Defense Acquisitions
An Analysis of the Special Operations Command's Management of Weapon System Programs Gao ID: GAO-07-620 June 28, 2007Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) duties have greatly increased since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Special Operations Forces are at work in Afghanistan and Iraq, and SOCOM has been assigned to lead U.S. efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. SOCOM's acquisitions budget has also greatly increased in this period--more than doubling from $788 million in 2001 to approximately $1.91 billion in 2006. In light of SOCOM's expanded duties, Congress requested that GAO review SOCOM's management of its acquisition programs. GAO's evaluation includes an assessment of: the types of acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 and whether the programs are consistent with its mission; the extent to which SOCOM's programs have progressed as planned; and the challenges SOCOM faces in managing its acquisition programs.
SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs that are consistent with the command's mission to provide equipment that addresses the unique needs of the Special Operations Forces. SOCOM has committed to spend about $6 billion on these programs. About 88 percent of the programs are relatively small, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing service equipment and assets. SOCOM's acquisition plans--as reflected in its current 5-year plan--continue to focus on relatively small-scale, short-cycle programs with modest development efforts. Overall, SOCOM's acquisition program performance has been mixed. About 60 percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and schedule estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost increases because of the need to buy additional quantities of equipment for ongoing combat operations. The other 40 percent of SOCOM's acquisition programs have not progressed as planned and experienced modest to, in a small number of cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays because of a range of technical and programmatic issues. Although fewer in number, the programs that experienced problems comprise about 50 percent of acquisition funding because they tend to be the larger and costlier, platform-based programs that SOCOM is acquiring and those where SOCOM depends on one of the military departments for equipment and program management support. SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges to ensure its acquisition programs are consistently completed on time and within budget. Urgent requirements to support SOCOM's ongoing combat missions have and will continue to challenge SOCOM's ability to balance near- and long- term needs against available funding resources. In addition, SOCOM has difficulty tracking progress on programs where it has delegated management authority to one of the military departments and has not consistently applied a knowledge-based acquisition approach in executing programs, particularly the larger and more complex programs. Furthermore, SOCOM has encountered challenges ensuring it has the workforce size and composition to carry out its acquisition work.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-620, Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special Operations Command's Management of Weapon System Programs
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Report to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2007:
Defense Acquisitions:
An Analysis of the Special Operations Command's Management of Weapon
System Programs:
GAO-07-620:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-620, a report to the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Special Operations Command‘s (SOCOM) duties have greatly increased
since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Special Operations
Forces are at work in Afghanistan and Iraq, and SOCOM has been assigned
to lead U.S. efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. SOCOM‘s
acquisitions budget has also greatly increased in this period”more than
doubling from $788 million in 2001 to approximately $1.91 billion in
2006. In light of SOCOM‘s expanded duties, Congress requested that GAO
review SOCOM‘s management of its acquisition programs. GAO‘s evaluation
includes an assessment of: the types of acquisition programs SOCOM has
undertaken since 2001 and whether the programs are consistent with its
mission; the extent to which SOCOM‘s programs have progressed as
planned; and the challenges SOCOM faces in managing its acquisition
programs.
What GAO Found:
SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs that are
consistent with the command‘s mission to provide equipment that
addresses the unique needs of the Special Operations Forces. SOCOM has
committed to spend about $6 billion on these programs. About 88 percent
of the programs are relatively small, have short acquisition cycles,
and use modified commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or
modify existing service equipment and assets. SOCOM‘s acquisition
plans”as reflected in its current 5-year plan”continue to focus on
relatively small-scale, short-cycle programs with modest development
efforts.
Overall, SOCOM‘s acquisition program performance has been mixed. About
60 percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001
have progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and
schedule estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had
cost increases because of the need to buy additional quantities of
equipment for ongoing combat operations. The other 40 percent of
SOCOM‘s acquisition programs have not progressed as planned and
experienced modest to, in a small number of cases, significant cost
increases and schedule delays because of a range of technical and
programmatic issues. Although fewer in number, the programs that
experienced problems comprise about 50 percent of acquisition funding
because they tend to be the larger and costlier, platform-based
programs that SOCOM is acquiring and those where SOCOM depends on one
of the military departments for equipment and program management
support.
SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges to ensure its
acquisition programs are consistently completed on time and within
budget. Urgent requirements to support SOCOM‘s ongoing combat missions
have and will continue to challenge SOCOM‘s ability to balance near-
and long-term needs against available funding resources. In addition,
SOCOM has difficulty tracking progress on programs where it has
delegated management authority to one of the military departments and
has not consistently applied a knowledge-based acquisition approach in
executing programs, particularly the larger and more complex programs.
Furthermore, SOCOM has encountered challenges ensuring it has the
workforce size and composition to carry out its acquisition work.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to ensure SOCOM
(1) establishes sound business cases when starting programs,
particularly its more complex and department-managed programs; (2) has
the workforce size and composition to match its acquisition workload;
and (3) improves its acquisition management information system. DOD
generally concurred with these recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-620].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-
4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Consistent with the Command's Mission:
SOCOM'S Acquisition Program Performance Has Been Mixed:
SOCOM Faces Management and Workforce Challenges in Its Acquisition
Programs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: SOCOM's Policies, Procedures, and Organizational Structure
for Managing Acquisitions:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: SOCOM Component Commands End Strength:
Table 2. SOCOM Acquisition Programs from 2001 to 2006 by Type and
Funding:
Table 3: Summary of SOCOM Programs by Acquisition Categories:
Table 4: Estimated Ranges of Acquisition Program Costs:
Table 5: Summary of Programs That Have and Have Not Been Progressing as
Planned:
Table 6: Summary of Acquisition Programs by Management Structure:
Table 7: SOCOM's Civilian and Military Acquisition Workforce
Composition and Training Levels:
Table 8: SOCOM's Military Critical Acquisition Position (CAP) and DOD
Certification Levels:
Table 9: Summary of SOCOM Acquisition Programs' MDAs and Program
Managers:
Figures:
Figure 1: Leaflet Delivery System:
Figure 2: SOCOM's Family of Sniper Rifles:
Figure 3: MH-47G:
Figure 4: Example of a SOCOM-Modified Commercial Vehicle:
Figure 5: MANPACK Advanced Concept Technology Development:
Figure 6: SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Management Structure:
Abbreviations:
ACAT: Acquisition Category:
AMP: Avionics Modernization Program:
ASD(SO/ LIC): Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and
Low- Intensity Conflict:
CAAP: Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration:
CAP: Critical Acquisition Position:
DAWIA: Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GWOT: global war on terrorism:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System:
MDA: Milestone Decision Authority:
MILDEP: military department:
SEAL: Sea Air and Land:
SOALIS: Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System
SOCOM: Special Operations Command:
SOF: Special Operations Forces:
UDA: Urgent Deployment Acquisitions:
USD(AT&L): Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 28, 2007:
The Honorable Jack Reed:
Chairman:
The Honorable Elizabeth Dole:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in 1987 to
oversee the training, doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF). A key objective in establishing a unified
command was to ensure that the Special Operations Forces of the
military services would be equipped with the right weapon systems to
carry out their unique missions. The SOCOM commander was granted the
authority to independently develop, acquire, and field specialized
equipment. This "special operations forces-peculiar" equipment may be
newly created or standard equipment modified to meet SOF needs, but may
not duplicate equipment provided from the other military
services.[Footnote 1]
In the past several years, SOCOM's acquisition program budget has
increased significantly--from $788 million in 2001 to approximately
$1.91 billion in 2006--as the role of the special operations forces in
U.S. military operations has grown. For example, in 2003, the Secretary
of Defense expanded SOCOM's duties to include leading the Department of
Defense's (DOD) global war on terrorism (GWOT) operations. In keeping
with this expanded role, DOD has begun to re-tool SOCOM from primarily
a supporting command into a command responsible for planning and
executing missions in GWOT. The change became more prominent with the
fiscal year 2004 budget request, in which the President proposed a 47
percent increase in SOCOM's funding.
In light of SOCOM's expanded acquisition duties, Congress requested
that GAO review SOCOM's management of its acquisition programs. To do
so we addressed the following questions:
* What types of acquisition programs has SOCOM undertaken since 2001
and are they consistent with SOCOM's mission?
* To what extent have SOCOM's acquisition programs progressed as
planned, meeting their initial cost and schedule estimates?
* What challenges if any does SOCOM face in managing its acquisition
programs?
SOCOM has encountered difficulties over the past several years with two
of its flagship acquisition programs--the Advanced SEAL Delivery System
(ASDS) and the CV-22 Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft.[Footnote 2] The
ASDS program is funded by SOCOM and managed by the Navy. The basic CV-
22 platform is funded by the Air Force and produced under a Navy
contract. SOCOM funds SOF-peculiar modifications to the CV-22. Both the
ASDS and CV-22 programs have experienced significant cost, schedule,
and performance problems because of requirements, technology, and
design issues. Since both programs began before 2001, we did not
include them in our analysis. However, we have reported separately on
the programs, and those reports are listed at the end of this report.
To assess SOCOM's management of its acquisition programs, we collected
and reviewed information on all programs undertaken by the command
between 2001 and 2006. We analyzed the information to determine what
types of systems were being acquired and whether programs were meeting
planned cost, schedule, and quantity objectives. To identify the
challenges they face, we examined and analyzed pertinent documentation
to include DOD, military departments, and SOCOM directives,
instructions, policies, and operating procedures related to the Defense
Acquisition System, and we interviewed key officials from SOCOM's
Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics and Resources and
Requirements organizations. We relied on previous GAO work as a
framework for knowledge-based acquisition.
We performed our review from July 2006 through May 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Since January 2001, SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition
programs that are consistent with the command's mission to provide
equipment that addresses the unique needs of the special operations
forces and for which there is no service-common requirement. SOCOM has
committed about $6 billion to date on these programs. About 88 percent
of the programs are Acquisition Category (ACAT) III level in
size,[Footnote 3] have short acquisition cycles, and use commercial off-
the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing service
equipment and assets. For example, SOCOM has modified commercially
available trucks, information technology equipment, and weapon systems,
as well as undertaken extensive modifications to service systems such
as the Army's CH-47 helicopter. In the latter case, the Army funded the
basic aircraft and Army-common improvements, and SOCOM funds the
special operations modifications, which include extended range and
enhanced defensive capabilities. Since 2001, SOCOM has undertaken only
one ACAT I level program. It was to develop a common avionics package
for its fleet of transport, tanker, and gunship aircraft. SOCOM's
acquisition plans--as reflected in its current Future Year Defense
Program[Footnote 4]--continue to focus on starting new programs that
will be relatively small-scale, short-cycle, and involve modifications
of existing systems.
Overall, SOCOM's acquisition program performance has been mixed. About
60 percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001
progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and schedule
estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost
increases from buying additional quantities of equipment for ongoing
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other 40 percent of
SOCOM's acquisition programs have not progressed as planned and
experienced modest to, in a number of cases, significant cost increases
and schedule delays because of a range of technical, programmatic, or
funding issues. Although fewer in number, the programs that experienced
problems make up about 50 percent of acquisition funding because these
acquisitions tend to be the larger and costlier platform-based programs
SOCOM is developing and programs where SOCOM is dependent on one of the
military departments for the basic platform or equipment and/or for
program management support. We could not compare SOCOM's acquisition
performance with DOD's overall performance, mainly because aggregate
data on DOD's smaller programs are not kept.
SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges in ensuring its
acquisition programs are more consistently completed on time and within
budget. Urgent requirements to support SOCOM's role in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and its new role as the lead in the global war on terrorism have
and will continue to challenge SOCOM's ability to balance near-and long-
term needs against available funding resources. For example, according
to SOCOM, in order to fund urgent deployment acquisitions in the past 5-
years, the command reallocated about $259 million from existing and
planned programs. Additionally, SOCOM has difficulty tracking progress
of programs for which it has delegated management authority to the
military departments and addressing problems early on when they occur
in these delegated programs. Also, while SOCOM employs elements of a
knowledge-based acquisition approach, it is not consistently applied.
For example, SOCOM has started some programs without ensuring that
there was a solid match between requirements and the necessary
resources, such as key technologies, to complete the development. In
addition, a key database SOCOM uses for managing all of its acquisition
programs has not been kept up to date, impeding program oversight.
Furthermore, SOCOM plans to expand the size of its acquisition
workforce by about 75 percent; however, in recent years SOCOM has
encountered difficulties in being able to hire personnel in reasonable
time frames and ensuring that its program managers are fully certified
in accordance with DOD standards.
To better position SOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program
outcomes, we are making recommendations that the Secretary of Defense
take steps to ensure that SOCOM: (1) establishes sound business cases
when starting programs, particularly its more complex and military
department-managed acquisition programs, and applies the elements of a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy; (2) has the workforce size and
composition to match its acquisition workload; and (3) improves the
accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of its acquisition management
information system. DOD partially concurred with the first
recommendation and fully concurred with the other two recommendations.
With respect to the first recommendation, DOD concurred with applying
elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, but only after it
is defined by DOD within the 5000 Series of documents. This should not
result in a delay in action on DOD's part as DOD's acquisition policy
already includes the key elements of a knowledge-based acquisition
approach particularly regarding technology, design, and production. It
is important that SOCOM follow this policy because we have found that
programs experience cost, schedule, and performance problems when they
proceed into system development and initial manufacturing with lower
levels of knowledge than specified in DOD's acquisition policy.
Background:
SOCOM is one of ten combatant commands[Footnote 5] directly responsible
to the Secretary of Defense. The command was established by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,[Footnote 6]
and codified in 10 USC Section 167. As a functional command, SOCOM's
primary responsibility is to prepare the special operations forces
(SOF) to carry out assigned missions. When appropriate, SOCOM may be
called upon to conduct special operations activities unilaterally or
provide support to other U.S. military forces. In 2003, the Secretary
of Defense expanded SOCOM's role to include leading the DOD's GWOT
operations. In this central role, SOCOM plans, directs, and executes
special operations in the conduct of the GWOT in order to disrupt and
destroy terrorist networks that threaten the United States, its
citizens, and its interests worldwide. SOCOM also organizes, trains,
and equips SOF warriors provided to the geographic combatant commanders
and to the American ambassadors and their country teams. In keeping
with this expanded role, DOD has begun to re-tool SOCOM from primarily
a supporting command into a command responsible for planning,
synchronizing, and executing missions in the GWOT. SOCOM is
headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, and has four
component commands, and one sub-unified command located at different
military bases. The Marine Corps Special Operations Command joined
SOCOM on February 24, 2006. Table 1 shows the end strength of each of
the component commands.
Table 1: SOCOM Component Commands End Strength:
Component command: Joint Special Operations Command (Sub-unified
Command);
Location: Pope Air Force Base and Ft. Bragg, N.C;
End strength: 1,250.
Component command: Army Special Forces Command;
Location: Ft. Bragg, N.C;
End strength: 22,386.
Component command: Naval Special Warfare Command;
Location: Coronado, Calif;
End strength: 7,507.
Component command: Air Force Special Operations Command;
Location: Hurlburt Field, Fla;
End strength: 12,801.
Component command: Marine Corps Special Operations Command;
Location: Camp Lejeune, N.C;
End strength: 1,414.
Component command: Total;
Location: [Empty];
End strength: 45,358.
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Congress created SOCOM to improve the ability of the United States to
conduct special operations. Congress vested the command with the
responsibility and the authority for the development and acquisition of
SOF-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the
head of agency, and the authority to execute its own budget. SOF-
peculiar equipment is defined as equipment, materials, supplies, and
services required for SOF activities for which there is no service-
common requirement. According to SOCOM, these are limited to items and
services initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for
service-common use by other DOD forces; modifications approved for
application to standard items and services used by other DOD forces;
and items and services critical for the immediate accomplishment of a
SOF activity.
To fund the acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment, SOCOM was also given
responsibility for supervising a separate Major Force Program-11 budget
account.[Footnote 7] Congress determined that a dedicated funding
mechanism was necessary because, in the past, the military departments
had tended to give lower priority to SOF's equipment needs than to
their own needs. For fiscal year 2006, SOCOM's total budget was $7.2
billion, of which $1.9 billion was for development-and-acquisition-
related purposes.
In acquiring SOF equipment, SOCOM falls under the same DOD acquisition
policies and guidelines and workforce requirements that apply to the
military departments and other defense agencies. The military
departments and SOCOM are governed by DOD's 5000 Series for the Defense
Acquisition System.[Footnote 8] Similarly, each military department,
along with SOCOM, has its own policies and procedures to implement
higher level directives and guide the management of acquisition
activities within the military departments or command.
SOCOM's acquisition workforce training and tenure is governed by the
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), enacted in
1990.[Footnote 9] The Act specifically created a formal acquisition
corps and defined educational, experience, and tenure criteria needed
for key positions, including program managers, contracting officers,
and other personnel involved in the acquisition process. According to
DOD, members of the acquisition corps may earn three progressive
certification levels--basic (Level I), intermediate (Level II), and
advanced (Level III).[Footnote 10] Each certification level is
comprised of a combination of education, experience, and training
elements. Certification recognizes the level to which a member of the
acquisition workforce has achieved functional and core acquisition
competencies required by a specific career field. Members of SOCOM's
acquisition workforce are required to meet the same training and
certification requirements as those in the military departments.
SOCOM's approach to acquisition management also has some distinctive
features. The command is unique in DOD in that it plans, funds,
acquires, and sustains weapon systems all under one roof. Specifically,
all the key entities involved in the acquisition life-cycle process--
requirements developers, comptroller, contracting personnel, logistics
planners, and program offices--are colocated. SOCOM also uses a
centralized approach to assess and prioritize requirements and select
programs based on competing needs and available resources. SOCOM's
customers--the SOF warriors--are directly involved in determining what
weapon systems are pursued. In addition, SOCOM can arrange to transfer
program management and milestone decision authority[Footnote 11]
responsibilities to one of the military departments to execute the
program on behalf of SOCOM. SOCOM has done this with many of its
programs that involve some modification of military department-provided
equipment or in cases where the military departments may have greater
technical and program management expertise. Further description of how
SOCOM is structured to manage its acquisitions is provided in appendix
II.
SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Consistent with the Command's Mission:
SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs since
January 2001 that are consistent with the command's mission to address
unique SOF needs and those needs for which there are no service-common
requirement. SOCOM has committed about $6 billion to date on these
programs. The vast majority of SOCOM's acquisition programs are ACAT
III level in size, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified
commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing
service equipment and assets. In acquiring systems, SOCOM has
emphasized the need for "80 percent" solutions that provide improved
capabilities incrementally to the warfighter in reasonable time frames,
rather than major development efforts that require advanced
technologies and years of research and development. Both the ASDS and
CV-22 programs were started in the 1990s. Since 2001, SOCOM has
undertaken only one ACAT I level program. It was to develop a common
avionics package for its fleet of transport, tanker, and gunship
aircraft. SOCOM's acquisition plans for the future--as reflected in its
current Future Year Defense Program--continue to maintain its SOF-
peculiar focus.
Most of SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Are Small:
SOCOM initiated 86 acquisition programs from 2001 to 2006 to meet SOF-
peculiar requirements, which can be grouped into five major areas:
rotary wing, fixed wing, maritime systems, information and intelligence
systems, and special operations forces warrior equipment (e.g.,
vehicles and weapons).[Footnote 12] Table 2 shows the number and
funding for these programs by each major grouping.
Table 2: SOCOM Acquisition Programs from 2001 to 2006 by Type and
Funding:
Program types: Rotary wing;
Number of programs: 10;
Funding ($M): $2,019.
Program types: Fixed wing;
Number of programs: 29;
Funding ($M): 1,670.
Program types: Maritime systems;
Number of programs: 5;
Funding ($M): 30.
Program types: Information and intelligence systems;
Number of programs: 15;
Funding ($M): 393.
Program types: Special Operations Warrior;
Number of programs: 27;
Funding ($M): 885.
Program types: Total;
Number of programs: 86;
Funding ($M): $4997[A].
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[A] This amount excludes about $254 million in supplemental funding.
[End of table]
As table 3 shows, 76 of SOCOM's 86 acquisition programs are ACAT III
level in size, and the majority of these programs use nondevelopmental
and commercial off-the-shelf items to meet SOF-peculiar needs. A
further breakdown of these programs, depicted in table 4, indicates
that most cost less than $25 million. The small number of larger, ACAT
I and II level programs are fixed and rotary wing systems, costing $200
million or more. These larger programs involve modifications to
existing platform systems and more substantial technology development
efforts. The one ACAT I level program SOCOM initiated since 2001--the
Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program--is
intended to provide specialized capabilities for MC-130H and AC-130H/U
transport, tanker, and gunship aircraft, including low probability of
detection and improved terrain following and avoidance radar.
Table 3: Summary of SOCOM Programs by Acquisition Categories:
Acquisition categories: I;
Number of programs: 1;
Program types: Fixed wing.
Acquisition categories: II;
Number of programs: 6;
Program types: Fixed wing and Rotary wing.
Acquisition categories: III;
Number of programs: 76;
Program types: Fixed wing, Rotary wing, Information & Intelligence
systems, Maritime systems, and Special Operations Forces Warrior.
Acquisition categories: N/A[A];
Number of programs: 3;
Program types: Information & Intelligence systems.
Acquisition categories: Total;
Number of programs: 86;
Program types: [Empty].
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[A] According to SOCOM, these programs do not meet the criteria to be
designated as a regular acquisition category.
[End of table]
Table 4: Estimated Ranges of Acquisition Program Costs:
Number acquisition programs: 6;
Cost ranges ($M): Greater than $200.
Number acquisition programs: 7;
Cost ranges ($M): $101 to $200.
Number acquisition programs: 11;
Cost ranges ($M): $51 to $100.
Number acquisition programs: 14;
Cost ranges ($M): $25 to $50.
Number acquisition programs: 48;
Cost ranges ($M): Less than $25.
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Several key examples of the types of programs SOCOM has undertaken are
described below.
Leaflet Delivery System:
The leaflet delivery system is an ACAT III program that was fielded by
SOCOM at a cost of about $20 million. The system uses a fully reusable,
commercial-off-the-shelf, unmanned aerial vehicle as a component of the
autonomously guided parafoil system it has developed. The delivery
system is capable of delivering leaflets or psychological operations
materials to target audiences in peacetime and in war. It took SOCOM
about 8 months to field this capability to the SOF warrior. It can be
ground launched from the back of a high-mobility multiwheeled vehicle
and air launched from a C-130, C-141, or C-17 cargo aircraft. Figure 1
below shows the leaflet delivery system.
Figure 1: Leaflet Delivery System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: SOCOM.
[End of figure]
Commercially Designed Sniper Weapons:
SOCOM's current family of sniper rifles was acquired as
nondevelopmental and commercial off-the-shelf items, which according to
the program office, enables rapid acquisition of an initial capability
as well as efficient spiral development of enhanced capabilities as
mission requirements direct. SOCOM currently has four rifles in its
family of sniper rifles, the MK 11--7.62mm Sniper Support Rifle, the MK
12--5.56mm Special Purpose Rifle, the MK 13--.300 Winchester Magnum,
and the MK 15--.50 caliber. Each will only fire one type of ammunition
and with varying effective ranges. Two of the sniper rifles, MK 11 and
MK 12, will be replaced by the Sniper Support Rifle variant of the SOF
Combat Assault Rifle, which is an ACAT III program consisting of a
modified commercial off-the-shelf system, and is estimated to cost
about $50 million. The new sniper rifle is a modular design, and the
caliber of the rifle can be changed by replacing the barrel, bolt, and
trigger modules. The life expectancy of the SOCOM rifles shown in
figure 2 is about 5 years. Therefore, according to the SOF Warrior
program office, SOF plans a phased replacement of like or enhanced
capability every 5 years.
Figure 2: SOCOM's Family of Sniper Rifles:
[See PDF for image]
Source: SOCOM.
[End of figure]
Modification to the Army's Service-Common CH-47 Helicopter:
SOCOM has an ACAT II program underway, estimated to cost about $200
million, which modifies the Army's service-common CH-47 helicopter to
meet its SOF-peculiar requirements. Several features on the aircraft
are SOCOM-peculiar such as the long aerial refueling probe on the front
of the aircraft, the standardized extended range fuel tank, and the
common aviation architecture systems cockpit. The CH-47 helicopter,
when modified by SOCOM, becomes a MH-47G helicopter that provides SOCOM
with a heavy assault helicopter with the latest avionics, sensors,
aircraft survivability features, and weapons systems. All MH-47
helicopters in SOCOM's inventory--which includes the MH-47D and the MH-
47E aircraft--will be converted to the MH-47G configuration over time.
According to SOCOM, at least two of the SOF-peculiar features on the MH-
47G helicopter were adopted by the Army and are now service-common
features. SOCOM developed standardized engines and an enhanced air
transportation kit that were designed to meet a SOF-peculiar
requirement. However, once they operational, the Army decided it could
use the capability as well and adopted it. Figure 3 shows some of the
basic modifications to the CH-47 that were provided by the Army and
those that were provided by SOCOM.
Figure 3: MH-47G:
[See PDF for image]
Source: SOCOM.
[End of figure]
Some SOCOM Programs Are Targeted to Urgent Needs:
In addition to regular acquisition programs, SOCOM has acquired various
equipment and material to meet urgent needs related to planned and
ongoing military operations. According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs
qualify for consideration if they meet one of two criteria: a potential
mission failure or loss of life. Because of the urgency of these needs,
SOCOM's focus is on acquiring readily available equipment in short time
frames. Since 2001, SOCOM has addressed about 50 urgent mission needs
and fielded equipment to its deployed SOF warriors at cost of about
$339 million. For example, to address an urgent operational need to
move personnel and materiel more effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq
without attracting local attention or projecting an overt military
presence, SOCOM acquired and modified about 150 commercial off-the-
shelf 4x4 trucks, sedans, and sport utility vehicles and fielded them
in about 4 weeks. Figure 4 below shows an example of a modified
commercial truck used by SOCOM.
Figure 4: Example of a SOCOM-Modified Commercial Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
Source: SOCOM.
[End of figure]
According to SOCOM officials, urgent needs are not to be used as a
means of circumventing or accelerating the normal program approval or
funding processes. To that end, equipment acquired via the urgent needs
process is fielded and sustained only for the duration of the military
operation. The sponsoring Component Commander is responsible for
determining post-operation disposition of any equipment acquired as a
result of an urgent needs request.
SOCOM has also fielded critical combat-related technologies through
DOD's Advanced Concept Technology Development program. DOD initiated
the program in 1994 to help get new technologies that meet critical
military needs into the hands of users faster and at less cost than the
traditional acquisition process.[Footnote 13] Over the past 5 years,
SOCOM has fielded seven Advanced Concept Technology Development
programs at a cost of about $385 million. For example, as shown in the
figure 5, SOCOM fielded the MANPACK radio threat detector which was an
Advanced Concept program. The MANPACK is designed to provide the basic
capability to identify and locate threat and friendly emitters, locate
unknown emitters, and provide situational awareness to the SOF operator
with little or no interaction from the user.
Figure 5: MANPACK Advanced Concept Technology Development:
[See PDF for image]
Source: SOCOM.
[End of figure]
SOCOM's acquisition plan for the future--as reflected in its current
Future Year Defense Program--continues to maintain a focus on providing
SOF-peculiar equipment. The acquisition programs SOCOM plans to start
over the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 time frame are similar to the
programs that SOCOM is currently acquiring. There are 13 acquisition
programs remaining in SOCOM's fiscal year 2007 to 2011 plan, and all
are at the ACAT III level. These programs continue to be small scale,
low cost, and will employ modified commercial-off-the-shelf and
nondevelopmental items. For example, the SOF Combat Assault sniper
rifle was among the remaining 2007 to 2011 programs and is SOF-peculiar
and a nondevelopmental item.
SOCOM'S Acquisition Program Performance Has Been Mixed:
Fifty-one (about 60 percent) of the 86 acquisition programs SOCOM has
undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, either staying within
original cost and schedule estimates or experiencing cost increases
unrelated to progress, such as for adding quantities to support ongoing
combat operations . The other 35 (40 percent) of SOCOM's 86 programs
have experienced or are likely to experience modest to, in a number of
cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays due to a range of
technical, programmatic, or funding issues. Although fewer in number,
these programs make up about 50 percent of SOCOM's total funding for
its acquisition programs. Ten of the programs have an estimated
schedule slip of at least one year, and several programs were canceled
because of a need to fund higher priorities or because of technical
issues encountered in developing the weapon system. The programs that
have not progressed as planned tend to be the larger, more complex
platform-based programs SOCOM is developing and programs where SOCOM is
dependent on the military departments for the basic platform or for
equipment and/or other resources, such as program management support.
Programs that are smaller, with less development risk, have better
results.
As shown in table 5, there are some differences in the type of programs
that are and are not progressing as planned, but the overall picture is
mixed.
Table 5: Summary of Programs That Have and Have Not Been Progressing as
Planned:
Type programs: Fixed wing;
Progressing as planned: Number of programs: 15;
Progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): $352.2;
Not progressing as planned: Number of programs: 14;
Not progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): $1,317.5.
Type programs: Information and intelligence;
Progressing as planned: Number of programs: 10;
Progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 65.6;
Not progressing as planned: Number of programs: 5;
Not progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 327.8.
Type programs: Maritime systems;
Progressing as planned: Number of programs: 4;
Progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 22.8;
Not progressing as planned: Number of programs: 1;
Not progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 7.0.
Type programs: Rotary wing;
Progressing as planned: Number of programs: 6;
Progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 1,492.5;
Not progressing as planned: Number of programs: 4;
Not progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 526.6.
Type programs: SOF Warrior;
Progressing as planned: Number of programs: 16;
Progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 543.3;
Not progressing as planned: Number of programs: 11;
Not progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): 341.9.
Type programs: Total;
Progressing as planned: Number of programs: 51;
Progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): $2,476.5;
Not progressing as planned: Number of programs: 35;
Not progressing as planned: Dollar value (millions): $2,520.7.
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[End of table]
In terms of the number of programs, fixed wing and SOF warrior systems
comprise a large proportion (25 out of 35) of those that are not
meeting original cost and schedule estimates. However, when viewed by
the amount of funding allocated to these programs, fixed and rotary
wing systems make up the majority ($1,844 million out of $2,521
million) that are not progressing as planned. We were not able to put
these results in context, that is, to compare them with DOD as a whole
to determine whether SOCOM's performance was typical or atypical. This
is primarily because of the fact that DOD does not keep aggregate
performance data on ACAT III programs--which comprise most of SOCOM's
acquisition portfolio.
Many of the fixed and rotary wing programs are the larger programs in
SOCOM's portfolio, involving modifications to existing military-
service or special-operations platform systems. As such, these programs
require more systems engineering and design/integration efforts than
other smaller programs being acquired by SOCOM. For example, the
estimated costs for SOCOM's fixed-wing AC-130U 30-millimeter gun-
modification program has increased 92 percent because of technical and
design issues, and the program has been deferred until fiscal year 2008
when additional funding may be available. Likewise, the AC-130U+4
program, which is intended to modify the C-130 aircraft into a side-
firing gunship, has been delayed by 7 months because of technical
issues with the aircraft 's configuration and design.
Many of SOCOM programs that are not progressing as planned are also
programs in which the military departments are involved in a management
capacity. As shown in table 6, 22 of the 35 programs that have not
stayed within original cost and schedule estimates have one of the
military departments in a management role--either as the milestone
decision authority or program manager or both. All of the fixed and
rotary wing programs that are not progressing as planned are in this
category. In contrast, however, SOCOM does manage its five largest
information and intelligence system programs, but they are not
progressing as planned.
Table 6: Summary of Acquisition Programs by Management Structure:
Management structure: SOCOM managed programs;
Progressing as planned: No. of programs: 26;
Progressing as planned: Cost (in millions): $632.3;
Not progressing as planned: No. of programs: 13;
Not progressing as planned: Cost (in millions): $626.0.
Management structure: MILDEP role in managing programs;
Progressing as planned: No. of programs: 25;
Progressing as planned: Cost (in millions): 1844.2;
Not progressing as planned: No. of programs: 22;
Not progressing as planned: Cost (in millions): 1895.0.
Management structure: Total;
Progressing as planned: No. of programs: 51;
Progressing as planned: Cost (in millions): $2476.5;
Not progressing as planned: No. of programs: 35;
Not progressing as planned: Cost (in millions): $2521.0.
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[End of table]
In assessing how programs have progressed, we identified a small number
of programs (8 out of 86) that SOCOM canceled or deferred because of a
need to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues
encountered during development. Most of these programs were canceled
early before significant funding and time were committed. In the other
few programs, however, we found significant time and effort was
invested before they were cancelled. For example, SOCOM's High Power
Fiber Optic Towed Decoy program, which was being developed to provide a
fiber optic towed decoy capability to SOCOM's fleet of AC and MC-130
aircraft, was canceled after spending about $85 million because of
higher funding priorities. SOCOM's one ACAT 1 program, the Common
Avionics Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program was also
subsequently terminated. The CAAP program, which was managed by the
U.S. Air Force, was being designed to provide SOF-peculiar avionics
capability to the U.S. Air Force's Avionics Modernization Program (AMP)
on the MC-130 H and AC-130H/U aircraft. It was designed to give SOF-
peculiar capabilities to the aircraft, including enhanced abilities to
follow terrain and avoid detection while using Air Force-provided
radar. However, SOCOM terminated all funding for the CAAP program in
its fiscal years 2008 to 2013 program objective memorandum. SOCOM
determined that it was cost prohibitive to continue the program after
the Air Force ran into problems with the AMP program and determined
that the cost to complete development of both AMP and CAAP would more
than double the original estimates.
SOCOM Faces Management and Workforce Challenges in Its Acquisition
Programs:
SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges in ensuring its
acquisition programs are completed on time and within budget. Urgent
requirements arising from SOCOM's role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its
new role in the GWOT have and will continue to challenge SOCOM's
ability to balance near-and long-term needs against available funding
resources. For example, in order to fund almost 50 urgent deployment
acquisitions in the past 5 years, SOCOM has had to reallocate $259
million from existing and planned acquisition programs. Additionally,
even though SOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition
approach, it is not consistently applied, and some programs have
started without a good match between requirements and resources. SOCOM
also has difficulty tracking progress on programs for which it has
delegated management authority to the military departments and
addressing problems earlier in these programs. Moreover, a key SOCOM
tool for managing its acquisition programs has not been consistently
maintained with up-to-date information. In addition, SOCOM has
encountered workforce challenges such as being able to hire civilian
personnel in reasonable time frames and ensuring that its military
personnel are fully compliant with DOD standards.
SOCOM Management Challenges:
Addressing high-priority urgent needs from the field will continue to
challenge SOCOM's ability to complete existing programs on time and
within budget. In its roles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and GWOT, SOCOM will
continue to fulfill urgent needs with acquisition programs. But because
of the short time frames involved, funding for these programs is not
built into the budget. In the past 5 years, SOCOM reallocated about
$259 million from budgeted programs to fund almost 50 urgent deployment
acquisitions. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, SOCOM did begin to receive
money from Congress in its budget--about $80 million and $22 million
respectively--to help defray some of the costs of its urgent deployment
acquisition programs. According to SOCOM's Acquisition Executive,
urgent deployment acquisitions are expected to continue over the next
several years, and the command anticipates requesting about $20 to $25
million each year from 2008 to 2013 to help pay for these needs.
Although funding shifts are disruptive in SOCOM, as they are in the
military departments, SOCOM's strategic planning structure for
assessing and selecting programs is well-suited for making the trade-
offs among priorities needed to address urgent needs.
SOCOM also has difficulty tracking progress and addressing problems
early in programs where it has delegated management authority to the
military departments. Having access to all the military departments
provides SOCOM the means to leverage resources and expertise that may
not reside at SOCOM, such as program management, engineering and
technical services, testing and evaluation support, and logistical
support. However, in some cases when SOCOM has relied on the military
departments for technical or basic capabilities, its programs have been
adversely affected when the department-provided capabilities are
delayed. When delays occur, there tends to be a cascading effect on
SOCOM programs. For example, initial schedule delays in the U.S. Air
Force's AMP for C-130 aircraft resulted in delays in SOCOM's ability to
acquire the CAAP program on the C-130 aircraft. The AMP program was to
provide a basic cockpit configuration and avionics capability for
different C-130 aircraft, and SOCOM's CAAP capability would provide
additional avionics capabilities for SOF missions. The AMP program
encountered technical and integration problems during installation
trials and is now being restructured. Because of delays and cost growth
with AMP, cost to complete the CAAP program increased significantly
leading to SOCOM's decision to cancel the CAAP program and defer this
capability.
According to SOCOM's acquisition executive, although SOCOM has over-
arching memorandums of agreement establishing program management
arrangements with each of the military departments, not all of the
agreements are signed at the appropriate levels of authority within the
military departments. While the agreement with the Army is signed by
the Secretary of the Army, the Air Force and Navy agreements are signed
by the chiefs of staff. This is a challenge to SOCOM because
acquisition and budget authority resides with the military department
secretary and not with the chief of staff. When problems occur in
programs managed by the Air Force or Navy, SOCOM may have less standing
to make a case that they are not living up to the memorandums of
agreement, than the command would with the Army. SOCOM also
acknowledges that memorandums of agreement for specific programs--
particularly the larger, more complex programs SOCOM delegates to the
military departments--have not been detailed enough in terms of laying
out the roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing
programs, nor detailed enough in laying out how SOCOM will be able to
track progress and participate in regular program reviews with the
military departments. While written agreements by themselves may not
result in better SOCOM-military department programs, they are important
in that they provide a foundation for effective program management.
SOCOM is currently taking steps to update the written agreements with
the military departments and also examining whether some of its
programs would be better under SOCOM management.
SOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, but
it is not consistently applied. We have frequently reported on the need
to develop a solid, executable business case before committing
resources to a new product development effort. A business case should
be based on DOD's acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading
commercial firms and other successful DOD programs. Our work has shown
that the business case in its simplest form demonstrates evidence that
(1) the warfighter's needs are valid and that they can best be met with
the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and
produced within existing resources--that is: proven technologies,
design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the
product when it is needed. We found that although SOCOM has a
systematic strategic planning process to prioritize and select
programs, it has started some programs, particularly the larger and
more complex programs, without ensuring that there was a solid match
between the requirements and resources to complete the development. For
example, SOCOM terminated the Common Avionics Architecture for
Penetration Program because of excessive cost growth resulting from
technical problems and schedule delays with the Air Force's Avionics
Modernization Program. While SOCOM attributes the cause of program
problems in part to poor contractor performance, it also acknowledges
that technology challenges and development costs were significantly
underestimated when the program started. In addition, the Navy-managed
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), which has been one of SOCOM's
largest investments since ASDS started in the mid-90s, encountered
significant problems because the capabilities required for the delivery
system outstripped the developer's resources in terms of technical
knowledge, time, and money. Although the first boat was accepted for
operational use in 2003, it did not meet technical or performance
requirements. Currently, reliability issues with the boat are being
examined, and an assessment of alternate material solutions are
underway to determine how best to address the remaining operational
requirements.
SOCOM's tool for managing its acquisition programs--called the Special
Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System (SOALIS)--
lacks sufficient oversight and maintenance. At the time of our review,
we found that information for most programs was out of date and that
some programs had not been updated in years, even though the program
executive officers and program directors are required to keep SOALIS
accurate and up to date on at least a monthly basis. Further, we found
no enforcement mechanism to ensure oversight of this important
management tool. According to SOCOM's Standard Operating Procedures
Directive, SOALIS is intended to give SOCOM decision makers and
stakeholders essential information on the status and progress of
ongoing acquisition efforts. Although regular progress reviews take
place on individual programs, the lack of up-to-date information on all
programs can impede SOCOM's ability to conduct effective oversight.
SOCOM Workforce Challenges:
SOCOM's acquisition workforce has remained relatively small for many
years, but plans are underway to increase the size of the acquisition
workforce about 75 percent by the end of 2008. This is being done to
address the growth in acquisitions work that has taken place over the
past several years as well as expected future growth in acquisitions
with SOCOM's expanded role in the GWOT. Since 2001, SOCOM's workforce
has remained fairly stable, growing by only 10 positions to a total of
185 government--civilian and military--acquisition employees. SOCOM
plans to expand its governmental acquisition workforce to about 300
employees. Currently, the governmental workforce is heavily
supplemented by contractors. Specifically, contractors comprise about
two-thirds of the overall workforce supporting SOCOM's acquisition
activities. The contractor support includes logistics, training,
education, and testing support, and engineering and technical services.
In order to prepare for the upcoming workforce expansion, SOCOM is
conducting a manpower study. The study, which is scheduled to be
completed in fiscal year 2008, is designed to assess the composition of
the workforce and determine workloads associated with each SOCOM
position--including all acquisition positions--to aid SOCOM officials
in their placement of newly hired government employees. Also, to lower
costs, SOCOM's acquisition executive anticipates a reduced reliance on
contractors in conjunction with the expansion of the governmental
acquisition workforce. How much of a reduction will be based on the
outcome of the ongoing manpower study and resource considerations.
As can be seen in table 7, the majority of SOCOM's current civilian
acquisition workforce has attained DOD's level III certification.
Table 7: SOCOM's Civilian and Military Acquisition Workforce
Composition and Training Levels:
Certification levels: Civilian workforce;
Level I: 2;
Level II: 14;
Level III: 76;
None: 0;
Vacancies: 10;
Total positions: 102.
Certification levels: Military workforce;
Level I: 1;
Level II: 11;
Level III: 19;
None: 6;
Vacancies: 6;
Total positions: 43.
Certification levels: Total;
Level I: 3;
Level II: 25;
Level III: 95;
None: 6;
Vacancies: 16;
Total positions: 145.
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Additionally, SOCOM's senior level civilian acquisition workforce at
the GS-14, GS-15, and senior executive service levels, along with those
assigned to Critical Acquisition Positions[Footnote 14] that require
level III certification, have all earned level III certification. We
found that the vacancy rate for civilian acquisition positions is about
10 percent and that the bulk of the unfilled positions are at the GS-14
and GS-15 levels, leaving vacancies in some key management positions.
The command has encountered challenges in filling vacancies in the
upper-level, civilian-acquisition-workforce positions. According to
SOCOM's acquisition executive, the difficulty in hiring qualified
personnel to fill these critical vacancies is due, in part, to the
lengthy process required to hire qualified acquisition personnel. SOCOM
uses the Air Force personnel system as its executive hiring agency.
However, this process has taken as long as 240 days to hire at the
upper levels.
SOCOM's military acquisition workforce certification rated at level III
is not as high as its civilian counterparts. This is particularly true
for critical acquisition positions, which usually involve significant
supervisory or management responsibilities (e.g., program manager). As
table 8 shows, about 40 percent of these positions are held by officers
who do not meet the level III certification standards required by DOD.
Table 8: SOCOM's Military Critical Acquisition Position (CAP) and DOD
Certification Levels:
Program manager certification levels: Level III;
Number of officers in CAPs: 13.
Program manager certification levels: Level II;
Number of officers in CAPs: 6.
Program manager certification levels: Level I;
Number of officers in CAPs: 1.
Program manager certification levels: No certification;
Number of officers in CAPs: 2.
Source: GAO analysis of SOCOM data.
[End of table]
While DOD guidelines[Footnote 15] allow acquisition officers to attain
the appropriate certification up to 24 months after being assigned to a
critical position, we found that 3 of SOCOM's 22 military officers
filling these positions are still lacking the required certification.
Although waivers are permitted on a case-by-case basis, at the time of
our review SOCOM did not have a process in place to review and grant
required waivers for those officers not in compliance with DOD
standards.
One of the challenges SOCOM faces in filling military acquisition
positions is that the command often requires military operational
experience and/or specialized skills. According to SOCOM, Army and Navy
policies require their acquisition officers to have operational
assignments before being assigned to the acquisition career field, but
officers in the Air Force do not have to gain prior operational
experience. In addition, some of the acquisition positions at SOCOM
require unique special operations experience. For instance, some of the
Navy's acquisition positions at SOCOM are designated to be filled by
Navy SEAL personnel, a group in short supply and generally not trained
in acquisition. Since SOCOM is reliant on the services to provide
military acquisition personnel to the command, SOCOM runs the risk of
not being able to fill acquisition positions if it turns down
candidates sent forward by the services who do not meet all the
position requirements.
Conclusions:
Thus far, SOCOM has done well with small acquisitions that modify
readily available commercial technologies and nondevelopmental items.
It has had more difficulty delivering the more complex systems that
involve significant development and reliance on the military
departments. As SOCOM prepares for more growth in its acquisition
function to meet the expanding needs for special operations forces, it
will be important for the command to leverage its experience into
better results in the future. For those more complex acquisitions that
must be undertaken, opportunities exist for SOCOM to improve its
results by ensuring that better business cases exist before embarking
on such acquisitions, especially if they depend on acquisitions being
managed by other military departments. In addition, the foundation for
all acquisitions can be improved by (1) ensuring that the size and
composition of the workforce is a good match for the acquisition
workload undertaken by SOCOM and (2) having a sound management
information system to track programs.
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
To better position SOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program
outcomes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following
three steps to ensure:
* SOCOM establishes sound business cases for its more complex and
military department-managed acquisition programs. Integral to this is
applying the elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy (That
is: programs match requirements with resources.) and having effective
agreements in place with the military departments that specify clear
roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing programs.
* as SOCOM increases its acquisition workforce, it (1) obtains
personnel with the skills and abilities needed for more complex
acquisitions, (2) makes sure personnel meet DOD acquisition
certification level requirements, and (3) has the ability to make the
hiring process as efficient as possible.
* SOCOM improves the accuracy, timeliness, and usefulness of its
acquisition management information system. To accomplish this, SOCOM
should (1) establish enforcement mechanisms to make sure program
managers submit updated information on a regular basis and (2) conduct
quality checks to make sure the information is reliable.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In DOD's letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD partially
concurred with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the
other two recommendations. In partially concurring with the first
recommendation, DOD agreed with the need to update memorandums of
agreement between SOCOM and the military departments and apply elements
of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy but only after it is defined
by DOD within the 5000 series of documents. This should not result in a
delay in action on DOD's part as DOD's acquisition policy already
includes the key elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach
particularly regarding technology, design, and production. It is
important that SOCOM follow this policy because we have found that
programs experience cost, schedule, and performance problems when they
proceed into system development and initial manufacturing with lower
levels of knowledge than specified in DOD's acquisition policy. We
believe that if properly implemented and enforced, a knowledge-based
acquisition approach, as defined in DOD acquisition policy, can help
reduce development risks and lead to better program outcomes on a more
consistent basis.
DOD's written comments appear at appendix III. Additionally, SOCOM
provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to this report to the Secretary of
Defense, Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and other
interested parties. We will also provide copies to others on request.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess what type of programs SOCOM has undertaken and whether they
have progressed as planned, we collected and reviewed information on
all programs undertaken by the command between 2001 and 2006. We
collected specific information on each program pertaining to its size,
use of commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental items, and
acquisition strategy. In addition, we collected data on planned versus
actual cost, schedule and quantities to be fielded. We analyzed this
information to determine what types of systems were being acquired and
the extent to which programs were meeting planned cost, schedule, and
quantity objectives. We relied on GAO's Applied Research and
Methodology teams to array and analyze the acquisition programs in our
review. Further, we interviewed SOCOM's senior-level program executive
officers to access and review available data on about 50 urgent
acquisition systems programs, and a small number of the Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration programs transitioned by SOCOM to its
forces.
To assess and determine the management and workforce challenges facing
SOCOM, we (1) reviewed and analyzed the current impact that unfunded
near-term requirements had on the regular approved acquisition
programs; (2) we reviewed and analyzed the command's key acquisition
program management tool--the Special Operations Acquisition and
Logistics Information System--for managing its acquisition programs;
and (3) to assess the workforce challenges that SOCOM faces, we
interviewed key SOCOM acquisition officials from SOCOM's Special
Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center and key civilian and
military personnel management officials at Tampa, Florida. We relied on
previous GAO work as a framework for knowledge-based acquisition.
We performed our review from July 2006 through June 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: SOCOM's Policies, Procedures, and Organizational Structure
for Managing Acquisitions:
SOCOM Plans, Resources, Acquires, and Sustains Weapon Systems All under
One Roof:
Unlike the military departments, which have geographically dispersed
acquisition organizations, SOCOM's acquisition activities are
geographically consolidated. All acquisition support functions integral
to SOCOM's acquisition activities--contracting, budgeting, and
requirements setting--are located at SOCOM headquarters.
The SOCOM Commander has duties analogous to both service Secretaries
and the service Chiefs. For example, like the Secretaries, he has
budget, programming, research, development and acquisition,
contracting, and procurement authority, and he can direct
investigations and audits. Similar to the service Chiefs, the Commander
of SOCOM is charged with organizing, training, and equipping SOF
personnel, establishing requirements, conducting operational testing,
and providing operational logistics. Unlike other combatant commanders,
the SOCOM Commander has both command and acquisition authorities--he is
the only combatant commander with a "checkbook." This arrangement
allows SOCOM officials to plan, resource, and acquire SOF-peculiar
equipment.
SOCOM decides what weapon systems and equipment to acquire through a
centralized strategic-planning and resource allocation process where
requirements are assessed and prioritized and programs are selected
based on competing needs and available resources. The process has many
of the characteristics of an integrated portfolio management framework
that GAO recently reported as lacking at DOD in its departmentwide
approach to weapon system investments.[Footnote 16] That is, SOCOM
addresses weapon system programs collectively from an enterprise level,
rather than as independent and unrelated programs. Proposed programs
are assessed through a screening process that weighs the relative
costs, benefits, and risks of each, and selects those that help SOCOM
balance near and future term opportunities, different SOF component
capability needs, and available resources against the demand for new
and ongoing systems and equipment.
SOCOM has a close relationship with its customers--the SOF community--
and receives inputs regarding capability needs directly from SOF
operators and component commands on an ongoing basis. SOCOM officials
with operational experience and expertise in different program areas
assess and prioritize the requests from the component commands on a bi-
annual basis. These officials rate each proposal in terms of its
potential to fulfill required military operational tasks. The officials
then forward their assessments to SOCOM's central decision-making body-
-the Board of Directors--for a final determination of what acquisition
programs should be undertaken by the command and where resources should
go.
The Board of Directors is composed of the SOCOM commander, all SOF
component commanders, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))--OSD's
principal advisor on special operations activities and the organization
charged with interfacing with SOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC)'s position on the
Board of Directors allows DOD insight and a voice into what acquisition
programs SOCOM undertakes.[Footnote 17] Although DOD has an oversight
role and decision authority over ACAT I programs, as previously
discussed, over 95 percent of SOCOM's acquisition programs are below
the ACAT I level. Therefore, ASD(SO/LIC) has no direct day-to-day
oversight role in the bulk of SOCOM programs. The Board of Directors is
SOCOM's primary and final approval authority regarding regular planned
SOF-peculiar acquisition programs.
Once the need for a SOF capability is verified and approved through
SOCOM's strategic planning process, it is reviewed through DOD's Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to verify that
it is a SOF-unique requirement, and not duplicative of a Service-common
system.[Footnote 18] However, according to SOCOM officials, JCIDS often
fails to resolve time-sensitive SOF capabilities gaps that may be
identified during active combat. Therefore, to support SOF acquisition
priorities, SOCOM established its own version of the larger joint-
requirement-setting process--the SOF Capabilities Integration and
Development System--which interoperates with the command's Acquisition
Management System and Strategic Planning Process.
SOCOM employs a two-tiered SOF Capabilities Integration and Development
System--standard and fast track--to support SOF priorities. The
standard capabilities process parallels the JCIDS process although it
is internal to SOCOM to specifically address SOF-unique capability
gaps. The fast track process is used when a SOCOM component identifies
an urgent and critical capability gap--derived from a combat-mission
need statement. This process is not intended as a means to circumvent
the command's standard acquisition portfolio management process, rather
it is SOCOM's method to accelerate its response to compelling and time-
sensitive SOF-peculiar needs.
Under the SOF Capabilities Integration and Development System,
validation and approval of a combat mission need statement mandates an
offset of resources as it constitutes a "must-pay" bill for SOCOM. Once
the mission need statement is approved through the Fast-Track CIDS
process, SOCOM officials initiate an urgent deployment acquisition to
expedite the acquisition and field the required equipment. At this
point, command officials reallocate resources to fund the urgent
deployment acquisition. SOCOM's goal is to field equipment within 180
days of approval.
SOCOM Has Unique Program Management Structure Options:
SOCOM can arrange to transfer program management and milestone decision
authority (MDA) responsibilities to one of the military departments to
execute the program on behalf of the command. SOCOM has delegated
responsibilities to the military departments in many of the acquisition
programs underway that involve some modification of military department-
provided equipment or in cases where the services have greater
technical and specific platform program management expertise, such as
fixed and rotary wing aircraft or submarine programs. SOCOM's
Acquisition Executive is the milestone decision authority for all SOCOM
acquisition programs, unless the executive delegates that authority.
However, through memorandums of agreement with the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, SOCOM employs a range of program management structures. The
command has the following three basic options for managing individual
programs:
* SOCOM can manage a program in-house by designating both a SOCOM
program manager and MDA to execute the program.
* SOCOM, through a program specific memorandum of agreement with a
military department, can agree on appointment of a department program
manager to manage the program under the direction of a SOCOM MDA.
* SOCOM can transfer both program management and MDA responsibility to
a military department through a program-specific memorandum of
agreement, to execute the program on behalf of SOCOM.
Applicable policies and procedures vary somewhat for each of the
program management options just described. For example, for SOCOM MDA
and SOCOM managed programs, SOCOM's acquisition and logistics
directives and standard operating procedures apply, and according to
SOCOM, any exceptions are noted in the acquisition program's
Acquisition Decision Memorandum. Secondly, for SOCOM MDA and military
department managed programs, responsibilities and exceptions to SOCOM
procedures are intended to be defined in program specific memorandums
of agreement. Finally, for programs with a military department MDA and
program manager, the military department's policies and procedures
normally apply. Table 9 illustrates how the acquisition executive has
delegated or retained decision authority for programs undertaken from
2001 to 2006.
Table 9: Summary of SOCOM Acquisition Programs' MDAs and Program
Managers:
Milestone decision authority: Program manager;
SOCOM: SOCOM;
SOCOM: MILDEP;
Military department (MILDEP): MILDEP.
Milestone decision authority: Percentages;
SOCOM: 45%;
SOCOM: 18%;
Military department (MILDEP): 37%[A].
Source: SOCOM data, GAO analysis.
[A] Totals do not include one program with a non-MILDEP MDA and one
program with a MILDEP MDA and SOCOM program manager.
[End of table]
SOCOM is the MDA for over 60 percent of its acquisition programs. The
SOCOM MDA could be the Acquisition Executive or a program executive
officer, depending on the size and importance of the program. The
Acquisition Executive has delegated the MDA role to the military
departments for approximately 37 percent of SOCOM's acquisition
programs. For programs managed directly by SOCOM, the command has a
hierarchical management structure, as shown in figure 6, which
resembles the military departments in its internal acquisition
organizational make-up.
Figure 6: SOCOM's Acquisition Programs Management Structure:
[See PDF for image]
Source: SOCOM.
[End of figure]
The program executive offices utilize program managers and system
acquisition managers organized by program. System acquisition managers
are charged with assisting the military department in program planning
and execution and also representing SOCOM at military department-led
integrated-product teams, technical conferences, and program reviews.
System acquisition managers are normally used when the MDA and program
manager or both options are assigned to a military department.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Jun 1 4 2007:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-07-620, `Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special
Operations Command's Management of Weapon System Programs,' dated May
16, 2007 (GAO Code 120563).
The Department has completed its evaluation of the draft report. The
DoD response to the GAO recommendations are contained in Attachment 1.
At Attachment 2, I've included some technical accuracy and editorial
review comments for your consideration.
My point of contact for the recommendation response and review comments
is Grace Washburn, (703) 697-3383, grace.washburn@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Nancy L. Spruill:
Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis:
Enclosures:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated May 16, 2007 GAO-07-620 (GAO CODES 120563):
"Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis Of The Special Operations Command's
Management Of Weapon System Programs"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
take steps to ensure Special Operations Command (SOCOM) establishes
sound business cases for its more complex and military service-managed
acquisition programs. Integral to this is applying the elements of a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy and having effective arrangements
in place with the military services that specify clear roles,
responsibilities, and expectations for executing programs.
DOD Response: Partial concur. DoD concurs with the recommendation that
OSD should take steps to ensure that Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
establishes sound business cases for its more complex and military
department-managed acquisition programs. DoD concurs with the
recommendation to update its Memoranda of Agreement with military
departments to specify clear roles, responsibilities, and expectations
for executing programs. DoD concurs with applying elements of a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy but only after it is defined by
DoD within the 5000 series of documents.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
take steps to ensure SOCOM, as it increases its acquisition workforce:
(1) obtains personnel with the skills and abilities needed for more
complex acquisitions, (2) makes sure personnel meet DoD acquisition
certification level requirements, and (3) has the ability to make the
hiring process as efficient as possible.
DOD Response: Concur:
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
take steps to ensure SOCOM improves the accuracy, timeliness, and
usefulness of its acquisition management information system. To
accomplish this, SOCOM should: (1) establish enforcement mechanisms to
make sure program managers submit updated information on a regular
basis and (2) conduct quality checks to make sure the information is
reliable.
DOD Response: Concur:
[End of section]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Paul L. Francis, Director, (202) 512-4841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, John Oppenheim, Assistant Director,
Leon S. Gill, John Ortiz, Michele Williamson, Julia Kennon, Greg
Campbell, and Marie Ahearn made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-07-
406SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. GAO-04-248.
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. GAO-03-476.
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Advanced SEAL Delivery System Program Needs
Increased Oversight. GAO-03-442. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Readiness of the Marine Corps' V-22 Aircraft for
Full-Rate Production. GAO-01-369R. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2001.
Navy Aviation: V-22 Cost and Capability to Meet Requirements Are Yet to
Be Determined. NSIAD/GAO-98-13. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 1997.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pursuant to Title 10 United States Code, Section 167, the
Commander, U. S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is vested with the
responsibilities and the authority for the development and acquisition
of special operations forces (SOF)-peculiar equipment, the authority to
exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to
execute its own budget. SOF-peculiar equipment is defined as equipment,
materials, supplies, and services required for SOF activities for which
there is no service-common requirement.
[2] The Advanced SEAL Delivery System is a long-range submersible
capability to deliver special operations forces for clandestine
missions. The submersible "hybrid combatant" provides improved range,
speed, and payload, and habitability for the operators. CV-22 Osprey is
a tiltrotor aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff, hover, and
vertical landing qualities of a helicopter with the long-range, fuel
efficiency, and speed of a turboprop aircraft. Its mission is to
conduct long-range infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions
for SOF.
[3] DOD categorizes acquisition programs into several categories--ACAT
I, II, and III. These categories are determined by the cost threshold
in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars, special interest, and the level
of decision authority. ACAT I programs have an estimated eventual total
expenditure for research, development, technology, and evaluation of
more than $365 million or for procurement of more than $2.190 billion,
and milestone decision authority resides with DOD's Under Secretary of
Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L), head of
the DOD component, or if delegated the DOD component acquisition
executive. ACAT II programs have an estimated eventual total
expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more
than $140 million or for procurement in excess of $660 million, and
milestone decision authority resides with the DOD component acquisition
executive or its designee. ACAT III programs are all other acquisition
programs that do not meet the criteria of an ACAT II or above program
and milestone decision authority is designated by the component
acquisition executive at the lowest appropriate level.
[4] DOD's Future Year Defense Programs reflect decisions made in the
planning, programming, and budgeting system, which is intended to
produce the best possible mixture of forces, equipment, and support to
accomplish the mission.
[5] A Unified Combatant Command is a U.S. joint military command
composed of forces from two or more services and has broad and
continuing mission.
[6] Pub. L. No. 99-661 Div A, §1311 (Nov.14, 1986), codified at 10
U.S.C §167.
[7] Congress directed DOD to include a new special operations budget
category, major force program-11. This provides the command with
funding authority for the development and acquisition of equipment,
materials, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations.
[8] DOD Directive 5000.1, Subject: The Defense Acquisition System (May
12, 2003) and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Subject:
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003).
[9] 10 U.S.C. Sections 1701-1764.
[10] DOD Instructions 5000.66, Subject: Operations of the Defense
Acquisition, Technology, Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and
Career Development Program (Dec. 21, 2005).
[11] The milestone decision authority is the designated individual with
overall responsibility for a program. The MDA has the authority to
approve entry of an acquisition program into the next phase of the
acquisition process and is accountable for cost, schedule, and
performance reporting to higher authority, including congressional
reporting. For ACAT I level programs, USD (AT&L), head of a DOD
component, or if delegated the DOD component acquisition executive is
the initial milestone decision authority.
[12] SOCOM also has mission planning and training systems, which are
included in the fixed wing programs.
[13] DOD guidelines for selecting Advanced Concept Technology
Developments include the following: (1) the time frame for evaluating
their military utility is typically 2 to 4 years; (2) the technology
should be sufficiently mature; (3) they should provide an effective
response to a priority military need; (4) a lead service or agency has
been designated; (5) risks have been identified and accepted; (6)
demonstrations or exercises have been identified that will provide a
basis for assessing the military utility; and (7) funding is sufficient
to complete them.
[14] As defined in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA), any acquisition position in DOD that is required to be filled
by (a) military grade of lieutenant colonel (or commander for the Navy)
or a higher grade or (b) an employee in a senior position in the
National Security Personnel System or in the Senior Executive Service,
is required to be designated as a critical acquisition position.
[15] DOD Instruction 5000.66, Subject: Operation of the Defense
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training,
and Career Development Program (Dec. 21, 2005) and Department of
Defense Desk Guide for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce
Career Management (Jan. 10, 2006).
[16] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C., Mar. 30, 2007). In this review, GAO
compared DOD's processes for investing in weapon systems to the best
practices that successful commercial companies use to invest in new
products. GAO found that DOD's organizational structures, processes,
and practices for planning and acquiring weapon systems at a department
wide level are fragmented, making it difficult for the department to
prioritize needs, make informed trade-offs, and achieve a balanced mix
of programs that are affordable, feasible, and provide the best value
to the warfighter. Commercial companies use an integrated portfolio
management approach to product development where the relative pros and
cons of market opportunities and competing product proposals are
assessed and a balanced mix of products is selected that ensures a good
return on investment and moves the company toward achieving its
strategic goals and objectives within available resources.
[17] The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) is the principal staff assistant and
civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense on Special Operations (SO) and Low-Intensity
Conflict (LIC) activities. ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for developing,
coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of policy for SO and
LIC activities and for ensuring adherence to approved policy. ASD(SO/
LIC) is also required to provide supervision of the preparation and
justification of Special Operations Forces programs and budget. ASD
(SO/LIC) is also charged to be the proponent for SO and LIC issues in
the Defense Acquisition Board and other appropriate boards and
committees, and maintain liaison to monitor progress in achieving
milestones.
[18] JCIDS is intended to manage military requirements across DOD, and
provide a top down, analytic-based process for affirming capability
gaps and proposed solutions to meet the needs of the warfighter.
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