Defense Logistics
Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach Gao ID: GAO-07-807 June 29, 2007During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps experienced problems with the delivery of supplies to the warfighter. Such problems highlight long-standing weaknesses in the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. DOD has identified joint theater logistics as a key effort aimed at improving distribution and supply support. GAO was asked to examine DOD's efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound management principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, services, agencies, and geographic combatant commands.
DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics across the department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key principles of sound management. Further complicating DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater logistics are the diffused organization of DOD's logistics operations, including separate funding and management of resources and systems, and changes in DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. DOD is currently testing a new approach to managing joint capabilities and is considering a realignment of capabilities in its long-term logistics strategy, which could affect the future of joint theater logistics. Without a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint theater logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right path toward achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will have difficulty achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset visibility associated with joint theater logistics. DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply support, but the department faces challenges that hinder its ability to realize the full benefits of these efforts. For example, while Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been established in each geographic combatant command to help manage supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders in Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult because of a lack of interoperability among information technology systems. Initiatives being developed to improve the coordination of surface transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues of command and control, the availability of information technology tools, and potential duplication of responsibilities with other organizations. Unless DOD successfully addresses these and other challenges GAO identified, the initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force commander to effectively and efficiently direct logistics functions, including distribution and supply support activities, across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission. Moreover, without addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to continue to experience some of the same types of distribution and asset visibility problems that have occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-807, Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach
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Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2007:
Defense Logistics:
Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military
Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach:
GAO-07-807:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-807, a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps
experienced problems with the delivery of supplies to the warfighter.
Such problems highlight long-standing weaknesses in the Department of
Defense‘s (DOD) supply chain management. DOD has identified joint
theater logistics as a key effort aimed at improving distribution and
supply support. GAO was asked to examine DOD‘s efforts to develop and
implement joint theater logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which
DOD‘s approach to managing joint theater logistics departmentwide
encompasses sound management principles and (2) the progress DOD has
made in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed
DOD documents and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, services,
agencies, and geographic combatant commands.
What GAO Found:
DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management
approach to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics
across the department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater
logistics initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components
due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability
for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures”key
principles of sound management. Further complicating DOD‘s ability to
adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint
theater logistics are the diffused organization of DOD‘s logistics
operations, including separate funding and management of resources and
systems, and changes in DOD‘s overall logistics transformation
strategy. DOD is currently testing a new approach to managing joint
capabilities and is considering a realignment of capabilities in its
long-term logistics strategy, which could affect the future of joint
theater logistics. Without a more coordinated and comprehensive
approach to managing joint theater logistics, DOD lacks assurance that
it is on the right path toward achieving this capability and that
individual initiatives will collectively address gaps in logistics
capabilities. Further, DOD will have difficulty achieving improvements
in theater distribution and asset visibility associated with joint
theater logistics.
DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint
theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply
support, but the department faces challenges that hinder its ability to
realize the full benefits of these efforts. For example,
* While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been
established in each geographic combatant command to help manage
supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders in
Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult because of a
lack of interoperability among information technology systems.
* Initiatives being developed to improve the coordination of surface
transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues of
command and control, the availability of information technology tools,
and potential duplication of responsibilities with other organizations.
Unless DOD successfully addresses these and other challenges GAO
identified, the initiatives are not likely to significantly improve the
ability of a joint force commander to effectively and efficiently
direct logistics functions, including distribution and supply support
activities, across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned
mission. Moreover, without addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to
continue to experience some of the same types of distribution and asset
visibility problems that have occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends DOD develop and implement a coordinated and
comprehensive management approach to guide and oversee efforts across
the department to improve distribution and supply support to U.S.
forces in a joint theater. GAO also recommends that DLA assess
opportunities to consolidate storage and shipping activities within all
geographic combatant commands. DOD concurred with GAO‘s
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-807].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above.
For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or
solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Management
Approach to Joint Theater Logistics:
DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives but Faces
Challenges That Hinder Its Ability to Fully Realize the Benefits of
These Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD's Ability to Fully Implement Joint
Theater Logistics Initiatives:
Figures:
Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD Logistics:
Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006):
Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General Support
Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006):
Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA
Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006):
Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options Included
in the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support Initiative:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 29, 2007:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Department of Defense (DOD) experienced problems with logistics
support and supply chain management during military operations in Iraq
that impeded the timely delivery of supplies and contributed to
shortages of items critical to the warfighter.[Footnote 1] These
problems--which affected both Army and Marine Corps ground forces--
included an insufficient capability to provide support to combat forces
during the early stages of the conflict, difficulties in distributing
supplies within the theater of operations, and limitations in asset
visibility.[Footnote 2] Such problems also occurred during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991. During the 1990s, following the end
of the Cold War, DOD reexamined the future threat environment that U.S.
military forces could face and identified logistics capabilities that
would be needed to support future military operations. One of these
identified capabilities, joint theater logistics, is aimed at improving
the ability of a joint force commander to direct various logistics
functions, including distribution and supply support activities, across
the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned mission.
Under DOD doctrine for conducting joint military operations, the joint
force commander is ultimately responsible for synchronizing all aspects
of logistics necessary to support the mission.[Footnote 3] However, the
joint force commander relies on various DOD components, including the
military services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and U.S.
Transportation Command, to provide the logistics resources and systems
needed to support U.S. forces. Various provisions of Title 10, U.S.
Code establish responsibilities and authorities for supplying and
equipping the armed forces.[Footnote 4] These and other Title 10
functions are promulgated by DOD through directives.[Footnote 5]
Implementing joint theater logistics involves harnessing these diffuse
resources and systems, which are not integrated but rather separately
funded and managed across DOD's components.
The Joint Staff Logistics Directorate is DOD's lead proponent for joint
theater logistics, and this effort involves developing and implementing
a number of initiatives across the department. DOD believes joint
theater logistics will improve the distribution and visibility of
assets in a theater of operations. For this reason, DOD has listed
joint theater logistics as one of several key initiatives in its supply
chain management improvement plan. Because of long-standing systemic
weaknesses that have been identified in our previous reports, we have
designated DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area. In 2005,
DOD developed the supply chain management improvement plan to place it
on a path toward removing supply chain management from our high-risk
list.
At your request, we have examined DOD's efforts to develop and
implement joint theater logistics as part of its plans for improving
logistics support and supply chain management. Specifically, this
report assesses (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing
joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound management
principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in implementing joint
theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply
support.
To assess DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics, we
identified sound management principles based on prior work on
organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the
Government Performance and Results Act.[Footnote 6] We reviewed
doctrine, regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and
other documents related to the development of joint theater logistics,
logistics strategic planning, and supply chain management, to include
reports by various audit and non-audit organizations that have assessed
DOD's logistics operations. We also interviewed officials from the
Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense who are involved
with joint theater logistics and logistics transformation. To assess
DOD's progress in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives, we
visited the five geographic combatant commands, the subordinate unified
command in Korea, military service component commands in three
theaters, and operational units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait. We met
with military service officials at headquarters offices, as well as at
selected commands and reserve components. We also visited U.S.
Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and DLA to obtain
information on specific initiatives. In addition, we attended the out-
brief for an Army conference on theater opening, reviewed after-action
reports from exercises testing the initiatives, and analyzed lessons
learned reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom. We determined that the
data we used were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Additional
information on our scope and methodology is provided at the end of this
letter. We conducted our review from July 2006 to April 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management
approach to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics
across the department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater
logistics initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components
due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability
for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key
principles of sound management. While DOD has broadly defined joint
theater logistics as an adaptive ability to anticipate and respond to
emerging theater logistics and support requirements, it has not
developed specific goals and strategies linked to this vision. In
addition, DOD has not assigned accountability for achieving results
under joint theater logistics and has not developed outcome-oriented
performance measures that would enable the department to know whether
its efforts are fully and effectively achieving a joint theater
logistics capability. Furthermore, the diffused organization of DOD's
logistics operations, including separate funding and management of
resources and systems, complicates DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated
and comprehensive management approach to developing and implementing
joint theater logistics capabilities. A number of studies that have
assessed DOD's logistics operations have recommended changes to DOD's
organizational structure and control of resources for providing joint
logistics support to military operations. Moreover, changes in DOD's
overall logistics transformation strategy have hampered its ability to
adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint
theater logistics. Over the years, DOD has made a number of attempts to
articulate a long-term strategy to guide logistics transformation,
including joint theater logistics, but progress on these efforts has
been hindered by differing visions within the department. DOD is
currently testing a new approach to managing joint capabilities and is
considering a realignment of capabilities in its long-term logistics
strategy--efforts that could affect the future of joint theater
logistics. Under this realignment, joint theater logistics may cease to
exist as a stand-alone capability area; however, the tenets of joint
theater logistics would be retained, and the functional areas
associated with joint theater logistics would be integrated within the
broader joint logistics portfolio. Without a coordinated and
comprehensive approach to managing joint theater logistics, DOD lacks
assurance that it is on the right path toward achieving this capability
and that individual initiatives will collectively address gaps in
logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will have difficulty achieving the
desired improvements in distribution and asset visibility associated
with joint theater logistics as portrayed in the supply chain
management improvement plan. We are recommending that DOD develop a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and oversee
efforts across the department to improve distribution and supply
support in a joint theater. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOD concurred with our recommendation.
Although a coordinated and comprehensive management approach does not
exist, DOD components have made progress developing and implementing
joint theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and
supply support; however, the department faces a number of challenges
that hinder its ability to fully realize the benefits of these efforts.
A notable improvement has been the establishment of Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Centers that can help joint force commanders
synchronize the arrival of supplies into a theater and assist in other
aspects of distribution and supply support. However, officials we
interviewed said these operations centers alone will not resolve
distribution and supply support problems. Other initiatives are at
various stages of development and implementation as DOD experiments
with new organizational arrangements, writes new concepts of
operations, and revises doctrine. Despite this progress, DOD faces a
number of challenges in fully developing and implementing joint theater
logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply support.
Some of the challenges are as follows:
* DOD has established an expeditionary organization to manage the
arrival of supplies moving into a theater during the early stages of a
military operation, but Army officials have raised questions about the
need for this new organization and the resources devoted to it, as well
as about the command and control over this organization.
* While Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been
established in each geographic combatant command to help manage
supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders in
Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult because of a
lack of interoperability among information technology systems. We also
found continuing problems with container management, although
improvements have been made.
* Initiatives to improve the coordination of surface transportation
assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues of command and
control, the availability of information technology tools, and
potential duplication of responsibilities with other organizations.
* Efforts to consolidate multiple storage and shipping activities in a
theater have been implemented on a limited scale and additional
consolidation opportunities may exist. During our site visits to
Kuwait, we found that DLA and the Army were operating separate
facilities that have the potential for consolidation, which could
result in more efficient use of resources. Since our fieldwork was
completed, DLA assessed ways to improve theater distribution and made
recommendations to consolidate and relocate existing operations.
Because this study was focused on the U.S. Central Command area of
operations, we are recommending DLA undertake similar assessments
within all the geographic combatant commands. In commenting on a draft
of this report, DOD concurred with this recommendation.
* Finally, various options have emerged for improving the ability of a
joint force commander to exercise command and control over joint
theater logistics functions. However, the military services have raised
concerns about how their own roles and responsibilities for providing
logistics support might be affected and have opposed expansion of the
most robust command and control option that has emerged.
Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the initiatives are
not likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force
commander to harness the diffuse logistics resources and systems that
exist within the department and effectively and efficiently direct
logistics functions, including distribution and supply support
activities, across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned
mission. Moreover, without addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to
continue to experience some of the same types of distribution and asset
visibility problems that occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Background:
We have identified weaknesses in DOD's supply and distribution support
in prior reports.[Footnote 7] These weaknesses have affected the
department's ability to meet its goal of delivering the "right items to
the right place at the right time" to support the deployment and
sustainment of military forces. One problem with logistics support has
been an insufficient capability to support combat forces during the
early stages of a conflict. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example,
DOD's priority was to move combat forces into the theater first, with
logistics personnel arriving later in the deployment. Because of the
shortage of support personnel in theater, the forces experienced delays
in receiving, storing, and distributing supplies. For example, early in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, inefficient packaging and palletizing of air
shipments created supply backlogs in Kuwait that delayed the delivery
of supplies shipped by air to units in Iraq. Once in theater, mixed
shipments had to be manually opened, sorted, and re-palletized at
theater distribution points, causing additional delays in getting
repair parts to their end users. Another problem has been limited
visibility of assets within the distribution system. Incomplete radio
frequency identification tags required logistics personnel to spend
time opening and sorting the shipments, significantly increasing
processing time. Additionally, logistics systems used to order, track,
and account for supplies were not well integrated and could not provide
the essential information to effectively manage theater distribution.
Thus, we have indicated that materiel distribution and asset visibility
are two key focus areas critical to resolving these supply and
distribution problems.
Joint theater logistics is one of seven future logistics capabilities
that DOD has grouped under the term "focused logistics." DOD has
broadly defined joint theater logistics as an adaptive ability to
anticipate and respond to emerging theater logistics and support
requirements. In addition to joint theater logistics, focused logistics
capabilities include joint deployment/rapid distribution, agile
sustainment, operational engineering, force health protection,
multinational logistics, and logistics information fusion. Together,
these capabilities are intended to support an overall joint logistics
capability, which DOD defines as "the capability to build effective,
responsive, and efficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment
pipeline; exercise control over the pipeline from end to end; and
provide certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces,
equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on
time." According to DOD, focused logistics can be achieved by
transforming logistics capabilities. To succeed, these focused
logistics capabilities must be fully integrated, expeditionary,
networked, decentralized, adaptable, and capable of decision
superiority. Further, they must support future joint operations that
are continuous and distributed across the full range of military
operations.
Since the 1990s, DOD has developed various strategic planning
documents, such as Joint Vision 2010, which included focused logistics
as a needed capability. In 2000, DOD incorporated joint theater
logistics and other focused logistics capabilities in joint warfighting
doctrine. In 2003, the department approved the joint functional concept
for focused logistics.[Footnote 8] In 2005, DOD issued its Focused
Logistics Roadmap, presenting an "as is" compendium of programs and
initiatives associated with the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget and
aligned under the focused logistics capabilities. The "as is" roadmap
was intended to complement previously published logistics strategies
and to represent the portfolio of programs and initiatives for which
the Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities Board[Footnote 9] and
Joint Staff Logistics Directorate have primary oversight
responsibility. In 2006, DOD approved the Joint Logistics
(Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept,[Footnote 10] which
complements the joint functional concept and calls for a joint
deployment and distribution enterprise that is capable of providing
joint force commanders with the ability to rapidly and effectively move
and sustain forces in support of major combat operations or other joint
operations. This document describes the enterprise as an integrated
system of assets, materiel, personnel, leaders, organizations,
procedures, tools, training, facilities, and doctrine that is expected
to enable the joint force commander to minimize seams in the
distribution pipeline. The joint deployment and distribution enterprise
is expected to complement and augment service or joint force commander-
unique distribution responsibilities and capabilities.
Distribution is part of the process and activities for managing the
supply chain. According to joint doctrine, distribution is the process
of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver the
"right things" to the "right place" at the "right time." DOD's
distribution system has two segments: strategic-national and theater.
The strategic segment of this pipeline involves the movement of
supplies from points outside a theater of military operations into the
theater. The theater segment consists of distribution that occurs
within a theater of military operations. The military services have the
responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide logistics support
to their respective forces.[Footnote 11] The military services and DLA
manage supplies and provide for asset visibility. U.S. Transportation
Command is responsible for providing transportation support, primarily
strategic airlift and sealift, as well as in-transit asset
visibility.[Footnote 12] The geographic combatant commands are
responsible for logistics in their theaters, to include managing and
directing the theater distribution system.[Footnote 13]
In September 2003, the Secretary of Defense assigned new organizational
responsibilities in the logistics area, including designating the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) as the
Defense Logistics Executive, and the Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command, as the Distribution Process Owner. The Defense Logistics
Executive has authority to address logistics and supply issues. The
role of the Distribution Process Owner is to improve the efficiency and
interoperability of the end-to-end distribution system. Prior to these
new organizational designations, the Secretary of Defense designated
U.S. Joint Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner,
responsible for improving joint deployment and redeployment processes.
The commanders of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Transportation
Command--recognizing that many deployment and distribution processes
are common and that both commands serve a common customer: the
supported joint force commander--signed a joint vision statement in
September 2006 to help guide their partnership as they work together to
improve DOD's joint deployment and distribution.
DOD Has Not Developed a Coordinated and Comprehensive Management
Approach to Joint Theater Logistics:
DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management
approach for guiding and overseeing the implementation of joint theater
logistics across the department. While DOD intends joint theater
logistics to improve the distribution and visibility of assets in
theater, its current approach is not consistent with sound management
principles that have been shown to be effective in accomplishing
organizational transformation, and has led to fragmented efforts across
components. In addition, changes in DOD's overall logistics
transformation strategy have hampered DOD's ability to adopt a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater
logistics. Without a coordinated and comprehensive approach, DOD will
continue to face difficulties achieving improvements in theater
distribution and asset visibility, which impair its ability to improve
overall supply chain management.
DOD's Approach to Joint Theater Logistics Is Not Consistent With Sound
Management Principles and Has Led to Fragmented Efforts:
Our review of DOD's efforts to develop joint theater logistics showed
that the department has taken a piecemeal approach rather than a
coordinated and comprehensive approach that is consistent with sound
management principles. DOD's current approach has led to fragmented
efforts among components to develop and implement initiatives. Sound
management principles, such as those used by leading organizations to
transform their culture and embodied in the Government Performance and
Results Act, include (1) specific goals and strategies, (2)
accountability for achieving results, and (3) outcome-oriented
performance measures. We have previously reported that organizations
that have progressed toward the results-oriented framework of the
Government Performance and Results Act have established performance
goals for which they will be held accountable, determined strategies
and resources to effectively accomplish the goals, and measured
progress towards those goals. A focus on results, as envisioned by the
Government Performance and Results Act, implies that collaboration is
important to ensure that consistent and complementary goals and
strategies for achieving results are developed and implemented across
the enterprise. Performance metrics are critical for demonstrating
progress toward achieving results and providing information on which to
base organizational and management decisions. Further, outcome-focused
performance metrics show results or outcomes related to an initiative
or program in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, or impact. When
combined with effective leadership, these principles provide a
framework to guide program efforts in a coordinated and comprehensive
fashion and allow leadership to determine if these efforts are
achieving the desired results. In contrast, an insufficient
articulation of program goals and inadequate information on performance
may be impediments to improving program efficiency and effectiveness.
DOD's approach to joint theater logistics is not consistent with these
principles of sound management. First, while DOD has a broad definition
of joint theater logistics, it has not articulated specific goals and
strategies linked to this vision. For example, DOD's Focused Logistics
Roadmap, supply chain management improvement plan, and other documents
we reviewed do not contain specific goals and strategies for achieving
joint theater logistics. DOD also has yet to identify the resources and
time frames for fully implementing joint theater logistics. Moreover,
DOD's description of joint theater logistics has not been consistent
over time, which may affect its ability to develop specific goals and
strategies. This issue is discussed later in this report.
Second, DOD has not assigned accountability for achieving results under
joint theater logistics. Although the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate
has been designated the lead proponent for joint theater logistics, no
one entity within DOD has responsibility for coordinating and
overseeing programs and initiatives related to joint theater logistics.
In addition, while DOD has designated executive agents and process
owners aimed at addressing logistics challenges that cut across the
department, the roles and responsibilities among DOD components have
not always been clearly delineated and may overlap. We have previously
reported on problems DOD has experienced in defining accountability and
authority for addressing supply distribution problems.[Footnote 14] For
example, although the Secretary of Defense in 2003 designated the
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, as DOD's Distribution Process
Owner--with responsibilities for overseeing the overall effectiveness,
efficiency, and alignment of DOD-wide distribution activities--DOD has
yet to issue a directive defining the process owner's authority,
accountability, resources, and responsibility.[Footnote 15]
Additionally, during our current review, service and combatant command
officials had concerns with U.S. Transportation Command expanding
beyond its traditional roles and responsibilities for strategic
distribution, believing that there should be a hand-off of
responsibilities once assets arrive in theater.
Furthermore, the diffused organization of DOD's logistics operations,
including separate funding and management of resources and systems,
complicates DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive
management approach to developing and implementing joint theater
logistics capabilities. Since 2003, a number of studies that have
assessed DOD's logistics organization have recommended changes to DOD's
organizational structure for providing joint logistics and supply
support to military operations.[Footnote 16] Some of these
organizations have noted that control over resources is a critical
issue to be addressed. For example, the Defense Science Board
recommended creation of a Joint Logistics Command that would combine
the missions of U.S. Transportation Command, DLA, and service logistics
commands. The Center for Strategic and International Studies also
suggested the creation of a departmentwide logistics command
responsible for end-to-end supply chain operations. Regarding resource
allocation, it further stated that resources should be organized,
managed, and budgeted largely along military service lines, but in
those instances where joint capability needs are not being met with
service-centric processes, the Secretary must turn to joint processes
and entities for their realization. The Lexington Institute, which also
recommended creation of a U.S. Logistics Command at the four-star
level, concluded that Title 10 can be used to prevent joint logistics
transformation and interoperability and may need to be amended in order
to create a Logistics Command. The Lexington Institute also concluded
that existing funding mechanisms act as disincentives for joint
logistics transformation and interoperability. The Defense Business
Practice Implementation Board, while not agreeing with the idea of
combining U.S. Transportation Command and DLA, recommended that DOD
elevate leadership for supply chain integration by designating a new
Under Secretary of Defense who would have authority to direct
integration activities, including control over budget decisions
affecting these two components and the military services. While we
noted that transformational changes such as those proposed by these
organizations may not be possible without amending existing laws, the
scope of our review did not include an assessment of these proposals or
what changes, if any, would require congressional action.
On the basis of our prior work on DOD's approach to business
transformation,[Footnote 17] we have stated that DOD needs to establish
a chief management official at an appropriate level with the authority
to be responsible and accountable for enterprisewide business
transformation, including business operations related to supply chain
management. Also, in our report on 21st century challenges confronting
the federal government,[Footnote 18] we stated that DOD faces
significant challenges in accomplishing its transformation goals and
making improvements in key business areas such as supply chain
management. We also suggested in that report that decision makers may
need to reexamine fundamental aspects of DOD's programs by considering
issues such as whether current organizations are aligned and empowered
to meet the demands of the new security environment as efficiently as
possible and what kinds of economies of scale and improvements in
delivery of support services would result from combining, realigning,
or otherwise changing selected support functions, including logistics.
Third, DOD has not developed outcome-oriented performance measures for
either joint theater logistics in general or for its specific
initiatives. The supply chain management improvement plan lists
potential metrics for joint theater logistics, but these have not been
made into quantifiable, outcome-oriented measures. For example, the
plan names visibility of logistics capabilities, logistics
footprint,[Footnote 19] and joint logistics and distribution planning
improvement as three potential metrics that could be developed to track
results and show the impact of joint theater logistics implementation.
Other documents we reviewed, including a joint theater logistics
implementation plan that was drafted in 2006 but not finalized,
recognize a need to identify metrics for the specific tasks required to
achieve the joint processes supporting joint theater logistics.
However, these metrics have not been identified as yet.
Because DOD has lacked a coordinated and comprehensive approach to
managing joint theater logistics, efforts to advance joint theater
logistics across the department have been fragmented. While DOD has
developed a series of initiatives to improve joint theater logistics,
leadership on individual initiatives is dispersed among various DOD
components. Many of these initiatives have been introduced by
individual services, combatant commanders, and other DOD components
without an overarching management approach for coordinating efforts.
For example, of the four initiatives identified in the Focused
Logistics Roadmap as supporting joint theater logistics, two have been
submitted by U.S. Transportation Command, one has been developed by the
Army, and another has been created by U.S. Joint Forces Command. During
our field visits, DOD officials identified a number of other
initiatives they had under way which they regarded as joint theater
logistics. Specific examples of DOD's fragmented efforts to develop and
implement joint theater logistics initiatives are discussed later in
this report. This fragmented approach could lead to duplication of
effort as well as capability gaps, diminishing the potential benefits
of joint theater logistics. Without a coordinated and comprehensive
approach that embodies sound management principles, DOD may be unable
to fully implement initiatives and achieve this capability. As a
result, DOD will have difficulty improving supply chain management in
the areas of distribution and asset visibility associated with joint
theater logistics.
Changes in DOD's Overall Logistics Strategy Hinder Development of Joint
Theater Logistics:
Changes in DOD's overall logistics strategy have hampered the
department's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive
management approach to joint theater logistics. These changes indicate
that DOD has lacked a consistent vision and strategy regarding its
efforts to transform logistics. Over the course of the last 10 years,
DOD has made multiple alterations to its overall logistics strategy
that have reflected differing visions about the future of the
department's logistics system. Figure 1 shows several of the strategic
planning documents, including vision statements, doctrine, campaign
plans, and roadmaps, that have addressed the future of DOD's logistics
systems.
Figure 1: Recent Strategic Planning Documents Addressing DOD Logistics:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Many of the strategic planning documents shown in figure 1 have
addressed joint theater logistics, but the description of this concept
has varied over time. For example, a strategic planning document
derived from Joint Vision 2010 refers to "joint theater logistics
command and control," describing this focused logistics capability
primarily as a concept to clarify lines of authority through a single
entity responsible for logistics support in a joint warfighting
environment. However, the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept
appeared to change the focus of joint theater logistics from command
and control to management. This document identified joint theater
logistics as a capability aimed at developing tools to allow the joint
force commander to effectively oversee management of logistics through
the range of military operations and did not focus on clarifying lines
of authority through a single logistics command and control
organization. As part of this continuing evolution of DOD logistics
strategies, the most recent efforts include (1) the "to be" roadmap,
(2) the revision of the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, and
(3) the capabilities portfolio management test for joint logistics.
* "To Be" Roadmap. As a follow-on to the 2005 "as is" Focused Logistics
Roadmap, DOD is developing a "to be" roadmap. Because the "as is"
roadmap indicated that key focused logistics capabilities would not be
achieved by 2015, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) directed the department to prepare a more
rigorous "to be" roadmap that would identify the scope of logistics
problems and capability gaps to be addressed, including joint theater
logistics. According to DOD officials, the roadmap is intended to
portray where the department is headed in the logistics area and how it
will get there, monitor progress toward achieving its objectives, and
institutionalize a continuous assessment process that links ongoing
capability development, program reviews, and budgeting. The first
edition of the "to be" roadmap was scheduled for completion in February
2007, in conjunction with the submission of the President's Budget for
Fiscal Year 2008. However, DOD put the roadmap on hold pending the
completion of other strategic initiatives. As of March 2007, DOD
estimated it would complete the roadmap by March of 2008, after
completion of its capabilities portfolio management test. Capabilities
portfolio management is discussed below.
* Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept. DOD is revising the
Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, which could affect the
future of joint theater logistics. In August 2006, Joint Staff
officials told us that they no longer believe that the Focused
Logistics Joint Functional Concept approved in 2003 accurately captures
the capabilities needed by the warfighter, as they found it difficult
to delineate the relationships among the seven focused logistics
capabilities, including joint theater logistics. Consequently, the
Joint Staff is currently rewriting the Focused Logistics Joint
Functional Concept, which they expect to be finalized in the fall of
2007. According to Joint Staff officials, the revision will likely
realign focused logistics capabilities, reducing the number of
capabilities supporting joint logistics from seven to five. They have
stated that joint theater logistics may cease to exist as a stand-alone
capability area under the proposed realignment. However, they have said
that the tenets of joint theater logistics would be retained in the
remaining capability areas addressing the supply chain, and the
functional areas associated with joint theater logistics would be
integrated within the broader joint logistics portfolio. Once the
Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept paper is rewritten, DOD
intends to complete the "to be" roadmap in alignment with the new joint
logistics capability areas. Additionally, DOD's key joint doctrine
document for joint logistics operations, Joint Publication 4-0, is
being rewritten to reflect these changes.
Prior to these changes, the Joint Staff's Joint Theater Logistics
working group had begun developing an implementation plan for joint
theater logistics. As part of this plan, the working group identified
13 capability areas in support of joint theater logistics.[Footnote 20]
For each capability, the working group planned to evaluate different
processes used by the services and merge the common parts of these
individual processes into a joint process to meet the commander's
requirements. The working group finished identifying the joint
processes for 3 of these potential capability areas that were
considered most readily joint--ammunition, fuels, and mortuary affairs-
-and began drafting the joint tasks and metrics associated with each.
Drafts of these documents were completed prior to the summer of 2006,
and the goal was to have the tasks identified for the 3 capability
areas by July 2006. All the services have agreed to these three joint
processes, and officials said that the next step is to complete task
identification for all 13 capabilities. However, these efforts have
been placed on hold pending DOD's realignment of the joint capability
areas.
* Capabilities Portfolio Management. In a separate but related effort,
the department has begun testing a new approach to managing the
development of joint capabilities DOD-wide. This new approach is known
as joint capabilities portfolio management. In September 2006, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense selected joint logistics as one of four
capability areas for testing capabilities portfolio
management.[Footnote 21] These experiments were initiated in response
to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that emphasized DOD's need to
build on capabilities-based planning and management. According to DOD
officials, the purpose of this test is to determine if DOD can make
better leadership decisions by managing a portfolio of capabilities
instead of managing systems and capabilities individually. Thus, this
portfolio test is intended to enable senior leaders to consider trade-
offs across previously stovepiped areas and to better understand the
implications of investment decisions across competing priorities. The
Joint Staff Director for Logistics is the test director for the joint
logistics test case, which will include all capabilities required to
project and sustain joint force operations, including supply chain
operations. DOD will examine the capabilities and their initiatives in
order to identify gaps or redundancies or determine where initiatives
complement one another. According to Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and Joint Staff officials, the initial results of the joint
logistics capability portfolio management test were expected to be
available in late spring 2007. The officials told us that these results
will then be used to write the revision to the Focused Logistics Joint
Functional Concept, which they said will enable them to complete the
"to be" roadmap. Joint Staff officials are also awaiting the completion
of the test prior to updating their joint theater logistics
implementation plan.
As DOD continues its attempt to articulate an overall strategy to guide
logistic transformation, the development of the "to be" roadmap and
other activities related to implementing joint theater logistics have
been delayed due to these changes. In addition, the initiation of the
capabilities portfolio management experiment has the potential to
fundamentally alter the management of joint logistics. Until DOD
decides on its vision and aligns its strategic direction, it will be
unable to develop a coordinated and comprehensive approach to joint
theater logistics. Moreover, it will be unable to ensure that it is
achieving its desired improvements in theater distribution and asset
visibility associated with joint theater logistics.
DOD Has Made Progress on Joint Theater Logistics Initiatives but Faces
Challenges That Hinder Its Ability to Fully Realize the Benefits of
These Efforts:
DOD components have several initiatives under way that are aimed at
developing a joint theater logistics capability in the area of
distribution and supply support. Our analysis showed that the current
initiatives generally address five areas of distribution and supply
support to a joint force commander. Some of the initiatives have been
specifically designated by DOD as supporting joint theater logistics,
and other initiatives supporting this capability were identified during
our field visits with DOD components. Although progress has been made
on some initiatives, DOD faces challenges in fully developing and
implementing these initiatives. Table 1 summarizes the five areas of
distribution and supply support, the related joint theater logistics
initiatives, and the challenges we identified during our review.
Table 1: Challenges Hindering DOD's Ability to Fully Implement Joint
Theater Logistics Initiatives:
Area of distribution and supply support: Receiving and processing a
large influx of supplies at the beginning of a military operation;
Related joint theater logistics initiatives: Joint Task Force-Port
Opening;
Challenges hindering full implementation:
* Potential redundancy of efforts;
* Sourcing and use of personnel;
* Command and control issues.
Area of distribution and supply support: Management of supplies moving
across the distribution system;
Related joint theater logistics initiatives: Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center;
Challenges hindering full implementation:
* Noninteroperable information technology systems;
* Container management.
Area of distribution and supply support: Theaterwide coordination of
surface transportation assets;
Related joint theater logistics initiatives: Theater and Expeditionary
Sustainment Commands, Director of Mobility Forces-Surface;
Challenges hindering full implementation:
* Fragmented theater logistics operations;
* Lack of information technology tools;
* Insufficient numbers of skilled personnel;
* Unclear position in command structure;
* Command and control issues;
* Potential duplication of efforts.
Area of distribution and supply support: Consolidation of supply
storage and shipping activities;
Related joint theater logistics initiatives: Node Management and
Deployable Depot, Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management,
Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point;
Challenges hindering full implementation:
* Funding of inventories;
* Security concerns.
Area of distribution and supply support: Exercise of command and
control over joint logistics functions;
Related joint theater logistics initiatives: Joint Experimental
Deployment and Support;
Challenges hindering full implementation:
* Statutory requirements for logistics support;
* Exercising directive authority for logistics;
* Operational and financial considerations.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Unless DOD successfully addresses these challenges, the initiatives are
not likely to significantly improve the ability of a joint force
commander to harness the diffuse logistics resources and systems that
exist within the department and effectively and efficiently direct
logistics functions, including distribution and supply support
activities, across the theater of operations to accomplish an assigned
mission. Moreover, without addressing such challenges, DOD is likely to
continue to experience some of the same types of distribution and asset
visibility problems that have occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
New Port Opening Capability Faces Implementation Challenges:
DOD has developed an initiative to improve its port opening capability
but faces implementation challenges because of concerns with potential
redundancy of efforts, staffing, and command and control issues. The
capability to rapidly open a new port in a theater to receive and
process a large influx of equipment and supplies is critical during the
initial stages of a military operation, ranging from humanitarian
missions to major combat operations. A rapid port opening capability
provides the joint force commander with an expeditionary force to
conduct an airfield or distribution assessment, establish initial
command and control, set up critical in-transit visibility and
communications systems, and establish movement control over
distribution operations. However, in the early stages of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces did not deploy a sufficient port opening
capability that was needed in Kuwait to successfully establish initial
supply and distribution operations. For example, we have previously
reported that because DOD's priority was for combat forces to move into
the theater first, logistics support forces to establish an initial
theater distribution system were either deleted from the deployment
plan or shifted back in the deployment timeline.[Footnote 22] As a
result, logistics personnel could not effectively support the
increasing numbers of combat troops moving into theater, and the
shortage of logistics support resulted in delays in the processing of
supplies as well as backlogs. According to Army officials, these early
decisions regarding port opening capabilities led to problems in
sustaining a large influx and flow of materiel during early operations.
The Army's deployed port opening capability could not support more than
a brigade-sized element, which resulted in a number of theater
distribution problems.
DOD Has Established a New Port Opening Unit:
To improve DOD's rapid port-opening capability, U.S. Transportation
Command began developing the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative
in 2005, and the Secretary of Defense approved a standing Execution
Order for the initiative in May 2006. As the Distribution Process
Owner, U.S. Transportation Command wanted a capability to rapidly
extend the distribution network into a theater and facilitate theater
distribution. The mission of the joint task force is to rapidly open a
port and manage initial distribution operations. Joint Task Force-Port
Opening is comprised of air and surface elements that train and work
together, are deployable in 12 hours, and are to be deployed for
approximately 45-60 days before being replaced by follow-on forces.
According to U.S. Transportation Command, Joint Task Force-Port Opening
is designed to rapidly establish and initially operate a port,
facilitating more effective movement of materiel within the theater by
arranging cargo just off the airfield in a logical pattern and creating
a forward distribution point, or node,[Footnote 23] within 10
kilometers. The capability was initially validated for an aerial port
of debarkation, and development of a similar capability for a seaport
of debarkation has begun.[Footnote 24] Joint Task Force-Port Opening
bypassed the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
process initially but is now going through an accelerated
review.[Footnote 25] U.S. Transportation Command's goal is to have
three Joint Task Force-Port Opening units, each comprised of an air and
a surface element, which would facilitate a cycle allowing for an
active, a training, and a reconstituting unit at any given time.
Currently, there is one surface element at Fort Dix, New Jersey, that
is staffed by individuals from multiple Army Reserve units and filled
through a request for forces that was originally set to expire in June
2007. The air element is provided by the Air Force's existing
Contingency Response Groups, and the current group is located at
McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, near the surface element at Fort
Dix.
Army Officials Have Raised Concerns About the Port Opening Unit:
During our field visits with combatant commands and the military
services, we found that while there was agreement on the need for an
effective port-opening capability, DOD components had differing views
on how to address the shortfall in this capability that became apparent
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In particular, senior Army officials we
interviewed--to include officials at the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, Army Reserve, and Army Combined Arms Support
Command--expressed concerns regarding (1) the potential redundancy
between the Joint Task Force-Port Opening initiative and their own
service-led efforts, (2) the personnel resources devoted to the task
force, and (3) command and control issues. Until the challenges
associated with implementing this initiative are resolved, DOD will
continue to struggle to develop and implement an effective and
integrated port opening capability.
Army officials questioned the need for Joint Task Force-Port Opening in
view of existing and emerging capabilities within the Army. Some Army
officials we interviewed asserted that the Army already has an adequate
port opening capability but it was not deployed properly during the
initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.[Footnote 26] These officials
consider Joint Task Force-Port Opening to be redundant of existing
capabilities. Other Army officials stated that while DOD's port opening
capability has been deficient, the Army's ongoing efforts to enhance
its expeditionary theater opening capability will address this
shortfall. Military officials have said that the Army's expeditionary
theater opening capability extends beyond the early entry capability of
Joint Task Force-Port Opening, and includes a range of key capabilities
critical to larger theater opening efforts. In the view of Army
officials, port opening is a subset of this larger effort, and
consequently Joint Task Force-Port Opening will ultimately fall short
of the capability they believe is required and will need to be
integrated into a larger theater opening framework. Army officials also
had some concerns about the effectiveness of Joint Task Force-Port
Opening across the range of military operations. Some officials noted
that Joint Task Force-Port Opening could become quickly overwhelmed by
a large operation and that additional Army logistics personnel would
have to be deployed to supplement the task force's operations.
A second area of concern to Army officials is the personnel
requirements to staff the Joint Task Force-Port Opening surface
element. Army officials told us they were unable to use active duty
personnel to fill the surface element due to commitments to other
operations, so they turned to the reserve component to fill these
positions. However, Army Reserve officials have questioned the
sustainability of the task force using reservists. These officials
noted that placing Army Reserve personnel on standby for potential
Joint Task Force-Port Opening deployment uses up the mobilization time
of these reservists without actually deploying the force. The Secretary
of Defense recently extended the provisional status of Joint Task Force-
Port Opening due to competing priorities for funding and personnel. As
a result, the Army Reserve will continue the interim manning
arrangement of the task force until the summer of 2008 rather than the
summer of 2007 as initially planned.
A final area of concern that emerged from our discussions with Army
officials was command and control over Joint Task Force-Port Opening.
Army officials raised questions about who would have the authority to
deploy the task force and who would direct its operations once it
deploys. According to Army officials, such command and control issues
must be resolved before Joint Task Force-Port Opening can be
effectively integrated into military operations. A theater opening
exercise conducted by the Army in November 2006 revealed that these
issues had not been resolved. U.S. Transportation Command officials,
however, do not identify command and control as an issue regarding the
task force. They have stated that the Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command, would have the authority to direct the Joint Task Force-Port
Opening into the theater and that the joint force commander may exert
command and control while the unit is deployed.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Supply Distribution, but Asset
Visibility and Container Management Challenges Remain:
DOD has taken steps to improve the management of supplies moving across
the distribution system, particularly through the creation of Joint
Deployment Distribution Operations Centers, but challenges remain in
achieving asset visibility across the theater and in managing
containers. We have previously reported that the defense logistics
systems used by various components to order, track, and account for
supplies are not well integrated and do not provide the information
needed to effectively manage theater distribution and provide asset
visibility.[Footnote 27] Limitations in these capabilities have led to
difficulties in the logistics planning process and the creation of
potential double orders for the same supply part, and could impact
readiness of forces.
DOD Has Established Joint Operations Centers in the Geographic
Combatant Commands:
To address deficiencies in the management of theater supply
distribution, DOD has created Joint Deployment Distribution Operations
Centers within the geographic combatant commands. The mission of the
operations centers is to improve intertheater and intratheater supply
distribution by integrating the flow of military forces and supplies
and materiel to sustain U.S. forces. The operations centers are
designed to incorporate representatives from DOD components, such as
U.S. Transportation Command, DLA, and the military services, who can
provide a knowledgeable connection to logistics supply centers in the
United States and facilitate the distribution of supplies to the
theater. According to DOD officials, the Joint Staff and U.S. Joint
Forces Command are currently working to incorporate the operations
centers into joint doctrine, which will result in updating numerous
existing DOD publications.
Initiated by U.S. Transportation Command, the first Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center was established in Kuwait under U.S.
Central Command. In addition to managing the coordination between
services and logistics agencies and improving asset visibility as
supplies enter the theater, operations center personnel also analyze
distribution problems, identify causes, and propose solutions. DOD
officials have stated that the operations center was successful at
improving the management of supplies moving across the distribution
system and achieving cost savings. For example, U.S. Transportation
Command officials said the operations center was responsible for
shifting from the use of airlift to sealift to transport supplies,
which reduces costly airlift requirements and frees up airlift
capacity; coordinating the movement of personnel from their point of
origin to final destination rather than through intermediate locations
with time-consuming layovers (a concept referred to as "single
ticket"); and improving distribution management by facilitating the use
of pure-packed pallets and containers,[Footnote 28] developing a
container management plan, and improving the return of Army materiel
from the theater. According to data provided by U.S. Transportation
Command, the activities of the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations
Center have resulted in total cost avoidance and savings of $343
million between fiscal years 2004 and 2007.
On the basis of the successes attributed to the Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait, DOD established new
operations centers in the other geographic combatant commands. The
size, structure, and organizational placement of these operations
centers vary across the combatant commands. For example, the U.S.
Central and European Commands have the largest operations centers, with
approximately 60 and 55 personnel, respectively. The other centers are
considerably smaller with a core staff ranging from 7 to 12 personnel.
However, the operations centers are considered "scaleable"--that is,
they can be increased in size as needed to support a military exercise
or operation.
Lack of System Interoperability Has Impeded Asset Visibility:
Senior military commanders in Kuwait told us that despite the benefits
obtained from the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center,
effective management of supply distribution across the theater has been
hindered by ongoing challenges in achieving asset visibility. They
attributed these challenges to a lack of interoperability among
information technology systems, making it difficult to obtain timely
and accurate information on assets in the theater. Interoperability
refers to the ability of different systems to communicate effectively,
including sharing information. Interoperable systems providing
effective asset visibility can enable commanders and logisticians to
have a common operating picture concerning the location, status, and
identity of equipment and supplies across a theater. According to DOD
doctrine, asset visibility across the supply chain and a common
operating picture are both key enablers for joint theater logistics. In
our previous reports, we stated that DOD lacks the systems integration
necessary to provide total asset visibility because of the duplicative
and stovepiped nature of DOD's systems environment.[Footnote 29]
During our field visit to Kuwait, officials from the 377th Theater
Support Command and 143rd Transportation Command said they must use
manual workarounds to overcome the problems caused by noninteroperable
information systems. These officials estimate that their staff spends
half their time pulling data from information systems, e-mailing it
around for validation or coordination, consolidating it on a
spreadsheet, and analyzing it to make management decisions. In January
2007, a joint assessment conducted by several DOD components at Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait, found that information technology capabilities need to
be improved to achieve visibility of materiel in transit and of
transportation resources required to optimize distribution. The
assessment reported that separate movement control battalions in Kuwait
and Iraq use both automated and handwritten transportation movement
requests to track air and ground movements. Consequently, to capture
the total theater movement picture, both movement control battalions
must consolidate manual and automated data into spreadsheets. Neither
movement battalion has total visibility over what is occurring in both
Kuwait and Iraq. Nor do they have total visibility of the surface
transportation resources necessary to optimize the distribution of
resources. The movement control battalions use e-mail on a daily basis
to coordinate each other's projected movement requests and planned
commitment of transportation assets.
Problems With Container Management Have Continued:
DOD also has challenges with container management that hinder asset
visibility and impede its ability to effectively manage logistics
operations and costs. These challenges include (1) the application of
radio frequency identification technology on containers in the supply
chain, (2) compliance with container management processes, and (3) the
return of commercial containers to maritime carriers. We discussed some
of these same problems in a prior report.[Footnote 30]
Most supply items shipped by surface ships, excluding large end items
such as vehicles, are consolidated and packed into 20-or 40-foot sea-
land containers (such as those shown in fig. 2) that are owned by the
government or commercial maritime carriers.
Figure 2: Military Storage Containers in Kuwait (October 2006):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) directed the use of active radio frequency identification
technology[Footnote 31] on all consolidated shipments moving to, from,
or between overseas locations. These shipments are to be tagged in
order to provide global in-transit visibility. U.S. Central Command has
emphasized the need to use radio frequency technology to improve asset
visibility in Iraq and Afghanistan. In January 2005, the Commander,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command, directed that all containers
moving to, from, and within the theater have active radio frequency
tags written with complete contents detail. However, more than a year
later, inadequately tagged containers continued to move throughout the
theater. Consequently, the Commander issued an updated radio frequency
tag policy in October 2006, instituting a phased-in approach for
compliance according to the following timeline: 50 percent compliance
by November 1, 2006; 75 percent by December 1, 2006; and 100 percent by
January 1, 2007. However, despite this updated policy, inadequate radio
frequency tagging of containers continues to be a problem.
U.S Central Command officials, including general officers, identified a
number of reasons why DOD continues to struggle with the application of
radio frequency identification technology in the theater supply chain.
Some problems include shipping containers without radio frequency tags
or with tags that are broken, tags with incorrect information, or tags
that are rewritten but not cross-referenced to the original shipping
information. Based on tracking charts from the Container Management
Element,[Footnote 32] from the period of August 15, 2006, to April 9,
2007, 15 percent of the containers that passed northbound through the
NAVISTAR[Footnote 33] distribution point had no radio frequency tag.
Another 20 percent of the containers had broken tags or tags that did
not match the container contents.[Footnote 34] In addition, a radio
frequency tag must be created to have the container's shipping
information and contents entered into an inventory software system that
then uploads the information to the DOD in-transit visibility server.
When a container moves between transportation nodes--the airport,
seaport, Army general support warehouse, Consolidation Receiving and
Shipping Point, Defense Distribution Depot, Theater Consolidation and
Shipping Point, NAVISTAR, or forward-located nodes in Iraq--it might
require creating a new tag to upload new information to the in-transit
visibility server. A container may require a new tag if its current tag
is broken or found to contain inaccurate data or when a container is
opened and repacked. The problem arises when the new radio frequency
tag, with its newly generated number that is assigned by the local
inventory software system, does not reference back to the original tag
number. As a result, the requesting customer might look up the original
tracking number in the in-transit visibility server and no longer have
visibility of the shipment.
Noncompliance with container management processes established by U.S.
Central Command can limit asset visibility of supplies. Officials in
U.S. Central Command's Container Management Element use an Army Web-
based central database to track container ownership, location,
condition, and use, and to provide visibility of all containers in
theater. For the system to effectively track containers, the containers
must be properly "in-gated"--recorded entering a transportation node--
and "out-gated"--recorded leaving a transportation node. In a process
similar to the commercial shipper tracking systems used by United
Parcel Service or Federal Express, a container is in-gated when it
first arrives at a location to document that it has been received,
according to Container Management Element officials. Upon departure
from that location, the container is out-gated to indicate that it has
been shipped. Container Management Element officials stated that the
failure of transportation nodes to properly in-gate and out-gate
containers as they pass through distribution channels is a significant
problem hampering asset visibility in theater because tagged containers
can become "lost" in theater, with no one able to track the location of
the container or its contents. In addition, if the container is
commercially owned and not returned to the carrier within a specified
time period, detention charges begin accumulating.
In the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial containers
were flowing into the theater but were not always tracked once in Iraq,
and many of the commercial containers moving into Iraq were not quickly
returned to maritime carriers.[Footnote 35] In July 2005, the Army
Audit Agency reported that container detention charges were continuing
to accrue at about $15 million per month. [Footnote 36] To improve
management and accountability over containers and to address the
growing detention charges, U.S. Transportation Command and the Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command developed a theater
container management process and established the Container Management
Element--a unit responsible for tracking and providing management
oversight of containers in the theater. In addition, the Army decided
to purchase ("buy out") commercial containers to reduce monthly
detention charges. According to information provided by the Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the Army had purchased
approximately 28,832 containers at a total cost of approximately $203
million, as of December 2006. Container Management Element officials
told us that through a combination of container buyouts and increased
oversight, detention charges decreased from approximately $10.7 million
per month in December 2005 to $3.7 million per month in October 2006.
Although DOD has been able to reduce monthly detention charges on
commercial containers, it is still experiencing problems with retaining
visibility over containers. As of April 30, 2007, the central container
database showed that 54,390 containers--or more than one-third of all
containers in the U.S. Central Command theater--were considered to be
lost. Furthermore, according to container management officials, DOD's
problem with commercial container detention charges is shifting from
Iraq to Afghanistan. Efforts to curtail the movement of commercial
containers into Iraq have been largely successful, according to
information provided by container management officials. For example, of
the 13,440 containers sent to Iraq from June 6, 2006, to October 17,
2006, only 19 were commercially owned. However, 4,901 (85 percent) of
the 5,752 containers sent into Afghanistan during the same period were
commercial containers. Container buyout data for December 2006--the
most recent data available--show that 4,748 (67 percent) of the 7,038
containers purchased were in Afghanistan. According to container
management officials, this problem stems from a general shortage of
government-owned containers in the theater and the lack of a container
transloading operation for materiel shipped into Afghanistan that would
be similar to the one at the port of Kuwait for materiel going to
Iraq.[Footnote 37] Items being shipped by sea to Afghanistan enter
through the port of Karachi in Pakistan since Afghanistan is
landlocked. According to container management officials, establishing a
transloading operation in Pakistan would be difficult because of
restrictions placed on U.S. military personnel in Pakistan. These
officials said that commercial containers en route to Afghanistan begin
to accumulate detention charges prior to reaching their final
destination because of the time required for trucks to cover the
difficult inland route.
Separate Organizations Are Being Established to Coordinate Surface
Transportation:
DOD components have initiatives underway to better coordinate the
surface transportation of supply items that are distributed across a
military theater of operations, but these efforts face challenges to
their implementation and may duplicate some functions. During the
initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD faced problems with
prioritizing and managing its transportation assets across the theater.
According to a 2005 RAND study,[Footnote 38] U.S. forces suffered from
both a shortage of transportation assets--primarily trucks--and the
fragmented control and management of these assets across the different
echelons of theater command. While RAND reported that exact data on the
total truck shortage were not available, the estimated ratio of Army
personnel to medium truck equivalents was 194 to 1 at the beginning of
Operation Iraqi Freedom compared to approximately 73 to 1 in Operation
Desert Storm. In addition, the distances from logistics operating bases
to support combat operations were greater--344 miles to Baghdad, versus
210 miles to the farthest incursion during Operation Desert Storm. The
Army Division Support Command, Corps Support Command, Area Support
Group, and Theater Support Command each controlled a portion of the
truck assets within the theater. Consequently, there was no single
distribution organization to advocate for truck assets during the force
planning process, which may account for the shortage of trucks, and no
single organization deployed in theater with the authority to rebalance
transportation assets across the theater and integrate and synchronize
the surface deployment and distribution movements in support of the
commander's priorities.
Sustainment Commands and Surface Mobility Directorate Are Aimed at
Coordinating Surface Transportation:
The Army and U.S. Transportation Command have separate initiatives
aimed at addressing these surface transportation problems. As part of
its modular transformation, the Army is creating new organizations--
Theater Sustainment Commands and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands--
that are aimed in part at centralizing control over Army surface
transportation assets within a theater of operations. Under the Army's
emerging sustainment doctrine, the objective of the Theater Sustainment
Command is to provide the Army with a single headquarters responsible
for operational command and control of logistics operations throughout
the theater. Its functions include theater opening, materiel
management, and distribution. This command would typically operate in a
rear area away from frontline military operations. Theater Sustainment
Commands replace the Army's existing Theater Support Commands and are
designed to plan, prepare, rapidly deploy, and execute operational
logistics within the theater of operations.[Footnote 39] Expeditionary
Sustainment Commands, a forward extension of the Theater Sustainment
Commands, have a primary role of managing regional logistics operations
in support of the joint task force commander. According to U.S. Central
Command officials, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command and the 316th
Expeditionary Sustainment Command are scheduled to deploy to Kuwait and
Iraq, respectively, in the summer of 2007. In addition, the 8th Theater
Sustainment Command has been established in U.S. Pacific Command,
Hawaii, and the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command is operational
in Korea.
In a separate initiative, U.S. Transportation Command created a new
organization, the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface, to integrate
surface deployment and distribution priorities set by the joint force
commander. According to U.S. Transportation Command, this initiative
will enable DOD to better synchronize and direct the movement and
coordination of surface transportation resources to ensure
uninterrupted distribution of materiel from air and sea ports of
debarkation to destinations within the theater. In addition, U.S.
Transportation Command officials believe that theater surface
distribution will benefit from establishing an organization that has a
capability similar to that provided by the Director of Mobility Forces-
Air for theater air distribution.[Footnote 40] The proposed
responsibilities of the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface include
coordinating, prioritizing, and executing surface transportation
movement requests. In Kuwait, U.S. Transportation Command and U.S.
Central Command established a pilot Director of Mobility Forces-Surface
in August 2006 and completed an initial assessment of the pilot in
February 2007. In addition, this initiative has been tested during
exercises in Korea, most recently in March 2007.
Initiatives Face Implementation Challenges:
The Army and U.S. Transportation Command face a number of challenges in
the implementation of their initiatives. While the Army's Theater and
Expeditionary Sustainment Commands were designed to be the single
headquarters responsible for operational command and control of
logistics operations throughout the theater, the fragmentation of
logistics operations in theater may hinder it from achieving this
objective. More specifically, according to U.S. Central Command
officials, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command will be placed under the
Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component, in Kuwait. As the forward
extension to Theater Sustainment Commands, Expeditionary Sustainment
Commands are designed to operate under the command and support of the
Theater Sustainment Command in order to provide a single command for
logistics theaterwide. However, according to U.S. Central Command
officials, the deployment order for the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment
Command has placed it under the operational control of the Commander,
Multi-National Forces-Iraq. While still attached to the 1st Theater
Sustainment Command, the placement of the 316th Expeditionary
Sustainment Command under Multi-National Forces-Iraq will likely
continue the fragmentation of logistics operations like surface
distribution that the new command structure was designed to eliminate.
The Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component, is a (Three Star)
Lieutenant General, and the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, is a
(Four Star) General and the highest ranking officer in the theater,
responsible for U.S. operations in Iraq. As a result, the 1st Theater
Sustainment Command will likely be responsible for logistics operations
in Kuwait and the rest of the theater, while the 316th Expeditionary
Sustainment Command will be responsible for logistics operations in
Iraq. In addition, the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Daegu,
South Korea, is under the operational control of the Commander, U.S.
Forces Korea, rather than the 8th Theater Sustainment Command in U.S.
Pacific Command, Hawaii. The deployment of these new Army logistics
support units under command and control structures that differ from
their original design raises questions about the efficacy of the
emerging Army sustainment command doctrine and its general
applicability to joint military operations conducted within a combatant
command theater.
Army officials also raised concerns about whether the sustainment
commands would have the information technology tools and personnel
necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out their mission. They
said these commands were designed to be smaller than their predecessors
based on an assumption that certain information technology tools would
be available to enable the commands to operate with fewer personnel.
However, some of these information technology tools have experienced
problems during their development that have limited their capability or
have delayed their fielding. For example:
* The next generation Mobile Tracking System is a satellite tracking
system for trucks that in its most advanced configuration is also able
to read and relay information from radio frequency identification tags
attached to containers and pallets traveling in a supply convoy. This
technology could provide near real-time visibility and location data on
supplies moving through the theater by surface transportation. However,
the technology is expensive and few trucks are equipped with this
latest configuration.
* Battle Command Sustainment Support System processes a large amount of
logistics data and can facilitate decision making by providing a means
for commanders to determine the sustainability of current and planned
operations. The system provides a capability for tracking supply
convoys moving through an area of operation. However, it lacks the
integration to produce and send a cargo manifest that can be linked to
an in-transit visibility device for tracking.
* TransLog Web was designed to serve as the single point of entry for
transportation movement requests. This Web-based program could serve as
a transportation planning and movement tracking tool to assist movement
managers in coordinating supplies and transportation assets. However,
the system (1) is not used by all movement control teams, (2) does not
provide visibility of the cargo's description beyond the supply class,
and (3) does not feed information to the Global Transportation
Network.[Footnote 41]
* Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements
System II is expected to enhance and improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of support planning needed to deploy and redeploy forces
and equipment; improve the visibility of assets; and enhance cargo and
passenger receiving, controlling, and shipping. However, the system is
not scheduled to be fully operational until around 2010, and while the
Army justified the system based on its joint service application, two
services (the Air Force and the Marine Corps) have stated that they do
not intend to use it.[Footnote 42]
According to Army officials, the shortcomings in available information
tools have resulted in the need for additional staff in the sustainment
commands. They explained that problems with data and a lack of system
interoperability have required the commands to use manual, ad hoc
techniques to validate, coordinate, and analyze data for decision
making, and these efforts are cumbersome and manpower intensive. In
Kuwait, the 377th Theater Support Command, including subordinate
commands such as the 143rd Transportation Command, controlled an
organization of several thousand personnel. By comparison, the Theater
Sustainment Command that will replace it was designed to be staffed
with several hundred people. According to Army officials, if the Army
had all the information technology tools in place that have been
promised and factored into the design of the new sustainment commands,
it might be possible to accomplish its mission with the smaller staff.
To meet the additional personnel requirements of the sustainment
commands, U.S. Central Command issued a request for additional forces,
which increased Theater Sustainment Command staffing from 155 to 461
personnel and Expeditionary Sustainment Command staffing from 254 to
378 personnel. Furthermore, Army officials noted that the leaner
staffing of the new commands places a premium on obtaining personnel
with the right expertise and skills. For example, assigned staff will
need to be fully networked with the national inventory control points,
able to quickly develop support relationships, and determine the best
method of meeting requirements. They must be proficient in tapping into
the Army's standard supply system, prepositioned stocks, host nation
support, and contracting. The officials expressed some concern about
the probability of getting personnel with those skills and expertise on
a recurring rotational basis.
The Director of Mobility Forces-Surface has also faced implementation
challenges. During exercises in Korea, the new organization has had
difficulty establishing its position within the U. S. Forces Korea and
Combined Forces Command structure. In each exercise, the directorate
has been placed under a different organization. For example, it has
been tested under the operational control of the Joint Force Support
Component Command and in the Joint Operations Fusion Center. U.S.
Forces Korea officials said that finding the proper niche for Director
of Mobility Forces-Surface is further complicated because the South
Korean military is responsible for surface mobility of the Combined
Forces on the Korean peninsula. During the 2007 exercise, the
directorate was placed in the Combined Transportation Movement Center,
which is co-chaired by the South Korean military.
Moreover, the initial assessment of the Director of Mobility Forces-
Surface pilot in Kuwait by U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central
Command indicated that the initiative faces a number of challenges
related to (1) command and control, (2) availability of information
technology tools, (3) securing personnel with the expertise and
knowledge to use the information technology tools that are available,
and (4) potential duplication of responsibilities with other Army
organizations. More specifically, the assessment found that while the
pilot had made progress, the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface:
* was assigned to the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, whose
authority is currently restricted to the Kuwait Joint Operations Area,
which impedes a U.S. Central Command-wide focus on surface
distribution;
* lacked adequate information technology tools to ensure the visibility
of materiel in transit and availability of surface transportation
assets required to optimize surface distribution across the theater;
* lacked personnel with the right skill sets or training to take
advantage of the technology tools that were available; and:
* provided functions that could overlap with those of the Army's 1st
Theater Sustainment Command.
Regarding this last point, an Army analysis also showed a potential for
duplication of efforts. Specifically, the Army reviewed 123 proposed
responsibilities of the Director of Mobility Forces-Surface and found
that most of the responsibilities are covered by the Army's sustainment
commands and service component commands. The Army's analysis showed
that most other proposed Director of Mobility Forces-Surface
responsibilities were covered by the geographic combatant command.
The U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central Command's assessment
also noted that "unity of effort" with regard to the Director of
Mobility Forces-Surface was lacking and that some key senior leaders
had not yet embraced the initiative's capabilities. In response to the
assessment, U.S. Central Command discontinued the pilot in May 2007,
until some of these issues are resolved.
Consolidated Storage and Shipping Arrangements Have Been Implemented on
a Limited Scale:
DOD components have begun several initiatives to consolidate storage
and shipping sites located in a joint theater, but these efforts have
been implemented on a limited scale and we found potential
opportunities for further consolidation during our fieldwork in Kuwait.
DOD currently uses multiple storage and shipping sites within a theater
to supply items to its customers. In some cases, these sites may carry
the same supply items and ship to the same customers. Operating
multiple sites requires additional facilities, personnel, contract
services, and inventories and also results in extra movements of stock,
inefficient use of surface and air distribution assets, increased
opportunities for information processing errors, and the loss of asset
visibility. Consolidating storage and shipping arrangements can help
address these supply chain problems while at the same time reducing
DOD's logistics footprint.
Consolidated Storage and Shipping Initiatives:
DOD has developed initiatives to consolidate and improve storage and
shipping of materiel, including Node Management and Deployable Depot,
Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management, and Theater
Consolidation and Shipping Point. Node Management and Deployable Depot
is a DLA initiative to develop a small-scale, rapidly deployable
distribution center that has the capability to provide consolidated
shipping, receiving, cross-docking, storage, communication, and order
processing. The initiative, which is in the early stages of development
and testing, is aimed at improving the flow of logistics information
along the supply chain and also providing efficient physical management
of materiel in the theater of operations. To deploy this capability to
a theater, DLA would send trained personnel, information technology
systems, portable structures, and materiel handling equipment. DLA is
collaborating with U.S. Transportation Command to establish a close
association between Node Management and Deployable Depot and Joint Task
Force-Port Opening. Supply items off-loaded by the port opening unit
could be moved to the DLA depot located within 10 kilometers away. The
two organizations plan to write this relationship into the concepts of
operations for both initiatives. U.S. Pacific Command is the
operational manager for Node Management and Deployable Depot, providing
the location for upcoming exercises to prepare for operations that
would be carried out in an austere location. The initiative is
currently undergoing tests of both its information technology and
materiel management capabilities.
A second consolidation initiative is Joint Regional Inventory and
Material Management, which is aimed at streamlining the storage and
distribution of common items for multiple military service locations in
a region from a DLA hub. The objectives of Joint Regional Inventory and
Material Management include eliminating duplicate materiel handling and
inventory layers. The pilot program for the Joint Regional Inventory
and Material Management initiative in Hawaii has been completed and
shows promise to improve joint theater logistics, but some funding and
metrics issues are still being addressed. DOD has met key milestones in
this initiative, and officials in U.S. Pacific Command reported that
they had reduced redundant service-managed inventories, the number of
times they handle parts, and customer wait times over the course of the
pilot. When the services stock fewer items, they also have more
efficiency in storage, and U.S. Pacific Command officials estimated
that the services had reduced their inventory levels by more than $10
million.[Footnote 43] A related activity included in the initiative is
the development of a Web site for hazardous materials that would allow
the services to share and view data on available hazardous inventories,
enabling them to make arrangements with the other services to reuse
items and save on waste disposal costs. Another related activity is an
ongoing effort to establish a joint shipment manager to provide
expedited and scheduled deliveries to move items from the DLA hub to
the requesting units. U.S. Pacific Command officials told us that they
plan to roll out Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management to
other DLA depots in the command's area of operations, and they plan to
establish this arrangement next in Okinawa and Guam. U.S. Pacific
Command has established a working group that is addressing some issues
such as tracking demand histories for multiple requests and deployed
units and determining appropriate metrics to ensure that DLA has the
assets available when the services require them. Officials we spoke
with believe Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management has the
potential to improve joint theater logistics by having common assets
available close to where they are needed and under the control of DLA,
freeing military service personnel to focus on service-specific assets
and their warfighting missions.
A third consolidation initiative we found during our review is the
establishment of Theater Consolidation and Shipping Points. DLA, in
coordination with the Army, has opened Theater Consolidation and
Shipping Points within the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central
Command geographic regions. The goal for these consolidated facilities
is to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of materiel
consolidation and shipping activities. The Theater Consolidation and
Shipping Points operate under memoranda of agreement between DLA and
each of these combatant commands. DLA is validating its template for
the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point, which is the first step
in creating a doctrinal organization, according to DLA officials.
The Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point in the U.S. European
Command opened in October 2006, and is collocated at DLA's Defense
Distribution Depot-Europe in Germersheim, Germany. The creation of this
consolidated activity was part of the Army's plan for managing a
reduction in personnel in Europe, which included divesting itself of
noncore activities and focusing on its warfighting functions. The DLA
organization took over distribution functions that had been performed
by the Theater Distribution Center, which was operated by the Army's
21st Theater Support Command at Panzer Kaserne, Germany. These
functions include breaking bulk materiel for multiple customers,
consolidating materiel for shipment to individual units, marking
pallets and containers with radio frequency identification tags, and
preparing them for onward shipment to customers. The Army agreed to
fund the realignment of the Theater Distribution Center's functions to
DLA by transferring $1.6 million each fiscal year for fiscal years 2007
and 2008, and then realigning funding directly to DLA beginning in
fiscal year 2009. According to the Commander of the Defense
Distribution Depot-Europe, the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point
will serve as the primary conduit for theater sustainment distribution
from multiple sources, including materiel entering the theater at
Ramstein Air Base and the Germersheim Rhine River terminal. He said
collocating the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point with the DLA
Defense Distribution Depot will improve the overall efficiency of
theater distribution activities by making better use of DLA's existing
distribution infrastructure, including its information technology
systems, and will capitalize on DLA's core competencies of receiving,
storing, and shipping materiel. According to the Commander, specific
benefits have included estimated annual cost savings of approximately
$700,000 and a reduction in full-time equivalent employees from 56 to
19. At the time of our visit, the activity had been operating for less
than a week; consequently, our review was limited to briefings and a
tour of the operations and processes at the facilities in Germersheim,
Germany. Therefore, we did not validate the claimed benefits.
In U.S. Central Command, the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point
was established in February 2006 when DLA took over theater
distribution functions from an Army-operated Theater Distribution
Center in Kuwait. The Theater Distribution Center had previously been
relocated to Camp Arifjan from just outside Camp Doha when Camp Doha
closed in 2005. According to DLA officials, the Army and DLA agreed to
transfer operations to DLA in December 2005, and DLA began operations
in February 2006. The facility is contractor-operated at an annual cost
of approximately $7.9 million. The transfer of operations to DLA was
aimed at capitalizing on the agency's materiel consolidation and
shipping expertise, streamlining the distribution process by linking
the distribution depot and the consolidation and shipping operations
under DLA management, and improving asset visibility by installing
DLA's standard distribution information system at the consolidation and
shipping point.
Additional Opportunities for Consolidating Shipping and Storage:
During our fieldwork in Kuwait, we found that additional opportunities
may exist for consolidating storage and shipping activities. Unlike the
consolidation and shipping point in Europe, the Kuwait activity is not
collocated with the DLA Defense Distribution Depot and therefore lacks
the efficiencies from combining operations available at the European
activity. Moreover, the Army continues to operate a general support
warehouse at Camp Arifjan that is separate from the DLA Theater
Consolidation and Shipping Point. Based on our visits to these
facilities and discussions with officials, we believe there are
potential opportunities to improve joint theater distribution processes
and sustainment operations through further consolidation, relocation,
and streamlining of distribution operations and processes. Some
potential improvements that might be achieved are:
* reducing contract and contract administration costs;
* maximizing use of pure pallets, thereby making more efficient use of
airlift capability and reducing customer wait time;
* eliminating redundant warehouse functions and substandard warehouse
facilities;
* freeing up government-owned containers for use in repacking materiel
intended for units in Iraq; and:
* consolidating materiel processing points, thereby reducing the
potential for errors in information technology and the loss of asset
visibility.
The DLA Defense Distribution Depot is a contractor-owned and operated
facility located in the Mina Abdullah Complex, a private industrial
park located approximately 14 kilometers outside Camp Arifjan. The
current annual contract cost for the distribution depot is
approximately $37.1 million. The distribution depot carries out similar
receiving, storage, packing, and shipping functions as the Theater
Consolidation and Shipping Point, and these facilities serve the same
customer base. For example, each facility pure packs air pallets to be
flown out of Ali Al Salem Air Base to units in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Horn of Africa. According to the distribution depot director, the
depot is having difficulty packing pure pallets to capacity and
consequently is not maximizing use of airlift capability. The depot's
goal is to hold air pallets for up to 24 hours in hopes of packing a
pure pallet. However, if the pallet is not completely pure packed
within the 24-hour hold period, it must be airlifted anyway in order to
meet customer wait time standards. DLA officials told us that by
collocating the consolidation and shipping point with the distribution
depot, they could more quickly build fewer and larger air pallets,
which would maximize the use of airlift capacity and reduce customer
wait time.
The Army's general support warehouse at Camp Arifjan also performs
materiel receiving, storage, and shipping functions. The Army warehouse
is in poor condition, is poorly lighted, and has little climate-
controlled space. It operates at capacity and has some of its inventory
stored outside in government-owned containers or on the bare ground and
exposed to the elements (see fig. 3). The DLA Defense Distribution
Depot, in contrast, appears to be a modern warehouse with approximately
a million square feet of covered warehouse space, much of which is
climate controlled, and another million square feet of hard surface
(asphalt) outside storage space for containers (see fig. 4).
Figure 3: Views of Container and Yard Storage at Army General Support
Warehouse, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (October 2006):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Exterior and Interior Views of Warehouses at the DLA
Distribution Depot, Kuwait (October 2006):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
According to DLA officials, the distribution depot has sufficient
capacity to absorb the Army general support warehouse workload and
already manages 920 Army-specific items. Consolidating the Army
warehouse inventory at the DLA distribution depot would likely produce
efficiencies through economies of scale, reducing the overall cost of
receiving, storage, and shipping, and also eliminate the need to
upgrade the substandard Army warehouse on Camp Arifjan. Consolidating
the Army general support inventory at the DLA depot would also free up
government-owned containers currently used for general warehouse
storage. Government-owned containers are needed to support seaport
operations for repacking materiel to send to Iraq from commercial
containers, and they are in short supply in Kuwait.
U.S. Central Command has directed that only government-owned containers
be sent into Iraq to prevent the accumulation of detention charges on
commercial containers. According to 831st Transportation Battalion
officials responsible for port operations, government-owned containers
sent to Camp Arifjan are seldom returned to the port to support
container cross-loading operations. Army general support warehouse
officials told us that when they are directed to give up government-
owned containers to support port operations, they often have no place
to put the materiel stored inside the container, which forces them to
store some inventory on the bare ground. Having adequate space to store
inventory at the DLA distribution depot would reduce the need to use
government-owned containers as storage space, thereby supporting
container cross-loading operations at the port, and would reduce the
need to place inventory on the ground and exposed to the elements.
The Army general support warehouse, DLA Theater Consolidation and
Shipping Point, and DLA Defense Distribution Depot, Kuwait all exist to
support essentially the same units in Iraq with regard to receiving,
storing, and shipping sustainment materiel. According to DLA officials,
consolidating these operations at the DLA Defense Distribution Depot
would help to improve asset visibility by reducing the number of
materiel processing points, and thereby the potential for errors in
inputting data into information technology systems. Under such a
consolidation, only one organization would be applying radio frequency
identification tags to containers and entering data into the joint in-
transit visibility systems, which are tasks that DLA officials consider
to be among the agency's core competencies.
In discussing our observations with Coalition Forces Land Component
Command officials, they generally agreed about the potential for
consolidating storage and shipping arrangements and stated that the
conditions needed to be thoroughly assessed and workable
recommendations developed. These officials noted two obstacles that
would have to be overcome. First, the Army had already purchased its
general support inventory and wanted to be reimbursed for inventory
transferred back to DLA. Second, the Directorate of Security Plans and
Operations, within the Army's Area Support Group in Kuwait, had
assessed the Mina Abdullah Complex as too great a security risk for
relocating the operations from Camp Arifjan. In January 2007,
subsequent to our visit to Kuwait, the directorate completed a new
force protection assessment of the Mina Abdullah Complex. According to
DLA officials, this new assessment leaves open the possibility of
moving the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point and the Army
general support warehouse to the distribution depot if certain
deficiencies are adequately addressed. In March 2007, the DLA Defense
Distribution Center directed a study team to conduct an analysis of
major theater receipt, storage, and distribution nodes and processes in
U.S. Central Command. In April 2007, the study team briefed the
Distribution Process Owner Executive Board on the results of its
assessment, which included recommendations to terminate the Theater
Consolidation and Shipping Point contract and assume these functions at
the defense distribution depot and to draw down inventory and
operations at the Army general support warehouse at Camp Arifjan.
Command and Control Over Joint Logistics Functions Remains Unresolved:
Command and control over joint logistics functions has been a concern
due to past challenges with directing and coordinating logistics
resources and systems within a theater of operations. In past combat
operations, joint forces dispersed over a large area of operations
placed significant demands on the ability of the joint force commander
to provide, manage, and prioritize logistics support. For example,
although the combatant commander has directive authority for logistics,
existing capabilities and processes limit the ability to exercise this
authority. In 1997, DOD identified command and control as a key focus
area of joint theater logistics in order to prioritize and allocate
scarce resources, determine how services can share existing assets and
capabilities in theater, and eliminate redundancies and excess
capabilities. Additionally, officials at U.S. Pacific Command explained
that senior military leaders have indicated that they want a single
point of contact for all logistics information in theater. Officials at
U.S. Central Command stated that clear lines of command and control, in
addition to improved asset visibility, are currently needed to advance
joint theater logistics.
Several Command and Control Options Have Emerged:
The joint theater logistics initiatives we reviewed all include
organizational structures intended to provide command and control over
all or part of logistics functions under the combatant commander's
control. In addition to the initiatives discussed earlier in this
report, U.S. Joint Forces Command is coordinating the Joint
Experimental Deployment and Support initiative.[Footnote 44] The
objective of this initiative is to experiment with a range of command
and control options that can provide logistics coordination,
integration, and synchronization to meet the combatant commander's
priorities. The initiative builds upon DOD's Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center concept and progresses along a continuum
to include more robust organizational options. According to U.S. Joint
Forces Command, the different options in the continuum would allow a
combatant commander to select a flexible capability and tailor it to
suit the size and complexity of a mission. The options along this
continuum are displayed in figure 5.
Figure 5: Continuum of Logistics Command and Control Options Included
in the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support Initiative:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Joint Force Command.
Note: Scalability refers to the breadth, depth, numbers of nations, and
size of the joint operations areas. Complexity is determined by the
geography of the theater, number of distribution nodes, and rapid
deployment, among other factors.
[End of figure]
The Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus, which is on
the lower end of the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support
continuum, is being tested in U.S. European Command. The command's
Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center currently has day-to-
day responsibilities that it handles with a staff of 55. For a
contingency operation, this organization could be upgraded to the Joint
Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus, with additional staff
augmentation from the command's logistics directorate, military
services, and other DOD components. U.S. European Command is drafting
standard operating procedures for the Joint Deployment Distribution
Operations Center Plus. According to command officials, the Joint
Deployment Distribution Operations Center Plus may be included in DOD's
updated template for the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations
Center, which is due in August 2007.
The Enabled/Enhanced J4,[Footnote 45] which is being tested and
developed in U.S. Pacific Command, is the next organizational option on
the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support continuum. According to
command officials, the Enhanced J4 is activated during contingencies
and includes U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Deployment Distribution
Operations Center and a fusion cell, which is a 4-person group that
pulls together and filters information for the J4. While U.S. Pacific
Command's Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center is run by a
staff of 5 for day-to-day operations, during a contingency the
organization would be augmented to support the Enhanced J4 with a staff
of up to 64. U.S. Pacific Command is currently developing standard
operating procedures and joint mission-essential tasks for this new
capability.
The Joint Force Support Component Command is the most robust continuum
option being evaluated. This organization is designed to provide a
single theater logistics command with enhanced joint capabilities to
identify theater logistics shortfalls, prioritize shortfalls, and
direct theater logistics resources. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea,
has stated that the Joint Force Support Component Command will be the
logistics command and control structure for any future contingency
operations in Korea. The Army's 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command
in Korea serves as the headquarters for the Joint Force Support
Component Command, which will be augmented by integrating staff from
other components in Korea, the Pacific Command's Joint Deployment
Distribution Operations Center-Korea, DLA, and the Director of Mobility
Forces-Surface. The Joint Force Support Component Command has been
tested in two exercises--Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and
Integration and Ulchi Focus Lens--and U.S. Forces Korea officials are
currently involved in the Senior Leader Seminar as part of the high-
level process to discuss the next iteration and iron out the roles and
responsibilities of the Joint Force Support Component Command. U.S.
military officials in Korea explained that the future goal is to merge
the Joint Force Support Component Command into a joint logistics
command.
The Joint Experimental Deployment and Support continuum shows two other
command and control options that could support more complex operations.
These options are the Combined Logistics Coordination Center and the
Combined/Coalition Joint Force Support Component Command. However, DOD
has not defined, developed, or tested these options.
Command and Control Issues Have Not Been Resolved:
Despite the development of these new organizations designed to offer
robust logistics command and control capabilities, our discussions with
officials from the combatant commands and the military services
revealed unresolved issues related to exercising joint command and
control over logistics functions in a theater of operations. For
example, some military services have indicated that they would not
support the establishment of a Joint Force Support Component Command in
other geographic combatant commands, leaving the future of this
initiative in question. A number of officials had concerns about how
organizations such as the Joint Force Support Component Command would
be staffed and what roles and authorities it would have. Specifically,
they mentioned (1) statutory requirements for logistics support, (2)
directive authority for logistics, and (3) operational and financial
considerations.
Although the Joint Force Support Component Command is still in an
experimentation phase, there has been resistance from the services to
its future implementation. The Air Force, for example, has stated that,
while the Joint Force Support Component Command might work for the size
and scale of operations in the Korean theater, DOD should be cautious
about adopting it as a model across all combatant commands. The
services have expressed concerns about mandating that they provide
staff to the Joint Force Support Component Command, while also
fulfilling their Title 10 responsibilities to man, train, and equip
their forces.[Footnote 46] The Marine Corps said this would hinder its
ability to provide logistics support to its own tasked missions and to
deploy in a "lean" condition. Officials from military service
components in the geographic combatant commands also raised the issue
of having a service component take direction from a separate component
command at the same level, rather than from a higher level command, and
they were resistant to losing personnel to such an organization because
the service component commands still have tactical logistics
responsibilities to fulfill. While the Navy has not provided an
official position on the Joint Force Support Component Command, Navy
officials told us they did have some concerns with the initiative and
that one disadvantage of a single logistics command is that it
separates logistics from operations instead of keeping both functions
under the same operational commander they are designed to support.
Some military service officials we interviewed raised questions about
the effectiveness of a Joint Force Support Component Command that
lacked an ability to exercise directive authority for logistics.
Directive authority for logistics gives the combatant commander the
ability to shift logistics resources within the theater in order to
accomplish a mission.[Footnote 47] While DOD doctrine states that
directive authority for logistics may be delegated to a subordinate
commander, such as a joint force commander or service component
commander,[Footnote 48] officials we interviewed did not believe
directive authority for logistics could be delegated below that level
of command to an entity such as the Joint Force Support Component
Command. Without this authority, some military service officials
question how the Joint Force Support Component Command differs from
other logistics command and control organizations if the organization
can make recommendations to the joint force commander but not actually
direct the transfer of assets across the service components, known as
cross-leveling. For example, officials in U.S. Pacific Command stated
that the Joint Force Support Component Command faced challenges when
trying to release joint logistics tasking orders during the exercises
because it could not resolve issues with the service components. They
believed that the role of the organization should be to coordinate with
the services to deconflict and prioritize support to the next campaign
rather than address problems at the tactical level. Since directive
authority for logistics still resides with the joint force commander,
the Joint Force Support Component Command does not provide any
additional authorities; therefore, some officials argued that its
functions could be accomplished with an organization such as U.S.
Pacific Command's Enhanced J4.
There are also readiness and financial considerations related to
exercising directive authority for logistics. In this process, the
component commanders provide input as to what they can support. There
are military operational risks and trade-offs associated with cross-
leveling, because assets diverted from one unit to support another unit
may affect the giving organization's ability to conduct a future
operation. Officials raised concerns that logisticians in a separate
logistics command may not fully understand the impact of cross-leveling
on the next military mission. Additionally, because the services obtain
funding for their own assets, several officials told us that some form
of financial reconciliation must be considered when exercising
directive authority for logistics. Thus, any assets provided from one
service to another must be accounted for and later replaced or
reimbursed. Because of these financial considerations, some military
service component officials believed that joint funding is necessary to
support joint operations.
Issues related to joint command and control over logistics in theater
are not limited to the Joint Force Support Component Command
organization. For example, another joint theater logistics initiative,
the Theater Sustainment Command, also faces some logistics command and
control challenges. As discussed earlier in this report, the Theater
Sustainment Command is an Army logistics command and control
organization that is being developed to streamline logistics support as
part of Army modularity. The Theater Sustainment Command, however, is
also being developed as a "joint-capable" headquarters that becomes a
joint organization in a theater of operations with the addition of
augmentees from the military services and other DOD agencies. Its joint-
capable designation raises the same issues as the Joint Force Support
Component Command regarding staffing, roles, and authorities. In
addition to the current uncertainty over who exercises control over the
Theater and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, there would be added
the question of where these organizations would fit into the theater.
Further, some military service component officials questioned whether
using these Army organizations in their joint command and control
capacities would lessen their ability to perform Army-specific tasks.
Until lines of command and control are clearly defined for these new
organizations, joint force commanders will continue to face challenges
in directing and coordinating logistics resources within a theater of
operations.
Conclusions:
Joint theater logistics has the potential to address long-standing
issues associated with visibility and distribution of assets within a
theater of operations, which is a critical step toward overall
improvements in supply chain management and support to the warfighter.
While several initiatives developed by different DOD components show
promise in improving the joint force commander's ability to see
emerging logistics requirements and rapidly respond to them, these
initiatives have been fragmented across the department due to the lack
of a coordinated and comprehensive management approach. Moreover, the
diffused organization of DOD's logistics operations, including separate
funding and management of resources and systems, complicates DOD's
ability to adopt such an approach to developing and implementing joint
theater logistics capabilities. Transformational changes in DOD's
organization--such as those proposed by a number of organizations that
believe DOD should move toward a more integrated logistics system and
change how it controls and allocates logistics funding--could
potentially require changes to existing laws, such as Title 10. Another
factor that has hindered adoption of a more coordinated and
comprehensive approach to joint theater logistics has been changes with
respect to DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. Without a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach, DOD may have
difficulty addressing the challenges discussed in this report,
including determining roles and responsibilities for DOD's port opening
capability, addressing asset visibility issues caused by
noninteroperable information technology systems, resolving
disagreements on roles for coordinating surface transportation, making
more use of opportunities to consolidate storage and shipping
activities in Kuwait, and clarifying command and control over theater
logistics functions. Moreover, without a coordinated and comprehensive
management approach, DOD is not in a position to effectively coordinate
the initiatives across the department, guard against potential
duplication of effort, and prioritize initiatives to make decisions on
how best to target its resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve logistics and supply chain operations, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), in his capacity as the
Defense Logistics Executive, to develop and implement a coordinated and
comprehensive management approach to guide and oversee efforts across
the department to improve distribution and supply support for U.S.
forces in a joint theater. This approach should encompass sound
management principles, including developing specific strategies and
goals, assigning accountability for achieving results, and using
outcome-oriented performance measures, and should be aligned with the
results of the ongoing joint capabilities portfolio management test,
the proposed realignment of focused logistics capabilities, and the
development of a "to be" roadmap. In considering options for
implementing this recommendation, the Under Secretary should determine
whether any changes should be made to DOD's organizational structure
and control of resources for joint logistics support and identify the
steps needed to make these changes, including changes to existing laws,
such as Title 10.
To make more economical and efficient use of shipping and storage
facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Director, DLA, to evaluate existing storage and shipping arrangements
within the geographic combatant commands and identify opportunities for
consolidation.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
both of our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments that
we incorporated as appropriate. The department's response is reprinted
in appendix I.
In response to our recommendation for developing and implementing a
coordinated and comprehensive management approach to improving
distribution and supply support in a joint theater, DOD stated that the
Deputy Secretary of Defense is leading initiatives in portfolio
management, the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) is focusing on Joint
Logistics portfolio management, Joint Staff (J4) is updating the Joint
Logistics Joint Functional Concept, and the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) is developing the logistics
strategy and roadmap, which are to be completed by summer 2008. While
we acknowledge these steps that DOD is taking to improve distribution
and supply support for U.S. forces in a joint theater as a good start,
we continue to believe that as DOD develops and implements a
comprehensive management approach that is coordinated across the
department, DOD needs to incorporate the sound management principles we
describe in this report. Again, in considering options for implementing
this recommendation, the Under Secretary should determine whether any
changes should be made to DOD's organizational structure and control of
joint logistical support, and identify steps needed to make these
changes, including changes to existing laws, such as Title 10. We are
reemphasizing these two matters because DOD did not specifically
address them in its comments to our recommendations.
Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Director, Defense Logistics Agency, to evaluate existing storage and
shipping arrangements within the geographic combatant commands and
identify opportunities for consolidation, DOD stated that it plans to
complete such an evaluation by the summer of 2008. We believe this
action, if implemented, will be responsive to our recommendation.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics, we
identified sound management principles based on prior work on
organizational transformation and federal agency implementation of the
Government Performance and Results Act.[Footnote 49] We also reviewed
doctrine, regulations, guidance, plans, briefings, status reports, and
other documents related to the development of joint theater logistics,
logistics strategic planning, and supply chain management. This review
included reports by various audit and non-audit organizations that have
assessed DOD's logistics organization. While we examined the
recommendations proposed by these organizations, the scope of our
review did not include an assessment of these proposals or what
changes, if any, would require congressional action. Additionally, we
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Joint Staff Logistics
Directorate who are involved in joint theater logistics and logistics
transformation. Over the course of these visits and interviews, we
obtained pertinent information on the status of DOD's efforts in
support of joint theater logistics, such as the "as is" Focused
Logistics Roadmap, the "to be" roadmap, and the supply chain management
improvement plan. We reviewed the draft joint theater logistics white
paper, implementation plan, and capability process analyses. We also
examined DOD's overall efforts to institute a long-term logistics
strategy, reviewing strategic planning documents such as vision
statements, joint doctrine, campaign plans, and roadmaps that have
addressed DOD's future logistics systems. We discussed the capabilities
portfolio management test case with OSD and Joint Staff personnel.
Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S.
Transportation Command, combatant commands, DLA, the military services,
and selected reserve components to get their perspectives on joint
theater logistics.
To obtain information on DOD's progress in implementing joint theater
logistics initiatives, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and military
service guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status reports, and
other pertinent documentation related to the development of these
initiatives. To identify the status of initiatives DOD is working on to
address joint theater logistics, we focused on the four initiatives
highlighted in the "as is" roadmap in support of joint theater
logistics: Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center, Director of
Mobility Forces-Surface, Joint Experimental Deployment and Support, and
Theater Sustainment Commands. We conducted interviews and obtained
information on these initiatives from U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.
Joint Forces Command, and the Army's G-4 logistics directorate. In
addition, we also looked at four other initiatives related to providing
support to the joint force commander: Joint Task Force-Port Opening,
Node Management and Deployable Depot, Theater Consolidation and
Shipping Points, and Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management.
Because these initiatives have been recently implemented or are still
in the testing stages, in some cases we were able to obtain only
limited data on their effectiveness, and we did not independently
validate these data. To obtain information on specific initiatives, we
interviewed officials from U.S. Transportation Command and two of its
components, Air Mobility Command and the Military Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command; DLA; U.S. Army
Combined Arms Support Command; the military services; and selected
reserve components. Additionally, we visited and interviewed officials
in the five geographic combatant commands: U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command. We also met with military service component commands
in U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific
Command and with operational units in Germany, Korea, and Kuwait.
Because several of the newly developed initiatives are being tested in
the Korean theater of operations, we visited the subordinate unified
command in Korea to discuss their experiences and challenges in
implementing joint theater logistics. We attended the out-brief for an
Army conference on theater opening, reviewed after-action reports from
exercises that tested the initiatives, and analyzed lessons learned
reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom. To assess the reliability of the
container management system data, we interviewed Container Management
Element officials at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, about the internal controls
and reliability of the system. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our review from
July 2006 to April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics);
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, DLA; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. This report will also be available at no charge at our Web
site at http://www.gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Should you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or
solisw@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix
II.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense For Logistics And Materiel Readiness:
3500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3500:
Jun 21 2007:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-07-807, "Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution
and Supply Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a
Coordinated Management Approach," dated May 22, 2007 (GAO Code 350907).
The Department concurs with the recommendations.
Detailed comments on the draft report recommendations are included in
the enclosure. The DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
draft report. My point of contact for this matter is Mr. Don Davidson,
703-614-6922, don.davidson@osd.mil.
Signed by:
Jack Bell:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated May 22, 2007 GAO Code 350907/GAO-07-807:
"Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support
for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated
Management Approach"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), in his capacity as the Defense Logistics Executive, to
develop and implement a coordinated and comprehensive management
approach to guide and oversee efforts across the Department to improve
distribution and supply support for U.S. forces in a joint theater.
This approach should encompass sound management principles, including
developing specific strategies and goals, assigning accountability for
achieving results, and using outcome-oriented performance measures, and
should be aligned with the results of the ongoing joint capabilities
portfolio management test, the proposed realignment of focused
logistics capabilities, and the development of a "to be' focused
logistics roadmap. In considering options for implementing this
recommendation, the Under Secretary should determine whether any
changes should be made to DoD's organizational structure and control of
resources for joint logistics support, and identify the steps needed to
make these changes, including changes to existing laws, such as Title
10.
DOD Response: DoD Concurs.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense is leading initiatives in portfolio
management, the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) is focusing on Joint
Logistics portfolio management, Joint Staff (J4) is updating the Joint
Logistics Joint Functional Concept and the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness) is developing the Logistics
Strategy and Roadmap, to be completed by Summer 2008,
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, to evaluate existing
storage and shipping arrangements within the geographic combatant
commands and identify opportunities for consolidation:
DOD Response: DoD Concurs.
DoD plans to complete an evaluation of existing storage and shipping
arrangements within the geographic combatant commands and identify
opportunities for consolidation by Summer 2008.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis (202) 512-8365:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report
were Karyn Angulo, Alissa Czyz, Maria Gomez, Thomas Gosling, Brian
Howell, and Larry Junek.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out
the movement and maintenance of forces. Logistics includes six broad
functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil
engineering, health services, and other services. Supply chain
management consists of processes and activities to purchase, produce,
and deliver materiel--including ammunition, spare parts, fuel, food,
water, clothing, personal equipment, and other items--to a force that
is highly dispersed and mobile.
[2] DOD describes asset visibility as the ability to provide timely and
accurate information on the location, quantity, condition, movement,
and status of equipment and supplies.
[3] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic
Support of Joint Operations (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3. (Hereafter cited as
JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. XX).
[4] See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.
[5] DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and
Its Major Components (Aug. 1, 2002) states that the military services
are responsible for providing logistic support for service forces. DOD
Directive 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (May 17, 2006), directs
DLA, among other responsibilities and functions, to provide materiel
commodities and supply chain management for items of supply and
services. DOD Directive 5158.4, United States Transportation Command
(Jan. 8, 1993), states that the command shall have combatant command
over all transportation assets of the military departments, except for
service-unique or theater-assigned assets.
[6] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[7] GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the
Effectiveness of Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom,
GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); Defense Logistics:
Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during
Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8,
2005); and Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply
Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain
These Efforts, GAO-05-775 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2005).
[8] Joint functional concepts describe, and are used as a basis to
shape, joint capabilities across the department.
[9] DOD has eight Functional Capabilities Boards that support the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and lead the capabilities assessment
process.
[10] Whereas a joint functional concept is a broad description of joint
force functions, a joint integrating concept is a description of
narrowly focused operations or functions and is used to identify,
describe, and apply specific capabilities.
[11] See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.
[12] DOD defines in-transit visibility as the near-real-time capability
to track logistic resources and transportation assets while they are
mobile and underway.
[13] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.4, Joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution (Aug. 22,
2000), p. II-6.
[14] GAO-05-775.
[15] In May 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense redesignated the
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command as DOD's Distribution Process
Owner. Under this redesignation, the mission of the Distribution
Process Owner is to oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and
alignment of DOD-wide distribution activities and to establish concepts
and operational frameworks relating to the planning and execution of
DOD transportation operations.
[16] For more information on these recommendations, see GAO, DOD's High-
Risk Areas: Progress Made Implementing Supply Chain Management
Recommendations, but Full Extent of Improvement Unknown, GAO-07-234
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2007).
[17] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan,
Integrated Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure
Success, GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2006).
[18] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005).
[19] Logistics footprint is the amount of personnel, spare parts,
resources, and capabilities physically present and occupying space at a
deployed location.
[20] The 13 joint theater logistics capabilities areas identified in
this process were: engineering; joint reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration; joint expeditionary theater opening; joint
contracting; joint deployment and distribution management; joint
petroleum management; joint service support; joint financial management
visibility; joint repair and maintenance; joint subsistence, food
service support, and water management; mortuary affairs; joint theater
conventional munitions management; and health service support.
[21] The other three test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint
Network Operations, and Battlespace Awareness.
[22] GAO-04-305R and GAO-05-775.
[23] A distribution node exists wherever materiel arrives in the
distribution system via transportation assets such as air, surface, or
ground transport.
[24] According to U.S. Transportation Command, the Joint Task Force-
Port Opening seaport of debarkation team is in the final stages of
staffing its concept of operations for U.S. Transportation Command
components, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, and the
services. The concept has also been briefed to the geographic combatant
commanders' staffs. U.S. Transportation Command officials stated that
planning and development of the seaport of debarkation training concept
and force sourcing activities began in April 2007, with a goal of
having forces to train by late summer of 2007.
[25] DOD uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
as an analytical process to identify, assess, and prioritize joint
military requirements in support of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council and its Functional Capabilities Boards. The purpose of the
analysis process is to identify capability gaps and redundancies,
determine the attributes of a capability or combination of capabilities
that would resolve the gaps, identify approaches for implementation,
and assess the cost and operational effectiveness of the joint force
for each of the identified approaches.
[26] Marine Corps officials noted that their service has its own port
opening capability through its special purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces.
[27] GAO-05-775.
[28] Pure-packing is the consolidation of cargo for shipment to a
single user.
[29] GAO, Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD's
Implementation of Its Long-Term Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of
Its Inventory, GAO-05-15 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2004) and GAO, DOD
Business Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested without
Adequate Oversight, GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).
[30] GAO-04-305R.
[31] Radio frequency identification technology is a data input system
that consists of (1) a transponder, generally referred to as a tag; (2)
a tag reader, also known as an interrogator, that reads the tag using a
radio signal; (3) centralized data processing equipment; and (4) a
method of communication between the reader and the computer. The
interrogator sends a signal to the tag, prompting the tag to respond.
The battery-powered tag sends a signal to the interrogator with
information about the container, pallet, or item to which it is
attached. The information is forwarded to the central data processing
equipment where it is stored and can be used to provide visibility over
inventory items as they move throughout the supply chain.
[32] This element is under the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations
Center.
[33] NAVISTAR is the point of crossing from Kuwait into Iraq.
[34] These averages exclude a gap from November 13 through November 30,
2006, for which no data are available.
[35] Containers were not returned for a number of reasons, primarily
because the military's resources were dedicated to tactical operations
and because soldiers resourcefully made use of empty containers for
such purposes as storage, perimeter barriers, and housing.
[36] U.S. Army Audit Agency: Asset Visibility and Container Management-
-Operation Iraqi Freedom, Audit Report: A-2005-0197-ALE (Alexandria,
Va.: July 5, 2005). As of May 2004, only 6 of the 37 transportation
nodes in Iraq could read radio frequency tags.
[37] Transloading is the unloading of a commercially owned container
and repacking its contents into a government-owned container.
[38] RAND Corporation, Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi
Freedom: Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations, Contract No.
DASW01-C-0003 (Santa Monica, Calif.: 2005).
[39] Certain subordinate command elements under the replaced Theater
Support Command also will be eliminated, such as the Transportation
Command, Transportation Command Element, and Transportation Group. The
Division Support Command, Corps Support Command, and Area Support Group
have also been eliminated from the Army force structure.
[40] According to U.S. Transportation Command officials, after
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the Air Force realized that it did
not have the right mix of skills and capabilities to integrate the air
mobility mission into the combined air operations center of the
combined joint forces air component command. In response, the Air Force
developed the air mobility division and its command structure,
including the Director of Mobility Forces-Air, to provide this
strategic-to-theater integration of distribution.
[41] The Global Transportation Network is DOD's designated in-transit
visibility system that collects, integrates, and distributes
transportation information to combatant commanders, the military
services, and other DOD customers and provides U.S. Transportation
Command with the ability to perform command and control operations,
planning and analysis, and business operations in tailoring customer
requirements throughout the requirements process.
[42] GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Uncertain Joint Use and Marginal
Expected Value of Military Asset Deployment System Warrant Reassessment
of Planned Investment, GAO-06-171 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
[43] Stockage levels for Joint Regional Inventory and Material
Management are based on the number of demands placed on a part per
year, and a minimum of four demands was required for an item to be
included in the pilot.
[44] U.S. Joint Forces Command is the DOD executive agent for joint
warfighting experimentation, making it responsible for conducting joint
experimentation on new warfighting concepts and disseminating the
results of these activities to the joint concept community.
[45] J4 designates the logistics directorate or section of a joint
staff. U.S. Joint Forces Command refers to this option as the Enabled
J4, and U.S. Pacific Command calls it the Enhanced J4.
[46] See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 5013, and 8013.
[47] Under 10 U.S.C. §164, unless otherwise directed by the President
or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of
the commander of a combatant command with respect to the commands and
forces assigned to that command include giving authoritative direction
to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions
assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all
aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
[48] JCS Pub 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000), p. I-3.
[49] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003), and GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices
That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
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