Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development Gao ID: GAO-07-596T April 19, 2007As operations overseas continue, the Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide valuable information in support of military operations. While the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. Congress has been interested in DOD's approach for managing and integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems. This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DOD's approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the potential for synergies between them. GAO's ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command operations, and review of 12 airborne ISR development programs.
DOD's first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the integration of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR Integration Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability portfolio management concept. DOD developed an ISR Roadmap that assessed current and planned ISR capabilities. Our preliminary work, however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1) identify future requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3) measure progress. DOD's second initiative to improve the integration of the services' ISR programs is assigning management of ISR issues as a test case of its joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the test case is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across DOD will enable interoperability of future capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. Although in its early stages, GAO identified challenges, such as the extent to which the services will adopt suggestions from portfolio managers. DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support operational requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR programs supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently have visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible for ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility over how tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have visibility into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to evaluate its ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is maximizing the use of existing assets, and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. We have identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. Additionally, most of the 12 airborne ISR development programs that we reviewed had either cost growth or schedule delays. These problems resulted from not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system development as provided for in Defense policy. In some cases, delay in delivering new systems to the warfighter led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant.
GAO-07-596T, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 19, 2007:
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for
New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development:
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Issues:
GAO-07-596T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-596T, testimony before the Subcommittee on Air and
Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
As operations overseas continue, DOD is experiencing a growing demand
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to
provide valuable information in support of military operations. While
the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community
to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to
make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future.
Congress has been interested in DOD‘s approach for managing and
integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems.
This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO‘s
ongoing work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to
improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and
challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DOD‘s
approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations,
and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the
potential for synergies between them.
GAO …s ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials
at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command
operations, and review of 12 airborne ISR development programs.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the integration
of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR Integration
Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability
portfolio management concept. DOD developed an ISR Roadmap that
assessed current and planned ISR capabilities. Our preliminary work,
however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1) identify future
requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3) measure progress.
DOD‘s second initiative to improve the integration of the services‘ ISR
programs is assigning management of ISR issues as a test case of its
joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the test
case is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across
DOD will enable interoperability of future capabilities and reduce
redundancies and gaps. Although in its early stages, GAO identified
challenges, such as the extent to which the services will adopt
suggestions from portfolio managers.
DOD‘s approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to
optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged
with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to
allocate to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support
operational requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR
programs supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently
have visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible
for ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility
over how tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have
visibility into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other
units are being tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to
evaluate its ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance
evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate
the demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is maximizing the use of
existing assets, and to acquire new systems that best support
warfighting needs.
Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the
development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more
efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the
warfighter. We have identified development programs where program
managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies
and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly
stovepiped solutions. Additionally, most of the 12 airborne ISR
development programs that we reviewed had either cost growth or
schedule delays. These problems resulted from not following a knowledge-
based approach to weapon system development as provided for in Defense
policy. In some cases, delay in delivering new systems to the
warfighter led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems
relevant.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-596T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Davi D‘Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov, Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
pickups@gao.gov, or Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or
sullivanm@gao.gov
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to discuss GAO's work for this
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and
acquisition of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,
including unmanned aircraft systems. As you know, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities are central to
ongoing military operations. Effective ISR can provide early warning of
enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military
forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality.
Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the
information they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that
is reflected in DOD's planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR
assets at every level of command is growing, and DOD is making
investments in a number of ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft
systems, manned platforms, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial
systems. Although the United States has significant ISR capabilities,
their effectiveness has been hampered by gaps in capabilities, growing
competition for assets, unavailability when needed, and systems that do
not fully complement one another. The Quadrennial Defense Review
emphasized the increasingly important role intelligence capabilities--
including manned and unmanned airborne and space capabilities--play in
supporting military operations and acknowledged that the ISR community
as a whole must move toward a collaborative enterprise to achieve more
responsive support for civilian decision makers and commanders engaged
in planning and executing operations within resources likely to be
constrained by the fiscal challenges of the federal budget.
Since we testified before this Subcommittee last year on one component
of DOD's ISR enterprise--unmanned aircraft systems--demand for ISR
support has continued to grow, and DOD is planning to invest in new
systems with expanded and new capabilities. Meanwhile, growing out of
the Quadrennial Defense Review's recommendations, DOD has undertaken a
number of studies designed to determine future ISR requirements and
established a new organization to help integrate current assets to
improve its processes for supporting combat operations. In addition,
DOD has updated its ISR Integration Roadmap. Today, you asked us to
discuss our preliminary observations on DOD's management of ISR
requirements, distribution of current assets, and planned acquisitions
based on ongoing work we are conducting for this Subcommittee.
Specifically, we will highlight (1) the status of DOD initiatives aimed
at improving the management and integration of ISR requirements and
challenges the department faces in implementing the initiatives, (2)
DOD's approach to managing current ISR assets to support military
operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development
and the potential for synergies between them. We will be continuing our
work on the management of ISR requirements, the support of ISR assets
for combat operations, and the acquisition of ISR capabilities and plan
to issue reports based on this work later this year.
To understand the status of initiatives within DOD to improve the
management and integration of ISR requirements, we analyzed DOD's ISR
Integration Roadmap and updates. We also reviewed documentation on ISR
requirements generation and validation that we obtained from DOD's
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System as well as
previous studies related to DOD's management of ISR assets. In
addition, we discussed DOD's ISR capabilities management initiatives
and challenges with senior officials from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); the Joint Staff; the Battlespace
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board; the National Security Space
Office; the Air Force; the Army; the Navy; the U.S. Strategic Command's
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance; the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Special Operations
Command; and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
To assess the effectiveness of DOD's approach to managing current ISR
assets in support of ongoing combat operations, we interviewed
officials and reviewed documentation from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Planning Task Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of
the military services; U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air
Force component commands; the Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and other
organizations. We also observed operations, reviewed documentation, and
interviewed officials at U.S. Central Command to better understand how
ISR assets are assigned to specific missions. Additionally, we
discussed the use of unmanned aircraft systems in military operations
with U.S. Central Command officials and system operators who recently
returned or are currently supporting operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
To assess the status of selected ISR programs and the potential for
synergies between them, we obtained and analyzed programmatic and
budget documents for each of the systems we reviewed. We also discussed
the status of each program with officials at the program office level
and with officials from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, we
discussed the potential for synergies among programs with officials
from the Joint Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
We conducted our ongoing work from June 2006 to March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
DOD has taken some important first steps to formulate a strategy for
improving the integration of future ISR requirements--the development
of its ISR Integration Roadmap and the inclusion of ISR systems across
DOD in a test case for the joint capability portfolio management
concept. In response to a statutory requirement, DOD developed the ISR
Integration Roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR
capabilities. Our preliminary work has shown, however, that while DOD's
ISR Integration Roadmap sets out some strategic objectives, such as
attaining global persistent surveillance, it does not clearly (1)
identify future requirements and how they can be met, (2) identify
funding priorities and a mechanism to ensure that services' investment
plans reflect the overall strategy, or (3) set out how DOD will measure
its progress toward its strategic goals for the ISR enterprise. We
previously testified on similar weaknesses in other ISR-related
programs, such as DOD's unmanned aircraft systems, and concluded that
DOD had insufficient plans to guide its development and investment
decisions. DOD's second initiative is its application of the joint
capability portfolio management concept to ISR systems across DOD as a
test of the concept. Through the capability portfolio management
concept, DOD seeks to develop and manage ISR capabilities across the
entire department --rather than by military service or individual
program--and by doing so, enable interoperability of future
capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. While implementation of
the portfolio management concept is in its early stages, our
preliminary assessment identified challenges. For example, the
portfolio managers do not currently have the authority to direct
services' investments in ISR capabilities, and DOD leadership is
monitoring the portfolio management test cases to determine whether
such authority is needed. Therefore, the extent to which the services
will change their investment plans to adopt suggestions from portfolio
managers to maximize the effectiveness of the overall enterprise is not
clear. DOD has undertaken some data-driven analyses of the capabilities
and costs of different systems that could provide portfolio managers a
basis for making trade-offs among competing investment options. We
identified some limitations to the analysis that DOD performed. Still,
if expanded to be more comprehensive and integrated, this analytical
approach could inform portfolio managers and decision makers and enable
DOD to develop and field the ISR capabilities that most efficiently and
effectively fill gaps and reduce redundancies.
DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets, including unmanned
aircraft systems, limits its ability to optimize the use of these
assets. While the Joint Force Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), which is charged with
recommending to the Secretary of Defense how theater-level assets
should be allocated to support operational requirements of combatant
commanders, has visibility into the major ISR programs supporting
theater-level requirements, it does not currently have visibility into
all ISR assets. JFCC-ISR is working to increase its knowledge of these
assets so that it can consider all assets in the allocation process.
Similarly, during ongoing operations, the commander responsible for
planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations does not
currently have visibility over how tactical assets are being tasked,
which could result in duplicative taskings and limit DOD's ability to
leverage all available ISR assets. In addition, DOD lacks sufficient
metrics and feedback for evaluating the performance of its ISR assets.
DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited metrics such as
the numbers of targets planned versus the number collected against. DOD
officials acknowledge more needs to be done and there is an ongoing
effort within DOD to develop improved metrics and identify qualitative
as well as quantitative ISR metrics, but progress has been limited.
Further, although DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of the
effectiveness of ISR support in meeting warfighter requirements, DOD
officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring,
due mainly to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without
sufficient visibility over the full range of available ISR assets and
feedback and metrics for evaluating ISR missions, DOD may not be in the
best position to validate the true demand for ISR assets, ensure it is
maximizing the use of existing assets, or acquire new systems that best
support warfighting needs.
The services are not required to jointly develop new weapon systems but
can attain economies and efficiencies when this happens. Short of a
joint development program, there are still opportunities for similar
weapon systems being developed by different services to gain synergies
that can result in providing new capabilities to the warfighter more
efficiently and affordably. We have identified development programs
where program managers and services are working together to gain these
efficiencies and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more
costly stovepiped solutions that are redundant. Additionally, of the 12
airborne ISR programs that we reviewed, most have encountered either
cost growth or schedule delays. These problems are typically the result
of not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system
development as provided for in DOD policy. In some cases, the resultant
delay in delivering the new capability to the warfighter has led to
unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant and operational
until the new capability is finally delivered.
Background:
The term "intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance," or "ISR,"
encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation
of sensors and assets that collect, process, and disseminate data in
support of current and future military operations. Intelligence data
can take many forms, including optical, radar, or infrared images or
electronic signals. This data can come from a variety of sources,
including surveillance and reconnaissance systems ranging from
satellites, to manned aircraft like the U-2, unmanned aircraft systems
like the Air Force's Global Hawk and Predator and the Army's Hunter, to
other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment, to human intelligence
teams. DOD ISR activities support the missions of the Department of
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, as well as the
missions of other government agencies. ISR activities directly support
current and future operations and military forces rely on the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the planning
and conduct of their operations and activities.
Many defense organizations play a role in identifying ISR requirements,
managing current assets, and developing new capabilities. DOD
established the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to
coordinate policy and strategic oversight of defense intelligence,
security, and counterintelligence to meet combatant commander
requirements. Other defense intelligence agencies, such as the National
Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have key roles in supporting defense and
national security missions.
Combatant commanders may identify their needs for ISR capabilities to
support their missions through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. For example, the U.S. Central Command is charged with
identifying the ISR capabilities required to support his theater of
operations. Generally, the individual military services or other DOD
agencies are responsible for managing the acquisition of new DOD ISR
systems.
In 2003, DOD altered its unified command plan to give the U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) responsibility for planning,
integrating, and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and global
operations. To execute this responsibility, USSTRATCOM established the
Joint Functional Component Command-ISR in March 2005 and designated the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency as the commander. The Joint
Functional Component Command-ISR is charged with developing strategies
for distributing, or allocating, existing ISR assets among combatant
commanders and ensuring the integration and synchronization of DOD,
national, and allied ISR capabilities and collection efforts. In the
case of ongoing operations, the Joint Force Air Component Commander
generally tasks theater-level ISR assets made available for support of
the Joint Force Commander's operational objectives.
Implemented in 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) is DOD's principal process for identifying, assessing,
and prioritizing proposals to improve existing capabilities and develop
new capabilities. The JCIDS process is designed to facilitate
coordination among DOD components in assessing proposals for new
capabilities to ensure that they enable joint forces to meet the full
range of military operations and challenges. Under the JCIDS
collaborative review process, proposals for new intelligence
capabilities that support DOD or national intelligence requirements
must be reviewed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which
consists of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a four-
star officer designated by each of the military services. Eight
Functional Capabilities Boards assist the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council in evaluating proposals and making recommendations on
approval.[Footnote 1] The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities
Board (BA/FCB) is responsible for reviewing proposals to develop and
acquire new ISR capabilities.
Under section 426 of title 10 of the U.S. Code, DOD is required to
establish an ISR Integration Council to serve as a forum for the
services and the defense intelligence agencies to discuss their ISR
integration efforts in order to ensure unity of effort and preclude
unnecessary duplication of effort. Led by the Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence, the council is statutorily made up of senior
intelligence officers from each of the armed services and U.S. Special
Operations Command, the directors of the defense intelligence agencies,
and the Joint Staff Director for Operations.[Footnote 2] DOD is also
required under section 426 to develop a comprehensive plan--known as
the ISR Integration Roadmap--to guide the development and integration
of DOD ISR capabilities from 2004 through 2018. DOD published the first
iteration of the ISR Integration Roadmap in May 2005 and updated the
Roadmap in January 2007. The details of the ISR Integration Roadmap are
classified, but the management issues and initiatives it contains are
not classified.
DOD Is Undertaking Important Initiatives, But the Extent to Which These
Will Guide Future Investments to Achieve Better Integration of ISR
Assets Is Not Clear:
Over the past few years, DOD has taken some important steps to enable
it to take a department-wide view of ISR capabilities. These steps are
important in DOD's efforts to formulate a strategy for meeting future
ISR requirements in a more integrated manner by considering how
existing and future assets will fit together to provide needed
information to support combatant commanders and national decision
makers. Specifically, DOD has developed and is updating a statutorily
required ISR Integration Roadmap that charts current and planned
programs and has begun testing portfolio management principles to
manage the requirements for future ISR capabilities. However, these two
initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and have some
limitations, and it is unclear whether these initiatives will be enough
to improve integration of DOD ISR assets and guide DOD ISR investment
decisions.
ISR Integration Roadmap:
DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap is a noteworthy step for DOD in examining
the ISR capabilities that DOD currently has available and planned,
although the Roadmap does not represent a comprehensive vision for the
ISR enterprise or define strategy to guide future investments. First
published in May 2005 in response to a statutory requirement and
updated in January 2007, DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap comprises a
catalogue of detailed information on all the ISR assets being used and
developed across DOD, including ISR capabilities related to collection,
communication, exploitation, and analysis. DOD's recent update took the
ISR Integration Roadmap a step farther than its 2005 version because it
incorporates information from the QDR and the National Intelligence
Strategy. For example, the updated version includes a list of the ISR-
related QDR decisions aimed at achieving future joint force
characteristics and building on progress to date, such as increasing
investment in unmanned aircraft systems and balancing air-and space-
borne ISR capabilities. In addition, the recent ISR Integration Roadmap
included changes in funding and ISR program information driven by the
fiscal year 2007 President's Budget.
We believe that, given the vast scope of ISR capabilities, which
operate in a variety of mediums and encompass a range of intelligence
disciplines, the ISR Integration Roadmap represents a significant step
toward providing DOD leadership and the Congress with the information
needed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of current ISR
capabilities. However, while the Roadmap sets out some strategic
objectives for the defense ISR enterprise,[Footnote 3] such as
attaining global persistent surveillance,[Footnote 4] it does not (1)
identify overall ISR capabilities and how it plans to achieve them, (2)
identify funding priorities, and (3) establish mechanisms to enforce an
investment strategy or measure progress. More specifically, the Roadmap
does not clarify what requirements for future ISR systems are already
filled, or possibly saturated, identify the critical capability gaps
that need to be filled by future systems, or identify focus areas for
future requirements. In addition, the Roadmap does not clearly show how
the ISR systems--existing and future--will fit together in a vision for
common architecture to most efficiently meet priority ISR requirements
or provide a basis for making trade-offs among competing programs. We
have previously testified on the need for better planning for other ISR-
related development programs. For example, DOD has continued to request
funding to support the services' plans to develop new unmanned aircraft
system capabilities in the absence of overall plans to guide
development and investment decisions. DOD officials acknowledged that
the ISR Integration Roadmap has limitations and said that these
limitations will be addressed in future revisions. As the department
moves forward with its ISR Integration Roadmap, we believe it could
provide a basis for DOD to determine the mix of future capabilities
that provides the best value with regard to their place in an
overarching ISR architecture.
Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management:
DOD is undertaking to better manage the requirements for future ISR
capabilities across DOD by applying a joint capability portfolio
management concept to ISR assets and planned programs. In September
2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided to bring ISR systems
across DOD together into a capability portfolio as part of a test case
for the joint capability portfolio management concept. The capability
portfolio containing these ISR systems is known as the battlespace
awareness capability portfolio, and it is one of the four test cases
for exploring this management concept.[Footnote 5] The intent of the
ISR portfolio management test case is to enable DOD to develop and
manage ISR capabilities across the entire department--rather than by
military service or individual program--and by doing so, to improve the
interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability
redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the lead office for the
battlespace awareness capability portfolio management. The ISR
Integration Council acts as the governance body for the ISR portfolio
management effort. In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence works closely with the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board,[Footnote 6] which is a Joint Staff organization
that provides analytic support for the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council's discussions and decisions on ISR capability needs, joint
concepts, and programmatic issues.
Battlespace awareness capability managers reviewed and prioritized ISR
assets to inform budget development for the first time with the fiscal
year 2008 budget, and the portfolio management concept is still being
tested. Therefore, it is too early to assess its effectiveness in
integrating ISR programs to meet future requirements. However, our
preliminary work has shown that the concept faces implementation
challenges, among them clarifying the responsibilities and authorities
of the capability portfolio managers in relation to the services in
order to make trade-offs among competing service priorities. For
example, the ISR Integration Council held discussions on service
resource allocation decisions in an effort to achieve consensus among
the services, combatant commanders, and other stakeholders. The Council
proposed recommendations for rebalancing the services' investments in
their respective ISR portfolios during the fiscal year 2008 budget.
However, the ISR Integration Council did not have the authority to
compel services to change their budget plans. According to defense
officials, there were some disagreements between the ISR Integration
Council's recommendations and the services on funding levels on ISR
systems. These issues were elevated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
for final decision. DOD leaders are monitoring the implementation of
the capability portfolio test cases to determine whether portfolio
managers should have the authority to direct changes to service plans.
However, without authority to direct the military services to adopt any
of its suggestions, it is unclear the extent to which the ISR
Integration Council can influence service plans.
The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board is charged with
reviewing service proposals for new ISR capabilities and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence assists in this effort. The
documentation the board reviews provides analysis of the capability
required and includes cost information related to the proposed approach
for generating the capability. However, it is not clear to what extent
these proposals are based on a comprehensive analysis that includes
data on cost/performance evaluations and consideration of national-
level capabilities.
Our preliminary work identified an example of the kind of data-driven
analysis of alternative investment strategies that we believe could be
useful to battlespace awareness capability portfolio managers for
analyzing competing ISR programs and developing an investment strategy
for the future. In 2004, the National Security Space Office[Footnote 7]
completed a limited architecture analysis of ISR assets using cost and
performance data. Specifically, the National Security Space Office
analyzed how much additional ISR capability would be provided by
various ISR system mixes for given levels of additional investment. The
intent of the study was to provide insight into the most efficient mix
of current and planned ISR systems. While the analysis was a useful
demonstration of an approach to inform decision makers, it had several
limitations. For example, the analysis did not include all national and
tactical ISR systems, mainly focusing on space and air. The analysis
also assumed that the additional infrastructure needed to support
integration of information from additional ISR systems would be
available, while the difficult to estimate costs associated with such
additional infrastructure were not included in the analysis. Further,
the analysis was limited in that it only considered ISR capabilities
only for levels of increased investment, not for levels of decreased
investment; thus, it did not consider what the most efficient mix of
ISR systems would be if limited resources forced decision makers to
decrease funding for ISR programs. Moreover, the analysis represented a
one-time effort and has not been repeated. Still, we believe that, if
expanded to be more comprehensive and integrated, this type of data-
driven analysis analytic approach could inform decision makers on the
implications of various options for providing the most effective mix of
ISR capabilities that DOD can afford. Without an ongoing and
comprehensive data-driven analysis of the most efficient solutions, it
is not clear to us how DOD can be assured that it is developing and
fielding the ISR capabilities that most efficiently and effectively
fill gaps and reduce redundancies.
Future GAO Work Will Continue to Focus on DOD's Approach for Developing
ISR Capabilities:
While our preliminary work has focused on the new processes that DOD
has established to address what it has acknowledged are weaknesses in
its planning for integrated future capabilities, our future work will
investigate DOD's processes for integrating requirements and developing
an investment strategy. Among the issues that we plan to address are
the extents to which:
* DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap incorporates a framework and investment
strategy for achieving an overall integrated ISR architecture;
* DOD's review processes enable it to identify gaps and redundancies in
ISR requirements;
* DOD has considered comprehensive analyses of new ISR capabilities, to
include consideration of all available ISR assets and cost/performance
evaluations; and:
* DOD provides information on the challenges and risks associated with
ISR programs for Congress' use in oversight and funding deliberations.
DOD Lacks Adequate Visibility and Metrics to Optimize ISR Assets:
Given the substantial investment DOD is making in ISR assets and the
increasing demand for them, effective management of these assets has
become critical. Currently, DOD's approach to allocation and tasking do
not provide full visibility for managing its current ISR assets.
Although DOD has established a process for allocating available ISR
assets to the combatant commanders to meet theater needs, including
unmanned aircraft systems, it does not have visibility over all ISR
assets, which would improve its ability to assign assets. Additionally,
DOD's process for tasking ISR assets does not currently allow for
visibility at all levels into how ISR assets are being used on a daily
basis. Furthermore, DOD does not have metrics and feedback for
systematically measuring the effectiveness of ISR missions. Without
better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the
information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets to ensure it
is maximizing the use of existing assets and to acquire new systems
that best support warfighting needs.
DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking ISR Does Not Consider All ISR
Assets:
DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available ISR
assets to the combatant commanders to meet theater-level needs,
including unmanned aircraft systems. That process is managed by
USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command-ISR (JFCC-ISR), which
is tasked with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on
how best to allocate ISR resources for theater use across the combatant
commands. Once ISR assets have been allocated, those assets are
available to the theater commanders to be assigned, or tasked, against
specific requests for ISR support, in support of ongoing operations.
JFCC-ISR's ability to fulfill its mission of integrating DOD, national
and international partner ISR capabilities to support the warfighter
depends on the extent to which it has awareness and visibility over all
ISR assets including DOD, national and allied ISR assets. However,
although the JFCC-ISR has been assigned the mission of integrating
national and DOD ISR capabilities, it does not currently have
visibility into all assets that could be brought to bear to support
combatant commanders' needs. Currently, JFCC-ISR has full visibility
only of ISR programs available to support theater-level requirements.
According to JFCC-ISR officals, although they are working to develop
better visibility over national ISR assets by working with other
defense and national intelligence agencies, they lack full visibility
into these ISR assets. According to JFCC-ISR officials, cultural
barriers to information sharing represent a hurdle to integrating data
from multiple defense intelligence agencies, and the success of efforts
to access highly sensitive ISR programs is currently dependent on
personal relationships rather than an institutionalized process. As
with national-level ISR assets, JFCC-ISR officials told us they have
limited visibility over tactical ISR assets, such as the smaller
unmanned aircraft systems, that are assigned to units in the field.
Without an approach to its allocation process that allows visibility
over all ISR capabilities and access to all relevant information, it is
not clear to us that the JFCC-ISR has the tools it needs in order to
fulfill its mission, in particular to leverage all available ISR assets
and to maximize the effectiveness of those assets.
Greater visibility of assets is also needed during ongoing operations
to improve DOD's process for tasking, or assigning ISR assets to
specific missions. Specifically, greater visibility of assets is needed
at the theater level. The theater combatant commander's Joint Forces
Air Component Commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and
monitoring joint air operations to focus the impact of air capabilities
and for assuring their effective and efficient use in achieving the
combatant commander's objectives. However, while the Air Component
Commander has visibility into how all theater-level ISR assets, like
the Air Force's Predator, are being used, it does not currently have
visibility into how ISR assets, embedded in and controlled by tactical
units, such as the Army's Hunter, are being used on a daily basis.
Greater visibility is also needed at the tactical level to allow units
a greater awareness of where other ISR assets, including both theater-
level and those assets embedded in other units, are operating and what
they are being used to do. Our preliminary work shows that as a result
of this lack of visibility, the potential exists for multiple unmanned
aircraft systems to be tasked to operate in the same area and against
the same requirement. Also, our work has shown that by leveraging the
capabilities of different ISR assets using techniques such as cross-
cueing,[Footnote 8] the Air Component Commander has been able to use
the different types of capabilities brought by different theater-level
manned and unmanned assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For
example, a manned Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and
Reconnaissance system could be used to sense movement in an area and
then an unmanned system such as a Predator could be called in to
collect imagery to confirm suspected activity. With greater visibility
into the tasking of all ISR assets, including those tactical assets
controlled by the military services, there is an opportunity for DOD to
gain greater synergies and maximize the use of its ISR assets and
determine whether additional perceived demand is well-founded. This
visibility would also allow tactical units, when appropriate, to
leverage other assets operating in their area to maximize the
information captured and avoid duplicative taskings.
DOD Lacks Metrics and Feedback for Systematically Tracking the
Effectiveness of Its ISR Missions:
The growing demand for ISR assets is an indication of their value in
supporting combat forces, but DOD does not have sufficient metrics for
evaluating the effectiveness of ISR missions and is not getting
consistent feedback on whether the warfighters' needs were met. For
example, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited metrics
such as the number of targets planned versus the number collected
against. We recommended in a December 2005 report that DOD ensure its
performance measurement system measures how effectively unmanned
aircraft systems perform their missions, identify performance indicator
information that needs to be collected, and systematically collect
identified performance information.[Footnote 9] DOD officials
acknowledged shortcomings of its metrics, and DOD is developing
qualitative as well as quantitative ISR metrics, but progress has been
limited. Additionally, although DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of
how effective ISR support is in meeting the warfighters' requirements,
DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently
occurring mainly because of the fast pace of operations in theater. For
example, while there is real-time communication among unmanned aircraft
system operators, requesters, and intelligence personnel during an
operation to ensure that the needed information is captured, there is
little to no feedback after the operation to determine whether the
warfighters' needs were met by the ISR mission. Without developing
metrics and systematically gathering feedback that enables it to assess
the extent to which ISR missions are successful in supporting
warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the true demand
for ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating and tasking its ISR
assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new systems that best
support warfighting needs.
ISR Development Programs Have Opportunities for Greater Synergies and
Have Experienced Some Cost and Schedule Growth That Impact Legacy
Systems:
Without a comprehensive and integrated approach to managing current ISR
assets and balancing demands for the ISR capabilities required for the
future, some of DOD's current ISR acquisitions are not benefiting from
collaboration among the services that could save time and money. Among
the ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases where
the military services' successful collaboration resulted in savings of
time and resources. We also found cases where more collaboration is
needed to provide greater efficiencies in developing more affordable
new systems to close gaps in capabilities. Most of the 12 airborne ISR
programs that we reviewed have experienced some cost and/or schedule
growth. One program experienced significant cost growth and 9 programs
have experienced schedule delays that range from 3 months to 60 months.
These problems were caused largely by acquisition strategies that
failed to capture sufficient knowledge about the product technologies
and design before committing to the development or demonstration of a
new system. Resultant delays in the delivery of some new systems have
required DOD to make investments in legacy systems in order to keep
them relevant and operational until they can be replaced by new
systems.
Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Services' ISR
Programs:
While the Office of Secretary of Defense has historically endorsed the
concept of joint acquisitions because of the potential synergies and
resultant benefits, the military services have not always embraced
joint acquisitions and often prefer separately managed programs to
satisfy their individual needs. As a result, opportunities to gain
efficiencies through common engineering, design, and manufacturing
efforts are not presented when a new acquisition program begins.
However, we found the military services sometimes initiate
collaborative approaches on their own to achieve some of the economies
and efficiencies of a joint program. In one case, we also found the
services resisted seeking synergies that could benefit both programs
and lead to potential savings in development and procurement costs. The
following three examples illustrate programs that are collaborating,
have taken initial steps to begin collaborating, and have resisted
collaborating. The ultimate extent of collaboration as well as outcomes
of these programs still remains to be seen.
Successful Collaboration on Fire Scout:
The Army began developing its Future Combat Systems--a family of
systems that included a vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aircraft
system called Fire Scout--in 2000. Program managers from the Army Fire
Scout contacted their counterparts in the Navy Fire Scout program to
share information and see if there could be any synergies between the
two programs. This was done on their own initiative as acquisition
policy does not require joint or collaborative programs. Army and Navy
officials met several times to discuss configuration, performance
requirements, testing, support, and other issues. Initially the
requirements for the two systems were quite different. The Army's
unmanned aircraft system had four blades and a larger engine, while
Navy's system had three rotor blades and a smaller engine. After
discussions, the Navy decided to switch to the Army's configuration.
The Army is buying common components, such as the air vehicle and
flight components, under the Navy contract.
An Army program management official estimated that the savings to the
Army in research and development alone would be about $200 million. As
both programs mature, the official believes additional synergies and
savings could be realized through contract price breaks on quantities
and shared test assets, such as air vehicles, support equipment, and
test components. Jointly acquiring common hardware under one contract
will also reduce procurement administrative lead time and permit common
design, tooling, and testing. Finally, future payload development such
as communications, sensors, and data links could be procured jointly.
Opportunity to Collaborate on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS):
The Navy identified a mission need for a broad area maritime and
littoral ISR capability in 2000. Based on a 2002 analysis of
alternatives, the Navy decided to pursue a manned platform Multi-
mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) with an unmanned adjunct, the BAMS. The
Navy subsequently performed an analysis of alternatives for the BAMS
program, which identified several potential alternatives; foremost
among them was the Global Hawk system. As a risk reduction effort, the
Navy funded the Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration program in 2003.
Working through the existing Air Force contract, the Navy procured two
Global Hawk unmanned aircraft and associated ground controls and
equipment. The demonstration program was expected to leverage the
existing Global Hawk system to develop tactics, training, and
techniques for maritime mission applications.
The BAMS program is at a critical juncture. It released a request for
proposals in February 2007 and plans to proceed with system development
and demonstration in October 2007. If the Global Hawk (or another
existing system like the Air Force Reaper) is selected, there are
opportunities for the Navy to work with the Air Force and take
advantage of its knowledge on the existing platform. By adopting the
collaborative techniques used by the Fire Scout officials, the Navy
could leverage knowledge early in the acquisition process and avoid or
reduce costs for design, new tooling, and manufacturing, and streamline
contracting and acquisition processes.
Collaboration Slow to Happen on Warrior and Predator:
In contrast to the Fire Scout experience, the Air Force and Army
repeatedly resisted collaborating on their Predator and Warrior
unmanned aircraft programs. The Air Force's Predator is a legacy
program that has been operational since 1995. Its persistent
surveillance/full motion video capability continues to be a valued
asset to the warfighter. When the Army began in 2001 to define
requirements for the Warrior, a system similar to the Predator, it did
not explore potential synergies and efficiencies with the Air Force
program. Both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible for
reviewing Warrior's requirements and acquisition documentation raised
concerns about duplication of an existing capability. Despite these
concerns, the Army did not perform an analysis of alternatives, citing
the urgent need of battlefield commanders for this capability.[Footnote
10] The Army awarded a separate development contract to the same
contractor producing the Predator.
Responding to direction from the Quadrennial Defense Review and the
Secretary of Defense, the Army and Air Force agreed to consider
cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems in January 2006.
However, the effort has stalled because the services have different
concepts of operation and requirements. For example, the Army does not
agree with the Air Force's requirement for rated pilots. The Air Force
and the Army are currently working to identify program synergies in a
phased approach. Initially, the Air Force will acquire two of the more
modern Warrior airframes and test them. Later, the services will
compare their requirements for ground control stations and automated
takeoff and landing. Finally, the Army and Air Force plan to compare
concepts of operation and training requirements for additional
synergies. However, so far the Army has coordinated the proposed
approach through the Vice Chief of Staff level, but the agreement has
not yet been approved by the Department of Army. The Air Force is still
working to resolve comments and concerns at lower organizational
levels. If this stalls, these programs could be more costly and
redundant.
Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led
to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems:
Nearly all of the 12 airborne ISR programs[Footnote 11] we reviewed
have experienced changes in cost or schedule. This can be attributed to
a variety of causes. Many programs began development without a solid
business case or a realistic acquisition strategy. As a result of the
schedule delays in some programs, the services will have to make
investments in legacy systems to keep them in the inventory longer than
planned. These investments represent opportunity costs that could have
been used for other needs within DOD.
Cost, Schedule, and Performance Status of Airborne ISR Programs:
Programs must build a business case that provides demonstrated evidence
that (1) the warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with
the chosen concept, and (2) the concept can be developed and produced
within existing resources--technologies, design, funding, and time.
Establishing a business case calls for a realistic assessment of risks
and costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business case
and invites failure. Once the business case is done, programs must
develop a realistic acquisition strategy, which requires having
critical program knowledge at key points in the acquisition. This
includes knowledge about technology maturity, system design, and
manufacturing and production processes. DOD's acquisition policy
endorses this knowledge-based approach to acquisition. This policy
includes strategies to reduce technology, integration, design,
manufacturing, and production risks.
Table 1 summarizes ISR programs that have encountered problems either
in development or as they prepared to begin the system development and
demonstration phase of an acquisition program. Results of these
problems included cost and schedule growth, program restructuring,
cancellation, and unplanned investments in the legacy systems that were
being replaced.
Table 1: Causes and Impacts of Cost and Schedule Growth:
System: E-10A;
Problem encountered: Uncertain need and immature technology;
Impact: Program cancelled.
System: Aerial Common Sensor;
Problem encountered: Requirements and design changes;
Impact: Development stopped; program being restructured; schedule
delayed 60 months; and increased investments in legacy systems.
System: Global Hawk;
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition; immature technology; and
requirements and design changes;
Impact: Cost growth (261 percent in development); schedule delayed 21
months; program restructured; potential increased investments in legacy
system.
System: Reaper;
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition and immature technology;
Impact: Cost growth (13 percent in development) and schedule delayed 7
months.
System: BAMS;
Problem encountered: Immature technology;
Impact: Schedule delayed.
System: MMA;
Problem encountered: Immature technology;
Impact: None to date.
System: Army Fire Scout;
Problem encountered: Acquisition dependent on another major acquisition
program (Future Combat Systems);
Impact: Schedule delayed 22 months.
System: Navy Fire Scout;
Problem encountered: Acquisition dependent on another major acquisition
program (Littoral Combat Ship);
Impact: Schedule delayed 3 months.
System: Space Radar;
Problem encountered: Immature technology and requirements change;
Impact: Cost growth (18 percent in development); schedule delayed 8
months; and program restructured.
System: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program;
Problem encountered: Acquisition strategy and funding dependent on
other major acquisition programs (E-10A cancelled and Global Hawk
continues);
Impact: Requirements changed and program restructured.
System: Warrior;
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition strategy and immature
technology;
Impact: Cost growth (21 percent in development); schedule delayed 9
months.
System: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (sensor);
Problem encountered: Immature technology and design;
Impact: Schedule delayed.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Impact of Delays on Legacy Systems:
Following are detailed examples of programs that failed to either
develop a good business case or an executable acquisition strategy and
that had problems. The outcome was that the services either had to or
may have to make additional investments in the legacy systems to keep
them relevant and in the operational inventory until the new system has
completed development and is fielded.
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS):
The Army's termination of the ACS system development and demonstration
contract could have significant schedule, cost, and performance impacts
on three legacy systems in the ISR portfolio--the Army's Guardrail
Common Sensor (GRCS) and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL), and the
Navy's EP-3. The Army and the Navy had planned a phased approach to
field the ACS and retire the legacy systems from the inventory with a
minimal investment in maintaining legacy systems. Delays in ACS
development will now require the Army and Navy to make investments in
the legacy systems at the same time that they develop new replacement
systems. In addition, any delay in either the development of new
systems or modification of legacy systems could result in an ISR
capability gap on the battlefield.
* The GRCS and ARL were to be replaced by ACS beginning in fiscal year
2009. Since the termination of the ACS development contract, the ACS
program has reverted to a predevelopment stage as the Army restructures
the program. ACS is scheduled to restart system development and
demonstration in 2009, 5 years later than the initial development
decision. Although the Army has not established a new date for initial
operating capacity, that date is also likely to slip by 5 years to
fiscal year 2014. The cost to keep GRCS and ARL mission equipment
viable and the platforms airworthy is estimated to be $767 million
between fiscal years 2007 and 2013. Without these improvements, the
systems will not remain capable against modern threats which could
result in a gap in ISR capabilities on the battlefield. In addition,
the airframes could not continue to fly during this time frame without
some structural modifications.
* The Navy had planned to replace its EP-3 with ACS and begin fielding
the new system in fiscal year 2012. After the Army terminated the ACS
development contract, the Navy considered staying with the Army in its
development effort. However, according to Navy officials, the Chief of
Naval Operations directed the Navy to proceed with a separate
development effort, also called Aerial Common Sensor. The Navy now
plans to proceed with system development and demonstration in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. The Navy has not established a date
to begin fielding the new system, but that is not likely to take place
before 2017. This translates into a 5-year slip in retiring the oldest
EP-3 systems and will make modifications to those systems necessary so
that they can remain in the field until the Navy achieves full
operating capacity for its ACS. The Navy plans to invest more than $900
million between fiscal years 2007 and 2013 to modify the EP-3.
Global Hawk:
The Air Force plans to replace the U-2 with the Global Hawk but delays
in the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need to keep the U-
2 in the inventory longer than anticipated. In December 2005, the Air
Force had planned to begin retiring the U-2 in fiscal year 2007 and
complete the retirement by fiscal year 2012. Although the next
configuration of the Global Hawk (with limited signals intelligence
capability) is scheduled for delivery in fiscal year 2009, it will not
have the same capability as the U-2. The version of the Global Hawk
that is planned to include a more robust signals intelligence
capability is scheduled to begin deliveries in 2012. The Air Force is
now developing a plan to fully retire the U-2s a year later in 2013 and
at a slower rate than the 2005 plan. There are no funds in the budget
beyond fiscal year 2006 but the Air Force intends to fund projects
necessary to keep the U-2 capable.
E-10A:
The E-10A development program has been cancelled, but some funding will
be used to support a technology demonstrator program for E-10A
technologies. The E-10A was planned to provide battlefield awareness
and command and control through technologies that provide capabilities
greater than the current Air Force Joint Surveillance, Target
Acquisition, and Reconnaissance system (Joint STARS). Battlefield
awareness is essential to military operations according to the Air
Force, and continued funding for the E-10A technologies, like the Multi-
Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP),[Footnote 12] is
seen as a means for exploring follow-on avenues for Joint STARS.
According to an Air Force program official, the Joint STARS radar will
need to be replaced at some point in the future and a variant of the MP-
RTIP would probably be a candidate. However, before this new radar
could be integrated on to the Joint STARS, its data processing and
communications capabilities would need to be upgraded. At this time,
this type of an effort is not a part of the Joint STARS program of
record.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy
to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For future questions about this statement, please contact Davi
D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431, Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619, or
Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Other individuals making key contributions to this
statement include Margaret Morgan, Patricia Lentini, Michael Hazard,
Assistant Directors; Gabrielle Carrington, Susan Tindall, Dayna Foster,
Frank Cristinzio, LaShawnda Lindsey, Elisha Matvay, Rae Ann Sapp,
Michael Aiken, and Grace Coleman.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. Washington, D.C.:
April 6, 2006.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in
Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49.
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Changes in E-10A Acquisition Strategy Needed
before Development Starts. GAO-05-273. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks, GAO-05-6. Washington, D.C.:
November 5, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Greater Use of Knowledge-Based Concepts Would
Reduce Risks in Developing New Signals Intelligence Aircraft, GAO-04-
939 Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington. D.C.: March
17, 2004.
Signals Intelligence: DOD Should Consider Joint Replacement of Aging
Aircraft. GAO-02-401. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The other Functional Capabilities Boards are Command and Control,
Focused Logistics, Force Management, Force Protection, Force
Application, Net-Centric, and Joint Training.
[2] The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has voluntarily
expanded membership of the council to include representatives of
several additional Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense
offices, a representative of U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
[3] The Defense ISR Enterprise consists of the intelligence components
of DOD operating cohesively to fulfill the Secretary of Defense's
obligation to meet DOD's intelligence needs and a significant set of
government-wide intelligence needs (as tasked by the Director of
National Intelligence.)
[4] DOD defines persistent surveillance as the integrated management of
a diverse set of collection and processing capabilities, operated to
detect and understand the activity of interest with sufficient sensor
dwell, revisit rate, and required quality to expeditiously assess
adversary actions, predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an
adversary, and assess results of U.S./coalition actions.
[5] Under this concept, a group of military capabilities, such as ISR
capabilities, is managed as a joint portfolio rather than separately by
each service. The other test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint
Net-Centric Operations, and Joint Logistics.
[6] The principal members of the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board are representatives from the services, the combatant
commands, the Joint Staff, OUSD(AT&L), the Director, PA&E, and
OASD(NII)/DOD Chief Information Officer.
[7] The National Security Space Office (NSSO) falls under the office of
DOD's Executive Agent for Space--the Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Its mission is to provide unity of effort and strategic focus to
national security space issues. The mission of the NSSO's ISR
Functional Integration Office, which conducted this analysis, is to
create and sustain the nation's integrated ISR architecture to provide
a basis for informed decision making across the national security
enterprise.
[8] Cross-cueing is the collaborative effort of utilizing capabilities
offered by multiple ISR platforms to fulfill a mission.
[9] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005).
[10] The Army asserted that its need was urgent and it could not get
sufficient support from Predator because of the system's limited
assets.
[11] These 12 programs are post Milestone A and are in technology
development or systems development and demonstration. A project enters
technology development at Milestone A, when the decision maker has
approved the technology development strategy. The purpose of this phase
of development is to reduce technology risk and to determine the
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system.
[12] A smaller, less capable version of the MP-RTIP is also planned for
the Global Hawk.
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