Defense Acquisitions
Status and Challenges of Joint Forces Command's Limited Acquisition Authority Gao ID: GAO-07-546 April 12, 2007Over 3 years ago, Congress granted limited acquisition authority (LAA)--subject to delegation by the Secretary of Defense--to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for a 3-year period to expedite development and acquisition of certain warfighter equipment. Congress directed GAO to report on JFCOM LAA implementation. GAO's report, issued in November 2005, said JFCOM finished five LAA projects and was working on a sixth project, and that JFCOM had experienced difficulty finding funding to develop, acquire, and sustain LAA projects. Last year, Congress extended LAA through September 2008 and again directed GAO to report on LAA. This report updates the status of JFCOM LAA efforts since the authority was enacted and key LAA challenges.
JFCOM has not approved any LAA projects since GAO's November 2005 report, and the LAA project that was incomplete as of then remains so. The projects generally fall under the category of battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence. Research funding provided for the six LAA projects has risen from $9 million in 2005 to $14 million as of January 2007. No procurement funds had been used for these projects as of then. Feedback from the projects' recipients--the warfighter--has been mostly positive about the LAA acquisition process and capabilities delivered. The Department of Defense (DOD) and JFCOM face several LAA challenges, one of which goes to the role of LAA. Shortly after LAA's enactment, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) to provide timely solutions for joint urgent warfighter needs. GAO analysis indicates that JRAC and JFCOM LAA cover similar ground and could overlap even more if JRAC is allowed to address needs other than for ongoing named operations. JRAC might have also been able to carry out most, if not all, of the six LAA projects had it existed when they were approved by JFCOM. Other challenges relate to how LAA is managed and operated. JFCOM officials said funding remains an issue because LAA is an authority without budgeted funds. JFCOM LAA staff tries to find funding for approved projects from other DOD organizations. When funding could not be found, JFCOM funded most of the six LAA projects with funds budgeted for other JFCOM work. The search for funding lengthens the time to get capabilities to the warfighter. JRAC does not have budgeted funds either, but has greater access to funding than JFCOM. Another challenge involves uncertainty between JFCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding what LAA powers were delegated to JFCOM. Until the uncertainty is resolved, how JFCOM should carry out LAA efforts will remain unclear.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-546, Defense Acquisitions: Status and Challenges of Joint Forces Command's Limited Acquisition Authority
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2007:
Defense Acquisitions:
Status and Challenges of Joint Forces Command's Limited Acquisition
Authority:
GAO-07-546:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-546, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Over 3 years ago, Congress granted limited acquisition authority
(LAA)”subject to delegation by the Secretary of Defense”to U.S. Joint
Forces Command (JFCOM) for a 3-year period to expedite development and
acquisition of certain warfighter equipment. Congress directed GAO to
report on JFCOM LAA implementation. GAO‘s report, issued in November
2005, said JFCOM finished five LAA projects and was working on a sixth
project, and that JFCOM had experienced difficulty finding funding to
develop, acquire, and sustain LAA projects. Last year, Congress
extended LAA through September 2008 and again directed GAO to report on
LAA. This report updates the status of JFCOM LAA efforts since the
authority was enacted and key LAA challenges.
What GAO Found:
JFCOM has not approved any LAA projects since GAO‘s November 2005
report, and the LAA project that was incomplete as of then remains so.
The projects generally fall under the category of battle management
command, control, communications, and intelligence. Research funding
provided for the six LAA projects has risen from $9 million in 2005 to
$14 million as of January 2007. No procurement funds had been used for
these projects as of then. Feedback from the projects‘ recipients”the
warfighter”has been mostly positive about the LAA acquisition process
and capabilities delivered.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and JFCOM face several LAA challenges,
one of which goes to the role of LAA. Shortly after LAA‘s enactment,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense created the JRAC to provide timely
solutions for joint urgent warfighter needs. GAO analysis indicates
that JRAC and JFCOM LAA cover similar ground and could overlap even
more if JRAC is allowed to address needs other than for ongoing named
operations. JRAC might have also been able to carry out most, if not
all, of the six LAA projects had it existed when they were approved by
JFCOM. The following table shows key aspects of the two processes.
Table: Key Aspects of JFCOM LAA and JRAC Rapid Acquisition Current
Processes:
Is it to address joint urgent needs?; JFCOM LAA: Yes;
JRAC: Yes.
In what time frae are needs to be met?; JFCOM LAA: Within 2 years;
JRAC: Within 2 years.
Can solution already be in development?; JFCOM LAA: Yes;
JRAC: Yes.
Must the need be for an ongoing, named operation?; JFCOM LAA: No;
JRAC: Yes.
Must the need be to prevent loss of life or mission failure?; JFCOM
LAA: No;
JRAC: Yes.
Is the need to be submitted by a combatant commander?; JFCOM LAA: Yes;
JRAC: Yes.
Is there a dollar limit per project for research funding?; JFCOM LAA:
Yes, estimated to be less than $ 10 million; JRAC: Yes, $365 million or
less in fiscal year 2000 dollars.
Is there a dollar limit per project for procurement funding?; JFCOM
LAA: Yes, estimated to be less $50 million; JRAC: Yes, $2.19 billion or
less in fiscal year 2000 dollars.
Source: GAO analysis of JFCOM LAA and JRAC processes.
[End of table]
Other challenges relate to how LAA is managed and operated. JFCOM
officials said funding remains an issue because LAA is an authority
without budgeted funds. JFCOM LAA staff tries to find funding for
approved projects from other DOD organizations. When funding could not
be found, JFCOM funded most of the six LAA projects with funds budgeted
for other JFCOM work. The search for funding lengthens the time to get
capabilities to the warfighter. JRAC does not have budgeted funds
either, but has greater access to funding than JFCOM. Another challenge
involves uncertainty between JFCOM and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense regarding what LAA powers were delegated to JFCOM. Until the
uncertainty is resolved, how JFCOM should carry out LAA efforts will
remain unclear.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense reassess the role of JFCOM
LAA in light of changes contemplated for the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell (JRAC) process, to determine whether and how JFCOM LAA should play
a role in meeting joint urgent needs; to the extent JFCOM LAA is to
continue to play a role, assess and resolve the challenges identified
in this report; and inform Congress of the results of the assessment
and decisions. DOD concurred with GAO‘s recommendations. GAO added a
matter for congressional consideration regarding the timing of the
congressional decision on the future of JFCOM LAA.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-546].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
No JFCOM LAA Projects Approved since Prior GAO Report:
DOD and JFCOM Face Several Challenges with LAA:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: JFCOM LAA Proposals Received and Approved by Fiscal Year since
LAA Was Enacted:
Table 2: Status of Six Approved LAA Projects:
Table 3: Warfighter Feedback from GAO Questionnaire about LAA Projects:
Table 4: GAO Analysis of Key Aspects of the LAA and JRAC Rapid
Acquisition Current Processes:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
JFCOM: U.S. Joint Forces Command:
JRAC: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell:
LAA: limited acquisition authority:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 12, 2007:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
In fiscal year 2004, Congress provided statutory authority by which the
Secretary of Defense may delegate limited acquisition authority (LAA)
to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to enable the commander to
develop and acquire certain equipment to meet joint warfighting needs.
The authority, which does not come with associated funding, was enacted
for a 3-year period through September 30, 2006. When LAA was enacted,
Congress directed GAO to report on JFCOM's implementation of LAA. Our
report, issued in November 2005,[Footnote 1] stated that during fiscal
years 2004 and 2005, JFCOM had undertaken six LAA projects, five of
which had been completed and a sixth that was ongoing. We also reported
that JFCOM faced challenges, including finding funding to develop,
acquire, and sustain LAA projects. Since then, Congress has extended
LAA[Footnote 2] through the end of September 2008. As part of that
extension, Congress directed us to report again this year on JFCOM's
implementation of LAA. As agreed with your staff, we provided briefings
in December 2006 and January 2007 to satisfy that requirement. We also
agreed to provide a subsequent written report. Accordingly, this report
updates the (1) status of JFCOM's LAA efforts since the authority was
enacted and (2) key challenges facing LAA's continued implementation.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed key documents and
interviewed officials from a variety of Department of Defense (DOD)
organizations. To describe JFCOM's LAA efforts since the authority was
enacted, we met with JFCOM officials in Norfolk, Virginia, and
collected relevant documentation. We developed and used a questionnaire
to obtain feedback from warfighters who had been involved with LAA
projects and used LAA capabilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and countries
in Europe. We interviewed military officials at military facilities in
Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania. To identify key challenges since LAA's enactment, we
interviewed JFCOM officials, officials representing three organizations
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics), other officials in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff/J-8 officials, and officials from the
Army Rapid Equipping Force about the Army's rapid acquisition process.
We examined pertinent information about the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell (JRAC), a rapid acquisition process recently created within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, we did not conduct an in-
depth evaluation of JRAC or the JRAC process. We also obtained and
analyzed various documents and interviewed officials about JFCOM LAA's
policy and procedures and communicated with warfighters, contracting
personnel, and officials with selected project offices about challenges
with LAA. For additional details on how we performed our review, see
appendix I. We conducted our work from July 2006 to March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
JFCOM has not approved any new LAA projects since our November 2005
report was issued. The LAA project that was ongoing at that time
remains ongoing, with additional development remaining. It is unclear
why LAA activity has slowed down recently, although a JFCOM LAA
official attributed the slowdown, in part, to the lack of associated
funding for LAA. Funding otherwise obtained for the six approved LAA
projects totaled $14 million in research, development, test, and
evaluation funds as of January 2007--up from $9 million in 2005. No
procurement funds had been used for these projects as of January 2007.
JFCOM officials believe that LAA has been beneficial. Rather than have
warfighters wait for "100 percent" solutions, JFCOM delivered interim
joint solutions more quickly to meet urgent needs. We contacted
recipients of capabilities for the five completed projects; the
recipients who responded for four projects cited a positive experience
using the LAA process and with the utility and effectiveness of the
delivered capabilities. Also, DOD officials stated that LAA has been
valuable in the war on terror.
DOD and JFCOM face several challenges with LAA's continued
implementation. One challenge goes to the role of LAA. Specifically,
the goals of JFCOM's LAA efforts share a number of similarities with
those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense-created JRAC, which
came into existence within 10 months of JFCOM's LAA. Both the JFCOM LAA
and JRAC processes seek to provide timely solutions for joint urgent
warfighter needs. It is conceivable that most, if not all, of the six
LAA projects could have been carried out through JRAC. Other challenges
go to the mechanics of LAA itself. It is an authority, not an
acquisition program, and comes with no budgeted funds. Although JRAC
does not have budgeted funds either, it has greater access to funding
than JFCOM. The JFCOM LAA staff has sometimes invested substantial
amounts of time to obtain funding for the projects. Finding funding
adds to the time it takes to get new capabilities to the warfighter. In
the end, most of the funding to develop and acquire the first six
projects came from JFCOM's own non-LAA budget, which does not provide
for any LAA needs. Furthermore, after an LAA capability is delivered,
an obligation arises to pay for sustaining it over time, but the LAA
statute does not specifically provide authority to use operations and
maintenance funding to sustain such projects. Another challenge to the
mechanics of LAA involves uncertainty as to the exact nature of the LAA
delegation to JFCOM by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Specifically, while it is clear that a full delegation of LAA was not
made under the statute, it is unclear exactly what powers were
delegated to JFCOM and under which legal authorities--the LAA statute
or other authorities available to the Secretary of Defense--those
powers were provided. Failure to clarify these issues may impair
JFCOM's ability to carry out LAA efforts. Last, since our prior report,
JFCOM has established procedures to systematically assess the
effectiveness of capabilities fielded from LAA projects, but with no
LAA projects approved since then, the procedures have not yielded
additional data.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to reassess
the role of the JFCOM LAA in light of the expanding JRAC process, and
determine whether and how JFCOM LAA should play a role in meeting joint
urgent needs; to the extent JFCOM LAA is to continue to play a role in
meeting joint urgent needs, assess and resolve, as appropriate, the
funding, coordination, and delegation challenges identified in this
report; and inform Congress of the results of the assessment and any
resultant decisions in time for Congress to consider them in its
deliberations on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. DOD stated that it would reassess the role of JFCOM
LAA in light of the expanding JRAC process and consider the other
issues identified in this report as a part of that effort. DOD expects
to complete that reassessment by the fourth quarter of 2007. DOD also
stated that it would inform Congress of the result of that assessment
and any associated decisions.
In light of our recommendations, DOD's comments, and the fact that DOD
has provided Congress with a fiscal year 2008 legislative proposal that
would make the LAA statute permanent, we have added a matter for
congressional consideration to this report because we believe that
Congress might want to delay its consideration of making JFCOM LAA
permanent until DOD has informed Congress of the results of the
recommended assessment and any associated decisions. This should not
impair JFCOM LAA, as DOD plans to complete its assessment by the fourth
quarter of 2007 and LAA, as currently enacted, extends through
September 2008.
Background:
JFCOM is one of nine DOD combatant commands and has multiple missions,
including leading joint force transformation within DOD with the aid of
joint warfighting concepts and capabilities to enhance interoperability
for the combatant commands. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 granted LAA to JFCOM, subject to delegation by the
Secretary of Defense. The intent behind this LAA is to address measures
to meet urgent, unanticipated joint warfighting needs are conceived,
developed, and fielded in an expeditious manner. The LAA statute
specifically refers to equipment for the following purposes:
* battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence;
* any other equipment that the JFCOM commander determines is necessary
and appropriate to facilitate the use of joint forces in military
operations or enhance the interoperability of equipment used by the
various components of joint forces.
The statute limits the equipment to total expenditures per system
estimated to be less than $10 million for research, development, test,
and evaluation, or estimated to be less than $50 million for
procurement.
DOD's traditional acquisition process, which involves much larger
budgets and longer time frames, generally serves to meet less
immediate, material warfighter needs, that is, 2 years and beyond.
Frequently, more urgent needs arise, and several rapid acquisition
processes are available to handle such needs. JFCOM's LAA is one of
these processes. Another is a process defined in Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01,[Footnote 3] which is principally
managed by JRAC. Like JFCOM's LAA, the JRAC process addresses joint,
urgent needs. Each military service has its own rapid acquisition
process, but those processes focus on addressing the urgent needs of
each respective service, and may not address the joint needs of the
combatant commands. In addition, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization[Footnote 4] and the U.S. Special Operations
Command[Footnote 5] have their own acquisition processes.
No JFCOM LAA Projects Approved since Prior GAO Report:
Very little has changed with regard to usage of JFCOM's LAA since our
November 2005 report was issued. It is not clear why the activity on
LAA has slowed down during the past 19 months, although JFCOM officials
believe one of the reasons is due to the fact that the authority does
not have associated funding. Combatant commands are dissuaded from
using LAA when they find out JFCOM does not already have funding and
must obtain it for LAA projects, according to a JFCOM LAA official.
Since LAA's enactment over 3 years ago, JFCOM has received 12 LAA
proposals and approved 6. Table 1 summarizes the number of proposals
received and approved since LAA's enactment.
Table 1: JFCOM LAA Proposals Received and Approved by Fiscal Year since
LAA Was Enacted:
Fiscal year: 2004;
Proposals received: 5;
Proposals approved: 2.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Proposals received: 3;
Proposals approved: 4[A].
Fiscal year: 2006;
Proposals received: 4;
Proposals approved: 0.
Fiscal year: 2007 (through 1/2007);
Proposals received: 0;
Proposals approved: 0.
Total;
Proposals received: 12;
Proposals approved: 6.
Source: JFCOM data and GAO analysis.
[A] One LAA proposal that was received in fiscal year 2004 was not
approved until fiscal year 2005.
[End of table]
JFCOM has not received any LAA proposals so far in fiscal year 2007. In
fiscal year 2006, JFCOM received four proposals--three are still under
consideration and one was referred to JRAC. Fifteen months have elapsed
since one of the proposals was submitted, but the JFCOM commander has
not yet decided whether to accept or reject it. JFCOM merged two other
LAA proposals because they involved the same requested need by two
combatant commands. Although these two proposals were submitted in
October 2005 and March 2006, they have not been approved because JFCOM
officials have been trying to settle on a solution that will be
compatible with several other non-LAA-related DOD efforts. These
particular proposals are needed to enable exchange of secure, but
unclassified, information between U.S. and coalition forces. JFCOM
forwarded the remaining LAA proposal to JRAC, which approved it as a
JRAC project. Fielding of this capability began in October 2006. In
fiscal year 2004, JFCOM rejected two LAA proposals, in part because no
combatant command would validate them as joint urgent operational
needs.
Of the six approved LAA projects in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, five
were completed and deployed from 2 to 17 months after having been
approved. A sixth project is ongoing with additional development
remaining. The total funding obtained for the six projects has
increased from $9 million in research, development, test, and
evaluation funds in 2005 to $14 million through January 2007. No
procurement funds had been used as of January 2007, although the
ongoing speech translation project has identified a need for
procurement funding. U.S. Central Command has been the predominant
recipient of LAA capabilities--the command received capabilities from
five of the six projects. According to JFCOM, the LAA projects
accelerated the provision of capabilities to the warfighter by
providing 60 to 80 percent interim solutions for battlefield problems,
rather than having the warfighter wait years longer for a 100 percent
solution. Table 2 summarizes key information about the six projects.
Table 2: Status of Six Approved LAA Projects:
Status: Capability;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Land mine and
improvised explosive device detection along convoy routes by using
visual imagery;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move: Broadband
communication for commanders while moving over rough terrain or
dismounted from a vehicle;
LAA project name: Joint Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds: High-
altitude air drop of logistics support packages where ground delivery
or an airfield is not available;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: Remote access to classified and unclassified networks while
away from the headquarters compound;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[A]: Transfer
and integration of blue force tracking data from battle management,
command and control systems to strike aircraft;
LAA project name: Simultaneous 2-Way Speech Translation: Hands-free
device for simultaneous translation of American English to Iraqi Arabic
and vice versa.
Status: LAA-related cost (research, development, test, and evaluation
dollars);
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: $550,000;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move: $1.95 million;
LAA project name: Joint Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds: $2.19
million;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: $850,000;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[A]: $3.38
million;
LAA project name: Simultaneous 2-Way Speech Translation: $5.3 million.
Status: Months to complete and field[B];
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: 5-11;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move: 11-14;
LAA project name: Joint Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds: 16-17;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: 4-15;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[A]: 2-5;
LAA project name: Simultaneous 2-Way Speech Translation: Initial
fielding in 8-12; project is ongoing.
Status: Recipient/; command;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: U.S. Central Command;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move: U.S. Central Command
first received it, but decided not to field it; U.S. Special Operations
Command now has portions of the capability;
LAA project name: Joint Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds: U.S.
Special Operations Command;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[A]: U.S.
Central Command;
LAA project name: Simultaneous 2- Way Speech Translation: U.S. Central
Command.
Source: JFCOM data and GAO analysis.
[A] The full name is Joint Translator Forwarder--Rapid Attack
Information Dissemination Execution Relay-Joint Blue Force Situational
Awareness.
[B] The range of months reflects when the initial units of the
capability were fielded through the time when fielding was completed.
[End of table]
In response to a GAO questionnaire directed at recipients of JFCOM LAA
capabilities, warfighters generally provided positive feedback about
the process that JFCOM developed and implemented for LAA projects. We
contacted recipients of the capabilities for the five completed
projects and recipients responded for four projects. Recipients of
three capabilities used them in operational missions and were pleased
with their effectiveness. Three recipients said they would use JFCOM
LAA again. We did not receive feedback from the recipient of the Joint
Precision Air Drop System project, and we did not send the
questionnaire to the recipient of the Simultaneous 2-Way Speech
Translation project, as it is not yet complete. Table 3 summarizes the
questionnaire's results.
Table 3: Warfighter Feedback from GAO Questionnaire about LAA Projects:
GAO's questions: Was adequate training provided to use the LAA
capability?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Yes;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: Not applicable,
capability not yet fielded;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Yes;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: Yes.
GAO's questions: Were you satisfied with JFCOM's LAA process?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Yes;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: Yes;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Yes;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: Yes.
GAO's questions: Were you satisfied with the time it took to obtain the
capability?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Yes;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: Yes, LAA reduced
the time to get to operational testing by 6-12 months;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Yes, LAA
provided the fastest procurement of this system;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: Yes.
GAO's questions: Were you prepared to sustain the capability?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Yes;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: Not applicable,
capability not yet fielded;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Yes;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: No.
GAO's questions: Was the capability used operationally?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Yes, used it daily for
several months;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: Not applicable,
capability not yet fielded;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Yes, used
it 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to support global forces;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: Yes, used it as often as four times a week.
GAO's questions: Was the capability operationally effective?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Yes, it did what it
was supposed to do, but not what recipient wanted it to do;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: Not applicable,
capability not yet fielded;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Yes, very
effective;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: Yes, it's top-notch.
GAO's questions: What were the advantages of using LAA?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Allowed rapid pursuit
of the most promising technology to meet the need;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: LAA's speed and
ease of ordering greatly accelerated testing the capability;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Without
LAA, the capability would not have been used operationally;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: LAA streamlined the budget process and rapidly provided a much-
needed capability.
GAO's questions: Would you use LAA again?;
LAA project name: Change Detection Work Station: Person filling out
questionnaire said he was not in a position to answer at that time;
LAA project name: Command and Control on the Move[A]: Yes, most likely;
LAA project name: Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness[B]: Yes, most
definitely;
LAA project name: Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and
Control: Yes, without hesitation.
Source: Warfighters (data); GAO (presentation and analysis).
[A] The information is from the second recipient of the capability; the
first recipient decided not to field it.
[B] The full name is Joint Translator Forwarder-Rapid Attack
Information Dissemination Execution Relay-Joint Blue Force Situational
Awareness.
[End of table]
Separate from the questionnaire, in February 2007, DOD sent a fiscal
year 2008 legislative proposal to Congress requesting that the LAA
statute be made permanent and that the statute add the authority to use
operations and maintenance funds for sustainment of equipment after its
acquisition. In that proposal, DOD stated that LAA has been invaluable
in the war on terror.
JFCOM officials continue to manage LAA using a multi-phased process
they developed and formalized in July 2005 and revised in June
2006.[Footnote 6] JFCOM has drawn on mature technologies for its LAA
projects. Half of the LAA approved projects originated from existing
joint technology demonstration programs. According to JFCOM, LAA
projects also can originate from commercial and government off-the-
shelf products. An important part of the LAA process is to make sure
the desired capability does not duplicate capabilities under
development elsewhere in DOD or that are part of an existing program of
record. The requested capability can, however, accelerate such
capabilities. Within the LAA process, JFCOM conducts feasibility
assessments, including procedures to identify related efforts
throughout DOD. One effort to avoid duplication involves the JFCOM
science advisers. Each of the military services has a science adviser
at JFCOM who checks with the Defense Technical Information Center, a
repository of technical information in DOD. Another effort involves a
JFCOM official who coordinates with the Program Executive Office
Interchange--an initiative that supports Air Force, Army, Marine Corps,
and Navy command and control program executive offices--to find out if
any similar efforts exist in the services. Also, JFCOM LAA officials
said they plan to coordinate with JFCOM's Office of Research and
Technology Applications to use an online DOD system to research all
existing programs of record.
JFCOM does not have dedicated acquisition staff for LAA projects.
Instead, JFCOM has a staff of one full-time and two part-time
employees, who broker and facilitate the projects. For contracting and
acquisition services, JFCOM relies on others within DOD. The Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) has
directed five acquisition organizations from the military services and
a defense agency to provide assistance in development and acquisition
to JFCOM LAA on a priority basis. However, JFCOM indicated it is not
limited to using only these five.
DOD and JFCOM Face Several Challenges with LAA:
DOD and JFCOM face several challenges in continuing to implement LAA--
one challenge goes to the role of LAA and the other challenges deal
with how LAA is managed and operated.
Two Rapid Acquisition Processes Address Similar Joint Needs:
Ten months after Congress enacted the JFCOM LAA statute, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense created JRAC to manage a process that also
addresses the joint, urgent operational needs of combatant commanders.
The two processes cover similar ground, and given that the JRAC process
is expected to be expanded soon, they could overlap even more. Table 4
shows our analysis of the similarities in the two processes.
Table 4: GAO Analysis of Key Aspects of the LAA and JRAC Rapid
Acquisition Current Processes:
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Is
it to address joint needs?;
JFCOM LAA: Yes;
JRAC: Yes.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Is
it to address urgent needs?;
JFCOM LAA: Yes;
JRAC: Yes.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: In
what time frame are needs to be met?;
JFCOM LAA: Within 2 years;
JRAC: Within 2 years.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Can
the solution be currently in development?;
JFCOM LAA: Yes, most of the approved projects use technologies assessed
at high readiness levels;
JRAC: Yes, most of the approved projects use technologies assessed at
high readiness levels.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Must
the need be related to an ongoing, named operation?;
JFCOM LAA: No;
JRAC: Yes, currently, but change under consideration.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Must
the need be immediate to prevent loss of life or mission failure?;
JFCOM LAA: No;
JRAC: Yes.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Is
the need to be submitted by a combatant commander?;
JFCOM LAA: Yes. However, the JFCOM commander can initiate a project to
meet a need he identifies; for example, the commander initiated three
of the six LAA projects, while other combatant commanders validated the
needs for the other three projects;
JRAC: Yes.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Is
there a limit for research, development, test, and evaluation
expenditures per system?;
JFCOM LAA: Yes, the expenditure must be estimated to be less than $10
million;
JRAC: Yes, the expenditure must be $365 million or less in fiscal year
2000 dollars.
GAO's analytical questions about key aspects of the two processes: Is
there a limit for procurement expenditures per system?;
JFCOM LAA: Yes, the expenditure must be estimated to be less than $50
million;
JRAC: Yes, the expenditure must be $2.19 billion or less in fiscal year
2000 dollars.
Source: GAO analysis of JFCOM LAA and JRAC processes.
[End of table]
In September 2004, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense created JRAC,
he stated that the war on terror and recent experiences with Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom (in Iraq and Afghanistan) highlighted the
institutional challenges that DOD faces in providing timely, integrated
solutions to the warfighter. He said that all too often, DOD
organizations have been reluctant to take advantage of the authority
and flexibility that Congress has given them to meet many of these
needs. To break through institutional barriers to providing timely,
effective support, the Deputy Secretary directed the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to establish JRAC, whose mission is
to facilitate meeting urgent material and logistics requirements that
combatant commanders certify as operationally critical. He also
directed the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and each of the military
services to provide a single point of contact with appropriate
authority to make commitments of support from the respective
organizations to JRAC projects. These individuals are expected to be
thoroughly proficient in their own organization's processes as well as
empowered to make rapid decisions within the scope of JRAC's mission.
According to JRAC officials, the JRAC process was initiated instead of
using the JFCOM LAA process because the Deputy Secretary of Defense
believed he needed an agent at the highest level of DOD, with
sufficient visibility and flexibility, to ensure that urgent warfighter
needs are quickly met.
In July 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
Instruction 3470.01 to formalize the JRAC process for rapidly
validating and providing resources for joint, urgent operational needs
in the year of project execution. This instruction, among other things,
established policy and procedures to facilitate assessment, validation,
sourcing, resourcing, and fielding of operationally driven urgent,
combatant command needs in the year of execution. Generally, these
needs are considered life-or combat mission-threatening, based on
unforeseen military requirements that must be resolved in days, weeks,
or months. These needs must also be considered inherently joint in
nature, that is, theaterwide combatant command needs spanning multiple
services. Instruction 3470.01 states that the JRAC process is not
intended to replace the decision-making processes in DOD's traditional
acquisition system, nor is it designed to compete with any of the
military services' or Joint Staff's processes, but to complement them.
However, our analysis indicates that the JRAC process overlaps with
JFCOM's LAA process.
As of April 2007, JRAC had completed 24 projects worth a total of
$335.5 million, including biometrics identification, jammers, signals
intelligence, and satellite communication systems. Three JRAC projects
touched on similar needs addressed by JFCOM LAA projects--foreign
language translation, blue force tracking, and joint precision air
drop. The JRAC also had 1 other project, totaling $10.0 million, under
consideration.
One of the two main differences between the JFCOM LAA and JRAC
processes relating to the nature of the need may soon change. According
to a Joint Staff official, Instruction 3470.01 is being revised and is
not expected to retain the requirement that the joint urgent
operational need be for an ongoing named operation. If this particular
requirement is eliminated, the JFCOM LAA and JRAC processes will
overlap even more. The revised instruction is expected to be finalized
in spring 2007.
Within this environment of competing joint rapid acquisition processes,
DOD has not established clear procedures or factors to take into
account to help combatant commands determine which process to use--
JFCOM LAA or JRAC. Although JFCOM LAA officials sit on JRAC's advisory
group, and some coordination takes place, Instruction 3470.01 does not
specify steps for coordinating between the two processes, and JFCOM's
LAA procedures do not specifically call for coordinating with JRAC.
Exemplifying the need for coordination, we analyzed the six approved
LAA projects and concluded that JRAC might have also been able to
accomplish most, if not all, of them. Following is the basis for our
conclusions. The first five projects listed below were approved on or
before the date Instruction 3470.01 came into existence.
* Change Detection Work Station: JFCOM officials told us this LAA
project would have met JRAC's criteria for a project because it clearly
was for an immediate warfighter need.[Footnote 7]
* Command and Control on the Move: JFCOM officials said this LAA
project would not have met JRAC criteria for an immediate warfighter
need. However, we believe the project might have been justified under
the JRAC criterion of preventing mission failure if a regional
combatant command had submitted it as an immediate need. For example,
if a joint task force commander cannot adequately communicate with the
troops while on the move or dismounted from a vehicle, this could lead
to mission failure. In this case, the JFCOM commander validated the
need as an LAA project.
* Joint Precision Air Drop System 2,000 Pounds: This LAA project met
JRAC's criteria as an immediate warfighter need because once JRAC came
into existence, JRAC obtained funding for the project from the Air
Force on JFCOM's behalf.
* Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control: JFCOM
officials said this project would not have met JRAC's criteria of
responding to a combat fatality or preventing mission failure. However,
we believe it might have been justified under the JRAC process to
prevent mission failure due to the importance for a joint task force
commander to have remote access to classified and unclassified networks
while away from the headquarters compound.
* Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness: JFCOM officials said JRAC
could have taken on this project because it was to meet a joint, urgent
operational need that may have met the criteria as an immediate
warfighter need.[Footnote 8]
* Simultaneous 2-Way Speech Translation: Although JRAC was in place
when JFCOM approved this LAA project, JFCOM officials said JRAC
provided most of the funding and took over the project after it was
approved as an LAA project.
For background purposes, the JFCOM LAA and JRAC processes are not the
only two rapid acquisition processes addressing urgent warfighter needs
within DOD. The military services have their own processes. However,
they differ from the JFCOM LAA and JRAC processes in that the services'
processes focus on service-specific needs, not joint needs. For
example, the Army Rapid Equipping Force began in fiscal year 2002 and
was formalized in March 2005.[Footnote 9] Its missions include rapidly
equipping operational forces to enhance mission capability and soldier
safety, inserting promising technologies into the current force, and
providing business process feedback to Army stakeholders. This process
provides commercial and government off-the-shelf solutions for urgent
needs, takes an average of 128 days to deliver an initial operational
capability from the time the request is received, and funds up to 2
years of sustainment when appropriate. In fiscal year 2006, the Rapid
Equipping Force had a budget of over $135 million and, since inception,
has provided 227 types of equipment, totaling over 51,000 individual
items, for the war on terror.
The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization addresses
joint urgent warfighter needs, but its mission specifically focuses on
supporting the efforts of combatant commanders and their task forces in
defeating improvised explosive devices. Originally established in June
2005 as a task force, it was changed to an organization in January
2006, and operates under the authority, direction, and control of the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. An official in the organization said it
generally fields capabilities to the warfighter from 6 to 12 months
after a request is approved, and funds up to 2 years of sustainment
once fielded. In fiscal year 2006, the Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization's budget was $3.49 billion.
The U.S. Special Operations Command has its own acquisition process as
well, including a process for rapid acquisitions.[Footnote 10]0 The
Special Operations Command process differs from the LAA and JRAC
processes in that it is oriented only toward developing and acquiring
capabilities for warfighters conducting special operations, and comes
with associated funding in the DOD budget. Due to the variety of DOD
rapid acquisition processes, coordination can help to prevent
duplication of effort and enhance knowledge sharing and resource
investment.
JFCOM Experiences Complications with Funding, Delegation, and Analysis
of Projects' Usefulness:
Finding Funding for LAA Projects Continues to Be Challenging:
Finding funding to develop, acquire, and sustain LAA projects was
identified as a challenge in our prior report and remains so. Because
LAA is an authority, not a program, LAA does not have budgeted funds.
After an LAA project is approved, JFCOM LAA staff must obtain funding
for it. JFCOM officials have to either find other DOD organizations to
pay for LAA projects or pay for them with funds budgeted for other
JFCOM work. For example, JFCOM sought and obtained funds from the Naval
Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California, for the
Change Detection Work Station project. JFCOM officials said the search
for funding can take 40 to 50 percent or more of the time it takes to
process an LAA project. While this keeps projects austere, the long
search delays getting new capabilities to warfighters in the field.
When locating funding to develop and acquire[Footnote 11]1 a project
proved especially difficult, JFCOM funded all or part of it by
offsetting funds from programs in JFCOM's non-LAA budget, which does
not include any budgeted LAA funds. JFCOM has provided over half of the
total funding to develop and acquire the six approved LAA projects.
However, a JFCOM official expressed that JFCOM is reluctant to continue
using its non-LAA program funding because of adverse effects on those
programs. Conversely, JRAC does not have as much difficulty obtaining
funding for its projects even though it does not have budgeted funds
either. A JRAC official said a senior executive in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the deputy director of
JRAC, and pointed out that this aids in identifying and obtaining
available funding throughout DOD. Furthermore, according to JRAC
officials, DOD recognized the need for increased financial resources
and flexibility for urgent warfighter needs because JRAC's
accomplishments have been attributable to improved access to resources.
The officials stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
intends to expand on past lessons and institutionalize a budget
approach with an annual transfer account specifically designed to
fulfill urgent warfighting needs.
After a capability has been acquired, an obligation for sustainment is
created. The LAA statute does not specifically provide the authority to
sustain a product--that is, use operations and maintenance funding--
after deployment, although JFCOM officials believe they can provide
this support under certain circumstances. To address such needs, JFCOM
tries to identify another DOD organization to adopt the LAA capability
for long-term sustainment. JFCOM officials commented that the timing of
the DOD budget cycle is a primary factor for organizations in dealing
with the sustainment issue for LAA-fielded projects. The officials said
that because LAA capabilities are acquired rapidly to respond to urgent
and emergent needs and typically fall outside the time frames of the
normal DOD budgeting cycle, finding an organization to sustain an LAA
project sometimes proves difficult. For example, for one LAA project,
JFCOM resorted to using its own operations and maintenance funds to
provide short-term sustainment during the "bridge" period while the
project was awaiting adoption by another organization. JFCOM's LAA
policy allows it to fund sustainment of a project for up to 2 years
from the time the project is approved. However, JFCOM officials believe
that using JFCOM's operations and maintenance funds for LAA projects is
only permitted under certain conditions. Specifically, the officials
said the lack of an operations and maintenance provision in the LAA
statute only allows the use of JFCOM operations and maintenance funds
to sustain an LAA capability if that mission is compatible with a pre-
existing JFCOM mission. When DOD recently sent a legislative proposal
to Congress requesting that the LAA statute be made permanent, it also
asked that the statute be revised to allow the use of operations and
maintenance funding for LAA projects.
To address the overall funding challenges, JFCOM recently approached
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Director, Defense Research and
Engineering) about obtaining funding for LAA projects. Although
officials from both offices said there is no statutory restriction on
including a funding line for LAA in the DOD budget, JFCOM officials
said they have been unsuccessful in obtaining LAA funding in the past
because building a justifiable budget request 1 to 2 years in advance,
which is the norm within the DOD budgeting process, is very difficult
for specific urgent warfighter needs that come up unexpectedly.
According to JFCOM officials, the current discussions for funding
assistance include the use of reprogrammings by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense on JFCOM's behalf.
Delegation of LAA to JFCOM Is Unclear:
Uncertainties exist as to the exact nature of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's delegation of LAA to JFCOM. Specifically, it is
unclear exactly what powers were delegated to JFCOM and under what
authorities--that is, the LAA statute or other authorities available to
the Secretary of Defense. Failure to clarify these issues may impair
JFCOM's ability to carry out LAA efforts. To understand the current
situation requires briefly revisiting LAA's origins.
As originally envisioned by the Senate bill, LAA's enactment would have
required the Secretary of Defense to delegate LAA to the JFCOM
commander. Prior to enactment, however, the language was changed to
give the Secretary discretion about whether to delegate the authority.
The provision for LAA in the fiscal year 2004 Senate National Defense
Authorization Bill included language that the Secretary of Defense
"shall delegate" LAA to the commander of the unified combatant command
for joint warfighting experimentation (currently, JFCOM). The fiscal
year 2004 House National Defense Authorization Bill had no provision
for LAA. In conference, the House receded with an amendment that
changed the language of the Senate bill from "shall delegate" to "may
delegate," thus providing the Secretary of Defense with the discretion
to delegate LAA authority to JFCOM. The LAA statute, as enacted,
provides that the Secretary of Defense may delegate to the [JFCOM]
commander authority of the Secretary "sufficient to enable the
commander to develop and acquire" certain described equipment.
The Secretary of Defense has not provided JFCOM a document specifically
citing delegation of LAA, in part or in whole. Rather, in June 2004,
the acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) issued an acquisition assistance memorandum to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of JFCOM, and the Directors of the
Defense Agencies directing that, "consistent with" the LAA statute (10
U.S.C. 167a), the JFCOM commander be provided assistance "in developing
and acquiring the urgent requirements of the Combatant Commanders" for
the same types of equipment as described in the LAA statute. The memo
further stated that it did not apply to the development or acquisition
of a system for which the total research, development, test, and
evaluation expenditure is estimated to be $10 million or more or for
which the total procurement expenditure is estimated to be $50 million
or more--again using the same language as the LAA statue. To help JFCOM
carry out its efforts, the memorandum identified five service and
defense agency contracting activities to provide services to JFCOM on a
priority basis. The memorandum was to be in effect until September 30,
2006, when LAA was originally to expire. When Congress extended LAA for
2 years in the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, the
Under Secretary of Defense issued a new acquisition assistance
memorandum with the same language as the original one but with extended
coverage until September 30, 2008.
JFCOM officials view the LAA statute as consisting of four powers that
could be delegated. Specifically,
* the power that expanded JFCOM's mission to allow it to acquire
capabilities for other combatant commands using research, development,
test, and evaluation and procurement funds;
* the power to influence the DOD requirements process;
* the power to influence the DOD planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution process; and:
* the power to sign contracts to develop and acquire LAA systems, that
is, to have warranted contracting officer authority.
In our discussions, JFCOM and Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials agreed that a full delegation of LAA was not made.
Specifically, they agreed JFCOM was not delegated the power to sign
contracts for LAA projects, that is, warranted contracting officer
authority. JFCOM did not see this power as practical given the limited
duration of LAA. Specifically, JFCOM officials stated that JFCOM did
not want to set up an infrastructure for warranted contracting officers
because it would have taken up most of the initial, limited 3-year term
of LAA, which would have slowed down the command's ability to meet
urgent warfighter needs as rapidly as possible. As a result, in lieu of
JFCOM's having been provided warranted contracting officer authority,
the acquisition assistance memorandum provided for other organizations
to provide contracting assistance for LAA projects on JFCOM's behalf.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense and JFCOM officials agreed the
acquisition memorandum provided JFCOM with the powers to influence the
requirements process and the planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution process. It is not clear, however, under what authorities--
the LAA statute or other authorities available to the Secretary of
Defense--these powers were provided, as the acquisition memorandum does
not specify these powers or their delegation under the LAA statute.
During the course of our review, Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials stated that the Secretary of Defense had the authority
outside of the LAA statute to provide JFCOM with these powers. The
officials noted, however, that enactment of the LAA statute was the
impetus for providing the acquisition assistance memorandum to JFCOM
and, ultimately, the fielding of the LAA capabilities to the warfighter
under JFCOM's auspices. By way of comparison, JRAC was established by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense without a new statute.
Importantly, there is disagreement between JFCOM and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense over whether the acquisition assistance memorandum
provided JFCOM with the first power above, that is, to expand JFCOM's
mission to allow it to directly acquire capabilities for other
combatant commands. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials stated
that JFCOM was not provided that power under the acquisition assistance
memorandum. Rather, they stated JFCOM has been given the power to
arrange for other DOD organizations to acquire the capabilities. JFCOM
officials said they could not have legally developed and acquired the
six LAA capabilities for other combatant commands without the
delegation of this power. In the end, the acquisition assistance
memorandum is not clear on this issue either because it does not
specifically cite this power or how JFCOM is to carry out LAA.
JFCOM Is Making Progress in Assessing LAA Projects' Effectiveness:
JFCOM has made progress in the past year or so in tracking LAA projects
on a quarterly basis. JFCOM officials also said they have solicited
information from warfighters on the effectiveness of fielded
capabilities, and have received adequate information for some of them.
Previously, JFCOM had received anecdotal feedback from warfighters,
which was limited in scope and detail. JFCOM also has revised the LAA
process, requiring future LAA proposals to include a plan to assess the
effectiveness of fielded capabilities and provide regular, written
feedback to JFCOM. However, since the revision, no LAA projects have
been approved, so the revised process has not yet resulted in
additional data.
Conclusions:
JFCOM has delivered capabilities under the auspices of LAA, taking
promising technologies and spinning them out quickly for joint, urgent
needs in the battlefield. Warfighters generally have had positive
experiences, not just with the capabilities, but also JFCOM's ability
to deliver. On the other hand, no new projects have been approved in
the past 19 months, and the creation of JRAC presents warfighters with
another avenue for rapidly acquiring similar capabilities. The expected
expansion of JRAC's coverage would lessen the remaining differences
between the two authorities. Having two processes addressing similar
joint urgent needs may have advantages--such as increasing the range of
efforts to more rapidly field joint capabilities. However, having two
processes also presents risks--such as lack of coordination and
duplication of effort--and employing resources efficiently and
effectively during wartime is important. Regardless of their
similarities, the two processes have a clear imbalance in access to
funding. JRAC's access to funding is defined, while JFCOM staff must
invest substantial time to find funding for its LAA projects, a fact
that works against the purpose of rapidly providing capabilities for
urgent needs. Further complicating this joint rapid acquisition picture
are the differing views on what LAA powers were delegated to JFCOM.
Such complications make the important and complex task of meeting
urgent needs more difficult than it has to be.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
As DOD considers expanding JRAC's coverage, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:
* reassess the role of the JFCOM LAA in light of the expanding JRAC
process, and determine whether and how JFCOM LAA should play a role in
meeting joint urgent needs;
* to the extent JFCOM LAA is to continue to play a role in meeting
joint urgent needs, assess and resolve, as appropriate, the funding,
coordination, and delegation challenges identified in this report; and:
* inform Congress of the results of the assessment and any resultant
decisions in time for Congress to consider them in its deliberations on
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
In light of our recommendations, DOD's response and the fact that DOD
has provided Congress with a fiscal year 2008 legislative proposal that
would make the LAA statute permanent, Congress might want to delay its
consideration of making JFCOM LAA permanent until DOD has informed
Congress of the results of the recommended assessment and any
associated decisions. This should not impair JFCOM LAA, as DOD plans to
complete its assessment by the fourth quarter of 2007 and LAA, as
currently enacted, extends through September 2008.
Agency Comments:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations, stating that it would reassess the role of the Joint
Forces Command's limited acquisition authority in light of the
expanding Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell process and consider the other
issues identified in this report as a part of that effort. DOD expects
to complete that reassessment by the fourth quarter of 2007. DOD also
stated that it would inform Congress of the result of that assessment
and any associated decisions. DOD's letter is reprinted in appendix II.
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
the Commander of JFCOM, and interested congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions concerning
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to the report include
Bruce H. Thomas, Assistant Director; Lily J. Chin; Joseph E. Dewechter;
Bonita J.P. Oden; Marie Ahearn; and Ken Patton.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To provide an update on the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) limited
acquisition authority (LAA) efforts since LAA was enacted, we obtained
and analyzed information and documentation, and interviewed officials
from a variety of organizations. For information on all LAA proposals
and approved projects, as well as current LAA policy and procedures, we
worked with officials from JFCOM, located in Norfolk, Virginia. For the
views of warfighters on participating in the LAA process and on the
utility and effectiveness of fielded LAA capabilities, we developed a
data collection instrument and obtained information from U.S. Central
Command and U.S. European Command warfighters, who had been involved in
and used the capabilities from four of the six LAA projects. Some of
these warfighters were in theater in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Europe.
Other warfighters were at the Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base, North
Carolina, and at the Fort Bragg Army Base, North Carolina. We also
collected information and interviewed officials from U.S. Central
Command headquarters, located in Tampa, Florida. For project offices
involved in LAA projects, we obtained information and interviewed
officials for selected LAA projects in the Sequoyah Transition
Management Office, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Life Cycle
Management Command, at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; in the U.S. Army
Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate, Army Materiel Command,
at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; in the Army Research, Development, and
Engineering Command, Natick Soldier Systems Center, Natick,
Massachusetts; and in the Joint Systems Integration Command, at
Suffolk, Virginia. For organizations providing contracting services for
LAA projects, we obtained information and interviewed officials at the
Navy Fleet Industrial and Supply Center, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
and in the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management
Command, at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
To identify key challenges in operating and managing LAA, we obtained
and analyzed information and documentation, and interviewed officials,
from JFCOM; and Office of the Secretary of Defense--General Counsel,
Comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics)/Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)/Joint Rapid
Acquisition Cell (JRAC), Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics)/Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
and the Joint Staff/J-8, Capabilities and Acquisition Division, which
are located in Arlington, Virginia. We reviewed and analyzed JFCOM's
LAA policy and procedures and identified challenges in operating and
managing LAA. We also obtained and analyzed information from the
warfighters, contracting organizations, and project offices for any
challenges they identified or experienced with LAA. In addition, we
researched and analyzed the LAA statute and its legislative history to
identify any legal challenges in implementing, operating, and/or
managing LAA.
To examine LAA within the context of other DOD rapid acquisition
processes, we obtained and analyzed information and documentation, and
interviewed officials, from JFCOM; the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)/Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy; the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics)/Director, Defense Research and Engineering;
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics)/JRAC; the Joint Staff/J-8, Capabilities and Acquisition
Division; the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,
located in Arlington, Virginia; and the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping
Force, located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. We also gathered information
on the rapid acquisition processes for the military services and the
U.S. Special Operations Command. We compared key aspects of the LAA
process with those of the JRAC process, including reviewing and
analyzing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01
for Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs
in the Year of Execution. We also determined if JRAC might have been
able to process the six approved LAA projects if the JRAC process had
existed at the time the projects were approved by JFCOM. Furthermore,
we reviewed and analyzed the LAA legislative history and the JRAC
process to identify similarities and differences. However, we did not
conduct an in-depth evaluation of JRAC or the JRAC process.
We conducted our work from July 2006 to March 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Apr 11 2007:
Mr. Paul Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-07-546, `Defense Acquisitions: Status and Challenges of
Joint Forces Command's Limited Acquisition Authority,' dated March 19,
2007 (GAO Code 120623).
We have enclosed comments addressing the three recommendations on pages
15 and 16 of the draft report.
My point of contact is Mr. Skip Hawthorne, 703.692.9556, or e-mail:
skip.hawthorne@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Shay D. Assad:
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report-Dated March 19, 2007 GAO Code 120623/GAO-07-546:
Defense Acquisitions: Status and Challenges of Joint Forces Command's
Limited Acquisition Authority:
Department Of Defense Comments Regarding The Draft Report:
GAO Draft Report Dated March 19, 2007 GAO-07-546 (GAO Codes 120623):
"Defense Acquisitions: Status And Challenges Of Joint Forces Command's
Limited Acquisition Authority"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
reassess the role of the Joint Forces Command's limited acquisition
authority (JFCOM LAA) in light of the expanding Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell process, and determine whether and how JFCOM LAA should play a
role in meeting joint urgent needs. (p. 15/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. The Secretary of Defense will reassess JFCOM's
Limited Acquisition Authority in light of the expanding Joint Rapid
Acquisition Cell process. The reassessment of JFCOM's LAA is expected
to be completed by 4Th quarter 2007.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
assess and resolve, as appropriate, the funding, coordination, and
delegation challenges identified in this report to the extent JFCOM LAA
is to continue to play a role in meeting joint urgent needs. (p. 15/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. These issues will be considered in association
with the reassessment of JFCOM's role in the development of joint
capabilities, expected to be completed by 4H quarter 2007.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
inform congress of the results of the assessment and any resultant
decisions in time for Congress to consider them in its deliberations on
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008. (p. 16/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. The Secretary of Defense will inform Congress of
the results of its reassessment and any associated decisions.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Joint Forces Command's Limited
Acquisition Authority, GAO-06-240R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005).
[2] The first LAA statute was enacted under the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136 Div. A,
section 848, Nov. 24, 2003). The extension was enacted under the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Pub. L. No.
109-163 Div. A, section 846, Jan. 6, 2006).
[3] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01,
Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs
(JUONs) in the Year of Execution, July 15, 2005.
[4] DOD Directive Number 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), February 14, 2006.
[5] See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational
Needs (JUONs) in the Year of Execution, Enclosure A, July 15, 2005.
[6] The JFCOM LAA acquisition process consists of multiple phases that
can be tailored to meet requests as expeditiously as possible. The
phases are proposal receipt, feasibility assessment, proposal review
and approval, locating and obtaining funding, contracting, and project
execution. Descriptions of these phases are in our November 2005
report.
[7] In Instruction 3470.01, an immediate warfighter need is defined as
a subset of joint urgent operational needs, so designated by JRAC,
which have a materiel or logistics solution that must be resolved
within 120 days or less. The instruction states that this special
category will confirm an added emphasis on the timely resolution of
this urgent operational need and enhanced visibility to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. According
to JRAC officials, their interpretation is that a solution for the
immediate warfighter need is to be developed in less than 120 days,
which can be delivered to the warfighter in less than 2 years.
[8] The full name is Joint Translator Forwarder-Rapid Attack
Information Dissemination Execution Relay-Joint Blue Force Situational
Awareness. JFCOM LAA funded the Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness
equipment.
[9] Department of the Army Memorandum for Director, Rapid Equipping
Force, March 10, 2005, Concept Plan to Establish the Rapid Equipping
Force (REF).
[10] [0] See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational
Needs (JUONs) in the Year of Execution, Enclosure A, which refers to
the U.S. Special Operations Command Directive 71-4, Combat Mission Need
Statement (CMNS) Process.
[11] [1] In this case, the term acquire relates to items that were
acquired with research, development, test, and evaluation funds, as
opposed to procurement funds.
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