Operation Iraqi Freedom
DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed Gao ID: GAO-08-143R November 30, 2007Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which operates under Multi-National Forces-Iraq, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and organize the ISF. Previously, once Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units were trained and equipped, operational responsibility for their employment was turned over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As of June 2007, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command has assumed operational control of 8 of the 10 extant Iraqi Army divisions, and the Ministry of Interior has assumed operational control of the National Police. Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel the Coalition has trained and equipped increased from over 171,000 in July 2005 to about 359,600 in September 2007. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense forces consist of the Joint Headquarters; the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, which commands the Army and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces; the Air Force; and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other, smaller forces. According to the September 2007 Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress, as of September 3, 2007, the Coalition has trained approximately 165,400 Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) personnel and 194,200 Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel, although there is currently no reliable data concerning how many of these personnel are still serving with the MOI. Moreover, in 2006 the Iraqi Prime Minister, with Coalition support, decided to expand the size of Iraq's security forces by possibly as much as 62,500 by the end of 2007. This expansion includes an increase in the size of extant Iraqi Army units that will bring them to 120 percent of authorized strength, an initiative to expand the overall size of the Iraqi Army from 10 to 13 divisions, and an initiative to increase the number of Iraqi police.
The MOD and MOI face significant challenges in developing their logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. Two factors, in particular, have thwarted their development--the persistence of high levels of violence and sectarianism and a lack of ministerial capacity. As a result, the ability of both ministries to maintain and sustain their forces, provide effective command and control of their forces, and provide their forces with intelligence is undermined and cannot be accomplished without Coalition support. Furthermore, since these support capabilities have yet to be fully developed, DOD claims that ISF units are either "independent" or "fully independent" are confusing and misleading. Although we are not discounting DOD reports that there are some ISF units that are more capable than others from an operational standpoint, we do not find sufficient evidence for an assessment of "independent" or "fully independent" for any ISF unit. Moreover, without clarity regarding the criteria according to which ISF units are assessed as independent, especially with regard to their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities, Congress cannot have clear visibility over DOD's role in assisting the ISF in becoming independent of Coalition support.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-143R, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed
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November 30, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security
Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities
Are Not Fully Developed:
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued by the National
Security Council in November 2005, asserted the Coalition's intention
to adjust its "posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi
capabilities grow," and for Coalition troop levels in Iraq to decrease
over time as the Iraqis take on more responsibilities for themselves.
Some three months later, in response to the growing capability of the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and some other indicators of progress, the
Department of Defense (DOD) recommended a decrease in the U.S. force
structure in Iraq from 17 to 15 combat brigades--a reduction of about
7,000 troops. Following the bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra on
February 22, 2006, however, an upsurge in violence throughout the
country undermined political gains and challenged the Government of
Iraq.
In light of these developments, the President commissioned a strategic
review in November 2006 that resulted in a new U.S. strategy for Iraq,
entitled the New Way Forward. President Bush announced this new
strategy on January 10, 2007, noting that he had made clear to the
Iraqi Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America would hold
the Iraqi Government to a set of political, security, and economic
benchmarks. On May 25, 2007, the President signed into law the U.S.
Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 (the Act), which contained 18
benchmarks against which progress by the Government of Iraq was to be
measured.[Footnote 1] One of those benchmarks is the increase of the
number of Iraqi Security Force units capable of operating
independently.
Since passage of the Act, several reports assessing the ability of the
Iraqi Security Forces to operate independently have been issued.
* DOD's June 2007 report to Congress[Footnote 2] stated that although
the United States, its Coalition partners, and the Iraqi government
continued to expand the size and capability of the Iraqi forces to meet
emerging requirements, the persistence of violence by insurgents,
terrorists, and militias means that Iraqi forces will require continued
training, development, and equipping from Coalition forces in order to
progressively assume missions on their own. The report outlined four
major areas on which the Coalition would focus, one of which was
support for the expansion of the Iraqi army.
* Also in June 2007, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight
& Investigations released its Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing
Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces, in which it reported
that despite making significant progress in generating a sizeable
national force, the Iraqi Security Forces have not developed as fast as
the Coalition planned; that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) and
Ministry of Interior (MOI) were not capable of accounting for,
supporting, or fully controlling their forces in the field; and that
the ISF did not have critical enablers such as intelligence and
logistics systems and processes that permit independent planning and
operations.
* In its Initial Benchmark Assessment Report to Congress, submitted on
July 12, 2007, the Administration asserted that while the Coalition had
significantly enhanced its training and mentoring commitment to the
ISF, the Iraqi Government had made unsatisfactory progress toward
increasing the number of Iraqi Security Force units capable of
operating independently, and thus the presence of Coalition partners
and support remained necessary for ISF operations.
* In GAO's September 4, 2007, report to Congress (Securing,
Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most
Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks),[Footnote 3] we
assessed that although the ISF had grown in size and was increasingly
leading counterinsurgency operations the Government of Iraq had not met
the benchmark of increasing the number of Iraqi Security Force units
capable of operating independently. Furthermore, we reported that
because of Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and
police units would continue to depend on Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-
I) for key sustainment and logistics support until December 2008.
* On September 6, 2007, the Independent Commission on the Security
Forces of Iraq released its report, stating that in general Iraqi
Security Forces have made uneven progress but would continue to rely on
the Coalition to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation
support, intelligence, and communications), combat service support
(logistics, supply chain management, and maintenance), and training.
* In its September 2007 report to Congress,[Footnote 4] DOD stated that
although there had been further improvement in the maturation of the
Army and, to a lesser degree, the police since its last (June 2007)
report, Ministry of Defense logistics from tactical to strategic levels
and Ministry of Interior logistics at the strategic level were fragile
and not capable of independent execution.
* Finally, the Administration's September 14, 2007, Benchmark
Assessment Report stated that although some Iraqi Army and police
forces were operating independently, it also stated that the greatest
constraints on independent operations were a shortage of trained
leaders and an immature logistics capability, and that for the present
time Coalition partnership and support remained necessary for most ISF
operations.
Since January 2006, GAO has been assessing three support capabilities
that all the aforementioned reports have cited in whole or in part as
being key to the ISF's achieving independence. Those three capabilities
are logistics, command and control, and intelligence. The first of our
reports,[Footnote 5] issued in March 2007, presented our preliminary
observations on the Iraqi Security Forces' support capabilities as of
August 2006. In those reports we noted that significant challenges had
to be overcome before the ISF attained self-sufficiency. Those
challenges included developing an effective logistics infrastructure to
support the Iraqi military and police; training Iraqi logisticians and
communications and intelligence specialists; maintaining vehicles and
equipment; and developing policies and procedures within the
ministries. In light of the continuing broad congressional interest in
Iraq, we have undertaken this follow-on engagement under the authority
of the Comptroller General[Footnote 6] to conduct evaluations at his
own initiative to examine in more detail the progress achieved in the
development of these capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to
determine: (1) what progress has been made toward the development of
Iraqi Security Forces' logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities, and what factors have affected further
progress; and (2) to what extent can DOD reports that ISF units are
capable of fully independent operations be supported. This report is
one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004
addressing the security situation in Iraq and the ISF. A list of our
related unclassified GAO products appears at the end of this report.
We use the term ISF in this report to refer to the combined forces of
the MOD and the MOI. However, the composition, structure, and
logistical, command and control, and intelligence systems of the two
ministries are significantly different. For example, the MOD is
developing a centrally directed logistics system composed of
organizations with specific responsibilities at various levels of the
chain of command but the MOI's logistics concept envisions a system
with a hybrid of centralized and decentralized logistics support
structures and mechanisms. Likewise, command and control in the MOD is
predicated on a classic military model headed by ministerial officials
who rely on commissioned and noncommissioned officers supported by a
communications and intelligence network that facilitates the
transmission of information both up and down the chain of command,
while command and control and intelligence in the MOI are organized
very differently. Some MOI forces, such as the National Police, receive
direction and intelligence from the ministry itself; others, most
notably the Iraqi Police Service, receive their intelligence
information from and are commanded and controlled by provincial
officials. Because of these differences, the factors we have identified
as impacting the development of each ministry's support capabilities
have affected the ministries in commensurately different ways and we
address the two in separate sections, starting with the Ministry of
Defense.
To determine the factors that have affected progress toward the
development of ISF support capabilities we reviewed relevant documents,
orders, and data that we obtained from the Department of Defense. We
also submitted written questions to DOD, received and reviewed those
responses, and met with and interviewed DOD officials in the United
States and Iraq, including representatives from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency. We also conducted telephone, e-mail, and in-person
interviews with former senior Coalition officials who recently returned
to the United States after serving year-long tours in Iraq as advisers
to the ISF and had teleconferences with Coalition officials still in
Iraq, during which we obtained additional information directly from the
appropriate individuals in Iraq. During our visits with individuals, we
determined that the data they provided us was sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report. We conducted our review from December 2006
through November 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Finally, in order to determine what progress has
been made in developing the support capabilities of the MOD and MOI, we
compared the state of development of those capabilities as of summer
2007 with what we found to be their state of development as of August
2006.
Results in Brief:
While the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, with Coalition
assistance, made some progress since August 2006 in developing their
respective logistics, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities--for example, the MOD has formed most of its lower echelon
logistics units and the MOI has established an intelligence
organization--persistent violence[Footnote 7] and sectarianism, along
with immature ministerial capacity, continue to impede this progress.
For example, sustained violence caused the Iraqi government to decide
to increase the size of the MOD forces and to prioritize the formation,
replenishment, and sustainment of its combat forces over combat
support, combat service support, and training formations. As a result,
the development of a national depot and garrison support units has
lagged behind that of lower level logistics units; Iraqi recruits
designated for training as logistics specialists have been diverted to
combat roles; training schools are inadequately staffed; and the
shortage of noncommissioned officers throughout the Iraqi Army has
worsened. Moreover, because the Ministry of Defense has yet to develop
adequate personnel management and support functions, Iraqi support
specialists are not being employed in the positions for which they were
trained, and schools with the mission of training these specialists
lack fuel, equipment, and supplies. For the Ministry of Interior,
violence has prevented contractors from completing the installation of
a command and control network, hampered intelligence capabilities, and
caused the ministry to implement force structure increases that have
aggravated its logistics challenges, while sectarianism threatens the
MOI's ability to exert effective command and control over its forces.
Further, the MOI has not sufficiently developed its capacity to
maintain or sustain its police forces, nor has it developed a personnel
management system to accurately account for its personnel, thus further
hindering its ability to provide command and control and logistical
support for its units.
Although DOD has, in multiple reports, stated that a certain number of
ISF units are either "independent" or "fully independent," it is
unclear how DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First,
since spring 2006 the process that Coalition transition teams use to
assess ISF units does not allow the option of giving a rating of
independent or fully independent; according to Multi-National Corps-
Iraq's (MNC-I) Transitional Readiness Assessment Report Implementing
Instructions Update, the highest rating any ISF unit can attain is
"capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency
operations."[Footnote 8] Second, in each of the reports in which DOD
asserts that a certain number of ISF units are independent or fully
independent it apparently contradicts this assertion by appending
significant qualifiers to the achievement of ISF independence. For
example, DOD reported in June 2007 that a certain number of MOD units
were either "in the lead with Coalition enablers" or "fully
independent" but then added the qualifying statements that fielded MOD
forces "often do not get the support they require without substantial
Coalition assistance" and "MOD's continued limited logistics and
sustainment capacity is a key hindrance to Iraqi forces' ability to
assume missions from the Coalition." Third, the MOD and MOI have yet to
develop those support capabilities by which they can logistically
sustain their forces, effectively command and control their forces, and
provide intelligence to their forces--all of which are inherent to
independence. As a result of DOD's lack of clarity, Congress and other
decision makers may not obtain a clear picture of the progress of the
ISF and whether it is becoming capable of truly conducting its
operations independently, i.e., without Coalition assistance and
support. Therefore, we recommend that DOD clarify its use of the terms
"independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the assessed
capabilities of ISF units, and particularly as they relate to the
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those
units. We also recommend that it clarify the process it uses to make
this assessment.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the department partially
concurred with our two recommendations, although it did not explicitly
outline any actions it would take to adopt them. Consequently, we
continue to believe that the actions we recommended are needed in order
to ensure that Congress and other decision makers are provided a clear
picture of ISF capabilities.
DOD agreed that the use of the terms "independent" and "fully
independent" can cause confusion, but stated that these terms were
still being used in reports and briefings because they are "more
illustrative" than other terms, although the department also stated
that it will evaluate its assessment terminology to more clearly
describe progress in capability development for the Iraqi forces. We do
not argue that some ISF units are more capable than others from an
operational standpoint. However, given the present state of the ISF's
capabilities, especially in the areas of logistics, command and
control, and intelligence, we believe that using the terms
"independent" or "fully independent" without clarification to describe
the ISF in reports and briefings perpetuates the very confusion DOD
acknowledges. The department also partially concurred with our
recommendation that it clarify the process it uses to assess ISF units
and replied that both the objective and subjective criteria defining
effectiveness used by transition teams is contained in Multi-National
Corps-Iraq's implementing instructions. The last time that DOD provided
any information on this process in its quarterly reports to Congress,
however, was July 2005. Since that time, the implementing instructions
for the assessment process have changed at least twice. We believe,
therefore, that in order to ensure Congress has a more complete and up-
to-date understanding of the assessment process, DOD should provide it
with an updated and detailed explanation of the current process.
Finally, the department also provided more specific technical comments
which we have reproduced and addressed individually at the end of this
report.
Background:
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which
operates under Multi-National Forces-Iraq, leads the Coalition effort
to train, equip, and organize the ISF. Previously, once ISF units were
trained and equipped, operational responsibility for their employment
was turned over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As of June 2007, the
Iraqi Ground Forces Command has assumed operational control of 8 of the
10 extant Iraqi Army divisions, and the Ministry of Interior has
assumed operational control of the National Police.
Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel the
Coalition has trained and equipped increased from over 171,000 in July
2005 to about 359,600 in September 2007. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense
forces consist of the Joint Headquarters; the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command, which commands the Army and the Iraqi Special Operations
Forces; the Air Force; and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi
Ministry of Interior forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the
National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other,
smaller forces. According to the September 2007 DOD report to Congress,
as of September 3, 2007, the Coalition has trained approximately
165,400 MOD personnel and 194,200 MOI personnel, although there is
currently no reliable data concerning how many of these personnel are
still serving with the MOI. Moreover, in 2006 the Iraqi Prime Minister,
with Coalition support, decided to expand the size of Iraq's security
forces by possibly as much as 62,500 by the end of 2007. This expansion
includes an increase in the size of extant Iraqi Army units that will
bring them to 120 percent of authorized strength, an initiative to
expand the overall size of the Iraqi Army from 10 to 13 divisions, and
an initiative to increase the number of Iraqi police.
Ministry of Defense:
In early 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and MNF-I approved a
multilayered logistics concept for the Iraqi military that called for
the generation of a variety of organizations from the ministerial to
the unit level. The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels
is expected to be the purview of two organizations: Headquarters and
Services Companies (HSC), which provide limited health, maintenance,
supply, and transportation support to Iraqi Army battalions, brigades,
and divisions; and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide
additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to
each of the Iraqi Army's infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics
support is expected to come from a National Depot, five Regional
Support Units (RSU), and the number of logistics bases needed to
support Iraqi Army requirements. A Support Command is to provide
command and control of the National Depot and RSUs, while the Iraqi
Joint Headquarters logistics staff (M-4) is to provide logistics input
to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure are the
Offices of the Director General, Armaments and Supply; Director
General, Contracts and Purchases; Director General, Infrastructure; and
Director General, Programs and Budget. These offices are tasked with
management of the ministry's overall logistical capability and the
acquisition of capital equipment, development of ministerial policies
and procedures, and management of the budget. The envisioned end state
is a comprehensive logistics system that will provide maintenance,
supply, transportation, and garrison support to all elements of the
Iraqi military.
Concurrently, command and control and intelligence infrastructures are
also being developed for the Iraqi military. The command and control
system envisions approximately 3,600 Iraqi soldiers, sailors, and
airmen to operate and maintain a command and control communications
system, in concert with contractor support, that is responsive to
program managers at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. An additional element
of this command and control system is a trained noncommissioned and
commissioned officer corps. The MOD's intelligence system envisions two
main intelligence organizations: the Directorate General of
Intelligence and Security and the Joint Headquarters Intelligence
Directorate (M-2). Both organizations are to provide effective
intelligence support to Iraqi counterinsurgency operations.
Additionally, each Iraqi Army division is to have an Intelligence,
Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) company.
To train the logistics, communications, and intelligence specialists
for these systems, the Coalition and the MOD have established training
schools at Taji. Logisticians are trained at the Iraqi Armed Service
and Support Institute (IASSI), Iraqi communications specialists are
trained at the Iraqi Signal School, and Iraqi intelligence specialists
are trained at the Iraqi Military Intelligence School.
Ministry of Interior:
By November 2006, the Coalition had developed a logistics concept of
support for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that both MNSTC-I and MNF-I
subsequently approved. While the MOI did not adopt the MNSTC-I
Logistics Concept of Support, the MOI Logistics Directorate published
its own Logistics Policy. The Coalition and MOI have started to
implement certain aspects of the MOI approved concept, a concept
composed of a hybrid of national, provincial, and regional logistics
support structures and mechanisms. At the national level, the ministry
is responsible for purchasing and distributing vehicles, weapons, and
ammunition for all its forces as well as allocating budgeted money to
police forces in 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces.[Footnote 9] Additionally,
through the allocation of funds the ministry is responsible for the
sustainment and maintenance of the National Police, the National
Information and Investigation Agency, and about 40 other organizations.
In the provinces, provincial Directors of Police are responsible for
the sustainment and maintenance of each of their respective Iraqi
Police Service (IPS) forces. Using the funds distributed to them by the
MOI, the provincial Directors of Police direct funds to IPS police
stations in their provinces. These local police stations, in turn, use
the allocated funds to pay local vendors for life support (e.g. food,
water, electricity), fuel, and vehicle maintenance. Finally, there are
five regional headquarters of the Department of Border Enforcement
(DBE) and Ports of Entry (POE) that also receive funds from the
ministry that they, in turn, use to purchase life support, maintenance,
and fuel from local sources.
As of July 2007 MOI had not yet approved a communications plan.
Nonetheless, the MOI and Coalition are working together to build a
command and control structure throughout Iraq that, like the logistics
concept, has three parts--national, provincial, and local. The nexus of
the MOI's command and control architecture at the national level is the
National Command Center (NCC), which is responsible for exercising
command and control over all matters pertaining to police, receiving
input from local and provincial police organizations, and reporting to
the Government of Iraq's National Operations Center and National Joint
Operations Center. Providing provincial input to the NCC are more than
260 police, border, and port communication centers that are, in turn,
supported by the Iraqi Command and Control Network (IC2N), which is
designed to connect provincial sites to each other and the NCC. A
second network, the Advanced First Responder Network (AFRN), is
intended to link MOI first responders in 15 Iraqi cities with both MOD
forces and to the MOI's National Command Center. Finally, underpinning
this communications architecture are more than 108,000 radios used by
MOI personnel. All told, the Coalition has spent approximately $360
million to install this communications structure for the MOI.
Criminal intelligence operations for the MOI are the responsibility of
one organization, the National Information and Investigation Agency
(NIIA). While other MOI organizations gather law enforcement
information, the NIIA is akin to the American FBI, and is tasked with
analyzing information gathered through criminal investigations to
counter serious crimes and threats to Iraq's national security. The
NIIA is organized as a headquarters with 15 provincial offices and is
authorized about 6,000 employees, including investigators, criminal
analysts, and surveillance personnel who are to work closely with the
IPS on the local level and liaison with other MOI organizations such as
the National Police and port forces.
Funding for Development of ISF Support Capabilities:
In September 2007, GAO reported that since 2003 the United States has
provided about $19.2 billion to train and equip about 350,000 Iraqi
soldiers and police officers in an effort to develop Iraqi Security
Forces, transfer security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi
government, and ultimately withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq.[Footnote 10]
This figure includes approximately $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2007
supplemental funding for the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) and an
additional $2.0 billion of ISFF funding for fiscal year 2008.[Footnote
11] Meanwhile, in calendar year 2007 the Iraqi Government has budgeted
$4.14 billion for the MOD and $3.18 billion for the MOI.
Based on DOD's ISFF budget justifications, GAO has determined that DOD
intends to allocate about $3.5 billion--or more than half of the $5.8
billion of fiscal year 2007 and 2008 ISFF money--to sustain the ISF and
further develop its logistics, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities. According to the categories in which DOD has organized
its justifications, the $3.5 billion is to be spent on infrastructure,
equipment, and transportation for the ISF and the training, operation,
and sustainment of Iraqi forces. See Table 1 for specific funding
requests for sustainment and development of ISF support capabilities.
Table 1: FY07 and FY08 ISFF Requests for Sustainment and Development of
ISF Support Capabilities:
DOD Budget Justification Category: Infrastructure;
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $409.8.
DOD Budget Justification Category: Equipment & Transportation;
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $1,835.6.
DOD Budget Justification Category: Training & Operations;
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $40.7.
DOD Budget Justification Category: Sustainment;
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $1,204.5.
Total;
ISFF Funding Requested for Sustainment and Development of ISF Support
Capabilities in FY07 and FY08 (in millions): $3,490.6.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Some Progress Has Been Achieved, but Persistent Violence, Sectarianism,
and a Lack of Ministerial Capacity Continue to Impede Development of
the Iraqi Security Forces' Support Capabilities:
Although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, with assistance from the
Coalition, has made some progress in developing its logistical, command
and control, and intelligence capabilities--for example, it has formed
most of the lower echelon units required by its logistical concept, it
has implemented more advanced communications training at its Signal
School, and its intelligence architecture is nearly complete--
challenges remain because of the impact of the persistent high levels
of violence and the inability of the ministry to carry out its
responsibilities. Most notably, the persistent violence in Iraq has
induced the MOD to prioritize the formation, replenishment, and
sustainment of Iraqi Army combat forces above combat service support
forces and training schools. As a result the development of mid-level
logistics organizations has lagged behind the development of lower
level logistics units; Iraqi recruits designated for training as
logistics specialists have been diverted to combat roles; training
schools are inadequately staffed; and the ratio of noncommissioned
officers throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened. Moreover, because the
Ministry of Defense has yet to develop adequate personnel management
and support functions, Iraqi support specialists are not being used in
the jobs for which they were trained, and schools with the mission to
train these specialists lack fuel, equipment, and supplies.
The Iraqi Ministry of Interior has likewise made progress in developing
its logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities--it
is in the process of implementing a logistics concept; increasingly
capable personnel are manning its command and control centers; and it
has established and largely equipped an intelligence organization--but
escalated violence and, to a much greater extent than in the MOD,
sectarianism have compelled its expansion to an extent that has
strained its logistical capabilities and undermined command and
control. The inability of the MOI to effectively perform its
ministerial functions has further undermined the implementation of the
MOI's logistical concept of support and eroded some intelligence and
command and control capabilities. Moreover, the MOI cannot accurately
account for its personnel, which makes questionable its ability to
develop an effective command and control or logistical support
capability.
The Coalition and Iraqi Government have taken steps to address the
persistent violence, sectarianism, and immature ministerial capacity
that continue to impede progress in developing ISF support
capabilities. For instance, the Iraqi government has decided to expand
the size of MOD and MOI forces in response to this violence and since
January 2007, the Iraqi government has replaced about 70 percent of the
senior commanders in the National Police who were suspected of
sectarianism. In addition, through its MOD and MOI transition teams,
MNSTC-I works with both ministries to improve their capacity.
Persistent Violence and Lack of Ministerial Capacity Impede Development
of MOD's Support Capabilities:
For the MOD, persistent violence has caused the establishment of a
national depot and garrison support units to lag behind that of lower
level logistics units, a condition we observed in 2006 that has served
to undermine the development of the Iraqi military's logistic support
capability. The violence has also aggravated shortages of trained
logisticians, training center faculty, and noncommissioned officers.
Poor ministerial oversight has also adversely impacted the training
institutions charged with training support specialists and spawned the
development of a bartering system as a workaround for shortages.
Persistent Violence Has Forced the Prioritization of the Formation of
Combat Over Critical Mid-Level Logistics Units:
According to DOD and former senior Coalition officials, because of high
levels of violence the Coalition and MOD have given priority to the
formation, replenishment, and sustainment of combat units over mid-
level combat service support units, a circumstance that has negatively
impacted the development of the National Depot and Garrison Support
Units (GSU). According to DOD, the goal is for the National Depot to be
completely transitioned to Iraqi control in early 2008, while full
transition of the GSUs to Iraqi control is projected for late 2007.
Although the MOD's logistics concept does not specify any priority to
the establishment of one type of logistics unit over another, since
August 2006 the priority has been on generating lower echelon logistics
formations, specifically HSCs and MTRs. In a previous GAO report, we
noted that as of August 2006, most of the authorized HSCs and MTRs were
already formed. According to updated information we obtained in July
2007, all of the HSCs and MTRs originally envisioned for the Iraqi Army
have been formed, while 32 additional HSCs and 2 additional MTRs
required by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Initiative to increase the size
of the Iraqi Army will be formed and transitioned to Iraqi control in
2008. But the development of the National Depot at Taji and the
formation of Garrison Support Units, which provide base support for
Iraqi military installations and comprise the basic building blocks of
the Iraqi Armed Forces' area support sustainment structure, have lagged
behind.
Coalition logisticians have emphasized that the development of all
echelons of the logistics concept is crucial in order for the MOD to
become capable of independently sustaining its forces. In February
2007, DOD underscored this by requesting approximately $654 million for
the development of infrastructure and various systems at the National
Depot at Taji and another $593 million for the development of Regional
and Garrison Support Units. In its justification for these funds, DOD
called the National Depot at Taji "the epicenter" of the logistical
infrastructure for the ISF and stated that without the capability to
provide logistical sustainment for the ISF through the National Depot,
the ISF will be unable to effectively conduct operations without
extensive Coalition support. Moreover, it emphasized that without the
funding requested for Regional and Garrison Support Units, those
facilities may go months or years without use while waiting for
equipment to be delivered through Iraqi acquisition systems. Yet,
despite significant U.S. funding, persistent violence in Iraq has
dictated the prioritization of combat over mid-level combat service
supports units, thereby hampering the MOD's ability to logistically
sustain itself.
Persistent Violence Has Undermined the Development of the National
Depot and Garrison Support Units:
In August 2006, the National Depot was plagued by manpower shortages,
security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor maintenance.
According to a former senior Coalition adviser to the National Depot,
as of June 2007 these challenges remained because of the relatively low
priority afforded the development of the depot vis-à-vis the formation
of Iraqi combat units. For example, according to this former Coalition
official, although there was a 100 percent increase in the number of
Iraqi personnel assigned to the National Depot since August 2006, that
increase brought the depot to only about 50 percent of its authorized
personnel complement. According to this official, manning levels at the
depot went from about 300 personnel assigned to about 600 personnel
assigned. The authorized complement is approximately 1,200. This
official attributed this personnel shortage to the higher priority
given to filling Iraqi Army combat over combat service support units.
Security at the National Depot is also problematic because of lack of
personnel. We reported that in August 2006, the National Depot's
security detachment was not filled. As of June 2007, this remained the
case, necessitating the formation of an ad hoc security force composed
of those Iraqi logisticians on hand, thereby further decrementing the
depot's capacity. Fuel, too, remained a scarce commodity at the
National Depot, a situation that adversely affected quality of life
there, as well as the depot's maintenance, inventory management, and
communications systems, all of which require generator-supplied
electricity. According to a former senior Coalition official we
interviewed, this fuel shortage was, like the shortage of trained
logistics specialists, a direct effect of the decision to supply combat
over combat service support units--again, a decision made in large part
because of the operational environment.
The priority given to combat over combat service support units has also
affected the development of GSUs. As of August 2006, the Coalition and
MOD had not yet determined the exact number of GSUs to be formed, and
only five were in the process of being formed. By July 2007, the
Coalition and MOD had agreed to form a total of 80 GSUs, but only 3 had
been completed while another 14 were under construction. According to
DOD, as the security situation in Iraq continues to be tenuous the
force generation of security forces, to include those required by the
Prime Minister's Initiative, has taken precedence over the generation
of Iraqi soldiers with some of the special skill sets required to fill
GSU sites. Underscoring this is an observation by a senior Coalition
adviser to IASSI. He stated that those logisticians who were trained at
IASSI were all sent to combat units. As a result, other purely
logistical formations, such as Regional and Garrison Support Units, did
not receive their quota of trained logisticians and were therefore
short-staffed and ineffective.
Persistent Violence Aggravates Shortages of Trained Logisticians,
Training Center Faculty, and Noncommissioned Officers:
The persistent violence in Iraq has also affected the MOD's combat
support and combat service support training institutions. For example,
according to two former senior Coalition logistics advisers to the
Iraqi Army, Iraqi Army recruits identified for training as logistics
specialists were often diverted during their basic training into combat
roles because of the Prime Minister's announced increases to the size
of the Army's combat formations. That diversion contributes to a
paucity of trained logistics specialists across the MOD.
According to DOD, the MOD's Military Intelligence School, which is
responsible for training Iraqi soldiers in intelligence skills, has
only 24 of 81 authorized instructors, a circumstance attributed in part
to security concerns for Iraqi faculty members who live outside the
military complex at Taji. Persistent violence also contributed to the
faculty shortfalls at IASSI. As of July 2007, of the 217 faculty
positions authorized for IASSI, only 153 were assigned and only 138
were present for duty. According to a former senior Coalition advisor
to IASSI as well as information provided by DOD, this shortfall is a
direct result of the higher priority given to combat units in the
present operational environment.
Finally, the persistent violence in Iraq has also contributed to a
dearth of trained noncommissioned officers in the Iraqi Army. As of
July 2007, the Iraqi Army was short 18,000 corporals, 14,500 sergeants,
and 7,500 sergeants first class. With MNSTC-I advice and assistance,
the Iraqis are working a number of initiatives to address this
leadership shortage. However, DOD notes that despite this shortage of
trained noncommissioned officers--leaders that are critical to
establishing effective command and control in the Iraqi military--
attendance at noncommissioned officer schools is unsatisfactory because
Iraqi Army commanders are challenged to balance the needs of the fight
with the requirements to release students for training.
Underdeveloped Ministerial Capacity Undermines the Development of
Support Capabilities:
The lack of ministerial support has also stymied the development of the
MOD's support capabilities by allowing Iraqi commanders to
inappropriately assign trained logisticians and communications
specialists and by perpetuating insufficiencies of fuel, equipment and
instructional materials at the training institutions for these
specialists. In our March 2007 report, we addressed some of these
ministerial capacity challenges as they affected the development of the
MOD's support capabilities. Updated information provided by DOD and
obtained through interviews with former senior Coalition officials
confirms the persistence of several of these challenges--particularly
personnel management and support for IASSI and the Signal School.
For example, we noted in March 2007 that, according to a senior Iraqi
Army signal officer, there was a tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to
inappropriately assign the Signal School's enlisted graduates to jobs
as infantrymen while officers, who may not have graduated from the
Signal School, operated the radios. According to updated information
obtained from DOD in July 2007, this practice persists for both
communications and logistics specialists. DOD noted that although the
Iraqi personnel management system is evolving and that new systems for
automated tracking of personnel should improve the ability of senior
levels of command to monitor the proper assignment of trained
personnel, Iraqi Army commanders continue to have discretion regarding
soldiers' position assignments.
The problem of managing trained personnel is also endemic in the Iraqi
Army's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance companies, one of
which is assigned to each Iraqi Army division. According to DOD, ISR
company soldiers are routinely used as personal security details and
guards, or to fill out combat units within the division. As a result of
these personnel decisions, as well as challenges in recruiting and
maintaining personnel, as of July 2007 DOD's assessment is that,
overall, ISR companies are mission-ineffective throughout Iraq.
Additionally, according to a former senior Coalition adviser to the
National Depot, trained logistics specialists also often tend to be
assigned to personal security detachments or as aides to senior Iraqi
officers.
According to former senior Coalition advisers and updated information
provided by DOD, none of the three schools have enough fuel to run
their generators, a circumstance DOD attributed to the Ministry of
Defense receiving only about 50 percent of its stated fuel
requirements. To mitigate the effect of these fuel shortages senior
Iraqi leaders, supported by Coalition advisers, are to negotiate the
hours for which fuel for generators and hence electricity will be
provided so that the impact on training and critical life support is
minimized. However, at both IASSI and the Signal School, this has not
always been possible. In September 2006, for example, fuel shortages
were so acute that the Iraqi commandant of IASSI was forced to shut
down training completely. As a result, 450 Iraqi soldiers who were to
be trained in a variety of logistics disciplines were sent back to
their divisions. According to a former senior Coalition adviser to the
Signal School, the Iraqi commandant there had also to shut down
operations completely in January because of a lack of fuel.
Training equipment and instructional materials used to support that
training were also in short supply, again the result of lack of support
from the MOD. For example, according to a former senior Coalition
adviser to the Signal School, MOD did not supply any instructional
supplies, such as pens, pencils, or paper, to the school during this
adviser's year-long tenure. All supplies were either purchased by
Signal School faculty, obtained by students themselves while they were
on leave, or donated by U.S. companies.
This lack of ministerial support also spawned a bartering system on
which, according to former senior Coalition advisers, both IASSI and
the Signal School came to rely and without which they could not perform
their missions. For example, according to a former senior Coalition
adviser to IASSI, during his year-long tenure there were never enough
high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) on which to train
Iraqi mechanics because MOD support to IASSI was minimal or
nonexistent. He said that IASSI was tasked with training 200 Iraqi
mechanics per class and required 10 HMMWVs to do so effectively.
However, IASSI had only 2 partial HMMWVs for the first 6 months of his
tenure. In January 2007, IASSI picked up 2 more by bartering with a
nearby Coalition unit and obtained another 2 later through the
intervention of a Coalition general officer. Furthermore, both IASSI
and the Signal School also obtained fuel through bartering. When IASSI
had to shut down its training completely for lack of fuel in September
2006, the Signal School was able to obtain some in exchange for
allowing a Coalition unit to use its buildings. According to a former
Coalition adviser to IASSI, the practice of advisors obtaining fuel
from Coalition fuel points for their Iraqi counterparts became so
pervasive that eventually the fuel points were instructed not to supply
any more fuel to these advisors. Beyond fuel, however, the Signal
School also obtained computer maintenance support through bartering.
According to a former senior Coalition adviser to the Signal School,
there were approximately 150 laptop and desktop computers at the school
for use in instruction, yet the MOD had no means to repair them if they
broke down. To alleviate this problem the Iraqi commandant of the
Signal School bartered for computer repair services with a nearby U.S.
sustainment unit. In exchange for the use of a civilian pickup truck,
the U.S. sustainment unit agreed to provide computer maintenance
support for the Signal School. According to this official, the Signal
School would not have been able to accomplish its mission of training
Iraqi communications specialists without this support.
Persistent Violence, Widespread Sectarianism, and Lack of Ministerial
Capacity Impede Development of MOI Support Capabilities:
The continued high levels of violence have hampered MOI communications
networks and intelligence capabilities while sectarianism has
undermined effective command and control in the Iraqi police forces. In
addition, the inability of the MOI to perform certain basic ministerial
functions has negatively impacted the development of its logistical,
command and control, and intelligence capabilities.
Persistent Violence Hampers MOI Communications Networks and
Intelligence Capabilities and Exacerbates Logistics Challenges:
Persistent high levels of violence have seriously degraded the MOI's
national communications architecture, thereby leading to a commensurate
degradation of the MOI's ability to provide effective command and
control over its forces. Additionally, the high levels of violence have
also curtailed MOI intelligence operations. According to DOD,
persistent attacks on the Advanced First Responder Network in Basrah
and southern Iraq in the summer of 2007 have degraded the network's
capability. Likewise, persistence violence has also affected use of the
Iraqi Command and Control Network. According to DOD, one IC2N
communications site has been the target of insurgent activity, and a
contractor has been unable to install the network's final node due to
insurgent activity in the area. MOI intelligence capabilities have also
been severely hampered by violence. According to DOD, the current
security environment in Baghdad and other cities restricts the National
Information and Investigation Agency's staff from traveling to crime
scenes. Because of this, the NIIA'a ability to conduct investigations
and intelligence operations is significantly degraded. Due to the high
levels of violence that have curtailed NIIA operations, as well as
delays in the construction of the NIIA's headquarters which was
supposed to be complete by May 2007 but for which construction had not
begun as of July 2007,[Footnote 12] the Coalition stated that it cannot
estimate when the NIIA will be self-sufficient.
Persistent violence has also aggravated the MOI's logistics challenges.
This is because, in response to the violence, the MOI has increased its
authorized strength without a commensurate increase in its ability to
support its increased size. In 2006 the Iraqi Minister of Interior, in
conjunction with MNSTC-I, responded to the persistent violence in Iraq
by expanding the authorized strength of the MOI from approximately
188,000 to about 195,000 personnel. Additionally, 2006 saw the
incorporation of security forces from 27 different Iraqi ministries
into one Facilities Protection Service, which, in turn, was placed
under the MOI, bringing an estimated 98,000 more personnel into the
ministry. However, the MOI's logistics infrastructure may not be able
to accommodate these rapid increases in size and organizational
structure. Indeed, MNSTC-I's 2007 Campaign Action Plan states that the
accelerated growth and transition of the MOI may exceed the ministry's
ability to adapt both operationally and logistically. More
specifically, a July 2007 Coalition assessment indicates that MOI
increases in end strength will stress the MOI's ability to meet its
requirements for general materials such as clothing, individual
equipment, construction materials, and some major end items.
Widespread Sectarianism Has Undermined the Effective Command and
Control of Iraqi Police Forces:
The MOI continues to be plagued by sectarianism at the ministerial
level as well as in the National Police and Iraqi Police Service. For
example, in June 2007, DOD reported that sectarianism impacts every
aspect of the ministerial offices in Baghdad and several other cities,
an observation underscored by a recent MNSTC-I report which states that
although it cannot quantify the amount of insurgent influence at the
ministerial level, it suspects that various insurgent groups have
significant influence throughout the ministry. According to both the
former and current MNSTC-I commanders, the National Police are also
beset with widespread sectarianism. In June 2007, the former MNSTC-I
commander testified that the Iraqi National Police was the "single most
sectarian organization in Iraq." Two months later, the current MNSTC-I
commander echoed his predecessor's assessment, stating that the
National Police were "overly infiltrated with militia elements" and
that "there's no doubt that in the National Police the sectarian
influence remains and will be hard to eradicate." Finally, evidence
indicates that the Iraqi Police Service is also heavily infiltrated
with sectarian elements. The former commander of the Iraq Assistance
Group[Footnote 13]characterized the Iraqi Police Service as the ISF
element most vulnerable to sectarianism, despite the MOI's removal of
over 3,000 members considered to have a sectarian bias in January 2007.
Finally, in September 2007, GAO determined that the Iraqi government
has not eliminated militia control over local security forces, and that
sectarianism in the ISF remains a serious problem in Baghdad and other
areas of Iraq.[Footnote 14]
Such widespread sectarianism in the MOI has undermined Coalition
efforts to develop Iraqi police forces that are ethical, competent,
loyal to the principles of the Iraqi constitution, and accountable to
the civilian leadership and people of Iraq. Furthermore, efforts to
root out sectarian influence in the MOI have resulted in personnel
turbulence among senior police commanders. Since January 2007, the
Iraqi government has replaced 70 percent of senior commanders in the
National Police due to their sectarianism, a list that includes 2
division, 7 brigade, and 17 battalion commanders. These high level
command changes are especially significant given that the National
Police are facing a critical officer shortage; by the summer of 2007
they had filled fewer than half of their officer positions. Despite
these officer changes, however, according to a July 2007 DOD report,
there continues to be a sectarian bias in the appointment of senior
Iraqi police commanders.
Undeveloped Ministerial Capacity Adversely Affects the Development of
MOI Support Capabilities:
The inability of the MOI to develop key ministerial functions at the
national and local levels has also negatively impacted the development
of the ministry's logistic, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities. This, in turn, has had a negative impact on the ability
of certain MOI forces to perform their missions and has caused DOD to
request further funding for several of these programs. For example,
according to a DOD assessment, because the MOI does not have a unit
that maintains the National Police's vehicular fleet, the National
Police cannot sustain deployments without support from either the Iraqi
Army or the Coalition. Because of this, as well as an unexplained delay
in the construction of MOI maintenance facilities, DOD explains that
the Coalition may extend the duration of the Baghdad Area Maintenance
Contract by six months. DOD officials stated that this contract, which
provides maintenance for all MOI vehicles in Baghdad, is planned to
cost the Coalition at least $22 million. Maintenance support for the
MOI's border and port forces is also a challenge. According to DOD,
maintenance support for both the border and port forces is "virtually
non-existent" and DOD estimates that the DBE will not be self-
sufficient in maintenance until the summer of 2011, although in its
2007 Iraqi Security Forces Fund request DOD sought $175 million to
build and sustain MOI vehicle maintenance facilities in order to
redress this shortcoming. Maintenance problems have also plagued the
MOI's communications systems. For example, MOI personnel in two of the
three zones in which the AFRN is located have not demonstrated the
ability to maintain the network or the equipment required to run its
systems, negatively impacting command and control. As a result, in
fiscal year 2007 the Coalition planned to spend at least $18 million to
bolster the MOI's command and control architecture, which accounts for
90 percent of the amount the ministry had budgeted for command and
control.
The MOI's inability to perform key ministerial functions also means it
has had difficulty supplying its forces. For example, the MOI has had
difficulty supplying adequate amounts of fuel for its forces. According
to DOD, the MOI is not wholly responsible for this problem; one reason
for this lack of fuel is that the Ministry of Oil has not supplied the
MOI with sufficient amounts of fuel. This has most notably affected the
MOI's National Police which, because of these fuel shortfalls, have had
difficulty conducting patrols. However, the IPS and border and port
forces, which are to use local vendors for fuel, have also experienced
shortages. According to the Iraq Assistance Group, this is because only
one-fourth of the National Police's fuel requirements are funded while
the IPS, border, and port forces pay black market prices for fuel,
which are substantially higher than the official price. Overall,
although the Coalition transferred responsibility for fuel to the MOI
in December 2006, because of these shortages it was still supplying
fuel to the MOI as of July 2007. Moreover, the sustainment to two key
MOI organizations, the National Police and the National Intelligence
and Investigation Agency, is undermined by the fact that neither has an
independent budget. Although the reason for this is unclear, the result
is that sustainment requirements for both the National Police and the
NIIA are subsumed in the budgets for other MOI organizations. One
result of this circumstance is that the National Police have been
unable to redress certain equipment shortfalls and the Coalition has
stated that because of challenges regarding maintenance, fuel, budget
independence, and manning, it cannot estimate when the National Police
will be able to operate self-sufficiently. In an effort to rectify some
of these challenges, DOD sought $493 million in its 2007 ISFF request
to modernize or replace MOI equipment that will be lost due to combat
loss or life cycle attrition, including 52,200 weapons, 1,720 trucks,
130 police sedans, and equipment for personnel.
Internal organizational challenges have also impeded development of the
MOI's command and control capability. For example, although the MOI has
a nascent communications network in place, the MOI has yet to develop a
comprehensive communications plan that governs its use and the absence
of such a plan makes effective command and control of MOI forces
difficult. According to Coalition sources, the needed communications
plan has not been developed because of internecine disagreements within
the ministry that have hindered its acceptance. Another organizational
challenge is the fact that, although the MOI's logistical concept
envisions organizations that will be responsible for vehicle
maintenance, spare parts management, and the running of national and
provincial warehouses, the MOI has yet to develop official
organizational structures or equipment requirements for these
organizations. Without these plans, it is unclear how the MOI can
effectively implement an effective maintenance support plan. In
addition, the inability of the MOI to effectively manage contracts has
led to challenges in sustainment and command and control. In its 2007
ISFF request, DOD sought $25 million for sustainment of MOI training
academies and medical facilities, explaining that the Government of
Iraq does not have appropriate contracting and budgetary procedures
established to sustain these facilities. MOI's ineffective contracting
has also undermined the sustainability of one of two critical
communications systems, the Advanced First Responder Network. According
to DOD, in May 2007 the MOI signed a contract for the operation and
maintenance of, and training of personnel for, the network. However, as
of summer 2007, MNSTC-I reports that the MOI has not funded the
contract, does not have the capacity to fund it, and is reluctant to
fund it. The Coalition planned for the MOI to assume responsibility for
operation and maintenance of the network by March 2007. However,
because of the ministry's inability to maintain the network, as of July
2007 the Coalition was unable to estimate when the MOI would be self-
sufficient in operation of the AFRN.
Finally, because of problems with its personnel management system, the
MOI is facing the fundamental challenge of not being able to accurately
account for its personnel. According to DOD's June and September 2007
reports to Congress, there is currently no reliable data on how many
Coalition-trained personnel are still serving in the MOI's forces.
Moreover, DOD has also reported that the MOI has hired a significant
number of police beyond those trained by the Coalition. According to
testimony by the former MNSTC-I commander, the MOI's payroll accounts
for about 60,000 to 74,000 more personnel than the number trained and
equipped by the Coalition. However, he also stated that about 20
percent of this overage are "ghosts," meaning personnel whose names
appear on the MOI's payroll but who are not actually serving. Effecting
command and control or fashioning a logistics system for an
organization of indeterminate size is problematic because both these
capabilities are, by their very nature, determined by the size of the
organization for which they are designed. It is unlikely that the MOI
can effectively ensure command and control of forces that it cannot
accurately count, especially if thousands of the personnel who appear
on its payrolls do not exist. In addition, basic logistics functions
such as budgeting for and procuring the requisite sustainment stocks
also require accurate knowledge of a force's size.
DOD's Determination of ISF Independence Is Not Clear:
Although DOD has in multiple reports stated that a certain number of
ISF units are either "independent" or "fully independent," it is
unclear how DOD arrived at this determination for three reasons. First,
the process by which ISF units are assessed does not allow for a rating
of "independent" or "fully independent." Second, statements in DOD
reports seemingly contradict claims of ISF independence. Third, the MOD
and MOI are still experiencing significant challenges with regard to
developing the support capabilities on which independence is
contingent.
Assessments of ISF Independence Are Problematic:
Since October 2005, DOD has asserted in its quarterly reports to
Congress that a certain number of ISF units are "independent" or "fully
independent," yet it is unclear how this determination can be made
given the process by which ISF units are evaluated, qualifying language
about ISF independence that DOD uses in its reports, and the challenges
facing the development of the ISF's support capabilities.
DOD began issuing quarterly reports to Congress in July 2005. In each
of these reports, except for the first,[Footnote 15] DOD reported that
a certain number of ISF units had been assessed as either "in the lead
with Coalition enablers or fully independent" or "capable of planning,
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independently or
with Iraqi or Coalition forces." For example, in its most recent report
to Congress, issued in September 2007, DOD stated that 95 Army, Special
Operations Combat Forces, and Iraqi Army Infrastructure units; an
indeterminate number of MOD logistics enablers; 7 National Police
Combat Battalions; and 3 National Police Brigade Headquarters were all
"capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency
operations independently or with Iraqi or Coalition forces." Although
in none of these reports does DOD distinguish between those forces that
are capable of operating independently and those that require Coalition
or Iraqi assistance, the tables in which DOD's data are presented lead
one to believe that at least one if not more than one of the units was
rated as independent. This was underscored during the MNF-I commander's
September 10 and 11, 2007 testimony, during which he briefed the
Congress that in every month since November 2005, with only one
exception (February 2006) the Coalition has assessed at least one ISF
unit as "fully independent."
However, despite DOD's reports and the MNF-I commander's recent
testimony that a certain number of ISF have been assessed as "fully
independent," after March 2006 it was no longer possible for a
Coalition transition team member to rate the readiness of an ISF unit
using these terms. Previously, in guidance provided to Coalition
transition teams for use in evaluating Iraqi Security Forces, a level 1
unit was said to be "fully capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining independent operations." However, in the spring of 2006, MNC-
I removed the words "fully" and "independent" from the definition. When
we asked DOD officials for the reason for this change they were not
able to provide us with an explanation. Therefore, according to the
current guidance, a level 1 unit is one that is "capable of planning,
executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations." It is
important to note that, according to the guidance, a Coalition
transition team cannot judge an ISF unit as "independent." However, in
its most recent report to Congress, DOD asserted that an "independent
unit is one that is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations." Thus, DOD's continued reporting that
some ISF units are "independent" or "fully independent" is not
congruent with MNC-I's instructions for filling out the Operational
Readiness Assessments on which DOD's assertions and reports seem to be
based. If independence is still a relevant descriptor of ISF unit
capabilities, then why was the term removed from the definition of a
level 1 unit in 2006?
Further obfuscating the issue are statements that DOD has made in each
of its reports to Congress that apparently contradict the assertion
that at least some ISF units are "fully independent." For example, in
its August 2006 report, DOD stated that in the absence of a self-
reliant logistics system, MNF-I must provide extensive support to Iraqi
forces. In its November 2006 report, DOD stated that perhaps the most
significant shortcoming in both the MOD and MOI forces' capabilities
lay in planning and executing their logistics and sustainment
requirements, and that efforts were underway to reduce Iraqi forces'
reliance on U.S. support and sustainment. The March 2007 report echoed
this observation, stating that the most significant shortcoming in both
the MOD and MOI forces' capabilities lay in planning and executing
sustainment requirements. In its June 2007 report to Congress, DOD
stated that building the logistics and sustainment capabilities of the
MOD and MOI constitutes one of four major areas on which the Coalition
is focusing. The report goes on to note that fielded MOD forces often
do not get the support they require without substantial Coalition
assistance. Finally, in its most recent report to Congress, released in
September 2007, DOD stated that MOD logistics from the tactical to
strategic levels, and MOI logistics at the strategic level, are fragile
and not capable of independent execution. Underscoring these qualifying
statements are the comments of the MNF-I commander, who stated during
his recent Congressional testimony that although there are about 95 ISF
units capable of taking the lead in operations, they still need some
Coalition support and that, furthermore, were U.S. forces to withdraw
rapidly from Iraq, the ISF would face "a high risk of disintegration."
Finally, because of the many challenges facing the Coalition and Iraqi
government in developing the ISF's support capabilities, it is clear
that the ISF is not independent of the Coalition. From January 2006,
when we began our investigation of ISF support capabilities, to
September 2007, the date of the latest information contained in this
report, the ISF have been unable to fully meet their logistics, command
and control, and intelligence requirements. Because these capabilities
are inherent to independence, until the ISF develops them, neither the
MOD nor MOI can be considered independent.
Although we are not discounting DOD assertions that there are some ISF
units that are more capable than others from an operational standpoint,
we find that using the terms "independent" or "fully independent" to
describe their overarching development is both confusing and
misleading. Every ISF unit, regardless of its operational ability, is
dependent upon institutional logistic, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities that are designed to support it and as this
report and our previous reports demonstrate, these capabilities in both
the MOD and MOI are facing significant challenges to their development.
Conclusions:
The MOD and MOI face significant challenges in developing their
logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. Two
factors, in particular, have thwarted their development--the
persistence of high levels of violence and sectarianism and a lack of
ministerial capacity. As a result, the ability of both ministries to
maintain and sustain their forces, provide effective command and
control of their forces, and provide their forces with intelligence is
undermined and cannot be accomplished without Coalition support.
Furthermore, since these support capabilities have yet to be fully
developed, DOD claims that ISF units are either "independent" or "fully
independent" are confusing and misleading. Although we are not
discounting DOD reports that there are some ISF units that are more
capable than others from an operational standpoint, we do not find
sufficient evidence for an assessment of "independent" or "fully
independent" for any ISF unit. Moreover, without clarity regarding the
criteria according to which ISF units are assessed as independent,
especially with regard to their logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities, Congress cannot have clear visibility over
DOD's role in assisting the ISF in becoming independent of Coalition
support.
Recommendations:
In order to provide the Congress and other decision makers with a clear
picture of ISF capabilities, we recommend that DOD clarify 1) its use
of the terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the
assessed capabilities of ISF units, especially with regard to the
logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of those
units, and 2) the process it uses to make this assessment.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our two recommendations and provided a matrix of narrower
technical comments. In its written comments, DOD stated that it would
evaluate its assessment terminology to more clearly describe progress
in capability development for the Iraqi forces. However, DOD did not
explicitly outline any actions it would take to adopt our
recommendation to clarify its terminology. Furthermore, DOD stated that
while the terms "independent" and "fully independent" can cause
confusion, they are still being used in reports and briefings because
they are "more illustrative" than other terms. Consequently, we
continue to believe that the actions we recommended are needed in order
to ensure that Congress and other decision makers are provided a clear
picture of ISF capabilities. DOD's written comments and its technical
comment matrix are reprinted in appendix I.
With regard to the first recommendation that DOD clarify its use of the
terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the
assessed capabilities of Iraqi Security Force units, especially with
regard to the logistical, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities of those units, the department partially concurred. DOD
agreed that the use of the terms "independent" and "fully independent"
can cause confusion, but stated that these terms were still being used
in reports and briefings because they are "more illustrative" than
other terms, although the department also stated that it will evaluate
its assessment terminology to more clearly describe progress in
capability development for the Iraqi forces. We believe, however, that
DOD's evaluation of the terms is insufficient; that the continued use
of "independent" or "fully independent" in briefings and reports only
perpetuates the very confusion that DOD recognizes; and that therefore
our recommendation that DOD clarify its terms is warranted for three
reasons. First, the process by which ISF units are assessed does not
allow for a rating of "independent" or "fully independent," a point
amplified by the definition of a level 1 unit DOD supplied in its
written comments. Second, statements in DOD reports seemingly
contradict claims of ISF independence. This was underscored by the
written statement submitted by the MNF-I commander in conjunction with
his September 2007 Congressional testimony, in which he stated that
although there are about 95 ISF units capable of taking the lead in
operations, they still need some Coalition support and that were U.S.
forces to withdraw rapidly from Iraq, the ISF would face "a high risk
of disintegration." Finally, as this report demonstrates, the MOD and
MOI are still experiencing significant challenges with regard to
developing the logistics, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities on which independence is contingent.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that it clarify
the process its uses to assess ISF units, stating that although MNC-I
modified the wording used to describe a level 1 unit in 2006, the
metrics and processes transition teams use to assess Ministry of
Interior and Defense units have not changed and that this process is
clearly defined in the MNC-I Transition Readiness Assessment Report
Implementing Instructions Update. We examined both the March 2006 and
the December 2006 updates (the latter being, according to DOD, the most
current update). Even a cursory look at the example forms reproduced in
the respective updates shows that the metrics have, in fact, changed.
For example, the number of sustainment and logistics categories by
which units are evaluated has gone from 3 to 5 and the subjective and
objective criteria used to determine unit ratings in the areas of
leadership, communications, administration, and training have also
changed. Furthermore, the last time that DOD provided any information
on the ISF assessment process in its quarterly reports to Congress was
July 2005. Since that time, the implementing instructions for the
assessment process have changed at least twice. We believe, therefore,
that in order to ensure Congress has a more complete and up-to-date
understanding of the assessment process, DOD should provide it with an
updated and detailed explanation of the current process.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. This report will also be available at
no charge on the GAO web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov if you or your
staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report included
Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director, Whitney Havens, Kate Lenane, Guy
LoFaro, Terry Richardson, Leo Sullivan, Christopher Turner, and Cheryl
Weissman.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2400 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, Dc 20301-2400:
November 8, 2007:
International Security Affairs:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-143R, "Operation Iraqi
Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent
Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed,"
dated October 5, 2007 (GAO Code 350948).
Recommendations: The GAO recommends that DoD clarify 1) its use of the
terms "independent" or "fully independent" as they relate to the
assessed capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces units, especially with
regard to the logistical, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities of those units, and 2) the process it uses to make this
assessment.
DoD Response:
1) Partially Concur. The use of the terms "independent" and "fully
independent" can cause confusion. The term "independent" was removed
from the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1 definition 18
months ago. However, because it is more illustrative than terms such as
"ORA 1," it is still used in briefings and reports. The current,
complete definition for a Level 1 unit as found in the ORA states:
"Level 1 (green): A Level 1 Iraqi Army (IA) unit is capable of
planning, executing and sustaining counter insurgency operations. The
status of resources and training will neither limit flexibility in
methods for mission accomplishment nor increase vulnerability of unit
personnel and equipment. The unit does not require any compensation for
deficiencies by Coalition forces. Extreme situations may cause
Coalition forces' mitigation."
In February 2007, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), recognizing
the limitations of the existing Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA)
metrics, added a new metric called "Operational Effectiveness." This
measure allows the senior transition team advisor and the Iraqi
contingent to provide a subjective assessment of a unit's ability to
conduct operations, regardless of other measures. Assessment of this
metric is based on historical performance and on the level of outside
assistance required to execute a unit's missions. Concurrently, the
assessment process was renamed Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA).
2) Partially Concur. Although MNC-I modified the wording used to
describe a Level 1 unit in 2006, the metrics and processes transition
teams use to assess Ministry of Interior and Defense units have not
changed. The process is clearly defined in the MNC- I Transition
Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report Implementing Instructions Update. The
instruction, which remains in place as guidance for the ORA process,
defines the objective criteria used to determine capabilities and the
subjective rating criteria defining effectiveness used by transition
teams to apply to the conditions on the ground.
DoD will evaluate the assessment terminology to more clearly describe
progress in capability development for the Iraqi forces.
Attached is a comment matrix with technical comments to the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Brigadier General Robin:
Rand Principal:
Director for the Middle East:
Unclassified:
Centcom/MNF-1 Comments:
Unclassified GAO Draft Report:
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units
as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully
Developed (GAO-08-143R):
Formal Comment Resolution Matrix:
Serial: 1;
Page #: 9;
Para #: 1;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal;
Recommendations: Change: ’and 80 Garrison Support Units“ to ’and the
number of logistics bases needed to support Iraqi Army requirements“;
Comment/Rationale: Based on current analysis, pending approval of the
MoD and JHQ Logistic Concept and procedures, discussions envision one
logistics base for every Iraqi Army division, with Regional Support
Units and a National Depot.
(See Comment 1.)
Serial: 2;
Page #: 10;
Para #: 1;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal;
Recommendations: Change: ’But for reasons that remain unclear,as of
March 2007 the MOI itself had yet to approve the concept. Despite
lacking the MOI‘s official endorsement, the Coalition and MOI have
started to implement certain aspects of the concept, ...“ To: ’While
the MOI did not adopt the MNSTC-I Logistics Concept of Support the MOI
Logistics Directorate published its own Logistics Policy. The Coalition
and MOI have started to implement certain aspects of the MOI approved
concept, ...“;
Comment/Rationale: The report refers to MNSTC-I FRAGO 06-085, approved
by MNSTCI on 6 November 2006. While this has never been endorsed by the
MOI, the MOI Logistics Directorate has adopted many of the concepts
into their own plans and has published its own Logistics policy. The
MOI has documented and distributed its logistics procedures, they have
established and automated their accountability system, and they have
streamlined their procedures for receipt, store and issue functions.
The MOI has demonstrated initiative and the capability to procure
material and equipment independent of coalition support, although they
are still hampered by contracting and finance laws, rules and
procedures; specifically for imported goods. This has been mitigated by
embracing the US Foreign Military Sales Program. In addition they have
developed a logistics reporting policy that provides visibility into
the Provinces‘ logistical readiness. The overall MOI logistics system
remains, however, problematic. One of the benefits of successful
offensive operations of recent months has been the rapid growth of the
Police Force. This growth has strained an already ailing MOI
Maintenance System.
(See Comment 2.)
Serial: 3;
Page #: 11;
Para #: 2;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal;
Recommendations: Change:’Intelligence operations for the MOI are the
responsibility of one organization, the National Information and
Intelligence Agency (NIIA).“ To: ’the National Information and
Investigation Agency“;
Comment/Rationale: Change:’Intelligence operations for the MOI are the
responsibility of one organization, the National Information and
Intelligence Agency (NIIA).“ To: ’the National Information and
Investigation Agency“.
(See Comment 3.)
Serial: 4;
Page #: 12;
Para #: 1;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal;
Recommendations: Add footnote after ’...for fiscal year 2008.“ To
address the increased request for ISFF funding to $3.0B in the FY08
GWOT Budget Amendment Request;
Comment/Rationale: To fund a portion of necessary expansion of the ISF,
an additional $1.0B of ISFF was requested in the FY08 GWOT Budget
Amendment request.
(See Comment 4.)
Serial: 5;
Page #: 13;
Para #: 1;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal;
Recommendations: Change: ’and the shortage of noncommissioned officers
throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened.“ To: ’and the ratio of
noncommissioned officers throughout the Iraqi Army has worsened.“;
Comment/Rationale: It is recognized that efforts are needed to increase
Iraqi Army noncommissioned officer numbers and that there are a number
of initiatives including recall and the early promotion of the top 10%
of basic training graduates. However, the continuing rapid growth of
the IA will have an adverse effect on the proportion of SNCOs available
and therefore the perception of deepening leader shortages within the
Iraqi Army.
(See Comment 5.)
Serial: 6;
Page #: 15;
Para #: 1;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal;
Recommendations: Delete: ’But the development of the National Depot at
Taji and the formation of GSUs, which provide base support for Iraqi
military installations and comprise the basic building block of the
Iraqi Armed Forces‘ area support sustainment structure, have lagged
behind.“;
Comment/Rationale: The National Depot is not lagging behind.Indeed, in
coordination with the Iraqi MoD, the depot is expanding rapidly. In
December 2007, the Small Arms Weapon Repair Facility will begin
operation, followed in 2008 by both the Tracked and Wheeled Maintenance
Depots. The Depot Warehouse is expanding its capability for receipt,
warehouse accountability, and issue of supplies and equipment. This
also includes personnel training, warehouse refurbishment, and on-site
life support functions.
(See Comment 6.)
Serial: 7;
Page #: 17;
Para #: 3;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (S)/Formal;
Recommendations: Change: ’As of Jul 2007 the MODs Mil Intelligence
Academy, which is responsible for training Iraqi Soldiers in
intelligence skills had only 43% of its authorized instructors.“ To:
’...had only 24 authorized Instructors“;
Comment/Rationale: There was no MTOE in July from which to base a
number. There are currently 24 of 81 authorized instructors, which is
30%, the number has remained constant since July, although there are
plans to redress this imbalance.
(See Comment 7.)
Serial: 8;
Page #: 22;
Para #: 1;
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal): (C)/Formal;
Recommendations: Change: ’The Coalition stated that it cannot estimate
when NIAA will be self sufficient.“To: ’the Coalition recognizes that
NIIA self sufficiency is condition dependent.“;
Comment/Rationale: NIIA will become self sufficient when the following
conditions are met: Basing: Construction of the new HQ complex and
Baghdad Bureau, scheduled to be completed in April 2008. Basing
improvements to the 14 other provincial and various border and ports of
entry offices planned for 2008. Command and Control: Establishment of a
secured communications architecture linking the new HQs with the
provinces and ports of entry offices planned for 2008.Training:
Establishment of an in-house training capacity in advanced
investigative and technical skills such as polygraph, forensics, and
biometrics. Resources: A separate and independent budget authorization
for the NIIA. Political Reconciliation: A work environment free of
intimidation and threats based on religious and tribal affiliations.
(See Comment 8.)
A= Administrative; S = Substantive; C = Critical;
* Formal – recommends comments should be published as part of official
DoD response to GAO.
* Informal – recommends comments should be provided to GAO but not be
published in report.
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments.
1. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.
2. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.
3. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.
4. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.
5. We revised the text to reflect DOD's comments.
6. Although we have not assessed the rate at which the National Depot
at Taji is currently expanding, according to information we obtained
from DOD in July 2007 and interviews with a former senior Coalition
official who was assigned to the depot until June 2007, many of the
same challenges affecting the development of the National Depot that we
identified in our March 2007 reports remain and continue to hamper its
capacity. Moreover, in light of the persistent violence in Iraq new
challenges have cropped up as well. As we point out in this report, the
formation of lower-echelon logistics units is complete, save those
required by the Prime Minister's expansion plan. DOD documents confirm
that since August 2006 the priority has been on creating lower-echelon
logistics units over national and regional logistics center, to include
GSUs. Hence, both by design and because of persistent violence, the
development of the National Depot and GSUs has lagged behind.
7. We have changed the sentence to read "According to DOD, the MOD's
Military Intelligence School, which is responsible for training Iraqi
soldiers in intelligence skills, has only 24 of 81 authorized
instructors, a circumstance attributed in part to security concerns for
Iraqi faculty members who live outside the military complex at Taji."
8. In written replies to our questions about the NIIA, DOD outlined the
conditions by which NIIA self-sufficiency could be achieved. However,
DOD could not give an estimate of when it expects those conditions
would come about.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Related GAO Products:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. GAO-07-1220T.
Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. GAO-07-1195.
Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007.
Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has
Reached Iraqi Security Forces. GAO-07-711. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2007.
Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Conditions in Iraq Are Conducive to
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-525T. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2007.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security
Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities. GAO-07-503R.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
Stabilizing Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Budget and Management
Challenges of Iraq's Security Ministries. GAO-07-637T. Washington,
D.C.: March 22, 2007.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning
the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to
Future Operations Planning. GAO-07-444. Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2007:
Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi
Security Forces. GAO-07-612T. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security
Forces' Logistical Capabilities. GAO-07-582T. Washington, D.C.: March
9, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and
Findings. GAO-07-385T. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-308SP. Washington, D.C.: January 9,
2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD's Reconstruction Program. GAO-07-30R.
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq Reconstruction
Contracts. GAO-07-40. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract
Management Challenges. GAO-06-1130T. Washington, D.C.: September 28,
2006.
Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-
1094T. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges. GAO-06-953T. Washington,
D.C.: July 11, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private
Security Providers, GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing
Challenges. GAO-06-697T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and
Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and
Sustainable Progress. GAO-06-179T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private Security
Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring
Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police. GAO-05-431T.
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005.
Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services,
and Oversight Issues. GAO-04-902R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No 110--28, §1314 (2007).
[2] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraqi: Report to Congress
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007,
Section 9010, Public Law 109-289 (June 7, 2007).
[3] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-
07-1195 (Washington, D.C.: September 2007).
[4] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraqi: Report to Congress
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007,
Section 9010, Public Law 109-289 (September 14, 2007).
[5] The first report we issued, GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Support
Capabilities, GAO-07-120C (Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007) is
classified secret. We then provided unclassified testimony on the
development of the ISF's logistical capabilities in GAO, Operation
Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces'
Logistical Capabilities, GAO-07-582T (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007).
The third report, GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary
Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistics and Command and
Control Capabilities, GAO-07-503R (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007) is
an unclassified version of the first report.
[6] 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1)(2000).
[7] In October 2007 we reported that although enemy-initiated attacks
declined from a total of about 5,300 in June 2007 to about 3,000 in
September 2007, the recent decrease in monthly attacks was primarily
due to a decrease in the number of attacks against coalition forces.
Attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and civilians have declined less
than attacks against coalition forces. See GAO, Securing, Stabilizing,
and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues, GAO-08-231T
(Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007).
[8] The Transitional Readiness Assessment process is now known as the
Operational Readiness Assessment process.
[9] The Kurdish Provinces are authorized 17 percent of Iraqi revenues
(Gross National Product) from which the provinces fund budgets to meet
all the financial obligations of their governments. There are two
Ministries of Interior within Kurdistan. One is located in Sulaymaniyah
and the other in Arbil. Both organizations are separate from the
central Iraqi government's Ministry of Interior addressed in this
report.
[10] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmark, GAO-07-
1195 (Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007).
[11] To fund a portion of necessary expansion of the ISF, an additional
$1.0 billion was requested in the fiscal year 2008 ISSF amendment
request.
[12] DOD did not give a reason for these delays.
[13] The Iraq Assistance Group is the overall executive agency for MNC-
I for all Iraqi Security Forces.
[14] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-
07-1195 (Washington, D.C.: September 4, 2007).
[15] DOD did provide a classified annex to its first report that
contained a rollup assessment of Iraqi Army unit capabilities.
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