Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq
U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk Gao ID: GAO-08-117 October 1, 2007Iraq's ministries were decimated following years of neglect and centralized control under the former regime. Developing competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The President received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds and requested an additional $255 million in fiscal year 2008 to develop the capacity of the Iraq's ministries. This report assesses (1) the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy for these efforts. For this effort, GAO reviewed U.S. project contracts and reports and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad and Washington, D.C.
Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts, without overarching direction from a lead entity that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating security and the reorganization of the U.S. mission in Iraq. First, no single agency is in charge of leading the U.S. ministry capacity development efforts, although State took steps to improve coordination in early 2007. State, DOD and USAID have led separate efforts at Iraqi ministries. About $169 million in funds were allocated in 2005 and 2006 for these efforts. As of mid-2007, State and USAID were providing 169 capacity development advisors to 10 key civilian ministries and DOD was providing 215 to the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Second, the focus of U.S. capacity development efforts has shifted from long-term institution-building projects, such as helping the Iraqi government develop its own capacity development strategy, to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital budgets and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. U.S. ministry capacity efforts face four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi ministries lack personnel with key skills, such as budgeting and procurement. Second, sectarian influence over ministry leadership and staff complicates efforts to build a professional and non-aligned civil service. Third, pervasive corruption in the Iraqi ministries impedes the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Fourth, poor security limits U.S. advisors' access to their Iraqi counterparts, preventing ministry staff from attending planned training sessions and contributing to the exodus of skilled professionals to other countries. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts in Iraq, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's previous analyses of U.S. multiagency national strategies demonstrate that such a strategy should integrate the efforts of the involved agencies with the priorities of the Iraqi government, and include a clear purpose and scope; a delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination with other donors, including the United Nations; desired goals and objectives; performance measures; and a description of benefits and costs. Moreover, it should attempt to address and mitigate the risks associated with the four challenges identified above. U.S. ministry capacity efforts to date have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures to determine results at civilian ministries, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-117, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2007:
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated
Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk:
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
GAO-08-117:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-117, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Iraq‘s ministries were decimated following years of neglect and
centralized control under the former regime. Developing competent and
loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq.
The President received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds and
requested an additional $255 million in fiscal year 2008 to develop the
capacity of the Iraq‘s ministries.
This report assesses (1) the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to
develop the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) the key challenges to
these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an
overall integrated strategy for these efforts. For this effort, GAO
reviewed U.S. project contracts and reports and interviewed officials
from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad and
Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found:
Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the
Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S.
agencies leading individual efforts, without overarching direction from
a lead entity that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting
timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating security and the
reorganization of the U.S. mission in Iraq. First, no single agency is
in charge of leading the U.S. ministry capacity development efforts,
although State took steps to improve coordination in early 2007. State,
DOD and USAID have led separate efforts at Iraqi ministries. About $169
million in funds were allocated in 2005 and 2006 for these efforts. As
of mid-2007, State and USAID were providing 169 capacity development
advisors to 10 key civilian ministries and DOD was providing 215 to the
Ministries of Defense and Interior. Second, the focus of U.S. capacity
development efforts has shifted from long-term institution-building
projects, such as helping the Iraqi government develop its own capacity
development strategy, to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries
overcome their inability to spend their capital budgets and deliver
essential services to the Iraqi people.
U.S. ministry capacity efforts face four key challenges that pose a
risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi
ministries lack personnel with key skills, such as budgeting and
procurement. Second, sectarian influence over ministry leadership and
staff complicates efforts to build a professional and non-aligned civil
service. Third, pervasive corruption in the Iraqi ministries impedes
the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Fourth, poor security limits U.S.
advisors‘ access to their Iraqi counterparts, preventing ministry staff
from attending planned training sessions and contributing to the exodus
of skilled professionals to other countries.
The U.S. government is beginning to develop an integrated strategy for
U.S. capacity development efforts in Iraq, although agencies have been
implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO‘s previous analyses of
U.S. multiagency national strategies demonstrate that such a strategy
should integrate the efforts of the involved agencies with the
priorities of the Iraqi government, and include a clear purpose and
scope; a delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination
with other donors, including the United Nations; desired goals and
objectives; performance measures; and a description of benefits and
costs. Moreover, it should attempt to address and mitigate the risks
associated with the four challenges identified above. U.S. ministry
capacity efforts to date have included some but not all of these
components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and
responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-
identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures to
determine results at civilian ministries, and information on how
resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that State, in consultation with the Iraqi government,
complete an overall strategy for U.S. efforts to develop the capacity
of the Iraqi government. Congress should consider conditioning future
appropriations on the completion of the strategy. State recognized the
value of such a strategy but expressed concern about conditioning
further capacity development investment on completion of such a
strategy.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-117].
For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity of the Iraqi Government Lack Unified
Direction:
Low Capacity of Iraq Ministries and Other Challenges Pose Risks to the
U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Program:
United States Is Beginning to Develop a Strategy for Capacity
Development Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of State and USAID:
GAO Comments:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: State-Led Capacity Development Programs as of May 2007:
Appendix IV: Other Donor Partner Capacity Development Efforts:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Estimated Staff Numbers and 2007 Annual Budget for Key Iraqi
Ministries:
Table 2: Key U.S. Capacity Development Efforts as of Mid-2007:
Table 3: Status of U.S. Capacity Development Strategy:
Figures:
Figure 1: Government of Iraq Executive Branch and Ministries:
Figure 2: Key U.S. Efforts to Improve Ministerial Capacity, 2003 to Mid-
2006:
Figure 3: Government of Iraq Budget and Actual Expenditures for January
to December 2006:
Abbreviations:
BBA: Bilingual, Bicultural Advisor:
BSA: Board of Supreme Audit:
CENTCOM: United States Central Command:
CETI: Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq:
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority:
CPI: Commission for Public Integrity:
DFID: Department for International Development, United Kingdom:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EU: European Union:
FMIS: Financial Management Information System:
FMS: Foreign Military Sales:
GRD: Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
IRFFI: International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq:
IRMO: Iraq Reconstruction Management Office:
IRRF: Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds:
ISFF: Iraq Security Forces Fund:
ITAO: Iraq Transition Assistance Office:
ITF: United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund:
JACC: Joint Anti-Corruption Council:
JTFCD: Joint Task Force on Capacity Development:
MNF-I: Multinational Force-Iraq:
MNSTC-I: Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq:
MOD: Ministry of Defense:
MOI: Ministry of Interior:
MPRI: Military Professional Resources, Incorporated:
MSI: Management Systems International, Incorporated:
NCCMD: National Center for Consultancy and Management Development, Iraq
Ministry of Planning:
OAT: Office of Accountability and Transparency:
SME: Subject Matter Expert:
UN: United Nations:
UNDP: United Nations Development Program:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 2007:
Congressional Committees:
The development of competent and loyal government ministries is
critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. Iraq's 34 ministries are
responsible for ensuring security through the armed forces and police
services and for providing basic government services including
electricity, water, health care, education, and justice. The ministries
are also Iraq's largest employer, with an estimated 2.2 million
employees.[Footnote 1] In 2005 and 2006, the United States provided
funding of about $169 million for programs to help build the capability
of key civilian ministries and the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
In January 2007, the President identified government capacity
development as a core principle of the new strategy for Iraq--the New
Way Forward--and sought an additional $395 million funding for these
efforts in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. The President received $140
million in supplemental funding for fiscal year 2007 to continue these
efforts and has requested an additional $255 million in fiscal year
2008.[Footnote 2] According to the New Way Forward, strengthening the
Iraqi government is critical to transforming Iraq into a modern
democratic state.
Ministry capacity development refers to efforts and programs to advise
and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to plan
programs, execute their budgets, and effectively deliver government
services such as electricity, water, and security. U.S. and
international officials agree that developing Iraq's ministerial
capacity requires long-term, sustained effort. In this report, we
assess (1) the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to develop the
capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) key challenges to capacity
development efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government
has an overall strategy for these efforts.
To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed U.S., Iraqi,
donor government, United Nations (UN), and World Bank reports and data.
Although U.S. ministry capacity development activities have been
ongoing since 2003, we focused on capacity development efforts
initiated between late 2005 and mid-2007 as part of the U.S. embassy's
attempt to launch a more focused and coordinated national capacity
development program. During our fieldwork in Washington, D.C; New York
City; Baghdad, Iraq; and Amman, Jordan, we reviewed relevant U.S. and
Iraqi government documents and met with officials and contractors
working for the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Treasury,
Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
During our trips to Iraq and Jordan, we met with officials from State;
its Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO); the DOD-run
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I); its subcommand, the Multinational
Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I); and donor country
representatives from the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European
Union. We analyzed reports documenting these entities' capacity
development efforts and results. We also analyzed data on Iraq's 2006
and 2007 budgets and 2006 budget expenditures. We conducted our review
from August 2006 through August 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. A detailed description of our
scope and methodology is included in appendix 1 of this report. Because
of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed our work
under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to
conduct reviews on his own initiative. The work performed for this
review has also contributed to several related GAO products on
Iraq.[Footnote 3]
Results in Brief:
The implementation of U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the
Iraqi national government over the past 4 years has been characterized
by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts, without
overarching direction from a lead entity or strategic approach that
integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in
response to deteriorating security and reorganization of the U.S.
mission in Iraq. First, no single agency is in charge of leading the
overall U.S. capacity development effort as originally called for by
State's late 2005 assessment. To address concerns raised by the
assessment, the U.S. mission initiated the National Capacity
Development Program at the end of 2005 but left responsibilities for
capacity development divided among State, DOD, and USAID. These three
agencies individually have led separate efforts at key Iraqi
ministries. While no lead entity provided overarching direction to
integrate their efforts, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad has taken steps to
improve coordination since early 2007. Together, these three agencies
have conducted the most significant programs with funding allocations
totaling about $169 million as of the end of 2006.[Footnote 4] As of
mid-2007, these agencies were providing 384 capacity development
advisors to 12 key ministries; State and USAID were providing 169
advisors to 10 key civilian ministries and DOD was providing 215 to the
Ministries of Defense and Interior. Second, the focus of U.S. capacity
development efforts shifted from long-term institution building to an
immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to
spend their capital budgets and better deliver essential services to
the Iraqi people by September 2007.
U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four challenges
that pose a risk to success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi
ministries have significant shortages of competent personnel with the
skills necessary to formulate budgets, procure goods and services, and
perform other vital ministry tasks. A September 2006 U.S. assessment
concluded that the majority of staff at all but one of the ministries
surveyed were inadequately trained for their positions. Second, Iraqi
efforts to build a professional and nonpartisan civil service are
complicated by partisan influence over the leadership and staffing of
the ministries. A November 2006, DOD report notes that ministry
personnel are frequently selected on the basis of political affiliation
and that some ministries are infiltrated by sectarian militias. Third,
corruption impedes the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to develop
ministry capacity. Iraqi law and intimidation limit anti-corruption
agencies' efforts to pursue prosecution of employees accused of
wrongdoing. Fourth, poor security conditions challenge the ministries.
The lack of security limits U.S. advisors' access to Iraqi ministries,
threatens Iraqi government workers, and prevents Iraqis from attending
planned training sessions or getting to work. The lack of security also
contributes to the loss of ministry personnel as some join the 4.2
million Iraqis who have fled the country or have been internally
displaced since 2003.
The U.S. government is just beginning to develop an overall strategy
for ministerial capacity development, although agencies have been
implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's previous analyses of
U.S. multiagency national strategies demonstrate that an overall
strategy for capacity development should include (1) a clear purpose,
scope, and methodology; (2) a delineation of U.S. roles,
responsibilities, and coordination with other donors, including the UN;
(3) desired goals, objectives, and activities, clearly linked to Iraqi
government priorities; (4) performance measures; and (5) a description
of the costs and resources needed. Moreover, it should attempt to
address and mitigate the risks associated with the four challenges
identified above. U.S. ministry capacity efforts to date have included
some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working
to better define roles and responsibilities for capacity development
and to ensure that the overall goals of these efforts are clearly
defined. However, U.S. ministry capacity development goals do not
include priorities identified by the Iraqis for all ministries. In
addition, U.S. agencies have developed tools to assess the capacity of
the Iraqi ministries but have not developed performance measures to
determine whether U.S. ministry capacity efforts are achieving results
at civilian ministries. Further, agencies have not identified the
future costs and resources needed or provided information on how
current or requested resources will be targeted to achieve the desired
end-state. Moreover, they should attempt to address and mitigate the
risks associated with the four challenges identified above. The three
agencies leading capacity development efforts, particularly the U.S.-
run MNSTC-I, have developed some of these elements for their individual
programs at the ministries but not as part of a unified strategy for
overall U.S. efforts.
We recommend that State, in consultation with the Iraqi government,
complete an overall integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development
efforts in Iraq that, among other things, addresses the risks
associated with these challenges and clarifies the roles and leadership
responsibilities of those involved in the overall program. Moreover,
given the absence of an integrated capacity development strategy, it is
unclear how further appropriations of funding for ministry capacity
development programs will contribute to the success of overall U.S.
efforts in Iraq. Congress should consider conditioning future
appropriations on the completion of a strategy incorporating these key
components.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State noted (1) its concern
over our recommendation to condition future appropriations for capacity
development on the completion of a strategy; (2) the recent appointment
of an ambassador to supervise all short-and medium-term capacity
development programs; and (3) the need to tailor capacity development
needs to each Iraqi organization. We do not recommend stopping U.S.
investment in capacity development; the $140 million in supplemental
funding appropriated in fiscal year 2007 remains available for the
agencies to continue their efforts. Rather, we recommend that Congress
condition future funding on the development of an overall integrated
strategy. We acknowledge that State named an ambassador to coordinate
the Embassy's economic and assistance operations, including supervising
civilian capacity development programs. However, this action occurred
in July 2007, underscoring our point that U.S. capacity development
efforts have lacked overall leadership and highlighting the need for an
overall integrated strategy. Finally, our recommendation does not
preclude U.S. agencies from tailoring capacity development efforts to
meet each ministry's unique needs. A strategy ensures that a U.S.-
funded program has consistent overall goals, clear leadership and
roles, and assessed risks and vulnerabilities.
Background:
The permanent national government of Iraq was established by a
constitutional referendum in October 2005, followed by election of the
first Council of Representatives (Parliament) in December 2005 and the
selection of the first Prime Minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, in May
2006. By mid-2006, the cabinet had been approved, and the government
now has 34 ministries responsible for providing security and essential
services including electricity, water, and education for the Iraqi
people (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Government of Iraq Executive Branch and Ministries:
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department and Map Resources (map).
Note: Ministry of Planning's full name is the Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation.
[End of figure]
The size of the ministries varies considerably in terms of staff
numbers and budget. As of May 2007, the U.S. government ministry
capacity development programs target 12 key ministries--10 civilian
ministries are the focus of State and USAID programs, while the
Ministries of Defense and Interior are targeted by DOD programs. These
ministries contain 65 percent of the workforce and are responsible for
74 percent of the current budget (see table 1).
Table 1: Estimated Staff Numbers and 2007 Annual Budget for Key Iraqi
Ministries:
Key Ministries: Finance;
Staff[A]: 9,802;
Staff as percentage:
