Operation Iraqi Freedom
Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-07-503R March 28, 2007In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative to provide information on the status and challenges of developing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during the course of our work Coalition officials provided us with information on the status of coordination and communication between and within the ministries. On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to Congress containing our preliminary observations. This report is the unclassified version of that classified report. Certain specific information and data about the current state of ISF's logistical, command and control and intelligence capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9, 2007, we testified before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on the development of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior's logistical capabilities for the Iraqi army and police. We expect to provide a follow-up report later that will examine in more detail the progress in the development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being provided to the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the ISF's support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi security forces.
Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD). For example, there is a logistical concept in place for the MOD, and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is fielding many of the units required by the concept. Furthermore, the Coalition and MOD have established a training base at Taji, where Iraqi logistical and communications specialists are being trained. However, significant challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve self-sufficiency. For example, although the ministry has a logistical concept, implementing that concept is hampered by a lag in the development of national and regional logistics centers, impediments to training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics, and maintenance shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a command and control capability in the MOD faces training challenges as well as a shortage of military leadership; the lack of a communications doctrine; and the lack of clearly defined policies and procedures at the ministerial level have further undermined efforts to develop this capability. Progress has also been made toward developing the logistics and command and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). For example, a logistics concept for the MOI is being worked on, the ministry has fielded communications technology, and a National Command Center is in operation. However, the MOI also faces challenges, such as supplying its forces and maintaining its vehicles. Furthermore, the logistics concept may not fully include the forces that are based in the provinces. With regard to command and control, maintenance and procedural challenges limit the capabilities of the MOI's communications technology.
GAO-07-503R, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities
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March 28, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi
Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities:
From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), led by the United States and the United Kingdom, was the United
Nations-recognized authority responsible for the temporary governance
of Iraq and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the
reconstruction effort. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military
organizations of the former regime and began the process of creating or
reestablishing new Iraqi security forces, including the police and a
new Iraqi military. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed
responsibility for recruiting and training some Iraqi defense and
police forces in their areas of responsibility.[Footnote 1] In May
2004, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive
stating that after the transition of power to the Iraqi government is
achieved, the Department of Defense (DOD) would continue to be
responsible for U.S. activities relating to security and military
operations. The Presidential Directive also stated that the U.S.
Central Command would direct all U.S. government efforts to organize,
equip, and train Iraqi security forces.
In the summer of 2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) developed and
began implementing a comprehensive campaign plan, which elaborated on
and refined the original strategy for transferring security
responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In November 2005, the National
Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,
which states that the Coalition will adjust its "posture and approaches
as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow," and that Coalition
troop levels in Iraq will decrease over time as the Iraqis take on more
responsibilities for themselves. The national strategy implies a
conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence in Iraq.
In April 2006, MNF-I revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, issued a Joint Campaign Plan that states
as a goal the transfer of security responsibilities from MNF-I to the
ISF and the Iraqi government. Finally, in August 2006, DOD issued its
fifth report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,
stating that even though 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades, 85
battalions, and 2 National Police battalions had assumed lead
responsibility for security in their areas of operation, most of these
units still require support from Coalition forces. This is because
logistics, sustainment, and command and control capabilities of the ISF
are not yet fully developed. The ISF comprises the forces of the
Ministry of Defense (MOD)--that is, the Iraqi Army, Navy, Air Force,
and several Strategic Infrastructure Battalions--and the forces of the
Ministry of Interior (MOI)--which includes the police, border
enforcement, and other Iraqi civilian security services.
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which
operates under MNF-I, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and
organize the Iraqi Security Forces. Once ISF units are trained and
equipped, operational responsibility for their employment is turned
over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), a command that is
subordinate to MNF-I and is responsible for command and control of
operations in Iraq.[Footnote 2]
According to DOD's August 2006 report to Congress, the seating of the
new government of Iraq, which was not fully complete until the
appointment in June 2006 of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and
State for National Security Affairs, sets the conditions for continuing
progress toward Iraqi security self-reliance. Senior Coalition
officials in Iraq echoed this sentiment, stating that prior to the
seating of the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior in
particular, only limited progress could be made toward forging a self-
reliant ISF.
In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have
undertaken this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller
General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative[Footnote 3] to
provide information on the status and challenges of developing ISF
support capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine
(1) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the
current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence
capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during the
course of our work Coalition officials provided us with information on
the status of coordination and communication between and within the
ministries.
On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to you containing our
preliminary observations.[Footnote 4] This report is the unclassified
version of that classified report. Certain specific information and
data about the current state of ISF's logistical, command and control
and intelligence capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9,
2007, we testified before the House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on the development of the
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior's logistical capabilities
for the Iraqi army and police.[Footnote 5] We expect to provide a
follow-up report later that will examine in more detail the progress in
the development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being
provided to the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the
ISF's support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq.
This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since
June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi security
forces. A list of related GAO products appears at the end of this
report.
To determine the current state of the logistical, command and control,
and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and
Interior, we reviewed relevant documents, orders, policies, and data
that we obtained from the Department of Defense, the Department of
State, and contracting officials. We also met with and interviewed DOD
officials and contractor representatives in the United States and made
two trips to Iraq, in January and August 2006. In Iraq, we met with
officials from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq,
and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. During our August
2006 trip, we also met with Iraqi Army officials and made a site visit
to an Iraqi Army training compound and Iraq's National Depot. During
our visits, we talked with knowledgeable officials and determined that
the data they provided us was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. We conducted our review from January 2006 through August
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Notwithstanding our repeated requests for DOD to expedite
and complete its reviews, this report was under security review within
the Department of Defense and MNF-I from October 2006 until February
2007. In our March 9th testimony, we updated information on the ISF's
logistical capabilities and, where appropriate, we have identified that
information in footnotes throughout this report.
Results in Brief:
Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and
control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. For example,
there is a logistical concept in place for the MOD, and MNSTC-I is
fielding many of the units required by the concept. Furthermore, the
Coalition and MOD have established a training base at Taji, where Iraqi
logistical and communications specialists are being trained. However,
significant challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve self-
sufficiency. For example, although the ministry has a logistical
concept, implementing that concept is hampered by a lag in the
development of national and regional logistics centers, impediments to
training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics, and maintenance
shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a command and control
capability in the MOD faces training challenges as well as a shortage
of military leadership; the lack of a communications doctrine; and the
lack of clearly defined policies and procedures at the ministerial
level have further undermined efforts to develop this capability.
Progress has also been made toward developing the logistics and command
and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. For
example, a logistics concept for the MOI is being worked on, the
ministry has fielded communications technology, and a National Command
Center is in operation. However, the MOI also faces challenges, such as
supplying its forces and maintaining its vehicles. Furthermore, the
logistics concept may not fully include the forces that are based in
the provinces. With regard to command and control, maintenance and
procedural challenges limit the capabilities of the MOI's
communications technology.
Background:
On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to an interim sovereign
Iraqi government. The CPA was officially dissolved, and Iraq's
transitional period had begun. Under Iraq's transitional law,[Footnote
6] the transitional period included the completion of a draft
constitution in October 2005 and two subsequent elections--a referendum
on the Iraqi constitution and an election for a permanent
government.[Footnote 7] The Iraqi people approved the constitution on
October 15, 2005, and voted for representatives to the Iraq Council of
Representatives (COR) on December 15, 2005. The Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq certified the election results on February 10, 2006.
On April 22, 2006, the COR elected senior members of the new
government, including a president, two vice presidents, a speaker of
the COR, and two deputy speakers. This Presidency Council subsequently
nominated a prime minister-designate and two deputy prime minister-
designates, signaling the start of a constitutionally-mandated 30-day
period in which the Prime Minister-designate was required to form his
cabinet. On May 20, 2006, the Prime Minister-designate named his
cabinet, which the COR approved the same day, with the Prime Minister
and deputy prime ministers also serving temporarily as the Ministers of
Defense, Interior, and State for National Security Affairs. On June 8,
2006, the Prime Minister submitted his nominees and the COR approved by
a majority vote the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and
Minister of State for National Security Affairs.
Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, MNF-I has the
authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to security and
stability in Iraq during this process, working in partnership with the
Iraqi government to reach agreement on security and policy issues.
Ministry of Defense is Developing Support Capabilities, but Faces
Training, Procedural, Maintenance, and Staffing Issues:
Iraq's Ministry of Defense has established a logistical concept and its
development is ongoing; however, implementation of the concept is
hampered by the failure to develop national and regional logistics
centers, training problems, and maintenance challenges. Similarly, as
of August 2006, the standing up of a command and control capability in
the MOD is hampered by a shortage of leadership and a lack of policies
and procedures at the ministerial level, the lack of a communications
doctrine, and training challenges.
Implementation of Logistical Concept is Challenged:
In early 2005, the MOD and MNF-I approved a multilayered logistics
concept for the Iraqi military. Inherent to the concept is the
generation of a variety of units from the ministerial to the unit
level. The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels is
expected to be the purview of Headquarters and Services Companies
(HSC), which provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and
transportation support to Iraqi Army battalions, brigades, and
divisions, and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide
additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to
each of the Iraqi Army's infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics
support is expected to come from a National Depot, five Regional
Support Units (RSU), and numerous Garrison Support Units (GSU). The
National Depot, located at Taji, provides facilities for the receipt,
storage, accounting, and issue of the Iraqi Armed Forces' national
stockholding of most classes of supply as well as the maintenance
capability to overhaul vehicles and other equipment. The RSUs are to
provide regionally focused supply, maintenance, and contract support
for the Iraqi military while GSUs are to provide base support for each
Iraqi military installation. A Support Command is to provide command
and control of the National Depot and RSUs while the Iraqi Joint
Headquarters logistics staff section (M-4) is to provide logistics
input to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the
Office of the Director General of Acquisitions, Logistics, and
Infrastructure (DG AL&I), which is expected to direct the ministry's
overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital equipment,
to develop ministerial policies and procedures, and to manage the
budget. The envisioned end state is a comprehensive logistics system
that will provide maintenance, supply, transportation, and garrison
support to all elements of the Iraqi military.[Footnote 8]
However, several challenges remain in the standing up of this logistics
system. First, the establishment of the National Depot, RSUs, and GSUs
has lagged behind the creation of HSCs and MTRs. Second, the training
of Iraqi logisticians has been affected by a lack of fuel, electricity,
personnel, and materiel support to the training academy. Finally, the
maintenance of the Iraqi military's vehicles is complicated because of
the heterogeneity of the MOD's vehicular fleet and the lack of trained
mechanics.
The Establishment of National and Regional Logistics Centers Has Lagged
Behind:
Although the MOD's logistics concept does not delineate any priority to
the establishment of one type of logistics unit over another, according
to an August 13, 2006, MNSTC-I briefing, the priority has been on
generating lower echelon logistics formations, specifically HSCs and
MTRs. As of August 2006, most of the authorized HSCs and MTRs had been
formed. Meanwhile, the creation of national and regional logistics
centers has lagged behind; a circumstance that Coalition officials
contend makes the attainment of MOD self-sufficiency problematic. For
example, the establishment of the National Depot has been plagued by
manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor
maintenance. In August 2006, Coalition officials assigned to the
National Depot told us that since April 2006, the amount of fuel
delivered to the National Depot has been below that required to support
routine warehouse, maintenance, and transportation requirements. The
maintenance of forklifts, vehicles, and generators necessary to support
day-to-day operations has suffered as well because of a lack of spare
parts, a situation exacerbated by the variety of makes and models of
the equipment with which the National Depot operates. In the words of
one senior Coalition logistician, what presently exists at Taji is "a
depot in name only."[Footnote 9]
The establishment of the RSUs and GSUs faces similar challenges. As of
August 2006, all five RSUs were still in the process of being formed
and had significant shortfalls in personnel, leadership, training, and
facilities. Furthermore, as of August 2006 the exact number of GSUs to
be formed had not been determined, and only five were in the process of
being formed.[Footnote 10]
Coalition logisticians have emphasized that development of all echelons
of the logistic concept is crucial in order for MOD to become capable
of independently sustaining its forces.
Challenges Exist in the Training of Iraqi Logisticians:
Another challenge that the Coalition and MOD face in developing a
logistics system for the Iraqi military is a shortage of experienced
officers and noncommissioned officers available to staff logistics
units. Providing trained officers and noncommissioned officers to fill
support and combat service support positions throughout the Iraqi Army
is the mission of the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute
(Institute). However, during our visit to the Institute, several
problems that negatively affected its ability to fulfill its mission
were evident.
According to a senior Iraqi Army official from the Institute, one
problem hampering the training of logisticians for the Iraqi military
is illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the students who report for each
course are turned away because they are illiterate in Arabic and
therefore incapable of reading the required manuals.[Footnote 11] This
includes students from Kurdish provinces who, though literate in
Kurdish, cannot read, write, or speak Arabic.
For those who are eventually accepted into one of the Institute's
courses, training has been hampered by quality-of-life problems, an
insufficient number of trained cadre members, and equipment shortages.
The quality-of-life problems stem from insufficient fuel for the
generators which provide the power to run air conditioners, water
pumps, and other life-support equipment. In August 2006, ambient
temperatures during the day ran as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit.
As of August 2006, the Institute was staffed with just over half of its
authorized Iraqi officer instructors. Although the reasons for this
shortage are unclear, it has resulted in the training of fewer
logistics specialists for the Iraqi Army because without the needed
cadre the Institute has had to operate at less than full capacity.
Maintenance Is Challenged by a Heterogeneous Vehicle Fleet and
Undermined by a Lack of Trained Mechanics and Funds:
Vehicle maintenance is another challenge that the MOD faces, a
challenge exacerbated by the heterogeneous mixture of the ministry's
vehicular fleet, a circumstance that has several causes: MOD vehicle
purchases, gifts of vehicles from donor countries, and vehicles left
over from Saddam's army. According to an August 1, 2006, vehicle
inventory, the Iraqi Army has 6 different types of fuel trucks, at
least 4 of which come from different manufacturers: Nissan, Ford, KrAZ
(Ukrainian), and MAZ (Belarusian); 21 different types of light utility
vehicles, including vehicles manufactured by Chevrolet, Gazelle
(Russian), Honker (Czech), Kia, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and UAZ
(Russian); and 15 different types of medium cargo vehicles, including
U.S. military 2.5-and 5-ton cargo trucks, as well as vehicles
manufactured by AMC, Ashok Leyland (Indian), GAZ (Russian), Hyundai,
Kamaz (Russian), Nissan, and Mercedes.[Footnote 12] According to
Coalition officials, obtaining repair parts for such a heterogeneous
vehicle fleet, especially parts for vehicles of non-U.S. manufacture
that are in relatively short supply in the MOD's vehicle inventory, is
so expensive that it results in the cannibalization of parts from
similar vehicles awaiting repair. The result is that some vehicles
never get repaired.[Footnote 13]
As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of this
heterogeneous fleet, MNSTC-I committed to a national maintenance
contract. According to the statement of work, MNSTC-I's intent, by way
of a "focus sustainment" effort, was to contract for the services of a
maintenance contractor to support the sustainment of the vehicles and
equipment issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi
Armed Forces in becoming self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of
organizational and intermediate maintenance tasks, the maintenance
contractor was to be organized to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi
personnel. However, Coalition officials stated that this training
regimen has not produced sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi mechanics.
As of August 11, 2006, only 26 of the 191 Iraqis that had been enrolled
in the on-the-job training program had completed this training.
The national maintenance contract's statement of work also requires the
contractor to determine and maintain an adequate authorized stockage
level (ASL) for all equipment repaired, with the intent of the ASL
being to reduce the "wait time" for parts. According to Coalition
officials, although an ASL has been completed, updated, and partially
funded by the Coalition, the MOD has not yet budgeted for maintaining
the ASL once the contract expires in March 2007. Coalition officials
fear that a failure by the Iraqis to budget for and maintain the ASL
will result in repair part shortfalls that will have a concomitant
negative impact on equipment readiness levels.[Footnote 14]
Coalition officials have remarked that the national maintenance
contract is too expensive for the MOD to continue past its March 2007
end date. Coalition officials have presented an alternative to the
national maintenance contract based on foreign military sales and
direct vendor contracts to the MOD. As of August 2006, the MOD had
taken no action with regard to this alternative.[Footnote 15]
Command and Control Capability Is Hampered by Lack of Ministerial
Policies and Procedures, a Shortage of Leadership, Lack of a
Communications Doctrine, and Training Challenges:
Although the MOD's command and control structure is still under
development, Coalition and Iraqi Army officials identified several
challenges that need to be addressed before full capability is
achieved. These include the development of ministerial policies and
procedures, the growth of Iraq's military leadership, the development
of an effective communications infrastructure, and the training of
communications specialists.
Leadership, Procedures, and Policies Need to be Developed:
According to senior Coalition officials, one of their greatest
challenges is getting their Iraqi counterparts on the ministerial and
Joint Headquarters Staff to agree on their respective roles and
responsibilities. This confusion stems in large part from an absence of
accepted procedures and policies. Echoing this claim is an August 1,
2006, Coalition assessment of the MOD's executive support measures of
effectiveness. This assessment rates all of the following core
competencies as "ineffective" the ministry's development and
implementation of a decision-making process; a process for the overall
professionalization of the ministry; a directive that establishes terms
of reference for ministry officials, civilian and military; a process
for oversight and periodic review of decisions; and development and
establishment of policy and procedures for command and control under
provisions of the Constitution. Coalition officials, working in concert
with their Iraqi counterparts, are addressing each of these
shortcomings. In August 2006, these officials stated that they believe
that the June 2006 naming of a Minister of Defense will contribute much
to the development and implementation of appropriate procedures and
policies. They stress, however, that without effective procedures and
policies, command and control of the Iraqi military will suffer from
confusion, lack of coordination, ineffectiveness, and inefficiency.
According to a July 2006 MNSTC-I report, although leadership
development programs for the Iraqi military are under way and a senior
officer selection committee has been established to identify Iraq's
future leaders, these measures will take time to have an effect.
However, the report stresses that it has become increasingly evident
that the larger and more complex the Iraqi Army has become, the harder
it is to find senior leaders at the rank of lieutenant colonel and
above able to provide confident, competent commanders and senior staff.
Communications Doctrine Needs to Be Developed:
According to Coalition and Iraqi Army officials, as of August 2006, the
MOD had not yet agreed on an Iraqi Army communications doctrine.
According to these same officials, a communications doctrine is
essential to the establishment of an effective communications system
which, in turn, is an essential part of a command and control system.
Training Challenges Remain:
As of August 2006, several challenges exist in training Iraqi signal
officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The 28-day training
program, which is conducted at the Iraqi Signal School at Taji, is the
same for all students regardless of rank and includes basic computer
skills, preventive maintenance checks and services, basic radio
communications procedures, and hands-on training with antennae and the
various radios employed by the Iraqi Army. The officials stated that
what is needed are several more courses specifically designed to train
Iraqi Army officers and noncommissioned officers in more advanced
procedures. Five such courses are envisioned for the future (a signal
officer basic and advanced course, a noncommissioned officer basic and
advanced course, and a signal military occupational specialty course),
but a lack of qualified instructors has undermined efforts to establish
these courses. And finally, according to a senior Iraqi Army signal
officer, there is a tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to improperly
employ the Signal School's enlisted graduates. Despite having been
trained in communications, once the students return to their units they
are employed as infantrymen, while officers, who may not have graduated
from the Signal School, run the radios.
Ministry of Interior Is Developing Support Capabilities, but Has Not
Resolved Logistical and Communications Challenges:
Although the Ministry of Interior and its Coalition advisers are
developing a logistics concept and the ministry has demonstrated
accountability for some commodities, the ministry faces challenges in
the supply of its forces and maintenance of its vehicles and the
logistics concept may not fully address MOI forces based in the
provinces. In the area of command and control, the MOI has fielded
communications technologies, but maintenance and procedural challenges
limit the capabilities of these systems.
MOI and Coalition Are Developing a Logistics Concept and MOI Has
Accountability for Some Commodities, but MOI Faces Supply and
Maintenance Challenges:
The Coalition and Ministry of Interior are currently developing a
logistics concept for the ministry's forces, but the concept may not be
ready for ministry approval until December 2006.[Footnote 16] The
ministry is experiencing logistics challenges in several areas,
including the repair of police vehicles and the maintenance of its
radios. Also, it is unclear whether the draft logistics concept for the
MOI will fully address forces located outside the capital.
Logistics Concept May Not Be Ready for MOI Consideration until December
2006:
According to a Coalition document, the Coalition's goal is to develop a
Ministry of Interior logistics system in which the central government
procures and distributes commodities; supports both the MOI's federal
forces (National Police and Border Forces) and those forces that are
based in each of Iraq's 18 provinces (Iraqi Police Service, Facility
Protection Service, and Fire/Civil Defense); and provides
accountability of items such as vehicles, weapons, and durable
equipment. In August 2006, this was the end state envisioned by the
Coalition for the ministry's logistics system, and although the MOI has
not yet approved the draft logistics concept being developed by the
Coalition, Coalition officials stated that one of the ministry's
organizations has implemented accountability of some commodities.
The draft logistics concept calls for a system of five to seven
warehouses that would perform maintenance on communications equipment
and weapons and would include three distribution centers to dispense
supplies. In addition, the concept is to include contracts that would
provide maintenance of vehicles and communications equipment. Although
we did not examine the proposed contracts, Coalition officials stated
that the proposed contracts will include $130 million in Coalition
funding for 12 months of vehicle maintenance and $4.5 million in MOI
funding for 12 months of radio maintenance and training of Iraqi
mechanics. A Coalition official also stated that these contracts are
intended as temporary solutions to provide maintenance until the MOI is
able to develop its own capabilities in these areas.[Footnote 17] An
August 2006 Coalition document states that in February 2007, the MOI
would assume operation of six warehouses that supply ministerial forces
and were being run by a Coalition-funded contractor.[Footnote 18]
MOI Has Exercised Accountability over Some Commodities, but Still Faces
Maintenance Challenges:
The end state envisioned by the Coalition for the MOI's logistics
system calls for the logistics system to provide accountability over
items including vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. While the
ministry has not approved the draft logistics concept, a Coalition
official stated that one of the ministry's organizations, the National
Police, has demonstrated accountability for certain commodities, for
example, vehicles, weapons, and uniforms.
However, the ministry is experiencing significant supply and
maintenance challenges in several other areas. According to a July 2006
Coalition assessment, the MOI's logistics capabilities are ineffective
because the force being developed by the Coalition for the MOI is
overwhelming the ministry's existing logistics capabilities and a lack
of centralized contracting and budget authorities limit MOI oversight.
Because of this ineffectiveness, the Coalition was procuring and
distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the MOI, and a
Coalition-funded contractor was running warehouses that supply
ministerial forces and providing transportation of supplies from these
warehouses to MOI facilities.[Footnote 19]
Coalition officials also stated that the MOI faces maintenance
challenges. In August 2006, approximately 1,600 police vehicles were
inoperable in Baghdad alone. In addition, MOI personnel are unable to
maintain a certain type of American truck delivered by Coalition forces
because these personnel are unable to work with the vehicles'
computerized systems. As of August 2006, the ministry had 1,179 trucks
of this type on hand.[Footnote 20] Coalition officials also stated that
there is little or no sustainment of certain types of police radio
equipment.
It is unclear how the logistics concept in development will address
some of the challenges the MOI faces. For instance, the MOI does not
currently have a program to perform vehicle maintenance, and although
we did not examine it, Coalition officials explained that the vehicle
maintenance contract under consideration will operate only in Baghdad.
As of August 2006, the draft logistics concept did not include a means
to transport MOI vehicles from other parts of the country to
Baghdad.[Footnote 21]
Logistics Concept May Not Fully Address Provincial Forces' Needs:
Another related challenge is that the Coalition and ministry are
unclear on how the concept will incorporate MOI forces in Iraq's 18
provinces. One goal for the logistics system is to support ministerial
forces in the provinces. However, in August 2006, a Coalition official
explained that the future logistical relationship between the MOI's
headquarters and its forces located in the provinces remained unclear.
For instance, while Iraqi Police Service units located in the provinces
are part of the ministry's forces, funding for these units is
controlled by each provincial governor. In August 2006, a Coalition
official stated that the then-current draft logistics concept
incorporated some of the ministry's provincial forces. However, the
extent to which the forces are included is unclear. Also, because the
relationship between the ministry and its provincial forces is still
being defined by Iraqi officials, the MOI's eventual draft logistics
concept may not fully address provincial forces.
Although the Coalition is currently focused on certain MOI forces that
operate on a federal level (National Police, Border Forces, and the
ministry's national headquarters in Baghdad), as the relationship
between the ministry and its provincial forces becomes clearer and the
concept evolves, Coalition officials explained that the logistical
relationship between the ministry's headquarters and its provincial
forces may be clarified in the concept. According to an August 2006
Coalition document, the focus of the ministry's future logistics
efforts were to shift to provincial forces. However, the timeline for
this shift is unclear.
MOI Has Fielded Command and Control Communications Technologies, but
Maintenance and Procedural Challenges Limit Capability:
While we did not examine the contracts ourselves, a Coalition official
stated that Coalition-funded contractors have built two command and
control networks for the Ministry of Interior: the Advanced First
Responder Network, which is intended to provide communication between
police forces, the ministerial headquarters, and Iraqi military forces
in 15 Iraqi cities; and the Iraqi Command and Control Network, which is
designed to link the MOI's national and provincial headquarters. The
MOI's forces are also being equipped with short-and long-range radios
that allow these forces to communicate among themselves and with Iraqi
military units.
As of August 2006, the MOI's progress in developing a national command
and control network had been mixed. Installation of the Advanced First
Responder Network was complete; work on the Iraqi Command and Control
Network was ongoing, with 52 percent of funded sites installed; and
most of the of short-and long-range radios have been deployed (about 91
percent and 81 percent of authorized requirements, respectively).
Although these technologies have been fielded, the MOI faces
substantial challenges in the area of national command and control. For
example, the capability of the Advanced First Responder Network is
limited by infrastructure insufficiencies, the fragility of Iraq's
electrical grid, and by the MOI's inability to replace critical
components.
Infrastructure, Maintenance, and Procedural Challenges Limit the
Capabilities of Certain Communications Technologies:
According to a Coalition document, the $218.5 million Advanced First
Responder Network was installed through a Coalition-funded contract and
is intended to provide a communications system for first responders by
integrating MOI police with local, provincial, and national public
safety headquarters and Iraqi military units through radio, secure
voice, data, and global positioning system services. In its current
form, the network was designed to provide communication for MOI forces
operating in 15 Iraqi cities. Although, according to a Coalition
document, 65 percent of the country's population lives in these cities,
the network does not provide national coverage. Several of Iraq's 18
provinces--including Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah in the northeast, al-
Anbar in the west, and Maysan in the east--do not have a city covered
by the network.
According to a Coalition document, other infrastructure insufficiencies
also limit the network's capability. For instance, certain switches
operate in a way that is not compatible with communications systems in
Iraq and a system of microwave relay towers used to transmit signals is
poorly designed.
Another challenge is maintaining consistent power for the network.
According to a Coalition official who worked with the MOI's Directorate
of Communications, the fragility of Iraq's electrical grid means that
the network must be powered with generators. The relatively small
number of backup generators presents an additional challenge because
the loss of a generator can result in a substantial loss in network
capability.
Challenges faced by the MOI in replacing parts compound the loss of
capability caused by infrastructure insufficiencies and inconsistent
power. For three reasons, the ministry has difficulty replacing parts.
First, while we did not examine the contract, a Coalition official
stated that the original contract to build the network does not require
the contractor to provide spare parts. For instance, according to a
Coalition document, replacement of faulty switches falls outside the
scope of the operations and maintenance contract. Second, according to
another Coalition document, although the ministry's Directorate of
Communications has agreed to assume responsibility for operations and
maintenance in January 2007, it is unclear whether the Minister of
Interior has agreed to that decision. Third, the ministry's Directorate
of Finance has refused a request for additional funding for the network
made by the Directorate of Communications. In August 2006, a Coalition
official stated that without additional funding to address these
challenges, the network would likely fail within 3 months.[Footnote 22]
In addition, as of August 2006, the MOI had not yet begun to develop
the standard operating procedures[Footnote 23] that govern how it will
run its communications networks. However, according to Coalition
officials, Iraqi staff in the National Command Center[Footnote 24] are
implementing standard operating procedures provided by the Coalition
and are making progress in their implementation. For instance, the
outgoing shift now briefs the incoming shift, the center's work space
is arranged for more effective communication, and the Center staff now
has adequate technology.
In a July 2006 assessment, the Coalition judged the MOI's communication
capabilities as partly effective. A Coalition official who works with
the ministry to develop its command and control capabilities explained
that while the MOI has several communications technologies in place or
in the process of being installed, as of August 2006, these had not
been coordinated to form a functioning national command and control
network.
Concluding Observations:
The Coalition has been working to transfer full security
responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. With
regard to the development of logistics capabilities, Coalition
officials stated that the MOD has progressed further than the MOI. In
regard to the development of command and control capabilities, we were
unable to determine if one ministry had made significantly more
progress than the other. This is because Coalition and Iraqi government
efforts in this area are numerous and in various stages of development,
making them difficult to compare. We plan to address this comparison in
subsequent work on ISF support capabilities. Further, according to
senior Coalition officials, the seating of the Ministers of Defense and
Interior in June 2006 sets the conditions for even greater progress
toward attaining ISF self-reliance. However, significant challenges
must be overcome before the ISF achieves full capability. These include
training Iraqi logisticians and communications specialists, maintaining
Iraqi vehicles and equipment, and developing policies and procedures
within the ministries. Without qualified logisticians and
communications specialists, reliable vehicles and equipment, and
accepted policies and procedures, the Iraqi forces cannot achieve the
self-sufficiency upon which the drawdown of Coalition forces depends.
Coalition officials recognize these challenges and state they work
daily to rectify them.
Agency Comments:
DOD provided official oral comments on a draft of this correspondence
and stated that it had no comments on our findings and observations.
DOD also provided technical comments that were incorporated into the
correspondence where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will also be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov if you or your
staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key Contributors to this report included
Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director; Katherine Lenane, Guy LoFaro,
Christopher Turner, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin.
Signed by:
William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Related GAO Products:
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Challenges of Iraq's Security Ministries. GAO-07-637T. Washington D.C.:
March 22, 2007.
Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi
Security Forces. GAO-07-612T. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security
Forces' Logistical Capabilities. GAO-07-582T. Washington, D.C.: March
9, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach and
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Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
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2007.
Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD's Reconstruction Program. GAO-07-30R.
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(350989):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and
Jordan academies with support from the State Department and the Justice
Department. The CPA's Coalition Military Assistance Training Team was
responsible for training a new Iraqi Army.
[2] MNC-I is headquartered by the U.S. Army III Corps forward deployed
to Camp Victory, Baghdad.
[3] 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1)(2000).
[4] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi
Security Forces' Support Capabilities, GAO-07-120C (Washington, D.C.:
March 7, 2007).
[5] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi
Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities, GAO-07-582T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007).
[6] Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period, March 2004.
[7] See GAO, Iraq's Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R (Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 2004) for more information on key events during Iraq's
transitional period.
[8] The areas of health and garrison support are not addressed in this
report.
[9] In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request,
DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop
maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National
Depot. According to DOD, if these funds are not procured, the National
Depot's construction will be affected and the shortfall will
necessitate the continued presence and support of Coalition forces
further into the future.
[10] According to updated information we obtained in December 2006, the
MOD was still developing the RSUs and they would not be transitioned to
full Iraqi control until June 2007. Moreover, the same update revealed
that full transition of the GSUs to Iraqi control would not occur until
late 2007. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund
request, DOD has asked for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining
facilities for GSUs and RSUs. Without this funding, DOD states that
those facilities might go months or years without use while waiting for
equipment to be delivered through Iraqi acquisitions systems. According
to DOD, if that were to occur the Coalition would not be able to
diminish its support.
[11] As a result of the literacy problem within the country, MNSTC-I
has developed a literacy course.
[12] Coalition officials stated that the information they provided us
about the MOD's vehicle inventory was fairly complete as of that point
in time, but acknowledged that there may be some vehicles in the MOD's
inventory over which they do not have visibility.
[13] According to DOD's Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request,
a portion of the $1,043 million it has requested for equipment and
transportation will be used to purchase common system vehicles for the
MOD, with an eye toward reducing the fleet to just one or two systems.
[14] In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request,
DOD has asked for $499.6 million to procure recommended levels of
supplies initially required to meet Iraqi wholesale and retail
authorized stockage levels for most major classes of supplies. If it
does not receive this funding, DOD states that the Iraqis will require
continued support from Coalition forces.
[15] According to a DOD official, MNSTC-I has reprogrammed some of its
funds to extend the national maintenance contract beyond its March 2007
expiration date.
[16] As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the
draft logistics concept proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this
is unclear.
[17] It seems that MOI's dependence on Coalition support of its
logistical facilities will continue into fiscal year 2008. DOD states
that the MOI requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental
Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund for the construction and
sustainment of warehouse and maintenance depots.
[18] According to an update we received from DOD in December 2006, only
one of the six warehouses will transition to Iraqi control by February
2007. The remaining five are to continue under Coalition control until
July 2007.
[19] These challenges have continued and the MOI remains dependent on
the Coalition to operate its warehouse system.
[20] According to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics remain
unfamiliar with the computerized systems which are found in most of the
MOI's vehicles. Moreover, a significant component of the MOI's forces,
the National Police, is unable to maintain its vehicles.
[21] DOD is requesting $145 million to build 130 maintenance facilities
for the MOI. DOD states that without this infrastructure the ministry
will not be able to maintain its vehicle fleet.
[22] DOD has requested $27 million in U.S. funding for MOI
communications maintenance and has stated that without this money,
MOI's radio networks will be severely jeopardized, its first responder
network will degrade and become inoperable, and the MOI will be unable
to assume responsibility for its national command and control network.
[23] Standard operating procedures are a set of instructions covering
those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or
standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.
[24] According to a document provided by Coalition officials, the
National Command Center maintains nationwide strategic and operational
situational awareness and exercises command and control in order to
implement plans and policy and track the execution of all operations
for the Ministry of Interior.
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