Defense Acquisitions
Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems Gao ID: GAO-07-578 May 17, 2007The Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide vital information in support of military operations. Over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest over $28 billion in existing and new airborne ISR acquisition systems. This represents a marked increase over prior ISR investments. Given the significant investments, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) assess the effectiveness of ISR investment decisions. To assess cost and schedule status, we reviewed programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate investment decisions, we collected information on system capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for similarities.
DOD plans to invest over $28 billion over the next 7 years to develop, procure, and modernize 20 major airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Nearly all of the systems in development have experienced cost growth or schedule delays. These problems have delayed the fielding of a warfighting capability and have resulted in program restructuring, cancellation, or unplanned investments in older legacy ISR systems. For example, problems in developing the Aerial Common Sensor affected three legacy programs, increasing their collective budgets by 185 percent, or nearly $900 million. In many cases, GAO found that the newer ISR programs lacked a solid business case or a knowledge-based acquisition strategy before entering the development process. A good business case requires the manager to match the system requirements with mature technologies and a system design that can be built. This requires sufficient knowledge about the system gained through basic system engineering concepts and practices. Although it fights jointly, DOD does not always procure new systems jointly. Instead, each service typically develops and procures systems independently. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and other programs that have less collaborative efforts and could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. For example, the Navy and Army have collaborated successfully on the Fire Scout, but in contrast, the Air Force and Army have not been as collaborative on the Predator and Warrior systems, as they each currently plan unique solutions to their similar needs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-578, Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems
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Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2007:
Defense Acquisitions:
Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Systems:
GAO-07-578:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-578, a report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide
vital information in support of military operations. Over the next 7
years, DOD plans to invest over $28 billion in existing and new
airborne ISR acquisition systems. This represents a marked increase
over prior ISR investments.
Given the significant investments, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate
various ISR platforms for potential synergies and assess their cost and
schedule status and the impact of any increases or delays on legacy
systems and (2) assess the effectiveness of ISR investment decisions.
To assess cost and schedule status, we reviewed programmatic and budget
documentation. To evaluate investment decisions, we collected data on
system capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed them
for similarities
What GAO Found:
DOD plans to invest over $28 billion over the next 7 years to develop,
procure, and modernize 20 major airborne intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance systems. Nearly all of the systems in development have
experienced cost growth or schedule delays. These problems have delayed
the fielding of a warfighting capability and have resulted in program
restructuring, cancellation, or unplanned investments in older legacy
ISR systems. For example, problems in developing the Aerial Common
Sensor affected three legacy programs, increasing their collective
budgets by 185 percent, or nearly $900 million. In many cases, GAO
found that the newer ISR programs lacked a solid business case or a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy before entering the development
process. A good business case requires the manager to match the system
requirements with mature technologies and a system design that can be
built. This requires sufficient knowledge about the system gained
through basic system engineering concepts and practices. Although it
fights jointly, DOD does not always procure new systems jointly.
Instead, each service typically develops and procures systems
independently. Opportunities exist for different services to
collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for
creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new
capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified development programs
where program managers and services are working together to gain these
efficiencies and other programs that have less collaborative efforts
and could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. For example, the
Navy and Army have collaborated successfully on the Fire Scout, but in
contrast, the Air Force and Army have not been as collaborative on the
Predator and Warrior systems, as they each currently plan unique
solutions to their similar needs.
Table: Developmental ISR Systems and Capabilities Planned:
Platforms: Aerial Common Sensor (ACS);
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: Check;
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: Check;
Electronic signals: Check;
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: piloted, onboard operator.
Platforms: Fire scout (Army);
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: Check;
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: Check;
Electronic signals: Check;
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: Unmanned.
Platforms: Warrior;
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: Check;
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: Check;
Communications signals: Check;
Electronic signals: [Empty];
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: Unmanned.
Platforms: E-10A;
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: [Empty];
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: [Empty];
Electronic signals: [Empty];
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: piloted, onboard operator.
Platforms: Global hawk;
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: Check;
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: Check;
Electronic signals: Check;
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: Unmanned.
Platforms: Reaper;
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: Check;
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: Check;
Communications signals: [Empty];
Electronic signals: [Empty];
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: Unmanned.
Platforms: Space Radar;
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: [Empty];
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: [Empty];
Electronic signals: [Empty];
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: Unmanned.
Platforms: broad Area Maritime Surveillance;
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: check;
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: Check;
Electronic signals: Check;
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: Unmanned.
Platforms: Fire Scout (Navy);
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: Check;
Radar imagery: [Empty];
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: [Empty];
Electronic signals: [Empty];
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: Unmanned.
Platforms: Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft;
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: [Empty];
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: [Empty];
Electronic signals: [Empty];
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: piloted, onboard operator.
Platforms: EPX (formerly Navy ACS);
Electro-optical/Infrared Imagery: Check;
Radar imagery: Check;
Video: [Empty];
Communications signals: Check;
Electronic signals: Check;
Unmanned; piloted, onboard operator: piloted, onboard operator.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD (1) develop and implement an integrated
enterprise-level investment strategy approach that draws on the results
of ongoing studies and (2) report to the defense committees by August
1, 2007, the results of the ISR studies and identify specific plans and
actions it intends to get greater jointness in ISR programs. DOD
generally believes current initiatives will address our
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-578].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Michael Sullivan,
sullivanm@gao.gov, at (202) 512-4841.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led
to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems:
Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Services' ISR
Programs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: System Descriptions:
Aerial Common Sensor:
Airborne Reconnaissance Low:
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload:
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Aircraft System:
E-10A:
EP-3:
EPX:
Fire Scout (Army):
Fire Scout (Navy):
Joint Surveillance, Target Attack, and Radar System:
Global Hawk:
GUARDRAIL Common Sensor:
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft:
Multi-platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
Predator:
Reaper:
Rivet Joint:
Space Radar:
U-2:
Warrior:
Appendix III: ISR Studies Under Way or Recently Completed:
Joint ISR Replacement Study:
U-2 Retirement Study:
Airborne ISR Requirements:
Optimization of ISR Capabilities:
Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Characteristics of ISR Programs Reviewed:
Table 2: Planned Investment in Airborne and Space ISR Systems from
Fiscal Year 2007 to Fiscal Year 2013:
Table 3: Causes and Impacts of Cost and Schedule Growth:
Table 4: Fiscal Years 2004 and 2008 President's Budget for the Army's
Guardrail Common Sensor and Airborne Reconnaissance Low and the Navy's
EP-3:
Figure:
Figure 1: U-2 Retirement and Global Hawk Fielding:
Abbreviations:
ACS: Aerial Common Sensor:
AMTI: Air-Moving Target Indicator:
ARIES: Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics System:
ARL: Airborne Reconnaissance Low:
ASIP: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload:
BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance:
COMINT: communication intelligence:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ELINT: electronic intelligence:
EO: electro- optical:
FMV: full-motion video:
GMTI: Ground Moving Target Indicator:
GRCS: Guardrail Common Sensor:
IR: infrared:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
MASINT: measurement and signature intelligence:
MMA: Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft:
MP-RTIP: Multi-platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
PA&E: Program Analysis and Evaluation:
RJ: Rivet Joint:
SAR: synthetic aperture radar:
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence:
SR: Space Radar:
STARS: Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance System:
UAS: unmanned aerial system:
USAF: U. S. Air Force:
USD(AT&L): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics:
USD(I): Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
VTUAV: vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aerial vehicle system:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Date:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Over the next 7 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest
over $28 billion to develop, procure, and modify 20 major airborne
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and
maintain existing systems until the new ones are fielded. This planned
investment represents a significant increase over past ISR investments
and comes in response to threats that have emerged over the past decade
and the high priority commanders have placed on gathering battlefield
intelligence.
Given the significant planned investment in ISR and DOD's recent focus
on its acquisition strategy, you asked us to review DOD's ISR
acquisition strategy. Specifically, we assessed 1) the cost and
schedule status of ISR systems under development as well as investments
planned for those systems currently in the DOD inventory and 2) the
effectiveness of ISR investment decisions.
To assess the cost and schedule status of ISR systems, we reviewed
programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate the effectiveness of
decisions for planned investments, we collected information on system
capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for
similarities. We also discussed the results of our analyses with
officials at the program office; Army, Navy, and Air Force
headquarters; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the
Joint Chief of Staff for Intelligence. (For more on our scope and
methodology, see app. I.) We conducted our work between June 2006 and
April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
In addition to this report, GAO is conducting two related review
efforts for the committee. These efforts will review and report on 1)
DOD's process to set requirements for ISR systems and 2) DOD's process
for integrating unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into ongoing combat
operations in support of ISR requirements. Two separate reports on
these issues will be provided later in 2007.
Results in Brief:
Nearly all of the ISR development programs that we reviewed have
experienced some cost or schedule growth. Cost and schedule growth in
these programs is largely the result of a poor business case or
acquisition strategy that failed to capture sufficient knowledge about
the product technologies and design before committing to the
development and demonstration of a new system. For example, the Global
Hawk program--which experienced a 261 percent cost growth--had
significant overlap of technology maturation, design, and production.
Significant delays in the delivery of some new systems, breaking the
investment strategy (for the new and legacy systems to be replaced)
established at the start of these acquisition programs, have required
DOD to make additional unplanned investments in legacy systems in order
to keep them relevant and operational longer than planned. For example,
the termination of the Aerial Common Sensor development contract
resulted in a 5-year delay and the need to modify three legacy systems
to keep them in the field longer than planned. The cost to keep these
systems capable is estimated at $1.4 billion between fiscal years 2008
and 2013, an increase of nearly $900 million over previous estimates to
do so. These unplanned investments represent opportunity costs that
could have been used for other needs within DOD had the original Aerial
Common Sensor acquisition strategy been based on more robust design
knowledge.
Among the ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases
where the military services have successfully collaborated to provide
capabilities to the warfighter more efficiently and affordably. For
example, the Army and Navy programs on their own initiative
collaborated successfully on the Fire Scout to use a single contract to
buy common components that can save hundreds of millions of dollars.
However, we also found cases where more collaboration is needed to
achieve efficiencies in costs and schedule and to close gaps in
capabilities. For example, despite similarities in the Air Force's
Predator program and the Army's Warrior program, the two services have
resisted collaboration, and the Army awarded a separate development
contract to the same contractor producing the Predator. Although the
Army and Air Force agreed to consider cooperating on the acquisition of
the two systems in January 2006, the services continue to struggle to
agree on requirements and a concept of operation. Through
collaboration, the services could leverage knowledge early in the
acquisition process and avoid or reduce DOD costs for design, new
tooling, and manufacturing, and streamline contracting and acquisition
processes. DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or
ongoing, and a pilot program to investigate portfolio management
practices, but there have been no current actions to gain greater
jointness in ISR acquisition programs.
While DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or
ongoing and including a pilot program to investigate portfolio
management practices, there have been no substantive actions recently
implemented to gain greater jointness in ISR acquisition programs.
Therefore, we are recommending that DOD (1) develop and implement an
integrated enterprise-level investment strategy approach that draws on
the results of ongoing studies like portfolio management and (2) report
to the defense committees by August 1, 2007, the results of the ISR
studies and identify the specific plans and actions it intends to get
greater jointness in ISR programs. DOD agreed with the first
recommendation but believes that current initiatives will address it.
We believe that many of the ongoing initiatives to achieve a greater
integrated investment strategy approach for ISR are steps in the right
direction but are concerned that they will not go far enough to address
the problems that have occurred in DOD acquisitions for some time now.
DOD also agreed to report the interim status on the portfolio
management program by the above date but suggested moving the suspense
date for reporting on the results of two other pertinent efforts to the
end of the calendar year. We believe a full reporting in December 2007
would be useful if it includes DOD‘s detailed plans. However, we
believe an interim reporting to the committees on the results and
planned outcomes from completed studies should be provided to the
committees by August 2007.
Background:
ISR directly supports the planning and conduct of current and future
military operations. ISR encompasses multiple activities related to the
planning and operation of sensors and assets that collect, process, and
disseminate data. Intelligence data can take many forms, including
electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) images, full-motion video (FMV),
images from a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), electronics intelligence
(ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and measures and
signature intelligence (MASINT). This data can come from a variety of
sources, including surveillance and reconnaissance systems that operate
in space or on manned or unmanned systems. Data can also come from
systems that are ground-or sea-based or from human intelligence teams.
Table 1 summarizes the ISR programs that we reviewed, 13 of which are
in development. (A brief description of each of the 20 programs we
reviewed is provided in app II.)
Table 1: Characteristics of ISR Programs Reviewed:
Army.
Platform: Aerial Common Sensor;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: Check;
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Platform: Airborne Reconnaissance Low;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: L;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Platform: Fire Scout;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Platform: Guardrail Common Sensor;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: L;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator: no
onboard operator.
Platform: Warrior[A];
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: Check;
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/ Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Air Force.
Platform: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload[B];
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator: N/A.
Platform: E-10A[D];
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/ Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Platform: Global Hawk;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Platform: Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
System;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: L;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Platform: Multi-platform Radar Technology Insertion Program[C];
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator: N/A.
Platform: Predator[A];
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: Check;
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: L;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Platform: Reaper[A];
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: Check;
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Platform: Rivet Joint;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: L;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Platform: Space Radar;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/ Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Platform: U-2;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: Check;
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: L;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator: no
onboard operator.
Navy.
Platform: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance;
Imagery intelligence: EO/ IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Platform: EP-3;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: L;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Platform: Fire Scout;
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/ Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
unmanned.
Platform: Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft[A];
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: [Empty];
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: ELINT: [Empty];
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Platform: EP-X (formerly Navy Aerial Common Sensor);
Imagery intelligence: EO/IR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: SAR: Check;
Imagery intelligence: FMV: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: Wet film: [Empty];
Signals intelligence: COMINT: Check;
Signals intelligence: ELINT: Check;
MASINT: [Empty];
Development (D)/Legacy (L)[E]: D;
Unmanned; piloted, no onboard operator; piloted, onboard operator:
piloted, onboard operator.
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
[A] These systems also carry munitions.
[B] This is a payload being developed for deployment on the U-2 and
Global Hawk.
[C] This is a payload being developed for deployment on the Global
Hawk.
[D] The E-10A program was a technology development program until it was
canceled in February 2007.
[E] Development refers to technology or systems development activities.
[End of table]
DOD plans significant investments in airborne ISR systems. For example,
between fiscal years 2007 and 2013, DOD plans to invest $28.7 billion
in the 20 systems we reviewed. (see Table 2):
Table 2: Planned Investment in Airborne and Space ISR Systems from
Fiscal Year 2007 to Fiscal Year 2013:
Dollars in millions.
Army.
Aerial Common Sensor;
Research and Development: $1,452;
Procurement: $0;
Total: $1,452.
Airborne Reconnaissance Low;
Research and Development: 23;
Procurement: 193;
Total: 216.
Fire Scout[A];
Research and Development: 0;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 0.
Guardrail Common Sensor;
Research and Development: 4;
Procurement: 547;
Total: 551.
Warrior;
Research and Development: 187;
Procurement: 1,211;
Total: 1,398.
Air Force.
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload;
Research and Development: 1,007;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 1,007.
E-10A[B];
Research and Development: 259;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 259.
Global Hawk;
Research and Development: 1,680;
Procurement: 4,439;
Total: 6,119.
Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance System;
Research and Development: 745;
Procurement: 945;
Total: 1,690.
Multi-platform Radar Technology Insertion Program;
Research and Development: 393;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 393.
Predator;
Research and Development: 205;
Procurement: 2,261;
Total: 2,466.
Reaper;
Research and Development: 222;
Procurement: 1,292;
Total: 1,514.
Rivet Joint;
Research and Development: 111;
Procurement: 908;
Total: 1,019.
Space Radar;
Research and Development: 266;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 266.
U-2;
Research and Development: 1;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 1.
Navy.
EP-X (formerly Navy Aerial Common Sensor);
Research and Development: 997;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 997.
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance;
Research and Development: 2,319;
Procurement: 0;
Total: 2,319.
EP-3;
Research and Development: 250;
Procurement: 665;
Total: 915.
Fire Scout;
Research and Development: 117;
Procurement: 509;
Total: 626.
Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft;
Research and Development: 5,364;
Procurement: 111;
Total: 5,475.
Total;
Research and Development: $15,602;
Procurement: $13,081;
Total: $28,683.
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
[A] The Army does not breakout Fire Scout costs separately. They are
included as part of Future Combat Systems.
[B] The E-10A program was a technology development program until it was
canceled in February 2007.
[End of table]
Congress has also recognized the need in acquiring UAS. For example, it
added funding between fiscal years 2003 and 2005 to enable the Air
Force to accelerate procurement of the Reaper UAS. Over those 3 years,
Congress increased the Reaper budget over $70 million, directing the
Air Force to procure a total of 8 additional air vehicles. Similarly,
the Navy Fire Scout budget was increased by $17 million in fiscal year
2006 to procure 2 additional air vehicles. In fiscal year 2003, the
Global Hawk budget was increased by $90 million, primarily to develop
advanced payloads for signals and imagery intelligence
capabilities.[Footnote 1]
Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led
to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems:
Nearly all of the 13 airborne ISR programs in development that we
reviewed have experienced some cost or schedule growth. [Footnote 2]
Cost and schedule growth in these programs is largely the result of a
poor business case or acquisition strategy that failed to capture
sufficient knowledge about the product technologies and design before
committing to the development and demonstration of a new system.
Significant delays in the delivery of some new systems, breaking the
investment strategy (for the new and legacy systems to be replaced)
established at the start of these acquisition programs, have required
DOD to make additional unplanned investments in legacy systems in order
to keep them relevant and operational longer than planned. Delays in
the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) aircraft have required DOD to make
additional unplanned investments in three Army and Navy legacy aircraft
systems in order to keep them relevant and operational longer than
planned. These additional investments, totaling about $900 million,
represent opportunity costs that could have been used for other needs
within DOD.
Cost, Schedule, and Performance Status of Airborne ISR Programs:
Of the 13 airborne ISR programs in development, 1 has experienced
significant cost growth and 9 have experienced schedule delays that
range from 2 months to 60 months. Table 3 summarizes ISR programs that
have encountered problems either in development or as they prepared to
begin the system development and demonstration phase of an acquisition
program.
Table 3: Causes and Impacts of Cost and Schedule Growth:
System: E-10A;
Problem encountered: Uncertain need and immature technology;
Impact: Program canceled.
System: Aerial Common Sensor;
Problem encountered: Requirements and design changes;
Impact: Development contract terminated, program being restructured,
schedule delayed 60 months, and increased investments in legacy
systems.
System: Global Hawk;
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition, immature technology, and
requirements and design changes;
Impact: Cost growth (261 percent in development), schedule delayed 36
months, program restructured, potential increased investments in legacy
system.
System: Reaper;
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition and immature technology;
Impact: Cost growth (13 percent in development) and schedule delayed 7
months.
System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance;
Problem encountered: Immature technology;
Impact: Schedule delayed 39 months.
System: Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft;
Problem encountered: Immature technology;
Impact: None to date.
System: Army Fire Scout;
Problem encountered: Business case dependent on another major
acquisition program (Future Combat Systems)[A];
Impact: Schedule delayed 22 months.
System: Navy Fire Scout;
Problem encountered: Business case dependent on another major
acquisition program (Littoral Combat Ship)[A];
Impact: Schedule delayed 3 months.
System: Space Radar;
Problem encountered: Immature technology and requirements change;
Impact: Cost growth (18 percent in development), schedule delayed 8
months, and program restructured.
System: Multi-platform Radar Technology Insertion Program;
Problem encountered: Acquisition strategy and funding dependent on
other major acquisition programs (E-10A canceled and Global Hawk
continues);
Impact: Requirements changed and program restructured.
System: Warrior;
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition strategy and immature
technology;
Impact: Cost growth (21 percent in development); schedule delayed 9
months.
System: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload;
Problem encountered: Immature technology and design;
Impact: Schedule delayed 2 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Delays in either the Future Combat Systems or the Littoral Combat
Ship could influence the respective services' Fire Scout programs even
if the specific Fire Scout development was meeting its cost and
schedule.
[B] EPX, the Navy's replacement for its EP-3, was not included because
it is a new program as of February 2007.
[End of table]
Many of these programs began development without an executable business
case and did not have a good acquisition strategy to capture critical
system knowledge at the key decision milestones. Our work on best
commercial practices has shown that before a company invests in product
development, it should develop a sound business case--one that
validates user requirements and determines that the concept can be
successfully developed with existing resources--to minimize the risks
associated with such a commitment. For DOD, an executable business case
provides demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need is valid
and that it can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the
concept can be developed and produced with proven technologies,
existing design knowledge, and available funding and time. To implement
the business case, programs must develop a realistic acquisition
strategy, one that includes critical program knowledge--such as
technology maturity, system design, and manufacturing and production
processes--at key points in the acquisition. DOD's acquisition policy
endorses a knowledge-based approach to acquisition and includes
strategies to reduce technology, integration, design, manufacturing,
and production risks.[Footnote 3]
Global Hawk is an example of a program that failed to implement best
practices for developing a new weapon system and encountered
significant cost and schedule problems. It initially began with an
incremental acquisition strategy that approached best practice
standards for technology and design maturity. However, after
development began the Air Force abandoned this strategy and radically
restructured the program to develop and acquire a larger, more advanced
aircraft that would have multimission capabilities (both signals
intelligence and imagery intelligence sensors on the same aircraft).
This new strategy called for concurrent technology development, design,
test, integration, and production in a compressed schedule. As a
result, the program has been rebaselined four times, the development
schedule has been extended by 3 years, and the program has experienced
a substantial contract cost overrun. Development costs alone have
increased over 260 percent. In addition, unit costs have increased to
the point where statutory reporting thresholds were triggered,
requiring DOD to recertify the fundamental program need to
Congress.[Footnote 4]
Impact of Delays on Legacy Systems:
The ACS and Global Hawk programs' failures to develop an executable
acquisition strategy have resulted in significant delays in delivering
required capabilities to the warfighter at the time overall investment
decisions were made. These delays will have significant implications
for legacy systems. Specifically, the services must now make difficult
decisions about investing in legacy systems to keep them operational
until the new systems have been developed and fielded.
Aerial Common Sensor:
The Army's termination of the ACS system development and demonstration
contract could have significant cost, schedule, and performance impacts
on three legacy airborne systems in the ISR portfolio--the Army's
GUARDRAIL Common Sensor aircraft (GRCS) and Airborne Reconnaissance Low
aircraft (ARL) and the Navy's EP-3 aircraft. The Army and the Navy had
planned a phased approach to field ACS and retire the legacy systems
from the inventory with a minimal investment in maintaining legacy
systems. In the fiscal year 2004 budget, the Army had planned for small
investments in GRCS and ARL because it expected to begin replacing them
with ACS in 2009. In that same budget, the Navy's request reflected its
plan to modify the EP-3.[Footnote 5] By the time DOD submitted its
fiscal year 2008 budget, both services recognized the need to keep
legacy systems capable because the ACS development contract was
cancelled. Therefore, the budget included funding to keep these legacy
systems operational for a longer period of time.
Since the termination of the ACS development contract, the program has
reverted to a technology development stage as the Army restructures the
program. ACS is scheduled to restart system development and
demonstration in 2009, 5 years later than the initial development
decision. Although the Army has not established a new date for initial
operating capacity, that date is also likely to slip by 5 years to
fiscal year 2014. The cost to keep GRCS and ARL mission equipment
viable and the platforms airworthy during this time is estimated to be
$562 million between fiscal years 2008 and 2013, an increase of $550
million over what had been previously planned. Without these
improvements, the systems will not remain capable against modern
threats, possibly resulting in a gap in ISR capabilities on the
battlefield. In addition, the platforms could not continue to fly
during this time frame without increased structural and avionic
modifications.
The Navy had planned to replace its EP-3 with ACS and begin fielding
the new system in fiscal year 2012. After the Army terminated the ACS
development contract, the Navy considered remaining part of the Army's
development effort. However, according to Navy officials, the Chief of
Naval Operations directed the Navy to proceed with a separate
development effort, designated the EP-X. The Navy now plans to proceed
with system development and demonstration in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2010. The Navy has not established a date to begin fielding
the new system, but that is not likely to take place before 2017. This
will be a 5-year slip in retiring the oldest EP-3 systems and will make
modifications to those systems necessary so that they can remain in the
field until the Navy achieves full operating capacity for its EPX. The
Navy plans to invest $823 million between fiscal years 2008 and 2013 to
modify the EP-3, an increase of 73 percent over the $475 million that
was previously planned.
Table 4 summarizes the budgetary impact of the delay in developing and
fielding ACS on the legacy systems it was to replace.
Table 4: Fiscal Years 2004 and 2008 President's Budget for the Army's
Guardrail Common Sensor and Airborne Reconnaissance Low and the Navy's
EP-3:
Dollars in millions.
Program and appropriation: GRCS and ARL: Development;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): $ 0;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): $ 22,700;
Increase: $22,700;
Percent: N/A[A].
Program and appropriation: GRCS and ARL: Procurement;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): 11,100;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): 539,300;
Increase: 528,200;
Percent: 4,758.
Program and appropriation: GRCS and ARL: Total;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): $11,100;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): $562,000;
Increase: $550,900;
Percent: 4,963.
Program and appropriation: EP-3: Development;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): $ 0;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): $215,429;
Increase: $215,429;
Percent: N/A[A].
Program and appropriation: EP-3: Procurement;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): 474,600;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): 607,700;
Increase: 133,100;
Percent: 28.
Program and appropriation: EP-3: Total;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): $474,600;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): $823,129;
Increase: $348,529;
Percent: 73.
Program and appropriation: Total GRCS, ARL, and EP-3: Development;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): $ 0;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): $238,129;
Increase: $238,129;
Percent: N/A[A].
Program and appropriation: Total GRCS, ARL, and EP-3: Procurement;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): 485,700;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): 1,147,000;
Increase: 661,300;
Percent: 136.
Program and appropriation: Total GRCS, ARL, and EP-3: Total;
2004 Budget (2004-2009): $485,700;
2008 Budget (2008-2013): $1,385,129;
Increase: $899,429;
Percent: 185.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Percent increase from zero is not calculated.
[End of table]
Global Hawk:
The Air Force plans to replace the U-2 with the Global Hawk, but delays
in the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need to keep the U-
2 in the inventory longer than anticipated. In December 2005, the Air
Force had planned to begin retiring the U-2 in fiscal year 2007 and
complete the retirement by fiscal year 2012. Although the next
configuration of the Global Hawk (with limited signals intelligence
capability) is scheduled for delivery in fiscal year 2009, it will not
have the same capability as the U-2. The version of the Global Hawk
that plans to include a more robust signals intelligence capability is
scheduled to begin deliveries in 2012. The Air Force is now developing
a plan to fully retire the U-2s a year later, in 2013, and at a slower
rate than the 2005 plan. There are no funds in the budget beyond fiscal
year 2006, but Air Force officials stated they intend to fund projects
necessary to keep the U-2 capable. Figure 1 shows the rate at which the
Air Force had planned to retire the U-2 and the revised retirement plan
compared to Global Hawk fielding.
Figure 1: U-2 Retirement and Global Hawk Fielding:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Services' ISR
Programs:
Among the ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases
where the military services have successfully collaborated and achieved
savings of time and resources. The Army estimated that for its Fire
Scout program, buying common components with the Navy Fire Scout
program would save $200 million in development costs alone and that
there were greater opportunities for savings. However, we also found
cases where more collaboration is needed to provide greater
efficiencies and jointness in developing more affordable new systems
and to close gaps in capabilities. These programs include the potential
for greater collaboration between the Navy Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance (BAMS) and the Air Force Global Hawk programs, and the Air
Force Predator and Army Warrior programs.
Army and Navy's Collaboration on Fire Scout Has Achieved Efficiencies:
In 2000, the Army began developing Fire Scout, a vertical takeoff and
landing UAS, as part of the Army's Future Combat Systems.[Footnote 6]
At the same time, the Navy was developing its own Fire Scout program.
Although these programs were not required to work jointly or
collaborate, Army Fire Scout program managers contacted their
counterparts in the Navy to determine whether efficiencies could be
achieved through collaboration.
Officials from the two programs met several times to share information
on their respective aircraft's configuration, performance requirements,
testing, support, and other issues. Initially the requirements for the
two systems were quite different. For example, the Army's UAS had four
rotor blades and a larger engine, while Navy's system had three rotor
blades and a smaller engine. However, after discussions, the Navy
officials determined that the Army's Fire Scout aircraft would meet
their needs and decided to switch to the Army's configuration. Both
services are buying common components, such as the air vehicle and
flight components, under one contract.
An Army program management official estimated that the savings to the
Army in research and development alone would be about $200 million. As
both programs mature, the official believes additional synergies and
savings could be realized through contract price breaks on quantities
and shared test assets, such as air vehicles, support equipment, and
test components. Jointly acquiring common hardware under one contract
will also reduce procurement administrative lead time and permit common
design, tooling, and testing. Finally, future payload development, such
as communications, sensors, and data links, could be procured jointly.
Collaboration on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Could Yield Similar
Efficiencies:
In 2000, the Navy identified a mission need for a broad area maritime
and littoral ISR capability and on the basis of a 2002 analysis of
alternatives, the Navy decided to pursue a manned platform, MMA, with
an unmanned adjunct, BAMS. The Navy subsequently performed an analysis
of alternatives for the BAMS program, which identified several
potential alternatives; foremost among them was the Global Hawk system.
As a risk reduction effort, the Navy funded the Global Hawk Maritime
Demonstration program in 2003. Working through the existing Air Force
contract, the Navy procured two Global Hawk UAS and associated ground
controls and equipment.[Footnote 7] The demonstration program was
expected to leverage the existing Global Hawk system to develop
tactics, training, and techniques for maritime mission applications.
The BAMS program is at a critical juncture. It released a request for
proposals in February 2007 and plans to proceed with system development
and demonstration in October 2007. If the Global Hawk (or another
existing system like the Air Force Reaper) is selected, there are
opportunities for the Navy to work with the Air Force and take
advantage of its knowledge on the existing platform. Through
collaboration, the Navy could leverage knowledge early in the
acquisition process and avoid or reduce costs for design, new tooling,
and manufacturing, and streamline contracting and acquisition
processes.
Collaboration Slow to Occur on Warrior and Predator:
Despite similarities in the Predator and Warrior programs, the Air
Force and Army have repeatedly resisted collaboration. The Air Force‘s
Predator is a legacy program that has been operational since 1995. Its
persistent surveillance/full motion video capability continues to be a
valued asset to the warfighter. However, when the Army began in 2001 to
define requirements for the Warrior, a system similar to the Predator,
it did not fully explore potential synergies and efficiencies with the
Air Force program. The Army did not perform an analysis of alternatives
to explore other options to a new system; it cited the urgent need of
battlefield commanders for the capability. In lieu of an analysis of
alternatives, the Army conducted a full and open competition and
awarded the contract to the same contractor producing the Predator.
Although the requirements for the Warrior were subsequently validated,
reviewing officials from the Air Force and the Joint Staff raised
concerns about duplication of an existing capability.
Both Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have
raised concerns about duplication between the two systems. During
question and answer sessions at various Congressional hearings, members
of Congress sought an explanation of the need for both systems. In
addition, OSD commissioned an industrial capabilities study to assess
whether the contractor for the Predator and the Warrior had sufficient
capacity to produce both systems at the same time. While the study did
not find any major production constraints, it concluded that the two
systems were 80 percent common. In January 2006, the Army and Air Force
agreed to consider cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems.
However, progress to date in implementing the agreement has been
limited due partly to differences in operating concepts for the two
services. Unlike the Air Force, the Army does not use rated pilots; it
relies on technicians and automated takeoff and landing equipment. In
addition, the Army uses direct-line-of-sight communications, while the
Air Force uses beyond-line-of-sight communications. Despite these
inherent differences, there are still many areas available for
collaboration, including airframes, ground stations, and
equipment.[Footnote 8]
The Air Force and the Army are currently working to identify program
synergies in a three-phased approach:
* First, the Air Force will acquire and test two of the more modern
Warrior airframes.
* Second, the two services will compare their requirements for ground
control stations and automated takeoff and landing.
* Finally, the Army and Air Force plan to compare concepts of operation
and training requirements for additional synergies.
To date, the Army has coordinated the proposed approach through the
Vice Chief of Staff level, but the agreement has not yet been approved
by the Department of Army. The Air Force is still working to resolve
comments and concerns at lower organizational levels. In the interim,
the Air Force has greatly increased the number of Predator aircraft it
plans to procure annually to meet the high demand from the warfighter
for this capability, increased in part by the war on terror. Instead of
buying 7 Predator aircraft per year, as the Air Force had initially
planned, it now plans to buy 24 aircraft in both 2007 and 2008, as well
as another 22 aircraft as stated in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental
request. In total, the Air Force plans to buy 160 Predators between
fiscal years 2008 and 2013.[Footnote 9]
The Air Force is currently seeking authority to become the executive
agent for UAS. This would allow it to have decision authority over
these type of medium and high altitude UAS. As a part of its efforts,
in March 2007 the Air Force began a comprehensive study of all existing
and planned (airborne and space-based) ISR systems. As executive agent
the Air Force believes it could improve the allocation of UAS, avoid
duplication of separate service acquisition efforts by centralizing
procurement, standardize downlinks, and control burgeoning bandwidth
requirements.[Footnote 10] However, the Air Force still intends to
procure two Warriors for testing, but details of a potential
collaboration with the Army remain uncertain.
Timing on the Army and Air Force's collaboration is critical: The
longer the services wait to collaborate, the lower the return. The
opportunity to achieve synergies in design, manufacturing, and support
will greatly diminish as the Warrior matures and more and more
Predators are added to the inventory.
DOD Efforts to Improve Collaboration:
The environment in which DOD operates has changed significantly since
2001. In recognition of this, the department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review described a vision that focuses on defining ISR needs based on
the type of intelligence or sensor rather than on the platform that
carried the sensor. Specifically, the department's vision for ISR is to
establish persistent surveillance over the battlefield and define ISR
sensor needs in terms of the type of intelligence needed rather than
the air, surface, or space platform in which they operate. Accordingly,
the department initiated a number of studies aimed at reviewing ISR
requirements and developing solutions either through new development
programs or changes in current systems (see app III for a brief
description of these studies). While most of the studies have been
completed, as of March 2007, DOD had released the results of only one-
-the Joint ISR study, which validated the requirement and confirmed the
continued need for the Army's ACS program. The results of the other
studies have not been released outside of DOD, but according to DOD
officials, several were briefed to senior leadership within OSD and the
Joint Staff.
One study DOD is undertaking has some promise to better manage the
requirements for future ISR capabilities across DOD by applying a joint
capability portfolio management concept to acquisition planning. This
pilot program is a test case to enable DOD to develop and manage ISR
capabilities across the entire department--rather than by military
service or individual program--and by doing so, to improve the
interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability
redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. However,
the portfolios are largely advisory and will, as a first step, provide
input to decisions made through the acquisition and budgeting process.
At this point the capability portfolio managers have not been given
direct authority to manage fiscal resources and make investment
decisions. Without portfolios in which managers have authority and
control over resources, DOD is at risk of continuing to develop and
acquire systems in a stovepiped manner, and of not knowing whether its
systems are being developed within available resources.[Footnote 11]
In addition to the various studies previously initiated, two more
studies were recently commissioned in February and March of 2007. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
requested that the Defense Science Board establish a task force to
assess whether current and planned ISR systems provide sufficient
support for U.S. military forces. The objectives of the study are to
(1) determine what improvements are needed for ISR systems, (2) examine
the balance and mix of sensors to identify gaps and redundancies, and
(3) identify vulnerabilities, potential problems, and consistency with
DOD network centered strategy. The Secretary also asked the task force
to review the findings of previous studies as part of the assessment.
In addition, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force recently began a
comprehensive study of all existing and planned airborne and space-
based ISR systems to determine their efficiencies and inefficiencies.
The effort includes developing a plan to increase interdependence of
medium-and high-altitude UAS and establish the Air Force as the
executive agent for all UAS in those regimes. A specific date for
reporting the results of these two studies has not been established.
Conclusions:
Many ISR systems suffer from the same cost, schedule, and performance
problems as other DOD acquisition programs by failing to establish a
good business case or capture critical product knowledge at key
decision points before moving forward in the acquisition process. In
some cases, the outcomes have been costly as legacy systems, once
planned for an earlier retirement, must now stay in the inventory,
requiring additional unplanned investments to keep them relevant and
operationally ready until a new capability can be fielded. The funds
spent to keep these systems viable represent opportunity costs that
could have been used for other DOD priorities. GAO has made numerous
recommendations in recent years to improve the acquisition process and
get more predictable outcomes in major acquisition programs and these
would apply to the development of ISR systems.
Ideally, because of the warfighter's universal needs for ISR
information, determining requirements and planning for ISR acquisition
programs should be based on a joint process that occurs at the
enterprise level in DOD to ensure economies and efficiencies based on
effective joint solutions to the maximum extent possible. DOD has
various studies in process that appear to have this as a goal for ISR,
but for now it is not routinely happening. The portfolio management
pilot program could potentially improve how DOD determines requirements
and sets up new acquisition programs for ISR capabilities. However, the
portfolios are largely advisory and the managers have no direct
authority to make investment decisions. Without authority and control
over investments there is the risk that nothing will change. At best
for now, there are some acquisition programs that through their own
initiative have garnered benefits from collaborative efforts. Others
still choose a stovepiped approach to provide a unique system for the
specific military service's needs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
While DOD has numerous ISR studies, either recently completed or
ongoing, there have been no substantive actions recently implemented to
gain greater jointness in ISR acquisition programs. Therefore, we
recommend that DOD:
1. Develop and implement an integrated enterprise-level investment
strategy approach that is based on a joint assessment of warfighting
needs and a full set of potential and viable alternative solutions,
considering cross-service solutions including new acquisitions and
modifications to legacy systems within realistic and affordable budget
projections for DOD. This strategy should draw on the results of
ongoing studies, like the portfolio management pilot program, but
should include the necessary authority and controls needed to ensure a
single point of accountability for resource decisions.
2. Report to the defense committees by August 1, 2007, the results of
the ISR studies and identify the specific plans and actions needed and
intended to make joint acquisition decisions in ISR programs and
improve the way it plans, buys, organizes, manages, and executes its
ISR acquisition programs and operations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments appear in appendix IV.
DOD agreed that it can report the interim status of ongoing ISR studies
to the committees by August 1, 2007, but suggested that delaying this
reporting until December 31, 2007, would allow the department to
include the results of two pertinent studies now ongoing. We believe a
full reporting in December 2007 would be useful if it includes DOD‘s
detailed plans on how it will achieve an integrated enterprise-level
investment strategy for ISR including planned changes to policy and
guidance, organization, and points of authority and responsibility.
However, we believe an interim reporting to the committees on the
results and planned outcomes from completed studies should be provided
to the committees by August 2007.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and implement an
integrated enterprise-level investment strategy for ISR and stated that
it thought this process was well under way in existing department
processes. However, it non-concurred with having a single point of
authority and control for ISR resource decisions and provided a number
of arguments as to why sufficient information was not included in the
report to support this specific part of the recommendation. We continue
to believe that our recommendation for an enterprise-level investment
strategy with a single point of accountability for resources decisions
is necessary to maximize to the full extent efficiency and
effectiveness in acquiring major acquisition systems. The Defense
Science Board Summer Study on Transformation reported in February 2006
came to similar conclusions: that the Secretary of Defense should
assemble a small direct-reporting cell to create and maintain a metric-
based, multiyear plan that specifies what is to be done, when, with
what resources, and with what capability output.[Footnote 12] It
concluded the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics needs authority over architectures, resources, and
personnel. Our other review efforts of the acquisition and requirements
processes continue to show that DOD has not sufficiently improved the
process to ensure cross-service redundancies are reduced or eliminated
where possible. Therefore, without this single point of authority,
limited defense resources are still not optimally used to develop and
produce weapon systems. Our comments below address the specific
arguments presented in DOD‘s response to this report.
We believe that many of the ongoing initiatives to achieve a greater
integrated investment strategy approach for ISR are steps in the right
direction but are concerned that they will not go far enough to address
the problems that have occurred in DOD acquisitions for some time now.
DOD suggests that the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) has been implemented to identify joint warfighting
capabilities. We agree that the JCIDS emphasizes a more joint approach
to identifying and prioritizing warfighting needs. However, as reported
in our March 30, 2007 report, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio
Management Approach to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD‘s
Acquisition Outcomes, this system is still not working as planned.
Despite the provisions of JCIDS, needs continue to be based on
investment decision-making processes that do not function together to
ensure DOD pursues needs that are not redundant. The Warrior decision
is an example where the service chose to ignore the recommendations of
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and proceeded with a unique
program.
DOD stated that its Portfolio Management Experiment supports this
enterprise-level strategy, but it is still a pilot program and actual
changes to the processes have not been identified to show how it will
ensure more responsible and joint decision making for major acquisition
programs. As pointed out in the report, while this seems like a good
first step, portfolios are largely advisory and managers have not been
given direct authority to manage fiscal resources and make investment
decisions. Without this authority, DOD continues to risk stovepiped
solutions that may overlap and not be affordable within available
resources. Furthermore, it seems within the last few years the real
input from DOD leadership comes at the end of the year, right before
the budget is supposed to go to Congress. In December each year a
Program Budget document is issued by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense that has included radical changes to major acquisition programs
but without the transparency as to the detailed analysis and integrated
investment planning that should have taken place to make these major
investment decisions.
In its response, DOD also states that a number of successes have
occurred within the Unmanned Aerial Systems portfolio managed by the
Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. While there may be some successful UAS programs, there are
also examples of large, important programs that have significantly
exceeded cost estimates and delivery dates. We believe that having a
UAS portfolio is contrary to the direction of the Quadrennial Defense
Review to get away from ’platform“-based decisions and move toward
’sensor“-based decisions. The Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board, as part of the JCIDS process, seems to be a more
representative grouping of ISR programs than the UAS portfolio. We
believe if properly organized based more on ’sensor“ requirements, then
it would not be necessary to have both for ISR investment decision
making.
DOD states that we did not consider the department‘s ongoing efforts to
develop UAS and ISR Roadmaps that represent, according to them,
enterprise-level strategies. While we did not review these as part of
this review, GAO has ongoing work under a different engagement that is
looking at the ISR Roadmap. The initial conclusions from that review
were presented to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces in testimony on April 19, 2007.[Footnote 13] GAO testified that
the ISR Roadmap was a noteworthy step in examining ISR capabilities but
it does not represent a comprehensive vision for the ISR enterprise or
define strategy to guide future investments. Furthermore, the ISR
Roadmap is managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, while the UAS Roadmap is managed by the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
This difference emphasizes the need for a single point for ISR
investment decisions within OSD.
Finally, DOD states that the report does not recognize ground component
requirements and operating concepts for multiple joint missions and
that it did not recognize the benefits of acquisition programs with
unique requirements or the benefits of competition. We believe the
report, as it relates to the decision to buy a unique platform for the
Warrior, did recognize the difference in how the two services planned
to operate the platforms. However, we do not believe that it
necessarily excuses DOD to buy two different platforms to satisfy the
warfighter‘s expressed ISR requirement. Furthermore, we believe it has
been the unique stovepiped solutions of the military services that have
over time created unnecessary duplication and inefficient use of
limited defense funding. As to competition, GAO has consistently
expressed its belief that with proper controls and oversight
competition is beneficial to price, reliability, performance, and
contractor responsiveness in buying major weapon systems.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov:
If you have any questions about this report or need additional
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report were Michael Hazard, Assistant Director; Dayna Foster;
Rae Ann Sapp; Michael Aiken; and Karen Sloan.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report examines the Department of Defense (DOD) development and
acquisition of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) systems. The primary focus of this work is to identify practices
and policies that lead to successful fielding of weapon systems to the
warfighter at the right time and for the right price. Specifically, our
objectives were to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential
synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of
any increases or delays on legacy systems; and (2) evaluate the
effectiveness of ISR investment decisions. Our work was conducted
between June 2006 and April 2007 and in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
We selected 20 major airborne ISR programs in technology or systems
development, already fielded but undergoing significant upgrade, or
operating in the field but due to be replaced by a system in
development; and one space-based program in technology
development.[Footnote 14] We considered a program in development to be
major if DOD designated it as a major defense acquisition program or
would be likely do so at Milestone B.[Footnote 15] We considered
systems already operating in the field as major if they played a role
in current operations.
For the systems we selected, we obtained information on current or
projected operational capabilities, acquisition plans, cost estimates,
schedules, and estimated budgets. We analyzed the data to determine
whether pairs of similar systems shared common operating concepts,
capabilities, physical configurations, or primary contractors. We
reviewed acquisition plans for programs in development to determine
whether they had established sound business cases or if not, where the
business case was weak. We reviewed cost and schedule estimates to
determine whether they had increased, and where possible, identified
reasons for the increases. For systems in development that experienced
a schedule delay, we determined whether the delay had an impact on the
legacy system to be replaced and where possible, determined the cost or
capability impact of the delay. We assessed the reliability and
validity of agency-official-provided and third party data by discussing
the data with officials from multiple agencies at varying levels of
responsibility. We also discussed the results of our reviews and
analyses with program office officials; Army, Navy, and Air Force
acquisition and requirements officials; the office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the office of the Joint
Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
[End of section]
Appendix II: System Descriptions:
Aerial Common Sensor:
The Army is planning to develop the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) as an
airborne ISR and target acquisition system and is designing it to
provide timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component
commander. The platform will be a large, piloted business jet and will
carry a suite of sensors to collect information on electronics and
communications signals, optical and infrared images, measures and
signatures, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images. Four onboard
intelligence analysts will operate the mission equipment, but with the
appropriate connectivity, the system can perform its mission with just
the flight crew. The ACS will replace the Guardrail Common Sensor and
the Airborne Reconnaissance Low airborne systems and will coexist with
current systems until it is phased in and current systems retire. The
Army has not established a date for initial operating capacity. ACS was
to have replaced the Navy EP-3 as well. However, the Navy recently
decided to pursue its own development program and expects to enter
system development in 2010.
Airborne Reconnaissance Low:
Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) is composed of communications
intelligence and imagery intelligence sensors and onboard operators in
a piloted aircraft. The current inventory includes two configurations;
one with a complete communications sensor package capable of
intercepting and locating radio emissions and providing reports to
appropriate commanders and intelligence-processing centers on the
ground. The more capable version combines communications and electro-
optical (EO) sensors, and SAR with moving target indicator onto one
aircraft. The ARL will eventually be replaced by ACS.
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload:
The Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) is a signals
intelligence (SIGINT) sensor being developed for use on multiple Air
Force platforms. It is a part of Air Force efforts to modernize its
SIGINT processes by developing an Air Force-wide capability for
performing SIGINT. ASIP sensors will be developed for use on the legacy
U-2 and Rivet Joint manned aircraft. It will also be used on legacy and
developmental unmanned aerial system (UAS) to include the MQ-1/MQ-9
(Predator/ Reaper) and RQ-4B Global Hawk. The details about its
capabilities are classified.
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Aircraft System:
The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS is scheduled to begin
systems development in October 2007. The BAMS system will be land-based
and provide a high-altitude, persistent ISR capability to the fleet and
joint forces commander. BAMS will conduct continuous maritime and
littoral surveillance of targets. As part of the Navy's maritime patrol
and reconnaissance force, it will operate independently or in
conjunction with the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and EP-3/EPX
signals intelligence platform. Because the BAMS has not yet begun
system development, vehicle design and sensor payload decisions have
not been finalized, but will include active imaging radar, passive
optical imaging, and limited signals collection capability. Its
projected initial operational capability is 2013.
E-10A:
The E-10A Program originally consisted of three primary elements: the
aircraft, the radar, and the battle management command and control
system. The aircraft proposed for the E-1OA is the Boeing 767 jet
aircraft. The radar is to be the Multi-platform Radar Technology
Insertion Program, which uses a SAR to provide a focused Air-Moving
Target Indicator (AMTI) and for Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI).
The program has been reduced from a technology development program to a
demonstration effort. The demonstration effort is focused on assessing
the newer radar, which will also be used on the Global Hawk UAS.
However, the Air Force recently canceled the demonstration effort.
EP-3:
The EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics System (ARIES)
II is the Navy's only land-based SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft. It is
a legacy aircraft based on the Navy's Orion P-3 airframe and provides
fleet and theater commanders worldwide with near-real-time tactical
SIGINT. It uses sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas to
perform its mission. The Navy had planned to replace this aircraft with
the Army ACS because the EP-3 airframe is aging and has a limited life
span. Drawdown of the EP-3E aircraft was scheduled to begin in the 2012
time frame but may be extended. Delays in ACS development contributed
to the Navy's recent decision to pursue its own replacement for the EP-
3.
EPX:
The EPX is the Navy's replacement for its aging EP-3. In late summer
2006, after a study on joint ISR requirements had been completed, the
Navy and Army concluded that there were significant requirements
differences between the two services. As a result, the Chief of Naval
Operations directed the Navy to recapitalize the EP-3 to provide multi-
intelligence capability. While requirements for the EPX have not been
fully established, it will be a multi-intelligence platform and will
include communications and electronics intelligence capability, optics,
and radar. EPX is part of the maritime patrol and MMA and BAMS.
Fire Scout (Army):
The Army Fire Scout is being developed as one of the UAS within the
Future Combat Systems. As part of this system of systems, the Fire
Scout is designed to support air-ground operations and reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition missions. It will employ SAR with
moving target indicator, EO sensors and a laser rangefinder/designator,
a tactical signals intelligence package, and the joint tactical radio
system communications suite. The Fire Scout is designed to take off and
land in unimproved areas to directly support brigade combat team
operations. Its initial operating capability is tied to the Future
Combat Systems, which is planned for December 2014.
Fire Scout (Navy):
The Navy Fire Scout, or the vertical takeoff and landing unmanned
aerial vehicle system, (VTUAV), entered systems development in February
2000. The Fire Scout is designed to provide ISR as well as targeting
data and damage assessments to tactical users. It is capable of
autonomous vertical takeoff and landing on aircraft carriers as well as
unprepared landing zones. The Fire Scout includes EO/IR sensors, a
laser designator system, and a common automatic recovery system. The
modular payload approach also includes the tactical control system,
tactical common datalink, and a mine detection system. Its initial
operating capability is planned for October 2008.
Joint Surveillance, Target Attack, and Radar System:
Joint Surveillance, Target Attack, and Radar System (STARS) is a joint
Air Force and Army wide area surveillance attack radar system designed
to detect, track, and classify and support the attack of moving and
stationary targets. Joint STARS is a legacy platform first use being in
the 1991 Gulf War. It has been used extensively in support of
Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. The Joint STARS fleet of
aircraft is currently being modified with new communication and
navigation equipment, and the Air Force is developing advanced mission
capabilities and identifying low-cost emerging technologies for future
use. In addition, the Air Force intends to replace Joint STARS engines
to make the platform more reliable and reduce operating and support
costs. Finally, the Air Force had originally intended to place Multi-
platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) on Joint STARS
but decided not to when it chose to go forward with the E-10A, which
was subsequently canceled.
Global Hawk:
The Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance UAS designed to
provide near-real-time high-resolution ISR imagery. It employs a SAR,
GMTI, and EO/IR sensors. After a successful technology demonstration,
the Global Hawk entered development and limited production in March
2001. Production of the initial seven (RQ-4A) aircraft is complete. The
larger, more capable version (RQ-4B) includes an advanced signals
intelligence payload and improved radar technologies. Initial
operational capability is planned for September 2007.
GUARDRAIL Common Sensor:
GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) is an airborne signals intelligence
collection location and exploitation system in the current inventory
that provides near-real-time signals intelligence and targeting
information to tactical commanders. The system integrates a
communications intelligence sensor and precision geolocation of
signals. The platform is a small, piloted aircraft with no onboard
analysts. The Army plans on eventually replacing GRCS with the ACS.
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft:
The Navy's MMA is part of the broad area maritime family of systems.
The MMA was initially planned to interoperate with the BAMS UAS and the
ACS. The MMA is intended to replace the Navy's P-3C Orion system. Its
primary role will be that of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare,
and it will have some ISR capability. The Navy plans for the aircraft
to achieve initial operational capability in 2013.
Multi-platform Radar Technology Insertion Program:
The MP-RTIP is a family of scalable, advanced radars that are being
developed for the RQ-4B Global Hawk and the E-10A. The Air Force funded
the sensor development under the E-10A budget line as a separate item.
The radar is currently in system development and demonstration.
However, in February 2007, the Air Force removed funding for the E-10A
radar development program starting in fiscal year 2008. The Air Force
still intends to develop the radar for the Global Hawk and begin
fielding the sensor by 2011.
Predator:
The Predator is a medium-altitude long-endurance UAS. The Predator
began as an advanced concept technology demonstration program and has
been operational since 1995. Originally designed as a persistent ISR
platform, it was modified in 2001 to carry two Hellfire missiles. The
Predator employs EO/IR sensors, laser designator, day/night cameras
that produce full motion video of the battlefield, and can be
configured to carry SAR. Used as an armed reconnaissance system, the
Predator also has a multi-spectral targeting system with Hellfire
missile targeting capability. The Air Force has begun an effort to
develop and integrate signals intelligence capability on the Predator.
To accelerate this effort, the Air Force increased this budget by a
factor of almost 6 in fiscal year 2008.
Reaper:
The Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole medium- to high-
altitude endurance UAS. Its primary mission is a persistent hunter-
killer for small ground mobile or fixed targets. Its secondary mission
is to gather ISR data. It will use EO/IR sensors, laser
rangefinder/designator, and SAR, and will carry ordnance such as the
Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Hellfire missiles. The Reaper entered
systems development in February 2004. Its initial operating capability
is planned for 2009. The Air Force has begun to examine the feasibility
of incorporating signals intelligence capability on the Reaper.
Rivet Joint:
Rivet Joint (RJ) is a reconnaissance aircraft in the current inventory
that supports theater-and national-level consumers with near-real-time
on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination
capabilities. The aircraft is an extensively modified C-135 with a
suite of onboard sensors, which allows the mission crew to detect,
identify, and geolocate signals throughout the electromagnetic
spectrum. The mission crew can then forward gathered information in a
variety of formats to a wide range of consumers via the system's
extensive communications suite. The interior seats 34 people, including
the cockpit crew, electronic warfare officers, intelligence operators,
and in-flight maintenance technicians. The first versions of the system
were deployed in 1964, but have undergone extensive upgrades to both
the platform and mission equipment. The Air Force does not have any
plans to replace the system.
Space Radar:
Space Radar (SR) is an Air Force-led, joint DOD and intelligence
community program to develop a satellite to find, identify, and monitor
moving or stationary targets under all weather conditions on a nearly
continuous basis across large swaths of the earth's surface. As
envisioned, SR would generate volumes of radar imagery for
transmissions to ground-, ship-, air-, and space-based systems. Initial
capability is planned for 2017.
U-2:
The U-2 provides continuous day-and-night, high-altitude, all-weather
surveillance and reconnaissance in direct support of US and allied
ground forces. It is a single-engine and single-seat ISR aircraft. The
U-2 is capable of collecting multisensor, photo, EO/IR, and radar
imagery as well as collecting SIGINT data. It can downlink all data
except wet film. The Air Force proposed to begin retiring the U-2 in
2007. However, Congress disagreed with the decision and prevented
retirement in 2007. Congress also directed the Air Force to first
certify that the capability was no longer required. In March 2007, the
Air Force revised the schedule from removing the U-2 from the inventory
and proposes doing so at a slower rate than before beginning in fiscal
year 2008. The Air Force is not requesting funding for the U-2 past
2007, but it is not clear whether the Air Force has provided the
certification that Congress requested.
Warrior:
The extended range, multipurpose Warrior UAS began systems development
in April 2005. It will operate with manned aviation assets such as the
Apache helicopter and perform missions including reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition/attack. It is being developed to
satisfy the Army's requirement for a UAS that is dedicated to the
direct operational control of its field commanders. The Warrior is
designed with an automatic takeoff and landing system, full motion
video capability, tactical signals intelligence payload, multirole
tactical common data link, EO sensors, SAR/ moving target indicator,
Ethernet communications capability, and redundant avionics. Its initial
operational capability is planned for 2010.
[End of section]
Appendix III: ISR Studies Under Way or Recently Completed:
Program Decision Memorandum III, dated December 2005 directed that
several studies be undertaken.[Footnote 16] Those studies included the
following.
Joint ISR Replacement Study:
The Army and Navy, in coordination with the Air Force, Joint Staff,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) and Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), were
directed to conduct a study of joint multi-intelligence airborne ISR
needs, focusing on trade-offs among manned and unmanned airborne
platforms and how those trade-offs translate into requirements for
recapitalizing the Army, Navy, and Air Force legacy systems. The
participants were directed to identify any resources in addition to the
fiscal year 2006 President's budget program of record to sustain the
Army and Navy aircraft until they can be replaced. The study was
completed in late summer of 2006 and concluded that the requirements
for the ACS were still valid.
U-2 Retirement Study:
The Strategic Command, in coordination with the Air Force; Navy; Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)); USD(I); and PA&E were directed to review the Air Force's
Global Hawk acquisition and U-2 retirement plan and determine if high-
attitude, long-endurance, multi-intelligence ISR requirements will be
satisfied during the transition. The findings were briefed within OSD
in early fall 2006.
Airborne ISR Requirements:
USD(I), in conjunction with the Joint Staff, services, and PA&E was
directed to develop a methodology to migrate to a capability-centric
focus, instead of a platform-centric focus, for determining combatant
commander and joint task force airborne ISR requirements. Results were
briefed within OSD in early fall 2006.
These studies were recently commissioned:
Optimization of ISR Capabilities:
On March 5, 2007, the Air Force Chief of Staff announced the start of a
comprehensive study of all existing and planned ISR systems--both
airborne and spaced-based--to consider the efficiencies and
inefficiencies in the theater and global warfighting templates. As part
of this broad effort, he advocated that the Air Force immediately
become the executive agent for medium-and high-altitude UAS. The
expected benefits from the study and executive agent concept include
improving distribution of intelligence assets across all theaters and
components, avoiding duplication of acquisition efforts, standardizing
UAS operations and downlinks, and controlling ballooning bandwidth
requirements. The results of the study will include a comprehensive
plan to optimize ISR capabilities, due in late April 2007.
Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence:
In February 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics requested that the Defense Science Board
establish a task force to assess whether current and planned ISR
systems provide sufficient support for U.S. military forces.[Footnote
17] The primary objective is to determine what improvements are needed
in carrying out the tasks associated with ISR systems. A second
objective is to examine the mix and balance of ISR sensors to identify
gaps and redundancies. The task force was also asked to examine current
and planned systems for vulnerabilities, new opportunities and
potential problems, and consistency with department strategy for
networked operations. Finally, the memorandum also asked the task force
to review the results of a number of studies, initiated by OSD and
completed in the fall of 2006, following the completion of the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review. Several of these studies are summarized in
this appendix. The tasking memorandum did not include time frames for
completion of the study or for reporting the results.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
6000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
Networks And Information Integration:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street NW:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on draft report "Defense
Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DoD's Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems" (GAO-07-578) dated April 5,
2007.
The Department agrees with the first recommendation to develop and
implement an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy, but
believes this process is well underway in existing Department
processes. The Department non-concurs that the GAO has provided
sufficient analysis and evidence to recommend a single point of
authority and controls for ISR resource decisions and does not agree
with that portion of the recommendation.
The Department agrees that it can report interim status on the progress
of the ISR Portfolio Management Pilot program to the committees by
August 1, 2007. There are two pertinent efforts, "Optimization of ISR
Capabilities" and "Task Force on Integrating Sensor Collected
Intelligence," that will not complete work in time to provide input to
the defense committees. The Department recommends a suspense date of
December 31, 2007 to permit integration of study findings.
It is unfortunate that an exit brief with the Department did not occur
prior to release of this draft report. The Department strives to be
transparent when working with the GAO and would like the GAO to ensure
that an exit interview takes place for any future reports.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John R. Landon:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3ISR & IT Acquisition):
Enclosures:
1. DoD Factual Comments:
2. DoD Response to Recommendations:
DoD Response to Recommendations From GAO Draft Report (Apr 5, 2007) GAO
CODE 120559/GAO-07-578 "Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies
Possible for DoD's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Systems"
Recommendation 1: Develop and implement an integrated enterprise-level
investment strategy approach that is based on a joint assessment of war-
fighting needs and a full set of potential and viable alternative
solutions, considering cross-service solutions including new
acquisitions and modifications to legacy systems within realistic and
affordable budget projections for DOD. This strategy should draw on the
results of ongoing studies, like the portfolio management pilot
program, but should include the necessary authority and controls needed
to ensure a single point of accountability for resource decisions.
Response To Recommendation 1: The Department agrees with your
recommendation to develop and implement an integrated enterprise-level
investment strategy, but believes this process is well underway in
existing DoD processes. However, the Department does not believe that
GAO has provided sufficient analysis and evidence to support the
recommendation to establish a single point of accountability for
resource decisions. Specifically,
The Department agrees that integrating an ISR enterprise level
investment strategy based on a Joint assessment and ongoing studies is
critical, but this work is already underway as noted in the GAO report,
and OSD makes portfolio adjustments as necessary through Program Budget
Decision and Program Decision Memorandum actions.
* The Department's current Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process has been implemented to identify
joint war- fighting capabilities.
- The draft report does not offer observations regarding this process.
* The Department's Capability Portfolio Management Experiment supports
this approach in that:
- It emphasizes resource decisions based on trade-offs within a given
portfolio, as determined by the OSD portfolio manager.
- Portfolio managers review capabilities across their functional
enterprise, prioritize these capabilities according to war-fighter
needs, and recommend to Department leadership key trade-offs-within the
portfolio, not within each organization, which would allow the
effective use of resources.
- The process to accomplish portfolio realignment is through OSD
decision memorandum; there is no intent to delegate this authority to a
Service or other government agency.
The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD AT&L) has been very successful managing
unmanned aerial system (UAS) development and acquisition with this
portfolio model. With support from the Military Services, the
Department has coordinated development and procurement of several
Military Service specific UAS programs to meet joint Military Service
requirements, including Raven B (Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and
Special Operations Command); Shadow (Army and Marine Corps); Fire Scout
(Navy and Army). Currently efforts are underway to further increase
cooperation between the Air Force and Army in the Predator and Warrior
Programs. Air Force recently utilized Army tooling to produce the first
two Air Force Block X airframes (Warrior common) and previously, the
Air Force permitted the Army to use tooling to produce the Army
extended range I-GNATS and Warrior-As (both MQ-1 Predator airframes).
Additionally, the Air Force loaned significant spares and sensors to
the Army to support combat operations.
The report does not offer sufficient evidence that a single point of
authority, beyond those currently belonging to the DEPSECDEF and
SECDEF, is required for resource decisions.
* The report concluded that these programs should consider developing a
business case and critical system knowledge (pg 7); and the report
acknowledges the Department currently has a directive addressing this
approach (pg 8; DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of Defense
Acquisition System, May 2002).
* Oversight of these processes currently falls under the Department's
single acquisition authority.
The report did not comment on the efforts currently underway within the
Department on consolidating ISR development efforts found in the UAV
Roadmap and other ISR roadmaps. The Department is utilizing an
enterprise-level strategy for Unmanned Systems technology which
supports several mission areas including the ISR mission area. This
roadmap identifies war-fighter needs for multiple mission areas
including missions falling in the ISR domain. The roadmap also
identifies technology trends and developments for areas such as
processors, communications, platforms, and payloads. Finally,
integrated capability and mission roadmaps are provided to identify
technology and schedule options for meeting the various war-fighter
mission needs. This technology roadmap is being expanded in 2007 to
incorporate all Unmanned Systems in a single roadmap, to better support
integrated war- fighter needs independent of individual Military
Service or system capability. The current and future roadmap, UAS and
Unmanned Systems Roadmap, also support the USD(I) ISR mission roadmap
as many individual Military Service ISR systems transition to Unmanned
Systems.
The report does not recognize ground component requirements and CONOPS
for multiple joint missions. This is made clear on page 14 of the
report: "Although limited progress has been made, the services continue
to have different concepts of operation and requirements more than a
year after discussions began."
The report did not recognize the benefits of acquisition programs with
unique requirements and the benefit of competition.
Recommendation 2: Report to the defense committees by August 1, 2007,
the results of the ISR studies and identify the specific plans and
actions needed and intended to make joint acquisition decisions in ISR
programs and improve the way it plans, buys, organizes, manages, and
executives its ISR acquisition programs and operations.
Response To Recommendation 2: Concur. The Department can report interim
status to the committees on the progress of the ISR Portfolio
Management Pilot program by August l, 2007.-There are two pertinent
efforts, "Optimization of ISR Capabilities" sponsored by the Air Force
and the Defense Science Board's "Task Force on Integrating Sensor-
Collected Intelligence" that are not scheduled to complete work in time
to provide input to the defense committees. The Department recommends
moving the suspense date to December 31, 2007 to ensure adequate
analysis and integration of study findings.
[End of section]
(120559)
FOOTNOTES
[1] The additional funding does not include DOD or service requests for
supplemental funding in fiscal year 2007 or 2008.
[2] All of these 13 programs are in technology development, or systems
development and demonstration as defined by DOD Instruction 5000.2,
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). The purpose
of development is to reduce technology risk and to determine the
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system.
[3] DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System
(May 12, 2003).
[4] 10 USC 2433 requires the Secretary concerned to report to Congress
when a program's unit cost increases by at least 15 percent over the
current baseline estimate or increases by 30 percent over the original
baseline estimate and requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out an
assessment of the program and provide written certification to Congress
when a program's unit cost increases by at least 25 percent over the
current estimate or increases by 50 percent over the original baseline
estimate.
[5] The Navy's fiscal year 2004 budget did not include any funding for
ACS because it was submitted before the decision to jointly acquire ACS
with the Army.
[6] The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS), a family of systems that
will equip the Army's transformational combat brigades, are composed of
unmanned ground and air vehicles (including the Fire Scout), networked
combat and sustainment systems, and unattended sensors and munitions.
FCS is about half-way through its development.
[7] The Navy acquired two older (RQ-4A) Global Hawk aircraft for the
demonstration. These aircraft were configured with radar software that
incorporates maritime search and inverse SAR modes.
[8] The Air Force requires pilots who are formally trained and rated
according to Air Force aeronautical standards. These standards include
several levels of pilot training, experience, and military flying time.
In contrast, the Army uses highly trained enlisted operators. Since
most of its unmanned systems have automatic takeoff and landing
capability, the Army does not require rated pilots to operate them.
[9] These quantities do not include those to be acquired as a result of
additional funding provided by Congress in earlier years or quantities
associated with supplemental requests.
[10] Bandwidth refers to the available frequencies to support the
flight of a UAS and is needed to support systems that control the
flight of certain unmanned aircraft, to transmit data collected by
payload sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers.
Because UAS and other weapons or communications systems, including
manned aircraft, often operate on the same frequency, certain
frequencies can become congested and interference can occur.
[11] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD‘s Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[12] DOD, Defense Science Board Summer Study on Transformation: A
Progress Assessment, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2006).
[13] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD‘s Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development, GAO-07-596T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2007).
[14] The Joint Staff identifies 31 core ISR systems; our review
included 14 of them. We added two programs that are developing payloads
for ISR systems and three more systems that were in development but
were not part of the core group as of August 2006 when we established
our list.
[15] Milestone B is the initiation of an acquisition program as defined
by DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System
(May 12, 2003).
[16] Several other studies were commissioned but information related to
them is classified and cannot be summarized here.
[17] The Defense Science Board is composed of members designated from
civilian life by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics) and advises the Secretary of Defense; the
Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition
process, and other matters of special interest to the DOD.
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