U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Procurement of Pumping Systems for the New Orleans Drainage Canals
Gao ID: GAO-07-908R May 23, 2007To avoid flooding in New Orleans after a rain storm, the city's Sewerage and Water Board pumps rainwater from the city into three drainage canals which then flow unrestricted into Lake Pontchartrain. While critical to prevent flooding from rainfall, these canals are vulnerable to storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain during a hurricane, and consequently are lined with floodwalls along both sides to protect storm surge from overtopping the canals and flooding the city. However, during Hurricane Katrina, several breaches occurred in the canal floodwalls allowing significant amounts of water to enter New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain. In its efforts to restore pre-Katrina levels of hurricane protection to New Orleans by the June 1st start of the 2006 hurricane season, in late 2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) considered strengthening the drainage canal floodwalls but decided to postpone this effort due to cost and time constraints. Instead, the Corps decided to install three interim closure structures (gates) at the points where the canals meet the lake. These gates would be closed during major storm events to prevent storm surge from entering the canals and potentially breaching the canal floodwalls and flooding the city. Due to space constraints along the canals and the limited amount of time it had before the start of the 2006 hurricane season, the Corps decided to procure 34 large-capacity hydraulic pumping systems1 to provide the most pumping capacity possible by June 1, 2006. The Corps acknowledged that its decision to install the gates and provide pumping capacity that was less than what was needed to keep the city dry could result in some flooding by rainfall but believed that the risk from a hurricane-induced storm surge was far greater than the risk of flooding from heavy rainfall. During the process of acquiring, testing, and installing the pumping systems for the drainage canals, many concerns were raised by the media about potential problems with the operation of these pumping systems, and GAO was asked to examine the (1) specifications and requirements of the contract and the basis for selecting the supplier of the pumping systems; (2) concerns identified during factory testing and the Corps' rationale to install the pumping systems in light of the factory test failures; (3) actions the Corps has taken to address the known problems with the pumping systems; and (4) pumping capacity that existed on June 1, 2006, the capacity that currently exists, and the capacity that is planned for the 2007 hurricane season.
The Corps' decisions to acquire the 34 hydraulic pumping systems were focused on satisfying its commitment to have pumping capacity on the drainage canals in place by June 1, 2006--the start of the 2006 hurricane season. In order to increase the likelihood that pumping capacity would be in place when needed, the Corps utilized several tools to expedite and streamline the acquisition process. The Corps appears to have had a valid reason for each of the iterative decisions it made at each stage of the procurement process. Factory testing of the pumps occurred from March through May 2006, and revealed several problems with specific components of the pumping systems. As a result of the concerns identified during factory testing, the Corps had no assurance that the pumping systems would operate to capacity when needed. Nevertheless, the pumping systems were installed as planned because the Corps believed that it was better to have some pumping capacity along the drainage canals during the 2006 hurricane season rather than none. Since June 1, 2006, the Corps has continued to take steps to correct known performance problems with the pumping systems, including uninstalling them to make some repairs. On June 1, 2006, the Corps had installed 11 pumping systems, and by July 2006, it had installed 34, although it is uncertain how much of the theoretical capacity of these pumping systems would have worked and for how long. By June 1, 2007, the Corps plans to complete the reinstallation of all 40 pumping systems that have been repaired and each has been tested for between 45 minutes to 2 hours, thus providing greater assurance that they will perform as designed during the upcoming 2007 hurricane season. However, the total planned pumping capacity will still not meet the Sewerage and Water Board's drainage needs to keep the city from flooding during a hurricane when the canal gates are closed.
GAO-07-908R, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Procurement of Pumping Systems for the New Orleans Drainage Canals
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May 23, 2007:
The Honorable Mary L. Landrieu:
Chairman:
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Subject: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Procurement of Pumping Systems
for the New Orleans Drainage Canals:
Dear Madam Chairman:
To avoid flooding in New Orleans after a rain storm, the city's
Sewerage and Water Board pumps rainwater from the city into three
drainage canals at 17TH Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue,
which then flows unrestricted into Lake Pontchartrain. The maximum
amount of water that the Sewerage and Water Board can pump into these
drainage canals is 10,500 cubic feet per second (cfs) at the 17th
Street Canal, 7,980 cfs at the London Avenue Canal, and 2,690 cfs at
the Orleans Avenue Canal. While critical to prevent flooding from
rainfall, these canals are vulnerable to storm surge from Lake
Pontchartrain during a hurricane, and consequently are lined with
floodwalls along both sides to protect storm surge from overtopping the
canals and flooding the city. However, during Hurricane Katrina,
several breaches occurred in the canal floodwalls allowing significant
amounts of water to enter New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain.
In its efforts to restore pre-Katrina levels of hurricane protection to
New Orleans by the June 1ST start of the 2006 hurricane season, in late
2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) considered strengthening
the drainage canal floodwalls but decided to postpone this effort due
to cost and time constraints. Instead, the Corps decided to install
three interim closure structures (gates) at the points where the canals
meet the lake. These gates would be closed during major storm events to
prevent storm surge from entering the canals and potentially breaching
the canal floodwalls and flooding the city. With the gates closed,
however, rainwater cannot flow from the drainage canals into Lake
Pontchartrain and large capacity pumping systems are needed to pump
water out of the canals and into the lake. Due to space constraints
along the canals and the limited amount of time it had before the start
of the 2006 hurricane season, the Corps decided to procure 34 large-
capacity hydraulic pumping systems[Footnote 1] to provide the most
pumping capacity possible by June 1, 2006. The Corps acknowledged that
its decision to install the gates and provide pumping capacity that was
less than what was needed to keep the city dry could result in some
flooding by rainfall but believed that the risk from a hurricane-
induced storm surge was far greater than the risk of flooding from
heavy rainfall. In mid-2006, the Corps decided to procure six
additional hydraulic pumping systems, thereby bringing the total number
of pumping systems to be installed along the three drainage canals to
40.
During the process of acquiring, testing, and installing the pumping
systems for the drainage canals, many concerns were raised by the media
about potential problems with the operation of these pumping systems,
and you asked us to examine the (1) specifications and requirements of
the contract and the basis for selecting the supplier of the pumping
systems; (2) concerns identified during factory testing and the Corps'
rationale to install the pumping systems in light of the factory test
failures; (3) actions the Corps has taken to address the known problems
with the pumping systems; and (4) pumping capacity that existed on June
1, 2006, the capacity that currently exists, and the capacity that is
planned for the 2007 hurricane season.
To address these objectives, we reviewed the Corps' plans for the three
interim gates and temporary pumping systems for the three New Orleans
drainage canals. (Unless otherwise noted, the pumping systems discussed
in this report are the temporary ones installed at the three canals.)
We reviewed documentation, including e-mails, correspondence, and other
documents related to the solicitation process, contract specifications,
factory test results, performance requirements, and the Corps' plans
for increasing pumping capacity through 2007. We visited the 17th
Street Canal and observed the pumping systems. We interviewed officials
from (1) Corps Headquarters, New Orleans District, other Corps
districts, and members of the Mississippi Valley Division's independent
team reviewing issues related to the contract and pump performance; (2)
Moving Water Industries Corporation and two other pump suppliers that
bid on the solicitation; and (3) the architectural and engineering
consulting firms under contract with the Corps. We conducted our work
from late-March through mid-May 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
On May 17, 2007, we provided a briefing to your staff on the results of
this work. This report summarizes the information presented in that
briefing and officially transmits the slides used during that briefing.
Summary:
The Corps' decisions to acquire the 34 hydraulic pumping systems were
focused on satisfying its commitment to have pumping capacity on the
drainage canals in place by June 1, 2006--the start of the 2006
hurricane season. In order to increase the likelihood that pumping
capacity would be in place when needed, the Corps utilized several
tools to expedite and streamline the acquisition process. The Corps
appears to have had a valid reason for each of the iterative decisions
it made at each stage of the procurement process. The cumulative effect
of these decisions resulted in one supplier--Moving Water Industries
Corporation--being in the strongest competitive position to receive the
contract for the pumping systems.
Factory testing of the pumps occurred from March through May 2006, and
revealed several problems with specific components of the pumping
systems. As a result of the concerns identified during factory testing,
the Corps had no assurance that the pumping systems would operate to
capacity when needed. Nevertheless, the pumping systems were installed
as planned because the Corps believed that it was better to have some
pumping capacity along the drainage canals during the 2006 hurricane
season rather than none. The Corps also believed that many of the
problems identified during factory testing could be resolved after
installation.
Since June 1, 2006, the Corps has continued to take steps to correct
known performance problems with the pumping systems, including
uninstalling them to make some repairs. Specific problems that have
been addressed include replacing some components that were undersized,
such as springs and motors; rewelding of some critical structural
welds; and revising certain start-up procedures.
On June 1, 2006, the Corps had installed 11 pumping systems, and by
July 2006, it had installed 34, although it is uncertain how much of
the theoretical capacity of these pumping systems would have worked and
for how long. By June 1, 2007, the Corps plans to complete the
reinstallation of all 40 pumping systems that have been repaired and
each has been tested for between 45 minutes to 2 hours, thus providing
greater assurance that they will perform as designed during the
upcoming 2007 hurricane season. By mid-August 2007, the Corps plans to
expand pumping capacity at the 17th Street and London Avenue canals by
adding 19 additional pumps, acquired under another contract with a
different supplier. However, the total planned pumping capacity will
still not meet the Sewerage and Water Board's drainage needs to keep
the city from flooding during a hurricane when the canal gates are
closed. First, weaknesses in some canal floodwalls will continue to
restrict the amount of water that can be pumped into the canals to
about 69 percent of their maximum capacity. Second, even if these
restrictions are lifted, the Corps' capacity to pump water out of the
canals would only be about 82 percent of the maximum capacity that the
Sewerage and Water Board can pump into the canals.
Agency Comments:
We obtained oral comments on our draft briefing slides at a meeting
with the Director of Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
other senior Corps staff. In commenting on the slides, these Corps
officials concurred with our findings and conclusions, and stated that
they were very helpful in pointing out weaknesses in the Corps'
approach and would help them develop procedures to prevent similar
problems from occurring in the future. The Corps also provided us with
technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretary of Defense, the Commanding General and Chief of Engineers of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and appropriate congressional
committees. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In
addition, the report is available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you and your staff have any questions or need additional
information, please contact me on (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major
contributors to this report were Edward Zadjura, Assistant Director;
James Dishmon; Terry Dorn; Christine Frye; Moses Garcia; Bradley James;
Richard Johnson; Stephanie May; Kenneth Patton; Alyssa Weir; and,
William Woods.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Anu K. Mittal:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Enclosure:
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Providing Pumping Capacity to the New
Orleans Drainage Canals:
May 17, 2007:
Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Staff graphic by Emmett Mayer III/emayer@timespicayune.com.
[End of figure]
Background:
The New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board pumps rainwater from the city
and into the three drainage canals, which flow into Lake Pontchartrain:
Maximum pumping capacity of the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board
into the drainage canals is 10,500 cfs for the 17th Street
Canal[Footnote 2], 7,980 cfs for the London Avenue Canal, and 2,690 cfs
for the Orleans Avenue Canal:
During Hurricane Katrina, several breaches occurred in the canal
floodwalls which allowed storm surge to enter the city:
In late 2005, the Corps considered strengthening the drainage canal
floodwalls but decided to postpone this effort due to cost and time
constraints:
Instead, the Corps decided to install temporary gates and procure 34
large-capacity hydraulic pumps to obtain the most pumping capacity
possible by the June 1 St start of the 2006 hurricane season:
Because the Corps considers hurricane-induced storm surge from Lake
Pontchartrain to be the greater risk, it intends to close the gates
during major storm events to prevent storm surge from entering the
drainage canals and potentially breaching the canal floodwalls and
flooding the city:
With the gates closed, rainwater cannot flow into the lake and large
capacity pumping systems are needed to pump water out of the drainage
canals and into the lake:
The Corps acknowledged that its decision to install gates and provide
limited pumping capacity could result in some flooding by rainfall but
believed this risk was much lower than the risk posed by storm surge:
In mid-2006, the Corps decided to procure 6 additional hydraulic pumps
to increase the pumping capacity at the 17th Street Canal:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
[End of figure]
Questions:
What were the specifications and requirements of the contract and what
was the basis for the selection of the supplier for the pump systems?
In light of the factory test failures known to the Corps, why did it
install the pump systems?
What pumping capacity existed on June 1, 2006, and what actions has the
Corps taken to address the known problems with the pump systems?
What is the current pumping capacity at the drainage canals and what
are the Corps' plans to increase capacity during the 2007 hurricane
season?
Scope and Methodology:
We reviewed the Corps' plans for three interim closure structures
(gates) and temporary pump systems on the three New Orleans drainage
canals (unless otherwise noted, the pump systems discussed in this
briefing are the temporary ones installed at the three canals):
We reviewed documentation, including e-mails, correspondence, and other
documents related to the solicitation process, contract specifications,
factory test results, performance requirements, and the Corps' plans
for increasing pumping capacity through 2007:
We visited the 17th Street Canal and observed the pump systems:
We interviewed officials from (1) the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at
Headquarters, the New Orleans District, other Corps districts, and
members of the Mississippi Valley Division's independent team reviewing
issues related to the contract and pump performance; (2) Moving Water
Industries (MWI) Corporation and the other two pump suppliers that bid
on the pump solicitation; and, (3) the architectural and engineering
consulting firms contracted by the Corps:
We conducted our work from late-March through mid-May 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards:
Contract specifications and requirements:
Process Used to Identify Pumping Options:
The Corps contracted with two architectural and engineering consultant
firms (consultants) to:
* determine available technical options that could meet the Corps'
time, space, and pumping capacity needs,
* conduct the associated market research, and * survey pump equipment
suppliers:
On the basis of some technical analysis, the consultants concluded that
the 60-inch hydraulic pump was the best alternative for the Corps
because installation of:
* electric shaft pumps would require the use of auxiliary equipment and
have greater space requirements, and:
* smaller sized hydraulic pumps would require more pumps to be
installed to provide the same amount of pumping capacity:
The consultants' limited market research indicated that more than one
supplier had specifications for a 60-inch hydraulic pump, but only MWI
had actually built a pump of this type and size:
The consultants contacted both MWI and FPI (another pump manufacturer)
regarding their pumps, and met with MWI:
Of these two suppliers, the consultants identified MWI as the only
supplier who had actually manufactured the 60-inch hydraulic pump with
a 60-inch impeller; FPI's design for a 60 inch pump included only a 54-
inch impeller:
The consultants believed that MWI could deliver the 34 60-inch pumps
that the Corps needed on schedule:
The consultants had conferred with MWI as they were developing the
design for the gates and pump stations along the drainage canals:
Process used to develop the specifications included in the Corps'
Request for Proposal (RFP):
* The Corps did not have an existing technical specification for a 60-
inch hydraulic pump:
* The consultants drafted a specification for the RFP based on
technical specifications and descriptions of the pump contained in
catalogs published by MWI and FPI:
* The consultants told us that they had provided the Corps with a
generic specification because any reference to a specific supplier had
been removed:
Our analysis of the RFP equipment specifications indicate that they
more closely matched MWI's than FPI's catalog descriptions:
The testing specifications used for the RFP were identical to those
published by MWI, which included an open sump test requirement:
* After another supplier complained that the open sump test requirement
was restrictive because only MWI had an open sump, the Corps amended
the RFP to delete this requirement:
* This more stringent test requirement was incorporated into the
contract at the time of award because it was offered by MWI as part of
its proposal and accepted by the Government:
Given the limited period of time before the start of the 2006 hurricane
season, the Corps contracted for the pumps under statutory authority
allowing for use of other than full and open competition procedures wen
the agency's needs are of an unusual and compelling urgency:
Using this authority, the Corps streamlined parts of the acquisition
process:
* RFP was issued on Jan. 13, 2006; contractors' proposals were due on
Jan. 18, 2006; and contract was awarded on Jan. 27, 2006:
* Limited market analysis was conducted to identify potential products
and suppliers:
RFP prescribed the method and mechanism by which the pumping capacity
would be provided, rather than using a performance specification
approach in which the offerors propose the method or mechanism they
would use to meet requirements for pumping capacity:
The Corps expected these steps to reduce the delivery time for the
pumps by at least 25 days:
Basis for vendor selection:
The Corps received 3 proposals in response to its RFP:
Suppliers submitted pricing information and technical proposals, and
made oral presentations to the Corps:
Corps officials told us their preference was to award one contract to
one vendor for ease of administration and perceived economies of scale;
however, to encourage competition the RFP allowed for multiple
contracts:
The Corps evaluated proposals on a best value basis making cost-
technical tradeoffs between price and technical merit/quality:
The Corps' five-member Source Selection Evaluation Board evaluated
offers using the following factors in order of descending importance:
* Technical Approach:
* Project Management:
* Past Performance:
* Small/Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB) Participation:
* Price:
The Source Selection Evaluation Board rated MWI's proposal
significantly higher than the other two proposals received:
MWI's proposal included commitments from suppliers and subcontractors
to deliver the necessary pump components:
MWI was believed to represent the best chance of meeting the Corps'
critical schedule of June 1, 2006:
MWI offered a firm fixed price of $26.6 million (based on the
government estimate of $25.6 million, MWI's price was within 2.8% of
the government estimate):
The Contracting Officer determined that MWI's price was fair and
reasonable so no discussions were conducted:
Based on the evaluation results, a firm fixed price contract was
awarded on Jan. 27, 2006 to MWI:
The total price of the contract was increased by about $5 million for
delivery incentives and subsequently by about $4 million for acquiring
6 additional pumping systems:
As of May 4, 2007 the Corps has paid MWI $28,583,950:
Additional Pumps Acquired Under Another Contract:
Subsequent to awarding the contract for the 34 pumps, the Corps in June
2006 released another RFP for additional hydraulic pumps with the same
specifications as the original RFP for the MWI contract:
This procurement was protested to GAO because the requirement was
restrictive to one supplier and it called for an extremely short
proposal turn around and equipment delivery time:
The protest was withdrawn when the Corps agreed to cancel the RFP and
write one with broader specifications:
This RFP also included government inspection and rejection of
unsatisfactory equipment, field tests for reliability, and inspection
and X-ray examination of welds, if needed, and that resulted in a
different vendor supplying different types of pumps that met the Corps'
needs:
Factory test concerns:
We identified the following concerns with the testing conducted on the
hydraulic pumps acquired under the contract with MWI:
* The Corps and MWI lacked a comprehensive testing plan designed to
identify and resolve problems before shipment:
* Because of schedule and performance concerns, factory testing
parameters changed several times, for example the Corps discontinued
some tests and added others:
* Limited provisions for field testing were included in the contract
with no criteria for desired end result or success of test:
Some of the factory test requirements in the contract:
* were inconsistent with the Corps' guidance, for example the
requirement for open sump testing was contrary to the Corps' guidance,
which limits testing for pumps 24-inch and larger to model testing:
* lacked specificity, for example the requirement to obtain pump
performance curves did not outline how curves were to be obtained, and:
* did not always identify what results constituted acceptable
performance or what was needed to ensure performance:
Factory testing was conducted from March through May 2006:
* Hydrostatic tests for leaks: Performed and passed:
* Performance tests:
- About mid-April, due to concerns about the time required to perform
these types of tests and the mechanical problems observed with the
hydraulic motor assembly the Corps stopped performance testing and
added endurance testing to help isolate the cause of the problems with
the hydraulic motor assembly:
- As a result, only '/4 of Rineer motor/pump impeller systems were
performance tested before shipment, some of which were later found to
have problems:
Endurance tests:
* The Corps requested a 5-hour endurance test, which was later changed
to a 3-hour test due to schedule concerns:
* Endurance tests were conducted and passed on hydraulic drive parts of
the pump systems (including spares), although some required several
test attempts after correcting non-hydraulic component failures:
* MWI conducted one 24-hour endurance test as requested by the Corps
but only at 1/3 of the full operating pressure due to testing
limitations at the factory:
The Corps rationale for installing the pumps:
Despite the incomplete and/or unsatisfactory results of the initial
factory tests, due primarily to problems with the hydraulic drive parts
of the pump systems, the Corps installed the pump systems because it
believed that the hydraulic drive parts of the pump systems had
satisfactorily completed the endurance tests and that:
* Any amount of pumping capacity that would help mitigate rainfall-
related flooding would be beneficial in the event that the gates had to
be closed due to a hurricane or storm, and:
* Any performance problems with the pump systems could be resolved
after they were installed on the canals:
Pumping capacity for the 2006 hurricane season:
As of June 1, 2006, the Corps had installed:
* 5 temporary pump systems on the Orleans Avenue Canal with a
theoretical capacity of 915 cfs:
* 0 temporary pump systems on the 17th Street Canal:
* 0 pumping capacity on the London Avenue Canal (there were 6 temporary
pumps installed on the London Avenue Canal but the gates were not
functioning so pumping capacity was not an issue):
Shortly after the beginning of the 2006 hurricane season, the Corps
added capacity at the three canals (including portable pumps) as shown
on the following three charts:
Although by July 2006 all 34 pumps had been installed, due to pump
performance problems during factory tests, it is uncertain how much of
this theoretical pumping capacity would have worked and for how long:
Pumping Capacity Trend for the 17'h Street Canal (June 1, 2006-August
15, 2007):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Carps of Engineers' data:
[End of figure]
Pumping Capacity Trend for the London Avenue Canal (June 1, 2006-August
15, 2007):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' data:
[End of figure]
Pumping Capacity Trend for the Orleans Avenue Canal (June 1, 2006-
August 15, 2007):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army corps of Engineers' data.
[End of figure]
Actions taken to address problems with certain components of pump
systems:
Known component problems and fixes:
* Gear oil circulation pumps undersized motors caused overheating:
- Replaced with larger motors:
Denison hydraulic pumps air pockets in hydraulic lines, caused
hydraulic pumps to run dry and become damaged:
* As an interim fix, the Corps revised its start-up procedures:
* The Corps also added a priming valve to 34 pumps to keep hydraulic
lines primed and will retrofit these pumps with a permanent fix but a
schedule has not yet been determined:
Welds suspected weak welds on pump housing which could cause pump
failure, and on hydraulic piping which could cause leaks:
* Rewelded some critical structural welds and pressure-tested hydraulic
piping:
Rineer motor undersized springs, caused pulsation in hydraulic lines:
* Upgraded to stronger springs in Rineer motor:
Pumping capacity for 2007 hurricane season and plans for additional
capacity:
On June 1, 2007, Corps plans to have 40 pump systems installed with the
following capacity:
* 17th Street - 18 temporary pump systems with 4,000 cfs and portable
pumps with 1,600 cfs will provide a total of 5,600 cfs or 73% of
restricted canal capacity and 53% of maximum canal capacity:
* London Avenue - 12 temporary pump systems with 2,665 cfs or 53% of
restricted canal capacity and 33% of maximum canal capacity:
* Orleans Avenue - 10 temporary pump systems with 2,220 cfs or 117% of
restricted canal capacity and 83% of maximum canal capacity:
Within practical testing parameters, as the Corps has reinstalled the
pump systems at the drainage canals, it has tested each one from
between 45 minutes to 2 hours, and believes that the known problems are
being fixed and that each pump system should operate as designed:
* As of May 15, 2007, the Corps has reinstalled and tested 35 pumps and
plans to reinstall and retest the remaining 5 pumps by May 24, 2007:
According to the Corps, it is not possible to test each pump system for
an extended period of time or to test the entire system due to
limitations in simulating the amount of water that would be present in
the canals and the lake during an actual storm event:
Additional plans for the 2007 Hurricane Season:
* Installation and testing of 19 vertical direct-drive pump systems (11
on the 17t" Street Canal will provide 4,180 cfs and 8 on the London
Avenue Canal will provide 2,700 cfs):
* 14 portable pumps will provide 1,600 cfs at the 17t"Street Canal:
The total planned pumping capacity provided by all temporary and
portable pumps to be installed by August 2007 will meet the restricted
level of water that the Sewerage and Water Board can pump into the
canals, given the current status of the canal floodwalls:
As a result of the restricted water levels allowed in the drainage
canals, there still may be some flooding in parts of the city in the
event that the canal gates are closed due to a hurricane or storm:
Furthermore, some questions remain regarding the actual capacity of the
pump systems due to the differences in the specifications (a larger
clearance between the impeller and housing):
Illustration of the 17th Street Canal with the additional vertical flow
pumps (in circle):
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
The Corps' decisions were focused on satisfying the primary requirement
to have pumping capacity in place by the start of the 2006 hurricane
season:
In order to increase the likelihood that pumping capacity would be in
place when needed, the Corps utilized several tools to expedite and
streamline the acquisition process:
The Corps appears to have had a valid reason for each of the iterative
decisions it made at each stage of the procurement process; the
cumulative effect of these decisions resulted in MWI being in the
strongest competitive position to receive the contract:
Although factory testing revealed problems with the pumps, and the
Corps had no assurance that the pump systems would operate to capacity
when needed, the Corps installed these pump systems to provide some
pumping capacity during the 2006 hurricane season:
Since June 1, 2006, Corps has continued to take steps to correct known
performance problems:
By June 1, 2007, the Corps plans to complete reinstallation of the 40
pump systems that have each been tested for 45 minutes to 2 hours thus
providing greater assurance that they will perform as designed:
By mid-August 2007, the Corps plans to expand temporary pumping
capacity at the 17th Street and London Avenue canals by adding 19
additional pumps of a different design:
However, total planned temporary and portable pumping capacity will not
meet the Sewerage and Water Board's drainage needs to keep the city
from flooding during a hurricane when the canal gates are closed for 2
reasons:
* Weaknesses in some canal walls will continue to restrict the amount
of water that can be pumped into the canals from the city to about 69%
of their maximum capacity:
* Even if these restrictions were eased or lifted, the Corps would have
pumping capacity equal to about 82% of the maximum canal capacity:
[End of section]
(360822):
FOOTNOTES
[1] A hydraulic pumping system is one where pressurized fluid is used
to transmit power from the engine to the pump motor and impeller. This
allows for greater flexibility in the placement of the engine and the
pumping system because they are connected by hydraulic lines.
[2] The Canal Street Pump Station, operated by Jefferson Parish, may
pump up to 160 cfs of the 10,500 cfs maximum capacity into the 17 t"
Street Canal.
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