Operation Iraqi Freedom
Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-07-582T March 9, 2007The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued in November 2005, implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence there. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress in November 2006 that although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior had about 323,000 trained and equipped forces, there was a serious shortcoming for both Ministries in the planning and executing of their logistics and sustainment requirements. According to DOD, without a developed logistical system the ISF will require continued Coalition support. Today's testimony addresses (1) the current state of the ISF's logistical capabilities, and (2) the challenges the ISF is facing to achieve logistical self-sufficiency. This testimony contains unclassified portions of a classified report that was issued on March 7, 2007. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from January 2006 through March 2007.
Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous challenges. For example, the development of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other logistics formations because of manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, poor maintenance, and funding procurement issues. DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot and for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities on Garrison Support Units and Regional Support Units. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of all echelons of logistics units is crucial in order for the Ministry of Defense to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. Furthermore, the policies and procedures intended to guide implementation of the logistics concept have not been effectively distributed. In addition, the training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been hindered by an insufficiency in the supply of Arabic-literate students, of fuel needed to power generators, and of cadre qualified to serve as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle fleet poses challenges because of its diversity, the shortage of trained mechanics, and the Ministry's failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. For instance, in July 2006, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the Ministry, in addition to funding a contractor to run warehouses and transport supplies to the Ministry's facilities. These challenges have continued, and the Ministry remains dependent on the Coalition to operate its warehouse system. In February, the Ministry was supposed to assume responsibility for running its warehouses. However, this has not happened. Moreover, in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental, DOD is requesting approximately $175 million for the construction and sustainment of Ministry warehouses and maintenance depots. Another example of the Ministry's continuing logistical challenges is vehicle maintenance. In August 2006 Ministry personnel were unable to maintain a certain type of American truck supplied to the ministry by the Coalition because its personnel were unable to work with the vehicles' computerized systems. In August 2006, the Ministry had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand. As of December 2006, Iraqi mechanics remained unfamiliar with these computerized systems which are found in most of the ministry's vehicles. Because the Iraqi National Police are not able to maintain their vehicles, the Coalition has let and funded a $130 million Baghdad Area maintenance contract to repair these vehicles.
GAO-07-582T, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities
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Testimony:
Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:00 a.m. EST:
March 9, 2007:
Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical
Capabilities:
Statement of William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-07-582T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-582T, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued in November 2005,
implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence
there. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress in November
2006 that although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of
Interior had about 323,000 trained and equipped forces, there was a
serious shortcoming for both Ministries in the planning and executing
of their logistics and sustainment requirements. According to DOD,
without a developed logistical system the ISF will require continued
Coalition support.
Today‘s testimony addresses (1) the current state of the ISF‘s
logistical capabilities, and (2) the challenges the ISF is facing to
achieve logistical self-sufficiency. This testimony contains
unclassified portions of a classified report that was issued on March
7, 2007.
GAO‘s preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from
January 2006 through March 2007.
What GAO Found:
Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in
place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous
challenges. For example, the development of national and regional
logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other logistics
formations because of manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate
fuel stocks, poor maintenance, and funding procurement issues. DOD has
asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance,
warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot and for
$73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities on Garrison
Support Units and Regional Support Units. Coalition logisticians have
emphasized to us that the development of all echelons of logistics
units is crucial in order for the Ministry of Defense to become capable
of independently sustaining its forces. Furthermore, the policies and
procedures intended to guide implementation of the logistics concept
have not been effectively distributed. In addition, the training of
Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been hindered by an insufficiency
in the supply of Arabic-literate students, of fuel needed to power
generators, and of cadre qualified to serve as faculty at the logistics
schools. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle fleet poses challenges
because of its diversity, the shortage of trained mechanics, and the
Ministry‘s failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage
level for equipment.
As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the
draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The
reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the
summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in
its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. For instance,
in July 2006, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment,
vehicles, and weapons for the Ministry, in addition to funding a
contractor to run warehouses and transport supplies to the Ministry‘s
facilities. These challenges have continued, and the Ministry remains
dependent on the Coalition to operate its warehouse system. In
February, the Ministry was supposed to assume responsibility for
running its warehouses. However, this has not happened. Moreover, in
its fiscal year 2007 supplemental, DOD is requesting approximately $175
million for the construction and sustainment of Ministry warehouses and
maintenance depots. Another example of the Ministry‘s continuing
logistical challenges is vehicle maintenance. In August 2006 Ministry
personnel were unable to maintain a certain type of American truck
supplied to the ministry by the Coalition because its personnel were
unable to work with the vehicles‘ computerized systems. In August 2006,
the Ministry had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand. As of December
2006, Iraqi mechanics remained unfamiliar with these computerized
systems which are found in most of the ministry‘s vehicles. Because the
Iraqi National Police are not able to maintain their vehicles, the
Coalition has let and funded a $130 million Baghdad Area maintenance
contract to repair these vehicles.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-582T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Bill Solis, 202-512-8365,
solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues related to the
development of the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) logistical
capabilities. Logistics is the lifeblood of any military organization.
It is the process of planning, implementing, and controlling the
efficient, effective flow and storage of goods, services, and related
information from point of origin to point of consumption for the
purpose of conforming to operational requirements and the sustainment
of the operations to the successful accomplishment of the mission or
task. The components of logistics are sustainment, maintenance, supply,
transportation, services, and health support.
In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq, which states that the Coalition will
adjust its "posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi
capabilities grow," and that Coalition troop levels in Iraq will
decrease over time as the Iraqis take on more responsibilities for
themselves. The national strategy implies a conditions-based linkage
between the development of the ISF, including its logistical and other
support capabilities, and the size and shape of the U.S. presence in
Iraq. Currently, much of the discussion on the size and shape of U.S.
forces in Iraq has focused on the relationship between trained and
equipped Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. combat brigades. However,
Coalition and U.S. support forces are providing extensive combat
service support to the ISF. In February 2006, the Department of Defense
(DOD) issued its third report to Congress, Measuring Stability and
Security in Iraq, and stated that with the generation of regular line
infantry battalions in the Iraqi Army largely completed, the focus of
the train-and-equip program was shifting toward building combat support
and combat service support units. In its next report to Congress,
issued in May 2006, DOD stated that more than 65 percent of personnel
in the Iraqi Army's support forces had been trained and equipped and
that logistics units were continuing to increase in capability.
However, in August 2006 DOD reported that logistics capabilities
continued to be an area of significant concern for the Iraqi Police
Service, particularly with respect to vehicle maintenance, and that
extensive support to Iraqi military forces was being provided by Multi-
National Force-Iraq. In its most recent report to Congress, issued in
November 2006, DOD stated that although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
(MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) had about 323,000 trained and
equipped forces, the most serious shortcoming for both ministries'
capabilities lay in planning and executing their logistics and
sustainment requirements. According to DOD, fiscal year 2007 is the
"Year of Leaders and Logistics" in Iraq. In justifying much of the $5.8
billion in its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund
request and its Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has
pointed out that without the funds designated for MOD and MOI logistics
and sustainment functions the Coalition would have to continue to
support the ISF.
In response to the growing interest by members of Congress, we began a
review under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct
evaluations at his own initiative[Footnote 1] in order to provide
information on the status and challenges of developing ISF support
capabilities. To determine the status and challenges we reviewed
relevant documents, orders, policies, and data that we obtained from
DOD, the Department of State, and contracting officials. We also met
with and interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives in
the United States and made two trips to Iraq, in January and August of
2006. While in Iraq we met with officials from the Department of State,
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Multi-National Force-Iraq,
Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq. During our August 2006 trip, we also met with Iraqi Army
officials and made a site visit to an Iraqi Army training compound and
Iraq's National Depot. We determined that the data we have used are
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. This work is
being done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Our classified report, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary
Observations on Iraqi Security Forces Support Capabilities (GAO-07-
120C), which also includes preliminary observations on the ISF's
intelligence and command and control capabilities, was issued on March
7, 2007. I will be presenting here some unclassified portions of that
report, updated with information we obtained in December 2006 and
February of 2007, on the development of the ISF's logistical
capability. We will be conducting further, follow-on engagement work on
this subject.
Summary:
Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in
place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous
challenges. For example, the development of national and regional
logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other unit-level
logistics formations. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that
the development of all echelons of the logistics concept--national and
regional logistics centers and unit-level logistics formations--is
crucial in order for MOD to become capable of independently sustaining
its forces. Furthermore, the policies and procedures intended to guide
implementation of the logistics concept have not been disseminated. In
addition, the training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been
hindered by an insufficiency in the supply of Arabic-literate students,
of fuel needed to power generators, and of Iraqis who are qualified to
serve as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, maintenance of the
vehicle fleet poses challenges because of the fleet's diversity, the
shortage of trained mechanics, and the Ministry's failure to budget for
and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment.
As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the
draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The
reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the
summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in
its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. For instance,
in July 2006, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment,
vehicles, and weapons for the MOI, in addition to funding a contractor
to run warehouses and transport supplies to MOI facilities. These
challenges have continued, and the MOI remains dependent on the
Coalition to operate its warehouse system. In February, the MOI was
supposed to assume responsibility for running its warehouses. However,
this has not happened. Another example of the Ministry's continuing
challenges is vehicle maintenance. In August 2006 MOI personnel were
unable to maintain a certain type of American truck supplied to the
Ministry by the Coalition because its personnel were unable to work
with the vehicles' computerized systems. As of August 2006, the MOI has
1,179 trucks of this type on hand. According to a December 2006 DOD
update, Iraqi mechanics remain unfamiliar with the computerized systems
which are found in most of the Ministry's vehicles.
Background:
In early 2005, the Ministry of Defense and Multi-National Force-Iraq
approved a logistics concept for the Iraqi military. Inherent to the
concept is the generation of a variety of organizations, from the
ministerial to the unit level. The provision of logistics support at
the lowest levels is expected to be the purview of, first, Headquarters
and Services Companies, which provide limited health, maintenance,
supply, and transportation support to Iraqi Army battalion, brigades,
and divisions; and, second, Motorized Transport Regiments, which
provide additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery
support to each of the Iraqi Army's infantry divisions. Midlevel
logistics support is expected to come from a national depot, five
Regional Support Units (RSU), and numerous Garrison Support Units
(GSU). The national depot, located at Taji, provides facilities for the
receipt, storage, accounting, and issue of most classes of supply for
the Iraqi Armed Forces, as well as the maintenance capability to
overhaul vehicles and other equipment. RSUs are to provide regionally
focused supply, maintenance, and contract support for the Iraqi
military, while GSUs are to provide base support for each Iraqi
military installation. A Support Command provides command and control
of the national depot and RSUs, while the Iraqi Joint Headquarters
logistics staff section provides logistics input to plans and orders.
Finally, atop the logistics structure is the Office of the Director
General of Acquisitions, Logistics, and Infrastructure, which is
expected to direct the overall logistical capability and the
acquisition of capital equipment, develop ministerial policies and
procedures, and manage the budget. The envisioned end state is a
comprehensive logistics system that will provide maintenance, supply,
transportation, medical, and garrison support to all elements of the
Iraqi military.[Footnote 2]
According to a December 2006 Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq assessment, the Iraqi military will be self-sufficient in the
provision of fuel, uniforms, building supplies, and life support by
December 2007 at the latest. Additionally, the same assessment states
that foreign military sales will be used to attain Iraqi self-
sufficiency in the following areas: ammunition management and handling
and the training of ammunition managers and handlers; vehicle
replacement and modernization; the purchase and stocking of repair
parts and the training of repair parts managers; the development of the
National Depot; and the formation of a movement coordination center and
shipment of supplies. All of these foreign military sales cases are to
be promulgated between March and June 2007.
According to a Coalition document, the Ministry of Interior logistics
system envisioned by the Coalition would enable the central government
to procure and distribute commodities; would support both the MOI's
federal forces (National Police and Border Forces) and the forces based
in each of Iraq's 18 provinces (Iraqi Police Service, Facility
Protection Service, and Fire/Civil Defense); and would assume
accountability for items such as vehicles, weapons, and durable
equipment.
The Coalition has developed this draft logistics concept for the Iraqi
police and border enforcement forces, but as of December 2006 it had
not been approved by the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, the
Ministry is working together to develop a centralized maintenance
concept, but that was still in process as of December 2006.
Ministry of Defense Has Approved a Logistical Concept, but Its
Implementation Faces Numerous Challenges:
Several challenges remain in the implementation of MOD's logistics
system. First, the establishment of the national depot, regional
support units, and garrison support units has lagged behind the
creation of Headquarters and Service Companies and Motorized Transport
Regiments. Second, the policies and procedures to facilitate
implementation of the logistics concept have not been effectively
disseminated. Third, the training of Iraqi logisticians has been
affected by a lack of fuel, electricity, and personnel support for the
training academy. Finally, the maintenance of the Iraqi military's
vehicles is complicated by the diversity of MOD's fleet, the lack of
trained mechanics, and the failure to budget for and maintain an
authorized stockage level for equipment.
Underdeveloped National and Regional Logistics Centers and the Failure
to Disseminate Policies and Procedures Hinder Iraqi Logistical Self-
Sufficiency:
The creation of national and regional logistics centers has lagged
behind that of lower echelon unit-level organizations because
preference has been given to the generation of lower echelon logistics
organizations, specifically Headquarters and Service Companies and
Motorized Transport Regiments.[Footnote 3] According to Coalition
officials, this makes the attainment of MOD logistical self-sufficiency
problematic. For example, the establishment of the National Depot has
been plagued by manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel
stocks, and poor maintenance. Coalition officials assigned to the
National Depot told us in August 2006 that the quantity of fuel
delivered there since April 2006 had been below that needed to support
routine warehouse, maintenance, and transportation requirements. The
maintenance of forklifts, vehicles, and generators necessary to support
day-to-day operations has suffered as well because of a lack of spare
parts, a situation exacerbated by the variety of makes and models of
equipment used by the National Depot. Additionally, the infrastructure
at the National Depot needs to be developed. In its supplemental Fiscal
Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for a total of
$339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base
support facilities at the National Depot. According to DOD, if these
funds are not procured, the National Depot's construction will be
affected and the shortfall will necessitate the continued presence and
support of Coalition forces further into the future. In the words of
one senior Coalition logistician, what presently exists at Taji is "a
depot in name only."
The standing up of the Regional Support Units and Garrison Support
Units faces similar challenges. According to a senior Coalition
official with whom we spoke in January 2006, all 5 RSUs were to be
operational by the end of calendar year 2006. But as of August 2006,
the Ministry of Defense was still in the process of forming the RSUs
and all 5 had significant shortfalls in personnel, leadership,
training, and facilities. According to updated information we obtained
in December 2006, MOD was still developing the RSUs and they would not
be transitioned to full Iraqi control until June 2007. In August 2006
MOD had not yet determined the exact number of GSUs to be formed, and
only 5 were in the process of being formed. Updated information
obtained from DOD in December 2006 revealed that GSU development was
still in an early stage, although the Iraqi Joint Headquarters was
taking aggressive action to accelerate the development of 23 GSUs.
According to DOD, full transition of GSUs to Iraqi control will not
occur until late 2007. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security
Forces Funds request, DOD has asked for $73 million to build and outfit
58 dining facilities on GSUs and RSUs. Without this funding, DOD states
that those facilities might go months or years without use while
waiting for equipment to be delivered through the Iraqi acquisitions
systems. According to DOD, if that were to occur the Coalition would
not be able to diminish its support.
Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of
all echelons of the logistics concept is crucial in order for MOD to
become capable of independently sustaining its forces. To that end,
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and Multi-National
Force-Iraq have developed Logistics Action Plans that include detailed
event trackers and delineate Coalition decision points throughout the
year. Overseeing implementation of the Logistics Action Plans is the
purview of the Logistics Concept Implementation Committee, an entity
formed in March 2006 to develop policies and procedures and steer their
implementation. The Logistics Concept Implementation Committee is
composed of both Iraqi and Coalition General Officers, and it meets
fortnightly. As of December 7, 2006, the Logistics Concept
Implementation Committee had produced 27 policies, procedures, and
plans. However, according to DOD officials, MOD does not have an
effective process for disseminating the policies and procedures
throughout the Iraqi military. We do not know the reason for this.
Training of Iraqi Logisticians Poses Challenges:
Providing trained officers and noncommissioned officers to fill support
and combat service support positions throughout the Iraqi Army is the
mission of the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute (Institute).
However, during our August 2006 visit to the Institute we found several
problems that negatively affected its ability to fulfill its mission.
One such problem, according to a senior Iraqi Army official from the
Institute, is Arabic illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the students
who report for each course, including students from the Kurdish
provinces who are literate in their own language, are turned away
because they cannot read the required manuals, written in
Arabic.[Footnote 4]
Quality-of-life problems also hamper training. There is not enough fuel
for the generators that provide the power necessary to run air
conditioners, water pumps, and other life-support functions. According
to an OSD report, the Taji RSU, which supports the Iraqi Armed Service
and Supply Institute, was so starved for fuel that the generators were
allowed to run only for 12 hours out of 24. During one 24-hour period,
most generators had no fuel at all.
Furthermore, the number of trained Iraqis is not sufficient for
training the number of logisticians required by the Iraqi military. As
of August 2006, the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute was
staffed with just over half of its authorized Iraqi officer
instructors. Lacking the needed faculty, the Institute has had to
operate at less than full capacity, resulting in the training of fewer
logistics specialists for the Iraqi Army. The reasons for this shortage
remain unclear.
Maintenance Is Challenged by Diversity of Vehicle Fleet and Undermined
by a Lack of Trained Mechanics and MOD Budgeting for Authorized
Stockage Levels:
Vehicle maintenance is another challenge that MOD faces, one
exacerbated by the heterogeneous mixture of the Ministry's vehicular
fleet. This diversity evolved because the fleet was assembled variously
from vehicles left over from Saddam's army, MOD vehicle purchases, and
vehicle gifts received from donor countries. According to an August 1,
2006, vehicle inventory, the Iraqi Army has 6 different types of fuel
trucks, at least 4 of which come from different manufacturers: Nissan,
Ford, KrAZ (Ukrainian), and MAZ (Belarusian); 21 different types of
light utility vehicles, including vehicles manufactured by Chevrolet,
Gazelle (Russian), Honker (Czech), Kia, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
and UAZ (Russian); and 15 different types of medium cargo vehicles,
including U.S. military 2.5-and 5-ton cargo trucks. It also has
vehicles manufactured by AMC, Ashok Leyland (Indian), GAZ (Russian),
Hyundai, Kamaz (Russian), Nissan, and Mercedes. According to Coalition
officials, obtaining repair parts for such a heterogeneous vehicular
fleet, especially for vehicles of non-U.S. manufacture, is so expensive
that crews have preferentially taken needed parts from similar vehicles
awaiting repair. The result is that some vehicles never get
repaired.[Footnote 5] Furthermore, vehicle maintenance in some Iraqi
Army units is adversely affected by the low octane rating in the fuel
they are receiving. According to an OSD report, some units in the
Kirkuk region are receiving fuel with an octane rating of between 70
and 78. As a result, fuel pumps are failing and the units are forced to
change fuel filters every 7 to 10 days.
As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of this
diverse fleet, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
committed to a national maintenance contract. According to the
statement of work, the command's intent was to contract the services of
a maintenance contractor to support the sustainment of the vehicles and
equipment issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi
Armed Forces in becoming self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of
organizational and intermediate maintenance tasks, the designated
contractor was to be organized to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi
personnel. However, Coalition officials stated that this training
regimen has not yet produced sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi
mechanics.
The national maintenance contract's statement of work also requires the
contractor to determine and maintain an adequate authorized stockage
level for all equipment repaired, the intent being to reduce the "wait
time" for parts. Coalition officials we spoke with in August 2006 said
that although an authorized stockage level has been completed, updated,
and partially funded by the Coalition, MOD has not yet budgeted for
maintaining it once the contract expires in March 2007. Coalition
officials fear that a failure by the Iraqis to budget for and maintain
the authorized stockage level will result in repair part shortfalls,
which in turn will have a negative impact on equipment readiness
levels. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund
request, DOD has asked for $499.6 million to procure recommended levels
of supplies initially required to meet Iraqi wholesale and retail
authorized stockage levels for most major classes of supplies. If it
does not receive this funding, DOD states that the Iraqis will require
continued support from Coalition forces.
Coalition officials have remarked that the national maintenance
contract is too expensive for MOD to continue past its March 2007 end
date. Coalition officials told us that they have presented an
alternative to the national maintenance contract based on foreign
military sales and direct vendor contracts to MOD. As of August 2006,
MOD had taken no action with regard to this alternative. However,
according to a DOD official, Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq has reprogrammed some of its funds to extend the National
Maintenance Contract beyond its March 2007 expiration date.
Ministry of Interior Has Drafted a Logistics Concept, but It Is Not
Self-Sufficient in Logistics:
As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the
draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The
reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the
summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in
its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. Because of
these challenges, the Ministry is dependent on Coalition support for
much of its logistics requirements. If left uncorrected, these
challenges will likely prolong the Ministry's dependence on Coalition
support into at least fiscal year 2008.
MOI's Warehousing and Supply Infrastructure Requires Continued
Coalition Support and Funding:
In December 2006, DOD reported that the MOI warehouse system consists
of five warehouses operated by the Coalition, one that is planned for
MOI operation in late December 2006, and several additional warehouses
at the headquarters of both the Ministry and its Department of Border
Enforcement. According to DOD, each of the Provincial Directors of
Police offices is responsible for establishing its own warehouse.
Since the summer of 2006, MOI has depended on the Coalition and
contractors to run its warehouses and supply much of its forces. For
example, in July 2006, not only was the Coalition procuring and
distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for MOI, it was also
funding a contractor to run the supply distribution warehouses and
provide the transportation assets needed to get the supplies from the
warehouses to MOI facilities. According to a Coalition assessment, this
state of affairs was necessary because MOI's existing logistics
capabilities were being overwhelmed by the force the Coalition was
developing for the MOI.
These challenges have continued, and MOI remains dependent on the
Coalition to operate its warehouse system. Although MOI was supposed to
assume responsibility for running these warehouses, this has not
happened. In August 2006, a Coalition-funded contractor was operating
six warehouses for MOI, and plans called for all six to transition to
MOI control by February 2007. However, according to an update we
received from DOD in December 2006, only one of the six warehouses will
be transitioned to Iraqi control by February 2007. The remaining five
are to continue under Coalition control until July 2007.
Moreover, it seems that MOI's dependence on Coalition support of its
logistics facilities will continue into fiscal year 2008. DOD states
that MOI requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental
Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund for the construction and
sustainment of warehouses and maintenance depots. DOD states that
without this funding, the Ministry will be unable to sustain its
warehouses, and the Coalition‘s significant investment in the MOI
vehicular fleet, comprising some 19,222 Coalition-supplied vehicles,
will be put at risk. In addition, DOD is seeking funding for MOI
logistics projects in the Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund
request.
MOI Is Unable to Independently Maintain its Vehicles and Equipment:
Maintenance is another area in which the MOI continues to face
challenges. As of December 2006, the MOI had at least two different
vehicle maintenance concepts. The first, for provincial police forces,
directs that vehicles be maintained at the provincial level. The
second, for the National Police, is still in development and is
expected to be based on a military model and centered in the Baghdad
area. Although MOI is developing a centralized vehicle maintenance
concept, as of December 2006 this concept was not complete.
Since the summer of 2006, MOI has faced significant vehicle maintenance
challenges. For instance, in August 2006, Coalition officials told us
that in Baghdad alone approximately 1,600 police vehicles were
inoperable. In addition, MOI personnel were unable to maintain a
certain type of American truck supplied by the Coalition because its
personnel were unable to work with the vehicles' computerized systems.
As of August 2006, MOI had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand.
Based on our latest information, some of these challenges have
persisted. For instance, according to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi
mechanics remain unfamiliar with the computerized systems which are
found in most of the MOI's vehicles. Moreover, a significant component
of the MOI's forces, the National Police, is unable to maintain its
vehicles.
Maintenance of communications equipment is another challenge that MOI
has faced since the summer of 2006. In August 2006, Coalition officials
stated that there was little or no sustainment for certain types of
police radio equipment but that plans called for MOI to fund a 12-
month, $4.5 million contract for radio maintenance and training of
Iraqi communications mechanics. The current status of this contract is
unclear.
Based on recent DOD information, we believe that the Ministry's
maintenance challenges will keep it dependent on Coalition assistance
into fiscal year 2008. For instance, according to Coalition officials
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq has established the
$130 million Baghdad Area Maintenance Contract to repair National
Police vehicles. According to Coalition officials, the contract is
currently set to expire in mid-2007, when MOI is supposed to assume
responsibility for maintenance of the National Police vehicle fleet.
Another example is the $145 million DOD is requesting to build 130
maintenance facilities for MOI. DOD states that without this
infrastructure the Ministry will not be able to maintain its vehicle
fleet. In addition, DOD is seeking funding for MOI logistics projects
in the Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request.
Furthermore, DOD has requested $27 million in U.S. funding for MOI
communications maintenance and has stated that without this money,
MOI's radio networks will be severely jeopardized, its first-responder
network will degrade and become inoperable, and it will be unable to
assume responsibility for its national command and control network.
Concluding Observation:
The Coalition has been working steadily toward the goal of transferring
full security responsibility to the Iraqi military and police. During
our trips to Iraq we met with scores of dedicated military, DOD
civilian, and contractor personnel who work daily to redress the
challenges we have pointed out in this testimony. We believe, however,
that much remains to be done before the ISF is logistically self-
sufficient. Until that happens, the Iraqi Security Forces will continue
to be reliant on the Coalition to provide the support they cannot
provide for themselves. According to DOD's November 2006 report to
Congress, the department has increasingly focused on addressing these
challenges by partnering Iraqi logistics units with U.S. units and,
within MOD, embedding civilian advisors to assist MOD officials in
developing MOD's capacity to organize, train, equip, sustain, and
upgrade its forces. Furthermore, the Government of Iraq has
increasingly turned to foreign military sales to execute equipment and
sustainment cases for both MOD and MOI. However, as we have shown,
several challenges have to be overcome in the areas of training,
maintenance, and sustainment before the Iraqis can become logistically
independent of the Coalition.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. At this time, I would be happy to answer any
questions that you may have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call William Solis at
(202) 512-8365. Other key contributors to this statement were Marilyn
Wasleski, Guy LoFaro, Christopher Turner, and Cheryl Weissman.
FOOTNOTES
[1] 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1) (2000).
[2] The areas of health and garrison support are not addressed in this
testimony.
[3] As of December 2006, 152 of 157 authorized Headquarters and Service
Companies have been formed and 7 of 9 Motorized Transport Regiments
have been transitioned to Iraqi control.
[4] As a result of the literacy problem within the country, Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq has developed a literacy
course.
[5] According to DOD's Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, a
portion of the $1,043 million it has requested for equipment and
transportation will be used to purchase common system vehicles for MOD,
with an eye toward reducing the fleet to just one or two systems.
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