Stabilizing Iraq
Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces Gao ID: GAO-07-612T March 13, 2007The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component in U.S. efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the United States has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces. DOD has also asked for an additional $5.8 billion in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request to continue U.S. efforts to develop Iraq forces and transition security responsibilities to them. This testimony discusses the (1) results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued reports and ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents.
As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped 327,000 Iraqi security forces--a substantial increase from the 142,000 reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that of the 153,000-strong U.S.-led coalition currently in Iraq. While the Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December 2006. Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have a primary mission of counterinsurgency--specifically, the Iraqi army. The other major component--the Iraqi police--has civilian law enforcement as its primary mission. Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army units. Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military, including fuel and ammunition. The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. While DOD captures this information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), it does not provide this critical information to Congress. These data provide information on capabilities and gaps in Iraqi units' manpower, equipment, and training levels, and as of late 2006, assess each unit's operational effectiveness. Congress needs this information to make informed appropriations decisions and engage in meaningful oversight. Despite repeated attempts over many months, we have yet to be provided the TRA information we are seeking.
GAO-07-612T, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces
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Testimony:
Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 3:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 13, 2007:
Stabilizing Iraq:
Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces:
Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
This testimony was amended on March 23, 2007, to reflect a change on
page 9. Footnote 5 was removed because the information in Appendix I
supercedes the information in the footnote.
GAO-07-612T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-612T, a report to House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Why GAO Did This Study:
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired end-
state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and
secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a
full partner in the global war on terrorism. Developing capable Iraqi
security forces is a critical component in U.S. efforts to achieve this
important goal. Since 2003, the United States has provided $15.4
billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces. DOD has also asked
for an additional $5.8 billion in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental
request and fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request to
continue U.S. efforts to develop Iraq forces and transition security
responsibilities to them.
This testimony discusses the (1) results of U.S. efforts to develop
Iraqi security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of
effective Iraqi security forces.
This testimony is based on GAO‘s issued reports and ongoing work on
U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both classified
and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based
only on unclassified documents. We completed this work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found:
As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped
327,000 Iraqi security forces”a substantial increase from the 142,000
reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that
of the 153,000-strong U.S.-led coalition currently in Iraq. While the
Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading counterinsurgency
operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to reduce
the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day
have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December
2006.
Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security
forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security
forces has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are
not a single unified force with a primary mission of countering the
insurgency in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have
a primary mission of counterinsurgency”specifically, the Iraqi army.
The other major component”the Iraqi police”has civilian law enforcement
as its primary mission.
Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in
an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for
duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized
reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many
coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage
of the 180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition
trained and equipped.
Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of
Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior
and the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr
Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the
dependability of many Iraqi army units.
Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon
the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was
providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military,
including fuel and ammunition.
The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed
information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. While DOD captures
this information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), it
does not provide this critical information to Congress. These data
provide information on capabilities and gaps in Iraqi units‘ manpower,
equipment, and training levels, and as of late 2006, assess each unit‘s
operational effectiveness. Congress needs this information to make
informed appropriations decisions and engage in meaningful oversight.
Despite repeated attempts over many months, we have yet to be provided
the TRA information we are seeking.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-612T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff, 202-512-
8979, christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi
security forces. In November 2005, the National Security Council issued
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq to clarify the President's
strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in
Iraq. The strategy articulated the desired end-state for U.S.
operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well
integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the
global war on terrorism. To achieve this end state, the United States
is, among other things, developing Iraqi military and police forces
that will be capable of leading security operations. Ultimately the
U.S. goal is to transfer security responsibilities from the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi
government as their capability and the security situation improve. From
2003 through 2006, the United States provided about $15.4 billion to
develop Iraqi military and police forces. The U.S.-led MNF-I is
responsible for developing Iraqi forces. [Footnote 1]
My testimony discusses (1) the results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi
security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of
effective Iraqi forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued
reports[Footnote 2] and ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq.
Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the
information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents.
To develop the information presented here, we relied on a number of
prior GAO reports and, where appropriate, we updated data. To update
data on the results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces,
we reviewed DOD and MNF-I documents and obtained and assessed MNF-I
data on enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi
partners from the Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for establishing general trends in the
number of attacks. To assess and update information on factors
affecting the development of Iraqi security forces, we reviewed DOD and
State reports, transcripts of MNF-I and U.S. Embassy conferences, and
MNF-I guidance on Iraqi readiness assessments. This work was conducted
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped
327,000 Iraqi security forces--a substantial increase from the 142,000
reported in March 2005. The number of Iraqi security forces is more
than double that of MNF-I's January force level of about 153,000
personnel. While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are
increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations, they and MNF-I have
been unable to reduce the levels of violence in Iraq. Enemy-initiated
attacks per day have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about
160 in December 2006.
Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi
security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi
forces has not decreased violence.
* First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with
a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. Only one major
component of the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi army, has
counterinsurgency as its primary mission. The Iraqi army represents
about 40 percent of the 327,000 Iraqi security personnel. The other
major component--the Iraqi police--has civilian law enforcement as its
primary mission.
* Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result
in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for
duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized
reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many
coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage
of the 180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition
trained and equipped. In addition, DOD estimates that one-third of
Iraqi soldiers are on leave at any one time as they return home to
provide money to their families.
* Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of
Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior
and the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr
Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the
dependability of many Iraqi army units.
* Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon
the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was
providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military,
including life support, fuel, uniforms, building supplies, ammunition,
vehicle maintenance and spare parts, and medical supplies.
The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed
information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I captures such
information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), but DOD
does not provide this critical information to Congress. The TRA reports
provide information on and identify gaps in areas such as each Iraqi
unit's manpower, equipment, training levels and, as of late 2006,
operational effectiveness and reliability. Congress needs this
information to make informed appropriations decisions and engage in
meaningful oversight. Despite repeated attempts over many months, we
have yet to be provided the TRA information we are seeking.
Background:
In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the military
organizations of the former regime, and the United States and Iraq
began the process of reestablishing or creating new Iraqi military and
police forces. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed
responsibility in their areas for recruiting and training some Iraqi
military and police forces. In October 2003, the multinational force
outlined a multistep plan for transferring security missions to the
Iraqi forces. The plan had the objective of gradually decreasing the
number of U.S. forces in conjunction with neutralizing Iraq's
insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of securing the country.
From the fall of 2003 through April 2006, MNF-I revised its security
transition plan a number of times because the Iraqi government and its
military and police forces proved incapable of assuming security
responsibilities within the timeframes envisioned by the plans. MNF-I
first revised the security transition plan in its August 2004 campaign
plan and later in the April 2006 joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad
Campaign Plan. In our classified briefings to members and staff, we
have discussed the campaign plan and conditions for drawing down U.S.
forces. Details of the plans are classified and can be discussed
separately from this unclassified statement.[Footnote 3]
The current version of MNF-I's security transition plan includes the
following four phases. According to State and DOD officials, MNF-I and
the U.S. Embassy Baghdad are in the process of revising their April
2006 Joint Campaign Plan, which includes the current security
transition plan.
* Partnership: During the first phase, which occurred from 2005 through
2006, MNF-I expanded the use of military, police, and other transition
teams to assist in the development of Iraqi security forces and
ministries. Its major subordinate commands established partnerships
with Iraqi military units.
* Iraqi army lead: In the second phase, currently ongoing, MNF-I is
attempting to organize and develop Iraqi army units so that they can
assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. Units in the lead,
however, still require MNF-I support because they need to develop
additional capabilities, particularly in the logistics and combat
support areas.
* Provincial Iraqi control: For the third phase, MNF-I and the Iraqi
government determine when the Iraqi provinces can assume responsibility
for security based on the threat level in the province, the
capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and the provincial
government, and MNF-I's ability to respond to major threats, if needed.
According to an MNF-I official, as these conditions are met, MNF-I
forces will then move out of all urban areas and assume a supporting
role.
* Iraqi security self-reliance: The government of Iraq is capable of
planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces
through its security ministries.
DOD has asked for an additional $5.8 billion to develop the Iraqi
security forces in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and the
fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request (see table 1). Of
this amount, about $3.25 billion (about 56 percent) would purchase
equipment and transportation for the Iraqi security forces. For
example, DOD requests resources to establish vehicle maintenance
facilities at the National Maintenance Depot located in Taji and to
procure equipment for the Iraqi military. DOD is also requesting about
$1.29 billion for sustainment projects, such as those to support the
Ministry of Interior's seven central warehouses that manage the storage
and distribution of mission essential equipment procured for the Iraqi
police.
Table 1: Request for Additional Funds to Develop Iraqi Security Forces
(dollars in millions):
Category: Infrastructure;
2007 Supplemental: MOD: 264.8;
2007 Supplemental: MOI: 205.0;
2007 Supplemental: Not Specified: 0;
2007 Supplemental: Subtotal: 469.8;
2008: MOD: 0;
2008: MOI: 0;
2008: Subtotal: 0;
Total: 469.8.
Category: Equipment and Transportation;
2007 Supplemental: MOD: 1,584.3;
2007 Supplemental: MOI: 373.6;
2007 Supplemental: Not Specified: 0;
2007 Supplemental: Subtotal: 1,957.9;
2008: MOD: 1,043.0;
2008: MOI: 245.0;
2008: Subtotal: 1,288.0;
Total: 3,245.9.
Category: Training and Operations;
2007 Supplemental: MOD: 51.7;
2007 Supplemental: MOI: 52.9;
2007 Supplemental: Not Specified: 0;
2007 Supplemental: Subtotal: 104.6;
2008: MOD: 77.0;
2008: MOI: 500.0;
2008: Subtotal: 577.0;
Total: 681.6.
Category: Sustainment;
2007 Supplemental: MOD: 1,079.6;
2007 Supplemental: MOI: 72.9;
2007 Supplemental: Not Specified: 0;
2007 Supplemental: Subtotal: 1,152.5;
2008: MOD: 135.0;
2008: MOI: 0;
2008: Subtotal: 135.0;
Total: 1,287.5.
Category: Related Activities;
2007 Supplemental: MOD: 0;
2007 Supplemental: MOI: 0;
2007 Supplemental: Not Specified: 157.5;
2007 Supplemental: Subtotal: 157.5;
2008: MOD: 0;
2008: MOI: 0;
2008: Subtotal: 0;
Total: 157.5.
Category: Total;
2007 Supplemental: MOD: 2,980.4;
2007 Supplemental: MOI: 704.4;
2007 Supplemental: Not Specified: 157.5;
2007 Supplemental: Subtotal: 3,842.3;
2008: MOD: 1,255.0;
2008: MOI: 745.0;
2008: Subtotal: 2,000.0;
Total: 5,842.3.
Source: Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund, Justification for Iraq
Security and Afghan Security Forces Fund, February 2007.
[End of table]
DOD is also requesting smaller amounts for infrastructure and training
projects, as well as related activities. For example, infrastructure
projects include the construction of logistical sustainment facilities
at the Taji National Depot, while training projects include the
training of Iraqi police officers who will serve as trainers at the 18
Iraqi provincial police headquarters. Finally, under the related
activities category, DOD has requested about $155 million to support
Iraqi security forces in the implementation of a disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program for militias.
Changing Composition and Growth of Iraqi Security Forces Have Not Led
to a Decrease in Violence:
The Iraqi security forces are comprised of Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior forces that vary in size and training. Overall,
the number of operational Iraqi military and police personnel has
increased from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February
2007. Ministry of Interior forces are made up of the Iraqi police and
other components such as the national police (formerly known as special
police) that have differing levels of training. The Iraqi police
account for over 70 percent of all Ministry of Interior personnel. Even
though the number of Iraqi forces has grown and more have taken the
lead for security operations, violence in Iraq increased significantly
through the end of 2006.
Iraqi Military and Police Force Levels Have Increased Over Time:
The number of military and police forces in Iraq has increased from
about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007, making
the total number of personnel over twice that of the 153,000 U.S. and
other coalition forces under MNF-I, as of January 2007. The Iraqi total
includes about 135,000 personnel under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
and about 192,000 personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Table 2
provides the force levels for the major components of the Iraq security
forces in March 2005 and in February 2007.
Table 2: Status of Iraqi Security Forces:
Ministry: Defense;
Component: Iraqi Army;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 59,880;
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 132,856[B].
Ministry: Defense;
Component: Air Force;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 186;
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 929.
Ministry: Defense;
Component: Navy;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 517;
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 1,135.
Ministry: Defense; Component: Sub-total;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 60,583[ C];
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 134,920[C].
Ministry: Interior;
Component: Iraqi Police Service;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 55,015[D];
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 135,000.
Ministry: Interior;
Component: Other MOI forces: National Police;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: [Empty];
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 24,400.
Ministry: Interior;
Component: Other MOI forces: Border Enforcement;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: [Empty];
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 28,400.
Ministry: Interior;
Component: Other MOI forces: Other;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: [Empty];
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 4,400.
Ministry: Interior;
Component: Other MOI forces: Subtotal;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 26,874;
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 57,200.
Ministry: Interior;
Component: Sub-total;
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 81,889[E];
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 192,200.
Total;
Component: [Empty];
March 2005 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 142,472;
February 2007 Operational/ Trained and Equipped[A]: 327,120[F].
Sources: State Department and Multinational Security Transition Command
reports.
[A] The term "operational" refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The
term "trained and equipped" refers to Ministry of Interior forces.
Numbers are from State Department's 3/9/05 and 2/28/07 Iraq Weekly
Status Report and Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi
Security Forces Update, 1/26/07.
[B] Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.
[C] Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of
Defense numbers.
[D] The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway
patrol forces.
[E] Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior
numbers.
[F] The total does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities
Protection Service personnel working in 27 ministries.
[End of table]
Ministry of Defense forces are comprised of the Iraqi army's 10
divisions, as well as a small air force and navy.[Footnote 4] The Iraqi
army generally receives 13 weeks of basic training, up from 8 weeks of
basic training in 2005. Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of
Iraqi police--which represents about 72 percent of police personnel
within the interior ministry--and other units, specifically, the
national police (formerly the special police), Department of Border
Enforcement, and Center for Dignitary Protection. Iraqi police
precincts are under the operational control of their local municipality
and the corresponding provincial government. New Iraqi police recruits
generally undergo a 10-week basic training course. Police with prior
experience attend a 3-week course instead of the basic course. The
national police receive 6 weeks of initial training.
Levels of Violence in Iraq Remain High Despite Increased Numbers of
Iraqi Security Forces and Greater Numbers of Iraqi Battalions Leading
Operations:
The overall growth in trained and equipped Iraqi security forces and
the increasing number of Iraqi army battalions leading
counterinsurgency operations has not resulted in lower levels of
violence in Iraq. As shown in figure 1, since June 2003, overall
security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex,
as evidenced by the increased numbers of attacks against the coalition
and its Iraqi partners and the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian strife after the
February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
Partners Compared with Progress in Developing Iraqi Security Forces:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: Multinational Force-Iraq, DOD and State Reports, and DIA.
Notes: DOD has not provided GAO with unclassified attack data for
November 2006 or an unclassified breakout for September 2006. We are
providing the subcommittee with the complete, classified data through
late February 2007 in a separate document.
[End of figure]
The average total attacks per day has increased from about 70 per day
in January 2006 to about 160 per day in December 2006, near the
previous record high of 180 per day reached in October 2006. These
attacks have increased around major religious and political
events, including Ramadan and elections. Coalition forces are still the
primary target of attacks, but the number of attacks on Iraqi security
forces and civilians also has increased since 2003. In October 2006,
the State Department reported that the recent increase in violence had
hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and showed the
difficulty in making political and economic progress in the absence of
adequate security conditions. In the President's revised strategy for
Iraq, he stated that while political progress, economic gains, and
security are intertwined, political and economic progress are unlikely
absent a basic level of security.
In an effort to expand the combat power of the Iraqi army, Prime
Minister Maliki announced in the fall of 2006 that the Iraqi government
would expand the Iraqi army from 133,000 to about 164,000 personnel.
This would allow the Iraqi army to grow from 10 to 13 divisions, 36 to
41 brigades, and 112 to 132 battalions. The initiative would also help
compensate for personnel shortages in some existing Iraqi army units.
In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, DOD stated that the
government of Iraq will fund the equipment for new Iraqi army units as
the government assumes increasing financial responsibility for Iraqi
security forces. However, the request also stated that the United
States has approved assistance to the Iraqi government to train and
equip the additional Iraqi army units that the Prime Minister
requested. Iraq's financial contribution to the continued development
of its security forces was not specified in the supplemental request.
We are completing a review of the Iraqi ministries' abilities to
provide for their own security and reconstruction needs.
Several Factors Complicate the Development of the Iraqi Security
Forces; More Information Is Needed to Assess Their Capabilities:
Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi
security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi
security forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence. These
factors include (1) the portion of Iraqi security forces dedicated to a
counterinsurgency mission, (2) high-rates of absenteeism and poor Iraqi
ministry reporting of active duty personnel, (3) sectarian and militia
influences within Iraqi forces, and (4) shortfalls in Iraqi logistical,
command and control, and sustainment capabilities. A complete
assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the Iraqi security
forces can only be determined through an analysis of data on their
readiness. We have requested unit-level TRAs from DOD but have not
received them as of March 9, 2007.
Several Factors Have Complicated the Development of Effective Iraqi
Security Forces:
The following factors help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi
security forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence.
First, Iraqi security forces are not a single, unified force; instead,
they are comprised of a wide range of units with different missions
that have changed over time. Of the security forces' major components,
only the Iraqi army currently has the primary mission of conducting
counterinsurgency operations. The Iraqi army has evolved over the past
3 years from two distinct forces: (1) army units that had the mission
of defending Iraq against external threats, and (2) former national
guard battalions[Footnote 5] that were established to perform
constabulary duties such as setting up traffic control points and
cordoning off streets in their home areas. In early 2005, the Iraqi
government decided to move Iraqi national guard battalions into the
Iraqi army and give the entire army the mission of conducting
counterinsurgency operations countrywide. The Iraqi army is currently
the second largest component of the Iraqi security forces and
represents about 41 percent of all Iraqi security personnel.
The Iraqi national police--a paramilitary force of about 24,000
personnel under the Ministry of Interior--had conducted
counterinsurgency operations in the past, but the Iraqi government
decided in late 2006 to transform it into a civil security force due to
frequent allegations of abuse and other illegal activities. This
transformation includes a 4-week retraining program for Iraq's national
police. While the 135,000 Iraqi police are often forced to engage
insurgents and other anti-Iraqi forces, their primary mission and
training has focused on civilian law enforcement. The Iraqi police
currently comprise about 41 percent of Iraqi security forces.
Second, the number of Iraqi security forces who are present for duty is
significantly lower than the number of trained and equipped Iraqi
personnel reported by DOD and State. For example, data on the number of
trained and equipped Ministry of Interior personnel include police who
are absent without leave, while Ministry of Defense data exclude
military personnel who are absent without leave. In addition, according
to DOD's November 2006 report to Congress, due to a lack of
standardized personnel strength reporting in the Ministry of Interior,
it is unclear how many of the coalition-trained police the ministry
still employs, or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be
on the ministry payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Moreover,
according to a DOD report, the Iraqi army generally has about one-third
of its soldiers (about 44,000 of 133,000 personnel) on leave so that
they can take their pay home to their families. In addition, some Iraqi
army units directed to deploy for combat operations outside of their
normal operating areas have absent without leave rates of more than 50
percent. This high-rate of absenteeism significantly affects the
manning levels of Iraqi army units at any given time.
Third, sectarian and militia influences on the Iraqi security forces
have frustrated U.S. efforts to develop effective Iraqi military and
police forces and have contributed to the high levels of violence in
Iraq. According to the unclassified January 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of
many Iraqi units and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve
outside the areas where they were recruited. According to an August
2006 DOD report, sectarian lines among the Iraqi security forces are
drawn geographically, with Sunni, Shi'a, or Kurdish soldiers serving
primarily in units located in areas familiar to their group. According
to the report, commanders at the battalion level tend to command only
soldiers of their own sectarian or regional background. DOD also
reported in November 2006 that political forces in Iraq may have
influenced senior military appointments on the basis of sectarian
affiliation.
Moreover, DOD and State also have reported numerous instances of
sectarian and militia influences on Iraqi police and national police.
For example, according to a DOD report, during operations to secure
Baghdad in summer 2006, Shi'a death squads received support from some
elements of the Iraqi police and the national police. DOD reported that
the police facilitated militia movement and warned death squads of
operations, serving as the major reason for the increased levels of
murders and executions. Further, in November 2006, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated that the Ministry of Interior
and the Iraqi police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the
Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the DIA Director, the
Mahdi Army often operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi
police to detain and kill suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. In
November 2006, the State Department reported that corruption and
infiltration by militias and others loyal to parties other than the
Iraqi government have resulted in the Iraqi security forces,
particularly the police, being part of the problem in many areas
instead of the solution.
Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon
the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities.[Footnote 6] As of December 2006, the
coalition was providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi
military, including life support, fuel, uniforms, building supplies,
ammunition, vehicle maintenance and spare parts, and medical supplies.
More Information Is Needed to Fully Assess Progress in Developing
Effective Iraqi Security Forces:
The extent of the challenges affecting the development of effective
Iraqi security forces cannot be fully assessed without detailed
information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I captures such
information in its TRAs, but DOD does not provide this critical
information to Congress. The TRA reports provide ratings of Iraqi
capabilities and identify gaps in areas such as each Iraqi unit's
manpower, equipment, training levels and, as of late 2006, operational
effectiveness and reliability. GAO has requested but DOD has not
provided these unit-level TRAs.
MNF-I uses the TRA system to determine when units of the Iraqi security
forces can assume the lead for conducting security operations. The TRA
is a classified joint assessment, prepared monthly by the unit's
coalition commander and Iraqi commander. For the Iraqi army, commanders
use the TRA process to determine when a unit--specifically, a
battalion, a brigade headquarters, or a division headquarters--is
prepared to assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations.[Footnote
7] The TRA report contains capabilities ratings and detailed narrative
information for each unit in personnel, command and control, equipment,
sustainment/logistics, training, and leadership.[Footnote 8] Appendix 1
shows a sample TRA form, as of December 1, 2006. As of late 2006, the
TRA also includes measures for determining how militia and sectarian
influences affect the loyalty and reliability of Iraqi police and
military forces. According to MNF-I guidance, the purpose of the TRA
system is to provide commanders with a method to consistently evaluate
units. It also helps to identify factors hindering unit progress,
determine resource shortfalls, and make resource allocations.
DOD provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall
readiness levels for the Iraqi security forces and information on units
in the lead. In mid-February, DOD allowed us to review TRAs from 2
battalions--1 Iraqi army battalion and 1 national police battalion.
However, DOD has not provided us with all unit-level TRA reports. We
are continuing to work with the department to obtain these reports
because they would help fully inform Congress on the capabilities and
needs of Iraqi security forces. As of March 9, 2007, DOD has not
provided GAO with this important data.
Conclusion:
Capable and effective Iraqi security forces are a critical element in
the U.S. strategy to stabilize Iraq, drawdown U.S. forces, and lay the
foundation for political reconciliation and economic development. For
the past 3 years, MNF-I has tried to reduce violence in Iraq so that
Iraqi forces can assume greater responsibility for their country's
security. The additional $5.8 billion that DOD now seeks for the Iraqi
security forces attests to the importance of this mission. But, after 3
years, more than $15 billion in prior U.S. assistance and a substantial
increase in the number of Iraqi security forces, violence in Iraq's
society has not lessened.
This outcome is partly explained by the differing capabilities among
Iraqi forces, high absenteeism, divided loyalties, and the continued
reliance on U.S. logistical support. Other reasons may be discerned
from the readiness assessments coalition advisors complete on Iraqi
units. These classified assessments show whether Iraqi units have their
required manpower, equipment, and training and how well they perform in
battle. We have asked DOD to provide us the TRAs, but they have not
done so. We appreciate the Committee's continuing support for our
request.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. Christoff
at (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Judith
McCloskey, David Bruno, Lynn Cothern, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring,
and Mary Moutsos.
FOOTNOTES
[1] In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential
Directive, which stated that DOD would be responsible for U.S.
activities relating to security and military operations in Iraq after
the transition of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the
Iraqi government. The presidential directive established that the U.S.
Central Command would direct all U.S. government efforts to organize,
equip, and train Iraqi security forces. The Coalition Provisional
Authority, established in May 2003, was the U.N.-recognized coalition
authority led by the United States and United Kingdom that was
responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq.
[2] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007);
and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in
Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police,
GAO-05-431T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2005); and Rebuilding Iraq:
Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight
Issues, GAO-04-902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
[3] See GAO, DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security
Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-152C (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005); and Plans for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-673C
(Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006).
[4] As of January 2007, the Iraqi army consisted of 10 divisions, 36
brigades, and 112 battalions. Nine Iraqi army divisions are light
infantry and one is a mechanized division. The Iraq air force consists
of 5 squadrons; the Iraqi navy has 4 squadrons and a marine battalion.
[5] The Iraqi National Guard was first known as the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps.
[6] GAO-07-582T, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on
Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: March
9, 2007); and Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues
for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
2007).
[7] MNF-I uses similar measures to assess the capabilities of other
components of the Iraqi security forces.
[8] See GAO-07-308SP for more information on the TRA process.
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