.
Finally, the Navy is modifying its acquisition strategy for the
Littoral Combat Ship and now plans to conduct an evaluation in 2009
prior to selecting a single design for the acquisition of the next
increment of Littoral Combat Ships, called Flight 1.
These acquisition challenges create a disconnect between the
availability of mine countermeasures systems--several of which are
scheduled to field in 2007--and the availability of Littoral Combat
Ships to deploy them. Delays could also affect the Navy's plan to
transfer mission responsibilities from current airborne and surface
mine countermeasures assets to Littoral Combat Ships beginning in 2015
if sufficient numbers of Littoral Combat Ships are not fielded by that
time. According to some Navy officials, this risk could be mitigated by
deploying new mine countermeasures systems from other surface ships,
including destroyers, amphibious ships, and aircraft carriers. These
officials report that this action may require the Navy to upgrade
certain engineering or computing systems on these vessels, but note
that the Navy has already borne such costs on six Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers modified to accommodate the Remote Minehunting System.
Despite these capability improvements, the Navy has significantly
scaled back plans to field the Remote Minehunting System from the
destroyers.
Limited Planned Investment for New Intelligence Preparation
Capabilities Could Affect Mission Timelines:
While the Navy has made significant investment in new mine
countermeasures systems and the Littoral Combat Ship, planned
investments for intelligence preparation of the environment
capabilities have been reduced. The Littoral Combat Ship relies on
intelligence preparation capabilities to a greater degree than existing
dedicated mine countermeasures ships. As these capabilities degrade,
the distance at which the Littoral Combat Ship must stand off from a
suspected minefield can be expected to increase. This situation could
impact the Littoral Combat Ship's ability to achieve desired mission
timelines. The Navy estimates that intelligence preparation of the
environment could reduce mine countermeasures mission timelines by 30
to 75 percent.
The Littoral Combat Ship is not designed to operate in a minefield.
Instead, the Navy intends the ship to stand off from the minefield and
deploy its sensors forward. As a result, the Littoral Combat Ship is
designed to perform to Level 1 survivability requirements. Level 1
includes minimal survivability features and is the standard for
existing mine countermeasures ships in the fleet. However, these ships
are designed with unique features--including hulls that minimize
magnetic signatures--that enable them to operate in minefields.
Typically, surface combatants like the Littoral Combat Ship are
designed to Level 3 survivability. As a result, the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, has previously recommended that the
Navy assess the risks to be sure Level 1 survivability is sufficient
for the Littoral Combat Ship. Since then, the Navy has maintained its
intent for the Littoral Combat Ship to have Level 1 survivability.
Accordingly, the Littoral Combat Ship will require intelligence
preparation of the environment to conduct its mine countermeasures
mission while remaining outside of the minefield. Intelligence
preparation of the environment will serve to map the boundaries of the
minefield and subsequently reduce risk to the warfighters who will be
operating the mine countermeasures systems from the Littoral Combat
Ship. However, as table 4 shows, according to current development and
fielding plans for intelligence preparation of the environment systems,
the Navy will not have the assets in place to perform these functions
when Littoral Combat Ships enter the fleet.
Table 4: Mine Countermeasure Systems That Will Perform the Intelligence
Preparation of the Environment Mission:
System: Battlespace preparation autonomous undersea vehicle;
Description: Uses side scan sonar and environmental sensors to support
mine reconnaissance and intelligence preparation of the environment;
Host platform: Littoral Combat Ship;
Development status: System development;
Planned fielding date: 2007 (engineering development model only will be
fielded;
there is no program funding for procurement).
System: Mission reconfigurable unmanned undersea vehicle system;
Description: Conducts autonomous, clandestine intelligence preparation
of the environment in support of mine countermeasures missions;
Host platform: Nuclear submarines;
Development status: Technology development;
Planned fielding date: 2016.
System: Littoral remote sensing;
Description: Conducts wide-area surveillance of the near-shore
environment using remote surveillance and reconnaissance assets;
Host platform: Various platforms;
Development status: Science and technology;
Planned fielding date: To be determined.
Source: Navy.
[End of table]
Currently, intelligence preparation of the environment capability is
provided to a limited degree through the mine countermeasures and
environmental decision aids library, which is a software-based
collection of meteorological and oceanographic condition data gathered
by survey ships. However, the Navy has reduced funding for additional
systems intended to perform the battlespace preparation mission
necessary for the Littoral Combat Ship. For example, the Navy reduced
its planned funding for the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea
Vehicle System by $200 million across the future years defense program
in its fiscal year 2008 budget request, resulting in a delay to initial
operational capability of this system from 2013 to 2016. This decision
follows a series of program delays, starting with the predecessor Long-
term Mine Reconnaissance System program. After completing approximately
95 percent of the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System's design, the
Navy canceled acquisition plans for 12 operational systems due to cost
growth and remaining technical challenges facing the program. Also, the
Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle, which the Navy
previously planned to include in the baseline configuration of the
Littoral Combat Ship mine countermeasures mission package, will now
only be in the form of an engineering development model, not a fully
developed system. In addition, while development of the Surface Mine
Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea Vehicle with Low Frequency Broadband
capabilities offers potential benefits for intelligence preparation of
the environment, the technology is still early in development within
the Office of Naval Research and will not be available when the
Littoral Combat Ship enters the fleet and begins conducting mine
countermeasures missions.
Intelligence preparation of the environment is also necessary for
commanders to determine the right tactics, conduct mission planning,
conduct asset and sensor management, monitor sensor and system
performance, conduct battle damage assessments, and determine remaining
risk to follow-on forces. Intelligence preparation of the environment
also provides the necessary means to perform the change detection
mission, which determines if objects in the water are existing objects
that were previously identified or new objects that must be further
investigated to determine if they are mines. This activity can reduce
mine countermeasures mission timelines up to an hour for each object
that does not have to be further investigated to determine if it is
actually a mine.
The Capabilities Envisioned by the Concepts of Operation Have Not Been
Reconciled with the Capabilities of the Ship Design:
The Navy has refined its concepts of operation for Littoral Combat Ship
warfighting, manning, training, and sustainment. These concepts have
evolved concurrently with the design of the ship's seaframe and the
development of individual mission systems. As table 5 shows, however,
the Navy has not yet fully reconciled Littoral Combat Ship operational
concepts with design characteristics of the ship.
Table 5: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe and Mine Countermeasures Mission
Package Characteristics:
Mission package personnel;
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: 15 allocated;
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: 19 needed to conduct mine
countermeasures missions;
Mitigation options and limitations:
* Plans for 4 shore-based personnel to support post-mission analysis
may be unrealistic.
Aviation detachment personnel;
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: 20 allocated;
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: 23 needed to operate and
sustain MH-60S helicopter and Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle;
Mitigation options and limitations:
* 3 personnel may perform post-mission analysis;
* Additional berthing and other impacts on accommodations are under
review.
Sustainment;
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: Minimal maintenance and
sparing aboard;
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: Some onboard sparing to
maintain operational availability of mission systems;
Mitigation options and limitations:
* Intent to maintain and supply spares from shore-based interim support
and Mission Package Support Facility.
Weight;
Littoral Combat Ship seaframe characteristics: 180 metric tons
allocated for mission package;
Mine countermeasures mission package needs: Baseline mission package
(MP4) exceeds weight allowance by about 10 percent;
Mitigation options and limitations:
* Mitigation plans have not been identified for baseline package;
* Mission packages 1 and 2 do not include all systems planned for
baseline package;
Navy plans to backfit earlier packages to include all baseline systems.
Source: Navy.
[End of table]
In particular, the Littoral Combat Ship is designed to accommodate
fewer personnel, mission systems, and spares than envisioned to execute
its mine countermeasures mission. As a result, even though the Littoral
Combat Ship is designed to transit to and within theater quickly, a
fact that should reduce mission timelines, the Navy expects it to
require an extended period of time once it arrives on station to
complete the detect-to-engage sequence relative to dedicated surface
mine countermeasures assets.
The Navy now has better knowledge regarding how it will introduce mine
countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ships to the fleet. To date,
the Navy has approved two concepts of operation: a warfighting concept
of operations covering the conduct of missions from the Littoral Combat
Ship and a wholeness concept of operations covering manning, training,
and sustainment for the Littoral Combat Ship. In addition, the Navy has
begun drafting a concept of operations for mission package support. The
Navy continues to refine these documents to reflect evolving program
plans and incorporate new perspectives from within the fleet.
Number of Mission Personnel Currently Expected to Exceed Littoral
Combat Ship Seaframe Personnel Capacity:
While the manning construct for the Littoral Combat Ship is minimal by
design, conducting mine countermeasures missions may be challenging
given the variety and complexity of mission tasks personnel aboard the
ship are expected to perform. Currently, the Navy plans to embark a
maximum of 15 mission package personnel and 20 aviation detachment
personnel with each mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat
Ship. These personnel are expected to conduct mission planning, operate
and support the MH-60S and its airborne sensors, safely launch and
recover unmanned systems, and conduct post-mission analysis.[Footnote
6]
While sailors and aviators can perform some steps in the detect-to-
engage sequence concurrently, others must be performed in order. For
example, personnel must conduct detection, classification, and
identification of mines before neutralization can begin. The
availability of Littoral Combat Ship personnel to manage these
operations may be constrained in light of current plans to deploy and
operate multiple offboard sensors at one time. Fleet operators are
concerned that current manning limits would require the Navy to work
Littoral Combat Ship personnel more hours than fleet commanders
consider safe or accept an inability to meet mission requirements
within desired timelines.[Footnote 7] Navy operators currently estimate
that 19 mission package personnel and 23 aviation detachment personnel
will be needed per ship to complete planned missions--an excess of 7
personnel above seaframe constraints. The Navy is exploring
alternatives as it continues to refine concepts of operation.
Some Navy officials have suggested that conducting post-mission
analysis of Littoral Combat Ship sensor data on shore may reduce the
number of personnel needed to embark each ship by up to four. However,
the use of shore-based personnel to conduct this analysis is not
possible because the Littoral Combat Ship is not designed with
communications capabilities to transmit the volume of data collected by
some of its mine countermeasures systems. A scenario where the data
would be physically carried to shore is also unlikely given where the
ship may be deployed.
A Minimally Manned Littoral Combat Ship Requires Different Training
Concepts and Strategies:
The Navy has made progress in identifying and developing training
programs for Littoral Combat Ship capabilities. However, as key systems
remain in development--including the seaframes themselves--the Navy
acknowledges that developing a training curriculum for operating new
mine countermeasures systems aboard the ship is difficult. The limited
number of mission system operators planned for the Littoral Combat Ship
permits only limited training aboard ship as compared to other ship
classes. The Navy is taking a new train-to-qualify approach for the
Littoral Combat Ship that is significantly different from the approach
used for other ship classes in that it embarks fully qualified
personnel aboard rather than bringing personnel aboard first and then
training them. Therefore, the Navy is training Littoral Combat Ship
personnel ashore, requiring the Navy to begin establishing a new
training infrastructure that includes a robust simulation capability.
The Navy is struggling to identify requirements and estimate costs for
this training infrastructure because of continuing uncertainty
regarding numbers of personnel per ship, ship basing locations, and
seaframe and mine countermeasures system acquisition schedules. As a
result, the additional investment required of the Navy to support a
mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ship is unclear.
Achieving the minimal manning concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship
increases the importance of robust training for fleet sailors assigned
to the ship. Training to meet the higher level of readiness expected of
sailors aboard the Littoral Combat Ship to conduct missions entails
realistic training opportunities that represent the variety of mine
countermeasures missions and tasks identified for the ship. Some
training opportunities, such as the Rim of the Pacific--a large
conventional exercise occurring every 2 years--offer significant and
challenging scenarios that help fleet personnel gain valuable
experience. As the schedules for Littoral Combat Ship seaframe and
mission system deliveries adjust to accommodate ongoing acquisition
challenges, the opportunities to fully train in such exercises are
further postponed. The first opportunity to participate in Rim of the
Pacific will now be in 2010 because of seaframe schedule delays. As a
result, it may take the Navy longer than planned to complete training
for its full complement of Littoral Combat Ship personnel.
Littoral Combat Ship Sustainment Capabilities May Affect Operational
Availability of Mine Countermeasures Systems:
The Navy designed new mine countermeasures systems to operate from
platforms with more robust sustainment capabilities than those offered
by the Littoral Combat Ship. As such, these systems largely require
intermediate-or depot-level maintenance in the event a component breaks
or malfunctions.[Footnote 8] This approach was implemented prior to the
Navy identifying the Littoral Combat Ship as a host platform for these
new systems. The original platforms on which the Navy planned to field
these systems--including aircraft carriers, destroyers, and amphibious
ships--have the ability to perform many of these corrective maintenance
tasks, while the Littoral Combat Ship does not. Alternatively, the
Littoral Combat Ship will rely on shore support to a degree greater
than any previous ship class. As such, if a mine countermeasures system
breaks onboard the Littoral Combat Ship and a spare is not readily
available, the ship may not be able to achieve its mission requirements
within desired timelines as envisioned in current concepts of
operation.
In addition, while the Navy's plans to logistically support Littoral
Combat Ships from shore include establishing a forward mission support
facility, decisions regarding forward-basing locations for these ships
are pending, requiring the Navy to establish an interim support
facility based in the United States. The Navy has not yet determined
the size and scope of the infrastructure due to continuing uncertainty
with seaframe and mission package deployments worldwide, package
configuration, and system quantities. Although the Navy plans to stand
up an interim sustainment facility, plans for long-term support hinge
on resolving these uncertainties and identifying funding to construct
and maintain permanent facilities.
The Navy also continues to evaluate sparing plans for Littoral Combat
Ship mine countermeasures systems, but seaframe design characteristics
may limit these options. The Navy has specified seaframe weight as a
key performance parameter, as it significantly affects the speed at
which the ship can travel. The weight requirement for the mission
packages is 180 metric tons.[Footnote 9] This requirement was
established while mine countermeasures systems were still early in
development, and their weights were relatively unknown. Currently, the
baseline mine countermeasures package--the fourth mine countermeasures
package to be configured--exceeds the weight requirement by
approximately 10 percent. While the initial mine countermeasures
packages meet the weight requirement, they do not contain all of the
systems that constitute the baseline package. Because the Navy plans to
backfit the first three mission packages to the baseline configuration,
the Navy can expect to face challenges meeting the weight requirement
for all packages currently planned. These weight challenges increase
risk that the level of capability planned for the Littoral Combat Ship
mine countermeasures mission package may not be achievable and could
require the Navy to further reduce the number of mine countermeasures
systems planned across the program. To meet the seaframe weight
allowance, the Navy may be forced to remove systems from the baseline
mission package, resulting in less mine warfare capability per ship.
The weight constraint might also force a reevaluation of the Navy's
current plans to backfit the first three packages with new systems as
they become available. Recognizing this, the Navy is exploring ways to
reduce weight while maintaining capability.
In addition, the Navy has decreased the number of mine countermeasures
systems planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. Prior plans indicated the
ship would carry multiple quantities of each mine countermeasures
system. However, between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the Navy reduced
its planned number of individual airborne mine countermeasures systems
within the mission package. Table 6 outlines these changes.
Table 6: Reductions to System Quantities within the Baseline Littoral
Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package:
System: AN/AQS-20A Sonar;
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 4;
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 3.
System: Airborne Mine Neutralization System;
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2;
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1.
System: Airborne Laser Mine Detection System;
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2;
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1.
System: Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep System;
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2;
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1.
System: Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System;
Fiscal year 2007 plan: 2;
Fiscal year 2008 plan: 1.
Source: Navy.
[End of table]
Given the assumptions for how mission systems will operate and their
projected operational availability, and in light of the minimal onboard
logistics and maintenance capability of the Littoral Combat Ship, a
decrease in certain mission system quantities from two to one per
package introduces additional risk that a needed capability will not be
available during a mine countermeasures mission. The occurrence of such
an event could significantly extend mission timelines. For example, the
area that a mine countermeasures-configured Littoral Combat Ship could
cover in a given timeframe could be expected to decrease. However, as
previously discussed, the weight limitation of the seaframe further
compounds this challenge as it effectively prohibits embarkation of
more than one of several types of mine countermeasures systems,
regardless of mission need.
In March 2007, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics requested that the Secretary of the Navy
reassess the planned number of mine countermeasures mission systems
contained within a mission package. This request also tasked the Navy
with reexamining planned quantities of mine countermeasures mission
packages needed to support 55 Littoral Combat Ship seaframes.
Conclusions:
The Navy's mine countermeasures strategy seeks to close capability
gaps, reduce mission timelines, and remove the sailor from the
minefield. Plans for implementing this strategy originally sought to
shift mission responsibilities away from dedicated mine countermeasures
ships to other ship platforms--aircraft carriers, amphibious ships,
surface combatants, and submarines--but more recently have tasked
primary responsibility for this mission to the Littoral Combat Ship.
The Navy's ability to carry out mine countermeasures missions as
currently envisioned depends upon the collective capability yielded by
(1) fleet assets, including seaframes, mission packages, and
intelligence preparation resources; and (2) new concepts of operation.
At this point, there are several uncertainties about the performance
and availability of these assets as well as their compatibility with
planned concepts of operation. For example, the weight and manpower
demands of the mine countermeasures mission package currently exceed
the capacity of the Littoral Combat Ship seaframes, and the reduced
investment in intelligence preparation assets could affect mission
timelines.
It is possible that the Navy can compensate for the shortcomings of one
asset by using other assets or changing its planned concepts of
operation. At the same time, it is possible that certain shortcomings-
-including slower delivery of Littoral Combat Ships and deficiencies in
intelligence preparation capabilities--may not be reconcilable without
lowering expected mission capabilities. The Navy has time now to assess
these uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed
mine countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have
and the concepts of operation it can likely execute. The Navy can also
avail itself of options to close or narrow potential capability gaps by
changing the mix of assets, altering the concepts of operation, or
both--thus capitalizing on the substantial investments it is making.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Given the importance of intelligence preparation of the environment for
enabling Littoral Combat Ship operations, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense analyze whether capabilities resulting from
current intelligence preparation investments will enable the Littoral
Combat Ship to meet required mission timelines. If necessary, the
Secretary of Defense should assess options for improving intelligence
preparation of the environment capabilities.
Given the importance of well-developed manning and sustainment concepts
to achieving mine countermeasures timelines, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to determine the extent to which
concepts of operation and the likely performance of the Littoral Combat
Ship and other assets can be reconciled to provide the needed mine
countermeasures capability.
In light of delays facing the Littoral Combat Ship program, as well as
the planned decommissioning of existing mine countermeasures ships and
helicopters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy
to evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding mine
countermeasures systems currently planned for the Littoral Combat Ship
on alternative ship platforms as well.
To ensure an accurate understanding of operational suitability for new
mine countermeasures systems, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained
within the mine countermeasures mission package, pending successful
completion of operational testing onboard their primary platform,
currently identified as the Littoral Combat Ship.
Agency Comments and Our Review:
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense agreed with our recommendation to analyze whether capabilities
resulting from current intelligence preparation investments will enable
the Littoral Combat Ship to meet mission timelines as planned and to
assess options for improving these capabilities, if necessary.
Intelligence preparation investments are important for enabling the
Navy's transition to the Littoral Combat Ship as its mine
countermeasures platform of the future. The Department of Defense noted
that it has completed analysis in the past and continues to evaluate
intelligence preparation investments. According to the department,
there is merit in examining the risks and capabilities from emerging
satellite and other remote sensing technologies. The Department of
Defense also stated that systems such as the Littoral Remote Sensing
system and the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System
show promise and warrant continued consideration. Nevertheless,
department investments in intelligence preparation capabilities--
including the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle System-
-have continued to be reduced. While such decisions may be warranted,
their cumulative effects must be analyzed against objective criteria,
especially the Littoral Combat Ship's mission timelines.
The Department of Defense also concurred with our recommendation to
evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding mine countermeasures
systems now planned for the Littoral Combat Ship on alternative ship
platforms. The department stated that it intends to include this
analysis in its fiscal year 2010 Naval Mine Countermeasures Master Plan
(expected to be completed in early 2009 in support of the Navy's fiscal
year 2010 budget request).
The Department of Defense partially concurred with our recommendation
to determine the extent to which concepts of operation and the likely
performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and other assets can be
reconciled to provide the required mine countermeasures capability. The
department agreed with our recommended action, but did not believe new
tasking was necessary. Specifically, it stated that concepts of
operation remain under heavy scrutiny from multiple agencies including
the Navy, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
According to the department, manning requirements, systems integration,
logistics, system performance parameters, and maintainability of
equipment are all being considered and reconciled in the Littoral
Combat Ship concepts of operation as the ship's mission is reviewed and
evaluated. We agree with the department that new tasking is not
necessary as long as these actions are taken.
The Department of Defense did not concur with our recommendation to
delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained within the
mine countermeasures mission package until those systems complete
operational testing onboard the Littoral Combat Ship--their primary
platform. The department stated that delaying full-rate production for
these systems would result in gaps in industrial production, cost
increases, and delays in delivering mine warfare capability to
operational forces. The department further noted that mine
countermeasures systems intended for employment from the MH-60S
helicopter and/or Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
do not require the Littoral Combat Ship to continue testing and
development because these aerial systems will have the ability to
operate from a variety of sea and land based platforms. However, as
long as the Littoral Combat Ship remains the primary host platform for
new mine countermeasures systems, we believe the prudent course is to
delay full-rate production of these systems until the Navy has
operationally tested and evaluated them onboard this unique ship.
Should the department decide to field these systems from other
platforms, then full-rate production decisions prior to testing aboard
the Littoral Combat Ship may be warranted. Further, we note that our
recommendation would continue low-rate initial production of systems as
planned--not suspend production entirely, which would invite production
gaps and increase costs. We also believe that by maintaining low-rate
initial production of systems, the Navy will have sufficient quantities
on hand to enable operational forces to train in advance of the
Littoral Combat Ship joining the fleet.
The Department of Defense's written comments are included in their
entirety in appendix II. The department also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated into the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Secretary of the Navy. We will also make copies available to others on
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report or need additional
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for
our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Navy's progress and identify remaining challenges in
developing new mine countermeasures systems, we analyzed program
documentation including acquisition strategies, performance
requirements, budget submissions, test plans and reports, and cost and
schedule performance reports. We also drew from our prior work related
to the Littoral Combat Ship and individual airborne mine
countermeasures systems. In addition, we reviewed Department of Defense
reports related to these and other programs for mine countermeasures.
To supplement our analysis, we held discussions with a number of Navy
and Defense officials responsible for acquiring and testing the
Littoral Combat Ship, its mine countermeasures mission package, and
other mine countermeasures systems external to the Littoral Combat
Ship.
To assess the Navy's progress and identify remaining challenges
associated with introducing new mine countermeasures systems to the
fleet, we analyzed concepts of operation for the Littoral Combat Ship
and mine countermeasures mission requirements. We compared these
documents with Littoral Combat Ship performance requirements and design
specifications to determine the degree to which the Navy had reconciled
manning, sustainment, and warfighting concepts with key characteristics
of the Littoral Combat Ship. To supplement this analysis, we further
discussed these issues with Navy and Defense officials responsible for
developing and reviewing Littoral Combat Ship concepts of operation and
introducing the ship to the fleet.
To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from
the Navy's Surface Warfare, Expeditionary Warfare, and Assessments
Divisions; Commander, U.S. Third Fleet; Commander, Naval Surface
Forces; Navy Warfare Development Command; Commander, Operational Test
and Evaluation Force, Navy; Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare
Command; and the mine warfare, mission modules, unmanned maritime
vehicle systems, and Littoral Combat Ship program offices. We also met
with officials from the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; Joint Staff; the Naval Surface
Warfare Center--Panama City; Naval Special Clearance Team One; the
Office of Naval Research; the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Littoral and Mine Warfare; Navy Supervisor of
Shipbuilding; Lockheed Martin; Marinette Marine Corporation; General
Dynamics; and Austal.
We conducted our analysis from October 2006 to August 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
September 26, 2007:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report 08-
13, "Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on
Mine Countermeasures Capabilities," dated August 24, 2007, GAO Code
120597. The Department's comments on the recommendations are enclosed.
I submitted separately a list of technical changes for your
consideration.
The Department partially concurs with the statements in the draft
report, concurs with recommendations one and three, partially concurs
with recommendation two, and non-concurs with recommendation four.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact
Ms. Darlene Costello, Deputy Director, Naval Warfare, (703) 697-2205.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 24, 2007:
GAO-08-13 (GAO CODE 120597):
"Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key To Capitalizing On
Mine Countermeasures Capabilities":
Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
analyze whether capabilities resulting from current intelligence
preparation investments will enable the Littoral Combat Ship to meet
required mission timelines. If necessary, the Secretary of Defense
should assess options for improving intelligence preparation of the
environment capabilities. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department has completed analysis in the past
and continues to evaluate intelligence preparation investments to
enable the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to meet required mission
timelines. No additional investment is necessary at this time. There is
merit in examining the risks and capabilities from emerging satellite
and other remote sensing technologies. Systems such as the Littoral
Remote Sensing system and the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea
Vehicle System (MRUUVS) show promise and warrant continued
consideration.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Navy to determine the extent to which concepts of operation
and the likely performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and other assets
can be reconciled to provide the needed mine countermeasures
capability. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Partially concur. All aspects of the concept of
operations remain under heavy scrutiny from multiple agencies,
including Navy, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. New tasking is not necessary. The points highlighted in the
report are recognized as key enablers or inhibitors of the platform's
mission performance capability. Manning requirements, systems
integration, logistics, system performance parameters, and
maintainability of equipment onboard Littoral Combat Ship are all being
considered and reconciled in the concept of operations as the
platform's mission is reviewed and evaluated.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Navy to evaluate the need for and feasibility of fielding
mine countermeasures systems currently planned for the Littoral Combat
Ship on alternative ship platforms as well. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The modular capabilities inherent in Mine
Countermeasure Systems under development should provide the flexibility
to operate these systems from a number of alternative ship and aircraft
platforms. Maximizing the number of platforms available for testing and
or future deployment could be advantageous to the department. The
department intends to include an analysis of alternate platforms in the
fiscal year 2010 Naval Mine Countermeasures Master Plan.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
delay approval of full-rate production for systems contained within the
mine countermeasures mission package, pending successful completion of
operational testing onboard their primary platform, currently
identified as the Littoral Combat Ship. (Page 25/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Non-concur. Full Rate Production (FRP) decisions on
current programs of record (Acquisition Category designated) have and
will continue to be made following the guidance of Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operations of the Defense Acquisition
System. Each of these systems has its own, approved requirements
documents, including testing plans, which support individual FRP
Decisions by the Milestone Decision Authority. Other systems under
development may require operational testing on Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) prior to FRP.
Delaying FRP of Mine Warfare Systems that have met all the FRP criteria
would result in gaps in industrial production, cost increases and
delays in delivering Mine Warfare (MIW) capability to operational
forces. The modular capabilities inherent in the Mine Countermeasure
Systems under development will provide the flexibility to operate these
systems from a number of alternative ship and aircraft platforms. Mine
Countermeasure Systems intended for employment from MH-60S and/or
FIRESCOUT do not require the LCS to continue testing and development.
Although designed to operate from LCS, a MIW equipped MH-60S or
FIRESCOUT will have the ability to operate from a variety of sea and
land based platforms. In addition, the training concepts employed for
the LCS Mission Packages requires full training and proficiency
qualifications to be met prior to reporting onboard LCS. For the
Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasure Systems, this requires sufficient
assets to train and qualify air detachments prior to initial
deployment. Current production profiles are required to meet this
demand. Any reduction in procurement quantities will have a significant
operational impact on the ability to deploy initial and future MIW
Mission Packages. Delaying full-rate production is neither economically
or operationally prudent.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Overview of Littoral Combat Ship Design and Production
Challenges:
The Littoral Combat Ship is a new class of warship to address the
challenges of operating U.S. military forces in the shallow waters
close to shore, known as the littorals. The three principal threats it
is expected to address are from mines, small surface boat attacks, and
submarines. The Littoral Combat Ship differs from existing types of
Navy surface warships in two critical ways. First, it will accomplish
its mine, anti-submarine, and surface warfare missions primarily
through the use of helicopters, unmanned vehicles, and other systems
that operate at a distance from the ship itself. Second, the systems
used to conduct each main or focused mission will be contained in
mission packages; for example, one mission package will consist of the
systems needed for detecting, engaging, and neutralizing mines. The
mission packages will be interchangeable, so that the Littoral Combat
Ship can be rapidly reconfigured for different missions.
The Navy is developing the Littoral Combat Ship using an evolutionary
acquisition approach. Capabilities are delivered by "flight," with the
first eight ships referred to as Flight 0 and the next increment of
capability as Flight 1. Flight 0 will provide an initial limited
capability from two platform designs to experiment with the critical
mission technologies and test the overall concept. Illustrations of the
two seaframe designs are shown in figure 1. Flight 1 will provide
greater capability and serve as the basis for learning lessons that
will be incorporated into additional follow-on ships.
Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Designs:
This figure is a combination of two illustrations of a littoral combat
ship.
[See PDF for image]
Source: Lockheed Martin (top), General Dynamics (bottom).
[End of figure]
From the outset, the Navy sought to concurrently design and construct
two lead ships in the Littoral Combat Ship program in an effort to
rapidly meet pressing needs in the mine countermeasures, anti-submarine
warfare, and surface warfare mission areas. The Navy believed it could
manage this approach, even with little margin for error, because it
considered each Littoral Combat Ship to be an adaptation of an existing
high-speed ferry design. It has since been realized that transforming a
high-speed ferry into a capable, networked, survivable warship was a
complex venture. Implementation of new Naval Vessel Rules (design
guidelines) further complicated the Navy's concurrent design-build
strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship. These rules required program
officials to redesign major elements of each Littoral Combat Ship
design to meet enhanced survivability requirements, even after
construction had begun on the first ship. While these requirements
changes improved the robustness of the Littoral Combat Ship designs,
they contributed to out-of-sequence work and rework on the lead ships.
The Navy failed to fully account for these changes when establishing
its $220 million cost target and 2-year construction cycle for the lead
ships.
Complicating Littoral Combat Ship construction was a compressed and
aggressive schedule. When design standards were clarified with the
issuance of Naval Vessel Rules and major equipment deliveries were
delayed (e.g., main reduction gears), adjustments to the schedule were
not made. Instead, with the first Littoral Combat Ship, the Navy and
shipbuilder continued to focus on achieving the planned schedule,
accepting the higher costs associated with out-of-sequence work and
rework. This approach enabled the Navy to achieve its planned launch
date for the first Littoral Combat Ship, but required it to sacrifice
its desired level of outfitting. Program officials report that schedule
pressures also drove low outfitting levels on the second Littoral
Combat Ship design as well, although rework requirements have been less
intensive to date. However, because remaining work on the first two
ships will now have to be completed out of sequence, the initial
schedule gains most likely will be offset by increased labor hours to
finish these ships.
The Navy acknowledges that the Littoral Combat Ship program was
hampered by an unwavering focus on achieving schedule and performance
goals, a fact that dissuaded industry from identifying cost growth in a
timely fashion. Moreover, prior to September 2006, poor earned value
management processes and reporting in the shipyard led the Navy to
incorrectly conclude that the first Littoral Combat Ship remained
within budget and was executing to that level.
The Navy also stated that it had initially lacked a sufficient number
of personnel in the shipyard to review and manage cost and schedule
performance of the first Littoral Combat Ship. This oversight
responsibility was allocated to the Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
which had challenges allocating sufficient numbers of staff among the
competing demands of different shipbuilding programs it oversees.
The Navy is taking steps to restructure the Littoral Combat Ship
program to better balance government and contractor cost risk. These
changes include restructuring contract terms with industry, increasing
Littoral Combat Ship construction time from 24 to 32 months to improve
stability, and requiring increased government oversight of contractor
performance.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant
Director; Gwyneth M. Blevins; Martin G. Campbell; Todd Dice;
Christopher R. Durbin; and Sylvia Schatz.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] M 51 Osprey-class hulls are made of glass-reinforced plastic
fiberglass.
[2] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,
Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 216 (a), as amended by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 215. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-65, § 911(a)(1) re-designated the position of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology in the Department of Defense
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.
[3] In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 216, as most
recently amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 216.
[4] The Navy classifies sea floor (bottom) types as either A, B, C, or
D depending on floor composition, predicted mine case burial, and
degree of roughness. The Navy categorizes the amount of clutter in the
water as 1, 2, or 3 depending on the amount of non-mine bottom objects
per square nautical mile. The A-1 environment has smooth surfaces and
zero to few objects that could be mistaken for mines.
[5] The MH-60S Block 2A helicopter is designed to employ the AN/AQS-20A
sonar and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. The Block 2B helicopter
is designed to operate these two systems plus the Airborne Mine
Neutralization System, Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep
System, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System.
[6] Post-mission analysis involves analyzing large amounts of data
collected by mine countermeasures sensors in order to plan and execute
additional mission tasks in the detect-to-engage sequence.
[7] This concern is also reflected in the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation's fiscal year 2006 report on the Littoral Combat Ship
and a recent draft of the Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness
Concept of Operations (Revision B).
[8] Intermediate-level maintenance consists of off-equipment repair
capabilities possessed by operating units and in-theater sustainment
organizations. Depot maintenance consists of all repairs beyond the
capabilities of the operating units, including rebuild, overhaul, and
extensive modification of equipment.
[9] The 180 metric ton requirement is composed of 75 metric tons for
fuel and 105 metric tons for mission systems.
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