Operation Iraqi Freedom
DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning Gao ID: GAO-07-639T March 22, 2007GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials.
The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." According to an Army lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however, DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed by an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations planning. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, potential adversaries are estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and execution.
GAO-07-639T, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, March 22, 2007:
Operation Iraqi Freedom:
DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over
Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning:
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-07-639T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-639T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
Why GAO Did This Study:
GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need
for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides
the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March
2003”known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)”concerns were raised about
how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional
munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This
testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi
conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate
risks associated with an adversary‘s conventional munitions storage
sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To
address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine
and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD
officials.
What GAO Found:
The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage
sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that
proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing
these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons
learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq‘s
conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate
being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions
storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some
remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned
reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred
because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional
munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and
assumptions. DOD‘s OIF planning priorities included quickly taking
Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force.
The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would
’capitulate and provide internal security.“ According to an Army
lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to
limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed
that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case
assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a
centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until
August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According
to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional
munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not
securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as
government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to
make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many
people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the
region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated
that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose
any residual risk nor have they been physically secured.
DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however,
DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed
by an adversary‘s conventional munitions storage sites in future
operations planning. DOD‘s actions generally have emphasized countering
the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations.
GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this
emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means
to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, potential adversaries
are estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would
require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that
this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be
an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an
adversary‘s munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration
for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot
ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary‘s
conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future
operations planning and execution.
What GAO Recommends:
The report GAO is releasing today recommends that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to (1) conduct
a theaterwide survey and risk assessment on unsecured conventional
munitions in Iraq, (2) report related risk mitigation strategies and
results to Congress, and (3) incorporate conventional munitions storage
site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels of
planning policy and guidance. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-639T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at
(202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss GAO's report being
released today on the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to plan for
the security of former Iraqi conventional weapons sites and the lessons
learned for planning future operations. In March 2003, citing the
failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors and other
concerns, the United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq in an
operation known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Commander of the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was primarily responsible for developing
and executing the war plan for OIF.[Footnote 1] The war plan's military
priorities included overthrowing the Iraqi regime by rapidly capturing
Baghdad and disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Although WMD stockpiles were not found, Iraq had hundreds of thousands
of tons of conventional munitions throughout the country at various
storage sites.[Footnote 2] The widespread looting of some Iraqi
conventional munitions storage sites during OIF has been the subject of
media reports. We previously reported on the looting and dispersal of
radiological sources from a number of sites in Iraq after the invasion
and DOD's efforts to collect and secure those sources.[Footnote 3] My
statement today addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over
conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, and (2) DOD actions to
mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions
storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons
learned.
The observations I will discuss today are based on the unclassified
version of our classified report on this topic.[Footnote 4] To examine
the security over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites provided
by U.S. forces, we reviewed field unit reporting and intelligence
products and interviewed DOD officials. We also collected and analyzed
the various iterations of OIF plans, doctrine, and concepts of
operations for coverage of the security of conventional munitions
storage sites. To examine DOD's actions to learn from its experience
with securing conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq and apply
these lessons learned to mitigate risks during future operations, we
interviewed DOD officials about their efforts to identify and document
lessons learned and examined documents on operations in Iraq. We
performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage
sites in Iraq, combined with prewar planning priorities and certain
prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S.
forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting,
according to DOD sources. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional
munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being five
times greater than the lower estimate. Although the amount of looted
munitions is unknown, field unit reports, numerous intelligence
assessments, and imagery products showed that many conventional
munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and
some may remain vulnerable. In October 2006, we could not verify that
all sites had been physically secured. According to lessons learned
reports and knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials, including field
commanders, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had
insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage
sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions that
proved to be invalid. For example, the OIF war plan assumed that the
regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal
security" and resistance was unlikely. Knowledgeable senior-level DOD
officials stated that these Iraqi army units would have been used to
secure conventional munitions storage sites. Our analysis of the
various iterations of the war plan found that the OIF war plan did not
examine the consequences of these and other important planning
assumptions being proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a
centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until
August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. While DOD
had destroyed, disposed of or secured 417,000 tons of munitions, Multi-
National Coalition-Iraq officials told us unsecured munitions continued
to pose a threat. Not securing these conventional munitions storage
sites has been costly. For example, looted munitions are being used to
construct improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed
many people and maintain the level of violence against U.S. and
coalition forces and their Iraqi partners, which has hampered the
achievement of the strategic goal of stability in Iraq. Moreover,
estimates indicate that the looted munitions will likely continue to
support terrorist attacks throughout the region.
While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned,
because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, DOD has
given little focus to mitigating the risk to U.S. forces posed by an
adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations
planning. Instead, the department's actions in response to OIF lessons
learned generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an
insurgency or terrorists during post-hostility operations. Although
these actions are good first steps, our review of DOD publications--
such as doctrine, policy, guidance, and procedures issued by the joint
staff--used to guide operational planning and execution found little
evidence of guidance concerning the security of conventional munitions
storage sites. Without appropriate joint doctrine, policy, guidance,
and procedures, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned regarding
the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites
will be a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration that is
integrated into future operations planning and execution, so that these
munitions do not become the source of materials for making IEDs.
Our report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman
of the Joint Chief of Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide survey and
risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq; (2)
report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and results to Congress; and
(3) incorporate consideration of conventional munitions storage sites
security into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including
joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other directives. DOD
partially concurred with our recommendations.
Background:
When the United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq on March
17, 2003, and the Iraqi government no longer functioned, many areas
experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public services,
such as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and coalition forces
were then confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and
infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Given the
extensive looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not assume that
facilities and items within the facilities would remain intact or in
place for later collection without being secured.[Footnote 5] Many
facilities, such as abandoned government research facilities and
industrial complexes, were no longer under the control of the former
regime and had been looted. For example, hundreds of tons of explosive
materials that had been documented by the International Atomic Energy
Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa explosives and munitions
facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003, through the theft and
looting of the unsecured installations. We also reported that regarding
radiological sources in Iraq, DOD was not ready to collect and secure
radiological sources when the war began in March 2003 and for about 6
months thereafter.[Footnote 6]
U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional
Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting:
According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons
learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition
forces were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage
sites in Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These
sources indicated that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by
the number and size of conventional munitions storage sites, and DOD
had insufficient troop levels to secure these sites because of prewar
planning priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid.
Despite war plan and intelligence estimates of large quantities of
munitions in Iraq, knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did
not plan for or set up a program to centrally manage and destroy enemy
munitions until August 2003, well after the completion of major combat
operations in May 2003. The costs of not securing these conventional
munitions storage sites have been high, as looted explosives and
ammunition from these sites have been used to construct IEDs that have
killed and maimed people. Furthermore, estimates indicate such
munitions are likely to continue to support terrorist attacks in the
region.
U.S. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional
Munitions Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting:
U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional
munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure
these sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat
operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit
reports, lessons learned reports, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF
estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly with
the higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate.
The commander of CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations on September 24, 2003, that "there is more ammunition in
Iraq than any place I've ever been in my life, and it is all not
securable."[Footnote 7]
Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the
time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April
2003 through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons
associated with Iraq's former republican guard had been extensively
looted and vandalized after the military campaign phase of OIF ended.
It concluded that the most prized areas for looting were the depots or
storage areas. The assessment further concluded that the thorough
nature of the looting and the seemingly targeted concentration on
storage areas suggested that much of the looting in the areas assessed
was conducted by organized elements that were likely aided or
spearheaded by Iraqi military personnel.
Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites--including fixed garrisons,
field sites, and ammunition production facilities--were reviewed to
assess their vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces
were obtaining munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small
number of sites were considered highly vulnerable because of the large
quantity of munitions, inadequate security, and a high level of
looting. The majority of the sites were assessed as having low
vulnerability--not because they had been secured, but because they had
been abandoned or totally looted. The review considered virtually all
the sites to be partially secured at best and concluded that U.S. and
coalition troops were able to guard only a very small percentage of the
sites.
U.S. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security
Because of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions:
DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S.
forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate
security for conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of
OIF planning priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be
invalid. According to DOD officials, ground commanders had two top
priorities during major combat operations that were set forth in the
February 2003 OIF war plan. First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned
for and successfully executed a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on
surprise and speed rather than massive troop buildup, such as was used
in 1991 during the first Gulf War. This rapid march to Baghdad
successfully resulted in the removal of the regime. Another critical
planning priority was finding and securing the regime's stockpiles of
WMD, which the administration believed were a threat to coalition
forces and other countries in the region. The OIF war plan assumed that
there was a high probability that the regime would use WMD against U.S.
and coalition forces in a final effort to survive when those forces
reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM planner for OIF stated that
ground commanders had to prioritize limited available resources against
the volume of tasks, both stated and implied, contained in the war
plan.
Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF
war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being
insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage
sites, including the following:
* The Iraqi regular army would "capitulate and provide security." The
OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and security
forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual surrender or
desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S. Commander, CENTCOM,
intended to preserve, as much as possible, the Iraqi military to
maintain internal security and protect Iraq's borders during and after
major combat operations. According to a study prepared by the Center
for Army Lessons Learned, this assumption was central to the decision
to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq.[Footnote 8] On
May 23, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi
Army, which the CENTCOM commander assumed would provide internal
security.
* Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid out the
probability of several courses of action that the regime might take in
response to an invasion, the plan did not consider the possibility of
protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S. and coalition forces
after the conclusion of major combat operations. As a result, DOD
officials stated that the regime's conventional munitions storage sites
were not considered a significant risk.
* Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The OIF war
planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons learned report,
was based on the assumption that the bulk of the Iraqi government would
remain in place after major combat operations and therefore civil
functions, including rebuilding and humanitarian assistance, could be
shifted from military forces to U.S. and international organizations
and, ultimately, the Iraqis, within about 18 months after the end of
major combat operations.[Footnote 9] Therefore, DOD initially did not
plan for an extended occupation of the country or the level of troops
that would be needed to secure conventional munitions storage sites in
particular or the country in general.
Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions
contributed to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report
by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not
examine the consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further
contributing to insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of
civil order in Iraq.[Footnote 10] The Joint Staff strategic-level
lessons learned report also discussed the effect inaccurate planning
assumptions had on force levels. According to this report, overemphasis
on planning assumptions that could not be validated prior to critical
decision points resulted in a force structure plan that did not
consider several missions requiring troops, such as providing security
for enemy conventional munitions storage sites.
DOD Did Not Set Up a Program to Centrally Manage and Destroy Iraqi
Munitions until after the Completion of Major Combat Operations:
Despite prewar intelligence assessments of large amounts of
conventional munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did
not set up a central office until July 2003 or set up a program to
centrally manage and destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003.
These steps were taken well after major combat operations were
completed in May 2003, because the department did not perceive
conventional munitions storage sites as a threat. The central office
was initially set up to address operational problems found during an
assessment of nine Iraqi sites. This assessment found that DOD lacked
priorities for securing the sites and uniform procedures and practices
for securing and disposing of munitions. It also uncovered serious
safety problems in the handling, transportation, storage, and disposal
of munitions.
In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center awarded contracts
for the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first demolition
of munitions under the program was conducted in September 2003. The
program's initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six depots
and to have all enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or
transported to the depots. The program also was tasked with assisting
in the establishment, management, and transfer of depots to the new
Iraqi army. According to the Engineering and Support Center, the
program has received more than $1 billion and has destroyed or secured
more than 324,000 tons of munitions. This number, combined with
military disposal operations, has accounted for more than 417,000 tons
of munitions, leaving an unknown amount of conventional munitions in
the hands of resistance groups or unsecured. This unknown amount could
range significantly, from thousands to millions of tons of unaccounted
conventional munitions.
According to Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials, unsecured
conventional munitions from the former regime continue to pose a risk
to U.S. forces and others. For example, some conventional munitions
storage sites in remote locations have not been assessed recently to
verify whether they pose any residual risk. These officials also stated
that smaller caches of weapons, munitions, and equipment as well as
remaining unexploded ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent a more
pressing and continuing risk. These officials said that the coalition
is working to reduce this risk by searching for and finding a growing
number of caches, but it will be some time before it can clean up all
the munitions in Iraq. The extent of the threat from smaller caches,
however, is difficult to quantify because the location or amount of
munitions hidden or scattered around the country is unknown.
Costs of Not Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites Have Been
High:
As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic,
and financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage
sites have been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and
explosives looted from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites
will likely continue to support terrorist attacks throughout the
region. Government agencies also have assessed that looted munitions
are being used in the construction of IEDs. IEDs have proven to be an
effective tactic because they are inexpensive, relatively simple to
employ, deadly, anonymous, and have great strategic value.[Footnote 11]
To illustrate, the Congressional Research Service reported in 2005 that
IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in
Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis. Moreover, Multinational Forces
in Iraq reported that the attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi
partners continued to increase through July 2006, representing at least
40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces.
DOD's Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on
Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations:
While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we
found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security
of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic
planning and priority-setting consideration during planning for future
operations. A critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured
conventional munitions storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to
U.S. forces, as illustrated by intelligence assessments that show one
potential adversary, for example, also has considerable munitions
stockpiles that would require a sizable occupying force to secure or
destroy. Despite the strategic implications regarding unsecured
conventional munitions storage sites, our analysis shows that securing
those sites generally is not explicitly addressed in military policy
and guidance, particularly at the joint level. We reviewed 17 DOD
publications--which Joint Staff officials told us were relevant to our
review--to determine the extent to which each of those publications
contained guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage
sites. A list of these publications can be found in our March 2007
report.[Footnote 12] In reviewing these documents, we found little
evidence of guidance regarding conventional munitions storage site
security. Although several publications addressed defeating IEDs during
an insurgency after major combat operations have ended or provided
tactical-level guidance on how to dispose of explosive hazards,
including munitions, or make those hazards safe, none explicitly
addressed the security of conventional munitions storage sites during
or after major combat operations as a tactical, operational, or
strategic risk.
Because of DOD's understandable focus on current operations, the
department's actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have
emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists
during posthostility operations. The specific actions DOD has taken are
discussed in our report. These actions are good first steps toward
broadening DOD's focus beyond the ongoing tactical and operational
counter-IED efforts used against Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or
external terrorist groups in Iraq to planning and executing strategic
counter-IED campaigns for future operations. However, the actions do
not directly address the strategic importance of securing conventional
munitions storage sites during major combat operations so that they do
not become the source of materials for making IEDs during an occupation
or become used for other forms of armed resistance.
Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured
conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat
to U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential
adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States'
experiences in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S.
invading forces. We believe these potential adversaries will likely
develop military doctrine to avoid direct military confrontation with
the United States if possible and try to undermine the United States'
political commitment with unconventional warfare. Therefore, the
number, size, and geographic separation of an adversary's munitions
storage sites could pose a significant security challenge during an
occupying force's follow-on operations. A large amount of munitions in
such an adversary's country could require an occupying force to
dedicate significant manpower to secure or destroy the contents of the
major munitions storage sites. Furthermore, the remnants of an
adversary's forces, insurgents, or terrorists could draw from any large
conventional munitions storage network left unsecured by an occupying
force.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
In our report, we concluded that a fundamental gap existed between the
OIF war plan assumptions and the experiences of U.S. and coalition
forces in Iraq, contributing to insufficient troops being on the ground
to prevent widespread looting of conventional munitions storage sites
and resulting in looted munitions being a continuing asymmetric threat
to U.S. and coalition forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs
of this failure to provide sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs
made with looted munitions causing about half of all U.S. combat
fatalities and casualties in Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis and
contributing to increasing instability, challenging U.S. strategic
goals in Iraq. Further, DOD does not appear to have conducted a
theaterwide survey and assessed the risk associated with unsecured
conventional munitions storage sites to U.S. forces and others. Such a
survey and assessment combined with associated risk mitigation
strategies--such as providing more troops or other security measures--
could assist DOD in conserving lives and in meeting its strategic goal
to leave a stable nation behind when U.S. forces ultimately leave Iraq.
We recommended that the Joint Chief of Staff conduct a theaterwide
survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions
in Iraq and report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results
of those strategies to Congress.
We also concluded that in preparing for future operations DOD's actions
in response to OIF lessons learned primarily have focused on countering
IEDs and not on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as
a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration for future
operations. Although good first steps, these actions do not address
what we believe is a critical OIF lesson learned, the strategic
importance of securing conventional munitions storage sites during and
after major combat operations. Unsecured conventional munitions storage
sites can represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would
require significant manpower or other resources during and after major
combat operations to secure. Therefore, since joint doctrine is to
present fundamental principles as well as contemporary lessons that
guide the employment of forces, we believe that it is important that
DOD clearly and explicitly address the security of conventional
munitions storage sites in revisions to joint doctrine. Therefore we
recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporate conventional
munitions storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all
levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine,
instructions, manuals, and other directives.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the
department conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding
unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is
imperative that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional
munitions storage sites be conducted, military commanders in theater
are aware of the significant risk posed by the sites, and similar
studies and assessments have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD
also stated that from a manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide
survey is not feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts
in Iraq and the region. As the evidence in our report clearly supports,
we made this recommendation because we did not see any evidence of a
strategic-level survey or an effective, theaterwide risk mitigation
strategy to address the commanders' awareness of this significant risk
or the findings of the studies and assessments regarding security of
conventional munitions storage sites. Accordingly, the intent behind
our recommendation is to have DOD assess the risks associated with
unsecured conventional munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide
basis to develop an effective risk mitigation strategy.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the
department report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of
those strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation, DOD
stated that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the
department and Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress
remain at the strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was
not our intention to detract tactical units from the current
warfighting mission or to suggest congressional oversight is needed for
each tactical unit. Instead, we are recommending that DOD alert
Congress of its assessment and the actions being taken to mitigate the
strategic risk associated with unsecured conventional munitions in
Iraq.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the
department incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage
sites as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy
and guidance and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the
appropriate language in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD
stated that (1) Iraq is a separate case and should not be considered
the standard for all future operations and (2) war plans must reflect
proper prioritization based on desired operational effects and
resources available as it may not always be possible or desirable in a
resource-and time-constrained environment to secure all sites or
destroy all munitions. We agree with these statements. The purpose of
this report was not to suggest that Iraq be the standard for all future
conflicts or to restrict commanders' planning prerogatives. Instead,
the report suggests that as DOD incorporates OIF lessons learned into
joint doctrine, it includes what is a key OIF lesson learned--an
adversary's stockpile of conventional munitions can be an asymmetric
threat to U.S. forces.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For questions about this statement, please contact Davi D'Agostino at
(202) 512-5431. Other individuals making key contributions to this
statement include: Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director, Renee Brown, Donna
Byers, John Van Schiak, and Nicole Volchko.
FOOTNOTES
[1] CENTCOM is one of five geographic combatant commands. A combatant
command is a unified command established by the President of the United
States with a broad continuing mission under a single commander.
[2] Conventional munitions are complete devices charged with
explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition that
are not nuclear, biological, or chemical for use in military
operations.
[3] GAO, Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source
Recovery Effort and Apply Lessons Learned to Further Recovery Missions,
GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).
[4] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage
Sites to Future Operations Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March
22, 2007).
[5] GAO-05-672.
[6] GAO-05-672.
[7] Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq
and Afghanistan: Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations,
United States Senate, 108th Cong. 133 (2003).
[8] Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, On Point: U.S. Army in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, D.C.: 2004).
[9] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One)
(Norfolk, Va.: January 2006).
[10] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis,
Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two).
[11] Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive Devices in
Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures, RS22330 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23,
2005).
[12] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned
Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage
Sites to Future Operations Planning, GAO-7-444 (Washington, D.C.: March
22, 2007).
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