Force Structure
Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve Accountability for Results Gao ID: GAO-08-145 December 14, 2007The Army's modular force restructuring is a multiyear $52.5 billion initiative to redesign operational Army units. The Army also plans to spend $70 billion through fiscal year 2013 to expand the force by 74,200 military personnel. Congress mandated that GAO report annually through fiscal year 2012 on the Army's modular force. For this report, GAO assessed to what extent the Army has (1) implemented and established management controls for its modular force and force expansion initiatives, and (2) assessed its modular unit designs. GAO assessed Army plans and funding requests; visited brigades that were reorganizing; and examined key Army planning documents, performance metrics, and testing plans. Both brigade combat teams and support brigades were visited, including units from the active component Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve.
The Army is making progress in establishing modular units but has not established sufficient management controls to provide accountability for results and facilitate transparency of the Army's overall funding needs for modular units and force expansion. By the end of fiscal year 2007, the Army established 138 of 190 planned modular units; however, all 10 units GAO visited that had converted to modular designs continue to have some equipment and personnel challenges, including shortfalls in key equipment, and mismatches in skill levels and specialties of assigned personnel. Although the Army originally estimated it could largely equip and staff modular units by spending $52.5 billion through fiscal year 2011, the Army now believes it will require additional funding to equip modular units through fiscal year 2017. However, the Army has not identified how much additional funding it may need to fully equip units, nor has it provided sufficient information on progress to date. In addition, the Army is seeking multiple sources of funding for modular unit and force expansion equipment purchases without linking the funding to its modular unit design requirements, thus complicating decision makers' ability to assess the Army's progress in fully equipping the modular force. GAO's work has shown that major transformation initiatives have greater chance of success when their funding plans are transparent, analytically based, executable, and link to the initiative's implementation plans. Effective management controls are needed to establish these links. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance explains that it is management's responsibility to take systematic and proactive measures to develop and implement management controls that ensure accountability for results. Without better controls, decision makers will have difficulty assessing the Army's progress in meeting its goals, knowing what resources will be required to equip and staff modular units, and balancing funding requests for these initiatives with other competing priorities. The Army is evaluating and applying lessons learned from its ongoing counterinsurgency operations, but it lacks (1) a comprehensive assessment plan to determine whether fielded modular unit designs meet the Army's original goals for modular units across the full spectrum of low- and high- intensity warfare, and (2) outcome-oriented metrics that help to measure progress in achieving the goals of the modular force. The Army evaluated the experiences of modular units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and has made some changes in unit designs based on these lessons; however, the Army continues to lack a plan for assessing modular units in high-intensity combat operations. Further, the Army has not yet defined outcome-oriented metrics against which it could assess progress, although GAO previously made this recommendation and OMB also notes this in its performance assessment reporting. As a result, the Army does not have a clear way to measure the extent to which it is achieving the benefits it initially envisioned when it designed the modular force and that it is doing so in a manner that supports DOD joint warfighting capabilities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-145, Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve Accountability for Results
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-145
entitled 'Force Structure: Better Management Controls are Needed to
Oversee the Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve
Accountability Results' which was released on December 17, 2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2007:
Force Structure:
Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the Army's Modular
Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve Accountability for Results:
Force Structure:
GAO-08-145:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-145, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army‘s modular force restructuring is a multiyear $52.5 billion
initiative to redesign operational Army units. The Army also plans to
spend $70 billion through fiscal year 2013 to expand the force by
74,200 military personnel. Congress mandated that GAO report annually
through fiscal year 2012 on the Army‘s modular force. For this report,
GAO assessed to what extent the Army has (1) implemented and
established management controls for its modular force and force
expansion initiatives, and (2) assessed its modular unit designs. GAO
assessed Army plans and funding requests; visited brigades that were
reorganizing; and examined key Army planning documents, performance
metrics, and testing plans. Both brigade combat teams and support
brigades were visited, including units from the active component Army,
Army National Guard, and Army Reserve.
What GAO Found:
The Army is making progress in establishing modular units but has not
established sufficient management controls to provide accountability
for results and facilitate transparency of the Army‘s overall funding
needs for modular units and force expansion. By the end of fiscal year
2007, the Army established 138 of 190 planned modular units; however,
all 10 units GAO visited that had converted to modular designs continue
to have some equipment and personnel challenges, including shortfalls
in key equipment, and mismatches in skill levels and specialties of
assigned personnel. Although the Army originally estimated it could
largely equip and staff modular units by spending $52.5 billion through
fiscal year 2011, the Army now believes it will require additional
funding to equip modular units through fiscal year 2017. However, the
Army has not identified how much additional funding it may need to
fully equip units, nor has it provided sufficient information on
progress to date. In addition, the Army is seeking multiple sources of
funding for modular unit and force expansion equipment purchases
without linking the funding to its modular unit design requirements,
thus complicating decision makers‘ ability to assess the Army‘s
progress in fully equipping the modular force. GAO‘s work has shown
that major transformation initiatives have greater chance of success
when their funding plans are transparent, analytically based,
executable, and link to the initiative‘s implementation plans.
Effective management controls are needed to establish these links.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance explains that it is
management‘s responsibility to take systematic and proactive measures
to develop and implement management controls that ensure accountability
for results. Without better controls, decision makers will have
difficulty assessing the Army‘s progress in meeting its goals, knowing
what resources will be required to equip and staff modular units, and
balancing funding requests for these initiatives with other competing
priorities.
The Army is evaluating and applying lessons learned from its ongoing
counterinsurgency operations, but it lacks (1) a comprehensive
assessment plan to determine whether fielded modular unit designs meet
the Army‘s original goals for modular units across the full spectrum of
low- and high- intensity warfare, and (2) outcome-oriented metrics that
help to measure progress in achieving the goals of the modular force.
The Army evaluated the experiences of modular units deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan and has made some changes in unit designs based on
these lessons; however, the Army continues to lack a plan for assessing
modular units in high-intensity combat operations. Further, the Army
has not yet defined outcome-oriented metrics against which it could
assess progress, although GAO previously made this recommendation and
OMB also notes this in its performance assessment reporting. As a
result, the Army does not have a clear way to measure the extent to
which it is achieving the benefits it initially envisioned when it
designed the modular force and that it is doing so in a manner that
supports DOD joint warfighting capabilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that (1) the Army develop a comprehensive strategy and
funding plan to improve accountability for staffing and equipping the
modular force; (2) the Army develop a plan for assessing the modular
force designs; and (3) DOD should review the Army‘s strategy, funding
plan, and assessment plan. DOD concurred with GAO‘s recommendations;
however, DOD‘s actions for assessing unit designs did not fully meet
the intent of GAO‘s recommendations. GAO added a matter for
congressional consideration to require the Army to more fully assess
modular force designs in full spectrum warfare.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-145]. For more information, contact Janet
St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results In Brief:
Background:
Modular Restructuring Is Progressing, but the Army Lacks Sufficient
Management Controls to Provide Decision Makers with Complete and
Transparent Information to Gauge Progress and Assess Funding
Requirements:
The Army Is Applying Lessons Learned but Still Lacks a Comprehensive
Approach for Assessing Modular Unit Designs and Performance:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Actual and Planned Army Modular Unit Restructuring:
Table 2: Funding Plan for Modular Restructuring, Fiscal Years 2005-
2011, as Reported to OMB in January 2007:
Table 3: Sources of Army Funding for Modular Restructuring and
Expansion:
Figure:
Figure 1: Time Lag between Establishing Units, Funding Equipment, and
Delivering Equipment for Modular Units:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 14, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
Two major Army initiatives--one to restructure the Army and another to
expand its size--will have significant implications for the Army's
combat capabilities and funding requests in the coming years. The
Army's modular force restructuring---sometimes referred to as Army
Modularity--is a multiyear undertaking that involves the total redesign
of the operational Army and was initiated, in part, to support current
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In early 2007, the Department of
Defense (DOD) announced a plan to expand the size of the Army in
response to the high pace of operations the Army has experienced over
the past several years and the need to increase capacity to meet future
strategic demands. Under the Army's new construct, the Brigade Combat
Team, rather than a division, will be the centerpiece of the Army's
combat forces and the lowest unit of organization capable of self-
sustained operations. The Army's modular restructuring initiative
includes its entire operational force consisting of active, National
Guard, and reserve units. The Army obtained Secretary of Defense
approval to spend $52.5 billion on this initiative through fiscal year
2011.[Footnote 1] To date, Congress has appropriated over $18 billion
for Army modularity, and DOD has requested an additional $10.4 billion
in the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request.
In addition, to meet the increasing strategic demands and to help
reduce stress on the force, the Secretary of Defense plans to expand
the Army from a total of 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active and reserve
soldiers by fiscal year 2013--an increase of 74,200 military personnel.
This planned expansion includes building six additional, active modular
combat brigades plus an undetermined number of modular support units,
which requires a substantial increase in funding for personnel,
equipment, and infrastructure. Currently, the Army estimates this
expansion may require $70 billion or more in increased funding through
fiscal year 2013 and a significant amount in annual funding thereafter
to sustain the expanded Army. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget
request, currently before Congress, contains $7.7 billion specifically
to expand the size of the Army.
Taken together, these initiatives will entail significant costs that
must be carefully evaluated in the context of both the current and
future strategic environment and weighed against other funding
priorities. In January 2007, we testified before the House Committee on
Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, that federal
agencies have a responsibility to provide sufficient transparency over
significant decisions affecting requirements for federal dollars so
that Congress can effectively evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks.
We initiated a body of work to assist Congress in assessing the Army's
plans for its modular force restructuring as well as plans to expand
the size of the force. Because of the cost and magnitude of the Army's
modular force initiative, and broad congressional interest, we
initially began work analyzing both the force structure and cost
implications of the Army's move to a modular force under the
Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative. Our work resulted in two published reports and two
congressional testimony statements.[Footnote 2] We recommended that the
Army develop a detailed plan estimating the costs of establishing
modular units; provide details about the Army's equipping strategy,
including a comparison of equipment plans with unit design
requirements; and develop performance metrics and plans for conducting
further evaluation of modular designs.
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
directed the Comptroller General to report annually through fiscal year
2012 to the congressional defense committees an assessment of the
Army's progress in equipping and staffing modular units in the regular
and reserve components, the use of funds by the Army for equipping and
staffing its modular units, and progress by the Army in conducting
further testing and evaluation of the Army's modular unit designs. In
accordance with this legislative mandate for fiscal year 2007, we
briefed your offices in March 2007 and April 2007 on our preliminary
observations. This report expands on the information reported in those
briefings. We are submitting this report to you because of your
oversight responsibilities on defense matters. For this report, we
assessed to what extent the Army has (1) implemented its modular force
initiative and established management controls that provide
transparency for assessing progress and funding for equipping modular
units and expanding the force, and (2) developed a comprehensive plan
to assess its modular unit designs.
To determine the extent to which the Army has implemented its modular
force initiative and established management controls that provide
transparency for assessing progress and funding for equipping modular
units and expanding the force, we reviewed current Army plans, funding
requests, and reports to Congress on Army Modularity and the Army
expansion initiatives. We assessed the completeness of these plans and
reports and analyzed to what extent Army funding requests were linked
to the Army's modular design requirements, particularly for the
procurement of new equipment. We supplemented this information with
visits to 10 brigades that were already reorganized or were in the
process of reorganizing to gain an understanding of the Army's progress
in organizing, staffing, and equipping these brigades. The brigades we
visited included Brigade Combat Teams as well as the Combat Aviation
and Sustainment Multi-Function Support Brigades in the active component
Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves. We selected these
brigades in order to compare brigades of the same design within the
different components and discuss progress in meeting Army goals with
staff from each of the components. While the Brigade Combat Teams are
only in the active Army and National Guard, the Multi-Function Support
Brigades we selected to assess have units in the regular Army, National
Guard, and Army Reserve components.
To analyze the Army's approach for assessing its modular designs, we
examined key Army planning documents, and lessons learned, and
discussed objectives, performance metrics, and testing plans with Army
officials. We compared the Army's current methods of assessing its
modular units with methods used by high-performing organizations,
drawing from our prior work evaluating the performance of organizations
that have undertaken significant reorganizations. Finally, we analyzed
the extent of the Army's progress in developing outcome-related metrics
and evaluating modular unit performance across the full spectrum of
operations. We conducted our review in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards from August 2006 through August
2007 and determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for
our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are
described in further detail in appendix I.
Results In Brief:
The Army is making progress in establishing modular units in the active
and reserve components, but has not established sufficient management
controls to provide accountability for results and transparency of
overall funding needs for establishing modular units and expanding the
force. By the end of fiscal year 2007, the Army established 138 of its
190 planned modular units. However, all 10 modular units we visited
continue to have some equipment and personnel challenges, including
shortfalls in key equipment items, and mismatches in skill levels and
specialties of assigned personnel. Also, the Army's funding plan is not
fully synchronized with its schedule for establishing units. Moreover,
neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the Army has
implemented our past recommendations to enhance accountability for
achieving the planned benefits of a modular force. As a result, it is
difficult to gauge the Army's progress in moving toward its goal of
fully staffing and equipping units in both the active and reserve
components. In addition, although the Army estimated in 2004 that it
could largely equip and staff modular units by spending $52.5 billion
through fiscal year 2011, the Army now believes it will require
additional funding through fiscal year 2017 to fully equip its units.
Our analysis shows that the Army believes it will need additional
funding to fully equip modular units because its $52.5 billion funding
plan:
* was developed before some modular unit designs had been finalized;
* assumed that Army National Guard and reserve units would retain some
older models of equipment that were not comparable to the active
component's equipment, whereas the Army has recently learned from its
experience in Iraq that all deploying units need to have modern
equipment; and:
* assumed that significant quantities of equipment would be returned
from Iraq in good enough condition to help equip modular units.
Army officials have not fully identified the amount of additional funds
needed to fully equip Army modular units but told us they plan to
request funds for additional equipment needs beyond fiscal year 2011
incrementally through DOD's annual budget process. However, in the
absence of a complete cost estimate, the Army will not be in a good
position to identify and provide transparency to Congress of its total
funding needs. Moreover, the Army is seeking a combination of regular
and supplemental appropriations to fund its expansion and accelerate
modular conversions, which further complicates decision makers' ability
to obtain a full picture of the Army's needs for both initiatives and
understand how these requests are linked and will contribute to meeting
the Army's goals. Our work has shown that major transformation
initiatives have a greater chance of success when their funding plans
are transparent, analytically based, executable, and link to the
initiative's implementation plans. Effective management controls are
needed to establish such linkage. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
guidance explains that it is management's responsibility to take
systematic and proactive measures to develop and implement management
controls that ensure accountability for results. Without improvements
to its management controls, the Army will be unable to fully assess the
costs of equipping modular units and expanding the force, and quantify
progress in equipping units to meet modular unit requirements. Lacking
such controls, senior DOD leaders and Congress will be limited in their
ability to evaluate future funding requests, assess the Army's
progress, and weigh near-term Army requirements with long-term
transformation initiatives. We are recommending that the Secretary of
Defense require the Army to (1) develop a plan that fully identifies
funding needs based on the Army's requirements for staffing and
equipping the modular force and report its estimate to Congress, and
(2) provide management controls for measuring progress. We are also
recommending that the Deputy Secretary of Defense review the Army's
plans and develop an updated Office of the Secretary of Defense funding
plan, consistent with the department's overall priorities and current
and expected resource levels, and report its results to Congress.
While the Army is evaluating lessons learned from its ongoing
counterinsurgency operations and applying these lessons to identify
necessary changes to its modular designs, it lacks (1) a comprehensive
testing and evaluation plan to determine whether fielded modular unit
designs meet the Army's original goals for modular units across the
full spectrum of operations and (2) outcome-oriented metrics on the
benefits the Army expected to achieve with its modular restructuring.
First, in seeking approval to establish modular units, the Army
identified a number of planned benefits associated with them, such as
that they would be as effective in combat as the Army's division-based
brigades. However, the Army has limited its evaluations to the
performance of modular units during pre-deployment exercises and
counter-insurgency operations and not across the full spectrum of
combat operations that include large-scale, high-intensity combat
operations. As a result, the Army does not have a clear way to measure
the extent to which new modular brigades are as effective as its older
brigades under a range of conditions. Although we previously
recommended that the Army develop a more comprehensive test and
evaluation strategy, the Army has not taken action because it believes
its current efforts are sufficient in light of its focus on managing
ongoing operations. However, officials with the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command have identified as a challenge the need for a broader-
based assessment of the Army's modular unit designs and the Army
Science Board and U.S. Army Infantry Center have identified potential
capability gaps.[Footnote 3] Furthermore, methodical testing,
exercising, and evaluation of new doctrines and concepts is an
established practice throughout the military. Until these efforts are
expanded to include a wider range of potential missions, the Army may
miss opportunities to further strengthen its designs. Second, with
respect to outcome-oriented metrics, we previously recommended that the
Army develop these metrics to which the Army responded it would explore
the development of expanded metrics; but the Army has not taken
specific action on our recommendation. A 2005 program assessment by OMB
noted that the Army's current metrics are output-related (i.e., how
many units have been transformed) as opposed to outcome-related. As a
result, the Army does not have a clear way to measure the extent to
which it is achieving desired benefits. Therefore, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense require the Army to develop a
comprehensive assessment, which includes steps to evaluate modular
units under high-intensity combat and provide oversight for the Army's
assessment program.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations to (1) direct the Army to develop a comprehensive
strategy and funding plan, (2) task the Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation, to review and assess the Army's plan to ensure that the
plan links funding needs to requirements, (3) revise the existing DOD
approved funding plan and communicate funding requirements to Congress,
and (4) have DOD include additional exhibits in its annual budget
submissions which show what requirements the funding request will
fulfill and what requirements remain to be funded. We agree that the
steps DOD plans to take in response to these recommendations, if fully
implemented, will introduce more effective oversight and management
controls of the Army's initiative within the Department, and will
better inform the Congress of the Army's progress in staffing and
equipping the modular force. DOD also concurred with our two
recommendations directing (1) the Secretary of the Army to develop a
comprehensive assessment plan that includes steps to evaluate modular
units in full spectrum combat operations and (2) requiring DOD to
oversee the Army's assessment program. However, DOD commented that it
believed that the Army and DOD were already evaluating modular units in
full spectrum operations via ongoing Army processes and did not
indicate what, if any, additional actions it would take to develop a
comprehensive assessment plan. We continue to believe that the Army
should develop and execute a comprehensive analysis plan to assess its
modular force designs and that DOD should be overseeing the Army's
assessment plan. Without such a plan, DOD may not be able to fully
gauge the need for additional refinements in its modular unit designs.
For this reason, we are adding a matter for congressional consideration
to require the Army to develop a comprehensive assessment plan for the
modular force and require OSD to review the plan and transmit it to
Congress. DOD's comments are in appendix II and our evaluation of its
comments is on page 33.
Background:
The Army's modular restructuring initiative began in 2004 as part of
the overall Army transformation initiative. The foundation of modular
restructuring is the creation of new, standardized, modular units that
change the Army's legacy division-based force structure to smaller,
more numerous brigade formations embedded with significant support
elements. These new modular Brigade Combat Teams and Multi-Functional
Support Brigades are designed to be stand-alone, self-sufficient units
that are more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint and
expeditionary combat and support operations than their larger division-
based predecessors. These units, along with Functional Support Brigades
and modular Headquarters Units, comprise the Army's new modular force.
In most cases, modular brigades require some new modern equipment and a
different personnel skill level mix than the earlier brigades they
replace. As opposed to the Army's legacy units, the standardized
modular unit designs are being implemented in the National Guard and
Army Reserves with the same organizational structure, equipment, and
personnel requirements.
During the development of the new modular Brigade Combat Team designs,
the Army Chief of Staff directed the Army to develop designs that would
be "as capable as" the legacy designs the Army wanted to replace. The
Army, via its Task Force Modularity organization working under the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command, approved an initial Brigade
Combat Team design, which was assessed and approved by the Army Chief
of Staff as "good enough" for the Army's modular restructuring. The
Army made this decision based upon the designs' performance during
combat simulations and scenario-driven table-top exercises, the Army's
ability to resource the unit designs within its equipment fielding
plans and existing industrial capacity, and the Army's ability to
quickly stand up new brigades and restructure its existing brigades by
fiscal year 2011.
The Army's approved designs were similar to modified versions of the
legacy Brigade Combat Team organization the Army previously employed
when it would "task organize" units within its legacy divisions and
assign them to a division's combat brigades prior to deploying the
division for combat operations. These task-organized brigades would be
temporarily expanded with additional battalion and company-sized units
that provided additional combat support and combat service support
capabilities, allowing the brigade to conduct self-sustained combat
operations. By permanently structuring a Brigade Combat Team with these
capabilities, the Army eliminated the need to task organize combat
units. In addition, the Army believed it would have considerable
advantages in operations by ensuring these units worked, trained, and
deployed together.
The Army also considered DOD's strategic plan as it restructured to a
brigade-based force. For example, the Army's Brigade Combat Team
designs were intended to be effective across the full spectrum of
operations and warfare including global war, major theater war, smaller
scale contingencies, insurgency/counter-insurgencies, and stability and
support operations. DOD's most recent strategic plan, the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, now refers to Army combat power in terms of
Brigade Combat Teams rather than number of divisions, consistent with
the Army's new structure. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) is responsible for analyzing whether the modular force is
capable of successfully conducting operations required across the full
spectrum of warfare. TRADOC does this by using its analytical centers,
such as the TRADOC Analysis Center, to analyze the capabilities of the
modular design and make design changes when deemed necessary and
approved by Army headquarters.
The Army's original restructuring plan called for a total of 43 active
component Brigade Combat Teams--33 restructured from existing combat
brigades and 10 newly created brigades. These 43 active Brigade Combat
Teams would be joined with 34 restructured National Guard brigades,
giving the Army a total of 77 modular Brigade Combat Teams. This plan
was modified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which reduced the
number to a total of 70 Brigade Combat Teams consisting of 42 active
Army and 28 National Guard brigades.
Since the Army introduced its modular restructuring initiative, the
Army has adjusted its cost estimate and changed the scope of its plans
for restructuring its operational force several times. In January 2004,
the Army developed a rough order of magnitude estimate which indicated
it would cost $20 billion to restructure the Army's existing combat
brigades and build additional ones for anticipated overseas combat
rotations. This estimate was updated 6 months later by adding $8
billion to restructure the National Guard divisions and brigades into
modular Brigade Combat Teams. The Army has since increased the scope of
its modular restructuring initiative to include its entire operational
force structure and in late 2004 obtained Deputy Secretary of Defense
approval to spend $52.5 billion on this initiative through fiscal year
2011.
A year after the Quadrennial Defense Review, in February 2007, the
President submitted his fiscal year 2008 budget request to Congress
that included a plan to increase Army military personnel by 74,200 over
the next 5 years and increase the number of brigades. The plan would
increase active Army end strength by 65,000 personnel to 547,400, Army
National Guard end strength by 8,200 personnel to 358,200, and Army
reserve end strength by 1,000 to 206,000. Army officials have stated
this plan will add six additional active Army Brigade Combat Teams to
the 42 brigades called for in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,
giving the Army a total of 76 Brigade Combat Teams. The Army's
preliminary cost estimate indicates that expanding the Army will
require approximately $70.2 billion from fiscal year 2007 through 2013
for personnel, equipment, operations, maintenance, and facility costs.
Our previous reports on the Army's modular restructuring initiative
included several recommendations intended to improve the information
DOD provides Congress for making decisions on Army modularity. In our
September 2005 report, we recommended that the Army provide Congress a
detailed plan estimating the costs of modularity and develop an
approach for tracking modular transformation costs that clearly
identifies obligations for the modular force.[Footnote 4] In our
September 2006 report, we recommended that DOD direct the Army to
provide Congress with details about the Army's equipping strategy,
including a comparison of equipment plans with unit design
requirements.[Footnote 5] In another of our recommendations, we
suggested that DOD direct the Army to develop a comprehensive plan for
assessing progress toward achieving the benefits of a modular force, to
include specific, quantifiable performance metrics and plans and
milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular designs.
In addition to our work on the Army's modular restructuring initiative,
we have recently completed work on other related Army issues. In August
2007, we issued a report on the Army and Marine Corps reset programs,
which recommends that DOD improve its reporting of obligations and
expenditures for resetting equipment and assess the Army and Marine
Corps approaches for resetting equipment to ensure priority is given to
address equipment shortages in the near term to equip units that are
preparing for deployment.[Footnote 6] We have also assessed the Army's
modular brigade training strategy and recommended that the Army take a
series of actions to assess unit training and identify funding needs by
developing specific goals and metrics and revising its funding
model.[Footnote 7] This same report also recommended that the Army
revise its training strategy to account for the high level of
operational demands, clarify the capacity modular units require at the
combat training centers, and complete testing of its exportable
training capability to verify it is the most appropriate approach to
meet the additional capacity requirements for training modular
units.[Footnote 8] Finally, we recently provided a classified report to
both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees which assessed the
Army's current readiness challenges and offered a series of
recommendations to improve Army unit readiness.
The Army's modular restructuring involves substantial resources for
which management controls are needed in order to provide accountability
for results. Guidance issued by OMB [Footnote 9] explains that the
proper stewardship of federal resources is an essential responsibility
of agency managers and staff. Federal employees must ensure that
federal programs operate and federal resources are used efficiently and
effectively to achieve desired objectives. Also, management control
should be an integral part of the entire cycle of planning, budgeting,
managing, accounting, and auditing. The Army's initiative to establish
modular units is a major transformation effort that is considered to be
the Army's most extensive restructuring since World War II. OMB
guidance explains that as agencies develop and execute strategies for
implementing or reengineering agency programs and operations, they
should design management structures that help ensure accountability for
results.[Footnote 10]
Modular Restructuring Is Progressing, but the Army Lacks Sufficient
Management Controls to Provide Decision Makers with Complete and
Transparent Information to Gauge Progress and Assess Funding
Requirements:
The Army is making progress in transforming its operational force into
modular units but has not established sufficient management controls to
provide accountability for results and facilitate transparency of its
overall funding needs for modular units and force expansion.
Additionally, the Army has substantially revised its timelines for
fully staffing and equipping its modular units. The Army established
138 of 190 planned modular units by the end of fiscal year 2007.
However, the 10 units we visited were experiencing some equipment and
personnel shortages. Moreover, because the Army's funding plan is not
transparent and fully synchronized with its schedule for establishing
units, it is difficult to gauge the Army's progress in moving toward
its goal of fully staffing and equipping units in both the active and
reserve components. In addition, although the Army's 2004 cost estimate
of $52.5 billion was initially expected to largely equip and staff its
modular units by fiscal year 2011, an as yet undetermined amount of
additional funding will be needed through 2017, according to Army
officials. This change has occurred because the Army's earlier estimate
had limitations and was built on several assumptions that no longer
appear valid. Although we previously recommended that the Army update
its cost estimate, the Army has not yet identified the full costs of
equipping modular units. Moreover, DOD and congressional oversight of
Army plans and progress has become more complicated because the Army
has requested funding for its modular force initiative and force
expansion plan using multiple sources of funding which do not clearly
show the linkage between funding needs, progress to date, and the
Army's requirements. Our work has shown that successful transformation
initiatives have funding plans that are transparent, analytically
based, executable, and link to the initiative's implementation plans.
This requires effective management controls that provide accountability
for the quality and timeliness of initiatives' performance, as well as
cost. OMB guidance explains that it is management's responsibility to
take systematic and proactive measures to develop and implement
management controls that ensure accountability for results. Lacking
sufficient controls, DOD may be limited in its ability to manage
resources effectively and reduce risk to the force because its does not
have the complete picture of the Army's resource requirements going
forward and cannot weigh these against other competing priorities in
order to provide a balanced and affordable force across all service
components.
The Army Continues to Transform Its Operational Force into Modular
Units, but Modular Units We Visited Experienced Some Challenges and
Assessing Progress in Staffing and Equipping Units Is Difficult:
Because of the urgency to create more units for rotations to Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Army decided to reorganize units into modular brigades
before funding was available to procure all of the new equipment
required by modular designs. The Army's strategy has been to allocate
its existing equipment, along with new equipment procured to date, to
Army modular units in accordance with a conversion schedule approved by
the Army senior leadership. This strategy has allowed the restructuring
to proceed generally on schedule, even though the Army does not have
sufficient quantities of all the equipment required by Army-approved
modular unit designs. The Army plans to provide units with additional
equipment as it becomes available through fiscal year 2011 under the
Army's $52.5 billion funding plan ($43.6 billion of which is allocated
to equipment). Additional equipment procured through other sources of
funding, such as reset funds, could also be allocated to units once it
enters the Army's inventory. However, because the Army's funding plan
is not fully synchronized with its schedule for establishing units, it
is difficult to gauge the Army's progress in moving toward its goal of
fully staffing and equipping units in both the active and reserve
components.
In accordance with its strategy, the Army restructured 138 of 190
modular units, about 73 percent, by the end of fiscal year 2007, as
shown in table 1. Prior to the recently announced expansion plans, the
Army was to have a total of 70 modular Brigade Combat Teams. For the
active Army, the Army projected it will have reorganized 11 of 18
headquarters units, 38 of 42 active Army Brigade Combat Teams, and 30
of 37 active Multi-Functional Support Brigades by the end of fiscal
year 2007. In the National Guard, the Army expected to have reorganized
6 of 8 headquarters units, 25 of 28 Brigade Combat Teams, and 23 of 46
Multi-Functional Support Brigades by the end of fiscal year 2007.
Finally, the Army projected it will have reorganized 5 of 11 Multi-
Function Support Brigades in the Army reserve by the end of fiscal year
2007.[Footnote 11]
Table 1: Actual and Planned Army Modular Unit Restructuring:
Component: Active;
Unit type: Headquarters units;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 11;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 7;
Total planned unit conversions: 18.
Component: Active;
Unit type: Brigade Combat Teams;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 38;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 4;
Total planned unit conversions: 42.
Component: Active;
Unit type: National Guard: Multi-Function Support Brigades;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: National Guard: 30;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 7;
Total planned unit conversions: National Guard: 37.
Component: National Guard;
Unit type: Headquarters units;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 6;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 2;
Total planned unit conversions: 8.
Component: National Guard;
Unit type: Brigade Combat Teams;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 25;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 3;
Total planned unit conversions: 28.
Component: National Guard;
Unit type: Multi-Function Support Brigades;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 23;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 23;
Total planned unit conversions: 46.
Component: U.S. Army Reserve;
Unit type: Multi-Function Support Brigades;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 5;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 6;
Total planned unit conversions: 11.
Component: Total Army;
Unit type: Headquarters units;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 17;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 9;
Total planned unit conversions: 26.
Component: Total Army;
Unit type: Brigade Combat Teams;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 63;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 7;
Total planned unit conversions: 70.
Component: Total Army;
Unit type: Multi-Function Support Brigades;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 58;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 36;
Total planned unit conversions: 94.
Unit type: Total modular units;
Total unit conversions through fiscal year 2007: 138;
Units expected to convert from fiscal year 2008 to 2011: 52;
Total planned unit conversions: 190.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Department of the Army, Army
Transformation Report to Congress, February 2007, and Department of the
Army, Army Campaign Plan Change 5, Annex A, December 15, 2006.
[End of table]
Army officials told us these units will be organized under modular unit
designs; however, it will take additional time to equip and staff units
at authorized levels. As a result, Army reporting notes that reaching
an (E-date) effective date for unit conversion does not imply readiness
or availability for deployment.
The following figure shows the lag between restructuring units and the
planned appropriation of funding for equipment totaling $43.6 billion
included in the Army's modular force funding plan for fiscal years 2005
through 2011. This is the amount of equipment funding included in the
Army's OSD approved plan; however, as we discuss later, it does not
reflect the total funding needed to fully equip the modular force. In
addition, the dotted line in this figure shows the expected lag between
the planned appropriation of equipment funds and their expected
delivery.
Figure 1: Time Lag between Establishing Units, Funding Equipment, and
Delivering Equipment for Modular Units:
This figure is a combination bar and line chart showing time lag
between establishing units, funding equipment, and delivering equipment
for modular units. The X axis represents the fiscal year, and the Y
axis represents modular units created or restructured. The bars
represent modular units created or restructured, the solid line
represents funding, and the dashed line represents procured equipment
estimated delivery.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data exclude additional units that will be established as part of
the Army's expansion plans and additional funding that may be required
beyond fiscal year 2011. The procured equipment estimated delivery is
an Army planning estimate and we did not independently evaluate it.
[End of figure]
The Army continues to allocate available equipment and personnel where
required to support deployed units or units designated as the next to
deploy. Any equipment or personnel resources available after that are
distributed in accordance with the Army's Resource Priority List. This
approach permits the Army to increase its pool of available units for
operational deployments to Iraq but has resulted in the Army assuming
some risk by having to distribute its equipment among more units. The
Army expects this situation to improve over time as it makes progress
in filling equipment shortages and is able to procure the extra
equipment necessary to proceed with scheduled unit conversions.
Evidence of the Army's shortfalls in staffing and equipping can be
found at the unit level where Army brigades continue to experience
challenges in fully staffing and equipping their units at authorized
levels. We visited and reviewed the status of 10 modular units and
found that all 10 units continue to have some equipment and personnel
challenges. During our January 2007 visit to an active Army Brigade
Combat Team scheduled to deploy in the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2007,
we found the unit did not have its full allowance of light and heavy
tactical wheeled vehicles, blue force tracking equipment, target
acquisition equipment, and field artillery equipment. Unit officials we
spoke with said that most of this equipment would be filled once the
unit arrives in theater and before it conducted its first operations.
During our December 2006 visit to an active Army Combat Aviation
Brigade, unit officials told us less than 38 percent of unit aircraft
were available for training during a 4-month period in late 2006. This
lack of aircraft availability was caused by the unit's 18-month reset
and training schedule between deployments and its aggressive
maintenance schedule, which was arranged to ensure all unit aircraft
were properly maintained and upgraded prior to the next deployment.
Brigade staff stated that while they were capable of preparing the unit
for deployment with a compressed reset and training period, any period
shorter than 18 months would not be possible for two reasons. The first
reason was the lack of available aircraft for training due to mandatory
pre-deployment maintenance, and the second reason was the inability to
conduct sufficient pilot training. The National Guard and Army reserve
units we visited had significantly greater shortfalls in equipment than
their counterparts in the active component. Unit officials consistently
commented that the lack of equipment had a negative impact on their
unit's ability to train. We also observed that equipment deficiencies
in the Sustainment Multi-Function Support Brigades were significantly
worse than within the Brigade Combat Teams.
Regarding personnel issues, brigade officials were mostly concerned
about mismatches in the skill levels and the specialties of their
assigned soldiers rather than the overall number of personnel assigned
to units. Active units we visited were generally staffed with the
authorized number of soldiers, but mismatches in skill levels and
specialties frequently occurred even though some of the units we
visited were nearing their deployment dates. Unit officials expressed
concerns that the Army was managing unit staffing only at the aggregate
level whereby units were expected to "grow their own" skill-level
expertise among noncommissioned and junior officer leaders. Unit
officials informed us that this places a large burden on the units to
ensure they can properly train and operate with lower-skill-level staff
than unit authorization documents require. The National Guard and Army
Reserve units we visited were concerned about obtaining soldiers
trained in new specialties and retraining their existing soldiers for
the new specialties required by the modular force designs. For example,
National Guard officials told us that obtaining classroom training for
National Guard members was complicated by the fact that National Guard
members often lacked priority for the training, and in other cases
could not take time from their civilian jobs to take courses exceeding
several weeks or months. Army officials said they expect it will take
several years to retrain personnel in new specialties required by the
Army's modular unit designs and are working with the components to
develop and implement training plans.
Brigade staff also commented on the challenge of training soldiers for
deployment when equipment is in limited supply. Deploying units have a
higher priority for equipment and personnel while nondeployed units do
not have the higher priority for either until approximately 45 days
prior to their mission rehearsal exercise. On the basis of a unit's
performance during this exercise, the Army will certify a unit has
achieved the requisite collective skills to successfully perform its
assigned military operations while deployed. However, several unit
officials we spoke with stated that receiving the bulk of their
equipment and personnel just 45 days before they are to conduct this
exercise leaves insufficient time to ensure soldiers become proficient
in operating some of the more complex technical equipment prior to the
mission rehearsal exercise.
To address high demand for limited quantities of equipment and
personnel, the Army's headquarters staff along with other major Army
commands continues to manage key equipment for modular units. The Army
maintains an extensive list of these critically managed pieces of
equipment controlled by its Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 headquarters
staff. These items are limited in quantity but are in high demand for
deploying units as well as those units converting to the modular
design. Examples of these items include the Long Range Scout
Surveillance System, the Counter-Fire Radar System, and the Heavy
Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck. The G-8 staff conducts a semiannual
equipment and personnel synchronization conference in order to
determine the requirements from units scheduled for upcoming deployment
along with equipment availability given existing inventory, newly
procured equipment, and equipment completing repair and reset work.
Representatives from the Army's personnel management organizations also
address upcoming personnel requirements. Even with these coordination
efforts, some Army units still experience shortages in their authorized
level of equipment and personnel, which may not be filled until shortly
before the unit deploys. While the Army is working on improving its
ability to provide equipment to units earlier in their training cycle,
some shortages are likely to continue until the Army procures more
equipment over time or the demand lessens for large numbers of Army
units for overseas operations.
The Army's Cost Estimate for Funding Modular Units Contained
Uncertainties and Was Built on Some Assumptions That No Longer Appear
Valid:
The Army's $52.5 billion cost estimate for its modular restructuring
initiative, which was developed in late 2004, contained uncertainties
and was based upon several assumptions that no longer appear valid. As
the Army's plans for its modular force have evolved, some of the early
uncertainties have now been clarified, while some of the key
assumptions--particularly those that related to National Guard
equipping, and the return of equipment from Iraq and Afghanistan--may
no longer be valid. Army officials told us that the OSD-approved $52.5
billion funding plan will not be adequate to fully equip the modular
force. As shown in table 2, $43.6 billion in this plan was specifically
designated for equipment purchases from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal
year 2011.[Footnote 12]
Table 2: Funding Plan for Modular Restructuring, Fiscal Years 2005-
2011, as Reported to OMB in January 2007:
Dollars in millions.
Appropriation category: Equipment;
Fiscal Year 2005: $4,354;
Fiscal Year 2006: $5,436;
Fiscal Year 2007: $5,907;
Fiscal Year 2008: $6,855;
Fiscal Year 2009: $7,165;
Fiscal Year 2010: $7,226;
Fiscal Year 2011: $6,666;
Total 2005-2011: $43,609.
Appropriation category: Sustainment and Training;
Fiscal Year 2005: $0;
Fiscal Year 2006: $1,022;
Fiscal Year 2007: $196;
Fiscal Year 2008: $285;
Fiscal Year 2009: $679;
Fiscal Year 2010: $744;
Fiscal Year 2011: $588;
Total 2005- 2011: $3,514.
Appropriation category: Construction/ Facilities;
Fiscal Year 2005: $250;
Fiscal Year 2006: $13;
Fiscal Year 2007: $497;
Fiscal Year 2008: $461;
Fiscal Year 2009: $1,440;
Fiscal Year 2010: $1,358;
Fiscal Year 2011: $1,359;
Total 2005- 2011: $5,378.
Total;
Fiscal Year 2005: $4,604;
Fiscal Year 2006: $6,471;
Fiscal Year 2007: $6,600;
Fiscal Year 2008: $7,601;
Fiscal Year 2009: $9,284;
Fiscal Year 2010: $9,328;
Fiscal Year 2011: $8,613;
Total 2005-2011: $52,501.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of table]
At the time the estimate was developed, the Army's modular designs were
incomplete, so budget analysts were uncertain about the exact number of
personnel and how many and what type of equipment items would be needed
for modular units, which contributed to the analysts' challenge in
developing an accurate cost estimate. Further, because the number and
composition of National Guard units had not been decided upon at the
time the cost estimate was developed, budget analysts made certain
assumptions about how much funding would be required by National Guard
units to convert to the new modular designs. When the Army began to
implement its modular restructuring initiative, it planned for the
National Guard to establish 34 Brigade Combat Teams plus an additional
number of support brigades. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,
however, recommended that the Army establish only 28 National Guard
Brigade Combat Teams and convert the remaining units to support
brigades.
In addition to these uncertainties, the Army assumed that National
Guard modular units would retain some older equipment rather than
acquire the newer versions being procured for active units. However,
the Army has recently found that it cannot deploy National Guard units
to Iraq with older equipment since it was not compatible with the
equipment being used by the active Army units. Further, maintenance
personnel were not able to maintain older equipment items in theater
because repair parts were difficult to obtain.
Further, from the beginning of the Army's modular restructuring
initiative, the National Guard was recognized as having significant
equipment shortfalls. These preexisting equipment shortfalls have been
exacerbated over the past several years as National Guard units needed
to transfer equipment between units to ensure deploying units were
fully equipped. These equipment transfers, combined with the Army's
practice of leaving significant quantities of National Guard equipment
in Iraq for follow-on units, have depleted National Guard equipment
stocks nationwide to less than 49 percent of requirements. As part of
the Army's original $52.5 billion cost estimate, the Army dedicated $21
billion to purchase new National Guard ground equipment. However,
because of the National Guard's extensive equipment requirements, the
Army now plans to allocate $37 billion for National Guard equipment
through fiscal year 2013. Moreover, senior Army officials have stated
that this amount may not be sufficient to ensure that National Guard
units are equipped to their authorized levels.
Last, the Army assumed that significant quantities of equipment would
come back from Iraq and be available after some reset and repair work
to be distributed to new modular units. Given the heavy use of
equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, this assumption may no longer be
valid. At the time the cost estimate was developed, the Army assumed
that at some point equipment would begin to rotate back from Iraq and
be reset at the Army's repair depots to be redistributed to new modular
units. The increased demands for equipment used in Iraq operations,
however have had a dramatic effect on equipment availability. This
demand reduces expected service life, creates significant repair
expenses, and creates uncertainty as to whether it is economically
feasible to repair and reset these vehicles.[Footnote 13] Further, some
of the up-armored vehicles currently being operated in theater may be
replaced altogether by newer vehicles offering better protection at a
higher cost.
The Army Has Substantially Revised Its Timeline for Fully Equipping
Units but Has Not Fully Identified the Total Cost:
According to senior Army staff officials, the Army cannot fully equip
and staff its modular units to meet unit design requirements by its
planned 2011 completion date. The Army is requesting modularity funding
in line with its $52.5 billion plan, although the Army is also
requesting additional funding for new initiatives to accelerate
conversion of two modular brigades and to expand the size of the Army.
However, Army officials have also said they plan to request additional
funding for modular force equipment beyond 2011 and revise the timeline
for fully equipping the modular force to 2019.[Footnote 14] Given the
Army's reliance on the reserve component units, senior Army staff
officials said that the Army now plans to procure 100 percent of
authorized levels of equipment for reserve component units as well as
for the active Army units. The implication of this decision will likely
be to extend procurement timelines for the additional quantities of
equipment needed to equip all units to their authorized levels. Army
officials said they now plan to fully equip the Brigade Combat Teams by
2015 and the Multi-Function Support Brigades by 2019, regardless of
component.
The practice of providing equipment to the fully authorized level
represents a departure from the Army's past practice of equipping
reserve forces with less equipment than many active component units.
However, for the units to be able to assist the active Army in meeting
its operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere,
senior Army staff officials said this practice needed to be changed.
The Army previously believed that in the event of war or a crisis,
sufficient time would be available to fully equip reserve component
units prior to deploying them. According to Army officials, this has
proven unfounded in the current operational environments of Iraq and
Afghanistan as the Army required both National Guard and Army reserve
unit capabilities early in these conflicts and afterward to support the
Army's continued rotation of forces. This decision will drive costs
higher than anticipated as equipment costs represent the bulk of the
Army's funding requests.
In our September 2005 report,[Footnote 15] we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Army to provide Congress a detailed
plan estimating the costs of modularity sufficient to provide Congress
reasonable assurance that estimated costs reflect total costs of
modular units as designed and tested. We made this recommendation to
improve the information available to decision makers on the cost of the
Army's plan and to disclose potential risk that modularity might not be
implemented as planned. OSD did not comment on our report
recommendation, and instead provided us with comments prepared by an
Army official who stated that the Army's estimate was solid and did not
include uncertainties. The Army official further commented that while
there would continue to be Army modular force design changes subsequent
to that estimate, these changes were normal in the course of the Army's
force development process and would not substantially change the Army's
estimate. Although the Army partially concurred with our September 2005
report recommendation to provide Congress a detailed cost estimate and
recognized the need for regular reporting on the Army's restructuring
initiative, the Army decided that its current methods for reporting to
Congress were sufficient and additional information was unnecessary. We
do not agree that the Army's regular reporting on its modular
restructuring initiative fully addressed the requirements of our
recommendation. Moreover, by not commenting on our recommendation and
not requiring the Army to take positive corrective action, OSD has
allowed a lack of transparency concerning total funding needs to
continue, and decision makers do not have all the necessary information
they need to assess funding needs and weigh competing priorities.
The Lack of Transparency and Clear Linkages between the Army's Funding
Requests, Requirements, and Implementation Plans Reflect Management
Control Weaknesses and Contribute to Oversight Challenges:
In addition to its modular force initiative, the Army is requesting
funds for other initiatives, such as force expansion and modular
brigade acceleration, using a combination of regular and supplemental
appropriations. These multiple funding requests also make it difficult
for DOD and congressional decision makers to assess the Army's
requirements for and progress in fully equipping the modular force and
establishing new units. Congress has required the Army to submit its
assessment of progress in transforming to a modular force. However,
while the Army is submitting regular reports to Congress in conjunction
with the President's annual budget requests, these reports include
lists of modular equipment to be purchased but do not include enough
information to enable Congress to gauge progress in meeting modular
unit requirements. For example, the reports do not compare the
quantities of equipment being requested with total requirements and
quantities on hand so that senior DOD officials and Congress can assess
the need for the requested equipment and progress to date in procuring
quantities required based on the Army's modular unit designs. As a
result, these reports provide insufficient information on which to
judge the extent to which the Army's proposed equipment purchases are
addressing equipment requirements for the modular force. The lack of
linkage between requirements, funding requests, and implementation to
date impedes oversight by not providing a means to measure the progress
the Army is making in filling its modular equipment requirements, and
to what extent the Army is making the best use of its requested
funding.
Similarly, the Army's reporting to OMB does not provide sufficient
information to measure the Army's progress in equipping its modular
units. In declining to implement our recommendation to provide Congress
a detailed plan estimating the cost of modularity, the Army commented
that the information it was reporting to Congress, as well as
information provided to OMB for modularity, already provided
comprehensive oversight and any additional reporting would be redundant
and unnecessary. The Army commented that it regularly submitted budget
and other program management information to OMB through the Office's
Program Assessment Rating Tool known as "PART."[Footnote 16] However,
information contained in PART reinforces the need for a detailed plan
estimating the modular force equipment costs. For example, the PART
shows that "risk for cost growth remains high" for Army modularity and
that increased efficiency and cost effectiveness has not been an Army
priority. On the basis of our review, we found that neither the Army's
report to Congress nor the Army's reporting under PART provides
evidence of specific plans, milestones, or resources required for the
Army to fully staff and equip its modular units.
Congressional oversight also will be complicated by the multiple
sources of funding being sought by DOD to complete the Army's modular
restructuring and expansion initiatives as well as a lack of
transparency into how the Army estimated these amounts. For example, as
shown in table 3, DOD's fiscal year 2008 regular budget request
includes funds for the Army's modular restructuring initiative, as well
as the Army's newly announced force expansion plan, which will involve
the creation of six Brigade Combat Teams and an unspecified number of
support units. Additional funds required to expand the Army are
included in the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental request and the
fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror supplemental request, submitted
with DOD's fiscal year 2008 budget. DOD's fiscal year 2008 annual
budget request includes $7.6 billion for the modular force, an amount
that is consistent with the Army's existing $52.5 billion funding plan
through fiscal year 2011. Funding to expand the Army draws on three
different funding sources with $1.3 billion included in the fiscal year
2007 supplemental request, $3.6 billion in the fiscal year 2008 regular
budget request, and $4.1 billion in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on
Terror request. Additional funding to accelerate the conversion of two
Brigade Combat Teams is included in two requests---$1.9 billion in the
fiscal year 2008 regular budget request, and $.9 billion in the 2008
Global War on Terror request. All of these funding requests included
substantial sums for Army equipment, but it remains unclear how each
request will support the Army's goal of fully equipping the modular
force because the Army has not provided a basis for how it computed its
cost estimates, including underlying assumptions, and has not linked
these estimates to modular force requirements and progress in equipping
the force to date. Without a fuller explanation of these estimates,
decision makers will not be in a position to assess whether the Army is
estimating costs consistently and whether requested funding for these
initiatives will meet, fall short of, or exceed Army requirements.
Table 3: Sources of Army Funding for Modular Restructuring and
Expansion:
Dollars in billions.
Army initiative: Army Modular Restructuring;
Fiscal year 2007 regular budget request: $6.6;
Fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request: $0;
Fiscal year 2008 regular budget request: $7.6;
Fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request: $0.
Army initiative: 2 BCT Restructuring Acceleration;
Fiscal year 2007 regular budget request: $0;
Fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request: $0;
Fiscal year 2008 regular budget request: $1.9;
Fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request: $0.9.
Army initiative: Army Expansion;
Fiscal year 2007 regular budget request: $0;
Fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request: $1.3;
Fiscal year 2008 regular budget request: $3.6;
Fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request: $4.1.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of table]
Further, DOD has requested other funds to meet modular brigade
equipment requirements, making it even more difficult to assess the
Army's progress against its plans. As shown in table 3, funding to
support the recent decision to accelerate the modular force conversion
of two Brigade Combat Teams in order to deploy them earlier than
planned includes a request for $1.9 billion in the fiscal year 2008
budget submission and nearly $1 billion in the fiscal year 2008 Global
War on Terror budget requests. We have also reported that the Army is
using some of its funds appropriated for resetting equipment to
accelerate achieving the Army's strategic goals under its modularity
initiative.[Footnote 17] DOD has not fully explained the basis for
these multiple funding requests and how it distinguishes one set of
requirements from the other. For example, DOD is requesting $2.8
billion to accelerate the conversion of two Army Brigade Combat Teams,
but the Army's $52.5 billion funding plan for modularity also included
funding for these same Brigade Combat Teams. Also, funding for DOD's
plans to expand the Army is not fully reflected in the three funding
requests currently before Congress, and the Army continues to refine
its estimated costs. Preliminary cost estimates from the Army state
this initiative may require $70 billion or more, which the Army plans
to request through fiscal year 2013. Because the Army's cost estimates
are still incomplete, decision makers in DOD and Congress do not know
the magnitude of funding required to complete the expansion plans and
restructure the Army's active and reserve units into a modular force.
As a result, they will not know how to weigh those requirements against
other competing priorities.
Our work has shown that major transformation initiatives have a greater
chance of success when their funding plans are transparent,
analytically-based, executable, and link to the initiative's
implementation plans. The scope, complexity, and magnitude of the
resources required to implement the Army's modular restructuring and
expansion initiatives require a high degree of fiscal stewardship. We
have testified about the need for transparency, accountability, and
enhanced stewardship of appropriated funds as a necessary component for
the success of major military transformation efforts.[Footnote 18] OMB
has provided guidance to agencies to improve accountability and the
effectiveness of agency programs and operations, emphasizing
management's responsibility for establishing accountability for results
when developing new plans to accomplish the agency's mission. Without
adequate management controls over such a broad-based initiative as the
Army's modular force restructuring, decision makers will not have the
information they need to evaluate progress, understand tradeoffs being
made, and assess risk. By directive, OSD plays a key role in providing
guidance and allocating resources to initiatives such as this. First,
the OSD's responsibilities include defining strategy, planning
integrated and balanced military forces, and ensuring the necessary
framework (including priorities) to manage DOD resources effectively
for successful mission accomplishment consistent with national resource
limitations. Second, OSD is responsible for the efficient management of
resources, which includes conducting an annual departmentwide budget
review of the services' budget requests with OMB. The Director, Program
Analysis and Evaluation, plays a key role in managing departmentwide
planning and budgeting by leading and supporting a "cost analysis
improvement group" that has the expertise to make independent cost
estimates of major spending programs to provide a comparison against
service-provided estimates. By not commenting on our prior
recommendations related to the cost of the Army's modular force
restructuring, and not directing the Army to take positive corrective
action in response to our recommendations, the OSD has missed an
opportunity to improve management controls, and emphasize transparency
and accountability for an initiative costing tens of billions of
dollars. Further, the Army may be at risk of not being able to complete
both its modular force and expansion initiatives because the Army has
not provided Congress with complete cost estimates for both of these
initiatives and has already extended time frames for equipping modular
units well into the next decade.
The Army has a responsibility to DOD and Congress for establishing
effective management controls over its transformation to a modular
force, particularly considering the magnitude of the dollars being
requested. Management controls include the organization, policies, and
procedures used by agencies to reasonably ensure that programs achieve
results; resources are used consistent with agency mission; and
reliable and timely information is obtained, maintained, reported, and
used for decision making. Effective management controls also mean that
leadership is responsive to outside audit recommendations and takes
proper corrective action. The lack of a transparent linkage between the
Army's modular force requirements, progress to date, and additional
funding requests means that a key management control is lacking¯one
that holds the agency accountable for results. Without improvements to
its management controls, the Army will be unable to fully assess the
costs of equipping modular units and expanding the force, and quantify
progress in equipping units to meet modular unit requirements.
The Army Is Applying Lessons Learned but Still Lacks a Comprehensive
Approach for Assessing Modular Unit Designs and Performance:
While the Army is evaluating lessons learned from its ongoing
counterinsurgency operations and applying these lessons to identify
changes to its modular designs, it still lacks (1) a comprehensive
testing and evaluation plan to determine whether fielded modular unit
designs meet the Army's original goals for modular units across the
full spectrum of warfare and (2) outcome-oriented performance metrics.
The Army evaluated the experiences of modular units deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan and has made some changes in unit designs based on
these lessons; however, the Army continues to lack a plan for
evaluating and testing modular brigades in a wide variety of situations
that include high-intensity combat operations. Further, the Army has
not yet defined outcome-oriented metrics against which it could assess
the modular force. As a result, the Army does not have a clear way to
measure the extent to which it is achieving the benefits it initially
envisioned when it designed the modular force and ensure that it is
doing so in a manner that is affordable and meets DOD joint war
fighting capabilities.
Lessons Learned from Ongoing Operations Are Being Applied to the
Current Modular Force, but the Army Lacks a Comprehensive Test and
Evaluation Plan:
The Army has not established a comprehensive approach to ensure its
original performance goals for modular units are being met by its
fielded modular designs across the full-spectrum of military
operations. When a large organization implements major transformation
initiatives that require substantial expenditures of resources, it is
important to establish a comprehensive approach to assess the extent to
which the goals of the transformation are being met. Our prior work
examining organizational change and defense transformation shows that
developing performance measures and criteria for assessing results is
important for transforming organizations to increase their likelihood
for success.[Footnote 19] Additionally, our prior work shows that
methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and
concepts are an important and established practice.[Footnote 20] Prior
to implementing modular restructuring, the Army established specific
expectations for how its modular designs would improve combat
performance and operational deployment and identified significant
amounts of additional resources--personnel and equipment--these units
need to meet these goals. Additionally, the Army's modular
restructuring initiative is about more than just providing units with
additional resources; it includes new doctrinal concepts that are
critical to the success of these new units.
The Army has a process to assess modular force capabilities against the
requirements of current operations; however, the Army lacks a
comprehensive approach to ensure its performance goals are met across
the full spectrum of military operations. As part of its evaluation
process, TRADOC officials formed teams that evaluate modular unit
designs and make recommendations for improvements in staffing and
equipping the force based on lessons learned from current operations.
The lessons-learned process relies on unit evaluations that take place
before, during, and after deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. For
example, on the basis of lessons learned, the Army has reconfigured
some of the modular unit designs and has added additional capabilities
in force protection and route clearance to counter specific threats
faced by deployed units. The Army adjusted the number and skill mix of
staff within its modular unit designs and changed the number and types
of equipment in modular units to increase their ability to address
current threats in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While the Army's modular designs are being evaluated based on the
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, these are counterinsurgency or
stability operations. The Army has not taken a more comprehensive
approach to test and evaluate the modular force across the full
spectrum of warfare, which includes high-intensity combat operations.
The Army's emphasis on current operations may be understandable given
the need to ensure that Army units are ready to meet the demanding
requirements of ongoing operations. While operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan are challenging, they represent only certain specific types
of operations as opposed to the Army's broader requirements to respond
to a full spectrum of joint operations. According to TRADOC officials,
the biggest challenge in testing and evaluating modular unit design is
in ensuring that the Army is assessing these units based on full-
spectrum joint operations that are not limited to the requirements of
current operations. In addition to its current operations, the Army may
also be required to deploy its modular forces to face the challenge of
protracted high intensity offensive or defensive combat operations
instead of the counterinsurgency engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army tested early versions of Brigade Combat Team designs via
computer simulations and desktop exercises which involved a specific
scenario that was neither prolonged nor characterized by large-scale,
high-intensity combat operations. These tested designs were also
equipped with higher levels of key equipment enablers, which so far,
the Army has not yet fielded in its Brigade Combat Teams. For example,
the original designs for Brigade Combat Teams included significantly
greater numbers of specific key-enabler equipment, such as Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles and the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System.
This key-enabler equipment provided units with a more robust
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability allowing the
modular units to detect and engage enemy positions faster than without
the equipment. Because of the differences between the design tested by
the Army and the current configuration of Army modular units, we
recommended in our September 2006 report that the Army formulate a
testing plan that includes milestones for conducting comprehensive
assessments of the modular force as it is being implemented.[Footnote
21] While the Army disagreed with this recommendation, believing its
existing program was adequate, we nonetheless continue to believe that
this recommendation has merit because of the narrow spectrum of
operations being used to assess modular force designs and the limited
nature of the original testing program that evaluated a more capable
unit design that included key enabler equipment that has not yet been
assigned to Brigade Combat Teams.
In addition, other organizations have released reports identifying
capability gaps with the Army's modular designs that could ultimately
affect the modular units' ability to operate effectively against some
current and predicted threats. The Army Science Board, the department's
senior scientific advisory body, released a study in 2006 asserting
that Multi-Function Support Brigades are not adequately equipped or
staffed for independent operations because they lack the communications
and force protection equipment needed to operate without the assistance
of other units. Instead of operating independently, these brigades need
to rely on Brigade Combat Teams for these capabilities, which affect
the Brigade Combat Team's mission capability. In March 2006, the U.S.
Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, produced a capabilities
assessment of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and found that these
units may not have the desired capability to operate independently
against heavier enemy forces, composed of tanks and other armored
vehicles, because these units were lighter and did not possess
sufficient anti-armor capability. Specifically, the U.S. Army Infantry
Center was concerned that the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams did not
have the capability to defeat enemy armored vehicles at a safe
distance, or armored vehicles with advanced reactive armor or active
denial systems that are currently being developed and fielded to some
armies throughout the world. Without a process to evaluate modular
units of all types----heavy and light combat units and support units--
the Army cannot be sure that it will have the capability to operate
effectively in the full-spectrum of joint combat operations.
The Army Has Not Established Outcome-Oriented Metrics for Measuring its
Progress in Achieving the Benefits of a Modular Force:
The Army has not established outcome-oriented metrics to ensure that
its modular designs meet its original goals, support joint warfighting
efforts, or are affordable given competing resourcing priorities.
Transforming the Army to a more modular and deployable force requires
significant resources to properly staff, train, and equip newly
organized modular units at a time when the Army must staff, equip, and
train units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army proceeded with
this modular restructuring effort in the face of these resource
challenges because it expected this transformation to achieve certain
benefits. The ultimate goals of its modular restructuring efforts,
according to the Army's Strategic Planning Guidance, were to achieve
output-oriented goals, such as increasing the rotational pool of ready
units by at least 50 percent and outcome-oriented objectives, such as
enhancing combat power by at least 30 percent in the active component.
While the Army's primary modular force transformation plan----the Army
Campaign Plan----includes output-oriented metrics, such as the number
of units organized each year, the Army has not developed important
outcome-oriented performance measures and criteria to measure success
and track the progress it is making toward its goals, such as assessing
the amount of combat power generated by these units.
Our prior work examining organizational change and defense
transformation shows that developing outcome-oriented performance
measures and criteria for assessing progress an organization is making
toward its goals is important for transforming organizations.[Footnote
22] Because of the value of these assessments, we recommended that the
Army develop specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure
progress toward meeting the goals and objectives established in the
Army Campaign Plan.[Footnote 23] The Army partially concurred with our
recommendation, but to date, has not taken any action, and according to
an OSD official, OSD has not required it to do so. OMB in its Program
Assessment Rating Tool noted the Army's current metrics for modularity
are output-related rather than focused on outcomes. According to OMB,
an outcome metric answers the question "What is the program's goal or
purpose?" Without developing outcome-related metrics, the Army will be
unable to measure whether its modular units are achieving their
originally envisioned benefits.
OSD Oversight of the Army's Modular Force Transformation Initiative Is
Needed to Ensure Efforts Support Joint Warfighting and Provide Benefits
That Outweigh Costs:
Without a comprehensive evaluation of the Army's modular force, it is
not clear whether the Army's plans for the modular force are compatible
with the overall development of joint force capabilities and provide
sufficient benefits that outweigh their costs. OSD has responsibility
for providing the best allocation of DOD's resources to provide for
joint warfighting capabilities by defining strategy, planning
integrated and balanced military forces, ensuring the necessary
framework (including priorities) to manage DOD resources effectively in
order to accomplish DOD's mission consistent with national resource
limitations, and providing decision options to the Secretary of
Defense. While the Army and not OSD is primarily responsible for
modular restructuring, some features of the Army's modular force
designs may affect other service roles and missions, which suggest that
OSD may need to become more involved in Army modular design efforts.
For example, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are critical enablers in
the Army's modular force designs, but the Air Force had advocated that
it be designated executive agent for all mid-range and higher range
UAVs. Further, as part of its modular transformation, the Army is
exploring the potential for adding precision-guided artillery to its
designs, in lieu of current reliance on joint-fires, such as the
precision strike capability provided by other services. Given the fact
that there may be duplication of effort and resources in these areas,
DOD may need to consider how to ensure the Army is capable of meeting
its requirements for UAV coverage and precision fires while minimizing
the potential for unnecessary duplication and wasted resources among
the joint force. Finally, Congress required the Army to seek out the
views of the combatant commanders, the final end users of Army units,
on the Army's modular force, but the Army has yet to transmit this
assessment to Congress. To date, according to an OSD official, OSD has
not required the Army to develop outcome-related metrics or develop a
comprehensive plan for evaluating modular units. Without further
analysis of the Army's modular force initiative in the context of joint
force capabilities, OSD will not be in a position to evaluate the
Army's modular force plans and funding requests.
Conclusions:
The Army's modular restructuring is a major undertaking requiring many
billions of dollars and therefore needs sound management controls. The
lack of linkage between the Army's funding requests, progress in
equipping and staffing units, and its modular design requirements
contribute to oversight challenges. This lack of linkage impedes
oversight by DOD and congressional decision makers by not providing a
means to measure the Army's progress in filling its modular equipment
requirements or to inform budget decisions. The Army currently plans to
request additional funding from Congress and extend its timeline to
equip its modular units; however, it has not provided a complete cost
estimate, or provided detailed information, on what specific
requirements remain to be filled. Moreover, the Army has recently
announced a plan to expand its force, which will lead to requirements
to fund new modular units at the same time it is trying to implement
its original restructuring plans. Until the Army provides a
comprehensive plan outlining its requirements for its modular
restructuring and expansion initiatives, identifying progress made to
date, and detailing additional equipment and other resources required,
OSD and Congress will not be in a sound position to determine the total
costs to complete modular restructuring and expand the Army and decide
how to best allocate future funding. The risk to the force is that
insufficient funds to complete both initiatives along overlapping
timelines may result in continued equipment and personnel shortfalls.
Effective management controls over these initiatives will be needed to
help measure progress and to achieve effective and efficient
operations. Moreover, OSD has a role to play in overseeing the
initiatives to help ensure accountability for results in addition to
its annual reviews of the services' budget requests. Further, while the
Army continues to evaluate the performance of its modular designs in
the current counterinsurgency conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Army's testing and evaluation of its modular unit designs still lack
some important components. The lack of outcome-related metrics prevents
the Army from measuring whether its modular unit designs are achieving
their originally envisioned benefits thereby justifying the large
expenditure of funds required to implement the Army's modular
restructuring initiative. The Army's modular restructuring initiative
would benefit from an assessment of the Army's fielded modular designs
across the full spectrum of warfare since it has limited itself to the
current counterinsurgency operations and has not included protracted
high-intensity conflict. Without a comprehensive testing program for
the Army's modular initiative incorporating these elements, OSD lacks
the information necessary to evaluate the Army's modular designs in
terms of the designs' effectiveness in supporting joint warfighting
requirements or make informed decisions on the Army's modular funding
plans given competing priorities for funding.
Recommendations:
To improve management controls, enhance transparency, and reduce the
risk associated with the Army modularity and force expansion
initiatives' costs, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense
take the following four actions:
* Direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a comprehensive strategy
and funding plan that identifies requirements for equipment and
personnel based on modular unit designs, identifies total funding
needs, and includes management controls for measuring progress in
staffing and equipping units. Also, direct the Secretary of the Army to
report its estimates to Congress.
* Direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with support from the
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, to review and assess whether
the Army's strategy and funding plan clearly identifies and links
requirements, progress to date, and additional funding requirements.
* Direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with support from the
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation and the DOD Comptroller, and
in keeping with the overall priorities of the department and current
and expected resource levels, to replace the Army's existing Office of
the Secretary of Defense--approved funding plan for modularity that
ends in fiscal year 2011, with a new approved Office of the Secretary
of Defense funding plan that fully considers the Army's requirements
for a modular force and is consistent with the Army's extended time
frames to fully staff and equip the modular force. This plan should
also be reported to Congress.
* Direct the Secretary of the Army to include exhibits with the annual
budget submissions to show how the budget requests help meet the
equipment and personnel requirements of the Army's modular units and
help identify what remains to be funded in future years.
Further, to enhance the rigorousness of the Army's efforts to assess
modular designs, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take
the following two actions:
* require the Army to develop a comprehensive assessment plan that
includes steps to evaluate modular units in full spectrum combat and:
* oversee the Army's assessment program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments responding to a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense concurred with all six of our recommendations.
The Department's comments are discussed below and are reprinted in
appendix II.
DOD concurred with our four recommendations intended to improve
management controls and bring about a comprehensive Army strategy and
funding plan for staffing and equipping modular units. Specifically,
DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) direct the Army to
develop a comprehensive strategy and funding plan, (2) task the
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, to review and assess the
Army's plan to ensure that the plan links funding needs to
requirements, (3) revise the existing DOD approved funding plan and
communicate funding requirements to Congress, and (4) have DOD include
additional exhibits in its annual budget submissions which are intended
to show what requirements the funding request will fulfill and what
requirements remain to be funded. In explaining how it planned to
implement these recommendations, DOD stated that would include in its
FY08 Annual Report on Army Progress under Section 323 of the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L.
109-364), the equipping and staffing requirements for different brigade
types; the number and types of brigades, the status of conversions to
modular design, and the status of the manning and equipment for the
force as a whole. DOD also stated that the Director, Program Analysis
and Evaluation will review and assess the Army's strategy and funding
plans as part of DOD's budget development process. In addition, DOD
stated it will work with the Army to reassess the accounting means for
equipping the force and determine the appropriate path forward. DOD
stated the Army will include additional information on equipping and
personnel requirements for its modular forces in its fiscal year 2008
Annual Report on Army progress and will incorporate the Army's funding
needs in the President's annual budget submission to Congress. We agree
that the steps DOD plans to take in response to these recommendations,
if fully implemented, will introduce more effective oversight and
management controls of the Army's initiative within the Department, and
will better inform the Congress of the Army's progress in staffing and
equipping the modular force. With regard to developing an updated
funding plan, we believe it will be important for the Army to identify
in its report to Congress its overall funding needs to staff and equip
the modular force through 2017--consistent with the Army's latest plan-
-in addition to providing materials to support the President's Budget
Request for a particular year. Such an overall plan is needed to help
senior DOD officials and Congress weigh the Army's funding needs for
modular units with other competing needs. In conjunction with the work
we are undertaking to annually review and report on the Army's plans
and progress in equipping and staffing modular units in response to a
congressional mandate, we plan to review the funding information DOD
submits as part of its annual report and fiscal year 2009 budget
justification materials and assess its comprehensiveness.
DOD also concurred with our two recommendations directing the Secretary
of the Army to develop a comprehensive assessment plan that includes
steps to evaluate modular units in full spectrum combat operations and
requiring OSD to oversee the Army's assessment program. However, DOD
commented that it believed that the Army and OSD were already
evaluating modular units in full spectrum operations via the Training
and Doctrine Command's modular force assessment efforts and the Total
Army Analysis process. Our review found that the Training and Doctrine
Command's ongoing evaluations and assessments are focused primarily on
counterinsurgency operations rather than full spectrum warfare.
Moreover, the primary purpose of the Total Army Analysis process is to
develop the mix of forces (numbers and types of units) needed to carry
out full spectrum operations; it is not a tool specifically intended to
assess and refine individual unit designs. For example, Total Army
Analysis may determine how many intelligence units the Army needs, but
would not be expected to determine how an intelligence unit should be
structured. We continue to believe that the Army should develop and
execute a comprehensive analysis plan to assess its modular force
designs and that DOD should be overseeing the Army's assessment plan.
Without such a plan, DOD may not be able to fully gauge the need for
additional refinements in its modular unit designs. The specific
actions DOD has described in its comments do not fully meet the intent
of our recommendation. For this reason, we are adding a matter for
congressional consideration to require the Army to develop a
comprehensive assessment plan for the modular force and require OSD to
review the plan and transmit it to Congress.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Given the magnitude of the Army's initiative to transform to a modular
force, and the range of analytical efforts the Army could bring to bear
to assess the effectiveness of the modular designs in meeting 21ST
century challenges, Congress should consider requiring DOD to develop
and provide a comprehensive assessment plan that includes steps to
evaluate modular units in full spectrum combat.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Army. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, obtained and
reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials from the
Headquarters, Department of Army; National Guard Bureau; U.S. Army
Reserve Command; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army
Forces Command; U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis; and U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center. We supplemented this information with visits to
brigades that had undergone modular conversions to gain an
understanding of the Army's modular force implementation plans and
progress in organizing, staffing, and equipping modular brigades. This
included requesting data comparing equipment and personnel on hand
versus authorized under the new design requirements; discussing
implementation challenges with senior brigade and division-level
officials; and researching future plans for completing the modular
conversion. The brigades we visited included brigades in the regular
Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. We selected 10 nondeployed
brigades to interview based upon whether each brigade had completed its
restructuring to a modular organization or was in the process of
restructuring, whether the unit was currently preparing for an upcoming
deployment, and whether other restructured modular brigades of the same
type were available to interview in other components. In the regular
Army, we visited brigades in the 3rd Infantry Division, including the
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, and the 3rd
Sustainment Brigade. We also visited the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat
Team of the 1st Infantry Division. In the Army National Guard, we
visited the 29th Combat Aviation Brigade, Maryland; 30th Heavy Brigade
Combat Team, North Carolina; and 116th Infantry Brigade Combat Team,
Virginia. We also interviewed the brigade staff of the 108th
Sustainment Brigade, Illinois, via phone. In the Army Reserve, we
visited the 55th Sustainment Brigade and interviewed the Commanding
Officer of the 244th Theatre Aviation Brigade via phone. We selected
these brigades in order to compare brigades of the same design within
the different components and discuss progress in meeting Army goals
with staff from each of the components.
To determine the extent to which the Army implemented its modular force
initiative and established management controls that provide
transparency for assessing progress and funding for equipping modular
units and expanding the force, we visited the above listed active and
reserve component units and gathered and analyzed information comparing
required equipment and personnel versus on-hand levels. From the Army's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G8), we obtained a list of
equipment the officials told us were vital to enabling modular brigades
to operate at least as effectively as the brigades they replaced. We
met with Army officials responsible for managing the equipment items
Army-wide to determine Army plans for acquiring and fielding those
equipment items. We updated and analyzed information on Army
requirements for funding and funding plans and assessed areas of risk
and uncertainty. We determined that the data used were sufficiently
reliable for our objectives as our analysis was focused on whether the
Army would be able to completely equip its modular units within the
Army's current funding plan, procurement plans, and timeline.
To determine how much funding the Army has been appropriated for
modular force restructuring, we reviewed Department of the Army base
budgets and supplemental budgets. To determine how much funding the
Army has programmed for future modular force restructuring costs and
Army expansion plans, we met with officials in the Department of Army
Headquarters, specifically officials from the Army's Deputy Chief of
Staff for Programs (G8). We also reviewed testimony provided by Army
officials at congressional hearings and budget data submitted by the
Army to OMB. To understand the Army's future plans for funding its
modular force transformation, and current Army views on its ability to
complete its modular force initiative, we met with senior Army staff
officials, including the Military Deputy for Budget, Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller); the
Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology); the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-
8); and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3/5/7).
To determine the extent to which the Army developed a comprehensive
plan to assess its modular unit designs, we assessed the extent of
progress in developing metrics and evaluating units' performance in
full-spectrum operations. We reviewed our prior work on assessing
organizations undertaking significant reorganizations. We reviewed and
analyzed the Army Campaign Plan and discussed it with officials in the
Department of the Army Headquarters. To analyze the Army's approach for
assessing the implementation of its modular conversion, we examined key
Army planning documents and discussed objectives, performance metrics,
and testing plans with appropriate officials in the Army's Combined
Arms Center. We also reviewed recently completed analyses on the Army's
modular force designs from the Army Science Board and from the United
States Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia.
We conducted our work from August 2006 through August 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, Dc 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
November 16, 2007:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-145, "Force Structure: Better Management Controls are
Needed to Oversee the Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives
and Improve Accountability for Results," dated October 18, 2007 (GAO
Code 350885).
The Department concurs with the six GAO recommendations and our
comments are enclosed. Modular brigades are the organizational
construct of the Army. The modular brigade organization has replaced
the Army's division centric organization and is the means by which the
Army provides necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant
Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.
The numbers and types of modular brigades, as well as the general
manning and equipping needs for each type of brigade have been
established and these will be continuously assessed to keep pace with
the changing operational environment. The Army's year to year
equipping, staffing, and readiness plans, for all brigades, are
considered Department resourcing priorities and are based on: (1)
deployment needs to fulfill missions; (2) existing Army equipment and
personnel; (3) planned upgrades and expansions; and (4) emerging needs.
Oversight of equipping, manning, and readiness plans comes through
existing Department requirements, readiness, acquisition, and
resourcing entities including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
Senior Readiness Oversight Council, Defense Acquisition Board, and the
Comptroller. The Department continually seeks to improve these
management and oversight processes for better overall efficiency.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure:
As stated:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition Gao Draft Report Dated October 18, 2007
Gao-08-145 (GAO Code 350885):
"Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the
Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve
Accountability for Results"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a comprehensive strategy
and funding plan that identifies requirements for equipment and
personnel based on modular unit designs, identifies total funding
needs, and includes management controls for measuring progress in
staffing and equipping units. Also, direct the Secretary of the Army to
report its estimates to Congress.
DOD Response: Concur. The Army shall include in its FY08 Annual Report
on Army Progress under Section 323 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364); the equipping
and staffing requirements for different brigade types; the number and
types of brigades, the status of conversions to modular design, and the
status of the manning and equipment for the force as a whole. The
funding needs will be included in the President's budget.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with support from the Director
of Program Analysis and Evaluation, to review and assess whether the
Army's strategy and funding plan clearly identifies and links
requirements, progress to date, and additional funding requirements.
DOD Response: Concur. The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
will review and assess the Army's manning and equipping plans as part
of the budget development for Program Objectives Memorandum 2010-2015.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with support from the Director
Program Analysis and Evaluation and the DoD Comptroller, and in keeping
with the overall priorities of the Department and current and expected
resource levels, to replace the Army's existing Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) approved funding plan for modularity that ends in
fiscal year 2011, with a new approved OSD funding plan that fully
considers the Army's requirements for a modular force and is consistent
with the Army's extended time frames to fully staff and equip the
modular force. This plan should also be reported to Congress.
DOD Response: Concur. As part of the Program Objectives Memorandum 2010-
2015 budget preparations, the Director Program Analysis and Evaluation
and the DoD Comptroller will work with the Army to reassess the
accounting means for equipping the force and determine the appropriate
path forward. This will be provided to Congress as part of the fiscal
year 2010 budget.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to include exhibits with the annual
budget submissions to show how the budget requests help meet the
equipment and personnel requirements of the Army's modular units and
help identify what remains to be funded in future years.
DOD Response: Concur. As part of the Army's Green Top and the budget
detail provided with the fiscal year 2010 President's budget, the Army
will address equipping and manning status.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require the Secretary of the Army to develop a comprehensive assessment
plan that includes steps to evaluate modular units in full spectrum
combat.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department and the Army will continue to
assess the Army's modular unit designs and the force effectiveness in
full spectrum operations. Force structure and force design are
evaluated using the Department's Analytic Agenda, to include Defense
Planning Scenarios for the full spectrum of combat operations, in
coordination with the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command. The
Department, including the Joint Staff and Program Analysis and
Evaluation, assesses force structure and capability continuously to
inform Defense Planning Guidance. The Army's yearly Total Army Analysis
and Training and Doctrine Command's force effectiveness efforts
evaluate the capabilities of the modular brigades throughout the
spectrum of combat operations.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
oversee the Department of the Army's assessment program.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department will continue to review the Army's
equipping and manning plans, capabilities, and execution.
[End of section]
Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant
Director; Grace Coleman; Barbara Gannon; Harry Jobes; Nichole Madden;
and J. Andrew Walker made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This figure does not include Army expansion costs.
[2] See the following GAO reports and testimony statements: GAO, Force
Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of Costs
for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 29, 2005); Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and
Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and
Implementation Plans, GAO-06-745 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6. 2006);
Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement
and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005);
and Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain
Uncertain, GAO-06-548T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006).
[3] The Army's Training and Doctrine Command is, among other things,
responsible for ensuring that the modular force it designs is capable
of conducting operations across the full spectrum of warfare.
[4] GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and
Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005).
[5] GAO, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation
Plans, GAO-06-745 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6. 2006).
[6] GAO, Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured
Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability while
Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements, GAO-07-814 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 2007).
[7] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the
Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
Implementation Challenges, GAO-07-936 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2007).
[8] GAO-07-936.
[9] OMB, Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal
Control, Revised (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2004).
[10] In addition to the OMB guidance, GAO has issued Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). Both OMB and GAO consider "internal
control" to be synonymous with "management control." GAO explains that
internal control helps government program managers achieve desired
results through effective stewardship of public resources. Internal
control comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet
missions, goals, and objectives in support of performance-based
management. Throughout this document we will use the term management
control.
[11] In addition the Army plans to restructure approximately 118
functional support brigades across all three components by the end of
fiscal year 2011; however, details on the Army's plans for these
brigades are still limited.
[12] Other GAO work related to the Army's military construction
requirements and funding can be found in GAO, Defense Infrastructure:
Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support
for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth, GAO-07-
1007 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007).
[13] See GAO-07-831 for additional information on reset challenges.
[14] The Army plans to request funding through 2017 which will result
in a fully equipped force by 2019.
[15] GAO-05-926.
[16] The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is a series of questions
designed to provide a consistent approach to rating programs across the
federal government. The PART uses diagnostic tools that rely on
professional judgment to assess and evaluate programs across a wide
range of issues related to performance.
[17] GAO-07-814.
[18] Comptroller General David Walker, Fiscal Stewardship and Defense
Transformation, GAO-07-600CG, speech before the U.S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, Maryland, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2007).
[19] GAO, Military Transformation: Additional Actions Needed by U.S.
Strategic Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and
New Organization, GAO-06-847 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2006).
[20] GAO-06-745.
[21] GAO-06-745.
[22] GAO-06-847.
[23] GAO-06-745.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, DC 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, DC 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, DC 20548:
