Military Base Closures
Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations
Gao ID: GAO-07-641 May 16, 2007
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected 62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14 units losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type of aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft. To implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of aircraft and retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this report, GAO addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC actions. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO conducted its work at the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states affected by BRAC 2005
Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but let ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to assign to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from the prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to affected units on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1 flying mission per state and to maximize the number of flying missions where possible. ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay when some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has developed programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the ANG and a plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that provide the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000 personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school can currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these have yet to be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining security clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process. Further, bridge missions have not been identified for some units that will face a gap between old and new missions. ANG also faces possible delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, and training. Finally, some ANG units believe there has been insufficient communication with ANG headquarters about new mission requirements, which impacts their ability to recruit and train personnel. GAO's analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will be annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than estimated $26 million annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further, the Air Force is not using BRAC funds for over $300 million for military construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement missions for units losing their flying mission. However, because these costs are not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission, Congress does not have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation costs.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-07-641, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations
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Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations' which was
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2007:
Military Base Closures:
Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve
Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National
Guard Recommendations:
GAO-07-641:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-641, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected
62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14
units losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type
of aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft.
To implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of
aircraft and retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this
report, GAO addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC
actions. GAO‘s objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide
replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress
and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the
cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller
General‘s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is
one in a series of reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO
conducted its work at the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states
affected by BRAC 2005.
What GAO Found:
Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air
Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected
units that supported either the future force structure or the National
Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation
with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force
developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but
let ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to
assign to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from
the prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to
affected units on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1
flying mission per state and to maximize the number of flying missions
where possible.
ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC
recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation
challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay
when some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has
developed programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the
ANG and a plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces
challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions
required to implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that
provide the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is
sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel
requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000
personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school
can currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has
worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these
have yet to be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining
security clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process.
Further, bridge missions have not been identified for some units that
will face a gap between old and new missions. ANG also faces possible
delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction,
and training. Finally, some ANG units believe there has been
insufficient communication with ANG headquarters about new mission
requirements, which impacts their ability to recruit and train
personnel.
GAO‘s analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will
be annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than estimated $26
million annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further,
the Air Force is not using BRAC funds for over $300 million for
military construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement
missions for units losing their flying mission. However, because these
costs are not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission,
Congress does not have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation
costs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Department of Defense develop a strategy
to address challenges, enhance communication, and provide more
transparent cost reporting. DOD partially concurred with the
recommendations on strategy and communication, but did not concur with
the recommendation on cost reporting.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and
Assign Replacement Missions:
ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That Are Likely
to Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their Missions:
No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC
Recommendations and Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over
All BRAC-Related ANG Costs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost Their
Flying Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005:
Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between
the 2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for
ANG-Related Recommendations:
Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC Recommendations
Affecting ANG:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation's Impact on ANG Flying Units
and Personnel:
Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units:
Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs:
Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the BRAC
Account:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 16, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its
recommendations to realign and close bases, which it projected would
yield nearly $50 billion in net savings over 20 years. Although Air
National Guard (ANG) units were affected by 37 of the 42 Air Force
recommendations, these actions were aimed primarily at transforming ANG
to better support the future force structure rather than producing
significant savings. In July 2005, we reported that DOD's proposed
recommendations affected 56 ANG installations with 22 units potentially
losing their flying mission.[Footnote 1] We also observed that the Air
Force had not identified new missions for many of those units. Air
Force officials said at the time that they planned to use positions in
these units for emerging missions to support the future force structure
in such areas such as homeland defense, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),
and intelligence, which they expected to further refine as part of the
Quadrennial Defense Review. After performing its own analysis, the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission[Footnote 2] made
substantial changes to the recommendations published in its September
8, 2005 report. The BRAC recommendations affected 56 (62 percent) of
ANG flying units with 14 units losing their flying mission, 4 units
reducing their flying mission, 5 units converting from one type of
aircraft to another, 4 units associating[Footnote 3] with another unit,
and 29 units receiving an increase in the number of aircraft assigned
to them. The BRAC Commission estimated that the Air Force
recommendations would result in an annual recurring savings of about
$1.1 billion and those affecting ANG would be about $26 million of the
Air Force projected annual recurring savings. The BRAC Commission
recommendations were accepted by the President and Congress and became
effective on November 9, 2005.
Once the recommendations became effective, the Air Force became
responsible for implementing recommendations affecting ANG. The Office
of the Secretary of Defense required the Air Force to submit a detailed
business plan for each recommendation that included a schedule for any
personnel, equipment, or aircraft movements between installations and
updated costs and savings estimates. All the plans affecting ANG were
approved by the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group between
April and October 2006. In accordance with BRAC statutory authority,
DOD must complete closure and realignment actions by September 15,
2011.[Footnote 4]
This report is one in a series of reports that detail progress DOD has
made in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the
2005 BRAC round. We performed our work under the Comptroller General's
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative[Footnote 5] and
are reporting the results to you in order to facilitate your oversight
role of DOD's infrastructure and BRAC initiatives. In this report, we
address the Air Force's efforts to implement the BRAC recommendations
affecting ANG. Our specific objectives were to determine (1) the
process the Air Force used to identify and assign new missions to ANG
units who will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005, (2) the
progress the Air Force has made and the challenges it faces in
implementing the BRAC recommendations, and (3) changes to the estimated
cost and savings associated with implementation of recommendations
affecting ANG since the BRAC recommendations became effective.
To accomplish these objectives, we performed our work at the Air Force
headquarters, including the Total Force Integration office[Footnote 6]
and the BRAC Project Management Office; and ANG Directorate of the
National Guard Bureau,[Footnote 7] in Washington, D.C. We also
interviewed ANG officials in 11 states that were affected by the 2005
BRAC recommendations.[Footnote 8] During these meetings, we interviewed
key officials involved in implementing the recommendations to
understand the process used to identify and assign new missions to ANG
units as well as the role that Air Force and ANG headquarters, the
state adjutants general, and affected units played in the process and
to identify the challenges the Air Force faces in implementing the
recommendations. Finally, we analyzed the changes to the costs and
savings estimates between the approved BRAC Commission recommendations
and the business plans developed by the Air Force and approved by the
Secretary of Defense. On the basis of our assessments, we believe the
DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We
conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details
on the scope and methodology are described in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Through an evolutionary and consultative process involving all key
stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG headquarters assigned
replacement missions for affected units that supported either the
future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize the
number of ANG flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its
major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force identified
potential missions for ANG, which it then categorized into a
prioritized list based on mission significance. The Air Force then let
ANG headquarters, with input from state leadership, decide which of
those missions to assign to specific units. Our analysis indicated that
23 of the 30 missions assigned were on the prioritized list. In
addition to the prioritized list, ANG leadership sought to ensure that
each state had at least one flying mission and to assign additional
flying missions where possible. Our analysis shows that the remaining 7
missions assigned were new flying missions based on this premise. For
example, Connecticut was assigned a new flying mission because it no
longer had one, and additional flying missions were assigned in
Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi, and two in Ohio.
ANG is making progress toward implementing the 2005 BRAC
recommendations, but some related challenges remain that could delay
when some units are able to be mission capable. The Air Force has
developed business plans that have been approved by the Secretary of
Defense, created 59 programming plans, developed a plan for the
movement of aircraft, and assigned missions to all affected units.
However, ANG headquarters faces challenges in managing the timing and
sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC
recommendations. First, ANG headquarters faces challenges in developing
the large number of unit manning documents and requirements templates
that provide the specific skill mixes required for replacement
missions. ANG headquarters also does not know the specific skill sets
needed for all missions because some of these missions are new and the
skill sets are still being defined. Second, ANG headquarters faces
challenges in ensuring that there is sufficient space in Air Force
training schools for all the personnel requiring training. For example,
ANG headquarters projects they need to train about 3,000 personnel for
intelligence-related replacement missions, but the intelligence school
currently cannot fully accommodate this requirement in a timely manner.
The Air Force is working on potential solutions, such as increasing the
number of instructors and shortening the required curriculum for one
intelligence specialty, but these solutions have yet to be fully
implemented and may add to ANG costs. Third, ANG officials are
concerned there could be delays in obtaining security clearances for
some of the personnel assigned new missions due to the time required to
process a clearance application. Fourth, ANG headquarters has not
identified bridge missions for all units that will face a delay between
the removal of their old mission and the startup of their replacement
mission. Fifth, ANG faces possible delays in obtaining required funding
for new equipment, construction, and training due to residual impacts
of the continuing resolutions for fiscal year 2007 and requirements
that were not included in the budget. Finally, according to some state
and ANG unit commanders,[Footnote 9] communication with ANG
headquarters is limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the
units, and they are not receiving key information--such as new mission
requirements and the new personnel skill mix that each unit will
require--which impacts units' ability to recruit and train personnel.
These challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC
recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. Without
a strategy to deal with these related challenges, some units may face
delays in when they are able to be mission capable.
In comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, our analysis of current
Air Force estimates indicates that no annual recurring savings will be
achieved as a result of the recommendations related to ANG, ANG one-
time implementation costs are projected to increase, and Congress has
not been given full visibility over ANG BRAC-related implementation
costs. Specifically, our analysis indicates that implementing the ANG
related recommendations is expected to result in annual recurring costs
of $53 million dollars rather than annual recurring savings of $26
million estimated by the BRAC Commission. The $79 million per year
difference occurred primarily due to language in the Commission's
report that prevents ANG from reducing its current end strength in some
states. Also, our analysis shows one-time implementation cost estimates
are projected to increase $68 million dollars (13.5 percent; from $504
million to $572 million) primarily due to additional military
construction requirements and inflation.[Footnote 10] Further, the Air
Force decided to fund over $300 million to establish replacement
missions for units that lost their flying missions outside the BRAC
account and did not report these costs in their BRAC budget submission.
Therefore, Congress does not have full visibility over ANG BRAC-related
implementation costs.
We are making recommendations to ensure the challenges we identified
are addressed, to improve communication between ANG headquarters and
the affected units, and to increase cost transparency.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with
our recommendations regarding ensuring the challenges we identified are
addressed and improving communication between ANG headquarters and the
affected units and did not concur with our recommendation regarding
increasing cost transparency. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC-
related because establishment of replacement missions was not part of
the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct
specific replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC
Commission recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain
all personnel in affected units, and where appropriate, retrain
personnel in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we
believe the costs to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and
should be reported in the Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as
appropriate.
Background:
ANG is a reserve component of the United States Air Force. It performs
both federal and state missions, consists of about 107,000 members, and
makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force. ANG provides 100
percent of the air sovereignty missions and plays a key role in the Air
Force's Aerospace Expeditionary Force,[Footnote 11] including 49
percent of theater airlifts and 45 percent of tanker missions. In their
state role, ANG units report to the governor of their respective state
or territory (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands) or the commanding
general of the District of Columbia National Guard and participate in
emergency relief support during natural disasters such as floods,
earthquakes, and forest fires; search and rescue operations; support to
civil authorities; maintenance of vital public services; and counter-
drug operations. For example, ANG was involved in the relief effort
following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.
The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each
have a role in the management of ANG. The Air Force and its major
commands play a key role in determining ANG's force structure,
approving new missions, and equipping ANG to perform its missions. The
National Guard Bureau administers the federal functions of ANG and
works with the Air Force Air Staff to develop and coordinate programs
that directly affect ANG. The Bureau also formulates and administers
programs for training, development, and maintenance of ANG units. The
National Guard Bureau also acts as the channel of communication between
the Air Force and the 54 states and territories where National Guard
units are located.[Footnote 12]
Prior to this round of BRAC, ANG had 91 units with flying missions. As
part of DOD's BRAC report, the Air Force proposed actions that would
have affected 56 of these units with 22 units losing their flying
mission. In July 2005, we reported that many of the personnel positions
associated with the units losing a flying mission did not have a new
mission identified. Air Force officials stated they planned to use
these positions for emerging missions in such areas as homeland
defense, UAVs, and intelligence, which they expect to further refine as
part of the 2004 Quadrennial Defense Review. After examining these
proposals, the BRAC Commission made substantial changes to the
recommendations affecting ANG with 14 units losing their flying
mission, other units reducing or converting aircraft, and others
increasing the number of aircraft. Table 1 summarizes the BRAC
Commission recommendations affecting ANG flying units.
Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation's Impact on ANG Flying Units
and Personnel:
Type of action: Ceasing flying mission;
Number of: Units: 14;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 6,000.
Type of action: Converting aircraft type[B];
Number of: Units: 5;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 1,000.
Type of action: Increasing assigned aircraft;
Number of: Units: 29;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 3,900.
Type of action: Associating with another unit[C];
Number of: Units: 4;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 1,100.
Type of action: Reducing assigned aircraft;
Number of: Units: 4;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 700.
Type of action: Total;
Number of: Units: 56;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 12,700.
Type of action: ANG (end strength/flying units);
Number of: Units: 91;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 106,800.
Type of action: Percentage affected;
Number of: Units: 62%;
Number of: Personnel[A]: 12%.
Source: ANG.
[A] Rounded to the nearest 100.
[B] Units that lost one aircraft type and gained another due to BRAC
recommendations.
[C] Units that lost their aircraft and are directed to share the
aircraft of an active or reserve unit due to BRAC recommendations.
[End of table]
While the BRAC Commission directed the removal of aircraft from 14
units, it did not identify replacement missions for these units.
Instead, the Commission recommended that the affected units would
assume a new mission that would integrate the unit into the Future
Total Force such as air mobility; engineering; flight training; or
UAVs, if the state agreed to change the organization, composition, and
location of the affected unit. Future Total Force transformational
missions, also known as Total Force Integration missions, are managed
through a new directorate established by the Air Force in March 2005,
called the Total Force Integration office.[Footnote 13] In addition,
the Commission recommended that the loss of a flying unit not change
the authorized end strength of ANG in each affected state.
The President and Congress approved the BRAC Commission
recommendations, which became effective on November 9, 2005. Once the
recommendations became effective, the Secretary of Defense designated
one of the military services or defense agencies as the executive agent
responsible for implementing each recommendation. The Air Force is the
executive agent for the recommendations involving ANG.[Footnote 14] The
Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group required the executive
agent to submit detailed business plans to update estimated costs and
savings and identify a schedule for implementing each recommendation.
The Air Force BRAC Project Management office prepared the business
plans for the recommendations affecting ANG. The business plans to
implement ANG recommendations were approved between April and October
2006 by the Infrastructure Steering Group, an office chaired by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
that oversees BRAC implementation.
While planning to implement the 2005 BRAC recommendations, ANG
headquarters had to manage several other issues that affected its end
strength. ANG headquarters identified that unit manning documents
guardwide included about 3,500 positions more than permitted by
authorized ANG end strength. ANG headquarters had to identify and
remove these excess positions across various states and units.
Furthermore, in December 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed ANG to
eliminate about 14,000 positions between fiscal years 2007 and
2011.[Footnote 15] After several months of planning for these
reductions, in May 2006, ANG reduced its budget in other areas by $1.8
billion rather than reduce its end strength. As a result, the new
mission plan for each state had to be altered and was not completed
until October 2006.
Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and
Assign Replacement Missions:
The Air Force and ANG headquarters identified and assigned new missions
to units that will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005
through an evolutionary and consultative process that involved key
stakeholders such as its major commands and individual units. A best
practice we have identified in previous work indicates that during
major organizational transformations it is important to involve
stakeholders to obtain their ideas and to gain their ownership of the
transformation. Further, stakeholder involvement helps to increase
stakeholder understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and
objectives, and gain ownership for new policies and procedures. In
addition to basing decisions on a prioritized list of possible
missions, ANG headquarters also sought replacement missions that
supported the future force structure of the Air Force and tried to
maximize flying missions wherever possible.
The process to identify new relevant missions for ANG units took place
in phases. In June 2005, the Air Force Total Force Integration office
prioritized mission ideas provided by ANG using working groups that
included staff at different levels as well as key stakeholders from all
components of the Air Force, state adjutants general, and major
commands. The Total Force Integration office developed a prioritized
list of potential missions by grouping them into one of the following
four bands:
* Band 1--the highest priority, missions the Air Force "must do" to
satisfy congressional mandates and existing laws.
* Band 2--missions that are considered "mission critical" to the Air
Force achieving its objectives.
* Band 3--missions that are "mission significant," meaning that failing
to perform the tasks could negatively affect overall effectiveness.
* Band 4--missions that are "mission enhancing," meaning that they
would be nice to do if resources are available.
The Air Force Total Force Integration office sent the banded mission
list to ANG headquarters,[Footnote 16]which used the list to assign
replacement missions to units based on a number of variables. These
included the existing skill sets in the affected units, recruiting
trends in the affected unit's state, the states' expressed desires, and
the mission requirements. According to ANG officials, they wanted to
assign missions that were consistent with the preexisting mission or
capitalize on the strengths of the states to minimize transition
challenges. Subsequent to the development of the banded list, the Air
Force identified some flying missions that could be assigned to ANG.
According to ANG officials, these flying missions were assigned to
units instead of other missions on the banded list. Most of the
replacement missions ANG headquarters assigned were either in the top
two bands or were flying missions. Our analysis indicated that 23 of
the 30 missions assigned were on the banded list and the remaining 7
missions assigned were new flying missions, as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units:
Source: Replacement flying mission;
Missions: Number: 7;
Missions: Percentage: 23;
Positions affected: Number: 1,875;
Positions affected: Percentage: 29.
Source: Band I;
Missions: Number: 12;
Missions: Percentage: 40;
Positions affected: Number: 3,410;
Positions affected: Percentage: 53.
Source: Band II;
Missions: Number: 6;
Missions: Percentage: 20;
Positions affected: Number: 472;
Positions affected: Percentage: 7.
Source: Band III;
Missions: Number: 1;
Missions: Percentage: 3;
Positions affected: Number: 65;
Positions affected: Percentage: 1.
Source: Band IV;
Missions: Number: 4;
Missions: Percentage: 13;
Positions affected: Number: 616;
Positions affected: Percentage: 10.
Total;
Missions: Number: 30;
Missions: Percentage: 100[A];
Positions affected: Number: 6,438;
Positions affected: Percentage: 100.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.
[A] Numbers do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of table]
As shown in table 2, about 83 percent of the missions assigned and 89
percent of their personnel were band I or II missions or a new flying
mission (see app. II for the unit assignments and their respective
priority level). Although the missions assigned in bands III and IV
constitute 5 of the 30 missions assigned (about 16 percent), they
require about 681 positions, which is approximately 11 percent of the
total affected positions of all positions in replacement missions. The
one band III replacement mission is an intelligence instructor mission
assigned to the ANG unit at Ellington, Texas. Many new positions in ANG
replacement missions are in the intelligence career field. Anticipating
the increased intelligence training requirement, this mission is
designed to augment the instructor staff at the Air Force intelligence
training school at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. The four band IV
missions assigned consist of two engineering missions assigned to
Mansfield, Ohio, and Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, an intelligence
production mission assigned to Nashville, Tennessee, and a classified
mission assigned to Nashville. According to Air Force officials, ANG
headquarters assigned the engineering missions to Ohio and Pennsylvania
based on the ANG desire to distribute homeland defense assets
regionally.
In phases subsequent to the development of the banded list, flying
missions were assigned with direct involvement of senior leadership
from the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau, and ANG. Throughout the
process to replace missions for affected ANG units there was an effort
to assign replacement flying missions to the greatest extent possible.
According to ANG officials, if any flying missions became available,
ANG headquarters would match those missions to units instead of other
missions on the banded list. The replacement flying missions are the
joint cargo aircraft,[Footnote 17] a B-2 association with an active
wing, and an F-16 foreign military sales training mission. The joint
cargo aircraft mission was assigned to ANG units at Bradley,
Connecticut; Kellogg, Michigan; Mansfield, Ohio; Key Field,
Mississippi; and Nashville, Tennessee. According to ANG officials,
Bradley received the joint cargo aircraft mission because it was in the
only state that did not have a flying mission, while units in Michigan,
Ohio, Mississippi, and Tennessee were selected based on the ANG desire
to distribute homeland defense assets regionally. Additionally,
two[Footnote 18] of the five joint cargo aircraft mission assignments
were made to units that currently fly the C-130, another airlift
aircraft, and one assignment was made to a unit that currently flies
the KC-135 tanker, which ANG headquarters officials believe will
minimize transition costs. According to ANG officials, the Air Combat
Command identified the potential for the ANG unit in St. Louis,
Missouri, to associate with the B-2 mission at Whiteman Air Force Base,
Missouri. The two bases are in the same state and it provides an
opportunity for an ANG unit to associate with an active Air Force
mission using an aircraft that is new for ANG and relevant for the
future of the Air Force. Finally, the unit in Springfield, Ohio, was
assigned an F-16 foreign military sales training mission because this
unit currently is an F-16 training unit.
ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That Are Likely
to Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their Missions:
ANG headquarters has completed some key planning tasks for the
implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, but we believe that
challenges remain that could delay when some units may be able to
become mission capable.[Footnote 19] To date, ANG headquarters has
completed programming plans, an aircraft movement schedule, and a state-
by state new mission plan. However, ANG headquarters faces challenges
in completing manning documents, potentially insufficient training
school capacity, obtaining security clearances for many personnel in a
prompt manner, ensuring that personnel at affected units have a mission
to perform when their old mission is removed, and funding delays.
Further, some ANG unit commanders state that communication with ANG
headquarters is ad hoc and inadequate to meet their needs. These
challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC
recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. ANG
officials have stated these challenges could delay when some units are
mission capable. A strategy for managing these challenges and improved
communication between ANG headquarters and affected ANG units will be
required to help minimize delays.
Some Key Planning Tasks Completed:
The Air Force has created a business plan for each recommendation that
will be used as planning tools for BRAC implementation. These plans
include a description of the actions required including an aircraft
movement schedule, financial plans, and construction required for each
recommendation. These plans have been approved by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and will be updated as implementation details
change.
ANG headquarters completed 59 BRAC-related programming plans between
December 2006 and January 2007. According to an ANG official, these
plans provide guidance from the major commands to units on how to
implement changes to unit structures and missions. Specifically, each
plan identifies the key organizations involved, lists key milestones
and objectives for specific actions, and assigns primary responsibility
to the offices that will assist with the implementation.
ANG headquarters has also completed a plan to manage the movement of
hundreds of aircraft that will relocate into or out of 56 ANG units.
This plan provides a schedule that identifies when aircraft will move
around the country by fiscal quarter, through 2011. According to an ANG
official, this movement schedule was in part designed to ensure that
units losing their aircraft are not left without a mission by
implementing a replacement mission before the aircraft depart, and to
ensure that existing homeland defense missions are continued.[Footnote
20]
ANG headquarters has also produced a state-by-state new mission plan
that identifies all the changes to ANG units that are occurring within
each state. This plan includes BRAC actions, new missions assigned
through the Total Force Integration process,[Footnote 21] the ANG
headquarters review of each unit manning document (UMD) to remove
excess personnel, and standardizing squadron size so that units
conducting the same missions are uniform in size. Specifically, the new
mission plan identifies the general number of people that will be
assigned to each mission; unit commanders can use this information as a
basic guide to plan for required internal manpower changes. For
example, if the new mission plan identifies that one mission is ceasing
and losing 150 positions and a new mission is starting in the same unit
or state that requires 150 new positions, unit commanders can begin to
approach the personnel in the ceasing mission to determine if they are
willing and able to qualify for the new mission.
Challenges in Managing Many Sequential Implementation Actions and
Communicating with Units:
ANG headquarters may face challenges in managing the timing and
sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC
recommendations and to complete the conversion process for units taking
on a new mission. First, ANG headquarters faces difficulties in
completing the UMDs that units require to determine retraining or
recruitment requirements. Second, ANG may also have difficulty in
securing training at technical and flight schools for all personnel in
time to perform their new missions as scheduled. Third, there may be
delays in getting security clearances for individuals who require one
for their new mission. Fourth, there are some units that will require a
temporary bridge mission to carry them over until their new mission is
available. Fifth, delays in funding for equipment and facilities could
delay when units are able to perform their replacement missions. Sixth,
according to some ANG units, communication with ANG headquarters is
limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the units, such as new
mission requirements. Though ANG headquarters officials are aware of
these challenges and developing some solutions at the working level,
they lack an overarching strategy to manage and mitigate these
implementation challenges and any potential domino effects and to
communicate solutions to the affected units, which increases the risk
that ANG headquarters will face delays in establishing replacement
missions and could result in decreased readiness and potentially
inefficiently utilized personnel.
Completing Manpower Documents:
ANG headquarters is behind schedule in completing some UMDs and at the
time we had completed our audit work an ANG official projected that
they may not be able to meet current stated internal deadlines as a
result. ANG headquarters must develop new UMDs for all converting ANG
units, which includes units receiving a replacement mission, converting
aircraft type, or forming an association with another unit.
Additionally, UMD changes are required for units gaining or losing some
aircraft or personnel. A UMD allows unit commanders to recruit and
train new personnel or identify existing personnel who require training
for a new mission.
According to an ANG official, they have to complete many UMDs this
year, and over 100 in order to implement BRAC and replacement missions.
Although, according to an ANG official, Air Force regulations require
UMDs to be issued to units 6 months before the units are supposed to
begin their assigned mission, ANG officials have stated that their goal
is to get a UMD to units up to 1 year prior. An ANG official stated
that they had hoped to complete all UMDs for units that are supposed to
begin conversion by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 by March 31,
2007, but at the time we had completed our audit work another ANG
official stated that they may be unable to meet this deadline because
of delays in major commands approving the draft UMDs.
According to ANG headquarters, all UMDs have to be approved by the
major commands before they can be completed and issued.[Footnote 22]
According to an ANG official, they have been waiting for approval for 2
to 3 months, and the process typically takes 30 days to complete. One
ANG official stated that these delays may in part prevent ANG from
meeting its March 31, 2007, UMD issuance deadline, which could cause
delays at some affected units.
Though required issuance deadlines have not been missed, ANG
headquarters faces challenges in completing the UMDs required for those
units that are transforming in the coming year. For example, ANG
headquarters has yet to complete the UMD for its Distributed Ground
System, an intelligence mission assigned to Terre Haute, Indiana,
though the Initial Operational Capability date for this unit is
scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. Of the 11 state
ANG commanders we interviewed, none have a final UMD for their new
missions. Missing internal deadlines for completing UMDs increases the
risk that ANG headquarters will miss other deadlines or the Air Force
requirement to issue UMDs 6 months prior to the start of new missions.
These delays could affect the sequencing of other actions, which could
in turn delay the establishment of replacement missions.
ANG officials stated that they are working on a solution that will
provide unit commanders with information about their new manpower
requirements through a document called a requirements template.
According to ANG officials, the templates will inform each unit
commander of the personnel requirements for their new mission, and
would permit some initial actions, such as sending existing personnel
to training. However, ANG officials stated these templates cannot be
used as a funding authorization for recruiting new personnel. According
to ANG documentation, all existing flying mission templates, including
those for F-15, F-22, A-10, and C-5, have been completed, but they are
still working to complete the templates for the joint cargo aircraft,
the Component Numbered Air Force mission, support staff at all units
including wing command elements and administrative personnel, and units
that are associating with an active or reserve unit. According to ANG
officials, templates for the support staff were to be done after those
for existing flying missions in part to ensure that individuals
requiring flight training or other lengthy technical training could
have time to reserve seats in flight schools, while support personnel
will likely not require further training. ANG unit commanders state
that they require the templates for support missions so they can
determine their new command structures. For example, Indiana ANG
commanders stated that they will not know if the command staff for the
fighter wing at Terre Haute will be responsible for commanding the new
Distributed Ground System and Air Support Operations Squadron missions
assigned to that unit, or if these will be assigned to a new command
staff. ANG officials stated that they had hoped to have requirements
templates issued to all units by December 31, 2006. However, as of
February, 2007, ANG headquarters had not issued templates to some of
the units we interviewed that were also assigned new missions,
including Texas, Mississippi, and Ohio.
According to ANG officials, the challenge in completing the UMDs and
requirements templates is due to the volume of work required. According
to ANG officials, nearly every ANG unit will require a new or modified
UMD as a result of BRAC, the Total Force Integration process, and
standardizing unit sizes. Completing the UMDs for some units may be
more difficult than for others. For example, completing the UMD for a
unit that is increasing or decreasing its allotted number of aircraft
by two or three is easier than completing a UMD for a unit that is
taking on an entirely new mission or converting from one mission or
aircraft to another. As a result of BRAC and the Total Force
Integration process, ANG headquarters has to complete many complicated
conversion UMDs, which is more time consuming; specifically, the ANG
manpower office is typically only required to complete five unit
conversion UMDs per year, but in order to implement the BRAC
recommendations, it will have to complete hundreds of conversion UMDs.
The Director, ANG, stated that ANG in general was not adequately
structured to complete the volume of work required by BRAC. Recognizing
that it does not have sufficient staff, according to state officials,
the ANG manpower office requested assistance from the units. However,
ANG headquarters is still expected to miss internal deadlines while
receiving this support from the field. Without significant augmentation
to the manpower office or some other change in the UMDs creation
process, delays in meeting sequential deadlines may continue, which
increases the risk that ANG headquarters will not be able to complete
UMDs in the time frames required. An ANG official also indicated that
ANG switched to a new manpower planning computer program at around the
same time as BRAC implementation, which delayed initial manpower
planning actions. Further, some of the replacement missions, such as
the still to be acquired joint cargo aircraft, are new and thus still
have undefined requirements.
Potential Training Capacity Shortfall:
ANG will have to train many individuals to qualify to fly a new
aircraft or to perform a new mission. According to ANG officials, these
requirements will create a surge of personnel needing training for the
coming years, and there may not be enough space in some training
schools to accommodate this demand. ANG officials have identified
shortfalls spanning from 2008 through 2012 for A-10 and F-15 pilot
training schools.[Footnote 23] For example, ANG officials stated that
ANG typically requires only 8 seats in the initial qualification
courses per year, but as a result of BRAC it will require 30 or more
seats in initial qualification courses per year. Without adjustments,
it will be difficult for some schools to incorporate the additional
requirements; for example, the only A-10 school is currently operating
at 100 percent capacity. An ANG official stated that without an
increase in available school seats, some pilot training delays may
stretch through 2014.
Some ANG pilots who need to qualify to fly a new aircraft as a result
of the BRAC recommendations may face delays when they are qualified for
their new mission. The projected shortfall may delay when some flying
units will achieve mission capability, and impact ANG readiness.
Specifically, the following units will be converting to an F-15 mission
or increasing their number of F-15 aircraft within the BRAC
implementation period: Great Falls, Montana; Portland, Oregon; New
Orleans, Louisiana; Jacksonville, Florida; and Barnes, Massachusetts.
Additionally, the following units will be converting to an A-10 mission
or increasing their number of A-10 aircraft within this time period:
Boise, Idaho; Fort Smith, Arkansas; Selfridge, Michigan; and Martin
State, Maryland. Some solutions to mitigate the shortfall in space at
flight schools have been discussed by ANG headquarters officials, but
to date none have been implemented. Some potential solutions that ANG
officials mentioned include increasing flight simulator training,
sending pilots to training early to avoid later delays,[Footnote 24]
and establishing ANG-owned flight schools. According to ANG officials,
this training shortfall could not only delay Initial and Full
Operational Capability for some units, but could also have an impact on
warfighting capabilities. ANG officials also identified that converting
units will face a period of time while their newly-trained personnel
are gaining the on-the-job experience required before the units can
achieve a Full Operational Capability. Without this on-the-job
experience, newly converted units potentially face decreased readiness
and capability.
An increase in personnel requiring training is projected for some
nonflight technical schools as well. For example, ANG headquarters and
Air Force officials have stated that some missions--such as the
Predator UAV mission--will have a high demand for personnel trained in
intelligence skills. ANG officials have estimated that the ANG is
increasing the total number of intelligence-related positions by
approximately 3,000 positions (200 percent) with an increase from 1,500
to 4,500. ANG and the Air Force realized that there would be a high
demand for the limited number of seats at the Air Force intelligence
training facility at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. The Air Force
and ANG headquarters developed two solutions to limit the impacts of
this shortfall. First, ANG headquarters is increasing the number of
instructors available to teach at the school by assigning a new
intelligence training mission to the Texas ANG. However, Texas ANG
officials stated that they did not know if they would be able to staff
this mission on time since the mission requires trained intelligence
instructors, and stated that late 2008 would be the earliest practical
date that this mission could be fully operational. Second, the Air
Force is decreasing the length of some courses. Specifically, ANG
headquarters and the Air Force arranged to decrease the training course
for personnel assigned to the UAV sensor operator specialty from 6 to 3
months because they recognized that these personnel did not initially
require all the skills provided in the full-length course. Instead, ANG
headquarters and the Air Force will allow personnel in these positions
to delay part of their initial training until later in their careers,
thus allowing them to report to their units faster while freeing up
seats in the schools. According to ANG officials, these solutions
should greatly reduce the strain on the intelligence training school
and should increase the throughput capability, though the increased
demand has yet to reach the school to test the efficacy of these
solutions. If these solutions do not increase the capacity of the
school to required levels, there could be personnel who are unable to
attend training as scheduled, resulting in a potentially inefficient
use of personnel and units that are unable to fully perform their
mission due to insufficient numbers of trained personnel, which
subsequently impacts unit readiness.
Lengthy Security Clearance Process:
All of the approximately 3,000 individuals who will be converting to a
new intelligence mission, such as a Predator UAV mission, will require
a security clearance, as will some personnel in communications
positions supporting an intelligence unit. According to ANG
headquarters officials and some unit commanders, there is a concern
that the length of time required to obtain a top secret clearance,
estimated by ANG officials as 1-1 ½ years, could delay when some
personnel are able to perform their mission. As we have previously
reported, there are long-standing delays and other problems with DOD's
personnel security clearance program, and this area remains on our high-
risk list.[Footnote 25] If affected units do not receive personnel
requirements that state the number of personnel requiring a clearance
for their new missions, some or all personnel may not have a clearance
in time. As a result, some personnel may be unable to perform their
mission until they obtain their clearance. For example, the unit
commander at the Otis, Massachusetts, ANG base does not have a
requirements template or a UMD for either of the two intelligence
missions that were assigned to Otis. One mission has an initial
operational capability date in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008;
Massachusetts ANG officials estimate that it will take several years to
establish the new mission, in part due to the time required to get
personnel top secret security clearances.
Identifying Bridge Missions:
ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for some units that
will require one, which could leave personnel without a mission to
perform and waste resources. Some units may face a period of time when
they have no mission to perform because their original mission was
removed and their new mission lacks required resources or is scheduled
to begin later. In order to prevent the inefficient use of personnel
who otherwise may have no mission to perform, these units will require
ANG headquarters to assign them a bridge mission that would temporarily
give personnel a mission to perform until they can transition to their
new mission. ANG headquarters has planned for bridge missions for some
locations, such as assigning C-21 light cargo aircraft to some
locations awaiting the joint cargo aircraft. An ANG official has also
stated that in some locations they may keep their currently assigned
aircraft in place past the planned removal date in order to provide a
mission for unit personnel. However, delaying the movement of aircraft
may further delay implementation at other locations that are waiting to
receive these aircraft. Alternatively, if the aircraft that are
departing are destined to be retired, there will be additional costs to
ANG to keep these aircraft in service.
ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for several units
that will have a mission gap. For example, ANG headquarters timelines
identify that Massachusetts loses its aircraft at Otis in the fourth
quarter of 2008, and Massachusetts ANG officials stated that they will
face a gap between missions and that they have not been given a bridge
mission. If no bridge mission is identified, personnel may have no
mission for almost 2 years until the new mission is established.
According to Massachusetts state commanders, ANG headquarters has not
given them any information about a potential bridge mission nor is one
identified in an ANG headquarters BRAC implementation tracking
database. Similarly, Ohio ANG officials expressed concern that the C-
130s based at Mansfield are leaving in 2010 but that the replacement
joint cargo aircraft mission has no solid implementation date since the
aircraft is yet to be acquired. No bridge mission for Ohio has been
identified by ANG headquarters, nor is one listed in an ANG
headquarters BRAC implementation tracking database. The Director, ANG,
estimates the deployment date for the joint cargo aircraft between 2012
and 2015. The DOD Budget Justification books state that requirements
are still being defined and predict initial Air Force procurement in
fiscal year 2010. Further, the Director, ANG, identified that there
will be a gap at Syracuse, New York; Tucson, Arizona; Fargo, North
Dakota; and Ellington, Texas, due to delays in procuring new UAVs.
Without a bridge mission, personnel at these locations and any others
that face a gap due to implementation delays will be unable to perform
a mission, resulting in an inefficient use of personnel and a reduction
in ANG readiness.
Delays in Funding:
According to ANG documentation, there may be delays in funding for
required training, equipment, and construction projects that may impact
some units converting to a new mission in fiscal year 2008.
Specifically, ANG has identified $127 million in funding shortfalls in
2008 for personnel, equipment, construction, and operations and
maintenance requirements to establish replacement missions. According
to an Air Force official, these costs were not included in the budget
due to internal Air Force prioritization and there are unfunded
requirements every year. According to ANG, these unfunded requirements
could result in delays in when some missions will be capable of
converting and performing their missions. For example, according to an
ANG official, residual impacts of the fiscal year 2007 continuing
resolutions may limit the funding available for some construction
projects in fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 26] For example, significant
construction was planned for Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and
Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, but funding delays due
in part to impacts from the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions may
postpone this construction.[Footnote 27] Construction at Barnes is
scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be completed by July 2009;
construction at Elmendorf is scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be
completed by August 2011. The schedule for construction at Elmendorf--
which is already constrained by the short construction season in Alaska
--leaves little margin for error if construction delays develop. An ANG
official has stated that construction may not begin by the scheduled
dates because of funding delays. If required construction activity at
Barnes or Elmendorf is not completed as scheduled, these units may not
receive their new aircraft as scheduled, which could delay other
implementation actions.
Shortfalls in training funding may also delay implementation of some
missions: Indiana ANG officials stated that they need to send
approximately 100-200 people to training for one of their new missions
that is scheduled to reach an Initial Operational Capability in the 1st
quarter 2008, but so far they have only been able to send 2 people to
training due to an insufficient training budget. Similarly, Texas ANG
officials stated that they had their Initial Operational Capability
date for their Predator mission postponed for almost 2 years because
there was not adequate funding to send personnel to training. The
Comptroller of ANG stated that the fiscal year 2007 continuing
resolutions constituted a large reduction in available funds that will
be hard to manage, and another ANG official stated that residual
impacts from the continuing resolutions may cause a major slip in
milestones. ANG officials have stated that they may need to take steps,
such as obtaining a supplemental appropriation or reallocating funds
internally, in order to ensure that required equipment, construction,
and personnel funds are available in order to achieve fiscal year 2008
actions on schedule and to avoid potentially cascading implementation
delays. For example, the Air Force has developed workaround solutions
for some affected units, such as using temporary facilities in lieu of
actual construction, but these solutions may be less efficient and more
costly in the long term.
Communication between ANG Headquarters and Units Has Been Inadequate:
Communications at the headquarters level within ANG offices and between
ANG headquarters and the Air Force appear to be regular and adequate,
but it is inadequate between ANG headquarters and ANG units, according
to units we visited. Specifically, ANG headquarters and Air Force
officials stated that they work together to identify potential
implementation challenges and create potential solutions. However,
according to senior leadership at ANG units we spoke with, including
adjutants general, assistant adjutants general, wing commanders, deputy
wing commanders, and one chief executive officer, communication between
the units in the field and ANG headquarters is ad hoc and the
information they are provided by ANG headquarters is not adequate to
meet their needs. For example, ANG headquarters developed an Internet-
accessible database that would provide information and milestones to
the units, but did not make this system available until 10 months after
it was created. One state ANG official said information received is
often due to their contacting or traveling to ANG headquarters rather
than through headquarters-initiated communication. The Director, ANG,
acknowledged that there are challenges in communicating with the units
and that some unit commanders may not have the information that they
feel they need to implement the BRAC recommendations and their new
missions. To address this challenge, the Director, ANG, has started
quarterly visits to affected units.
Unit commanders and state adjutants general want details of the skill
mix required to perform their new missions as soon as possible so they
can determine how to best fit individual guardsmen in the new missions
and avoid retention problems. Several ANG units that we interviewed
stated that they were able to get in contact with ANG headquarters
offices, but that the information they received in response to
questions was not sufficient to meet their requirements. One of the ANG
units attributed the communications deficiencies to the high workload
that ANG headquarters is undertaking. State-and unit-level ANG
commanders identified the following examples of challenges in
communicating with ANG headquarters:
* Texas ANG officials stated that they do not know how many jobs will
accompany their Predator UAV mission, or if they will even be receiving
any Predator aircraft as part of the mission or rather flying UAVs
belonging to other units instead. This has led to retention issues
among guardsmen who fear losing their jobs, with 50 percent of their
maintenance personnel planning to leave the unit.
* Virginia ANG officials stated that they find it difficult to
communicate with ANG headquarters because they do not have a single
point of contact at headquarters to approach with concerns.
* Missouri and Ohio ANG officials are concerned that there may not be
funding available to send their guardsmen to required training and they
cannot get assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be adequate
funding or other solutions.
* South Carolina officials told us that they did not know the date of
their expected Initial Operational Capability, and consequently cannot
adequately plan for the transition even though they already have some
new aircraft on the ground.
* Massachusetts and Texas ANG officials stated that they cannot get any
information or assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be
"bridge missions" for their personnel until the new mission arrives.
Consequently, unit personnel may be underutilized.
Though ANG headquarters created an information-sharing system for the
BRAC implementation process, it did not promptly make this system
available to the units, which resulted in unit commanders not having
important information about their unit conversions. ANG headquarters
developed the computer-based information-sharing system in June 2006 to
facilitate frequent communication and to provide updates on the status
of implementation and requirements for each unit. However, ANG
headquarters only provided access to this system on March 9, 2007,
approximately 10 months after it was created.[Footnote 28] The system,
informally called "dashboard," lists all actions related to BRAC and
Total Force Integration by state and unit and provides dates for key
implementation milestones and requirements for each unit. According to
the Director, ANG, the release was delayed until the President's budget
was finalized.
Our prior work has identified that a best practice for organizations
undergoing a major transformation includes establishing a communication
strategy specific to the transformational action that communicates
progress and expectations. Importantly, we have identified that such a
strategy should include means for providing specific information to
meet the needs of stakeholders, and that the strategy should identify
the importance of communicating early and often to build trust with
stakeholders. Furthermore, we have found that promoting two-way
communication is important for major transformations to ensure the
transformation's successful completion.[Footnote 29]
ANG headquarters has recently created a draft Strategic Communication
Plan, but we found this plan to be general in scope and not specific to
BRAC implementation. Specifically, this plan identifies key
stakeholders and general tools for communicating information to the
public and ANG stakeholders, but it focuses more on managing the ANG
"brand" through specific talking points for use in external
communications. Airmen, unit commanders, and state adjutants general
are identified as being target audiences, but there is no specific
discussion of how ANG headquarters will provide information to them.
For example, although the purpose of the plan is to improve trust
between all stakeholders by delivering consistent, frequent, and
relevant communications, it does not identify exactly what specific
tools ANG headquarters will use to communicate information to each
affected unit. Instead, the plan generally discusses the use of news
media and the ANG Web site to promote the ANG brand, messages, and
initiatives. ANG headquarters also has a section in the instruction
document they use to guide the unit conversion process that assigns
responsibilities for communications during the unit conversion process
to the communications and information directorate, but this section
does not discuss communicating any information to the affected
units.[Footnote 30]
No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC
Recommendations and Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over
All BRAC-Related ANG Costs:
Compared to cost estimates contained in the BRAC Commission's report,
our analysis of the Air Force's current estimates to implement ANG-
related BRAC actions indicates that there will be net annual recurring
costs rather than net annual recurring savings, and one-time costs are
projected to increase by $68 million (13.5 percent). Furthermore,
Congress has not been given full visibility over all BRAC-related
implementation costs because some BRAC-related implementation costs
funded outside of the BRAC account are not being reported as BRAC-
related costs. Air Force budget submissions have not provided complete
and transparent information on the costs to implement BRAC-related
actions because the Air Force decided to fund some costs required to
establish replacement missions outside of the BRAC account and did not
report these costs in its annual BRAC budget.
Current Estimates Indicate Annual Recurring Costs Rather Than Annual
Recurring Savings for ANG Recommendations:
Although the BRAC Commission projected that the recommendations
affecting ANG would result in estimated annual recurring savings of $26
million, our analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that
there will be annual recurring costs of $53 million instead (see app.
III).[Footnote 31] However, Air Force officials still expect to realize
annual recurring savings overall as a result of other BRAC actions
affecting the active and reserve components.
The change in estimates occurred primarily due to language in the
Commission's report that prevents the Air Force from reducing its
current end strength in some states.[Footnote 32] For example, annual
recurring savings decreased an estimated $33 million from BRAC
Commission projections in the recommendation to realign ANG units at
Otis, Massachusetts; St. Louis, Missouri; and Atlantic City, New
Jersey.[Footnote 33] These projections were based on the elimination of
about 240 positions. Furthermore, annual recurring savings decreased an
estimated $55 million in seven recommendations[Footnote 34] from BRAC
Commission projections. According to Air Force officials, these BRAC
Commission projections were based on the assumption that additional
positions would be eliminated in the seven recommendations to realign
other ANG units. However, since no positions could be eliminated from
those states as a result of BRAC--and, overall, ANG headquarters
reassigned affected positions elsewhere rather than reducing end
strength--those projected savings will not materialize. Thus, in
preparing the business plans the Air Force had to reduce the projected
savings for these recommendations.
In addition, our analysis revealed that the BRAC Commission's projected
savings related to facilities maintenance are not likely to be
realized. DOD facilities' maintenance costs[Footnote 35] are partly
tied to the number of personnel positions and the mission assigned at a
particular facility. Since there will be no personnel eliminations and
limited facility eliminations across ANG, the associated facility
maintenance savings that would have occurred as a result of personnel
eliminations will not be realized. Air Force BRAC project management
officials concurred with our analysis. For example, savings estimates
included in the BRAC Commission report in the recommendation affecting
ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic City would have saved about
$11 million annually. In its updated estimates for this recommendation,
the Air Force projects an annual cost of about $1 million in facilities
maintenance for these installations.
ANG One-Time Implementation Cost Estimates Have Increased:
The estimated one-time costs to implement 2005 BRAC recommendations
affecting ANG are also projected to increase. One-time implementation
costs include military construction costs and other costs associated
with moving personnel and equipment. In comparison to the BRAC
Commission estimates, our analysis of current Air Force estimated
implementation costs (see app. IV) indicates that one-time
implementation cost estimates for recommendations affecting ANG have
increased by a net of $68 million (13.5 percent) primarily due to
updated construction requirements and inflation,[Footnote 36] as seen
in table 3.
Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs:
Dollars in millions.
Military construction;
BRAC Commission estimate: $247;
Current Air Force estimate: $366;
Difference: $119.
Other[A];
BRAC Commission estimate: 257;
Current Air Force estimate: 206;
Difference: (51).
Total;
BRAC Commission estimate: $504;
Current Air Force estimate: $572;
Difference: $68.
Source: GAO Analysis of BRAC Commission and Air Force data.
[A] Other includes costs associated with moving personnel and
equipment.
[End of table]
Although updated site surveys that clarified requirements for mission
changes resulted in decreased cost estimates for some activities, the
survey process revealed an estimated $119 million in additional
military construction requirements, causing the overall estimate of one-
time costs to increase.[Footnote 37] For example, estimated military
construction costs to close Kulis, Air Guard Station, Alaska, and
transfer the mission to Elmendorf, Air Force Base, Alaska, increased by
$87 million. Air Force officials determined that there was inadequate
utility capacity within the proposed development area to support new
missions, and that an engineer training complex, an upgraded fuel cell
maintenance hangar, and an upgraded helicopter maintenance hangar were
required. Likewise, estimated military construction costs in the
recommendation to realign ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic
City increased by $46 million after site surveys at those locations
determined the existing squadron operations facilities were too small
to support the new mission requirements, and the affected ANG units did
not have facilities to meet the Air Sovereignty Alert mission
requirement. In addition, other one-time cost estimates decreased by a
net of $51 million.[Footnote 38] According to Air Force officials,
these estimates decreased primarily due to the Commission language that
retained personnel at the realigning bases. The greatest decreases were
in training and civilian personnel severance and relocation costs that
were not required because positions were not realigned. For example,
estimated other one-time costs to realign Springfield Air Guard
Station, Ohio, decreased by $14 million.
Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over All ANG BRAC-Related
Implementation Costs:
Congress has not been given full visibility over all ANG BRAC-related
implementation costs because some BRAC-related implementation costs
funded outside of the BRAC account are not being reported as BRAC-
related costs. The Air Force is funding about $309 million for military
construction, equipment, and training to establish replacement missions
for 14 ANG units who lost their flying missions outside the BRAC
account, as shown in table 4.
Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the BRAC
Account:
Dollars in millions.
Military construction;
Estimated cost[ A]: $136.
Equipment[B];
Estimated cost[ A]: 101.
Training;
Estimated cost[ A]: 68.
Other;
Estimated cost[ A]: 4.
Total;
Estimated cost[ A]: $309.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
[A] Air Force officials stated that the process of developing these
cost estimates is ongoing and may understate the ultimate actual costs.
[B] We did not include the equipment costs for three Predator
replacement missions with a combined estimated equipment cost of about
$400 million because the equipment is an Air Force-controlled asset and
not under the direct control of ANG. We also did not include military
construction or equipment costs for five joint cargo aircraft missions
because the Air Force cannot determine these costs until the aircraft
is selected.
[End of table]
The Air Force estimates are based on combined costs to replace 30
missions for the 14 affected units. For example, the estimate of $136
million for military construction includes about $23 million for major
renovations and new facilities for the Predator mission at March Air
Reserve Base in California. The projected cost of $101 million for new
equipment includes $64 million for equipment associated with the
Distributed Ground System missions assigned to units in Indiana,
Kansas, and Massachusetts. The estimated training costs include $27
million to recruit and train approximately 440 operations and
maintenance personnel in a St. Louis ANG unit that will associate with
the active B-2 wing at Whiteman Air Force Base.
None of these costs are reported in the section of the Air Force's BRAC
budget submission that would identify one-time costs funded outside of
the BRAC account. Air Force officials informed us that the BRAC Closure
Executive Group decided to fund all costs to establish replacement
missions for the units losing their flying mission outside of the BRAC
account. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and
Logistics decided not to report replacement mission costs as BRAC-
related costs because the Commission did not direct a specific
replacement mission for the affected units. Nevertheless, the BRAC
Commission report recommended that personnel in affected units should
remain in place, assume a new mission, and where appropriate be
retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Although the
Commission did not direct specific replacement missions, the language
in the report requires DOD to provide replacement missions. Therefore,
any costs associated with establishing replacement missions are BRAC-
related.
Conclusions:
The successful implementation of the BRAC recommendations and
establishment of new missions depend on the ability of ANG headquarters
to execute hundreds of sequential actions in a very tight sequence with
little room for delays. While ANG headquarters has developed various
implementation plans, challenges remain that could delay when units are
fully capable of performing their new mission. Furthermore, any delay
or change in schedule could have a domino effect and impact other
planned actions. The absence of a strategy that addresses mitigation of
these and other challenges that may arise and is shared with all
stakeholders increases the risk that delays will occur. Effective
development of such a strategy for the BRAC implementation process
would enable ANG headquarters to measure progress towards their goals;
determine strategies and resources needed to effectively meet these
goals; and identify strategies to meet goals that were not met due to
implementation challenges. Further, improved communication between ANG
headquarters and the affected units is essential to provide unit
commanders with timely information to ensure they can train and recruit
personnel to perform their new missions as planned. The lack of a
communication strategy, specific to the BRAC implementation, period
that addresses how ANG headquarters will provide frequently changing
information as required by the units to carry out BRAC implementation
increases the risk that implementation actions may not occur as
scheduled.
It is important for congressional decision makers to have complete
information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions as they
deliberate the budget. The Air Force is providing incomplete cost
information by not including the costs to establish replacement
missions for units that lost their flying mission in its annual budget
submission. Including these costs in the BRAC budget would provide
Congress with more complete and transparent information to implement
BRAC and assist it in evaluating BRAC budget appropriation requests.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to ensure management of BRAC implementation challenges, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief, National
Guard Bureau, to task the Director, Air National Guard, with the
following.
* Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that
anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation
challenges. At a minimum, this strategy should include time frames for
actions and responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the
ability of ANG headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential
delays in interim milestones.
* Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how ANG
headquarters will provide the affected ANG units with the information
needed to implement the BRAC-related actions.
In order to provide more complete and transparent ANG BRAC cost
information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to report in the Air Force annual BRAC
budget submission the costs and source of funding required to establish
replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their flying missions
as a result of BRAC 2005.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with two recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into
this report as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Air National Guard, to
develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that
anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation
challenges throughout the BRAC implementation process. DOD suggested
that we modify the recommendation to reflect that the Director, Air
National Guard, is normally tasked by the Chief, National Guard Bureau.
We changed the recommendation to reflect DOD's position because it
clarifies accountability and respects the chain of command while still
implementing the substance of our recommendation. DOD also stated that
mitigation plans cannot be released until they have been thoroughly
vetted with all of the key stakeholders. At the same time, however, it
is important to note that BRAC recommendations are required by law to
be completed by September 15, 2011, and the limited time available
coupled with the complexity of implementation actions led us to make
this recommendation. Therefore, while we agree that the mitigation
plans should be vetted with all of the key stakeholders, it will be
important to do this in a timely manner. Further, we believe that
affected state adjutants general are key stakeholders and as such
should be included in the process to vet these plans.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the
Director, Air National Guard, expand the Strategic Communication Plan
to include how ANG headquarters will provide the affected ANG units
with the information needed to implement the BRAC-related actions. DOD
stated that it is incumbent upon ANG and all affected units to maximize
established chains of leadership and communication to effectively
manage and execute BRAC actions. We agree. Our report points out that
units are using the existing established chains of leadership and
communication to ANG headquarters but the communication from ANG
headquarters is nonetheless ad hoc and not adequate to meet their
needs. Further, the Director, ANG, acknowledges that there are
challenges in communicating with the units and that some unit
commanders may not have the information that they feel they need to
implement the BRAC recommendations and their new missions.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Air Force provide
more complete and transparent cost information by including in its
annual BRAC budget submission the costs required to establish
replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their flying mission
as a result of BRAC 2005. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC-
related because establishment of replacement missions was not part of
the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct
specific replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC
Commission recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain
all personnel in affected units, and where appropriate retrain
personnel in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we
believe the costs to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and
should be reported in the Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission.
DOD also stated that BRAC funds cannot be used to establish these
missions and that the costs in question have been appropriately
programmed and budgeted in the Air Force's regular military
construction account. In making our recommendation, it was not our
intent to prescribe which funds should be used to establish replacement
missions but rather to recommend that DOD provide more complete and
transparent cost reporting about these BRAC related costs. DOD said it
was willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these
costs. As a result, we modified our recommendation to include that DOD
identify the source of funding for these costs in its BRAC budget
documentation. Further, we continue to believe that the annual BRAC
budget documentation would be the most complete and transparent place
for DOD to report the costs to establish replacement missions because
this documentation is used in evaluating BRAC implementation costs.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Director,
National Guard; the Director, ANG; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://wwww.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Additional contacts and staff
acknowledgements are provided in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Brian Lepore, Acting Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs, and
Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We performed our work at the Air Force Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) Office, Air National Guard (ANG) headquarters, and in various
states which had ANG units affected by the BRAC 2005 recommendations.
We selected states to visit that had BRAC actions scheduled early in
the 6-year implementation period and also had units that were going to
lose, reduce, convert, or increase their flying mission or associate
with another unit as a result of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. We
visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia. We also held video conferences with state ANG officials in
Oklahoma and Ohio and received written responses to questions from
state ANG officials in Mississippi. At all states except Indiana and
Virginia we spoke with either the adjutant general, assistant adjutant
general, or both; at every unit we spoke with the wing commanders or
the deputy wing commanders of affected units. In Indiana, we spoke with
the wing commanders and the deputy wing commanders, and in Virginia we
spoke with the Virginia ANG chief executive officer.
To assess the process the Air Force used to assign new missions to
units that lost their flying mission, we interviewed all stakeholders
to the process. These stakeholders included officials in the Total
Force Integration Office, Headquarters Air Force; the Office of
Transformation, ANG, and the aforementioned state ANG officials to
determine how new flying missions were assigned to ANG units. In
addition, we compared the banded list of potential missions developed
by Air Force headquarters to the missions assigned by ANG headquarters
to the affected units.
To determine the progress that ANG headquarters has made in
implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations, we reviewed the BRAC
business plans, the ANG aircraft movement plan, and the new mission
plan by state for ANG units affected by BRAC. We interviewed officials
in ANG headquarters, including the Director, ANG, and interviewed or
obtained written responses from ANG officials in 11 states regarding
these plans and to identity any challenges the Air Force faces in
implementing the BRAC recommendations. We reviewed Air Force
Instructions and Policy documents regarding Unit Manning Documents
(UMD) and interviewed ANG headquarters manpower officials to obtain
information on their plan for developing the unit manning documents and
requirements templates for the affected units. We also reviewed
documentation pertaining to the training requirements for new missions
and for pilots converting to a new aircraft, and compared these
requirements to the allocation of seats in pilot training schools for
ANG for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to determine the likelihood of
adequate pilot training seats being available. We interviewed officials
in the Air Force Office of Total Force Integration and ANG training
officials on their plans to address and mitigate these training
shortfalls, and spoke with ANG officials in Texas about the training
mission assigned to Ellington. To determine the impact of funding
delays, we spoke with ANG officials including the Comptroller of ANG,
and reviewed ANG documentation pertaining to funding delays. To assess
the degree to which the states were aware of 2005 BRAC-related changes
that were required for their units, we conducted interviews or field
visits with or obtained written responses from senior ANG leadership
and wing commanders from 11 states that had units that were impacted by
BRAC. We asked these officials their perspective on communications with
ANG headquarters, and to describe any challenges that they faced in
BRAC implementation. We also met with ANG headquarters officials that
were responsible for communicating 2005 BRAC changes with the states,
including the A/8 Office of Transformation and the A/1 Manpower Office.
We were briefed on the internal interface system called "dashboard"
that ANG headquarters had developed for an eventual "roll out" to the
states and units that would provide the affected units with
transformation updates, and reviewed the information available on this
system.
To assess changes to projected costs and savings, we compared DOD's
current estimates to the estimates in the BRAC 2005 Commission report.
BRAC Commission estimates are based on DOD's quantitative model, known
as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). DOD has used the COBRA
model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over time, has improved
upon its design to provide better estimating capability. In our past
and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found it to be a generally
reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among
various BRAC options. Air Force estimates did not segregate the ANG-
related costs and annual recurring savings of the Air Force
recommendations. Therefore, ANG officials provided us with the current
estimated implementation costs from a Web-based tool, BRAC Management
Tool (BMT). On the basis of that information, we were able to extract
the estimated ANG related costs and savings of the BRAC 2005 Commission
report, as well as the current estimated annual recurring costs. The
Air Force BRAC Project Management Office identified a number of issues
with our results. After reviewing their issues, we updated the data
accordingly and satisfied their concerns. To determine the reasons why
DOD's current estimates changed compared to the Commission's estimates,
we interviewed officials at the Air Force BRAC Project Management
Office, ANG headquarters, and reviewed explanations documented in the
Air Force business plans and decision memorandums. Finally, to identify
costs being funded outside of the BRAC account, we reviewed Air Force
budget submissions for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, as well as obtained
data from the Air Force Total Force Integration office on the estimated
funding for equipment, military construction, and training to establish
the cost of replacement missions for units that lost their flying
mission due to the BRAC recommendations. We assessed the reliability of
the Air Force Total Force Integration and BRAC Management Tool data by
interviewing knowledgeable officials and determined the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost Their
Flying Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005:
Replacement missions: Affected units: March, CA;
Replacement missions: Band 1: Predator;
Replacement missions: Band 2: Joint Space Operations Center[A];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Bradley, CT;
Replacement missions: Band 1: Component Numbered Air Force (CNAF)[B];
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft [C].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Capital, IL;
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF;
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Terre Haute, IN;
Replacement missions: Band 1: Distributed Ground System (DGS)[D];
Replacement missions: Band 2: Air Support Operations Squadron
(ASOS)[E];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty].
Replacement missions: Affected units: McConnell, KS;
Replacement missions: Band 1: DGS;
Replacement missions: Band 2: ASOS;
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Otis, MA;
Replacement missions: Band 1: DGS, CNAF;
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Kellogg, MI;
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF;
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft.
Replacement missions: Affected units: St Louis, MO;
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF;
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: B2 Association with Whiteman
AFB[F].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Key Field, MS;
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF;
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft.
Replacement missions: Affected units: Mansfield, OH;
Replacement missions: Band 1: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy
Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (Red Horse)[G];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft.
Replacement missions: Affected units: Springfield, OH;
Replacement missions: Band 1: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 2: Measurement & Signatures Intelligence[H];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: F-16 training unit [I].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Willow Grove, PA;
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF;
Replacement missions: Band 2: ASOS;
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: Red Horse;
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Nashville, TN;
Replacement missions: Band 1: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Band 4: Classified, Intelligence Production;
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft.
Replacement missions: Affected units: Ellington, TX;
Replacement missions: Band 1: Predator;
Replacement missions: Band 2: ASOS;
Replacement missions: Band 3: Intelligence Training[J];
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty];
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty].
Replacement missions: Affected units: Total;
Replacement missions: Band 1: 12;
Replacement missions: Band 2: 6;
Replacement missions: Band 3: 1;
Replacement missions: Band 4: 4;
Replacement missions: Flying mission: 7.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.
[A] A Joint Space Operations Center integrates various joint-space
capabilities to provide shared situational awareness to commanders and
troops on the ground.
[B] A Component Numbered Air Force is a combination of up to three
separate missions, including an Air Operations Center (AOC, which
includes Operations, Planning, Strategy, Intelligence, and Surveillance
and Reconnaissance components), an Air Mobility Division (AMD), and an
Air Force Forces group (AFFOR).
[C] The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) will be a new, small, tactical
airlift aircraft that has not yet been procured by the Air Force.
According to senior ANG leadership, the JCA may not be ready for
deployment until between 2012 to 2015.
[D] A Distributed Ground System processes intelligence information.
[E] An Air Support Operations Squadron provides support to ground
forces by facilitating Air Force air strikes.
[F] ANG personnel will operate B-2s at Whiteman in conjunction with
active-duty Air Force personnel.
[G] A Red Horse, Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair
Squadron Engineers, supports contingency and special operations
missions with mobile, self-sufficient civil engineers.
[H] Measurement & Signatures Intelligence units employ a variety of
intelligence gathering techniques including advanced radar, electro-
optical/ infrared, and materials sensing.
[I] The Foreign Military Sales--F-16s unit is a school for foreign
countries that acquire F-16s and require training. The FMS school at
Springfield will train Dutch pilots.
[J] This intelligence training unit will provide additional
intelligence instructors for the school at Goodfellow, Texas.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between
the 2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for
ANG-Related Recommendations:
Dollars in millions.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and
Atlantic City, NJ;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: $(27.875);
Current estimated savings: $5.399;
Difference: $33.274.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Great Falls, MT;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 0.050;
Current estimated savings: 12.735;
Difference: 12.685.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Martin State, MD;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (8.597);
Current estimated savings: 0.117;
Difference: 8.714.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and
Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (6.339);
Current estimated savings: 0.505;
Difference: 6.844.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Mansfield, OH;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (6.708);
Current estimated savings: 0.107;
Difference: 6.815.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: March, CA;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (4.045);
Current estimated savings: 2.749;
Difference: 6.794.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force
Leased Locations & National Guard Headquarters Leased Locations[A];
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 17.008;
Current estimated savings: 23.461;
Difference: 6.453.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Boise, ID;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (6.291);
Current estimated savings: 0.000;
Difference: 6.291.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Grand Forks, ND;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 17.177;
Current estimated savings: 20.905;
Difference: 3.728.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (4.923);
Current estimated savings: (1.642);
Difference: 3.281.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Springfield, OH;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (2.524);
Current estimated savings: 0.005;
Difference: 2.529.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Nashville, TN;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.880);
Current estimated savings: 1.568;
Difference: 2.448.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Capital, IL and Hulman, IN;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (2.003);
Current estimated savings: 0.070;
Difference: 2.073.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Niagara Falls, NY;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.258);
Current estimated savings: 1.504;
Difference: 1.762.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Kulis and Elmendorf, AK;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (10.779);
Current estimated savings: (9.059);
Difference: 1.720.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Kellogg, MI;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (1.480);
Current estimated savings: 0.042;
Difference: 1.522.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV,
and Elmendorf, AK;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 9.072;
Current estimated savings: 10.547;
Difference: 1.475.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Portland, OR;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (7.004);
Current estimated savings: (5.658);
Difference: 1.346.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Hector, ND;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (1.016);
Current estimated savings: 0.023;
Difference: 1.039.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Key Field, MS;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.939);
Current estimated savings: 0.010;
Difference: 0.949.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Fairchild, WA;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.925);
Current estimated savings: (0.153);
Difference: 0.772.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA,
Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, MD;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.508);
Current estimated savings: 0.237;
Difference: 0.745.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Ellington, TX;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.327);
Current estimated savings: (0.090);
Difference: 0.237.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: New Orleans, LA--F100 Engine
Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 0.140;
Current estimated savings: 0.151;
Difference: 0.011.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Willow Grove and Cambria, PA[A];
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (14.923);
Current estimated savings: (14.923);
Difference: 0.000.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Robins, GA;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 0.000;
Current estimated savings: 0.000;
Difference: 0.000.
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Lackland, TX;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (2.902);
Current estimated savings: (3.640);
Difference: (0.738).
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Selfridge, MI and Beale, CA;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 12.808;
Current estimated savings: 4.536;
Difference: (8.272).
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Fort Smith, AR and Luke, AZ;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 12.674;
Current estimated savings: 3.613;
Difference: (9.061).
Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Cannon, NM;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 16.425;
Current estimated savings: 0.000;
Difference: (16.425).
Total;
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: $(25.892);
Current estimated savings: $53.119;
Difference: $79.011.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006).
[A] Non-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC Recommendations
Affecting ANG:
Dollars in millions.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Kulis And Elmendorf, AK;
Military construction: 174.569;
Other costs[A]: 7.249;
Total one-time implementation costs: 181.818.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and
Atlantic City, NJ;
Military construction: 66.340;
Other costs[A]: 27.718;
Total one-time implementation costs: 94.058.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force
Leased Locations & National Guard Headquarters Leased Locations[B];
Military construction: 55.320;
Other costs[A]: 3.431;
Total one-time implementation costs: 58.751.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA,
Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, MD;
Military construction: 11.931;
Other costs[A]: 23.456;
Total one-time implementation costs: 35.387.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Capital, IL, and Hulman, IN;
Military construction: 6.104;
Other costs[A]: 9.750;
Total one-time implementation costs: 15.854.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: March, CA;
Military construction: 0.000;
Other costs[A]: 15.821;
Total one-time implementation costs: 15.821.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and
Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX;
Military construction: 5.014;
Other costs[A]: 10.542;
Total one-time implementation costs: 15.556.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Mansfield, OH;
Military construction: 3.479;
Other costs[A]: 10.885;
Total one- time implementation costs: 14.364.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Selfridge, MI, and Beale, CA;
Military construction: 4.360;
Other costs[A]: 9.196;
Total one-time implementation costs: 13.556.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Grand Forks, ND;
Military construction: 5.232;
Other costs[A]: 6.207;
Total one-time implementation costs: 11.439.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Fairchild, WA;
Military construction: 6.104;
Other costs[A]: 4.091;
Total one-time implementation costs: 10.195.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA;
Military construction: 0.061;
Other costs[A]: 9.935;
Total one-time implementation costs: 9.996.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Hector, ND;
Military construction: 0.000;
Other costs[A]: 8.950;
Total one-time implementation costs: 8.950.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Ellington, TX;
Military construction: 2.884;
Other costs[A]: 5.544;
Total one-time implementation costs: 8.428.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Lackland, TX;
Military construction: 7.303;
Other costs[A]: 1.056;
Total one-time implementation costs: 8.359.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Great Falls, MT;
Military construction: 0.000;
Other costs[A]: 7.999;
Total one-time implementation costs: 7.999.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Program Management, Various
Locations[C];
Military construction: 0.000;
Other costs[A]: 7.730;
Total one-time implementation costs: 7.730.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: New Orleans, LA F100 Engine
Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities;
Military construction: 7.185;
Other costs[A]: 0.004;
Total one-time implementation costs: 7.189.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Portland, OR;
Military construction: 1.299;
Other costs[A]: 5.648;
Total one-time implementation costs: 6.947.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, and
Elmendorf, AK;
Military construction: 0.000;
Other costs[A]: 4.763;
Total one-time implementation costs: 4.763.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Kellogg, MI;
Military construction: 2.066;
Other costs[A]: 2.682;
Total one-time implementation costs: 4.748.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Niagara Falls, NY;
Military construction: 0.000;
Other costs[A]: 4.430;
Total one-time implementation costs: 4.430.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Cannon, NM;
Military construction: 0.000;
Other costs[A]: 3.918;
Total one-time implementation costs: 3.918.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Robins, GA;
Military construction: 2.812;
Other costs[A]: 0.721;
Total one-time implementation costs: 3.533.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Martin State, MD.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Key Field, MS.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Springfield, OH.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Willow Grove and Cambria, PA[B].
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Boise, ID.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Nashville, TN.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Fort Smith, AR And Luke, AZ.
Recommendations affecting ANG units: Total;
Military construction: $365.662;
Other costs[A]: $205.939;
Total one- time implementation costs: $571.601.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006).
[A] Other costs include costs associated with moving personnel and
equipment.
[B] Non-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard.
[C] Our analysis indicated that Program Management Costs (if any) were
included in each recommendation. On the basis of the information we
received from Air Force officials, Program Management Costs were
calculated separately for the current estimates of one-time costs.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
9000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20901-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
May 04 2007:
Mr. Brian J. Lepore:
Acting Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO
draft report, "Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations," dated April 4,
2007, (GAO Code 350913/GAO-07-641).
The Department partially agrees with two of the draft report
recommendations concerning development of a mitigation strategy for
implementation challenges and expansion of existing communications,
building on the existing business plan process. However, the Department
strongly disagrees with GAO's recommendation to "report" new mission
cost in its annual Base Realignment and Closure budget because the
Department's annual BRAC budget properly includes only BRAC-related
costs. Elsewhere in its draft report, GAO characterizes new mission
costs as "BRAC-related" costs that should be part of the BRAC budget
submission. The Department disagrees with this characterization.
Establishment of replacement missions, as directed by the Commission,
are not part of these recommendations and, therefore, not actions
necessary for implementation. BRAC funds cannot be used for these
purposes.
The costs in question have been appropriately programmed and budgeted
in the Air Force's regular military construction account to support
these independent actions. As the Department indicated in its oral
comments, we have no issue with identifying the cost associated with
new mission requirements and making sure Congress has visibility on
these costs. However, we must do so in a way that does not give the
impression that they are "BRAC-related costs". The Department is
willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these costs
and state they are reflected elsewhere in our budget documentation.
The Department's comments regarding the specific recommendations in the
report are outlined in the enclosure. The Department appreciates the
work performed by the GAO in this regard and appreciates the
opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Philip W. Grone:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated April 4, 2007 GAO Code 350913/GAO-07-641:
"Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) to develop a mitigation
strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates,
identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges throughout
the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) implementation process. At a
minimum, this strategy should include timeframes for actions,
responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the ability of ANG
headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential delays in interim
milestones.
DOD Response: DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation. As
part of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the ANG Directorate would
normally be tasked by the Secretary of Defense through the Chief,
National Guard Bureau as the agency head. Therefore, we believe the
appropriate recommendation should read as follows:
"The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief,
National Guard Bureau to task the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) to
develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that
anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation
challenges throughout the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
implementation process."
The Department will develop a mitigation strategy that expands
stakeholder participation, building on the business plan process.
However, implementation planning is a dynamic process; one which often
involves working with each state separately to develop and refine
tailored courses of action. In many cases these plans cannot be
released until they have been thoroughly vetted with all of the key
stakeholders. An unintended consequence of this process is that it may
lead some to conclude that it is delayed when it is not. We agree that
once a plan is developed and coordinated, the information should be
made available to all affected parties.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Director, Air National Guard to expand the Strategic
Communication Plan to include how ANG headquarters will provide the
affected units with the information needed to implement the BRAC
related actions.
DOD Response: DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation.
Communication is critical to the successful accomplishment of tasks and
achievement of goals. It is incumbent upon the ANG and all effected
units to maximize established chains of leadership and communication to
effectively manage and execute BRAC actions.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to "report" in its annual BRAC
budget submission the costs required to establish replacement missions
for units that will lose their flying mission as a result of BRAC 2005.
DOD Response: The DoD non-concurs with the GAO recommendation to
"report" new mission cost in its annual BRAC budget because the
Department's annual BRAC budget properly includes only BRAC-related
costs. Elsewhere in the report GAO characterizes new mission costs as
"BRAC-related" costs that should be considered part of the BRAC budget
submission. The Department disagrees with this characterization. BRAC
2005 funds are only available to fund actions necessary to implement
the BRAC 2005 recommendations. Establishment of replacement missions is
not part of the recommendation and, therefore, not actions necessary to
implement the recommendation. BRAC funds cannot be used for these
purposes. The costs in question have been appropriately programmed and
budgeted in the Air Force's regular military construction account to
support these independent actions. As the Department indicated in its
oral comments, we have no issue with identifying the cost associated
with new mission requirements and ensuring Congress has visibility of
these costs. However, we must do so in a way that does not give the
impression that they are "BRAC-related costs". The Department is
willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these costs
and state they are reflected elsewhere in our budget documentation.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant
Director; Ronald Bergman; Susan Ditto; James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake;
James Madar; Julie Matta; and Charles Perdue made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).
[2] The BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended
by Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX) provides for an independent
Commission to review the Secretary of Defense's realignment and closure
recommendations and present its findings and conclusions on the
Secretary's recommendations, along with its own recommendations to the
President.
[3] In an associate unit, a unit from one component (i.e., active,
guard, or reserve) of the Air Force operates and maintains equipment
that it shares with a unit from another component. By sharing
equipment, the Air Force seeks to train more people and make more
efficient use of the equipment.
[4] Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904, as amended (1990).
[5] 31 U.S.C. §717.
[6] The Air Force Total Force Integration Office (A8F) was previously
known as the Future Total Force Office.
[7] The ANG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau is hereafter
referred to as ANG headquarters.
[8] We visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia. We also held video conferences with state ANG officials in
Oklahoma and Ohio and received written responses to questions from
state ANG officials in Mississippi.
[9] In conducting our work, we spoke with senior state and ANG unit
commanders, including adjutants general and assistant adjutants
general, as well as the wing commanders and some deputy wing commanders
of affected units.
[10] BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005
dollars, whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars,
which includes inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation
period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent.
The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are
incurred.
[11] The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as
the Air and Space Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve,
and Guard into one component that trains, deploys, and operates
together. This force is comprised of fighters, bombers, tankers, and
tactical air lifters.
[12] 10 U.S.C. § 10501.
[13] The directorate is staffed with representatives from stakeholder
organizations including the Air Staff, Air National Guard, Air Force
Reserve Command, and several states.
[14] The Navy is the executive agent for one recommendation affecting
ANG.
[15] Program Budget Decision 720.
[16] ANG headquarters also used the banded list to assign missions to
units affected by other force structure changes that were occurring
outside of BRAC.
[17] The Joint Cargo Aircraft will be a new, small airlift aircraft the
Air Force plans to acquire.
[18] Units assigned the joint cargo aircraft as a replacement mission
that previously flew the C-130 are Mansfield, Ohio, and Nashville,
Tennessee. The ANG unit at Key Field, Mississippi, previously flew the
KC-135 air tanker and the ANG unit at Kellogg, Michigan, previously
flew the A-10.
[19] ANG has planned for two phases of mission capability for units
converting to a new mission: Initial Operational Capability, and Full
Operational Capability. According to ANG officials, Initial Operational
Capability is a variable term that can apply to any predetermined level
of partial capability, depending on the unit and mission, while Full
Operational Capability is achieved when unit commanders report that the
unit is ready to perform its mission. ANG officials stated that the
conversion process typically takes approximately 4 years to complete.
[20] One of the missions that ANG units perform is the homeland defense
Air Sovereignty Alert mission, where fighter aircraft stationed around
the country are always ready and available to intercept potentially
hostile aircraft.
[21] In addition to the replacement missions assigned to the 14 units
losing their flying mission, ANG also assigned new Total Force
Integration missions to nearly every U.S. state and territory in a
simultaneous process unrelated to BRAC.
[22] Major commands identified by ANG headquarters include Air Force
Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command.
[23] Though these school shortfalls may not be caused by implementation
of the BRAC recommendations, they may be exacerbated by the number of
pilots converting to a new airframe as a result of the BRAC
recommendations.
[24] ANG officials stated that this solution may require pilots to
temporarily relocate to another unit if their home unit does not yet
have the new aircraft on the ground. This process results in increased
costs for ANG.
[25] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
[26] DOD did not receive a permanent appropriation for military
construction until Congress replaced the continuing resolutions with a
permanent appropriation for fiscal year 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-05,
February 15, 2007.
[27] The ANG base at Kulis, Alaska, is required by BRAC to close; all
personnel and aircraft from the 176th wing will relocate to the Air
Force base at Elmendorf, which will require significant construction in
order to accommodate the equipment. Barnes is directed to take the Air
Sovereignty Alert mission from Otis, Massachusetts, which will require
construction of an alert facility and other additional buildings.
[28] The Air Force Total Force Integration office has a similar Web-
based database that provides details for all the Total Force
Integration missions that is accessible to the state leadership and
unit commanders. However, one field commander that we spoke with stated
that the system is of limited utility due to frequently changing
information. Additionally, this system does not discuss any of the BRAC
changes or how timing of all actions will occur.
[29] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[30] Air National Guard Instruction 10-406, March 10, 2006.
[31] The estimates of the annual recurring savings associated with 24
of the 30 recommendations affecting ANG decreased by a total of $114
million and the estimated annual recurring savings for 4 increased by a
total of $35 million.
[32] The language affected Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.
[33] The projected $33 million decrease in annual recurring savings was
primarily due to the elimination of personnel and facilities
maintenance savings.
[34] These seven recommendations affected ANG units at (1) Great Falls,
Montana; (2) Martin State, Maryland; (3) Andrews, Maryland; Will Rogers
and Tinker, Oklahoma; and Randolph, Texas; (4) Mansfield, Ohio; (5)
March, California; (6) co-located miscellaneous Air Force leased
locations and National Guard headquarters leased locations; and (7)
Boise, Idaho.
[35] Facilities maintenance costs include sustainment,
recapitalization, and base operating support costs.
[36] BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005
dollars, whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars,
which include inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation
period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent.
The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are
incurred.
[37] There were 25 recommendations in which there was a change in
estimated military construction costs. In 14 recommendations estimated
military construction costs increased by a total of $168 million and in
11 recommendations estimated military construction costs decreased by a
total of $49 million.
[38] There were 31 recommendations in which there was a change in
estimated one-time costs. In 19 recommendations, estimated other one-
time costs decreased by a total of $121 million and in 12
recommendations estimated other one-time costs increased by a total of
$70 million.
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