Tactical Aircraft
DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy Gao ID: GAO-07-415 April 2, 2007The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $109 billion in its tactical air forces between 2007 and 2013. Long term, DOD plans to replace aging legacy aircraft with fewer, more expensive but more capable and stealthy aircraft. Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces within today's constrained budget environment is a formidable challenge. DOD has already incurred substantial cost and schedule overruns in its acquisition of new systems, and further delays could require billions of dollars in additional investments to keep legacy aircraft capable and sustainable. Because of the large investments and risk, GAO was asked to review investment planning for tactical aircraft. This report describes the current status of DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs; identifies current impacts on legacy aircraft modernization programs and retirement schedules; and assesses DOD's overall investment plan for tactical aircraft.
DOD's efforts to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces have been blunted by cost and schedule overruns in its new tactical aircraft acquisition programs: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Air Force F-22A, and the Navy F/A-18E/F. Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about $400 billion--with about three-fourths still to be invested. The JSF program, which is expected to make up the largest percentage of the new fleet, has more than 90 percent of its investments still in the future. Increased costs and extended development times have reduced DOD's buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy aircraft with about one-third fewer new aircraft compared to original plans at each program's inception. The outcomes of these acquisition programs directly impact existing tactical aircraft systems. Until new systems are acquired in sufficient quantities to replace legacy fleets, legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant. Continual schedule slips and reduced buys of new aircraft--particularly in the F-22A and JSF programs--make it difficult for program managers to allocate funds for modifying legacy aircraft to meet new requirements or to set retirement dates for legacy aircraft. Lengthening the life of legacy systems also impacts DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threats and reduces the department's flexibility to invest in new weapons. DOD's tactical aircraft investments are driven by the services' separate acquisition planning. Moving forward, these plans are likely unexecutable given competing demands from future defense and non defense budgets. The EA-6B--providing tactical radar jamming capabilities for all services and one of the few examples of a joint asset--is also expected to be replaced by separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Without a joint, DOD-wide strategy for tactical aircraft investments, it is difficult to identify potential areas where efficiencies might be achieved or where capability gaps might occur in DOD's tactical aircraft acquisitions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-415, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2007:
Tactical Aircraft:
DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy:
GAO-07-415:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-415, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Air
and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $109 billion in its
tactical air forces between 2007 and 2013. Long term, DOD plans to
replace aging legacy aircraft with fewer, more expensive but more
capable and stealthy aircraft.
Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces within today‘s
constrained budget environment is a formidable challenge. DOD has
already incurred substantial cost and schedule overruns in its
acquisition of new systems, and further delays could require billions
of dollars in additional investments to keep legacy aircraft capable
and sustainable.
Because of the large investments and risk, GAO was asked to review
investment planning for tactical aircraft. This report describes the
current status of DOD‘s new tactical aircraft acquisition programs;
identifies current impacts on legacy aircraft modernization programs
and retirement schedules; and assesses DOD‘s overall investment plan
for tactical aircraft.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s efforts to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces
have been blunted by cost and schedule overruns in its new tactical
aircraft acquisition programs: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Air
Force F-22A, and the Navy F/A-18E/F. Collectively, these programs are
expected to cost about $400 billion”with about three-fourths still to
be invested. The JSF program, which is expected to make up the largest
percentage of the new fleet, has more than 90 percent of its
investments still in the future. Increased costs and extended
development times have reduced DOD‘s buying power, and DOD now expects
to replace legacy aircraft with about one-third fewer new aircraft
compared to original plans at each program‘s inception.
The outcomes of these acquisition programs directly impact existing
tactical aircraft systems. Until new systems are acquired in sufficient
quantities to replace legacy fleets, legacy systems must be sustained
and kept operationally relevant. Continual schedule slips and reduced
buys of new aircraft”particularly in the F-22A and JSF programs”make it
difficult for program managers to allocate funds for modifying legacy
aircraft to meet new requirements or to set retirement dates for legacy
aircraft. Lengthening the life of legacy systems also impacts DOD‘s new
tactical aircraft acquisition programs. DOD has become increasingly
concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant
and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in
the face of forecast threats and reduces the department‘s flexibility
to invest in new weapons.
DOD‘s tactical aircraft investments are driven by the services‘
separate acquisition planning. Moving forward, these plans are likely
unexecutable given competing demands from future defense and non
defense budgets. The EA-6B”providing tactical radar jamming
capabilities for all services and one of the few examples of a joint
asset”is also expected to be replaced by separate and unique aircraft
for each of the services. Without a joint, DOD-wide strategy for
tactical aircraft investments, it is difficult to identify potential
areas where efficiencies might be achieved or where capability gaps
might occur in DOD‘s tactical aircraft acquisitions.
Table: Planned Changes in Tactical Aircraft Inventories:
Air force;
Inventory 2006: 2,500;
Inventory 2025: 1,800;
Inventory reduction: 700;
Percent reduction: 28%.
Navy and Marine Corps;
Inventory 2006: 1,200;
Inventory 2025: 900;
Inventory reduction: 300;
Percent reduction: 25%.
Total;
Inventory 2006: 3,700;
Inventory 2025: 2,700;
Inventory reduction: 1,000;
Percent reduction: 27%.
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
Note: These numbers are approximate to show relative changes in
amounts.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
To achieve better outcomes in acquisition programs and investment
planning, GAO recommends that DOD (1) take decisive actions to shorten
cycle times in developing and delivering new weapon systems and (2)
develop an integrated and affordable enterprise-level investment
strategy for tactical air forces.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-41].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at
(202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
New Acquisition Programs Are Spending Significantly More Dollars and
Delivering Fewer Tactical Aircraft Later Than Originally Planned:
New Acquisition Costs and Delays Have Made Resourcing Decisions for
Legacy Systems Reactive and Less Efficient:
A Joint Enterprise-Level Investment Strategy for Tactical Aircraft Is
Lacking As Services Plan Independently:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Response:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Tactical Air Forces Funding Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011:
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft Systems Ongoing and Future
Efforts:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: New Aircraft Replacing Legacy Fleets:
Table 2: New Systems Acquisition Costs and Quantities:
Table 3: Changes in Acquisition Quantities for New Tactical Aircraft
Systems:
Table 4: Changes in Key Outcomes of New Tactical Systems:
Table 5: Total Investments in New and Legacy Tactical Aircraft from
Fiscal Years 2007 to 2013:
Table 6: Air Force Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs:
Table 7: Navy Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs:
Table 8: Changes in Tactical Aircraft Inventories Fiscal Years 2006 to
2025:
Table 9: F-22A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 10: Navy JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 11: Air Force JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 12: F/A-18 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 13: EA-18G Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 14: A-10 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 15: F-15 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 16: F-16 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 17: F-117A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 18: EA-6B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Table 19: AV-8B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD Investment in Tactical Air Forces:
Figure 2: Original Planned and Current Procurement Quantities for New
Tactical Aircraft:
Figure 3: Operating Costs per Flying Hour for Air Force Tactical
Aircraft:
Figure 4: Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft Force Structure:
Figure 5: Air Force Tactical Aircraft Force Structure:
Figure 6: Projected Budgets for Tactical Aircraft:
Figure 7: F-22A Raptor:
Figure 8: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
Figure 9: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet:
Figure 10: EA-18G Growler:
Figure 11: A-10 Warthog:
Figure 12: F-15A/B/C/D Eagle and F-15E Strike Eagle:
Figure 13: F-16 Fighting Falcon:
Figure 14: F-117A Nighthawk:
Figure 15: F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet:
Figure 16: EA-6B Prowler:
Figure 17: AV-8B Harrier II:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ICAP III: Improved Capability electronic suite modification:
IOC: initial operational capability:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities, Integration, and Development System:
JSF: Joint Strike Fighter:
OSD: Office of Secretary of Defense:
QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review:
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation:
STOVL: short field take- off and vertical landing:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 2, 2007:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent
$534 billion to develop, procure, and modify its tactical air forces.
Tactical air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air
dominance during combat operations and account for a significant share
of the defense dollar. After procuring large numbers of fighter and
attack aircraft in the 1970s and 1980s, DOD shifted its emphasis to
procuring bombers, airlifters, and other systems. DOD now seeks to
recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces to ensure the total
force has sufficient capabilities and capacity to meet operational
requirements today and in the future. Over the next 20 years, DOD plans
to replace several thousand aging tactical aircraft with a
substantially smaller number of more expensive but more capable and
stealthy new aircraft, while continuing to modify and sustain its
current fleets in order to keep them operationally viable until
sufficient numbers of the new systems are fielded.
Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces to meet the
warfighter's needs within today's constrained budget environment is a
formidable challenge. Our work in this area has shown that DOD has
incurred substantial cost increases and delays in its acquisition of
new systems. Further delays in delivering these aircraft, cost
increases, and cuts in quantity could easily occur, meaning billions of
dollars in additional investments could be needed to keep current
(legacy) aircraft both capable and sustainable for longer periods of
time than currently planned.
Because of the costs, complexities, and interrelationships of the
tactical air forces, and the need for greater insight, the Chairman of
the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed
Services, asked GAO to look at DOD's investment planning for
recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical fighter and attack aircraft
force portfolio. This report addresses (1) current risks for DOD's new
tactical aircraft acquisition programs; (2) impacts on legacy aircraft
modernization programs and retirement schedules; and (3) the extent to
which DOD has developed an overall investment plan for future tactical
aircraft that addresses capability gaps, limits redundancies, and
considers the timing and affordability of planned actions. To conduct
our work, we evaluated new acquisition and legacy modification plans,
budgets, retirement and delivery schedules, and results to date for
recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces. We analyzed Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps plans and processes for establishing
force and capability requirements and reviewed joint efforts and
initiatives to look at integrated DOD-wide solutions. We also drew
extensively on work conducted under other GAO engagements concerning
weapon systems and force structure. We performed our work from June
2006 through March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Appendix I further discusses this
report's scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
During the next 7 years, the military services plan to spend about
$109.3 billion to acquire about 570 new tactical aircraft and to
modernize hundreds of operational aircraft. Substantial cost increases,
schedule delays, and changes in requirements have significantly reduced
procurement quantities of new aircraft. For example, since its start,
the development period for the F-22A doubled, threat conditions
changed, new ground attack and intelligence-gathering requirements were
added, and its unit costs more than doubled, resulting in a steady
decline in the number of aircraft the Air Force can now procure.
Similar conditions and risk of poor outcomes seem to be emerging for
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is the linchpin for future
modernization efforts because of its sheer size and plans to replace
hundreds of operational systems in all three services. However, its
development costs have increased by $31.6 billion since 2004, and
procurement and delivery schedules are slipping.
Funding needs and plans for new and legacy aircraft are by nature
interdependent. Legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally
relevant until new systems complete development and are ready to
replace them. If quantities of new aircraft are reduced and/or
deliveries slip further into future years, significantly more as yet
unplanned money will be required to sustain, modernize, and extend the
life of legacy systems to ensure that the total force is both capable
and sufficient in numbers. Uncertainty about new systems costs and
deliveries makes it challenging to effectively plan and efficiently
implement modernization efforts and legacy retirement schedules. Over
the next seven years, the services are investing an average of about
$1.7 billion per year on legacy modifications, but there are large pent
up demands--billions more--for unfunded requirements and potential life
extension programs identified by program officials. Officials said the
time is approaching when hard decisions on retiring or extending the
life of legacy aircraft must be made.
Looking forward, DOD does not have a single, comprehensive, and
integrated investment plan for recapitalizing and modernizing fighter
and attack aircraft. Lacking an integrated DOD-wide view of
requirements, it is difficult to determine the extent of capability
gaps and shortfalls, or, alternatively, duplication of capability.
Rather, each military service operates largely within its own stovepipe
to plan and acquire the resources needed to fill its individual force
structure construct. In the Air Force's case, it is the forces deemed
necessary to fill its air and space expeditionary wings; for the Navy,
its carrier strike forces; and for the Marines, its expeditionary
forces. Collectively, the services have underperformed to date in terms
of delivering aircraft within desired costs and quantities, and future
plans are likely unaffordable within projected funding levels.
Individual service plans are largely dependent on favorable assumptions
about the cost, quantity, and delivery schedules for new acquisitions
and the ability to increase and sustain future funding levels
substantially above current levels. These favorable assumptions are not
realistic when juxtaposed with projected decline in future federal
discretionary spending (including defense investment accounts),
continued operational support requirements for the global war on
terror, and looming start-ups of other big-ticket defense items, such
as a strategic tanker aircraft and next generation long-range strike
systems, competing for the same funds. Recent efforts to examine joint
requirements on an integrated, DOD-wide basis have not significantly
affected service plans and investments.
In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical
air forces that reflect what is needed and affordable from a joint
service perspective and that has high confidence of being executed as
planned, GAO is recommending that DOD (1) take decisive actions to
shorten cycle times in developing and delivering new tactical aircraft
and (2) develop an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy for
tactical air forces.
Background:
Tactical air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air
dominance during combat operations. These forces include Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighters and attack aircraft with air-
to-air combat, air-to-ground attack, and defense suppression[Footnote
1] missions, and related equipment and support activities. These forces
operate in the first days of a conflict to penetrate enemy air space,
defeat air defenses, and achieve air dominance. This allows follow-on
ground, air, and naval forces freedom to maneuver and attack in the
battle space. Once air dominance is established, tactical aircraft
continue to vigorously and persistently strike ground targets for the
remainder of the conflict. Some tactical aircraft are also essential to
protect the homeland by defending against incoming missiles or enemy
aircraft.
Current operational tactical aircraft (referred to as legacy systems)
are the Air Force's F-15, F-16, F-117A, and A-10 systems and the Navy
and Marine Corps F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B. Most of these aircraft were
purchased in the 1970s and 1980s and are considerably aged as measured
by the number of flying hours accumulated by an aircraft compared to
its estimated life expectancy. Weapon systems also tend to cost more to
operate and maintain as they age. To meet national defense security
requirements, DOD sustains its legacy fleets and also modernizes some
with new capabilities and enhanced structures to keep aircraft
operationally viable until new systems can be delivered in sufficient
quantities and the legacies can be retired.
DOD is continuing efforts to recapitalize its tactical air forces
(replace legacy with new) by acquiring and fielding the Air Force's F-
22A, the Navy's F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, and the joint service F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) weapon systems. Recapitalization plans began 20
years ago with the start-up of the F-22A program and are now expected
to take another 20 years or more to fulfill culminating with the final
JSF procurements. The JSF is being developed in three variants for the
U.S. and allied forces.[Footnote 2] The Air Force's version, a
conventional take-off and landing aircraft, is intended to replace the
F-16 and A-10 and complement the F-22A. The Navy's carrier-capable
version is intended to replace F/A-18C/D aircraft and complement the F/
A-18E/F. The Marines Corps is acquiring a short field take-off and
vertical landing (STOVL) variant to replace its AV-8B and F/A-18D
fleets. Table 1 shows the new aircraft with the legacy systems they are
expected to replace.
Table 1: New Aircraft Replacing Legacy Fleets:
New tactical aircraft: Joint Strike Fighter;
Legacy aircraft to be replaced: F-16 & A-10 (Air Force) F/A-18C/D
(Navy) F/A-18D & AV-8B (Marine Corps).
New tactical aircraft: F-22A;
Legacy aircraft to be replaced: F-15C/D (Air Force).
New tactical aircraft: F/A-18E/F;
Legacy aircraft to be replaced: F/A- 18A/B/C (Navy).
New tactical aircraft: EA-18G;
Legacy aircraft to be replaced: EA-6B (Navy).
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
Tactical Air Forces Costs:
Tactical air forces account for a significant share of the defense
budget. DOD spends billions of dollars every year to develop, procure,
and modernize its tactical air forces. Figure 1 shows the trend in
actual and projected investment over the 36-year period from fiscal
year 1976 to 2011. To reflect the trend in relative buying power, we
normalized the data to express costs in fiscal year 2007 dollars. The
total investment for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
and procurement during this time period approaches $1 trillion in
constant dollars. The figure illustrates the large investments
throughout the 1980s when most of the legacy fleets were acquired and
the subsequent decrease in investment during the 1990s as DOD focused
on other procurement priorities. The rise in investment starting in the
mid-1990s reflects the build up and acquisition of the new systems.
This data does not include another $3.3 billion requested by DOD for
tactical aircraft in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and fiscal year
2008 budget request for the Global War on Terror.
Figure 1: DOD Investment in Tactical Air Forces:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD historical budget data.
[End of figure]
In addition to the large expenditures for development and procurement,
the services spend billions more annually to operate, support,
maintain, and man the tactical air forces. Over the past decade, the
tactical air forces share of the total defense budget has stayed
remarkably consistent, annually receiving about 11 to 12 percent of the
total DOD budget and about 15 to 16 percent of the investment
appropriations. DOD programmed a total of $331.6 billion for personnel,
operations and maintenance, military construction, and acquisition
costs for the tactical air forces for fiscal years 2006 to 2011, an
annual average of $55.3 billion. Appendix III shows the breakdown by
military service and by appropriation.
New Acquisition Programs Are Spending Significantly More Dollars and
Delivering Fewer Tactical Aircraft Later Than Originally Planned:
Midway through a 40-year effort to recapitalize and modernize its
tactical air forces, DOD's efforts have been blunted by relatively poor
outcomes in its cornerstone new acquisition programs. Increased costs,
extended development times, requirement changes, and budget pressures
have reduced DOD's buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy
aircraft with about 1,500 fewer new tactical aircraft than it had
originally planned--a reduction of one-third. Additionally, delivery of
these new systems has lagged far behind original plans, not only
delaying the fielding of capabilities to the warfighter, but also
increasing operating and modernization costs to keep legacy aircraft
relevant and in the inventory longer than expected.
DOD Plans for New Aircraft and Their Implications for the Total Force:
DOD's recapitalization plans center on the acquisitions of the JSF, F-
22A, F/A-18E/F, and its electronic attack variant, the EA-18G.
Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about $400 billion--
with almost three-fourths still to be invested--to acquire about 3,200
aircraft (see table 2). Through the end of fiscal year 2006, Congress
has appropriated about $111 billion, and the services have taken
delivery on 480 new aircraft. Table 2 also shows that about 72 percent
of the expected investment and 85 percent of the planned procurement
quantity is in the future. The F-22 and the F-18 series acquisition
programs are expected to be mostly completed over the next five years,
but the JSF program is only halfway through development with
procurement starting in 2007 and continuing until 2034. With most of
its program still ahead, its sheer size, and its tri-service impact,
the JSF is, in many ways, the linchpin of DOD's tactical aircraft
future.
Table 2: New Systems Acquisition Costs and Quantities:
(In millions of current year dollars):
JSF;
Costs;
Prior years: $24,796.7;
Investments FY07-11: $41,688.1;
To complete: $209,974.1;
Totals: $276,458.9.
JSF;
Qty;
Prior years: 1;
Investments FY07-11: 202;
To complete: 2,255;
Totals: 2,458.
F-22A;
Costs;
Prior years: $50,224.7;
Investments FY07-11: $12,375.3;
To complete: $0.0;
Totals: $62,600.0.
F-22A;
Qty;
Prior years: 123;
Investments FY07-11: 60;
To complete: 0;
Totals: 183.
F/A-18E/F;
Costs;
Prior years: $34,891.8;
Investments FY07- 11: $9,592.8;
To complete: $0.0;
Totals: $44,484.6.
F/A-18E/F;
Qty;
Prior years: 352;
Investments FY07-11: 110;
To complete: 0;
Totals: 462.
EA-18G;
Costs;
Prior years: $1,429.2;
Investments FY07-11: $7,177.0;
To complete: $564.6;
Totals: $9,170.8.
EA-18G;
Qty;
Prior years: 4;
Investments FY07-11: 82;
To complete: 4;
Totals: 90.
Totals;
Costs;
Prior years: $111,342.4;
Investments FY07-11: $70,833.2;
To complete: $210,538.7;
Totals: $392,714.3.
Totals;
Qty;
Prior years: 480;
Investments FY07-11: 454;
To complete: 2,259;
Totals: 3,193.
Percent;
Costs;
Prior years: 28%;
Investments FY07-11: 18%;
To complete: 54%;
Totals: [Empty].
Percent;
Qty;
Prior years: 15%;
Investments FY07-11: 14%;
To complete: 71%;
Totals: [Empty].
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports, Dec. 31, 2005.
Note: F/A-18E/F and EA-18G costs include prorated shares of development
costs for the Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar, funded in its
own Navy program.
[End of table]
Increased costs, schedule delays, and budget pressures have combined to
decrease procurement quantities of new tactical aircraft. Total
quantities have been reduced by one-third compared to original plans at
each program's inception (see table 3).
Table 3: Changes in Acquisition Quantities for New Tactical Aircraft
Systems:
Aircraft: JSF;
Original Qty: 2,988;
Current Qty: 2,458;
Decreased Qty: 530;
Percent decrease: -18%.
Aircraft: F-18;
Original Qty: 1,000;
Current Qty: 552;
Decreased Qty: 448;
Percent decrease: -45%.
Aircraft: F-22;
Original Qty: 750;
Current Qty: 183;
Decreased Qty: 567;
Percent decrease: -76%.
Totals;
Original Qty: 4,738;
Current Qty: 3,193;
Decreased Qty: 1,545;
Percent decrease: -33%.
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
Note: Current F-18 quantities include 462 F/A-18E/Fs and 90 EA-18G
electronic attack variant.
[End of table]
The cumulative impacts of delayed deliveries and reduced quantities on
the total force (see fig. 2) have slowed the recapitalization of the
legacy force and made it more expensive to modernize, operate, and
maintain. Collectively, this means that the warfighters will have fewer
of the newest and most capable aircraft throughout the recapitalization
period. With fewer buys of new systems, legacy aircraft will make up a
larger proportion of the future force and for a longer period of time
than originally envisioned. Although legacy aircraft are still very
capable--and will be expected to remain so through upgrades and life
extension efforts--they are becoming increasingly more expensive to
operate and maintain. Service officials are confident that new systems
will provide improved capabilities compared to legacy systems they
replace, but worry whether the numbers of aircraft acquired are
sufficient to meet national security requirements at an acceptable
level of risk. They are also concerned with managing risks using legacy
systems in the near-and mid-terms.
Figure 2: Original Planned and Current Procurement Quantities for New
Tactical Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Cost, Schedule, and Performance Issues for New Acquisition Programs:
Over the years, our extensive reviews of DOD's major weapon system
acquisitions have usually found positive outcomes when programs follow
the evolutionary, knowledge-based strategy espoused by the best
practices of leading commercial firms and now established in DOD
policy. This includes establishing a solid business case that
accurately and realistically matches available resources (technologies,
money, expertise, and time) to warfighter needs. The Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment report in January 2006 also found
that a disciplined business approach was needed to improve DOD's weapon
system acquisition process. One particular and key practice recommended
was for time-certain development programs--delivery of the first unit
to operational forces within about six years from the Milestone A
decision point.[Footnote 3] We have usually found poorer outcomes--
significant cost increases, reduced procurement quantities, and
schedule delays--in programs not following these practices. For
example, immature technologies, design problems, and changes in threats
and requirements underpinning the original business case, contributed
to major cost increases for the F-22A program, a doubling of its years
spent in development, and a sharp reduction in quantities deemed
affordable. We are concerned that the JSF is on a similar risky path
with highly concurrent plans to begin production while still early in
development and with little testing completed. On the other hand, the
F/A-18E/F program is employing a more evolutionary approach and is
experiencing better cost and schedule outcomes. We have some concerns
that its new electronic attack variant, the EA-18G, is pursuing a too-
aggressive and more concurrent strategy, increasing its risks of poor
program outcomes in the future. Table 4 summarizes outcomes to date on
these four tactical aircraft programs.
Table 4: Changes in Key Outcomes of New Tactical Systems:
F-22A;
Development cost changes: 47%;
Quantity reductions: 465;
Program unit cost increases: 186%;
Cycle time delays: 27 mo.
JSF;
Development cost changes: 29%;
Quantity reductions: 408;
Program unit cost increases: 33%;
Cycle time delays: 23 mo.
F-18E/F;
Development cost changes: (5)%;
Quantity reductions: 538;
Program unit cost increases: 36%;
Cycle time delays: 12 mo.
EA-18G;
Development cost changes: 8%;
Quantity reductions: 0;
Program unit cost increases: 4%;
Cycle time delays: 0 mo.
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
Notes: Outcome measures compare costs and plans established at the
start of system development with current costs and plans.
Cycle time delays show added months required to reach initial
operational capability.
[End of table]
An overview of key observations on each new system follows. More
details on each system's mission, program status, major work
activities, and funding are provided in appendix IV.
* The F-22A "Raptor" needs a new business case that more accurately and
realistically supports the changed conditions and the program of
record, including justification for additional investments of $6.3
billion to incorporate more robust ground attack and intelligence-
gathering capabilities. There is a 198 aircraft difference between the
Air Force's stated need for 381 aircraft and the 183 aircraft the
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) says is affordable. We have
previously recommended that DOD develop a new business case for the F-
22A program before further investments in new aircraft or modernization
are made. DOD has not concurred with this recommendation, stating that
an internal study of tactical aircraft has justified the current
quantities planned for the F-22A. Because of the frequently changing
OSD-approved requirements for the F-22A, repeated cost overruns,
significant remaining investments, and delays in the program we
continue to believe a new business case is required and that the
assumptions used in the internal OSD study be validated by an
independent source.
* The JSF "Lightning II" acquisition strategy's high degree of
concurrent development and production weakens its business case and
poses substantial risks for cost overruns, schedule slips, and late
delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. The program has
contracted to deliver full capabilities for the three different
variants in a single-step, 12-year development program and plans to
begin production in 2007 with immature technologies, incomplete
designs, undemonstrated system integration, and little knowledge about
performance and producibility. Costs have increased another $31.6
billion from the fiscal year 2004 rebaselined amount. Due to
affordability pressures, DOD is beginning to reduce annual procurement
quantities; recent plans indicate a 28 percent decrease in maximum
annual buy quantities compared to last year's program of record.
* The F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet" program adopted a more evolutionary and
less risky approach, having substantial commonality with its
predecessor C/D models and leveraging previous technology. Planned
upgrades incrementally add new capabilities, some of which are having
performance problems and delays according to OSD testers. Over half of
the planned fleet has been delivered, and some have been used in
combat. The mature and stable production program is on its second
multiyear contract and is delivering aircraft ahead of the contract
schedule and within cost targets.
* The EA-18G "Growler" is the newest program and shares the same F/A-
18F platform, but incorporates airborne electronic attack capabilities.
Its acquisition schedule is very aggressive and concurrent. Only two of
its five critical technologies are fully mature to best practice
standards even though the program is well into development and plans to
start producing electronic attack-capable aircraft this year. OSD's
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation also cites its aggressive
schedule to achieve an initial operational capability and special risks
in integrating the electronic attack capabilities onto the F/A-18F
platform.
New Acquisition Costs and Delays Have Made Resourcing Decisions for
Legacy Systems Reactive and Less Efficient:
The problems and delays encountered by the new tactical aircraft
acquisition programs have direct and significant impacts on legacy
systems plans and costs. Funding needs and plans for new and legacy
aircraft are by nature interdependent, and decisions to sustain,
modernize, or retire legacy systems are largely reactive to the
outcomes of new systems. The military services accord new systems
higher funding priority, and the legacy systems tend to get whatever
funding is remaining after the new systems' budget needs are met. If
new aircraft consume more of the investment dollars than planned, the
buying power and budgets for legacy systems are further reduced to
remain within DOD budget limits. However, as quantities of new systems
have been cut and deliveries to the warfighter delayed, more legacy
aircraft are required to stay in the inventory and for longer periods
of time than planned, requiring more dollars to modernize and maintain
aging aircraft. Table 5 summarizes budgeted investments (development
and procurement funding) for new and legacy systems. Over the next 7
years, DOD plans to invest about $109.3 billion in tactical aircraft to
acquire about 570 new systems and modernize hundreds of legacy systems.
Table 5: Total Investments in New and Legacy Tactical Aircraft from
Fiscal Years 2007 to 2013:
(In millions of dollars):
New systems: JSF;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $60,418.6;
Legacy systems Air Force: A-10;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $2,026.8;
Legacy systems Navy/Marines: F/A-18A-D;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $3,527.9.
New systems: F-22A;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $16,665.2;
Legacy systems Air Force: F-15A-D;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $2,667.8;
Legacy systems Navy/Marines: E/A-6B;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $634.1.
New systems: F/A-18E/F;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $13,083.6;
Legacy systems Air Force: F-16;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $2,400.1;
Legacy systems Navy/Marines: AV-8B;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $403.1.
New systems: EA-18G;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $7,466.1;
Legacy systems Air Force: F-117A;
Investments FY 2007-2013: $16.0;
Legacy systems Navy/Marines: [Empty];
Investments FY 2007- 2013: [Empty].
Total New systems: $97,633.5;
Total Legacy Air Force: $7,110.7;
Total legacy Navy/Marines: $4,565.1.
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
Notes: The Navy consolidates budgets for the F-18 series aircraft;
accordingly, investment amount shown above for the new E/F models
includes some development funding for the legacy A-D models, and the
investment amount for the legacy models includes some modification
funding for the new models.
Total investments also include $3,320.0 million for tactical aircraft
funding requested in the pending Fiscal Year 2007 Global War on
Terrorism supplemental and the Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on Terror
budget requests.
[End of table]
Uncertainty about new systems costs and deliveries makes it difficult
to effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization efforts and
legacy retirement schedules. With unpredictable quantities and delivery
schedules of the new systems, program managers for legacy aircraft are
challenged to balance reduced funds for modifications with requirements
to keep legacy systems operational and relevant longer than they had
planned. Stable retirement plans are critical to effective management
and efficient resource use, but in this environment retirement plans
keep changing. Program managers are hard-pressed to allocate funds or
set sunset schedules[Footnote 4] for legacy fleets until the outcomes
of new acquisitions are known. Furthermore, the longer the services
retain legacy systems in their inventories, the more money they will
need for operation and maintenance costs in order to keep legacy
aircraft operational and relevant. DOD has become increasingly
concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant
and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in
the face of forecast threat capabilities and is depleting modernization
accounts, reducing the department's flexibility to invest in new
weapons.
Operating costs per flying hour for Air Force legacy systems are shown
in figure 3. It illustrates that operation and maintenance costs
typically increase as weapons systems age. It also shows the relatively
high operating costs for the F-117A, a factor in the decision to retire
that fleet early. Some officials believe that operating costs for new
systems will be less expensive than the legacy systems they replace,
but others challenge that notion, citing such factors as the higher
technology, stealth characteristics, and private sector support
arrangements.
Figure 3: Operating Costs per Flying Hour for Air Force Tactical
Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Since legacy programs typically receive less funding than requested,
program managers must prioritize and fund first those modifications
that are absolutely necessary--ones that are related to safety of
flight or that will cause the aircraft to be grounded. As a result,
there are large pent up demands of unfunded requirements the
warfighters report as necessary to meet their mission requirements.
Current estimates for unfunded modernization and sustainment
requirements on legacy systems total several billions of dollars. The
services are considering substantial service life extension programs
and additional modernization enhancements for several of the legacy
fleets, but many of these costs are not reflected in current programmed
budgets or have yet to be estimated.
Some of these issues and concerns about legacy systems are not new, but
perhaps have gained more immediacy because of their interdependency
with the large scale new systems recapitalization efforts. GAO has
previously reported on the condition, program strategies, and funding
for key existing DOD weapon systems, including tactical aircraft. Our
2005 report[Footnote 5] found that the military services had incomplete
long-term strategies and funding plans for some systems, in that future
requirements are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for
maintenance and upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were
delayed or not yet identified. We recommended that DOD reassess and
report annually on its near-and long-term programs for key systems
until replacements are fielded. DOD partially concurred to reassess
programs stating that it already does this in its planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution process. It did not concur that
additional annually reporting to Congress of this information was
necessary as they stated the annual budget submission already includes
a balanced overall program within available resources.
The Air Force Is Increasing Investments in Legacy Systems to Keep Them
Relevant and Capable:
The Air Force plans to invest more than $7.1 billion from fiscal year
2007 to 2013 to modernize legacy aircraft (table 6). These investments
are heavily influenced by the ability of the Air Force to complete its
recapitalization strategy for the F-22A and the JSF aircraft as
currently planned. Further reductions in quantities and delays in
delivering these new aircraft will impact the number of legacy aircraft
retained and the amount of time they must remain in service. Future
investments beyond those shown, including service life extension
efforts costing billions of dollars, may be required to keep legacy
fleets relevant and operational longer. Officials said the time is
approaching when hard decisions on retiring or extending the life of
legacy aircraft must be made.
Table 6: Air Force Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs:
(In millions of current year dollars):
A-10;
Prior Two Years: $225.4;
Investments FY07-13: $2,026.8;
Totals: $2,252.2.
F-15 (all series);
Prior Two Years: $630.5;
Investments FY07-13: $2,667.8;
Totals: $3,298.3.
F-16 (all series);
Prior Two Years: $985.4;
Investments FY07-13: $2,400.1;
Totals: $3,385.5.
F-117A;
Prior Two Years: $59.0;
Investments FY07-13: $16.0;
Totals: $75.0.
Totals;
Prior Two Years: $1,900.3;
Investments FY07-13: $7,110.7;
Totals: $9,011.0.
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
[End of table]
The following provides an overview of key observations on the Air Force
legacy systems. Additional details on these systems are in appendix IV.
* The Air Force will retain the A-10 "Warthog" fleet in its inventory
much longer than planned because of its relevant combat capabilities--
demonstrated first during Desert Storm and now in the ongoing Global
War on Terror. However, because of post-Cold War plans to retire the
fleet in the early 1990s, the Air Force had spent little money on major
upgrades and depot maintenance for at least 10 years. As a result, the
Air Force faces a large backlog of structural repairs and
modifications--much of it unfunded---and will likely identify more
unplanned work as older aircraft are inspected and opened up for
maintenance. Major efforts to upgrade avionics, modernize cockpit
controls, and replace wings are funded and underway. Program officials
identified a current unfunded requirement of $2.7 billion, including
$2.1 billion for engine upgrades, which some Air Force officials say is
not needed. A comprehensive service life extension program (if
required) could cost billions more.
* F-15 "Eagles" will not be fully or as quickly replaced by F-22As as
planned. For years, the Air Force modification efforts and funds have
been concentrated on about half the fleet--the number projected as
required to complement the new F-22A aircraft. With the F-22A
quantities now reduced, more F-15s need to be modernized and retained
for longer periods of time. Officials identified near-term unfunded
requirements of $2.3 billion and much more if life extension efforts
are needed. The newest F-15E aircraft with enhanced strike capabilities
will be retained even longer. The Air Force deferred the start up of a
major radar upgrade effort costing $2.3 billion, and program officials
identified another $1.7 billion in unfunded requirements to address
avionics, structural, and engine concerns among other efforts proposed
for the F-15E.
* Newer F-16 "Falcon" aircraft may be needed to stay viable and
operational longer due to JSF schedule delays and deferrals. The F-16
fleet consists of several different configurations that were acquired
in a long and successful evolutionary program. The Air Force has
invested billions over the years to upgrade capabilities, engines, and
structural enhancements needed to achieve its original life expectancy
of 8,000 hours. The program office estimated $3.2 billion in unfunded
requirements, including radar upgrades to the aircraft capable of
suppressing enemy air defenses, the Air Force's only platform for that
mission. Significant unknowns exist about extending the life beyond
8,000 hours should that be necessary. This makes any additional JSF
schedule delays, deferrals, and cost growth very problematic for the
overall Air Force fighter structure.
* The Air Force plans to retire the F-117A "Nighthawk" stealth fighter
in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, stating that there are other more
capable assets that can provide low observable, precision penetrating
weapons capability. Program Budget Decision 720, dated December 2005,
directed the Air Force to develop a strategy to gain congressional
support for this plan. Program officials estimate that the drawdown of
the fleet and the shutdown of government and contractor offices and
facilities would cost approximately $283 million. There is currently no
funding allocated for these retirement costs of the F-117A. This cost
does not include storage and maintenance of the fleet after such a
retirement.
Plans for Navy and Marine Corps Legacy Systems Are Evolving and Likely
to Require More Funding:
The Navy plans to invest about $4.6 billion in its legacy tactical
aircraft over the next seven years (table 7). Officials are relying
heavily on the acquisition of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the JSF as
planned to complete its recapitalization strategy. Delays in the JSF
program could require additional modifications beyond those already
budgeted for the F/A-18C/D and AV-8B aircraft. Work on EA-6B aircraft
is dependent on the timely delivery of the EA-18G Growler, its naval
replacement, and on evolving Marine Corps plans for its future
electronic attack capability.
Table 7: Navy Legacy Aircraft Modernization Costs:
(In millions of current year dollars):
F/A-18 (all series);
Prior Two Years: $1,106.6;
Investments FY07-13: $3,527.9;
Totals: $4,634.5.
EA-6B;
Prior Two Years: $254.4;
Investments FY07-13: $634.1;
Totals: $888.5.
AV-8B;
Prior Two Years: $119.9;
Investments FY07-13: $403.1;
Totals: $523.0.
Totals;
Prior Two Years: $1,480.9;
Investments FY07-13: $4,565.1;
Totals: $6,046.0.
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
Note: The Navy consolidates budgets for the F/A-18 series; funding
above includes some procurement modification funding for the new F/A-
18E/F as well as the legacy F/A-18A/B/C/D aircraft.
[End of table]
The following provides an overview of key observations on the Navy and
Marine Corps legacy systems. Additional details on these systems are in
appendix IV.
* The F/A-18C/D "Hornet" fleet may be given extra life to ameliorate a
fighter shortfall projected by Navy officials. Service officials are
considering efforts to extend the life of the legacy aircraft until
replaced by the JSF. A service life assessment effort to be completed
in December 2007 will determine the feasibility, scope of work, and
total costs for extending the life of the system. A preliminary
estimate, including the costs of the assessment, is about $2 billion,
but officials said that number could very well increase substantially
as the assessment progresses and cost estimates mature. Also included
in the above estimate is the Center Barrel Replacement to eliminate
structural limitations caused by cracking in the central fuselage. This
effort is about half completed and will cost about $970 million. A
Naval Air Systems Command official said they could very well identify
additional modifications and structural work required beyond what is
funded. Further delays in JSF could exacerbate problems.
* The Navy will retire its EA-6B "Prowler" aircraft by 2013 and replace
them with the new EA-18G, but the Marine Corps's future plans are still
evolving. The Navy will transition its most capable aircraft to the
Marines who will operate and maintain them until retirement. The Marine
Corps had planned to retire its EA-6B fleet starting in 2015, but
officials said plans could change depending on the transition of
aircraft from the Navy and that they may need to keep these aircraft in
the inventory longer depending on the JSF delivery schedule. The Marine
Corps has not yet made firm plans as to its future electronic attack
capability and is considering employment of the JSF and other assets.
The Marine Corps has requested a total of $379 million in the fiscal
year 2007 global war on terrorism supplemental and the fiscal year 2008
global war on terror request to upgrade an additional 18 EA-6Bs with
the Improved Capability III electronic attack suite and for other
modernization enhancements.
* The Marine Corps wants to replace its entire AV-8B "Harrier" fleet
with the JSF STOVL aircraft as expeditiously as possible. The Harrier-
-the original STOVL aircraft--is costly to maintain, and has a
relatively high attrition rate. Program officials have budgeted very
little future funds for Harrier modifications, but delays in JSF
deliveries and possible cutbacks in quantity may require some
redirection. Harriers may need to be retained in inventory longer than
expected, but officials have not determined the extent of work
required, nor the potential cost. Between 1994 and 2001, the majority
of AV-8Bs were remanufactured with new fuselages to add structural life
and to accommodate night attack modifications and a higher performance
engine. Currently, five day attack aircraft are being upgraded to night
attack capability, and two training aircraft are being refurbished.
A Joint Enterprise-Level Investment Strategy for Tactical Aircraft Is
Lacking As Services Plan Independently:
DOD does not have a single, integrated investment plan for
recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical air forces. Rather, each
service independently develops its requirements and programs its
resources to size and shape its individual force structure. These plans
to date have underperformed in terms of higher acquisition costs and
fewer quantities delivered, and officials from each service forecast
near-term and future shortfalls in the capabilities and numbers of
aircraft. Moving forward, projected plans are likely unaffordable given
competing demands from future defense and nondefense budgets.
Efforts to build a more joint position continue with some promise, but
recent studies did not significantly impact service acquisition plans.
Without a joint, integrated investment strategy for tactical aircraft
that plans and addresses requirements on a DOD enterprise-wide basis,
it is difficult to evaluate the efficacy and severity of capability
gaps or, alternatively, areas of redundancy. Also, it is difficult to
fully account for and assess real and potential contributions from
other current and future non-tactical systems providing similar
capabilities, including bombers, missiles, and unmanned aircraft.
Services Plan Tactical Aircraft Investments Independently:
The national defense strategy, which comes from an enterprise level in
DOD, requires the services to be able to successfully and
simultaneously defend the homeland, win two overlapping major
contingencies, operate in forward locations around the world to deter
aggression, and handle lesser operations as needed such as humanitarian
and peace-keeping missions. Defense strategy continues to evolve with
an increased emphasis on the "long war"--the Global War on Terror--and
other asymmetric operations and a reduced emphasis on major theater
combat and conventional adversaries.
While OSD and the joint staff provide oversight and may make
adjustments, each military service is primarily responsible for
assessing tactical aircraft requirements, sizing its force structure,
developing investment plans, and programming resources to meet its
individual assignments within the total national defense policy
requirements.[Footnote 6] The future forces planned by the military
services will be smaller than today's force, but more capable and
stealthier, according to officials (see table 8). Even so, Service
officials are forecasting shortfalls in force structure capabilities
and numbers throughout this period.
Table 8: Changes in Tactical Aircraft Inventories Fiscal Years 2006 to
2025:
Air Force;
Inventory 2006: 2500;
Inventory 2025: 1800;
Inventory reduction: 700;
Percent reduction: 28%.
Navy & Marine Corps;
Inventory 2006: 1200;
Inventory 2025: 900;
Inventory reduction: 300;
Percent reduction: 25%.
Total;
Inventory 2006: 3700;
Inventory 2025: 2700;
Inventory reduction: 1000;
Percent reduction: 27%.
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
Note: These numbers are approximate to show relative changes.
[End of table]
Two important factors in sizing and shaping forces are the types of
forces and systems needed (capabilities) and the overall size of the
force to meet operational demands (capacity). This means maintaining a
force structure that not only has modern systems with advanced
capabilities to meet projected threats, but also has enough assets to
cover assigned targets, threats, and territories. Each Service also
wants to size their force structure to enable them to employ rotational
plans that cycle force packages through sequential phases of active
deployment, return from deployment to reconstitute, and preparation for
the next deployment.
Department of the Navy Future Tactical Aircraft Plans:
The Navy sizes and shapes its tactical fighter requirements to fill 10
carrier strike forces. Each future force would comprise 44 aircraft--24
F/A-18 E/Fs and 20 carrier capable Joint Strike Fighters--with
equivalent capabilities and a mix of stealthy and non stealthy
aircraft. EA-18Gs will also be assigned to carriers to provide tactical
jamming support for the strike force.
Marine Corps fighter squadrons are attached to Marine expeditionary
units and are sized and positioned to provide direct fire support and
protection to front-line forces and reinforcements. The future Marine
Corps combat air force is tied to success of the JSF acquisition
program as officials plan to have an all-JSF force in the future. The
future force will also have 40 percent fewer aircraft assigned to each
infantry battalion.
In 2003, the Department of the Navy began implementing a tactical air
integration plan to address affordability concerns. The plan was aimed
at more closely integrating Navy and Marine Corps strike fighter
inventories, in effect managing tactical air assets as a common pool.
The Navy projected net savings of $18.5 billion through fiscal year
2021 by reducing the number of operational legacy fighters required
and, in turn, the number of new aircraft needed for recapitalization.
This reduced future procurement plans by 409 JSFs and 88 F/A-18E/F
aircraft. At the same time, it was recognized that integration would
increase operating and maintenance costs because the smaller number of
aircraft would need to be maintained at higher rates of readiness in
order to meet emergency surge deployments.
Actual and planned inventory levels for combined Navy and Marine Corps
tactical aircraft from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 2025 are
shown in figure 4. The Department of the Navy tactical aviation forces
peaked in the early 1990s at about 1,800 aircraft and shrunk to about
1,200 by 2006, principally through retirement of the A-6 fleet and
beginning draw downs on the F-14 fleet. By 2025, the total tactical
inventory is slated to decrease another 300 aircraft, or 25 percent
(refer back to table 8). Therefore, the total inventory in 2025 is
projected to be one-half the inventory in the early 1990s. Legacy
aircraft would be virtually replaced by the more capable new systems.
Figure 4: Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft Force Structure:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Shortfalls Forecast by Navy and Marine Corps Officials:
Navy officials are projecting persistent future shortfalls in both
legacy and new FA-18 aircraft. The amounts of the shortfall vary
depending on two key variables--the rate of procurement on the Joint
Strike Fighter and service life estimates for F/A-18s. Navy and Marine
Corps officials told us that buying the JSF at the current planned
rate--requiring a ramp-up to 50 aircraft per year by fiscal year 2015-
-will be difficult to achieve and to afford, particularly if costs
continue to increase and schedules slip. According to one study, a
likely scenario assumes acquiring fewer JSFs annually and achieving a
modest increase in flying hour life for legacy F/A-18C/Ds; this
scenario would project shortfalls starting in 2010 and peaking at 167
legacy strike fighters by 2017. Navy officials also project a shortfall
of 131 F/A-18E/Fs by 2024 based on estimated usage, attrition, and
assuming an increase in flying hour life from 6,000 to 9,000 hours.
Options to erase these shortfalls include buying more new aircraft and
extending the life of legacy aircraft.
Marine Corps officials project a near-term shortfall in the AV-8B fleet
ranging from 8 to 14 aircraft between fiscal years 2006 to 2011.
Erasing this shortfall after 2011 depends upon acquiring the JSF STOVL
in the numbers and time frames currently planned. According to
officials, a one-year slide in the JSF schedule increases the shortfall
by approximately three aircraft per year. As a result, the fleet would
need to examine squadron structure and additional reductions to
aircraft would be expected to negatively impact deployment
capabilities.
Department of the Air Force Future Tactical Aircraft Plans:
The Air Force sizes its tactical air forces to meet warfighting
requirements. In order to fill peacetime defense needs, the Air Force
schedules ten air and space expeditionary forces, the planned
organizations of Air Force aircraft, personnel, and support for
operations and deployments. These individual force constructs are
applied against rotational national security requirements. The Air
Force's future plan for combat aircraft that is believed affordable is
termed the programming force and is shown in figure 5.
This plan assumes buying the 183 F-22As deemed affordable by OSD and
the current program of record for the JSF, but with a slowdown in
fielding. The programming plan projects the total number of tactical
aircraft decreasing by about 700 aircraft--from 2,500 currently to
about 1,800 in 2025 (refer back to table 8). This plan continues the
overall decline in inventory since 1990 when the Air Force fielded
about 4,000 tactical aircraft. The programming force shows significant
quantities of A-10 and F-15C/D/E aircraft remaining in the force by
2025 with phased drawdown of all F-16s. The 2025 force is now projected
to be roughly 60 percent new systems and 40 percent legacy systems.
This is a significant shift from earlier projections which had planned
on an almost all new force. This shift reflects changes due to the cuts
in total F-22A purchases and the reduced annual buys of JSF with
consequent slowdown in fielding.
Figure 5: Air Force Tactical Aircraft Force Structure:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD data, GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Shortfalls Forecast by Air Force Officials:
Officials at Air Combat Command--the requirement-setting command that
supports the warfighter--told us that the programming (funded) force is
not sufficient to meet national security requirements at acceptable
levels of risk. According to these officials, the funded program would
support only 100 combat aircraft (tactical fighters and bombers) in
each air and expeditionary force compared to 150 aircraft today. While
the new systems are expected to provide improved capabilities compared
to the legacy systems they replace, officials do not think the force
would have sufficient capacity to cover future security needs with
acceptable risks.
Air Combat Command develops another force plan known as the vision
force (later reworked into a planning force by Air Force headquarters)
that the requiring command believes provides the right mix and numbers
to meet future needs at an acceptable level of risk. This plan would
procure the full complement of JSFs and the Air Force's stated
requirement for 381 F-22As, which would allow a full operational
squadron to be assigned to each of the 10 air and space expeditionary
forces. Under this plan, almost all legacy aircraft would be retired by
2025 with the exception of the F-15E, the latest model in the F-15
series that has an enhanced strike capability. This plan is not
constrained by resources, and command officials estimated it would cost
more than $100 billion over the funding levels currently expected
through 2025.
Affordability of Long-Range Plans Is Questionable:
Looking forward over the next 20 years, DOD's collective tactical
aircraft recapitalization plans are likely not affordable as currently
planned. Acquisition strategies and plans assume favorable assumptions
about cost and schedule and the ability to sustain funding at high
levels over a considerable period of time. Historically, however, costs
increase; quantities are reduced; and delivery schedules are delayed.
The JSF program represents 90 percent of the investments to go for new
tactical aircraft and projected plans are likely unaffordable given
projected future budget constraints and competing demands.
First, plans for new systems are based on conservative estimates of
future cost growth to complete the programs but optimistic estimates on
the availability of future funding, production rates, and quantities of
new aircraft delivered to the warfighter on time. While it is
understandable to project that programs will execute to cost and
quantity targets as planned, the prevailing and historical evidence
suggests otherwise. In 1997 we reported[Footnote 7] that the historical
average cost growth of major acquisition systems was at least 20
percent. Our annual assessment of weapon systems[Footnote 8] continue
to show today that many programs cost more, take longer to develop, and
deliver fewer assets than planned. While the F/A-18E/F program has
generally executed to schedule, the F-22A did not, and we believe the
recent cost escalation and potential delays in production indicate that
the JSF is on a similar path. Air Force and Marine Corps officials told
us that the planned maximum procurement rates for the JSF will be very
difficult to sustain and there are already pressures to reduce or delay
procurement before it even begins. The fiscal year 2008 budget has
reduced near-term quantities and current planning projections suggest
that the Air Force will significantly reduce annual procurement
quantities midterm in the program and defer these aircraft to later
years, extending the procurement period by 7 years.
Second, the tactical aircraft plans do not consider billions in
potential added costs for legacy systems. As discussed earlier in this
report, substantial service life extension programs and additional
modernization enhancements are under serious consideration for many of
the legacy fleets. Some of these costs are not reflected in current
programmed budgets or have yet to be estimated. For example, the Navy
is considering options to extend the life of its F/A-18 fleets, but has
not yet developed comprehensive cost estimates. An initial estimate is
for $2 billion, but an official told us the cost will likely be much
larger. The Air Force is now planning to keep the A-10 in inventory for
a longer period of time, but the full costs to extend the life are not
known, and some other potential costs, including $2.1 billion to
improve the engines, are not funded. One estimate for extending the A-
10's life in total was $4.4 billion. We also learned that $283 million
to retire the F-117A during fiscal years 2007 and 2008 has not yet been
funded, and given officials' comments about unstable divestiture
schedules and changing retirement dates, it may be the case that other
programs have also not factored in retirement costs to close contractor
facilities and government programs. Furthermore, as legacies remain in
the operational force longer, substantial funding for additional
sustainment costs and annual operating and maintenance costs will be
necessary, particularly if plans to defer JSF procurements are
implemented.
Third, tactical aircraft plans will face increasing competition for the
defense dollar from other new procurements and from continuing costs
for the Global War on Terror. DOD is planning the start-up of several
big-ticket items including a new strategic tanker aircraft, a next
generation strike aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and other more
transformational programs. Projected costs for ongoing military
operations in the Global War on Terror will continue to put pressure on
defense investment accounts and are also expected to increase the share
of the total budget going to ground forces which could decrease the
share for aviation programs. Flat or lower funding levels and future
systems that can perform the same or similar tactical air missions may
substantially alter the ultimate mix, timing, and rate at which combat
aircraft are acquired.
Fourth, any questions on affordability must be viewed in a larger
context relative to federal spending, demographic trends, and impacts
on discretionary funding. The Comptroller General testified[Footnote 9]
last year on the nation's unsustainable fiscal path and its large and
growing structural deficit due primarily to known demographic trends,
rising health care costs, and lower federal revenues as a percentage of
the economy. Federal discretionary programs, including defense
spending, will face serious budget pressures. Even so, defense programs
are commanding larger budgets. Over the past 5 years, the department
has doubled its planned investments in new weapon systems from about
$700 billion in 2001 to nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006.
The Congressional Budget Office evaluated the long-term implications of
defense plans and determined that current investment plans would
require sustained funding levels at higher real (inflation-adjusted)
amounts than since mid-1980s, due to sustained purchase of new
equipment, increased costs for new capabilities, increased operations
and maintenance costs for aging legacy systems, and costlier new
systems. At the same time, the Congressional Budget Office notes that
increased medical and operating support costs competing for the defense
dollar and national demographic trends will continue to put pressure on
federal discretionary spending.
Figure 6 illustrates the affordability challenge. It contrasts DOD's
optimistic future-funding plans with a more conservative estimate.
DOD's plan (top-line in figure 6) assumes funding levels well above
historical amounts. The spike in funding required starting in 2008,
clearly shows the typical bow wave effect in which weapon system budget
requirements tend to move to the right (delayed to future years) as
programs fail to receive full funding or do not execute as planned.
DOD's projections show an optimistic bent that tactical aircraft
procurement will be able to significantly increase its share of defense
funding, exceeding historical levels when many project flat or falling
funding levels. The lower line (shaded portion of fig. 6) assumes
funding at the same level as fiscal year 2006 carried forward with
annual inflationary increases. This more conservative projection is in
line with historical experience. Our analysis of future-year defense
plans indicates that the military services in total and the tactical
aircraft procurement in particular have received similar shares of the
defense dollar over time, a finding that argues against a strategy that
requires a substantial increase in order to succeed. The gap between
the lines thus represents DOD plans that are likely unaffordable.
Figure 6: Projected Budgets for Tactical Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Efforts to Build Forces from a Joint Perspective Continue, but Recent
Studies Have Not Had Substantial Impacts on Acquisition Plans:
DOD continues broad efforts to improve jointness and bring a more
integrated cross-service perspective to its plans and programs. There
are promising, but still rather new efforts to enhance capabilities-
based planning and portfolio management that could be used to better
integrate and hone joint tactical aircraft requirements. However,
recent efforts to apply jointness to tactical aircraft have not had
much direct impact on service investment plans and strategies. We also
note that one of the few mission capabilities that have been provided
jointly, the tactical airborne electronic attack mission carried out by
the EA-6B, is now expected to be replaced in the future by separate and
unique aircraft for each of the services.
New Planning Efforts Show Promise:
DOD has several promising efforts to enhance jointness and bring a
capabilities-based approach to defense investments. The Joint
Capabilities, Integration, and Development System (JCIDS), portfolio
management, and other initiatives are evolving mechanisms designed to
bring top commanders' needs up-front and take a more joint, enterprise-
wide view of requirements and funding decisions. Continuing efforts to
develop joint capabilities-based assessment and planning methodologies
will be essential to understand contributions to the warfighter,
develop DOD-wide priorities, and craft investment strategies to
mitigate shortfalls or eliminate duplication.
JCIDS is a major, but relatively new initiative to shift from a service-
centric focus on individual acquisition programs to a more top- down
and joint view of warfighting capabilities and effects. JCIDS is
intended to involve a wide range of stakeholders, including combatant
commanders, in identifying capability needs and alternative solutions.
JCIDS introduces new methodologies intended to foster jointness and
groups warfighting needs into eight functional areas based on
warfighting capabilities--such as, force application, battle-space
awareness, and focused logistics[Footnote 10]--that cut across the
military services and defense agencies. JCIDS process emphasizes early
attention to the fiscal implications of newly identified needs,
including identifying ways to pay for new capabilities by divesting the
department of lower priority or redundant capabilities. Our recent
report[Footnote 11] discusses JCIDS and other steps DOD is taking to
better identify and prioritize joint warfighting needs, but finds that
DOD's service-centric structure and fragmented decision-making
processes hinder successful implementation.
Another promising and related initiative is joint capability portfolio
management. The intent is to manage groups of like capabilities across
the enterprise to improve interoperability, minimize capability
redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. This
would help build budgets around a set of capabilities instead of
traditional military accounts. The idea is to take a more joint look at
what capabilities combatant commanders and warfighters need, as opposed
to the current more service-centric way in which the services
independently buy and field capabilities they deem important. By
shifting the focus from service-specific programs to joint
capabilities, DOD should be better positioned to understand the
implications of investment and resource trade-offs among competing
priorities. In September 2006, DOD management selected four test cases
for experimentation with the joint capability portfolio management
concept. Depending on this outcome, tactical aviation would appear to
be an excellent candidate for portfolio management by cross-decking
similar capabilities in each service. Although the implementation of
these portfolio management initiatives seems to have the potential for
improving interoperability and minimizing capability redundancies and
gaps, DOD still has a long way to go before the effectiveness of this
capability-based planning and management effort can be determined.
The Air Force is also implementing a new "associate wing" concept that
is similar in its aims as the Navy-Marine Corps integration effort.
Associate wings would pair up active and reserve component units to
share the same aircraft and facilities, while retaining separate chains
of command. Rather than each unit's operating and maintaining its own
wings, the two would now operate and maintain just one wing in common.
While still very new, the expected outcomes would be reduced
inventories, reduced operating costs, and fewer future replacements
needed.
Joint Studies Have Not Been Very Directive:
Despite the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) and other studies, there
are many unanswered questions about whether services can achieve
overarching goals for modernizing aging tactical aircraft fleets. In
testimony on the results of the department's 2006 QDR, the Secretary of
Defense stated that continued U.S. air dominance depends on a
recapitalized fleet. Surprisingly, however, DOD's 2006 QDR report,
issued in February 2006, did not present a coherent joint investment
strategy for tactical aircraft systems that addressed needs, capability
gaps, alternatives, and affordability. The Joint Strike Fighter, the
largest aircraft acquisition program, was not mentioned and the F-22A
only in relation to multi-year contracting. The QDR report did include
some non prescriptive direction for joint air capabilities, emphasizing
systems with greater range and persistence, larger and more flexible
payloads, and the ability to penetrate and sustain operations in denied
areas.
In a 2005 testimony,[Footnote 12] we suggested that the QDR would
provide an opportunity for DOD to assess its tactical aircraft
recapitalization plans and weigh options for accomplishing its specific
and overarching goals. By not specifically addressing these issues, the
DOD missed an opportunity. With limited information contained in the
QDR report, many questions are still unanswered about the future of
DOD's tactical aircraft modernization efforts.
In addition, DOD conducted a joint air dominance study that looked at
current acquisition plans and capabilities. While it validated the need
for three JSF variants, the study did not receive wide services
support. Air Force officials said they submitted their own
recommendations that were not adopted. Another consultant study,
directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and intended to replicate
the Navy-Marine Corps integration effort on a DOD-wide basis, also
appears not to have had much direct impact on altering service
acquisition plans going forward.
Joint Tactical Radar Jamming Mission May End:
In conducting military operations, U.S. and allied aircraft can be at
great risk from enemy air defenses, such as surface to air missile
systems. The airborne electronic attack mission employs specialized
aircraft to suppress, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy radars and
communications and is a critical enabler to successful tactical air
operations. Because these specialized aircraft protect aircraft of all
services in hostile airspace, the electronic attack mission crosses
individual service lines. DOD considers airborne electronic attack to
be a key capability for many contingencies and predicts increasing
roles and missions for aircraft with these capabilities. Since 1995,
the EA-6B has been DOD's only tactical standoff radar jammer aircraft
and has provided support to all services during numerous joint and
allied operations against both traditional and nontraditional threats.
This capability--one of the few examples of a truly joint asset shared
by the military services--is now expected to diminish, to be replaced
by separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Concerned
about a gap in defense suppression capabilities as a consequence of
increasing modernization of enemy air defenses and aging of the EA-6B,
DOD conducted an analysis of alternatives for airborne electronic
attack. The May 2002 report concluded that the EA-6B inventory would be
insufficient to meet DOD's future needs and identified many potential
platform combinations to address capability shortfalls. DOD adopted a
system-of-systems approach in which a multitude of systems are needed
to provide required capabilities across the electronic spectrum. The
report stated that before a service can begin a formal acquisition
program, services decisions should consider whether one service will
provide DOD's core capability and whether it would reside in a single
platform.
Subsequent to the report, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps each
decided to develop individual and unique electronic attack capabilities
to replace the EA-6B in the stand-off tactical jamming role. The Navy
is developing the EA-18G, but plans to procure only enough to support
its carrier strike forces. The Air Force initially proposed a modified
B-52 for the standoff radar jamming role. With OSD concurrence, the Air
Force cancelled this program because of its high estimated costs, and
is now considering other options. In the near-term, the Marine Corps
will continue to use upgraded EA-6B aircraft, but anticipates using in
the future an electronic attack-capable Joint Strike Fighter integrated
with unmanned aerial systems. There is an OSD directed study underway
to validate the services' requirements.
While DOD continues to tout joint capabilities, it is a concern that
one area of success is being curtailed. A September 2004 memorandum of
understanding between the military services and joint staff stated that
the Navy expeditionary EA-6B squadrons will decommission between fiscal
years 2009 and 2012 to be replaced by indigenous Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps electronic attack capability. DOD continues to assess
requirements and options.
Conclusions:
Tactical air recapitalization and modernization is a costly and very
challenging enterprise, requiring a delicate and dynamic balancing of
funding, fielding schedules, and retirement plans between new system
acquisitions and legacy aircraft to ensure that current and future
forces can meet national security requirements at reasonable levels of
risk. New tactical aircraft programs, for the most part, have not
adequately employed evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition
strategies--resulting in escalating costs that undercut DOD's buying
power, reduces aircraft purchases, and delays delivering needed
capabilities to the warfighter. Because funding needs and plans for new
and legacy aircraft programs are interdependent, cost, schedule, or
performance problems experienced in acquiring new systems cause
perturbations in modernization costs and retirement schedules
throughout the operational fleets. Dependent largely on the future
course of the Joint Strike Fighter, legacy programs are placed in
reactive modes with uncertain and changeable future requirements,
unstable retirement plans, and potential unfunded requirements in the
billions of dollars. While the services strive to reduce war-fighting
risks by fielding new systems and limiting investment in legacy
systems, they are faced with increased prices and schedule risks for
new aircraft while maintaining aging, capability-limited legacy
aircraft. In the past, we have recommended the department use an
evolutionary acquisition approach to develop weapon system programs
coupled with a process that ensures at the start of development that
requirements have been reduced to match mature technologies, a feasible
design, and a reasonable expectation of available funding. While the
department's acquisition policy has included such practices, DOD has
not fully embraced the use of these practices as it executes current
acquisition programs.
Despite DOD's repeated declaration that recapitalizing its aging
tactical aircraft fleet is a top priority, the department does not have
a single, comprehensive, and integrated investment plan to adequately
craft joint priorities, identify critical capability gaps, and allocate
scarce funds. Instead, planning has been separately done by the
services. Each military service independently plans and resources
individual programs that, collectively, are likely unaffordable and
that make it difficult to identify and quantify DOD-wide capability
gaps or duplication. DOD needs to bring overall tactical aircraft
investments into line with more realistic, long-term projections of
overall defense funding and the amount of procurement funding expected
to be available for aircraft purchases, and then establish and adhere
to a plan that is militarily justified and can be executed within that
amount. Efforts to improve joint capabilities-based planning and to
manage tactical air assets as a portfolio should be encouraged.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical
air forces that reflect what is needed and affordable from a joint
service perspective and that has high confidence of being executed as
planned, we are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
The Secretary should:
* take decisive actions to shorten cycle times in delivering needed
combat capabilities to the warfighter including:
- adopting a time-certain development cycle that can deliver an
increment of new capability within 5 to 6 years after the start of
system design and development; and:
- reassessing requirements for ongoing weapon system acquisition
programs to identify ways to reduce requirements and speed up delivery
of initial capabilities; and:
* develop an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy that:
- is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of
potential and viable alternative solutions, considering not only new
acquisitions but also modifications to legacy aircraft to achieve this
balance within realistic and affordable budget projections for DOD;
- strikes a balance between maintaining near-term readiness and
addressing long-term needs; and:
- considers the contributions of bombers, long range strike aircraft,
unmanned aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in the
inventory and those planned that can be employed to attack the same
type targets as the tactical aircraft.
Agency Comments and Our Response:
DOD concurred with both recommendations in written comments on a draft
of this report. These comments appear in appendix II. They also
provided technical comments that we incorporated in the final report as
appropriate.
Regarding our first recommendation that DOD take decisive actions to
shorten cycle times in developing and delivering weapon systems, DOD
stated that this is consistent with a major initiative of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
intended to put military capability into the hands of the warfighters
faster and more affordably. The Department is also pursuing other
efforts supporting such actions, including acquisition personnel pay
incentives, acquisition policy changes, focused research and
engineering investments in technology, and revised, earlier in-process
reviews of requirements and proposed solutions by OSD and Joint Staff.
At the same time, however, DOD stated that aircraft development is a
highly complex engineering challenge and that it would be unreasonable
to uniformly apply a six year cycle time to complex programs like the
JSF.
We think that it is precisely because of complexity that programs like
the JSF could stand to benefit most from adopting a more evolutionary
acquisition process to develop and evolve weapon systems through small,
time-phased development increments. DOD's history of substantial cost
growth and extended development times for major weapon systems
acquisitions were factors driving recent policy changes to require a
more knowledge-based evolutionary process with time-phased development
increments--key recommendations also in the Defense Acquisition
Performance Assessment report. We note that the JSF's predecessor, the
F-16 fighter program, delivered an initial increment of capability to
the warfighter within about 4 years after development began and then
successfully delivered 2,200 aircraft with incremental improvements as
technology became available over the span of about 30 years. We believe
this alternative, less risky and more evolutionary approach is feasible
and still available to the JSF as it seeks to develop multiple variants
to recapitalize aging tactical fleets involving three services and
international partners.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD develop an integrated and
affordable enterprise-level investment strategy for tactical aviation,
DOD concurred but stated it already had elements of such a strategy.
Officials cited key decisions to invest in fifth generation systems
such as the JSF and F-22, prudent life extension programs for selected
legacy aircraft, the Joint Air Dominance study conducted during the
2006 QDR, and new processes--the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System and portfolio management--as bringing integrated
capabilities-based approaches in formulating a tactical aircraft
investment strategy. We agree that the Department is making strides
toward an integrated enterprise-wide investment strategy but that key
processes are still in their beginning stages and that annual budget
decisions are still primarily driven on a service-centric, weapon
system-specific basis. The new Joint capability portfolio management
initiative is a reaction to the current environment in which the
services independently budget, buy, and field capabilities. It has the
potential to bring a joint warfighter, cross-service view and
disciplined budgeting over sets of mission area capabilities, but test
cases for experimenting and proving the concept are just beginning. The
2006 QDR had the potential, but did not present a coherent joint
investment strategy that addressed needs, capability gaps,
alternatives, and affordability. These are critical, but now largely
missing, elements to the comprehensive and integrated investment
strategy we are recommending.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine current risks and future plans for DOD's new tactical
aircraft acquisition programs, we evaluated plans, budgets, delivery
schedules, and results to date on the JSF, F-22A, F/A-18E/F, and EA-
18G. We compared cost, schedule, and performance data to prior
estimates to identify significant changes and their causes. We
discussed concerns and emerging issues with officials from the program
offices, the requiring commands, and service headquarters. To limit
impacts on the services and leverage our work, we drew extensively upon
prior and ongoing GAO engagements on the JSF, F-22A, and EA-18G.
To determine impacts on legacy systems and retirement schedules, we
reviewed work content and funding requirements for ongoing and
projected modernization and sustainment projects for tactical aircraft.
We discussed future plans for legacy systems, retirement schedules, and
the degree they have been affected by cost, schedule, and performance
outcomes for new acquisition systems. We compiled lists of unfunded
requirements and estimates of costs for service life extension
programs.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed an integrated
investment plan for future tactical aircraft, we analyzed Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps plans and processes for establishing force and
capability requirements, the factors used to size and shape future
force structure to meet national security requirements, and how
capability gaps or redundancies are addressed. We reviewed OSD and
joint staff responsibilities and processes for exercising program
management and oversight of service programs and new initiatives
intended to improve enterprise planning and look for integrated DOD-
wide solutions.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed
officials from the F-22A System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio; F/A-18 System Program Office, Patuxent River, MD;
program offices for Air Force legacy systems, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio; program offices for Navy and Marine Corps legacy
systems, Patuxent River, MD; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force
Base, VA; Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, MD; Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force headquarters offices, OSD, and Joint Chiefs of
Staff offices, Washington, D.C. We performed our work from June 2006
through March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Mar 2 8 2007:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC. 20545:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-07-415 "Tactical Aircraft: DoD Needs a Joint and Integrated
Investment Strategy," dated February 23, 2007 (GAO Code 120564).
The report recommends DoD take decisive actions to shortest cycle times
in developing and delivering new weapon systems and develop an
integrated and affordable enterprise-level investment strategy for
tactical air forces.
The DoD concurs with both of the GAO recommendations, but disagrees
with the GAO's supposition that we do not have an enterprise level
investment strategy for tactical aviation. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L))
established seven major acquisition related goals for the Department.
Three of those goals directly pertain to shortening of acquisition
cycle These goals flow down directly from the National and Defense
Strategic Guidance. Three of the USD(AT&L) goals also pertain to
improvement of how we invest our scarce resources. The enclosures
provide additional comments on how the Department is addressing the
GAO's recommendations and technical comments.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. My point of contact far this effort is Mr. David Hersh, (703)
697-3619, David.Hersh@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosures:As stated:
GAO Draft Report Of February 23, 2007 GAO-07-415 (GAO Code 120564):
"Tactical Aircraft: DoD Needs a Joint and Integrated investment
Strategy"
Department Of Defense Comments To GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation: 1: The GAO recommended that be DoD We decisive actions
shorten cycle times in developing and delivering needed combat
capabilities to the warfighter including:
* Adopting a time-certain development cycle that can deliver an
increment of new capability within five to six years after the start of
system design and development, and:
* Reassessing requirements for ongoing weapon system acquisition
programs to identify ways to reduce requirements and speed up delivery
of initial capabilities.
DOD Response: Concur. Acquisition cycle time reduction is a major Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L))
initiative intended to put military capability into the hands of the
warfighters faster and more affordably. The GAO recommendation is
consistent with that initiative. Improving cycle time is a daunting
challenge, and is a focus area in three of the USD(AT&L) goals. 1 he
USD(AT&L) goals have been communicated to all members of the
acquisition community and are being codified in the Department's
acquisition management policy. Under the National Security Personnel
System, implemented by the Department, acquisition community personnel
pay is tied directly to employee performance towards achievement of
those goals. The acquisition policies being put into place brings
together the requirements, acquisition, programming, and budgeting
communities to improve affordability, and cycle time. The Department's
investments in research and engineering are focused towards
technologies to take advantage of opportunities to affordably and
rapidly improve military capability. This includes actions to ensure
the technology readiness levels of the systems selected for development
are sufficient to minimize risk and accelerate procurement. The EA4 8G
program is an example of a program that does this well, providing an
incremental new capability that uses the proven T'/t'9- I$17 platform
and integrates the proven EA-6B ALQ-218 receiver system. The EA-1 8G is
on track to deliver this capability on time, less than five years from
program start.
The Joint Staff now reviews technical maturity levels before validating
Service requirements documents. Our intent is to avoid requiring
technical solutions at the cutting edge in favor of those that can be
developed incrementally and more rapidly. The department. is also
reviewing potential materiel and non-materiel solutions far earlier in
be process than ever before. This initiative, called "Concept
Decision," is intended to stabilize requirements and improve funding
stability critical to reducing risk, accelerating cycle time, and
ensuring predicable outcomes. Stability of requirements is another area
we are addressing. Requirements growth increases risk, adds cost, and
slows development. Another major factor we are attempting to address is
funding stability. Funding cuts, whether internally by the Department
or by the Congress, can also add risk, increase cost, and slow
development.
It is important to recognize that aircraft development, even when not
pushing the cutting edge of technology, is a highly complex engineering
challenge that can easily take longer than five or six years. It would
be unreasonable to uniformly apply a six year cycle time to complex
programs like the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) which has multiple
variants and involves multiple services and international partners.
Simply conducting the developmental and operational testing necessary
for such programs can consume two years or more. If we were to await
successful completion of that testing before beginning procurement, we
would add an additional two years or more. It is necessary to
intelligently accept some risk in concurrency to minimize the cycle
time. Future improvements to tactical aircraft will follow the
incremental approach described in the GAO's report, keeping the F-22
and JSF as viable in service weapon systems for many decades, much like
we have achieved with the B-52, F/A-18, F-15, F-16, EA-6, AV-8 and A-
10.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the DoD develop an
integrated and affordable enterprise-level investment strategy that:
* Is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of
potential and viable alternative solutions, considering not only new
acquisitions, but also modifications to legacy aircraft to achieve this
balance within realistic and affordable budget projections for DoD.
* Strikes a balance between maintaining near-tern readiness and
addressing long-term needs; and considers the contribution of bombers,
long-range strike aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in
the inventory and those planned that can be employed to attack the same
type targets as the tactical aircraft.
DOD Response: Concur. The DoD has developed and implemented an
investment strategy for tactical air forces as reflected in the
President's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget submission. The first key element
of the Budget is to buy Joint Strike Fighter aircraft (JSF). Investing
in fifth generation platforms such as the F-22 and JSF, instead of
legacy aircraft, for the Air Force, Navy, and Marines will reduce
attrition losses in high-threat environments. The second key element
incorporates a planned buy of 183 F-22 aircraft to field air dominance
capabilities and hedge risk. For the third key element, as DoD
modernizes with stealth platforms, the services will maintain needed
capabilities and force structure via prudent life extension programs
for selected aircraft such as the F/A-18C/D.
This investment strategy was formulated based on high-level guidance,
such as the National and Defense strategies, and key studies such as
the Joint Air Dominance study conducted during the 2005 Quadrennial
Defense Review. In addition, the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) and portfolio management are key processes
which bring a capabilities-based approach to the tactical aircraft
investment strategy. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council takes a
joint enterprise-wide view of requirements, vice a Service-centric
approach to tactical aircraft investment. The Service chiefs, in
carrying out their responsibilities to train and equip their respective
Services, develop force structure plans which they believe best serve
their Service mission requirements. The individual Service plans are
vetted through the joint process which results in a unified fiscally-
constrained Department position on force structure.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Tactical Air Forces Funding Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011:
Dollars in thousands:
Air Force.
Military construction;
2006: $380,760;
2007: $296,077;
2008: $533,027;
2009: $913,709;
2010: $754,934;
2011:$358,505;
2006-2011: $3,237,012.
Military personnel;
2006: $9,355,951;
2007: $9,570,892;
2008: $9,594,455;
2009: $9,788,140;
2010: $10,017,144;
2011: $10,345,118;
2006-2011: $58,671,700.
Operations and maintenance;
2006: $12,776,725;
2007: $13,019,158;
2008: $13,640,801;
2009: $13,698,510;
2010 $14,196,380;
2011: $14,428,658;
2006-2011: $81,760,232.
Procurement;
2006: $7,587,576;
2007: $7,321,053;
2008: $9,841,779;
2009: $10,671,089;
2010: $10,104,223;
2011: $10,379,510;
2006-2011: $55,905,230.
Research, development, test, and evaluation;
2006: $5,909,282;
2007: $6,170,332;
2008: $5,840,288;
2009: $5,288,475;
2010: $4,624,294;
2011: 3,588,672;
2006-2011: $31,421,343.
Navy.
Military construction;
2006: $0;
2007: $0;
2008: $0;
2009: $0;
2010: $0;
2011: $0;
2006-2011: $0.
Military personnel;
2006: $1,157,408;
2007: $1,181,013;
2008: $1,197,863;
2009: $1,234,087;
2010: $1,273,850;
2011: $1,302,516;
2006-2011: $7,346,737.
Operations and maintenance;
2006: $2,027,062;
2007: $1,922,443;
2008: $1,945,247;
2009: $1,901,132;
2010: $1,941,628;
2011: $1,922,958;
2006-2011: $11,660,470.
Procurement;
2006: $5,990,828;
2007: $5,977,071;
2008: $7,820,351;
2009: $11,419,657;
2010: $11,461,509;
2011: $10,081,260;
2006-2011: $52,750,676.
Research, development, test, and evaluation;
2006: $2,871,719;
2007: $2,626,234;
2008: $2,147,384;
2009: $1,480,793;
2010: $1,231,906;
2011: $893,068;
2006-2011: $11,251,104.
Marine Corps.
Military construction;
2006: $0;
2007: $0;
2008: $0;
2009: $0;
2010: $0;
2011: $0;
2006-2011: $0.
Military personnel;
2006: $1,543,652;
2007: $1,571,905;
2008: $1,637,699;
2009: $1,701,146;
2010: $1,755,634;
2011: $1,816,020;
2006-2011: $10,026,056.
Operations and maintenance;
2006: $906,053;
2007: $820,374;
2008: $849,582;
2009: $884,860;
2010: $880,779;
2011: $882,676;
2006-2011: $5,224,324.
Procurement;
2006: $709,064;
2007: $508,526;
2008: $441,031;
2009: $220,030;
2010: $239,761;
2011: $245,740;
2006-2011: $2,364,152.
Research, development, test, and evaluation;
2006: $0;
2007: $0;
2008: $0;
2009: $0;
2010: $0;
2011: $0;
2006-2011: $0.
Total DOD.
Military construction;
2006: $380,760;
2007: $296,077;
2008:$533,027;
2009: $913,709;
2010: $754,934;
2011: $358,505;
2006-2011: $3,237,012.
Military personnel;
2006: $12,057,011;
2007: $12,323,810;
2008: $12,430,017;
2009: $12,723,373;
2010: $13,046,628;
2011: $13,463,654;
2006-2011: $76,044,493.
Operations and maintenance;
2006: $15,709,840;
2007: $15,761,975;
2008: $16,435,630;
2009: $16,484,502;
2010: $17,018,787;
2011: $17,234,292;
2006-2011: $98,645,026.
Procurement;
2006: $14,287,468;
2007: $13,806,650;
2008: $18,103,161;
2009: $22,310,776;
2010: $21,805,493;
2011: $20,706,510;
2006-2011: $111,020,058.
Research, development, test, and evaluation;
2006: $8,781,001;
2007: $8,796,566;
2008: $7,987,672;
2009: $6,769,268;
2010: $5,856,200;
2011: $4,481,740;
2006-2011: $42,672,447.
Grand Total;
2006: $51,216,080;
2007: $50,985,078;
2008: $55,489,507;
2009: $59,201,628;
2010: $58,482,042;
2011: $56,244,701;
2006-2011: $331,619,036.
Source: DOD's 2007 Future Years Defense Program.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: A Summary of Tactical Aircraft Systems Ongoing and Future
Efforts:
This appendix provides more details on new and legacy tactical aircraft
to expand upon summary information provided in the body of this report.
We include a brief description of each aircraft's mission, program
status, and our observations on program execution and outcomes. Where
applicable, we also highlight recent GAO work on some systems. The
appendix also includes a funding table for each aircraft that
consolidates the budget requests in the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense
Budget, the Fiscal Year 2007 Global War on Terrorism Supplemental, and
the Fiscal Year 2008 Global War on Terror request. The budget
information in these tables is expressed in current (then year) dollars
and the totals may not add exactly because of rounding. The fiscal year
2007 funding shown in these tables has been appropriated by Congress
except for the supplemental requests.
Figure 7: F-22A Raptor:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The F-22A is the Air Force's next generation air superiority fighter
and incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable airframe, advanced
integrated avionics, and a supercruise engine. It will replace or
complement the F-15 as the Air Force's primary air-to-air fighter and
was originally intended to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union.
The Air Force has decided to add more robust air-to-ground and
intelligence-gathering capabilities not previously envisioned at
program start, but now considered necessary to increase its utility.
Program Status:
Demonstration and validation began in October 1986 and system
development in June 1991. Low-rate initial production was approved in
August 2001 and full-rate production in March 2005. The first
production aircraft was delivered in June 2003 and, as of October 2006,
78 aircraft had been delivered to the operational forces. The program
of record is to acquire a total of 183 aircraft at a total cost of
$62.6 billion. The Air Force plans to complete procurement in 2010
under a multiyear contract.
Initial operational capability was declared in December 2005. In its
December 2006 annual report, DOD's Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation has determined that the F-22A is operationally effective in
the air-to-air mission role and in the air-to-ground mission against
fixed targets using the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The aircraft is
not yet operationally suitable due to reliability and maintainability
deficiencies. Operational users report that the aircraft has performed
excellently in military exercises against representative threats and
represents a large advantage over the F-15.
The Air Force is implementing a modernization and reliability
improvement program and plans to invest another $6.3 billion to develop
and integrate more robust ground attack, intelligence-gathering, and
other new capabilities. Formally established in 2003, the F-22A's
modernization program is currently being planned for three increments
of increasing capability to be developed and delivered over time, from
fiscal year 2007 to 2013. Additional modernization is expected, but the
content and costs have not been determined or included in projected
budgets beyond 2013.
GAO Observations:
The Air Force's current stated need is for 381 F-22As. However, because
of past cost overruns and current budget constraints, OSD states that
183 are all that is needed and affordable. This leaves a 198-aircraft
gap with the Air Force's stated need. We have reported on F-22A issues
for many years and have recommended that a new and executable business
case be prepared that more accurately and realistically supports the
current program of record and which resolves a capability gap between
what the Air Force requires and what DOD can afford.[Footnote 13]
During the more than 20 years the aircraft has been in development, the
conditions underpinning the original business case substantively
changed--threat and employment plans changed, costs increased, the
development period doubled, and new mission requirements were added.
Without a new relevant business case--on the appropriate number of F-
22As for our national defense--it is uncertain whether additional
investments in the modernization program are advisable.
The Air Force is working with the contractor to fix structural
deficiencies on the F-22A. Fatigue testing identified cracks in the
aircraft near the horizontal section tail of the aircraft. The Air
Force is planning modifications to strengthen the structure to get the
8,000-hour service life. The Air Force estimates the costs to modify 72
F-22As will be approximately $124 million. These modifications will not
be fully implemented until 2010.
At the start of modernization, all three critical technologies
essential to achieving capability requirements were considered mature
by best practice standards. Since that time, however, the program added
three additional critical technologies, all of which are immature.
Immature and untested technologies, as the program pushes forward,
significantly increase the risk of poor cost and schedule outcomes.
Table 9: F-22A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget;.
RTD&E;
FY07: $472.5;
FY08: $743.6;
FY09: $666.8;
FY10: $510.3;
FY11: $417.3;
FY12: $512.0;
FY13: $495.8;
Total: $3,827.3.
Procurement;
FY07: 3,385.4;
FY08: 3,579.4;
FY09: 3,673.0;
FY10: 45.9;
FY11: 46.9;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 10,730.6.
Modifications;
FY07: 145.6;
FY08: 281.9;
FY09: 345.6;
FY10: 337.9;
FY11: 433.3;
FY12: 271.4;
FY13: 291.6;
Total: 2,107.3.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Total;
FY07: $4,003.5;
FY08: $4,604.9;
FY09: $4,685.4;
FY10: $894.2;
FY11: $897.4;
FY12: $792.4;
FY13: $787.4;
Total: $16,665.2.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 8: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The JSF program goals are to develop and field an affordable, highly
common family of stealthy, next-generation strike fighter aircraft for
the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies. The carrier
suitable variant will provide the Navy a multirole, stealthy strike
aircraft to complement the F/A-18E/F. The conventional take-off and
landing variant will primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for the
Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and will complement the F-22A.
The short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant will be a multi-
role strike fighter to replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B
aircraft.
Program Status:
The JSF program is DOD's most costly aircraft acquisition program. DOD
estimates that the total cost to develop and procure its fleet of
aircraft will be $276 billion, with total costs to maintain and operate
the JSF adding another $347 billion over its life cycle. It is also
DOD's largest cooperative development program. Eight partner countries
are providing funding for system development and demonstration:
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom.
Concept demonstration began in November 1996. The program entered
system development and demonstration in October 2001 and is expected to
run through fiscal year 2013. Manufacture and assembly of test aircraft
is continuing, and first flight of the Air Force's variant occurred in
December 2006. Overall, the cost estimate to develop the JSF has
increased from $34.4 billion in 2001 to $44.5 billion in 2005--about 29
percent. Procurement costs have increased from $196.6 billion in 2001
to $231.7 billion in 2005--about 18 percent. Since program start, JSF
quantities have been reduced by 530 aircraft. Current estimated program
acquisition unit costs are about $112 million, a 38 percent increase
since 2001.
GAO Observations:
We recently issued our third annual report on the JSF
acquisition.[Footnote 14] The development team has achieved first
flight and has overcome major design problems found earlier in
development. However, the current acquisition strategy still reflects
very significant risk that both development and procurement costs will
increase and that aircraft will take longer to deliver to the
warfighter than currently planned. Even as the JSF program enters the
midpoint of its development, it continues to encounter significant cost
overruns and schedule delays. As a result of the program reporting a
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach, a new baseline was established in 2004
with additional costs of $19.4 billion; since then, estimated costs to
complete the acquisition have increased another $31.6 billion. OSD cost
analysts are concerned about worsening cost performance and believe the
cost to complete the program will further escalate. The program has
also experienced delays in several key events, including the start of
the flight test program, delivery of the first production
representative development aircraft, and testing of critical missions
systems.
Our past reports have found that the acquisition program is not
following a knowledge-based evolutionary approach that places it at
risk of continued poor program outcomes. The degree of concurrency
between development and production in the JSF's acquisition strategy
includes significant risks for cost and schedule overruns or late
delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. For example, at
the time of the low-rate initial production decision, only one aircraft
will have flown; less than 1 percent of the flight test program will
have been completed; and none of the three variants will have a
production representative prototype built. The 7-year flight test
program of more than 11,000 hours of testing just began in December
2006. It will not be until 2011 that a fully capable, integrated JSF is
scheduled to begin flight testing. By that time, DOD expects to have
committed to buy 103 production aircraft for $20 billion. Therefore,
almost all of critical flight testing remains to confirm the aircraft
will indeed deliver the required performance. Manufacturing and
technical problems can delay the completion of the flight test program,
may necessitate design changes, increase the number of flight test
hours needed to verify the system will work as intended, and affect
when the capabilities are delivered to the warfighter.
DOD appears to be taking some actions to lessen funding risk--the
ability to sustain funding in times of austere budgets or against
competing priorities. DOD's plan in 2006 assumed extremely high annual
funding rates averaging $14 billion between 2012 and 2023. This is an
extremely large annual funding commitment that carries a
correspondingly high level of funding risk as the program moves forward
and must annually compete with other programs for the defense dollar.
Due to affordability pressures, DOD is beginning to reduce procurement
budgets and annual quantities. The recently released fiscal year 2008
defense budget shows declining procurement quantities for the first
years of production. To meet future constrained acquisition budgets,
Air Force and Navy officials and planning documents suggest a decrease
in maximum annual buy quantities from 160 shown in the current program
of record to about 115 per year, a 28 percent decrease. While this will
reduce annual funding requirements, it will also stretch the
procurement program at least seven years to 2034, assuming buy
quantities are deferred rather than eliminated.
Table 10: Navy JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $2,163.9;
FY08: $1,707.4;
FY09: $1,548.9;
FY10: $1,045.3;
FY11: $1,065.9;
FY12: $745.6;
FY13: $663.7;
Total: $8,940.7.
Procurement;
FY07: 124.5;
FY08: 1,317.1;
FY09: 1,809.0;
FY10: 3,608.0;
FY11: 3,422.7;
FY12: 5,675.7;
FY13: 5,647.2;
Total: 21,604.2.
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Total;
FY07: $2,288.4;
FY08: $3,024.5;
FY09: $3,357.9;
FY10: $4,653.2;
FY11: $4,488.6;
FY12: $6,421.2;
FY13: $6,311.0;
Total: $30,544.9.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Table 11: Air Force JSF Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $2,132.9;
FY08: $1,780.9;
FY09: $1,541.2;
FY10: $1,146.0;
FY11: $789.1;
FY12: $975.2;
FY13: $734.9;
Total: $9,100.1.
Procurement;
FY07: 648.5;
FY08: 1,461.7;
FY09: 1,906.3;
FY10: 2,457.3;
FY11: 3,544.1;
FY12: 4,914.1;
FY13: 5,222.6;
Total: 20,154.6.
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Procurement;
FY07: 389.0;
FY08: 230.0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: [Empty].
Total;
FY07: $3,170.4;
FY08: $3,472.6;
FY09: $3,447.5;
FY10: $3,603.3;
FY11: $4,333.2;
FY12: $5,889.3;
FY13: $5,957.5;
Total: $29,873.7.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 9: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program was approved as a major modification
in the F-18 series in May 1992. It is a twin engine, single-and two-
seat, multi-mission tactical aircraft designed to perform fighter
escort, interdiction, fleet air defense, and close air support
missions. The F/A-18E/F is replacing the F/A-18A/B/C, has improved
range and payload, and is less detectable. In addition to the
procurement quantity of 462 E/F aircraft, the Navy is also procuring 84-
90 airframes for the EA-18G program (total acquisition up to 552
aircraft).
Program Status:
Development began in 1992, procurement in 1996, and initial operational
capability was declared in September 2001. Through fiscal year 2006,
the Navy has taken delivery of 272 aircraft and has 210 aircraft on a 5-
year multiyear contract.[Footnote 15] The Navy has received an
unsolicited draft proposal for a third multiyear contract that would
complete the planned program. Navy officials believe this could reduce
unit costs, but told us to be effective the contract would need a
quantity higher than the 70 aircraft remaining to be bought. This would
seemingly require an increase in Navy buys or the addition of potential
foreign military sales.[Footnote 16]
Super Hornet aircraft have flown over 340,000 hours by the end of
December 2006 and have been employed in combat operations. The Navy
originally planned to buy 1,000 aircraft, but the quantity was reduced
to 548 by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, expecting to transition
more quickly to the JSF, but with provisions for additional procurement
if the JSF is delayed. In 2003, the quantity was further reduced to 462
when a study showed closer integration of Navy and Marine Corps
aviation fleets would provide greater efficiency for common assets.
GAO Observations:
The F/A-18E/F acquisition program is mature and has had relatively good
procurement cost and schedule outcomes. One substantive reason for good
outcomes is the low risk, evolutionary acquisition strategy adopted.
The E/F variant is part of the F/A-18's family of aircraft that has
gradually upgraded capabilities since delivery of the original F-18 in
the late 1970s. It has substantial commonality with its predecessor C/
D models and leveraged previous technologies. For example, the initial
release of the E/F models incorporated the avionics suite from the C/D
models with provisions for upgrades to occur subsequent to the basic
air vehicle development. Planned upgrades to the F/A-18E/F continue to
incrementally add capabilities. Current production is phasing in block
upgrades including the active electronically scanned array radar,
advanced crew station, network-centric operation, and time-critical
strike modifications. Navy program officials cited that, for the past
three years, full rate production aircraft have been consistently
delivered up to 3 months ahead of schedule, that the program is mature,
and its current costs remain well-defined and within targets.
While platform production and fielding has been successful, the
December 2006 report of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
identified ongoing tests and deficiencies in several of the aircraft's
major systems, including radar, defensive countermeasures, and weapons.
The report states it is paramount that all systems interoperate
properly in order to allow for optimal operational effectiveness and
suitability.
The program has reported two Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) breaches in
unit cost since 1999, but these are attributable more to external
factors than to system development, production, or management problems.
The first breach occurred in 1999 when the procurement quantity was
significantly reduced by the QDR. The second breach occurred in 2005
when the quantity was again reduced. Also, the OSD Comptroller decided
to break out program reporting for the EA-18G aircraft separate from
the E/F models. In doing so, common support costs for both programs
were budgeted in the E/F program.
Prior to this review, we last reported on the E/F program specifically
in our 2003 annual weapon systems' assessment.[Footnote 17] At that
time program officials noted that the aircraft demonstrated two to
three times the quality of the F/A-18C/D and have provided measurable
improvements to squadron readiness. In addition, all F/A-18E/F
preplanned upgrades continued to track to their program schedules.
Program officials also stated that the active electronically scanned
array radar program continues to execute as planned, and the program
received the first engineering and manufacturing development unit in
2003.
Table 12: F/A-18 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $39.3;
FY08: $44.9;
FY09: $66.3;
FY10: $66.3;
FY11: $61.0;
FY12: $52.1;
FY13: $35.4;
Total: $365.3.
Procurement;
FY07: 2,560.7;
FY08: 2,135.4;
FY09: 1,780.5;
FY10: 1,986.0;
FY11: 1,708.1;
FY12: 1,604.7;
FY13: 201.2;
Total: 11,976.6.
Modifications;
FY07: 424.7;
FY08: 441.9;
FY09: 460.2;
FY10: 480.4;
FY11: 510.6;
FY12: 521.9;
FY13: 529.6;
Total: 3,369.3.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 1.5;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 1.5.
Procurement;
FY07: 16.0;
FY08: 725.7;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 741.7.
Modifications;
FY07: 96.8;
FY08: 60.8;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 157.1.
Total;
FY07: $3,137.4;
FY08: $3,409.7;
FY09: $2,307.0;
FY10: $2,532.7;
FY11: $2,279.7;
FY12: $2,178.7;
FY13: $766.3;
Total: $16,611.5.
Source: DOD budget data.
Note: This table includes all F/A-18 series budget data as the Navy
consolidates investment funding for all models. Procurement funds
requested are for the purchase of the new F/A-18E/F, while RDT&E and
modification funds include amounts for both new and legacy F/A-18A/B/C/
D aircraft.
[End of table]
Figure 10: EA-18G Growler:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The EA-18G is the replacement for the Navy's EA-6B Prowler and will
provide carrier strike forces with electronic attack and tactical
jamming capabilities to defeat enemy air defenses and to protect strike
fighters and the carrier group. Derived from the combat proven F/A-18F
aircraft, the EA-18G incorporates advanced airborne electronic attack
avionics for the suppression of enemy air defenses, including accurate
emitter targeting for employment of onboard weapons such as the High-
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile.
Program Status:
The two-seater EA-18G airframe is about 90 percent common with the F/A-
18F airframe and is procured under the same multiyear contract. The two
models diverge at a point in the production line and airframes destined
to be Growlers receive the electronic attack subsystems. System
demonstration and design was about 70 percent complete by October 2006.
Two test articles were delivered in 2006 and first flight was in August
2006. The low-rate initial production decision is scheduled for late
April 2007 and initial operational capability is planned for the last
quarter in 2009.
The Navy is proposing to reduce the total quantity of EA-18Gs from 90
to 84. The reduction is a result of re-evaluating inventory
requirements in association with the Navy's fiscal year 2008 budget and
the application of tiered readiness, as well as a reduction of four
aircraft from the first low-rate production buy. The Navy expects to
receive its first EA-18G in 2009.
GAO Observations:
We reported in 2006 on the EA-18G's acquisition schedule for
integrating the electronic attack subsystems.[Footnote 18] Our analysis
showed that the program was not fully following the knowledge-based
approach espoused in best practices and DOD's acquisition guidance,
thus increasing the risk of cost growth, schedule delays, and
performance problems. None of its five critical technologies were fully
mature when system development started, and, at the time of our review,
flight testing hadn't begun. The Navy proposed buying one-third of the
total quantity as low-rate initial quantity aircraft based on limited
demonstrated functionality. We recommended DOD consider outfitting
additional EA-6Bs with the improved electronic suite for an interim
capability, which would allow the restructuring of EA-18G production
plans to begin procurement after full functionality was demonstrated.
This year, our follow on review as part of our annual assessments of
major weapon systems determined that progress has been made but that
three of the five critical technologies are still not fully mature to
best practices standards with production slated to start in
2007.[Footnote 19] Flight testing is underway and, until full
functionality is demonstrated, there are risks of redesign and
retrofit. Fifty-six aircraft are already on the F-18 multiyear
contract, most procured as low-rate initial production aircraft based
on limited demonstrated functionality. A fully functioning Growler, one
that meets or exceeds the upgraded EA-6B capability, will not complete
operational testing until January 2009, 20 months after production
starts and after more than one-third of the total fleet has already
been bought.
Navy officials agree that EA-18G's schedule is aggressive, but
disagreed with our overall assessment of the EA-18G. Officials reported
that the program has been stable since its schedule was developed in
2003 and is meeting or exceeding all cost, schedule and performance
parameters. Furthermore, officials stated that some technologies are
evolutionary upgrades of systems previously tested on its EA-6B
aircraft with demonstrated effectiveness. We note, however, that these
technologies are in new environments with form and fit challenges,
including space constraints, which could impact performance and
ultimate design. The December 2006 annual report from the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the schedule remains
aggressive with plans to fully assess risk areas to achieve initial
operational capability in fiscal year 2009. The Director reported that
the primary risks include the integration of multiple components of the
electronic attack system onto the F/A-18E/F platform and the operator
workload for the two-man crew in missions currently performed by the
four-person EA-6B aircraft.
Table 13: EA-18G Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $372.1;
FY08: $272.7;
FY09: $135.2;
FY10: $72.3;
FY11: $45.2;
FY12: $36.7;
FY13: $28.3;
Total: $962.5.
Procurement;
FY07: 669.8;
FY08: 1,427.6;
FY09: 1,652.7;
FY10: 1,352.9;
FY11: 707.9;
FY12: 242.6;
FY13: 0;
Total: 6,053.5.
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Procurement;
FY07: 450.0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 450.0.
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Total;
FY07: $1,492.0;
FY08: $1,700.3;
FY09: $1,788.0;
FY10: $1,425.1;
FY11: $753.1;
FY12: $279.3;
FY13: $28.3;
Total: $7,466.1.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 11: A-10 Warthog:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The A-10 was the first Air Force aircraft specially designed for close
air support of ground forces. It is a simple, effective and survivable
twin-engine jet used against all ground targets, including tanks.
Officials cite exceptional combat results during Desert Storm and the
Global War on Terror. Some aircraft are specially equipped for airborne
forward air control.
Program Status:
Because of the A-10's relevant combat capabilities--demonstrated first
during Desert Storm and recently in the Global War on Terror--the Air
Force now plans to keep it in the inventory longer than anticipated.
How long and with what upgrades is also dependent on whether the JSF
aircraft are delivered on schedule. The Air Force is pursuing several
major modifications to upgrade systems and structures on the A-10
fleet. A major re-winging effort is planned for 2007 through 2016 that
will replace the "thin skin" wings on 242 aircraft at an estimated cost
of $1.3 billion. This effort will help to extend the A-10's service
life to 16,000 hours. Precision Engagement modernizes cockpit controls
and upgrade avionics and weapons. All 356 aircraft in the force are
slated to receive the Precision Engagement suite. Total cost to
complete the modification is estimated to be $420 million.
GAO Observations:
Significant investments are underway and others planned or proposed to
modernize 356 A-10s and to extend service life from 8,000 to 16,000
flying hours in order to achieve the goal of keeping the aircraft in
service until 2025 or later. However, because of post-Cold War plans to
retire the aircraft starting in the early 1990s, the A-10 fleet
received no money for major modifications or programmed depot
maintenance during the 1990s. As a result, the Air Force is now faced
with a very large backlog of maintenance, structural repairs, and
extensive modifications to modernize the A-10 fleet and keep it viable.
Officials have begun major upgrades to modernize the cockpit and major
subsystems and to replace the wings on most of the fleet. Officials are
also finding that as older aircraft are inspected and opened up for
modification, additional and more costly structural and sustainment
work is being identified beyond initial plans.
Even with the higher priority accorded the aircraft, program officials
identify at least another $2.7 billion in unfunded
requirements.[Footnote 20] Chief among these are an engine upgrade
program estimated at $2.1 billion. It is intended to provide the A-10
with significantly improved engine capabilities. However, the proposal
was deferred by the requiring command because of limited funding and
higher warfighter priorities. The Air Force's Fleet Viability Board,
which assesses aging aircraft fleets and recommends to the Secretary
and Chief of Staff of the Air Force whether aircraft should be retired
or continued in service, recently determined that the A-10 is still
viable and validated many of the modifications and repairs already
underway. The Board recommended funding this engine upgrade in order to
extend the A-10's service life until 2030. The Board's assessment
identified mission limitations due to insufficient thrust to maximize
survivability in the current threat environment with existing engines.
Although agreeing that the engine upgrade would be desirable if funds
were available, the requiring command continues to defer this program
as a lower priority. We note that the Air Force has requested
development funding of $230 million for the engine upgrade program in
the 2008 supplemental request.
Table 14: A-10 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget;.
RTD&E;
FY07: $31.9;
FY08: $2.0;
FY09: $0;
FY10: $3.0;
FY11: $0;
FY12: $0;
FY13: $0;
Total: $36.9.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 106.9;
FY08: 161.7;
FY09: 145.6;
FY10: 306.0;
FY11: 274.5;
FY12: 268.9;
FY13: 268.9;
Total: 1,532.5.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 10.0;
FY08: 230.0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 240.0.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 217.4;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 217.4.
Total;
FY07: $366.2;
FY08: $393.7;
FY09: 145.6;
FY10: 309.0;
FY11: $274.5;
FY12: $268.9;
FY13: $268.9;
Total: $2,026.8.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 12: F-15A/B/C/D Eagle and F-15E Strike Eagle:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The F-15A/B/C/D Eagle is a single-and two-seat, twin-engine, all-
weather tactical fighter designed to gain and maintain air supremacy
over the battlefield. The F-15E Strike Eagle is a two-seater dual-role
fighter designed to perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. An
array of avionics and electronics systems gives the F-15E the
capability to strike targets at low altitude, day or night, and in all
weather.
Program Status:
The Air Force has a number of ongoing improvement efforts for the F-15
fleet, including:
* helmet mounted cueing system,
* a new identification friend-or-foe system,
* various computer upgrades, and:
* new radar for the F-15E:
The Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System is planned for several DOD
systems and provides pilots the capability to aim weapons and sensors
by looking at the intended target. The new friend-or-foe identification
system will solve obsolescence issues, add capability, and be
upgradeable for the future. Computer upgrades also resolve obsolescence
issues, enhance on-board computers, and improve avionics performance.
The F-15E model will receive the improved active electronically scanned
array radar.
GAO Observations:
For years, modernization efforts and funding for the F-15C/D aircraft
had been concentrated on about half the fleet--178 aircraft of its
total inventory of 391. These were the number of aircraft the Air Force
projected was needed to provide sufficient force structure to meet
defense requirements and to complement the F-22A. That projected number
was predicated upon the Air Force receiving its full F-22A stated
requirement of 381 aircraft. However, due to affordability, the Air
Force now faces a 198 aircraft shortfall in the quantity of F-22As it
is slated to receive. As a result, officials expect more F-15C/Ds need
to be modernized and retained for longer periods than planned.
Originally planned for retirement by 2015, the Air Force now needs to
keep substantial numbers of F-15C/D aircraft operational to 2025 and
perhaps beyond.
A multi-staged improvement program for the 178 aircraft, including
recent upgrades of the engines and radar, is mostly complete. Officials
identified near-term unfunded requirements on these aircraft totaling
$2.3 billion, including new radars and countermeasure sets. In
addition, potential service life extension efforts on the fleet and
backlogged unfunded requirements to modernize aircraft in addition to
the 178 may be needed but the full costs have not been identified.
The Air Force also plans to keep 224 F-15Es in service beyond 2025.
These are the newest F-15s with enhanced strike capabilities. The major
upcoming upgrade effort on the F-15E is a radar modernization program
to add active electronically scanned array radar. Estimated to cost
$2.3 billion, the Air Force has delayed funding for this effort and now
plans to start procurement in 2010. Program officials identified
unfunded requirements totaling about $1.7 billion, including upgraded
radar warning receivers, helmet mounted cueing system, and long-term
sustainment efforts to address electrical, structural, and power plant
concerns to keep the aircraft viable for another 25 or more years.
Table 15: F-15 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $137.5;
FY08: $101.3;
FY09: $186.4;
FY10: $165.6;
FY11: $120.0;
FY12: $120.8;
FY13: $123.2;
Total: $954.8.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 164.3;
FY08: 19.2;
FY09: 58.2;
FY10: 256.6;
FY11: 336.6;
FY12: 287.2;
FY13: 148.5;
Total: 1,270.6.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 97.5;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 97.5.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 192.0;
FY08: 152.9;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 344.9.
Total;
FY07: $493.8;
FY08: $370.9;
FY09: $244.6;
FY10: $422.2;
FY11: $456.6;
FY12: $408.0;
FY13: $271.7;
Total: $2,667.8.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 13: F-16 Fighting Falcon:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a single engine multi-role fighter with
full air-to-air and air-to-ground combat capability. It provides a
relatively low cost, high-performance weapon system for the United
States and allied nations. The F-16 currently comprises more than half
of the Air Force's fighter force. The fleet includes several different
configurations or blocks. The newest blocks incorporate the high-speed
anti-radiation missile targeting system, the Air Force's only platform
specifically for the suppression of enemy air defenses.
Program Status:
The Air Force is not currently purchasing any new F-16's, but the
contractor is still producing them for foreign sale. The production is
slated to continue past 2009 to accommodate recent sales. If the Air
Force were to buy new aircraft, officials estimated that it would cost
$380 million for development and about $50 million per aircraft
procured.
The Air Force has a number of ongoing improvement efforts for the F-16,
including:
* structural airframe modifications,
* avionics and capabilities upgrades,
* engine service life extension program, and:
* new engines for some F-16 models.
Falcon STAR is an effort to modify the airframe to allow the F-16 to
reach the original 8,000 hours estimated for its flight life. Due to
increased workload and weight that exceed the original specifications
of the aircraft, the F-16 must be structurally modified to compensate
for the increases. A number of common avionics and capabilities
upgrades are necessary to provide increased processor speed and
memories, color displays, and incorporate the Joint Helmet Mounted
Cueing System. The F110 engine service life extension program addresses
safety, reliability and maintainability concerns and new engines for
the Block 42 aircraft will provide needed thrust improvements.
GAO Observations:
With over 1,300 aircraft, the F-16 fleet comprises more than one-half
the Air Force's fighter and attack forces. The fleet includes several
different configurations that were acquired and upgraded in
evolutionary fashion over a considerable period of time. Reduced annual
buy quantities on the JSF and deferred deliveries to the warfighter
means that F-16s slated to be replaced by the JSF and retired will need
to remain operable and relevant for additional years. Already investing
several billions of dollars to keep the fleet operable, improve
capabilities, and sustain it to meet its original expected service
life, a preliminary unfunded cost estimate to increase the life
expectancy of the newer fighters is $4.5 billion.
Without improvements, almost 90 percent of the fleet would exceed
design limits on engines by 2010. High usage, increased stresses, and
more weight than planned threatened to cut life expectancy in half.
Significant unknowns exist about extending the life beyond 8,000 hours
should that be necessary. This makes any additional JSF schedule
delays, deferrals, and cost growth very problematic for the overall Air
Force fighter structure.
If it becomes necessary to enable the newest F-16 aircraft to reach a
10,000 flying hour life, a program official estimated an additional
cost of $2.2 billion for structural enhancements. The program office
also identified another $3.2 billion in unfunded requirements,
including radar upgrades to aircraft capable of suppressing enemy air
defenses. The oldest F-16s are to be retired over the next few years,
and the Air Force has halted modifications and funding for these
aircraft.
Table 16: F-16 Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $152.0;
FY08: $90.6;
FY09: $113.8;
FY10: $117.6;
FY11: $108.6;
FY12: $110.7;
FY13: $112.9;
Total: $806.2.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 366.4;
FY08: 329.3;
FY09: 292.4;
FY10: 234.4;
FY11: 202.6;
FY12: 72.3;
FY13: 41.2;
Total: 1,538.6.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 55.3;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 55.3.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Total;
FY07: $518.4;
FY08: $475.2;
FY09: $406.2;
FY10: $352.0;
FY11: $311.2;
FY12: $183.0;
FY13: $154.1;
Total: $2,400.1.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 14: F-117A Nighthawk:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The F-117A Nighthawk is the world's first operational aircraft designed
to exploit low observable stealth technology. This precision strike
aircraft penetrates high-threat airspace and uses laser-guided weapons
against critical targets.
Program Status:
As part of its transformation plans, the Air Force proposed retiring
the F-117A aircraft in 2007 and 2008, stating that there are other more
capable assets that can provide low observable, precision penetrating
weapons capability. Program Budget Decision 720, dated December 2005,
directed the Air Force to develop a strategy to gain congressional
support for this plan. Congress has agreed, with certain limitations,
mandating that the Air Force retire F-117As in "pristine" storage in
case the aircraft would need to be recalled into service.
GAO Observations:
Program officials estimate that the drawdown of the fleet and the
shutdown of government and contractor offices and facilities would cost
approximately $283 million. However, there is currently no funding
allocated for these retirement costs of the F-117A. This cost does not
include long-term storage and maintenance of the fleet after such a
retirement.
Table 17: F-117A Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $14.0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: $14.0.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 2.0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 2.0.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: [Empty];
FY08: [Empty];
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Procurement;
FY07: [Empty];
FY08: [Empty];
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: [Empty];
FY08: [Empty];
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Total;
FY07: $16.0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: $16.0.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 15: F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The F/A-18A/B/C/D is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft also
known as the Hornet. It is a single-and two-seat, twin engine, multi-
mission fighter/attack aircraft that can operate from either aircraft
carriers or land bases. The F/A-18 fills a variety of roles: air
superiority, fighter escort, suppression of enemy air defenses,
reconnaissance, forward air control, close and deep air support, and
day and night strike missions.
Program Status:
The major modification effort ongoing is the Center Barrel Replacement
to eliminate structural limitations caused by cracking in the central
fuselage. This effort is expected to cost about $970 million. During
scheduled inspections of the aircraft, the Navy also identified cracks
in the wing structure in about 40 percent of the aircraft. These could
cause safety of flight issues in the future but are not thought to be
serious enough at this time to ground the aircraft or to require
immediate repair.
GAO Observations:
The F/A-18s are the backbone of the naval tactical aircraft fleet, but
are quickly running out of service life. The Navy plans to soon retire
the A and B models, and the Marine Corps plans to transition entirely
to the JSF for its future strike force. The Navy's modernization
efforts are focused on the remaining 421 F/A-18C/D aircraft. The Navy
has an ongoing assessment of the service life of this aircraft that is
expected to be completed in December 2007. At this time, it is not
clear as to the need for or extent of future modifications, but a Naval
Air Systems Command official said the assessment could very well
identify additional modifications and structural work required beyond
what is funded. Further delays in JSF could exacerbate funding
shortfalls to sustain and modernize the operational fleet.
While the F/A-18C/D legacy aircraft are currently meeting both the
Navy's and Marine Corps's force structure requirements and readiness
levels, inventory reductions though the Navy-Marine Corps tactical
aircraft integration plan, JSF delays, and better defined structural
limits of the F/A-18C/D have created a shortfall starting in 2011 in
the number of aircraft that Navy officials project as needed to support
its war-fighting plans. One option the Navy is considering would be the
purchase of additional F/A-18E/F models to resolve this shortage.
Another option under consideration is extending the life of its F/A-
18C/D fleets to mitigate projected shortfalls. The full cost of the
life extension program is not known at this time. The service life
assessment effort to be completed in December 2007 will determine the
feasibility, scope of work, and total costs for extending the life of
the system. Current estimate for extending service life, including the
costs of the assessment, is about $2 billion, but officials said that
number could very well increase substantially as the assessment
progresses and cost estimates mature.
Concerned over the looming gap in the Navy's inventory, in May 2006,
the Senate Committee on Armed Services recommended that the Navy
consider buying more F/A-18E/Fs to mitigate any possible shortfall in
aircraft until JSF aircraft are delivered.
Note: Budget information for the F/A-18A/B/C/D is included earlier in
this appendix with the discussion of the F/A-18E/F (see table 12, p.
50). The Navy consolidates investment budgets for all models of the F-
18.
Figure 16: EA-6B Prowler:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The primary mission of the EA-6B Prowler is the suppression of enemy
air defenses in support of strike aircraft and ground troops by
interrupting enemy electronic activity and obtaining tactical
electronic intelligence within the combat area. The Prowler is a long-
range, all-weather aircraft with advanced electronic countermeasures
capability, and enhances combat survivability of strike force aircraft
and weapons by denying, delaying, and degrading the acquisition of
friendly forces by enemy air defense systems. Both the Navy and Marines
maintain Prowler assets.
Program Status:
In 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the sole tactical radar
support jammer for all services after the Air Force decided to retire
its fleet of EF-111 aircraft. This decision resulted in increased use
of the EA-6B, as the Prowler provided airborne electronic attack
capability during numerous joint and allied operations since 1995. The
Navy plans to start retiring its EA-6B in 2008 and replace it with the
EA-18G as its core airborne electronic attack component. The Marine
Corps had expected to retire their EA-6B assets in 2015, but that could
change as future plans for its replacement are still evolving.
Three significant upgrades to the EA-6B are:
* the Improved Capability electronic suite modification (ICAP III),
which provides the EA-6B with greater jamming capability;
* an upgrade to the aircraft's current electronic pods, which improves
frequency band capability; and:
* replacement of the wing center sections of the entire fleet and outer
wing panel replacement on portions of the fleet.
The ICAP-III modification includes the addition of software to allow
the EA-6B to automatically pinpoint enemy signals and better receive
and utilize data. Aircraft not receiving ICAP III are having the
current electronic attack systems upgraded. Funding to replace the wing
center sections was added by Congress. To date, 114 wings have been
procured and 100 have been installed on aircraft. In addition forty-
seven EA-6Bs are also in need of an outer wing panel replacement; Navy
officials said that the first four pairs have already been delivered,
and procurement will be ramped to 18 sets per year in order to receive
deliveries through 2008.
GAO Observations:
In 2006 GAO reported[Footnote 21] that, as a result of DOD's decision
to move to an electronic attack system of systems, the EA-6B would be
able to meet the defense suppression needs of the Navy until 2017 and
those of the Marine Corps until 2025 if the aircraft were fitted with
the ICAP-III electronic suite upgrade. Because the EA-18G's five
critical technologies were not fully mature and posed a costly risk for
design changes, GAO recommended that DOD consider outfitting additional
EA-6Bs with the ICAP III suite, which would allow the Navy to slow EA-
18G low rate production until its technologies become fully mature and
functionality demonstrated.
The Navy and Marine Corps operate the EA-6B, which provides electronic
attack support DOD-wide at this time. The EA-6B has been upgraded over
time to increase its reactive jamming capability. The most important on-
going effort to the EA-6B is the ICAP-III electronic suite
modification, which provides more rapid emitter detection, selective
reactive jamming, and expanded coverage. The Navy has two squadrons
currently deployed with ICAP-III and plans to equip a total of 15 of
its EA-6Bs with the ICAP-III suite. The Navy plans to start
decommissioning the EA-6B from its fleet starting in 2008 and retire
all aircraft by 2013, replacing them with the new EA-18G that will
provide electronic attack support to its carrier strike forces.
The Navy will start transferring aircraft to the Marine Corps in fiscal
year 2010 and complete transfers in 2013 with delivery of the ICAP III
aircraft. The Marines Corps planned to retire its EA-6Bs by 2015, but
officials said plans could change depending on the transfer schedule
and that they may need to keep these aircraft in the inventory longer
depending on the JSF delivery schedule. The Marine Corps has not yet
made firm plans for its future electronic attack capability and is
considering employment of the JSF and unmanned aircraft systems. We
note that the Marine Corps has requested a total of $379 million in the
fiscal year 2007 and 2008 global war on terror requests to upgrade an
additional 18 EA-6Bs with the ICAP-III suite and for other
modernization enhancements.
Table 18: EA-6B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $0;
FY08: $0;
FY09: $0;
FY10: $0;
FY11: $0;
FY12: $0;
FY13: $0;
Total: $0.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: 0;
FY10: 0;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 48.8;
FY08: 30.6;
FY09: 33.7;
FY10: 32.8;
FY11: 33.3;
FY12: 37.5;
FY13: 38.1;
Total: 254.8.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: [Empty];
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: [Empty];
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 178.6;
FY08: 200.7;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 379.3.
Total;
FY07: $227.4;
FY08: $231.3;
FY09: $33.7;
FY10: $32.8;
FY11: $33.3;
FY12: $37.5;
FY13: $38.1;
Total: $634.1.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
Figure 17: AV-8B Harrier II:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
Mission:
The AV-8B Harrier II is a short field take-off and vertical landing
(STOVL) jet aircraft that deploys from naval ships, advanced bases, and
expeditionary airfields. Its mission is to attack and destroy surface
targets and escort friendly aircraft, day or night, under all weather
conditions during expeditionary, joint or combined operations. The
Harrier is responsible for conducting close air support, armed
reconnaissance and air interdiction, offensive and defensive anti-air
warfare, including combat air patrol, armed escort mission, and
offensive missions against enemy ground-to-air defenses. The first
Harrier squadron is expected to be replaced by the JSF starting in
fiscal year 2011.
Program Status:
The AV-8B, a more powerful and longer range model, than its predecessor
the AV-8A, was introduced in 1985. The AV-8Bs were originally designed
as day attack only aircraft, but some were later upgraded to add night
attack and radar capabilities. The night attack and radar upgrades
enhance the pilot's ability to locate and destroy targets under various
weather conditions and at night. Some of the AV-8Bs received an upgrade
to enhance night attack with improved multimode radar in 1991-1992.
Between 1994 and 2001, the majority of AV-8Bs were remanufactured with
new fuselages to add structural life to the airframe and to accommodate
the new radar upgrade.
Currently there are several on-going efforts to add capabilities and
improve sustainment for the AV-8B until replaced by the JSF, including:
* remanufacturing 5 old, day attack aircraft to receive the night
attack capability and refurbishing 2 training aircraft;
* using a more accurate method to track the useful life of the
aircraft; and:
* continuing efforts to improve sustainment through a readiness
management plan for the airframes and an engine life management plan.
The AV-8B was originally designed to last for 6,000 flying hours. This
estimate was based on engineering fatigue projections on a 20 year
service life, flying 300 hours per year, on very rigorous mission
profiles. However, the aircraft have typically not been flown in such
stressful flight envelopes and the Marines estimate they will be able
to exceed the original 6,000 hour service life and maintain an
additional 66 aircraft in service through 2015. In addition, the Marine
Corps plans a set of modifications, largely unfunded, that would add
important capabilities by 2012 or later to enable the Harriers to be
more effective in future threat environments.
GAO Observations:
The AV-8 aircraft was DOD's first STOVL system. The aircraft is costly
to maintain and has a relatively high attrition rate. The Marine Corps
has 134 AV-8Bs in its current fleet and plans to replace them all with
STOVL JSFs by 2025. The new fuselages increased the estimated service
for the AV-8Bs from 6,000 to 9,000 flight hours. Further, the AV-8Bs
have not been used as vigorously as mission profiles used to project
its useful life and officials believe that the fleet can remain in
inventory well beyond the expected delivery dates of the JSF, if
necessary.
Ongoing and planned modernization efforts are minimal. The Marines are
upgrading five AV-8Bs that did not get previous upgrades so that they
will now have the night attack capability, and refurbishing two
training aircraft In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps began repairs
on four aircraft damaged during combat operations using supplemental
funding. As another step to mitigate potential slips in JSF production,
officials are also increasing the amount of depot level maintenance on
the AV-8B fleets to ensure sufficient numbers are available and
capable. The Harrier is scheduled to remain in service until at least
2021, but its retirement is dependent upon the delivery of the JSF.
Table 19: AV-8B Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (in millions of
dollars):
FY 2008 Budget.
RTD&E;
FY07: $21.7;
FY08: $17.4;
FY09: $26.3;
FY10: $14.8;
FY11: $12.5;
FY12: $12.7;
FY13: $12.9;
Total: $118.1.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 3.0;
FY09: 3.4;
FY10: 3.4;
FY11: 0;
FY12: 0;
FY13: 0;
Total: 9.9.
Modifications;
FY07: 57.5;
FY08: 37.5;
FY09: 51.7;
FY10: 37.3;
FY11: 29.2;
FY12: 23.0;
FY13: 22.6;
Total: 258.8.
Supplemental.
RDT&E;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 6.4;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 6.4.
Procurement;
FY07: 0;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 0.
Modifications;
FY07: 9.9;
FY08: 0;
FY09: [Empty];
FY10: [Empty];
FY11: [Empty];
FY12: [Empty];
FY13: [Empty];
Total: 9.9.
Total;
FY07: $89.9;
FY08: $64.3;
FY09: $81.4;
FY10: $55.5;
FY11: $41.7;
FY12: $35.7;
FY13: $35.5;
Total: $403.1.
Source: DOD budget data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
Michael J. Sullivan (202) 512-4841:
Acknowledgments:
Principal contributors to this report were the Assistant Director
Michael Hazard, Bruce Fairbairn, Marvin Bonner, Erin Clouse, Matthew
Lea, Sara Margraf, Robert Miller, and Karen Sloan.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
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406SP. Washington D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-07-
388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter
Engine Program. GAO-07-656T. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007.
Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. GAO-07-360.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business Case before
Making Further Investments. GAO-06-455R. Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2006.
Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs Could Reduce
Risk in Development of EA-18G. GAO-06-446. Washington, D.C.: April 26,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapon
Systems Investments. GAO-06-585T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006.
Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by
Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. GAO-06-487T. Washington,
D.C.: March 16, 2006.
Systems Acquisition: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost
and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy. GAO-06-368.
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Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-06-391. Washington D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing
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Defense Acquisitions: Business Case and Business Arrangements Key for
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2006.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not Well-
Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid. GAO-06-211.
Washington D.C.: January 30, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees
Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-06-66. Washington D.C.:
December 19, 2005.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T. Washington
D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface
Combatant Program. GAO-05-924T. Washington D.C.: July 19, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive Problems
Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisitions. GAO-05-570R. Washington
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Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's
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GAO-05-669. Washington D.C.: June 15, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications
for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-519T. Washington D.C.:
April 6, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-05-301. Washington D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Changes in E-10A Acquisition Strategy Needed
Before Development Starts. GAO-05-273. Washington D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-
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March 15, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike
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Washington D.C.: March 15, 2005.
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Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-390T.
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FOOTNOTES
[1] Defense suppression is the neutralization, destruction, or
temporary degradation of enemy air defenses, either by physical attack
with munitions or by electronic means to jam and confuse enemy radar.
[2] JSF is being developed jointly with eight other nations: United
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark,
and Norway.
[3] A project enters technology development at Milestone A. The purpose
of this phase of development is to reduce technology risk and to
determine the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a
full system.
[4] Sunset schedules can be impacted by a statutory prohibition (10
U.S.C. 2244a) on making modifications to a weapon system within five
years of its planned retirement.
[5] GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and
Potential Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for
Selected Equipment, GAO-06-141 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2005).
[6] While aircraft investment budgets are consolidated at the
Department of the Navy level, the Navy and Marine Corps largely plan
independently to fill individual force structure requirements.
[7] GAO, Aircraft Acquisition: Affordability of DOD's Investment
Strategy, GAO/NSIAD-97-88, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 1997).
[8] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,
GAO-07-406SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on
Weapons Systems Investments, GAO-06-585T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5,
2006).
[10] The other capability areas are command and control, net centric
warfare, force management, force protection, and joint training.
[11] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[12] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and
Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization,GAO-05-519T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2005).
[13] The latest report is GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a
New F-22A Business Case before Making Further Investments, GAO-06-455R
(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006).
[14] GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain,
GAO-07-360 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007).
[15] This multiyear procurement contract, the program's second of this
contract type, includes 154 F/A-18E/F and 56 EA-18G airframes for a
total of 210.
[16] There are currently seven foreign counties that have F/A-18A/B/C/
Ds in their fleets: Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia,
Spain, and Switzerland.
[17] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-03-476 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003).
[18] GAO, Electronic Warfare: Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs
Could Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G, GAO-06-446, (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 26, 2006).
[19] GAO-07-406SP.
[20] We obtained another preliminary estimate that suggests a service
life extension program for the A-10 could cost $4.4 billion, which may
include some of these unfunded requirements.
[21] GAO-06-446.
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