Defense Acquisitions
Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System Gao ID: GAO-07-376 March 15, 2007The Future Combat System (FCS) is central to Army transformation efforts, comprising 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network. In previous work, GAO found that the elements of a sound business case--firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding--were not present. As a result, FCS is considered high risk and in need of special oversight and review. Congress has mandated that the Department of Defense (DOD) decide in early 2009 whether FCS should continue. GAO is required to review the program annually. In this report, GAO analyzes FCS development, including its requirements definition; status of critical technologies, software development, and complementary programs; soundness of its acquisition strategy related to design, production and spin-out of capabilities to current forces; and reasonableness of costs and sufficiency of funding.
The Army has been granted a lot of latitude to carry out a large program like FCS this far into development with relatively little demonstrated knowledge. Tangible progress has been made during the year in several areas, including requirements and technology. Such progress warrants recognition, but confidence that the program can deliver as promised depends on high levels of demonstrated knowledge, which are yet to come. Following the preliminary design review in 2009, there should be enough knowledge to demonstrate the soundness of the FCS business case. If significant doubts remain about the program's executability at that time, DOD will have to consider alternatives to proceeding with the program. Currently, GAO sees the FCS business case as follows. Requirements--Progress has been made in defining requirements and making some difficult trade-offs, but key assumptions about the performance of immature technologies and other technical risks remain to be proven. Technology--The Army has made progress in maturing technologies, but it will take several more years to reach full maturity. All key technologies should have been mature in 2003 when the program began. FCS software has doubled in size compared to original estimates and faces significant risks. The Army is attempting a disciplined approach to managing software development. Acquisition Strategy--The FCS acquisition strategy is compressed. Key testing to demonstrate FCS performance will not be completed, and maturity of design and production will not be demonstrated until after the production decision. Program Costs--New estimates place FCS costs significantly above the current estimate of $163.7 billion. The Army has recently proposed a plan to buy fewer systems and slow production rates. This recent program adjustment will affect program costs, but details are not yet available.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-376, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2007:
Defense Acquisitions:
Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System:
GAO-07-376:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-376, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Future Combat System (FCS) is central to Army transformation
efforts, comprising 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced
information network. In previous work, GAO found that the elements of a
sound business case”firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-
based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient
funding”were not present. As a result, FCS is considered high risk and
in need of special oversight and review. Congress has mandated that the
Department of Defense (DOD) decide in early 2009 whether FCS should
continue.
GAO is required to review the program annually. In this report, GAO
analyzes FCS development, including its requirements definition; status
of critical technologies, software development, and complementary
programs; soundness of its acquisition strategy related to design,
production and spin-out of capabilities to current forces; and
reasonableness of costs and sufficiency of funding.
What GAO Found:
The Army has been granted a lot of latitude to carry out a large
program like FCS this far into development with relatively little
demonstrated knowledge. Tangible progress has been made during the year
in several areas, including requirements and technology. Such progress
warrants recognition, but confidence that the program can deliver as
promised depends on high levels of demonstrated knowledge, which are
yet to come. Following the preliminary design review in 2009, there
should be enough knowledge to demonstrate the soundness of the FCS
business case. If significant doubts remain about the program‘s
executability at that time, DOD will have to consider alternatives to
proceeding with the program. Currently, GAO sees the FCS business case
as follows: Requirements. Progress has been made in defining
requirements and making some difficult trade-offs, but key assumptions
about the performance of immature technologies and other technical
risks remain to be proven. Technology. The Army has made progress in
maturing technologies, but it will take several more years to reach
full maturity. All key technologies should have been mature in 2003
when the program began. FCS software has doubled in size compared to
original estimates and faces significant risks. The Army is attempting
a disciplined approach to managing software development. Acquisition
Strategy. The FCS acquisition strategy is compressed. Key testing to
demonstrate FCS performance will not be completed, and maturity of
design and production will not be demonstrated until after the
production decision. Program Costs. New estimates place FCS costs
significantly above the current estimate of $163.7 billion. The Army
has recently proposed a plan to buy fewer systems and slow production
rates. This recent program adjustment will affect program costs, but
details are not yet available.
Figure: FCS Core Systems:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: U.S. Army.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that specific
criteria should be considered during the 2009 milestone review and
alternatives to the program analyzed should FCS fail to deliver needed
capabilities when and as expected. DOD concurred with GAO‘s
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-376].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul Francis, 202-512-
4841, francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Despite Progress, FCS Requirements Must Still Prove Technically
Feasible and Affordable:
Army Reports Significant Progress, but Major Technological Challenges
Remain:
Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Will Provide for Late Demonstration of
FCS Capabilities:
Likely Growth of FCS Costs Increases Tension between Program Scope and
Available Funds:
Conclusions:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Level Ratings:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: FCS Software Blocks, Percentage of Completion, and Delivery
Dates:
Table 2: Key FCS Test Event Schedule:
Table 3: Comparison of the Original Cost Estimate and Recent Cost
Estimates for the FCS Program (in billions of dollars):
Table 4: Annual and Cumulative FCS Funding and Planned Events and
Achievements:
Table 5: Technology Readiness Level Descriptions:
Figures:
Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems:
Figure 2: Flow of FCS's Overarching Requirements to System-Level
Requirements:
Figure 3: TRL 6 Projections over Time:
Figure 4: FCS Projected Software Lines of Code (in thousands):
Figure 5: Acquisition Compared with Commercial Best Practices:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FCS: Future Combat System:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
TG: Terminal Guidance:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 15, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
As the centerpiece of the Army's transformation to a lighter, more
agile, and more capable combat force, the Future Combat System (FCS)
program--which comprises 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced
information network needed for a brigade combat team--is considered to
be, according to the Army, the greatest technology and integration
challenge it has ever undertaken. The Army started its FCS program in
May 2003 without fulfilling the basic elements of a business case--that
is, determining if the program's requirements and concept were valid
and that the concept could be successfully developed with existing
resources including proven technologies, stable design, adequate
funding, and adequate time. The Army projects the FCS program will cost
$163.7 billion, which has been adjusted for inflation, but does not
include key complementary programs. As a result, the program is
recognized as being high risk and in need of special oversight and
review. In 2006, Congress mandated that the Department of Defense (DOD)
hold an FCS milestone review, essentially a "go/no-go" decision,
following its preliminary design review, which is now scheduled for
early 2009.
Given its cost, scope, and technical challenges, section 211 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires GAO to
report annually on the FCS program.[Footnote 1] The specific objectives
of this report are to assess FCS progress in terms of (1) definition of
requirements; (2) status of critical technologies, software
development, and complementary programs; (3) the soundness of the
acquisition strategy as it relates to design and production as well as
the spin-out of capabilities to current forces; and (4) reasonableness
of program costs and whether funds have been committed to complete the
program as planned.
In conducting our work, we have contacted numerous DOD and Army
offices. We reviewed documents pertaining to the FCS program, attended
meetings at which DOD and Army officials reviewed program progress, and
held discussions with key DOD and Army officials on various aspects of
the program. Officials from DOD and the Army have provided us access to
sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters in
this report. In addition, we drew from our body of past work on weapon
systems acquisition practices. We performed our work from March 2006 to
March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
To date, the FCS program has spent about $8 billion despite having
significantly less knowledge--and less assurance of success--than
required by best practices or DOD policy. By early 2009, enough
knowledge should be available about the key elements of the FCS
business case to make a well-informed decision on whether and how to
proceed with the program. If significant doubts remain regarding the
program's executability, DOD will have to consider alternatives to
proceeding with the program as planned. Central to the go/no-go
decision will be demonstrable soundness of the FCS business case in the
areas of requirements, technology, acquisition strategy, and finances.
Our assessment of these elements today is as follows:
Requirements: Progress has been made in defining requirements in
greater detail, and some difficult trade-offs have been made. The Army
believes that the FCS requirements are feasible, but that will not be
certain until key assumptions about the performance of immature
technologies and other technical risks are proven. Replacing these
assumptions with knowledge is essential for completing the requirements
process for the individual FCS systems, as additional performance trade-
offs may be necessary.
Technology: The Army has made progress in maturing technologies in the
past year, but major challenges remain. It assesses about 80 percent of
FCS technologies to be mature--double last year's number. The Army uses
a lower standard for maturity than what GAO has found to be a best
practice. The current assessment was not done independently as last
year's had been. A sound business case would require FCS to have had
all technologies mature in 2003 when the program began. It will still
take several more years to mature key technologies to that point.
Current estimates of FCS software--the most in any weapon system
program--are double initial estimates. The Army is attempting to
incorporate a number of best practices into its development effort, and
some initial increments of software have been delivered on time.
Acquisition Strategy: Even if all goes as planned, the FCS strategy
will provide for late demonstration of performance. Similar to
technologies, design reviews of FCS systems will be done quite late in
the program and key testing will not begin until just prior to the
initial production decision. Relative to best practices, maturity of
design and production will not be demonstrated until after the
production decision. The Army has started to implement its plans to
spin out some early FCS technologies and systems to current Army forces
and that effort is expected to place more demands on FCS test
resources.
Program Costs: FCS costs are likely to grow, which will increase the
tension between the program's scope and available funds. While the Army
has only slightly changed its cost estimate of $160.7 billion since
last year, independent cost estimates put costs at between $203 billion
to nearly $234 billion. The tension between program scope and available
funds has led to the Army's recent announcement to buy fewer systems
and slow production rates. This will be the second restructuring in 4
years. These changes will affect program costs, but full details are
not yet available.
Anticipating that further changes will need to be made to the program,
we are making several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on
specific criteria that should be considered during the 2009 milestone
review and the need to analyze alternatives to the program should the
FCS fail to deliver needed capabilities within reasonable time frames
and expected funding. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with our recommendations.
Background:
The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army's Future Force,
which is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable
and responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-
centric structure of the past. The Army is reorganizing its current
forces into modular brigade combat teams, each of which is expected to
be highly survivable and the most lethal brigade-sized unit the Army
has ever fielded. The Army expects FCS-equipped brigade combat teams to
provide significant warfighting capabilities to DOD's overall joint
military operations. The Army is implementing its transformation plans
at a time when current U.S. ground forces continue to play a critical
role in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has
instituted plans to spin out selected FCS technologies and systems to
current Army forces throughout the program's system development and
demonstration phase.
As we were preparing this report, the Army made a number of adjustments
to its plans for the FCS program. The revised program will no longer
include all 18 systems as originally planned. The FCS family of weapons
is now expected to include 14 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air
vehicles, sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an advanced
information network. The systems include:
* eight new types of manned ground vehicles to replace current tanks,
infantry carriers, and self-propelled howitzers;
* two classes of unmanned aerial vehicles;
* several unmanned ground vehicles; and:
* an attack missile.
Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass with superior
information--allowing soldiers to see and hit the enemy first rather
than to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. This solution attempts
to address a mismatch that has posed a dilemma to the Army for decades:
the Army's heavy forces had the necessary firepower needed to win but
required extensive support and too much time to deploy while its light
forces could deploy rapidly but lacked firepower. If the Future Force
becomes a reality, then the Army would be better organized, staffed,
equipped, and trained for prompt and sustained land combat, qualities
intended to ensure that it would dominate over evolving, sophisticated
threats. The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and will employ
revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new technology. The
Army envisions a new way of fighting that depends on networking the
force, which involves linking people, platforms, weapons, and sensors
seamlessly together in a system-of-systems.
Figure 1: FCS's Core Systems:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army.
[End of figure]
If successful, the FCS system-of-systems concept will integrate
individual capabilities of weapons and platforms, thus facilitating
interoperability and open system designs. This would represent
significant improvement over the traditional approach of building
superior individual weapons that must be retrofitted and netted
together after the fact. This transformation, in terms of both
operations and equipment, is under way with the full cooperation of the
Army warfighter community. In fact, the development and acquisition of
FCS is being accomplished using a uniquely collaborative relationship
among the Army's developers, the participating contractors, and the
warfighter community.
The Army has employed a management approach for FCS that centers on a
lead systems integrator to provide significant management services to
help the Army define and develop FCS and reach across traditional Army
mission areas. Because of its partner-like relationship with the Army,
the lead systems integrator's responsibilities include requirements
development, design, and selection of major system and subsystem
subcontractors. The team of Boeing and Science Applications
International Corporation is the lead systems integrator for the FCS
system development and demonstration phase of acquisition, which is
expected to extend until 2017. The FCS lead systems integrator acts on
behalf of the Army to optimize the FCS capability, maximize
competition, ensure interoperability, and maintain commonality in order
to reduce life-cycle costs. Boeing also acts as an FCS supplier in that
it is responsible for developing two important software subsystems. The
Army advised us that it did not believe it had the resources or
flexibility to use its traditional acquisition process to field a
program as complex as FCS under the aggressive timeline established by
the then-Army Chief of Staff. The Army will maintain oversight and
final approval of the lead systems integrator's subcontracting and
competition plans. The FCS lead systems integrator originally operated
under a contractual instrument called an "other transaction agreement."
In 2006, the Army completed the conversion of that instrument to a more
typical contract based on the Federal Acquisition Regulation. As
required by section 115 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, we are reviewing the
contractual relationship between the Army and the lead systems
integrator and will be reporting on that work separately.[Footnote 2]
Elements of a Business Case:
We have frequently reported on the wisdom of using a solid, executable
business case before committing resources to a new product development
effort. In the case of DOD, a business case should be based on DOD
acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial firms
and successful DOD programs. The business case in its simplest form is
demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter's needs are valid and
that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen
concept can be developed and produced within existing resources--that
is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, adequate
time, and management capacity to deliver the product when it is needed.
A program should not go forward into product development unless a sound
business case can be made. If the business case measures up, the
organization commits to the product development, including making the
financial investment.
At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to
product development that is both a best practice among leading
commercial firms and the approach preferred by DOD in its acquisition
policies. For a program to deliver a successful product within
available resources, managers should demonstrate high levels of
knowledge before significant commitments are made. In essence,
knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge can be
described as three levels or points that should be attained over the
course of a program.
* First, at program start, the customer's needs should match the
developer's available resources--mature technologies, time, funding,
and management capacity. An indication of this match is the
demonstrated maturity of the technologies needed to meet customer
needs.[Footnote 3] The ability of the government acquisition workforce
to properly manage the effort should also be an important consideration
at program start.
* Second, about midway through development, the product's design should
be stable and demonstrate that it is capable of meeting performance
requirements. The critical design review is the vehicle for making this
determination and generally signifies the point at which the program is
ready to start building production-representative prototypes.
* Third, by the time of the production decision, the product must be
shown able to be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality
targets and have demonstrated its reliability. It is also the point at
which the design must demonstrate that it performs as expected through
realistic system-level testing.
A delay in attaining any one of these levels delays the points that
follow. If the technologies needed to meet requirements are not mature,
design and production maturity will be delayed. In successful
commercial and defense programs that we have reviewed, managers were
careful to develop technology separately from and ahead of the
development of the product. For this reason, the first knowledge level
is the most important for improving the chances of developing a weapon
system within cost and schedule estimates. DOD's acquisition policy has
adopted the knowledge-based approach to acquisitions. DOD policy
requires program managers to demonstrate knowledge about key aspects of
a system at key points in the acquisition process. Program managers are
also required to reduce integration risk and demonstrate product design
prior to the design readiness review and to reduce manufacturing risk
and demonstrate producibility prior to full-rate production.
The FCS program is about one-third of the way into its scheduled
product development. At this stage, the program should have attained
knowledge point one, with a strategy for attaining knowledge points two
and three. Accordingly, we analyzed the FCS business case first as it
pertains to firming requirements and maturing technologies, which
indicate progress against the first knowledge point. We then analyzed
FCS's strategy for attaining design and production maturity. Finally,
we analyzed the costs and funding estimates made to execute the FCS
business case.
Agency and Congressional Actions Since Our Last Report:
In our previous report on the FCS program, released in March 2006, we
reported that the program entered the development phase in 2003 without
reaching the level of knowledge it should have attained in the pre-
development phase.[Footnote 4] The elements of a sound business case
were not reasonably present, and we noted that the Army would continue
building basic knowledge in areas such as requirements and technologies
for several more years. We concluded that in order for the FCS program
to be successful, an improved business case was needed.
The Defense Acquisition Board met in May 2006 to review the FCS
program. That review approved the Army approach to spin out certain FCS
technologies to current Army forces in 2008 and directed the Army to
continue with yearly in-process reviews and a Defense Acquisition Board
meeting in the late 2008 timeframe. Performance expectations were also
established for the review. During the meeting, it was noted that
significant cost and schedule risk remains for the program and that
reductions in scope and more flexibility in schedule are needed to stay
within current funding constraints.
Also in 2006, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense conduct a
milestone review for the FCS program, following the preliminary design
review scheduled for early 2009.[Footnote 5] Congress stated that the
review should include an assessment of whether (1) the needs are valid
and can be best met with the FCS concept, (2) the FCS program can be
developed and produced within existing resources, and (3) the program
should continue as currently structured, be restructured, or be
terminated. The Congress required the Secretary of Defense to review
specific aspects of the program, including the maturity of critical
technologies, program risks, demonstrations of the FCS concept and
software, and a cost estimate and affordability assessment and to
submit a report of the findings and conclusions of the review to
Congress. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary of Defense
to provide an independent cost estimate that will encompass costs
related to the FCS program and a report on the estimate. The Institute
for Defense Analyses is expected to deliver this analysis to Congress
by April 2007.
Finally, in response to concerns over funding shortfalls and other
resource issues for fiscal years 2008 to 2013, the Army has recently
made a number of changes to its plans for the FCS program. Although
complete details are not yet available, the Army plans to:
* reduce the number of individual systems from 18 to 14 including
eliminating 2 unmanned aerial vehicles;
* slow the rate of FCS production from 1.5 to 1 brigade combat team per
year;
* change the total quantities to be bought for several systems; and:
* reduce the number of planned spin-outs from four to three.
Full details of the Army's plans were not available at the time of this
report. Based on what is known, program officials expect that the
production period for the 15 brigade combat teams would be extended
from 2025 to 2030. The initial operating capability date would also be
delayed by 5 months to the third quarter of fiscal year 2015.
Despite Progress, FCS Requirements Must Still Prove Technically
Feasible and Affordable:
The Army has made considerable progress in defining system-of-systems
level requirements and allocating those requirements to the individual
FCS systems. This progress has necessitated making significant trade-
offs to reconcile requirements with technical feasibility. A key
example of this has been to allow a significant increase in manned
ground vehicle weight to meet survivability requirements which in turn
has forced trade-offs in transportability requirements. The feasibility
of FCS requirements still depends on a number of key assumptions about
immature technologies, costs, and other performance characteristics
like the reliability of the network and other systems. As current
assumptions in these areas become known, more trade-offs are likely. At
this point, the Army has identified about 70 high technical risks that
need to be resolved to assure the technical feasibility of
requirements.
Army Has Made Progress in Defining System-Level Requirements:
The Army has defined 552 warfighter requirements for the FCS brigade
combat team that are tied to seven key performance parameters: network-
ready, networked battle command, networked lethality, transportability,
sustainability/reliability, training, and survivability. Collectively,
the Army has stated that the FCS-equipped brigade combat teams must be
as good as or better than current Army forces in terms of lethality,
responsiveness, sustainability, and survivability. In August 2005, the
Army and the lead systems integrator translated the warfighter
requirements into 11,500 more specific system-of-systems level
requirements, established the functional baseline for the program, and
allocated requirements to individual FCS systems. Since then, the
contractors have clarified their design concepts and provided feedback
on the technical feasibility and affordability of the requirements.
In an August 2006 review, the Army and its lead systems integrator
reduced the number of warfighter requirements to 544, but increased the
system-of-systems requirements to 11,697. Of the system-of-system
requirements, 289 have "to be determined" items and 819 have open
issues to be resolved. At this review, the FCS requirements were
translated further down to the individual system level, totaling about
90,000. The system level requirements provide the specificity needed
for the contractors to fully develop detailed designs for their
individual systems. While the stages of translating requirements for
FCS are typical for weapon systems, the enormous volume suggests the
complex challenge that a networked system-of-systems like FCS presents.
Figure 2 illustrates how the FCS requirements are translated from the
warfighter to the individual systems.
Figure 2: Flow of FCS's Overarching Requirements to System-Level
Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Leading up to the review, the lead systems integrator and the
subcontractors identified over 10,000 "to-be-determined" items and
issues to be resolved related to the flow-down of the system-of-systems
requirements to the FCS system-level requirements. The "to-be-
determined" items generally involve the need for the user community and
the developers to come to an understanding on a way to better specify
or quantify the requirement. A common issue to be resolved involves the
need for compromise between the users and developers when the design
solution may not be able to fully meet the initially allocated
requirement. The Army and lead systems integrator plan to resolve the
"to-be-determined" items and issues prior to the preliminary design
review in early 2009.[Footnote 6]
The Army and lead systems integrator are also developing a network
requirements document that is intended to provide end-to-end network
requirements in an understandable format to inform the system-level
requirements. The number of network requirements in this document has
not yet been determined. However, the Army and lead systems integrator
have identified about 2000 "to-be-determined" items and issues to be
resolved in this area that need to be addressed and clarified. The Army
and lead systems integrator expect to complete this work by the time of
the preliminary design review.
Some Key Requirements and Design Trade-offs Have Been Made:
The Army and its subcontractors have already made some trade-offs as
they continue to refine their system design concepts and the FCS system-
level requirements. One key trade-off came in the area of the projected
weight of the manned ground vehicles and their transportability by
aircraft. Originally, the manned ground vehicles were to weigh less
than 20 tons so they could be carried on the C-130 aircraft. These
vehicles were to be lightly armored at 19 tons and with add-on armor
bringing the total vehicle weight up to about 24 tons. However, the
Army and its contractor team found that this design did not provide
sufficient ballistic protection. Currently, the vehicle designs with
improved ballistic protection are estimated to weigh between 27 and 29
tons. At this weight, it is practically impossible to transport the
vehicles on the C-130s, and they are now being designed to be
transported by the larger C-17 aircraft. Illustrative of the FCS design
challenges, the added weight of the vehicles could have ripple effects
for the designs of the engine, suspension, band track, and other
subsystems. The Army still wants vehicles to be transportable by the C-
130 when stripped of armor and other equipment, so that C-130 cargo
size and weight limits will still serve to constrain the design of the
manned ground vehicles. As these are primarily paper and simulated
designs, the potential for future trade-offs is high.
Another example involves the requirement that the manned ground
vehicles be able to operate for several hours on battery power and
without the engine running. Based on the analyses to date, it has been
determined that current battery technologies would permit less than one
hour of this "silent watch" capability. The Army, lead systems
integrator, and the FCS subcontractors are continuing their
assessments, as is the user community, which is re-evaluating which
internal manned ground vehicle subsystems may need to operate in these
situations. With less demand for power, the batteries are expected to
last somewhat longer. As that work concludes, the Army will be able to
determine the specific level of silent watch capability it can expect
for the manned ground vehicles and how best to change the operational
requirements document. The Army plans to finalize this and other
requirement changes and numerous clarifications by the time of the
preliminary design review in early 2009.
Technical Feasibility of System-Level Requirements Based on Numerous
Assumptions:
The Army and lead systems integrator believe that most of the FCS
system-level requirements are technically feasible and have decided
that design work should proceed. However, as the design concepts and
technologies mature, their actual performance does not necessarily
match expectations, and trade-offs have to be made. To date, the Army
has had to make a number of requirements and design changes that
recognize the physical constraints of the designs and the limits of
technology. Ideally, these trade-offs are made before a program begins.
Because many technologies are not yet fully mature, significant trade-
offs have been made and will continue to be necessary. The technical
feasibility of FCS requirements still depends on a number of key
assumptions about the performance of immature technologies, thus more
trade-offs are likely as knowledge replaces assumptions. The challenge
in making additional changes to requirements is at least two-fold:
first is assessing the potential ripple effect of changing a
requirement for one system on the thousands of other system
requirements; the second is assessing the cumulative effect of numerous
system level requirements changes on the overall characteristics of
survivability, lethality, responsiveness, and supportability.
Technical Feasibility Dependent on Addressing Some High Level Risks:
The Army has identified numerous known technical risks, about 70 of
which are considered to be at a medium or high level. These involve the
information network, characteristics like weight and reliability that
cut across air and ground vehicles, and several system-specific risks.
The Army is focusing management attention on these risks and has risk
reduction plans in place. Nonetheless, the results of these technology
development efforts will have continuing implications for design and
requirements trade-offs.
Network:
FCS survivability depends on the brigade-wide availability of network-
based situational awareness plus the inherent survivability of the FCS
platforms. There is hardly any aspect of FCS functionality that is not
predicated on the network, and for many key functions, the network is
essential. However, the FCS program manager has stated that the Army
still has a lot yet to learn on how to successfully build such an
advanced information network. Some of the network medium and high level
risks include:
* End-to-end quality of service on mobile ad-hoc networks. The
probability is high that the FCS network will not be able to ensure
that the information with the highest value is delivered to the
recipients. Failure to support the warfighter in defining and
implementing command intent for information management will result in
substantially reduced force effectiveness, in a force that trades
information for armor.
* Wideband waveform availability. The current Joint Tactical Radio
System Ground Mobile Radio program continues to pose risks because its
schedule is not yet synchronized with the schedule for the core FCS
program or FCS spin-outs. Any schedule slip in this area could lead to
further delays. This consequence will mean integrators will not have
Joint Tactical Radio System hardware in sufficient quantities,
capability, and function to support the FCS schedule. In addition to
schedule delays this could also jeopardize the network spin-outs,
experiments, and the integration of the core program requirements.
* Soldier radio waveform availability. The soldier radio waveform
provides functional capabilities that are needed to support many FCS
systems but may not be completed in time to support FCS development.
These functional capabilities facilitate interoperability and gateway
functions between the FCS family of systems. These systems are critical
to FCS performance and delays of these functional capabilities will
negatively impact the FCS schedule.
* Spectrum availability and usage. There is a high likelihood that more
frequency spectrum is required for all of the communications needs than
will be available given current design assumptions. Lack of system
spectrum may force a choice to operate without critical data due to
reduced data throughput, reducing mission effectiveness and leading to
possible failure.
* Unmanned vehicle network latency. Unmanned ground and air vehicles
are completely dependent on the FCS network for command and control
interaction with their soldier/operators. Inadequate response time for
unmanned payload tele-operation and target designation will result in
degraded payload performance and targeting when these modes are
required.
* Net-ready critical performance parameter verification and
testability. The Army recognizes the risk that FCS will not be able to
adequately verify and test compliance with this parameter as it relates
to the Global Information Grid.[Footnote 7] FCS is expected to have
extensive connectivity with other services and agencies via the Grid.
The risk is due to, among other things, the many yet-to-be-defined
critical or enterprise interfaces which are being delivered in
parallel. Failure to meet the net-ready testability requirements could
result in, among other things, fielding delays and cost and schedule
overruns.
Weight and Reliability:
All of the unmanned and manned ground vehicles and several other FCS
systems are expected to have difficulty meeting their assigned weight
targets. According to program officials, about 950 weight reduction
initiatives were being considered just for the manned ground vehicles.
The Army expects the FCS program to make substantial progress toward
meeting these goals by the time of the preliminary design review. It is
not yet clear what, if any, additional trade-offs of requirements and
designs may be needed to meet the FCS weight goals.
High levels of reliability will be needed for the FCS brigade combat
teams to meet their requirements for logistics footprint and
supportability. Current projections indicate that many FCS systems--
including the Class IV unmanned aerial vehicle, communications
subsystems, and sensors--may not meet the Army's high expectations for
reliability. The Army plans to address these issues and improve
reliability levels by the time of the preliminary design review in
2009.
System-Specific Risks:
The Army and lead systems integrator have also identified other medium
to high risk issues that could affect the requirements and design
concepts for individual FCS systems. These include:
* Class I unmanned aerial vehicle heavy fuel engine. The Class I
vehicle requires a heavy fuel engine that is small in size,
lightweight, and operates with high power efficiency. Such an engine
does not currently exist, and no single candidate system will meet all
FCS requirements without additional development. An engine design that
cannot balance size and power will critically affect compliance with
several key requirements.
* Lightweight track component maturation. Current band track designs do
not meet mine blast requirements and may not meet the FCS durability
requirement or the critical performance parameter requirements for
reducing logistics footprint and reduced demand for maintenance and
supply. Without enhanced mine blast resistance, vehicle mobility will
be diminished, which could result in survivability impacts.
* Vehicular motion effects. There is likelihood that system design may
not preclude vehicular-induced motion sickness capable of degrading the
crews' ability to execute their mission. These effects may reduce the
ability of the crew to perform cognitive tasks while in motion, thereby
reducing operational effectiveness.
* Safe unmanned ground vehicle operations. If necessary operational
experience and technology maturity is not achieved, the brigade combat
teams may not be able to use these vehicles as planned. Also, if a high
level of soldier confidence in the reliability and accuracy of fire
control of weapons on moving unmanned ground vehicles is not achieved,
the rules of engagement of these systems may be severely restricted.
Cost Could Force Additional Requirements Trade-offs:
Unit cost reduction goals have been established at the FCS brigade
combat team level and have been allocated down to the individual FCS
systems and major subsystems. Many FCS systems are above their assigned
average cost levels, and stringent reduction goals have been assigned.
In particular, the manned ground vehicles have a significant challenge
ahead to meet their unit cost goals. In order to meet these goals,
requirements and design trade-offs will have to be considered.
The Army faces considerable uncertainty about how much investment money
it will have in the future for FCS. The Army has capped the total
amount of development funding available for FCS, and the contract
contains a provision to identify trade-offs to keep costs within that
cap. Hence, if costs rise, trade-offs in requirements and design will
be made to keep within the cap. Recent events provide a good example of
this situation. In 2006, the Army conducted a study to determine the
number and type of unmanned aerial vehicles it can and should maintain
in its inventory. All four of the FCS unmanned aerial vehicles were
included in that study, and a decision has recently been made to remove
the Class II and III vehicles from the core program. While this will
free up money for other needs, the Army will have to reallocate the
requirements from those unmanned aerial vehicles to other FCS systems.
Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review:
As it proceeds to the preliminary design review and the subsequent go/
no-go milestone, the Army faces considerable challenges in completing
the definition of technically achievable and affordable system-level
requirements, an essential element of a sound business case. Those
challenges include:
* completing the definition of all system-level requirements for all
FCS systems and the information network (including addressing the "to-
be-determined" items and issues to be resolved);
* completing the preliminary designs for all FCS systems and
subsystems;
* clearly demonstrating that FCS key performance parameters are
achievable with confidence;
* obtaining a declaration from the Army user community that the likely
outcomes of the FCS program will meet its projected needs;
* clearly demonstrating that the FCS program will provide capabilities
that are clearly as good as or better than those available with current
Army forces, a key tenet set out by the Army as it started the FCS
development program in 2003;
* mitigating FCS technical risks to significantly lower levels; and:
* making demonstrable progress towards meeting key FCS goals including
weight reduction, reliability improvement, and average unit production
cost reduction.
Army Reports Significant Progress, but Major Technological Challenges
Remain:
The Army has made progress in the areas of critical technologies,
complementary programs, and software development. In particular, FCS
program officials report that the number of critical technologies they
consider as mature has doubled in the past year. While this is good
progress by any measure, FCS technologies are far less mature at this
point in the program than called for by best practices and DOD policy,
and they still have a long way to go to reach full maturity. The Army
has made some difficult decisions to improve the acquisition strategies
for some key complementary programs, such as Joint Tactical Radio
System and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, but they still face
significant technological and funding hurdles. Other complementary
programs had been unfunded, but Army officials told us that these
issues have been addressed. Finally, the Army and the lead systems
integrator are utilizing many software development best practices and
have delivered the initial increments of software on schedule. On the
other hand, most of the software development effort lies ahead, and the
amount of software code to be written--already an unprecedented
undertaking--continues to grow as the demands of the FCS design becomes
better understood. The Army and lead systems integrator have recognized
several high risk aspects of that effort and mitigation efforts are
underway.
FCS Critical Technologies Are Maturing Faster Than Predicted Last Year:
Last year, we reported that an independent review team assessment
revealed that 18 of the program's 49 critical technologies had reached
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6--a representative prototype system
in a relevant environment.[Footnote 8] The independent team projected
that by 2006, 22 of FCS's 49 critical technologies would reach TRL
6.[Footnote 9] The FCS program office currently assesses that 35 of 46
technologies are at or above TRL 6--a significantly faster maturation
pace than predicted last year.[Footnote 10] Figure 3 compares the
readiness levels of FCS technologies over a 3-year period.
Figure 3: TRL 6 Projections over Time:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Several of these technologies jumped from a TRL 4 (low-fidelity
breadboard design in a laboratory environment) to a TRL 6 including
cross domain guarding solutions and the ducted fan for the Class 1
unmanned aerial vehicle. The program's technology officials maintain
that such a leap can be made, even though it was not anticipated by the
independent assessment. They cited the ducted fan technology for small
unmanned aerial vehicles as an example. This technology was largely
considered immature until a single demonstration showcased the system's
capabilities in demanding conditions, which convinced Army leadership
that the ducted fan technology was at a TRL 6. Appendix IV lists all
critical technologies, their current TRL status, and the projected date
for reaching TRL 6.
However, not all of the FCS technologies are truly at a TRL 6. Two of
the most important technologies for the success of manned ground
vehicles and the overall FCS concept are lightweight armor and active
protection. The Army has previously been more optimistic about the
development pace for these technologies. However, during the past year,
the Army recognized that the particular solutions they were pursuing
for lightweight armor were inadequate and active protection only
satisfied the conditions for a TRL 5.
Active Protection System:
An active protection system is part of the comprehensive FCS hit
avoidance system architecture that will protect the vehicles from
incoming rounds, like rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles.
The active protection system would involve detecting an incoming round
or rocket propelled grenade and launching an interceptor round from the
vehicle to destroy the incoming weapon. In mid-2006, the lead systems
integrator (with Army participation) selected Raytheon from among
numerous candidates to develop the architecture to satisfy FCS short-
range active protection requirements. A subsequent trade study
evaluated several alternative concepts and selected Raytheon's vertical
launch concept for further development.
While the FCS program office's most recent technology readiness
assessment indicates that the active protection system is at TRL 6, a
2006 trade study found that the Raytheon concept had only achieved a
TRL 5. Active protection system is a vital technology for the FCS
concept to be effective, and the FCS manned ground vehicles
survivability would be questionable without that capability. Not only
will the active protection system concept chosen need additional
technology development and demonstration, but it also faces system
integration challenges and the need for safety verifications. Indeed,
the Army recognizes that it faces a challenge in demonstrating if and
how it can safely operate an active protection system when dismounted
soldiers are nearby.
Lightweight Hull and Vehicle Armor:
A fundamental FCS concept is to replace mass with superior information-
-that is to see and hit the enemy first rather than to rely on heavy
armor to withstand a hit. Nonetheless, the Army has recognized that
ground vehicles cannot be effective without an adequate level of
ballistic protection. As a result, the Army has been developing
lightweight hull and vehicle armor as a substitute for traditional,
heavier armor. In the past year, the Army concluded that it would need
additional ballistic protection and the Army Research Laboratory is
continuing armor technology development to achieve improved protection
levels and to reduce weight. The Army now anticipates achieving TRL 6
on the new armor formulation in fiscal year 2008, near the time of the
manned ground vehicle preliminary design review. Armor will continue to
be a technology as well as integration risk for the program for the
foreseeable future.
Technology Maturity Must Be Seen in a Broader Context:
As noted above, the Army's progress in FCS technology is notable
compared with the progress of previous years. This progress, however,
does need to be put in a broader context. The business case for a
program following best practices in a knowledge-based approach is to
have all of its critical technologies mature to TRL 7 (fully functional
prototype in an operational environment) at the start of product
development. For the FCS, this would mean having had all technologies
at TRL 7 by May 2003. By comparison, even with the progress the program
has made in the last year, fewer than 35 of FCS's 46 technologies have
attained a lower maturity--TRL 6--3½ years after starting product
development. Immature technologies are markers for future cost growth.
In our 2006 assessment of selected major weapon systems, development
costs for the programs that started development with mature
technologies increased by a modest average of 4.8 percent over the
first full estimate, whereas the development costs for the programs
that started development with immature technologies increased by a much
higher average of 34.9 percent.[Footnote 11]
FCS program officials do not accept these standards. Rather, they
maintain they only need to mature technologies to a TRL 6 by the time
of the critical design review which is now scheduled for 2011.
According to the Army's engineers, once a technology achieves TRL 6,
they are no longer required to track the technology's progress. They
maintain that anything beyond a TRL 6 is a system integration matter
and not necessarily technology development. Integration often involves
adapting the technologies to the space, weight, and power demands of
their intended environment. To a large extent, this is what it means to
achieve a TRL 7. This is work that needs to be accomplished before the
critical design reviews and is likely to pose additional trade-offs the
Army will have to make to reconcile its requirements with what is
possible from a technology and engineering standpoint. Accordingly, the
FCS program has singled out several critical technologies that have
been assessed at TRL 6 but yet continue to have moderate or high risk
that could have dire consequences for meeting program requirements if
they are not successfully dealt with. Examples include:
* High density packaged power. Current battery technology may not meet
the performance levels needed to support the initial production of FCS.
Among other things, calendar life, cost, cooling methods, safety, and
thermal management have not been demonstrated. The potential impacts of
this risk could affect not only vehicle propulsion but also lethality
and supportability.
* High power density engine. The Army has recognized that there is a
risk that engine manufacturers may not have the capability to build a
reliable, cost effective engine that will meet FCS requirements within
the FCS program schedule. Engines have been tested that meet the power
density required but not at engine power levels consistent with manned
ground vehicle needs. The mitigation strategy includes engine testing
to identify and correct potential engine design issues as soon as
possible.
* Hull anti-tank mine blast protection. The Army recognizes that there
is a probability, given the weight constraints on FCS platforms and
evolving blast mitigation technology, that the FCS hull and crew
restraints will not protect the crew from life threatening injury due
to anti-tank blast mines equal to (or greater than) the threshold
requirement. The potential consequence is that the mobility and
survivability of the brigade combat team will be affected. The FCS
program and Army Research Laboratory are developing an anti-tank mine
kit for each manned ground vehicle to meet requirements.
* Highband networking waveform. FCS needs a high data rate capability
to send sensor data and to support the FCS transit network. The
Wideband Information Network-Tactical does not yet meet the performance
requirements for size, weight, and power; signature management; and
operational environments. There may be significant schedule and cost
risk involved in getting that radio to meet the requirements. Without
the high data rate capability, sensor data may not be presented in an
adequate or timely fashion to perform targeting or provide detailed
intelligence data to the warfighter.
* Cross-domain guarding solution. FCS needs this technology to ensure
the security of information transmitted on the FCS information network.
The Army recognizes that it will be difficult to obtain certification
and accreditation as well as to meet the space, weight, and power and
interface requirements of FCS. Failure to address these concerns in a
timely manner will result in delays in fielding FCS-equipped units and
additional costs.
The FCS program will continue to face major technological challenges
for the foreseeable future. The independent technology assessment
planned to coincide with the preliminary design review in early 2009
should provide objective insights regarding the Army's progress on
technology maturity and system integration issues.
Army Reassessing Complementary Programs:
The FCS program may have to interoperate or be integrated with as many
as 170 other programs, some of which are in development and some of
which are currently fielded programs. These programs are not being
developed exclusively for FCS and are outside of its direct control.
Because of the complementary programs' importance to FCS--52 had been
considered essential to meeting FCS key performance parameters--the
Army closely monitors how well those efforts will synchronize with the
FCS program. However, many of these programs have funding or technical
problems and generally have uncertain futures. We reported last year
that the Army is reassessing the list of essential complementary
programs given the multiple issues surrounding them and the budgetary
constraints the Army is facing. In addressing the constrained budget
situation in the 2008 to 2013 program objective memorandum, program
officials said the Army is considering reducing the set of systems.
When the set of complementary programs is finalized, the Army will have
to determine how to replace any capabilities eliminated from the list.
Two complementary programs that make the FCS network possible, the
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical (WIN-T), were restructured and reduced in scope. A
challenge in making changes in these programs is their individual and
cumulative effects on FCS performance.
JTRS:
JTRS is a family of software-based radios that is to provide the high
capacity, high-speed information link to vehicles, weapons, aircraft,
sensors, and soldiers. The JTRS program to develop radios for ground
vehicles and helicopters--now referred to as Ground Mobile Radio --
began product development in June 2002 and the Army has not yet been
able to mature the technologies needed to generate sufficient power as
well as meet platform size and weight constraints. A second JTRS
program to develop variants of small radios that will be carried by
soldiers and embedded in several FCS core systems--now referred to as
Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Factor radios--entered product
development with immature technologies and a lack of well-defined
requirements. In 2005, DOD directed the JTRS Joint Program Executive
Office to develop options for restructuring the program to better
synchronize it with FCS and to reduce schedule, technology,
requirements, and funding risks.[Footnote 12] The restructuring plan
was approved in March 2006 and is responsive to many of the issues we
raised in our June 2005 report.[Footnote 13] However, the program still
has to finalize details of the restructure including formal acquisition
strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and evaluation plans.
Further, there are still cost, schedule, and technical risks associated
with the planned delivery of initial capabilities, and therefore it is
unclear whether the capabilities will be available in time for the
first spin-out of FCS capabilities to current forces in 2008. Fully
developed prototypes of JTRS radios are not expected until 2010 or
later.
WIN-T:
The Army is developing WIN-T to provide an integrated communications
network to connect Army units on the move with higher levels of command
and provide the Army's tactical extension to the Global Information
Grid. Although the program has been successful in developing some
technologies and demonstrating early capabilities, the status of its
critical technologies is uncertain. As a result of an August 2005
study, the WIN-T program is being re-baselined to meet emerging
requirements as well as a shift in Army funding priorities. The Army's
proposal for restructuring would extend system development for about 5
years, and delay the production decision from 2006 to about 2011, while
seeking opportunities to spin out WIN-T technologies both to FCS and to
the current force. Despite this improvement, several risks remain for
the program, and the restructuring does have consequences. Coupled with
new FCS requirements, the restructure will increase development costs
by over $500 million. Critical technologies that support WIN-T's mobile
ad hoc networking must still be matured and demonstrated, while the new
FCS requirements will necessitate further technology development. Also,
some WIN-T requirements are unfunded, and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense recently non-concurred with part of the program's Technology
Readiness Assessment. In order to obtain concurrence, the WIN-T program
manager is updating the body of evidence material to reaffirm the
technology maturity estimates.
Army Is Devoting Considerable Attention to Software Development, but
Major Risks Need to be Addressed:
The FCS software development program is the largest in DOD history, and
the importance of software needed for FCS performance is unprecedented.
The Army is attempting to incorporate a number of best practices into
their development, and some initial increments of software have been
delivered on time. However, since the program started, the projected
amount of software needed for FCS has almost doubled, to 63.8 million
lines of code. Further, the Army must address a number of high risk
issues that could impact delivery schedules, operational capabilities,
and overall FCS performance.
Disciplined Approach Needed to Manage Unprecedented Amount of Software:
Several numbers help illustrate the magnitude of the FCS software
development effort:
* 95 percent of FCS's functionality is controlled by software,
particularly the network;
* 63 million lines of code are currently projected to be needed for
FCS, more than 3 times the amount being developed for the Joint Strike
Fighter;
* FCS will have its own operating system, like Microsoft Windows,
called the System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment; and:
* Over 100 interfaces or software connections to systems outside FCS
will have to be developed.
Of primary importance to the success of FCS is the System-of-Systems
Common Operating Environment software. This software is expected to act
as the infrastructure for other FCS software. It is to standardize
component-to-component communications within computers, vehicles, the
virtual private networks, and the Global Information Grid, enabling
interoperability with legacy Army, joint, coalition, government, and
non-government organizations. Finally, it is to provide the integration
framework for the FCS family of systems and enable integrated system-
of-systems functionality and performance.
We have previously reported that software-intensive weapon programs are
more likely to reach successful outcomes if they used a manageable
evolutionary environment and disciplined process and managed by
metrics.[Footnote 14] The Army is attempting to follow such an approach
to meet the software challenges on FCS. Specifically, FCS software will
be developed in four discrete stages, or blocks. Each block adds
incremental functionality in eight functional areas (command and
control, simulation, logistics, training, manned ground vehicles,
unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, and warfighting
systems). The Army and lead systems integrator are also partitioning
software into at least 100 smaller, more manageable subsystems. The FCS
program is also implementing scheduled and gated reviews to discipline
software development and have developed a set of metrics to measure
technical performance in terms of growth, stability, quality, staffing,
and process.
Considerable Risks Remain with Software Development:
Apart from the sheer difficulty of writing and testing such a large
volume of complex code, a number of risks face the FCS software
development effort. As requirements have become better understood, the
number of lines of code has grown since the program began in 2003.
Specifically, in 2003, the Army estimated that FCS would need 33.7
million lines of code, compared to today's estimate of 63.8 million. As
the Army and its contractors learn more about the limits of technology
and its design concepts, the amount and functionality to be delivered
by software may change.
FCS's 63 million lines of software code can be broken down further into
code that is new, reused, or commercial-off-the-shelf, as seen in
figure 4.
Figure 4: FCS Projected Software Lines of Code (in thousands):
[See PDF for image]
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
The Army maintains that new software code presents the greatest
challenge because it has to be written from scratch. Reused code is
code already written for other military systems that is being adapted
to FCS. Similarly, commercial-off-the shelf software is code already
written for commercial systems that is being adapted to FCS. A program
official told us that estimates of software code that will be reused
are often overstated and the difficulty of adapting commercial software
is often understated in DOD programs. This optimism translates into
greater time and effort to develop software than planned. An
independent estimate of reuse and commercial software has concluded
that these efforts have been understated for the FCS program, which
will translate into higher cost and schedule slippage.[Footnote 15] If
the independent estimate proves correct, more software development
could be pushed beyond the production decision.
A foundational block of software (Build 0) has already been completed
and an interim package of the System-of-Systems Common Operating
Environment software was recently tested and delivered. However, as can
be seen in table 1, even if FCS stays on schedule, a portion--10
percent--of FCS software is planned to be delivered and tested after
the early 2013 production decision that will limit the knowledge
available to decision makers at that point.[Footnote 16]
Table 1: FCS Software Blocks, Percentage of Completion, and Delivery
Dates:
Block: 0;
Percentage of total software completed: 5;
Delivery date: September 2005.
Block: 1;
Percentage of total software completed: 30;
Delivery date: December 2007.
Block: 2;
Percentage of total software completed: 61;
Delivery date: May 2010.
Block: 3;
Percentage of total software completed: 90;
Delivery date: October 2011.
Block: 4;
Percentage of total software completed: 100;
Delivery date: October 2013.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Currently, the Army estimates that 45 percent of the total 63 million
source lines of code will have been written and tested by the early
2009 preliminary design review and 75 percent will be done by the 2011
critical design review. Although there has been no significant schedule
slippage to date on the initial increments of software, both of these
estimates may prove to be ambitious. Additionally, according to program
officials, the most difficult part of software development is the last
10 percent.
Although the Army is attempting to implement several software best
practices, there are a number of factors that may complicate those
efforts. One of the leading problems in software development is the
lack of adequately defined requirements. Without adequate definition
and validation of requirements and design, software engineers could be
coding to an incorrect design, resulting in missing functionality and
errors. As we discussed earlier, the ultimate system-level requirements
may not be complete until the preliminary design review in 2009. The
Army acknowledges that the FCS's lack of adequate requirements and
incomplete system architecture could result in software that does not
provide the desired functionality or performance. This lack of top-
level requirements and architecture definition also affects the
accuracy of projected lines of code. Program risk charts suggest that
software estimates could be understated by as much as 70 percent, which
could impact overall schedule and performance.
The Army has identified specific aspects of FCS software development as
high risk and is developing plans to mitigate the risks:
* System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment Availability and
Maturity. There is a recognized risk that the software may not reach
the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program
milestones.
* FCS software integration performance and development. Due to the
complexity, functional scope, net-centric focus, and real-time
requirements for the command and control software, software integration
may not yield fully functional software that performs as desired.
* Block 1 incompatible software components during integration. There
are a large number of diverse groups working on software components
that need to be integrated into full units. A lack of early integration
process and collaboration among the suppliers represents substantial
risk to rework during integration and subsequent schedule impact.
* Software estimating accuracy. To date, estimating accuracy has been
hampered by changing requirements, immature architecture, and
insufficient time to thoroughly analyze software subsystems sizing. The
difficulties associated with accurate software estimating is an
indication that complexity increases as the design is better understood
and this serves to increase the level of effort.
* Software supplier integration. The unprecedented nature, volatility,
and close coupling of FCS suppliers' software will frequently require
various combinations of suppliers to share information and rapidly
negotiate changes in their products, interfaces, and schedules. As
these suppliers are traditionally wary competitors that are used to
performing to fixed specifications, there are significant risks of slow
and inflexible adaptation to critical FCS sources of change. Failure to
do so will translate directly into missed delivery schedules,
significantly reduced operational capabilities, and less dependable
system performance.
Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review:
As it approaches the preliminary design review and the subsequent go/
no-go milestone review, the Army should have made additional progress
in developing technologies and software as well as aligning the
development of complementary programs with the FCS program. The
challenges that will have to be overcome include:
* demonstrating that all critical technologies are mature to at least
the TRL 6 level. This assessment should be reviewed and validated by an
independent review team;
* mitigating the recognized technical risks for the FCS critical
technologies, including their successful integration with other FCS
subsystems and systems;
* clearly demonstrating that the risks inherent in the active
protection system and the lightweight hull and vehicle armor have been
reduced to low levels;
* synchronizing the JTRS and WIN-T development schedules with FCS
system integration and demonstration needs for both the spinouts and
core program;
* mitigating the cost, schedule, and performance risks in software
development to acceptably low levels; and:
* establishing the set of complementary programs that are essential for
FCS's success, ensuring that that are fully funded, and aligning theirs
and the overall FCS program schedules.
Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Will Provide for Late Demonstration of
FCS Capabilities:
The FCS acquisition strategy and testing schedule have become more
complex as plans have been made to spin out capabilities to current
Army forces. The strategy acquires knowledge later than called for by
best practices and DOD policy. In addition, knowledge deficits for
requirements and technologies have created enormous challenges for
devising an acquisition strategy that can demonstrate the maturity of
design and production processes. Even if requirements setting and
technology maturity proceed without incident, FCS design and production
maturity is not likely to be demonstrated until after the production
decision is made. The critical design review will be held much later on
FCS than other programs, and the Army will not be building production-
representative prototypes with all of their intended components to test
before production. Much of the testing up to the 2013 production
decision will involve simulations, technology demonstrations,
experiments, and single system testing. Only after that point, however,
will substantial testing of the complete brigade combat team and the
FCS concept of operations occur. However, production is the most
expensive phase in which to resolve design or other problems found
during testing. Spin-outs, which are intended to accelerate delivery of
FCS capabilities to the current force, also complicate the acquisition
strategy by absorbing considerable testing resources and some tests.
Acquisition Strategy Will Demonstrate Design Maturity after Production
Begins:
The Army's acquisition strategy for FCS does not reflect a knowledge-
based approach. Figure 5 shows how the Army's strategy for acquiring
FCS involves concurrent development, design reviews that occur late in
the program, and other issues that are out of alignment with the
knowledge-based approach that characterizes best practices and is
supported in DOD policy.
Figure 5: Acquisition Compared with Commercial Best Practices:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Ideally, the preliminary design review occurs at or near the start of
product development. Activities leading up to the preliminary design
review include, among others, translating system requirements into
design specifics. Doing so can help reveal key technical and
engineering challenges and can help determine if a mismatch exists
between what the customer wants and what the product developer can
deliver. Scheduling the preliminary design review early in product
development is intended to help stabilize cost, schedule, and
performance expectations. The critical design review ideally occurs
midway into the product development phase. The critical design review
should confirm that the system design performs as expected and is
stable enough to build production-representative prototypes for
testing. The building of production-representative prototypes helps
decision makers confirm that the system can be produced and
manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. According to
the knowledge-based approach, a high percentage of design drawings
should be completed and released to manufacturing at critical design
review. The period leading up to critical design review is referred to
as system integration, when individual components of a system are
brought together, and the period after the review is called system
demonstration, when the system as a whole demonstrates its reliability
as well as its ability to work in the intended environment.
The Army has scheduled the preliminary design review in early 2009,
about 6 years after the start of product development. The critical
design review is scheduled in fiscal year 2011, just 2 years after the
scheduled preliminary design review and 2 years before the initial FCS
production decision in fiscal year 2013. This will leave little time
for product demonstration and correction of any issues that are
identified at that time.[Footnote 17] This is not to suggest that the
two design reviews for the FCS could have been conducted earlier but
rather that commitments to build and test prototypes and begin low-rate
production are scheduled too soon afterward. The timing of the design
reviews is indicative of how late knowledge will be attained in the
program, even if all goes according to plan. With requirements
definition not being complete until at least the final preliminary
design review in early 2009 and technology maturation not until after
that, additional challenges will have to be addressed within the system
integration phase. System integration will already be a challenging
phase due to known integration issues and numerous technical risks. The
best practice measure for the completion of the system integration
phase is the release of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings by
the time of the critical design review.
The Army is planning to have developmental prototypes of all FCS
systems available for testing prior to low-rate initial production. For
example, most of the manned ground vehicle prototypes are expected to
be available in 2011 for developmental and qualification
testing.[Footnote 18] However, these prototypes are not expected to be
production-representative prototypes and will have some surrogate
components. Whereas the testing of fully integrated, production-
representative prototypes demonstrate design maturity and their
fabrication can demonstrate production process maturity, neither of
these knowledge points will be attained until after the initial
production decision is made.
System-Level Testing Compressed into Late Development and Early
Production:
The FCS test program is unique because it is designed to field a new
fighting unit and concept of operations to the Army, not just new
equipment. To help do this, the Army has incorporated a new evaluation
unit, known as the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team, to help with
development and testing of the FCS systems and the tactics, techniques,
and procedures necessary for the unit to fight. The test effort will
involve four phases during development, which examine how the program
is maturing hardware and software, during development. These phases are
intended as check points. The first phase has a corresponding spin-out
of mature FCS capabilities to current forces.
The Army is proceeding with its plans to reduce FCS risks using
modeling, simulation, emulation, and system integration laboratories.
This approach is a key aspect of the Army's acquisition strategy and is
designed to reduce the dependence on late testing to gain valuable
insights about many aspects of FCS development, including design
progress. However, on a first-of-a-kind system--like FCS--that
represents a radical departure from current systems and warfighting
concepts, actual testing of all the components integrated together is
the final proof that the FCS system-of -systems concept works both as
predicted and expected. FCS program test officials told us that while
they understand the limitations involved, the use of emulators,
surrogates, and simulations gives the Army a tremendous amount of early
information, particularly about the system-of-systems and the network.
This early information is expected to make it easier for the Army to
deal with the compressed period between 2010 and 2014 and give the Army
the ability to fix things quicker. As we were preparing this report, it
was not clear what, if any, impact the Army's program adjustments would
have on its testing and demonstration plans and schedules. Table 2
describes the key test events, as currently scheduled, throughout the
FCS program.
Table 2: Key FCS Test Event Schedule:
No.: 1;
Event: Experiment 1.1;
Systems: Ground sensors and other emulators, radio systems, and other
systems;
Description: Provides early and limited assessment of abilities of
selected network systems;
Dates: 7/2006 to 6/2007.
No.: 2;
Event: Experiment 2;
Systems: Command and control, ground sensors, communications, lethality
enablers, and other systems;
Description: Early experiment with several FCS systems at the
battalion, company, and platoon echelons;
Dates: 1/2008 to 1/2009.
No.: 3;
Event: Spin-Out 1 Limited User Test 1;
Systems: Various computer systems, ground sensors, and missile launch
system;
Description: Battalion level test with current force equipment and
selected systems being "spun" out to current forces;
Dates: 3/2008 to 4/2008.
No.: Preliminary design review;
Dates: 2nd quarter fiscal year 2009.
No.: Defense acquisition board milestone review;
Dates: 3rd quarter fiscal year 2009.
No.: 4;
Event: Early Ground Vehicle Delivery;
Systems: Early prototype of the non line of sight-cannon manned ground
vehicle;
Description: Initial prototype with commonality with later prototypes;
Dates: 3rd Quarter Fiscal Year 2008.
No.: 5;
Event: Integrated Mission Test 2;
Systems: Integration laboratory, simulations, common operating system
and other items;
Description: First system-of-systems test in integration phase 2 and
indicator of network functionality;
Dates: 8/2009 to 11/2010.
No.: 6;
Event: Aerial Vehicle;
Systems: Prototype of the Class IV Fire Scout;
Description: Early prototype delivery and demonstration;
Dates: 3/2010.
No.: 7;
Event: Limited User Test 2;
Systems: Small number of unmanned aerial vehicles and a task organized
platoon;
Description: Assess network maturity and capabilities of aerial
vehicles in operational environment;
Dates: 2/2010 to 4/2010.
No.: 8;
Event: Spin-Out 1 Initial Operational Test;
Systems: Various computer systems, ground sensors, and missile launch
system;
Description: Operational test of selected systems and their
effectiveness being "spun out" to current forces;
Dates: 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 2010.
No.: Critical design review;
Dates: 2nd quarter fiscal year 2011.
No.: 9;
Event: Pre-Production Prototypes Delivery;
Systems: Non-Line- of-Sight Cannon and other manned ground vehicles;
Description: Pre- production prototype delivery of manned ground
vehicles with common features;
Dates: 3rd Quarter Fiscal Year 2010 to 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 2011.
No.: 10;
Event: Technical Field Test 3;
Systems: Field test of the brigade combat team with prototypes;
Description: Important test that deals with maturing the network and
confirms important interfaces and interoperability;
Dates: 10/2011 to 3/2012.
No.: 11;
Event: Integrated Qualification Test 3;
Systems: All manned ground vehicles and remaining unmanned ground
vehicles, aerial vehicles and ground sensors;
Description: Integrated qualification tests for majority of FCS systems
including pre-production representative prototypes in their core
threshold configurations;
Dates: 8/2010 to 1/ 2012.
No.: 12;
Event: Limited User Test 3;
Systems: Some of all systems deployed in two companies with the
network;
Description: Assesses the brigade combat team small unit capabilities;
Dates: 4/2012 to 5/2012.
No.: Initial low-rate production decision;
Dates: 2nd quarter fiscal year 2013.
No.: 13;
Event: Production and Deployment Limited User Test;
Systems: All manned ground vehicles and some unmanned systems;
Description: Complete full-up system-level tests of all systems to
production standards;
Dates: 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 2014.
No.: Initial operating capability;
Dates: 3rd quarter fiscal year 2015.
No.: 14;
Event: Live Fire Test;
Systems: All individual systems;
Description: Live fire tests with complete and functional systems;
Dates: 2014 to 2016.
No.: 15;
Event: Initial Operational Test;
Systems: Brigade combat team and all of the systems involved;
Description: Full spectrum operations with production representative
systems in a realistic, operational live environment;
Dates: 3rd and 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 2016.
No.: Full rate production decision;
Dates: 2nd quarter fiscal year 2017.
No.: Full operating capability;
Dates: 3rd quarter fiscal year 2017.
Source: FCS Test and Evaluation Master Plan and FCS Program Office
(data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
The majority of testing through 2012 is limited in scope and is more
about confidence building than demonstrations of key capabilities. Much
like the overall acquisition strategy, the FCS testing plan will
provide key knowledge late in the systems development phase. Early test
efforts will focus on experiments and development testing of individual
systems. Some early systems will be tested as part of the Army's
efforts to spin out technologies to current forces, including unmanned
ground sensors and the non-line-of-sight-launch system. The bulk of the
developmental prototypes will not be available until 2010 and later for
testing and demonstrations.
The first large scale FCS test that will include a majority of the
developmental prototypes and a large operational unit will not take
place until 2012, the year before production is now slated to begin.
This will mark the start of the Army's testing of the whole FCS,
including the overarching network and the FCS concept. For example, a
limited user test in 2010 involves only a platoon and a few unmanned
aerial vehicles while a similar test, in 2012, will involve two
companies and developmental prototypes for each of the manned ground
vehicles as well as other systems being tested at the brigade level.
Starting in 2012, several key tests will occur that should give
decision makers a clearer understanding of whether the FCS system-of-
systems and concept actually work as expected. By the end of 2014,
production representative vehicles are expected to be available and
tested in a production limited user test. Another important test is the
initial operational test and evaluation in 2016, which provides the
first full assessment of the entire program including all of the FCS
systems, the brigade combat team, network operations, and the actual
operating concept. This test involves full spectrum operations in a
realistic environment.
There are two major risks in the FCS testing approach: schedule
compression and testing of the network. The first risk centers on the
lack of time available to identify, correct, and retest for problems
that come up during early testing and the second on the lack of
capabilities to test an essential element of the FCS concept, the
information network. Independent test officials noted that it is
unclear what the Army expects from the network. With the network
identified as a major risk element of the program, as well as a major
risk, test officials noted that the Army needs to set benchmarks for
what will be demonstrated over time. Independent testing officials have
also told us that the FCS test schedule is very tight and may not allow
adequate time for "test-fix-test" testing. The test and evaluation
master plan recognizes this possibility by noting that within each
integration phase there is only time to test and fix minor issues. More
substantial problems would have to be fixed in a succeeding integration
phase. Overall, testing officials are concerned that the FCS program is
driven by its schedule and that the Army may rush prematurely into
operational testing and perform poorly when it is too late to make cost
effective corrections.
Testing of the network is critical because it must provide secure,
reliable access and distribution of information over extended distances
and, sometimes, when operating in complex terrain. Testing the large
number of FCS sensors and the network's ability to process the
information will not be effective since test capabilities,
methodologies, and expertise needed to test a tactical network of this
magnitude are incomplete and insufficient. The first major test of the
network and FCS together with a majority of prototypes will not take
place until 2012, the year before low-rate production is now expected
to begin.
The FCS program is thus susceptible to late-cycle churn, that is, the
effort required to fix a significant problem that is discovered late in
a product's development. In particular, churn refers to the additional-
-and unanticipated--time, money, and effort that must be invested to
overcome problems discovered through testing. Problems are most serious
when they delay product delivery, increase product cost, or escape to
the customer. The discovery of problems through testing conducted late
in development is a fairly common occurrence on DOD programs, as is the
attendant late-cycle churn. Often, tests of a full system, such as
launching a missile or flying an aircraft, become the vehicles for
discovering problems that could have been found earlier and corrected
less expensively. When significant problems are revealed late in a
weapon system's development, the reaction--or churn--can take several
forms: extending schedules to increase the investment in more
prototypes and testing, terminating the program, or redesigning and
modifying weapons that have already made it to the field. While DOD has
accepted such problems over the years, FCS offers particular
challenges, given the magnitude of its cost in an increasingly
competitive environment for investment funds. Problems discovered at
the production stage are generally the most expensive to correct.
Spin-Outs Support the Current Force but Place More Demands on FCS Test
Resources:
When the Army restructured the FCS program in 2004, it revised its
acquisition strategy to include a way to field various FCS
capabilities--technologies and systems--to current forces while
development of the core FCS program is still underway. This
restructuring was expected to benefit the current forces as well as
provide early demonstrations that would benefit the core FCS program.
Known as spin-outs, the Army plans to begin limited low-rate production
of the systems planned for Spin-Out 1 in 2009 and field those systems
to current Army forces 2 years later. Leading up to the production
decision in 2009 will be system development tests and a limited user
test. Additional spin-outs are now planned to occur in 2010 and 2012.
Using this method, the Army plans to deliver significant capabilities
to the current force earlier than previously planned. Over the long-
term, these capabilities include enhanced battle command capabilities
and a variety of manned and unmanned ground and air platforms that are
intended to improve current force survivability and operations.
Currently, FCS Spin-Out 1 involves the non-line-of sight launch system
and unmanned ground sensors as well as early versions of the System-of-
Systems Common Operating Environment and Battle Command software
subsystems. Also included are the kits needed to interface with current
force vehicles. These capabilities will be tested and validated using
the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team, which will provide feedback to help
refine the FCS doctrine and other matters. These systems are expected
to be fielded to operational units starting in 2010, although it is
unclear yet if these elements of FCS will provide significant
capability to the current forces at a reasonable cost.
There are two test-related concerns with spin-outs. One is that spin-
outs have complicated the FCS acquisition strategy because they focus
early testing and test resources on a few mature systems that will be
spun out to current Army forces. FCS program test officials told us
that the primary focus of the program's first integration phase will be
on events supporting systems in that spin-out. It is unclear if
subsequent integration phases will be similarly configured. If that
were to occur, fewer overall FCS systems would be looked at and tested
in each phase, and testing to evaluate how the FCS system-of-systems
and concept of operations could come later than originally planned. A
program official has noted that the schedule to deliver the needed
hardware and software to the evaluation brigade combat team is
ambitious and the schedule for tests leading up to a production
decision for Spin-Out 1 is compressed. Some individual systems
developmental and other testing began in 2006, but key user and
operational tests will not occur until 2008, just prior to the
production decision for systems in Spin-Out 1. Independent test
officials have expressed concern not only over whether there will be
enough time to test, fix and test again during these key tests but also
whether there will be enough time to "reset" or refurbish the equipment
being used from one test to another. For example, the technical field
test, force development test and evaluation and pilot test, and the
limited user tests for Spin-Out 1 are to be conducted back-to-back over
a several month period just before the production decision. In
addition, key tests including a limited user test for the non-line-of-
sight launch system will take place after the Spin-Out 1 production
decision. FCS program test officials have told us, however, that the
program does not plan to fix and test again any problems discovered in
a particular integration phase until the next integration phase. They
also noted that the compressed event schedule allowed them to use the
same resources and soldiers in each test.
Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review:
As the Army proceeds to the preliminary design review, the FCS
acquisition strategy will likely continue to be aggressive, concurrent,
and compressed and one that develops key knowledge later in the
development process than called for by best practices. Few FCS
platforms will have been tested by this point. The majority of testing
and the proof of whether the systems can be integrated and work
together are left to occur after prototypes are delivered starting in
the next decade. The Army faces a number of key challenges as it
proceeds to and beyond the preliminary design review including:
* completing requirements definition and technology maturity (at least
to TRL 6) to be able to complete the final preliminary design review;
* clearly demonstrating spinout capabilities prior to committing to
their initial production and fielding;
* completing system integration and releasing at least 90 percent of
engineering drawings by the critical design review in 2011;
* allocating sufficient time, as needed, for test, fix and retest
throughout the FCS test program; and:
* allocating sufficient time to thoroughly demonstrate each FCS system,
the information network, and the FCS concept prior to committing to low
rate initial production in 2013.
Likely Growth of FCS Costs Increases Tension between Program Scope and
Available Funds:
Last year, we reported that FCS program acquisition costs had increased
to $160.7 billion--76 percent--since the Army's original estimate
(figures have been adjusted for inflation.) While the Army's current
estimate is essentially the same, an independent estimate from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense puts the acquisition cost of FCS
between $203 billion and $234 billion. The comparatively low level of
technology and design knowledge at this point in the program portends
future cost increases. Our work on a broad base of DOD weapon system
programs shows that most developmental cost increases occur after the
critical design review, which will now be in 2011 for the FCS. Yet, by
that point in time, the Army will have spent about 80 percent of the
FCS's development funds. Further, the Army has not yet fully estimated
the cost of essential complementary programs and the procurement of
spin-out items to the current force. The Army is cognizant of these
resource tensions and has adopted measures in an attempt to control FCS
costs. However, some of these measures involve reducing program scope
in the form of lower requirements and capabilities, which will have to
be reassessed against the user's demands. Symptomatic of the continuing
resource tension, the Army recently announced that it was restructuring
several aspects of the FCS program, including the scope of the program
and its planned annual production rates to lower its annual funding
demands. This will have an impact on program cost, but full details are
not yet available.
New Independent Estimates Indicate Higher FCS Acquisition Costs:
The Army's official cost estimate for FCS has changed only slightly
from last year's estimate, which reflected a major program
restructuring from the original estimate. In inflated dollars, the
program office estimates the acquisition cost will be $163.7 billion,
up from the original 2003 estimate of $91.4 billion. However,
independent cost estimates are significantly higher, as presented in
table 3.
Table 3: Comparison of the Original Cost Estimate and Recent Cost
Estimates for the FCS Program (in billions of dollars):
Base year 2003 dollars: Research, development, test, and evaluation;
Original Army estimate: May 2003: $18.1;
Current Army estimate: December 2005: $26.4;
Independent cost estimate: May 2006: $31.8--44.0.
Base year 2003 dollars: Procurement;
Original Army estimate: May 2003: $59.1;
Current Army estimate: December 2005: $92.8;
Independent cost estimate: May 2006: $118.7.
Base year 2003 dollars: Total;
Original Army estimate: May 2003: $77.2;
Current Army estimate: December 2005: $119.2;
Independent cost estimate: May 2006: $150.5--162.7.
Base year 2003 dollars: Research, development, test, and evaluation;
Original Army estimate: May 2003: $19.6;
Current Army estimate: December 2005: $30.6;
Independent cost estimate: May 2006: $36.6--52.7.
Base year 2003 dollars: Procurement;
Original Army estimate: May 2003: $71.8;
Current Army estimate: December 2005: $133.1;
Independent cost estimate: May 2006: $166.7--181.2.
Base year 2003 dollars: Total;
Original Army estimate: May 2003: $91.4;
Current Army estimate: December 2005: $163.7;
Independent cost estimate: May 2006: $203.3--233.9.
Source: U.S. Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense (data); GAO
(analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Recent independent estimates from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement Group indicate that FCS acquisition
costs could range from $203 billion to $234 billion in inflated
dollars. The independent estimate reflected several additional years
and additional staffing beyond the Army's estimate to achieve initial
operational capability. The difference in estimates is also
attributable to the Cost Analysis Improvement Group's assessment that
FCS software development would require more time and effort to complete
than the Army had estimated. The independent estimate also provided for
additional risks regarding the availability of key systems to support
the FCS network, such as the JTRS radios. Neither the Army nor the
Defense Acquisition Board has accepted the independent estimate.
Program officials believe the independent estimate of research and
development costs is too high because it is too conservative regarding
risks.
The higher estimates of procurement costs reflect additional quantities
of individual systems needed to provide full capabilities to the
Brigade Combat Team. Neither the Army nor independent estimate reflects
the recent decision to reduce the number of FCS systems and slow down
the production rate. Prior to that decision, the Army had actually been
contemplating expanding the scope of FCS to include additional Class IV
unmanned aerial vehicles, additional unattended ground sensors,
intelligent munitions systems, and test assets for the Army user
community, as well as two new systems--a centralized controller device
and a rearming module for the manned ground vehicles. This expansion
would have increased the Army's estimate to about $208 billion, but
appears obviated by the recent decision to reduce scope.
Soft Knowledge Base for Cost Estimates Portends Future Cost Growth:
Cost estimates for any program are limited by the level of product
knowledge available. All of the FCS estimates are thus limited by the
relatively low level of knowledge in the FCS program today. If the FCS
program had been following knowledge-based acquisition practices, its
2003 estimate would have been based on mature technologies and the
current estimate would have had the benefit of a complete preliminary
design review and a considerable amount of work towards the critical
design review. The program's estimate would be based much more on
demonstrated knowledge and actual cost versus assumptions. Instead, the
current FCS estimates are built on a knowledge base without mature
technologies, a preliminary design that is at least 2 years away, and a
critical design review that is 3 to 4 years away. The Army must,
therefore, make significant assumptions about how knowledge will
develop. As experience has shown, in many DOD weapon systems,
assumptions generally prove optimistic and result in underestimated
costs.
As it is currently structured, the Army is planning to make substantial
financial investments in the FCS program before key knowledge is gained
on requirements, technologies, system designs, and system performance.
Table 4 shows the annual and cumulative funding, as reported in the
program's current cost estimate, and the level of knowledge to be
attained each fiscal year.
The impact of the Army's recent program adjustments on the research and
development funding stream were not known at the time this report was
written.
Table 4: Annual and Cumulative FCS Funding and Planned Events and
Achievements:
Fiscal Year: 2003;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 0.5;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): $165.2;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): $165.2;
Planned events and achievements: Start of product development.
Fiscal Year: 2004;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 6.1;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 1701.3;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 1,866.5;
Planned events and achievements: Program restructured.
Fiscal Year: 2005;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 15.7;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 2929.9;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 4,796.4;
Planned events and achievements: System-of-Systems Functional Review;
system-of- systems requirements stabilized; cost estimate updated.
Fiscal Year: 2006;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 26;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 3162.4;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 7,958.8;
Planned events and achievements: Initial system level requirements.
Fiscal Year: 2007;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 38.2;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 3717.7[A];
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 11,676.5;
Planned events and achievements: Preliminary design work in progress.
Fiscal Year: 2008;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 50.2;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 3674.8;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 15,351.3;
Planned events and achievements: Most technologies reach TRL 6; final
system-level requirements.
Fiscal Year: 2009;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 61.5;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 3457.9;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 18809.2;
Planned events and achievements: Preliminary design review; all
technologies reach TRL 6; mandated "go/no-go" review.
Fiscal Year: 2010;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 71.9;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 3187.8;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 21,997;
Planned events and achievements: Limited user test 2; some prototypes
available.
Fiscal Year: 2011;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 80.7;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 2695.4;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 24,692.4;
Planned events and achievements: Critical design review; design
readiness review; all system prototypes available.
Fiscal Year: 2012;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 88.1;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 2253.7;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 26,946.1;
Planned events and achievements: Technologies reach full TRL 7
maturity; limited user test 3; initial system-of-systems demonstration.
Fiscal Year: 2013;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 92.7;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 1436.2;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 28,382.3;
Planned events and achievements: Milestone C--initial program
production decision.
Fiscal Year: 2014;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 96.6;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 1189.4;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 29,571.7;
Planned events and achievements: Limited user test 4; full system-of-
systems demonstration; fielding start brigade combat teams.
Fiscal Year: 2015;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 99.6;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 919.8;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 30,491.5;
Planned events and achievements: Initial operational capability.
Fiscal Year: 2016;
Percentage of funding spent to date: 100;
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): 110.6;
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): 30,602.1;
Planned events and achievements: Initial operational test and
evaluation; full-rate production decision.
Fiscal Year: 2017;
Percentage of funding spent to date: [Empty];
Annual research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in millions
of dollars): [Empty];
Cumulative research, development, test, and evaluation funding (in
millions of dollars): [Empty];
Planned events and achievements: Full operational capability.
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[A] Research and development funding was cut by $254 million in the
fiscal year 2007 budget.
[End of table]
As can be seen in table 4, through fiscal year 2007, the program will
have spent about a third of its development budget--over $11 billion.
By the time of the preliminary design review and the congressionally
mandated go/no-go decision in 2009, the Army will have spent about 60
percent of its FCS development budget--over $18 billion. At that point,
the program should have matured most of the critical technologies to
TRL 6, and the definition of system-level requirements should be
nearing completion. This is the level of knowledge the program should
have achieved in 2003 before being approved for development start,
according to best practices and the approach preferred by DOD in its
acquisition policies. The FCS critical design review is now scheduled
for fiscal year 2011. By that time, the program will have spent about
$24.7 billion, or about 81 percent of its expected research and
development expenditures.
The immature state of FCS technologies and the timing of its critical
design review make the FCS cost estimate vulnerable to future
increases. In our 2006 assessment of selected major weapon systems, we
found that development costs for the programs with mature technologies
increased by a modest average of 4.8 percent over the first full
estimate, whereas the development costs for the programs with immature
technologies increased by a much higher average of 34.9
percent.[Footnote 19] Similarly, program acquisition unit costs for the
programs with mature technologies increased by less than 1 percent,
whereas the programs that started development with immature
technologies experienced an average program acquisition unit cost
increase of nearly 27 percent over the first full estimate. Our work
also showed that most development cost growth occurred after the
critical design review. Specifically, of the 28.3 percent cost growth
that weapon systems average in development, 19.7 percent occurs after
the critical design review.
The current cost estimates do not fully reflect the total costs to the
Army. Excluded are the costs of complementary programs, such as the
Joint Tactical Radio System, which are substantial. Also, the costs to
procure the FCS spin-out items and needed installation kits--previously
estimated to cost about $23 billion--are not included. In fact, the
procurement of FCS spinout items was not previously funded; however, as
we were preparing this report, Army officials told us that in
finalizing its budget plans for fiscal years 2008 to 2013, there was a
decision to provide procurement funding for FCS items to be spun out to
current forces. Congress recently mandated an independent cost estimate
to address the full costs of developing, procuring, and fielding the
FCS to be submitted by April 1, 2007.
Army Steps to Control FCS Program Costs:
The Army has taken steps to manage the growing cost of FCS. Program
officials have said that they budgeted for development risk by building
$5 billion into the original cost estimates to cover risk. They have
also said that they will not exceed the cost ceiling of the development
contract, but as a result, they may have to modify, reduce, or delete
lower-priority FCS requirements. However, this approach would reduce
capabilities, and a lesser set of FCS capabilities may not be adequate
to meet the user's expectations. Also, the Army is focusing on reducing
the average unit production cost of the FCS brigade combat teams, which
currently exceed the amount at which each brigade combat team is
budgeted. The Army has established a glide path to reduce the unit
costs; however, program officials have said they are struggling to
further reduce the unit costs in many cases, particularly as a result
of challenges with the manned ground vehicles. Further, any additional
savings from such initiatives may not be realized until several years
later into the program.
The FCS contract allows for the program to make what is called "Program
Generated Adjustments" whereby any known cost overrun or increase in
scope of work that would require additional funding is offset by
identifying work scope that can be deleted with minimal impact to the
program. Each year, the government and lead systems integrator will
identify a prioritized list of candidates for capabilities that can be
partially or completely deleted and its associated budget re-directed
to the new work scope or to offset a cost overrun.
The Army and lead systems integrator monitor the performance of the FCS
program through an earned value management system, which allows program
management to monitor the technical, schedule, and cost performance of
the program. As it proceeds, the Army and lead systems integrator can
use the information gleaned from the earned value management system to
make informed program decisions and correct potential problems early.
According to earned value data, the FCS is currently tracking fairly
closely with cost and schedule expectations. However, it is too early
in the program for the data at this point to be conclusive.
Historically, the majority of cost growth on a development program
occurs after the critical design review. Further, according to program
officials, due to the size and complexity of the program, coupled with
an uncertain budget from year to year, detailed planning packages are
only planned about 3 to 6 months in advance. While this may be
unavoidable for a program as complex as FCS, the near term status of
the program, as reported by the earned value management system, does
not fully represent the extent of the challenges the Army still faces
with FCS.
Funding Constraints Have Forced the Army to Restructure Its FCS Plans:
FCS will command most of the Army's investment budget and thus must
compete with other major investments and operations. If FCS costs
increase, demands outside FCS increase, or expected funding decreases,
adjustments are likely to be necessary in FCS. Last year, we reported
that the large annual procurement costs for FCS were expected to begin
in fiscal year 2012, which was largely beyond the then-current budget
planning period (fiscal years 2006 to 2011). This situation is called a
funding "bow wave." This means that more funds would be required in the
years just beyond the years covered in the current defense plan that
are subject to funding limits. As previously structured, the FCS
program would require over $12 billion annually in its peak procurement
years. If the Army budget remains at its current levels, FCS could
represent 60-70 percent of the Army's procurement budget in those years
at a time that the Army was meeting other demands, including force
modularity, FCS spin-outs, complementary programs, aviation
procurement, missile defense, trucks, ammunition, and other equipment.
Recently, this tension between FCS scope, costs, and competing demands
has led to another set of changes in the FCS program. The FCS program
manager has informed us that, in light of budget issues for the 2008 to
2013 planning period, the Army has reduced annual production rates, and
plans to forego two of the originally planned unmanned aerial vehicles,
among other adjustments. While this course of action is necessary to
accommodate funding realities, it has other consequences, as it would
increase the FCS unit costs and extend the time needed to produce and
deploy FCS-equipped brigade combat teams. It would also necessitate
evaluating the effects of these changes on individual system
requirements and on the aggregate characteristics of lethality,
survivability, responsiveness, and supportability. Details of the
adjustment to the FCS program are not yet finalized; thus, we have not
evaluated the full implications of the changes.
Considerations for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review:
By the time of the preliminary design review and the congressionally
mandated go/no-go milestone in 2009, the Army should have more of the
knowledge needed to build a better cost estimate for the FCS program.
The Army should also have more clarity about the level of funding that
may be available to it within the long term budget projections to fully
develop and procure the FCS program of record. Continuing challenges
include:
* developing an official Army cost position that narrows the gap
between the Army's estimates and the independent cost estimate planned
for that time frame. In the cost estimate, the Army should clearly
establish if it includes the complete set and quantities of FCS
equipment needed to meet established requirements;
* ensuring that adequate funding exists in its current budget and
program objective memorandum to fully fund the FCS program of record;
and:
* securing funding for the development of the complementary systems
deemed necessary for the FCS as well as to procure the FCS capabilities
planned to be spunout to the current forces.
Conclusions:
The Army has been granted a lot of latitude to carry out a large
program like FCS this far into development with relatively little
demonstrated knowledge. Tangible progress has been made during the year
in several areas, including requirements and technology. Such progress
warrants recognition, but not confidence. Confidence comes from high
levels of demonstrated knowledge, which are yet to come. Following the
preliminary design review in 2009, there should be enough knowledge
demonstrated to assess FCS's prospects for success. It is thus
important that specific criteria--as quantifiable as possible and
consistent with best practices--be established now to evaluate that
knowledge.
At the same time, decision makers must put this knowledge in context.
Specifically, if the FCS is able to demonstrate the level of knowledge
that should be expected at a preliminary design review, it will be
about at the point when it should be ready to begin system development
and demonstration. Instead, by that time, FCS will be halfway through
that phase, with only 4 years left to demonstrate that the system-of-
systems design works before the planned production commitment is made.
For that reason, decision makers will have to assess the complete
business case for FCS. This will include demonstrative proof not only
that requirements can be met with mature technologies and the
preliminary design, but also that the remainder of the acquisition
strategy adequately provides for demonstration of design maturity,
production process maturity, and funding availability before the
production decision is made.
Clearly, it is in the nation's interests for the FCS to be the right
solution for the future and to be a successful development. FCS has not
been an easy solution to pursue and underscores the commitment and
vision of Army leadership. Nonetheless, in view of the great technical
challenges facing the program, the possibility that FCS may not deliver
the right capability must be acknowledged and anticipated. At this
point, the only alternative course of action to FCS appears to be
current Army weapons, increasingly upgraded with FCS spin-out
technologies. It is incumbent upon DOD, then, to identify alternative
courses of action to equip future Army forces by the time the go/no-go
decision is made on FCS. Otherwise, approval to "go" may have to be
given not because FCS is sufficiently developed, but because there is
no other viable course of action.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish criteria now that
it will use to evaluate the FCS program as part of its go/no-go
decision following its preliminary design review. At a minimum, these
criteria should include:
* a definition of acceptable technology maturity consistent with DOD
policy for a program half way through system development and
demonstration;
* determination which FCS technologies will be scored against those
criteria;
* use of an independent assessment to score the FCS technologies;
* a definition of acceptable software maturity consistent with DOD
policy for a program half way through system development and
demonstration;
* an independent assessment to score FCS software;
* the likely performance and availability of key complementary systems;
* an assessment of how likely the FCS system-of-systems--deemed
reasonable from the progress in technology, software, and design--is to
provide the capabilities the Army will need to perform its roles in
joint force operations (Such an assessment should include sensitivity
analyses in areas of the most uncertainty.);
* a definition of acceptable levels of technology, design, and
production maturity to be demonstrated at the critical design review
and the production decision;
* an assessment of how well the FCS acquisition strategy and test plan
will be able to demonstrate those levels of maturity;
* a determination of likely costs to develop, produce, and support the
FCS that is informed by an independent cost estimate and supported by
an acceptable confidence level; and:
* a determination that the budget levels the Army is likely to receive
will be sufficient to develop, produce, and support the FCS at expected
levels of cost.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense analyze alternative
courses of action DOD can take to provide the Army with sufficient
capabilities, should the FCS be judged as unlikely to deliver needed
capabilities in reasonable time frames and within expected funding
levels.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD concurred with our recommendations and stated that the Defense
Acquisition Board's review, aligned with the FCS program's preliminary
design review in 2009, will be informed by a number of critical
assessments and analyses. These include a technology readiness
assessment, a system engineering assessment, an independent cost
estimate, an evaluation of FCS capabilities, an affordability
assessment, and ongoing analyses of alternatives that include current
force and network alternatives.
We believe that these are constructive steps that will contribute to
the Defense Acquisition Board review of the FCS following the
preliminary design review. We note that it is important that the
board's review be recognized as a decision meeting--albeit not
technically a milestone decision--so that a declarative go/no-go
decision can be made on FCS. Accordingly, while it is necessary that
good information--such as that included in DOD's response--be presented
to the board, it is also necessary that quantitative criteria that
reflect best practices be used to evaluate the information. These
criteria, some of which were included in our recommendations, should be
defined by DOD now. For example, while FCS technologies need to be
independently assessed, it is likewise important to establish what
level of technology maturity is needed for a program at that stage and
to evaluate the FCS technologies against that standard. This is true
for software as well. In the area of cost, Army cost estimates should
be evaluated against recognized standards, such as confidence levels as
well as the independent cost estimate.
We had also recommended that criteria be established to serve as a
basis for evaluating the FCS acquisition strategy, including what would
constitute acceptable levels of technology, design, and production
maturity to be demonstrated at the critical design review and the
production decision. DOD did not respond to these aspects of our
recommendations, but a response is important because they have to do
with the sufficiency of the FCS business case for the remainder of the
program. Finally, as DOD evaluates alternatives, there are several
things to keep in mind. First, an alternative need not be a rival to
the FCS, but rather the next best solution that can be adopted if FCS
is not able to deliver the needed capabilities. Second, an alternative
need not represent a choice between FCS and the current force, but
could include fielding a subset of FCS, such as a class of vehicles, if
they perform as needed and provide a militarily worthwhile capability.
Third, the broader perspective of the Department of Defense--in
addition to that of the Army--will benefit the consideration of
alternatives.
We also received technical comments from DOD which have been addressed
in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any
questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Other contributors to this report were Assistant
Director William R. Graveline, William C. Allbritton, Noah B. Bleicher,
Marcus C. Ferguson, John P. Swain, Robert S. Swierczek, and Carrie R.
Wilson.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. (Bill) Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To develop the information on the Future Combat System program's
progress toward meeting established goals, the contribution of critical
technologies and complementary systems, and the estimates of cost and
program affordability, we interviewed officials of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics);
the Army G-8; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller); the Secretary of Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement
Group; the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command; the Fraunhofer Center at the University of
Maryland; the Program Manager for the Future Combat System (Brigade
Combat Team); the Future Combat System Lead Systems Integrator; and
Lead Systems Integrator One Team contractors.
We reviewed, among other documents, the Future Combat System's
Operational Requirements Document, the Acquisition Strategy Report, the
Selected Acquisition Report, the Critical Technology Assessment and
Technology Risk Mitigation Plans, and the Integrated Master Schedule.
We attended the FCS System-of-Systems Functional Review, In-Process
Reviews, In-Process Preliminary Design Review, Board of Directors
Reviews, and multiple system demonstrations. In our assessment of the
FCS, we used the knowledge-based acquisition practices drawn from our
large body of past work as well as DOD's acquisition policy and the
experiences of other programs.
We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials from
the Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several changes as a
result. We performed our review from March 2006 to March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition. Technology And Logistics:
Mar 13 2007:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-07-376, "Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on
Future Combat System" dated February 7, 2007 (GAO Code 120521).
The report recommends to the Secretary of Defense that specific
criteria should be considered during the 2009 milestone review and
alternatives to the program analyzed should FCS fail to deliver needed
capabilities as expected.
The Department concurs with the GAO recommendations and our comments
are enclosed. The Army's transformation effort, and in particular the
FCS program, requires a disciplined, yet agile, acquisition construct.
The FCS acquisition strategy, represents:
the Department's business case and includes periodic acquisition
reviews by the Department, including a critical review subsequent to
the FCS preliminary design review in 2009. Detailed technical comments
were provided separately.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure:
As stated:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GAO Draft Report Dated February 7, 2007 GAO-07-376 (GAO Code 120521):
"Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions To Be Made On Future Combat
System"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish criteria now that it will use to evaluate the FCS program as
part of its go-no/go decision following its preliminary design review.
At a minimum, these criteria. should include:
- A definition of acceptable technology maturity consistent with DOD
policy for a program half way through system development and
demonstration.
- Determination which FCS technologies will be scored against those
criteria.
- Use of an independent assessment to score the FCS technologies.
- A definition of acceptable software maturity consistent with DOD
policy for a program half way through system development and
demonstration.
- Use of an independent assessment to score the FCS software.
- The likely performance and availability of key complementary systems.
- A assessment of how likely the FCS system-of-systems - deemed
reasonable from the progress in technology, software, and design--will
provide the capabilities the Army will need to perform its roles in
joint force operations. Such an assessment should include sensitivity
analyses in areas of the most uncertainty.
- A definition of acceptable levels of technology, design, and
production maturity to be demonstrated at the critical design review
and the production decision.
- An assessment of how well the FCS acquisition strategy and test plan
will be able to demonstrate those level of maturity.
- A determination of likely costs to develop, produce, and support the
FCS that is informed by an independent cost estimate and supported by
an acceptable confidence level.
- A determination that the budget levels the Army is likely to receive
will be sufficient to develop, produce, and support the FCS at the
expected levels of cost.
DOD Response: Concur. The FCS Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), aligned
with the program's Preliminary Design Review, will receive a number of
critical assessments to support the Department's FCS acquisition and
budget decisions. These include:
- A Technology Readiness Assessment will be conducted by the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering. This assessment will be informed by
an independent review of the critical technologies and will evaluate
the maturity of those technologies relative to program timeframe.
- A System Engineering Assessment will be conducted by Director,
Systems and Software Engineering. This assessment will include an
evaluation of and risks associated with the FCS acquisition strategy,
test plan, software, and key complementary systems. Additionally, this
assessment will evaluate the program's System Engineering Plan for
reasonable exit criteria associated with the critical design review and
production readiness.
- An Independent Cost Estimate will be conducted by the Cost Analysis
and Improvement Group. This review will provide the likely costs to
develop, produce and support the FCS.
- An assessment by the Joint Staff, using the Force Application
Functional Capability Board, the Joint Capability Board, and the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council will evaluate the FCS capabilities
relative to its role in joint force operations.
- An affordability assessment conducted by PA&E will evaluate the cost
levels to develop, produce, and support the FCS and likely Army budget
levels.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
analyze alternative courses of action it can take to provide the Army
with sufficient capabilities, should the FCS be judged as not being
likely to deliver needed capabilities in reasonable timeframes and
within expected funding levels.
DOD Response: Concur. The FCS DAB, aligned with the program's
Preliminary Design Review, will be informed by ongoing analyses of
alternatives that include current force and network alternatives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to
determine whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be
incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior work has found TRLs to be
a valuable decision-making tool because they can presage the likely
consequences of incorporating a technology at a given level of maturity
into a product development. The maturity level of a technology can
range from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes that can be tested in a
realistic environment (TRL 7), to an actual system that has proven
itself in mission operations (TRL 9). According to DOD acquisition
policy, a technology should have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment (TRL 6) or, preferably, in an operational environment (TRL
7) to be considered mature enough to use for product development. Best
practices of leading commercial firms and successful DOD programs have
shown that critical technologies should be mature to at least a TRL 7
before the start of product development.
Table 5: Technology Readiness Level Descriptions:
Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware and software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware and software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware and software: Analytical studies and demonstration of non-
scale individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware and software: Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration of non-
scale components to show pieces will work together. Not fully
functional or form or fit but representative of technically feasible
approach suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
Integration of components;
Hardware and software: High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally
equivalent but not necessarily form and/or fit (size, weight,
materials, etc.) Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include
integration of several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment;
Hardware and software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit,
and function. Probably includes the integration of many new components
and realistic supporting elements/ subsystems if needed to demonstrate
full functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment.
Integration of technology is well defined.
Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an
operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in
a test bed aircraft;
Hardware and software: Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware and software: Flight-qualified hardware;
Demonstration environment: Developmental test and evaluation in the
actual system application.
Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware and software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration environment: Operational test and evaluation in
operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration
data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Level Ratings:
[See PDF for Table - did not compute]
Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
Note: N/A = Not Applicable; N/R = Not Rated:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat
System's Success, GAO-06-564T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case is Needed for Future
Combat System's Successful Outcome, GAO-06-367. Washington, D.C.: March
14, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key for
Future Combat System's Success, GAO-06-478T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2006.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926. Washington,
D.C.: September 29, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's
Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force,
GAO-05-669. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects
for Success, GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects
for Success, GAO-05-442T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
NASA's Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure
Requirements Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242. Washington, D.C.:
February 28, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features,
Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO-04-248.
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Issues Facing the Army's Future Combat Systems Program, GAO-03-1010R.
Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems
Challenges, GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 2001.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2001.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 211.
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 115 (2006).
[3] Technology readiness levels (TRLs) are a way to measure the
maturity of technology. According to best practices, technology is
considered sufficiently mature to start a program when it reaches a
readiness level of 7. This involves a system or prototype demonstration
in an operational environment. The prototype is near or at the planned
operational system. Appendix III lists the definitions for all TRLs.
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for
Future Combat System's Successful Outcome, GAO-06-367 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006).
[5] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 214 (2006).
[6] The Army will hold system level preliminary design reviews leading
up to the system-of-systems level preliminary design review in early
2009.
[7] The Global Information Grid is a large and complex set of programs
and initiatives intended to provide internet-like capability allowing
users at virtually any location to access data on demand; share
information in real time; collaborate in decision making, regardless of
which military service produced which weapon system; and have greater
joint command of a battle situation.
[8] A full explanation of technology readiness levels is presented in
appendix III.
[9] Previous FCS critical technology assessments have been evaluated by
an independent review team. Although the latest assessment has not been
independently reviewed, the Army expects to have an independently-
reviewed critical technology assessment available for the preliminary
design review in early 2009.
[10] Since our previous report, a Critical Technology Working-Level
Integrated Product Team recommended that the Army remove three critical
technologies from its assessment. The team concluded that these
technologies did not conform to DOD's definition of critical
technologies because, in its view, the technologies did not constitute
a unique or novel application.
[11] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs, GAO-06-391 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[12] Joint Program Executive Office was established in February 2005
after Congress directed DOD to strengthen the joint management of all
the JTRS program components.
[13] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the
Army's Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future
Force, GAO-05-669 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005).
[14] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are
Needed to Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapons Acquisitions. GAO-04-
393 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).
[15] The estimate was conducted by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Cost Analysis and Improvement Group in support of the FCS
Milestone B review from May 2003.
[16] In the recent adjustments to the FCS program, the Army has moved
the Milestone C decision about 5 months to early 2013. Based on the
available information on the program adjustments, it is not clear if
the software delivery dates have been impacted.
[17] The early 2009 preliminary design review and the 2011 critical
design review are culminating events; system-level preliminary design
reviews and critical design reviews will be conducted prior to those
dates.
[18] The Army will have early prototypes of the non line-of-sight
cannon vehicle available as early as fiscal year 2008 in order to meet
congressional direction.
[19] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs, GAO-06-391 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
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