Military Personnel
DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy Gao ID: GAO-07-780 July 17, 2007Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military operations and 10 U.S.C. 487 requires that the Department of Defense (DOD) annually report on personnel tempo--the time servicemembers spend away from home. Section 345 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed GAO to report on a number of Army and Marine Corps issues. For this report GAO addresses the extent to which (1) changes in mobilization and deployment policies have affected reserve component availability and provided an approach to meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism; and, (2) DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have collected, maintained, and reported complete and accurate personnel tempo data. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data from DOD's Personnel Tempo and Contingency Tracking System databases, and interviewed agency officials.
On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum which changed mobilization and deployment policies and increased reserve component availability, making virtually all reserve component personnel available on an indefinitely recurrent basis under a long-term approach for meeting the requirements for the global war on terror. Previously, involuntary reserve component mobilizations for the global war on terrorism were limited to 24 cumulative months; there is no cumulative time limit on involuntary mobilizations under the new policy. DOD's new policies provide for an integrated approach to manage the long-term requirements for the global war on terrorism while addressing issues that had previously been addressed in a piecemeal fashion. The new policies emphasize the importance of deployment predictability and unit cohesion and they contain deployment rotation goals, which differ between the active and reserve components. In taking this long-term approach, DOD has recognized that it will not be able to immediately achieve its rotation goals and some units will be remobilized sooner than the standard. Therefore, the Secretary also directed that a program be established to compensate servicemembers who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often or extend beyond the established rotation policy goals. DOD has reported personnel tempo data to Congress and the President since 2001, but the reports have not been complete and accurate because the Army and Marine Corps do not have quality controls in place to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the reports' underlying data. In October 2001, DOD waived two statutory personnel tempo requirements due to national security interests. As permitted by the statutes, DOD waived the high-deployment payment provision and the management of servicemember deployments which approach or exceeded certain thresholds. With the provisions waived, two mechanisms that would identify faulty personnel tempo data were no longer in place, and the services lacked any other quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy of the data they were collecting and sending to DOD. Despite DOD guidance requiring complete and accurate personnel tempo data, service reviews have found that the collection and tracking of tempo data have not been accurate. In 2005, the Army Human Resources Command reported that personnel tempo was not properly recorded for 72 percent of forward-deployed soldiers. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, Marine Corps inspection teams found that inspected commands did not have procedures in place to ensure that personnel tempo information was accurately reported. DOD's focus on collecting deployment data for ongoing operations has shifted its attention away from personnel tempo reporting and DOD recently sent a proposal to Congress to modify the definition of deployments. If approved, the new definition would be used to revise personnel tempo thresholds and related compensation. Until DOD establishes quality control procedures, Congress and users of DOD's personnel tempo data need to use caution because they cannot be assured that the data fully and accurately reflect servicemembers' actual tempos.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-780, Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-07-780
entitled 'Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data
and Needs Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy' which was released
on July 17, 2007.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate and Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:
July 2007:
Military Personnel:
DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs Quality Controls to
Improve Data Accuracy:
GAO-07-780:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-780, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military
operations and 10 U.S.C. §487 requires that the Department of Defense
(DOD) annually report on personnel tempo”the time service members spend
away from home. Section 345 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed GAO to report on a
number of Army and Marine Corps issues. For this report GAO addresses
the extent to which (1) changes in mobilization and deployment policies
have affected reserve component availability and provided an approach
to meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism; and, (2) DOD,
the Army, and the Marine Corps have collected, maintained, and reported
complete and accurate personnel tempo data. To address these
objectives, GAO analyzed data from DOD‘s Personnel Tempo and
Contingency Tracking System databases, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found:
On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum which
changed mobilization and deployment policies and increased reserve
component availability, making virtually all reserve component
personnel available on an indefinitely recurrent basis under a long-
term approach for meeting the requirements for the global war on
terror. Previously, involuntary reserve component mobilizations for the
global war on terrorism were limited to 24 cumulative months; there is
no cumulative time limit on involuntary mobilizations under the new
policy. DOD‘s new policies provide for an integrated approach to manage
the long-term requirements for the global war on terrorism while
addressing issues that had previously been addressed in a piecemeal
fashion. The new policies emphasize the importance of deployment
predictability and unit cohesion and they contain deployment rotation
goals, which differ between the active and reserve components. In
taking this long-term approach, DOD has recognized that it will not be
able to immediately achieve its rotation goals and some units will be
remobilized sooner than the standard. Therefore, the Secretary also
directed that a program be established to compensate service members
who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often or extend beyond
the established rotation policy goals.
DOD has reported personnel tempo data to Congress and the President
since 2001, but the reports have not been complete and accurate because
the Army and Marine Corps do not have quality controls in place to
ensure the accuracy and completeness of the reports‘ underlying data.
In October 2001, DOD waived two statutory personnel tempo requirements
due to national security interests. As permitted by the statutes, DOD
waived the high-deployment payment provision and the management of
deployments which approach or exceeded certain thresholds. With the
provisions waived, two mechanisms that would identify faulty personnel
tempo data were no longer in place, and the services lacked any other
quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy of the data they were
collecting and sending to DOD. Despite DOD guidance requiring complete
and accurate personnel tempo data, service reviews have found that the
collection and tracking of tempo data have not been accurate. In 2005,
the Army Human Resources Command reported that personnel tempo was not
properly recorded for 72 percent of forward-deployed soldiers. In
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, Marine Corps inspection teams found that
inspected commands did not have procedures in place to ensure that
personnel tempo information was accurately reported. DOD‘s focus on
collecting deployment data for ongoing operations has shifted its
attention away from personnel tempo reporting and DOD recently sent a
proposal to Congress to modify the definition of deployments. If
approved, the new definition would be used to revise personnel tempo
thresholds and related compensation. Until DOD establishes quality
control procedures, Congress and users of DOD‘s personnel tempo data
need to use caution because they cannot be assured that the data fully
and accurately reflect service members‘ actual tempos.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army and Marine
Corps to develop quality control procedures for validating the accuracy
of service member personnel tempo data. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DOD concurred with the recommendation.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-780].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
{End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Virtually All Reserve Component Personnel Are Available Under DOD's
Revised Policies that Provide a Long-Term Approach to Meet Mobilization
Requirements:
Since 2001, DOD Has Submitted Personnel Tempo Reports but the Army and
Marine Corps Lack Quality Controls to Ensure the Accuracy of Underlying
Data:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempo Trends Based on
Available Data:
Appendix II: Retention/Attrition Rates for Enlisted Occupational
Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment Rates:
Service Retention and Attrition Tracking:
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
GAO Comments:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities:
Table 2: Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos:
Table 3: GAO Calculations of Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos:
Table 4: Retention Rates for Active Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates:
Table 5: Attrition Rates for Reserve Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 17, 2007:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military
operations; and since 2001, approximately 931,000 U.S. Army and Marine
Corps service members have deployed for military operations abroad in
support of the Global War on Terrorism, including approximately 312,000
Guard and Reserve members. Prior to the Global War on Terrorism,
concerns about the negative effects on individual service members or
service readiness led Congress to place statutory limits on the numbers
of reserve component personnel who could be involuntarily called to
active duty under various mobilization authorities, as well as time
limits on involuntary activations. Recently, in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (FY 2000 NDAA), Congress enacted
several provisions addressing personnel tempo.[Footnote 1] Title 37 of
the U.S. Code was amended with the addition of a section requiring the
secretaries of the military services to pay high-deployment
compensation payments to service members for lengthy or numerous
deployments in excess of set limits.[Footnote 2] A section was added to
Title 10 of the U.S. Code requiring management of deployments of
service members in danger of exceeding high-deployment days
thresholds.[Footnote 3] Sections were added to Title 10 of the U.S.
Code requiring the Secretary of Defense to include personnel tempo
information in his annual report to the President and Congress[Footnote
4] and making the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (OSD P&R) responsible for monitoring personnel tempo and
establishing related standards and policies, subject to the authority,
direction and control of the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 5]
The provisions requiring high-deployment compensation payments and
management of service member deployments allow the waiver of those
sections if necessary for the national security interests of the United
States. In October 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a
memorandum that waived those two provisions due to the national
emergency declared by the President following the September 11th
attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. The memorandum
stated that the requirements for tracking and reporting of personnel
tempo information would not be waived, and explained that past
operations have shown the value of collecting this type of data to
develop after-action reports, reply to queries, or accomplish analysis
relating to the scope of operations.
Since then, the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued a variety of
policies that directly and indirectly affect personnel tempo and on
January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that
contained revised policies for managing the total active and reserve
component force. DOD has also proposed that Congress approve a change
to the definition of deployment, which would impact the days of service
that could be counted for purposes of calculating personnel tempo, and
has said that if the definitional change is approved it will work with
the military departments to develop high-deployment thresholds and
compensation proposals that are more closely tailored to the individual
services' deployment cycles rather than having a single set of
thresholds for all services.
In the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007,[Footnote 6] Congress required that the Comptroller General issue
one or more reports assessing the readiness of Army and Marine Corps
ground forces due to the significant deployments under current
operational commitments and other demands. Specifically, the act
required that the Comptroller General's reports include analyses of
Army and Marine Corps reported readiness trends, the ability of the
Army and Marine Corps to provide trained and ready forces for ongoing
operations and other commitments, the availability of equipment for
training, current and projected requirements for equipment repair and
replacement and the effects on training, personnel tempos including
trends and retention data for enlisted occupations with unusually high
or low deployment rates, efforts to mitigate the impact of high
operational tempo, and the effect of current mobilization policies on
reserve component force availability. This report assesses (1) the
extent to which changes in mobilization and deployment policies have
affected reserve component availability and provided an approach to
meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism, and (2) the
extent to which DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have collected,
maintained, and reported complete and accurate personnel tempo data. We
are also providing information on trends in personnel tempo (see app.
I), and retention/attrition rates for Army and Marine Corps personnel
in enlisted occupational specialties that are experiencing unusually
high or low deployment rates (see app. II). We are not drawing any
conclusions concerning relationships between deployment and retention
because deployment rates are not the only factor that can affect
retention or attrition. Appendix II identifies some of the other
factors that influence service member retention decisions, or
attrition. We are reporting separately on the other readiness reporting
requirements included in the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
To assess the extent to which changes in mobilization and deployment
policies have affected reserve component availability and provided an
approach to meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism, we
reviewed and analyzed past and present DOD mobilization and deployment
policies as well as requirements for the global war on terrorism,
comparing the effects of policies before and after Secretary Gates'
January 19, 2007, memorandum regarding the utilization of the total
force. We also interviewed officials who are responsible for the
implementation of personnel policies. To assess the extent to which
DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have collected, maintained, and
reported complete and accurate personnel tempo data, we interviewed and
obtained data from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army,
Marine Corps, and Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) officials who
collect and track personnel tempo and deployment data. To provide the
data in the appendices on trends in personnel tempo and retention rates
for Army and Marine Corps personnel in enlisted occupational
specialties that are experiencing unusually high or low deployment
rates, we analyzed data from three DMDC data systems--the PERSTEMPO,
Contingency Tracking System (CTS), and end strength data systems
(Active Duty Military Personnel Master File and the Reserve Components
Common Personnel Data System). For the personnel tempo analyses, we
used PERSTEMPO and end strength data to identify the yearly end
strength population, the population of deployed personnel, and
cumulative days deployed. Additionally, we reviewed inspection reports
related to personnel tempo and DOD's Annual Reports to Congress and the
President. To determine retention rates for Army and Marine Corps
personnel in enlisted occupational specialties that are experiencing
unusually high or low deployment rates, we used the CTS and end
strength data to determine the enlisted occupational specialties that
had unusually high or low deployment rates. We then obtained retention
data on these occupations from DMDC. We assessed the reliability of the
three DMDC data systems and determined that the CTS and end strength
data we used were reliable for our purposes. We determined the
PERSTEMPO data was not producing reliable personnel tempo summaries and
trends. Consequently, we did not use PERSTEMPO data to support findings
or recommendations, and in order to meet legislative requirements, we
report these data only in appendix I, along with the associated data
reliability caveats. For more information on our scope and methodology,
see appendix III. We conducted this performance audit from June 2006
through May 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum which
changed mobilization and deployment policies and increased reserve
component availability, making virtually all reserve component
personnel available on an indefinitely recurrent basis under a long-
term approach for meeting the requirements for the global war on
terrorism. Prior to this memorandum, service member availability was
restricted by a DOD policy which limited involuntary mobilizations for
the global war on terrorism to 24 cumulative months. The Secretary's
memo and the implementing guidance that followed in March 2007
rescinded the 24-cumulative-month limitation and provided the services
with much greater access to their reserve component personnel for the
long-term requirements of the global war on terrorism. For example, as
of August 31, 2006, almost 421,000 reserve component personnel had been
activated and had limited availability for future involuntary
mobilizations under the 24-cumulative-month policy, but when the policy
was rescinded, previously mobilized personnel became available for
future involuntary mobilization without any limitations on their
cumulative service. As a result of the new policy, involuntary
mobilizations, which will generally be limited to 12 months,[Footnote
7] can now recur indefinitely. In addition, the new implementing
guidance replaces the prior policies that were issued in a piecemeal
fashion to address short-term requirements with an integrated set of
policies that governs access to active as well as reserve component
personnel. The previous policies had emphasized the use of volunteers,
but the new policies emphasize the importance of maintaining unit
cohesion and deployment predictability. The new policies contain
rotation goals which differ between the active and reserve components.
While the new policies provide a long-term approach for meeting
requirements, both the Secretary's memo and the implementing guidance
acknowledge that the services will not be able to immediately achieve
the rotation goals, due to global demands. Therefore, the Secretary's
memo directed the establishment of a program to compensate or
incentivize service members who are required to mobilize or deploy
early or often, or to extend beyond the established rotation policy
goals.
Since 2001, DOD has reported personnel tempo data in its "Annual
Defense Report to the President and the Congress", but the reports have
not been complete and accurate because the Army and Marine Corps do not
have quality controls to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the
reports' underlying data. In October 2001, DOD waived two provisions
related to personnel tempo due to national security interests, but the
requirement to report personnel tempo data to the President and
Congress remained in place. As permitted by 37 U.S.C. §436 and 10
U.S.C. §991, DOD waived the high-deployment compensation requirement
and the requirement to manage service member deployments which approach
or exceeded high-deployment thresholds. When these provisions were
waived, two of the mechanisms for identifying faulty personnel tempo
data were no longer in place, and the services lacked any other quality
control procedures to effectively ensure the accuracy of the data they
were collecting and sending to DOD. Despite DOD guidance which requires
personnel tempo data to be complete and accurate, several reviews have
found that service collection and tracking of personnel tempo data have
not been complete or accurate. For example, in 2005 the Army Human
Resources Command reported that personnel tempo was not properly
recorded for 72 percent of forward-deployed soldiers, and Marine Corps
inspection teams found that 43 percent of the 326 active and reserve
units they inspected in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 had not consistently
or accurately reported personnel. Furthermore, DOD officials expressed
a low level of confidence in the data and said that they relied on an
alternative set of data to examine tempo trends. Shortly after the
September 11, 2001, attacks, DOD shifted its attention away from
collecting and maintaining personnel tempo data and began focusing on
collecting and maintaining data to track activations and deployments
related to ongoing operations.[Footnote 8] In addition, DOD recently
sent a proposal to Congress requesting a modification to the deployment
definition, which if approved would modify personnel tempo calculations
and allow DOD to develop revised high-deployment thresholds and
compensation programs that are tailored to individual service
deployment cycles. However, DOD officials have stated that neither DMDC
nor the services have the complete and accurate data needed to
effectively implement a personnel tempo compensation program. Without
quality control procedures, personnel tempo data could not be used as
an accurate basis to determine eligibility for the high-deployment
payment program under 37 U.S.C. §436, or for the revised high-
deployment compensation program that DOD has recently proposed to
Congress. Until the Army and Marine Corps establish quality control
procedures for the collection of their personnel tempo data, Congress
and other users of DOD's personnel tempo data need to be cautious when
using the data because they cannot be assured that the data fully and
accurately reflect service members' actual tempos.
To improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the personnel tempo
data that DOD reports to Congress and the President, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness to provide guidance which directs
the Army and Marine Corps to develop quality control procedures for
ensuring the accuracy of the personnel tempo data they collect and
report, whether under the existing personnel tempo definition or under
any revised definitions that Congress may approve. In its comments on a
draft of this report, DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in the report
as appropriate. DOD's comments and our evaluation are reprinted in
their entirety in appendix IV of this report.
Background:
Reserve Mobilization:
Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of
authorities. Most reserve component members who have been called to
active duty for other than normal training since September 11, 2001,
have been activated under one of the three legislative
authorities[Footnote 9] listed in table 1.
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities:
Statute: 10 U.S.C. §12301 (d); "With members consent";
Type of activation: Voluntary;
Maximum number of Ready Reserve members who can be activated at once:
Unlimited;
Maximum length of activation: Unlimited.
Statute: 10 U.S.C. §12302; "Partial Mobilization";
Type of activation: Involuntary;
Maximum number of Ready Reserve members who can be activated at once:
1,000,000;
Maximum length of activation: 730 days/24 consecutive months.
Statute: 10 U.S.C. §12304; "Presidential Reserve Call-up";
Type of activation: Involuntary;
Maximum number of Ready Reserve members who can be activated at once:
200,000;
Maximum length of activation: 365 days/12 consecutive months.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions.
[End of table]
On September 14, 2001, the President declared that a national emergency
existed as a result of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and he
invoked 10 U.S.C. §12302, the partial mobilization authority. When DOD
issued subsequent guidance concerning the partial mobilization
authority,[Footnote 10] it limited mobilization orders to 12 months but
allowed the secretaries of the military departments to extend the
orders for an additional 12 months or remobilize reserve component
members, as long as an individual member's cumulative service under the
partial mobilization authority did not exceed 24 cumulative months. The
guidance also allowed the services to keep members on active duty after
they had served 24 months under the partial mobilization authority if
the member volunteered to stay on active duty under 10 U.S.C. §
12301(d).
In 2004, we reported[Footnote 11] that the 24-cumulative-month approach
and other policies developed at the war's outset had affected the
availability of Army and Marine Corps reservists for second involuntary
mobilizations.[Footnote 12] The report concluded that adhering to the
24-cumulative-month policy amid persistently high requirements could
result in the services running out of reservists eligible and available
for a second involuntary mobilization. Moreover, we stated that DOD's
policies, many of which emphasized the use of volunteers, were
implemented in piecemeal fashion, responding to the short-term
requirements of the services and the needs of reserve component
members, and were not developed within an overall strategic framework
to meet the department's long-term requirements for the global war on
terrorism. We concluded that given the duration of operational
commitments to date (2004) and the likelihood for persistently high
force-level requirements into the future, the department needed to
develop an integrated set of policies to address both the long-term
requirements for reserve component forces and individual reserve
component members' needs for predictability. After assessing DOD's
policies regarding the management and deployment of reserve component
service members, the Secretary of Defense enacted changes to reserve
mobilization policy with his January 19, 2007, total force policy
memorandum.
Personnel Tempo:
Personnel tempo is currently defined as the amount of time members of
the armed forces are engaged in their official duties, at a location or
under circumstances that make it infeasible for a member to spend off-
duty time in the housing in which the member resides when on garrison
duty at the member's permanent duty station.[Footnote 13] Title 10 of
the U.S. Code contains a number of provisions related to personnel
tempo including a provision which requires the secretary of each
military department to establish a system for tracking and recording
the number of days that each member of the armed forces under that
secretary's jurisdiction is deployed.[Footnote 14] There is also a
provision that requires management of service members' deployments
which approach or exceed high-deployment thresholds.[Footnote 15] In
addition, since October 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense has been
required to include personnel tempo information in his annual report to
the President and Congress.[Footnote 16]
Title 37 of the U.S. Code contains a requirement for DOD to compensate
service members who exceed legislatively established deployment
thresholds.[Footnote 17] At the time the provision was created by the
FY 2000 NDAA, the services were to pay a per diem allowance of $100 to
members who deployed for more than 250 days out of the previous 365.
Later, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (FY
2004 NDAA[Footnote 18]) modified the high-deployment thresholds and pay
provisions, replacing the per diem allowance with a monthly allowance
of up to $1,000, payable for any month in which a member is beyond the
new high-deployment thresholds[Footnote 19] by at least 1 day.
In May 2001, OSD P&R issued a military personnel record instruction
which updated responsibilities, procedures, and information-reporting
requirements including personnel tempo reporting.[Footnote 20]
According to the instruction, all services are to submit personnel
tempo data to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), which serves as
the central repository and archive for automated manpower and personnel
information for DOD. The instruction requires that the services report
timely, accurate, and complete personnel tempo data. The Army and
Marine Corps each issued further implementing guidance based on the OSD
instruction.
On October 8, 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum
in accordance with waiver provisions found in 10 U.S.C. §991 and 37
U.S.C. §436, suspending the requirement to compensate service members
who exceeded the personnel tempo threshold due to the existence of a
national emergency declared by the President. Additionally, the
memorandum suspended the statutory requirement for management of
service member deployments which approached or exceeded high-deployment
thresholds. The memorandum did not suspend the requirement for services
to collect and submit personnel tempo data, and stated that past
operations have proven that collection of these data is valuable in
developing after action-reports, replying to queries, or accomplishing
analyses relating to the scope of operations.
Virtually All Reserve Component Personnel Are Available Under DOD's
Revised Policies that Provide a Long-Term Approach to Meet Mobilization
Requirements:
On January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that
changed mobilization and deployment policies and increased reserve
component availability, making virtually all reserve component
personnel available on an indefinitely recurrent basis. The memorandum
and subsequent implementing guidance also established a long-term
approach for meeting the requirements for the global war on terrorism
while striving to provide service members with increased
predictability. Additionally, DOD recently established a program to
compensate service members who are required to mobilize or deploy early
or often, or to extend beyond established rotation policy goals.
Virtually All Reserve Component Members Are Available for Deployment
Under New Mobilization Policies:
The Secretary of Defense's January 19, 2007, total force policy
memorandum and the subsequent March 15, 2007, implementation policy
guidance made virtually the entire reserve component force available
for mobilization and deployment.[Footnote 21] Prior to the Secretary's
memorandum, service member availability was restricted by a DOD policy
which limited involuntary mobilizations for the global war on terrorism
to 24 cumulative months. Under the prior policy, any service member who
had been involuntarily mobilized for 24 months was no longer available
to the services for involuntary mobilization. According to DOD data,
almost 421,000 reserve component personnel were currently activated or
had been previously activated as of August 31, 2006. These personnel
would not have been available for involuntary mobilizations, or would
have had limited availability under the prior policy.[Footnote 22]
However, when the Secretary's memo and the implementing guidance
rescinded the 24-cumulative-month limitation all of these personnel
became available for involuntary mobilizations. The revised policies
provide the services with much greater access to their reserve
component personnel for the long-term requirements of the global war on
terrorism because they allow for repeat involuntary mobilizations,
without limitations on the cumulative time a service member is
mobilized. The new guidance allows DOD to mobilize reserve component
individuals for a period of time--generally no more than 12 months at a
time, send them home, and then remobilize them, repeating this cycle
indefinitely and providing an essentially unlimited flow of forces,
within the 1 million service member and 730 consecutive day limitations
of the partial mobilization authority.[Footnote 23]
Mobilization Policy Changes Establish a Long-Term Approach for Meeting
the Global War on Terrorism Requirements:
DOD's current mobilization policies differ from prior policies because
the Secretary's memorandum and the corresponding implementation
guidance provide DOD with an integrated approach for managing the use
of active and reserve component personnel in meeting the long-term
requirements of the global war on terrorism. In 2004 GAO
reported[Footnote 24] that DOD's mobilization and personnel policies
had been implemented in a piecemeal fashion to address short-term
requirements and as a result reserve component personnel were uncertain
about the likelihood of mobilizations, the length of service
commitments, the length of overseas rotations, and the types of
missions they would perform.
The Secretary's January 2007 memorandum and the March 2007 implementing
guidance helped address the need for predictability while giving the
services flexibility to meet long-term requirements. For example, the
documents specified that future mobilizations of ground combat, combat
support, and combat services support would be managed on a unit basis
to allow greater cohesion and deployment predictability. The
implementing guidance also indicated that the secretaries of the
military departments would determine the best method for filling unit
shortfalls. This decentralized decision authority represents a
departure from the previous centralized policy guidance that called for
using volunteers before involuntarily mobilizing Individual Ready
Reserve members or remobilizing previously mobilized Selected Reserve
members.[Footnote 25] The current guidance states that options for
filling unit shortfalls could include, but would not be limited to,
using volunteers including retirees, involuntary call-ups of Individual
Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard, or integrating active
component members.
Overall, the memorandum and implementation guidance presented a
substantial revision to preceding reserve mobilization policies,
stating that the services would plan for a protracted war on terrorism
by effectively managing their manpower resources. The single set of
guidance provided an integrated approach for meeting long-term
requirements and addressed the full range of policy issues that had
previously been addressed in a piecemeal fashion. For example, the
issues addressed in the March 2007 policy guidance included the length
of mobilization orders, extensions, early releases from orders, the use
of the Individual Ready Reserve, and exemptions from training following
deployments.
The new guidance specifies that future involuntary mobilizations will
generally be limited to 12 months, with possible service exceptions for
individual skill training required for deployment and postmobilization
leave, and other exceptions if approved by the Secretary of Defense.
The documents also set rotation policy goals for both reserve and
active component personnel. These goals can differ between the active
and reserve components and among services.[Footnote 26] While these
rotation policies provide a long-term approach for meeting
requirements, both the Secretary's memo and the implementing guidance
acknowledge that the services will not be able to immediately achieve
the rotation goals, due to global demands. The Secretary's memo
explicitly states that global demands will require some units to be
remobilized sooner than the standard. Therefore, the memo directed the
establishment of a program to compensate or incentivize service members
who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or to extend
beyond the established rotation policy goals.
On April 18, 2007, DOD announced that administrative absences would be
awarded to service members who are required to mobilize or deploy with
a frequency that exceeds established rotation policy goals. The
absences will be distinct from normal leave accrued by service members.
They will be awarded when service member deployments exceed
mobilization and deployment planning objectives---that is, twice as
much time at home as deployed for the active component, and five times
as much time at home as mobilized for the reserve component.[Footnote
27] In addition to the administrative absences, some service members
could eventually receive monetary compensation for these deployments or
mobilizations if they cause the service member to exceed certain
thresholds under broader personnel tempo definitions.
Since 2001, DOD Has Submitted Personnel Tempo Reports but the Army and
Marine Corps Lack Quality Controls to Ensure the Accuracy of Underlying
Data:
Since 2001, DOD has reported personnel tempos in its "Annual Defense
Report to the President and the Congress", but the reports have not
been complete or accurate because the Army and Marine Corps do not have
quality controls in place to ensure the accuracy and completeness of
the reports' underlying data. In addition, DOD's focus on collecting
deployment and activation data for ongoing operations has shifted
attention away from personnel tempo tracking and reporting.
Since 2001, DOD Has Reported Personnel Tempo Data to the President and
Congress:
As directed by 10 U.S.C. §991, the services began collecting personnel
tempo data in fiscal year 2000; and since 2001, DOD has published
personnel tempo data in an appendix to "The Annual Defense Report to
the President and the Congress" as required by 10 U.S.C. §487. The
reported data covered fiscal years 2001 through 2005 and the personnel
tempo appendixes have generally included the types of figures that are
required by the law--service and component end strengths, the
populations of deployed personnel, and average personnel tempos (in
days) among the deployed populations or the total end strength
populations. Other information related to personnel tempos has also
been reported on a sporadic basis. For example, in 2001 and 2002, the
appendices included the number of days "high demand/low density" units
deployed but this information was not included in unclassified versions
in later years.
The Army and Marine Corps Lack Quality Controls to Accurately Collect
Personnel Tempo Data:
With the suspensions of the high-deployment compensation requirement
and the requirement for management of service member deployments that
approach or exceed high-deployment thresholds, no service members have
received personnel tempo payments and a key quality control mechanism
has been missing for more than 5 years.[Footnote 28] The suspensions
have removed two mechanisms that could have identified faulty personnel
tempo data and the Army and Marine Corps lack other quality control
procedures for effectively ensuring the accuracy of the data they
collect and send to DOD. According to various DOD and service
officials, quality checks on the data only occur if service members
check the accuracy of their own personnel tempo data. Service members
have several opportunities to review their personnel tempo records,
such as when they transfer between commands or separate from the
service, but the likelihood that they will actually do so is low
because there is no incentive to do so. A 2005 III Corps Inspector
General report found that fewer than 25 percent of the units inspected
included personnel tempo reporting and tracking procedures as part of
their in-and out-processing procedures. Furthermore, the Inspector
General report found that the office responsible for personnel policy
did not publish personnel tempo management guidance in a timely manner.
Since the suspension of the high-deployment compensation and deployment
management provisions, several reviews have found that the services'
collection and tracking of personnel tempo data have not been complete
or accurate, even though the requirement to report tempo data to the
President and Congress has remained in place. For example, in 2005 the
Army Human Resources Command reported that for 72 percent of forward-
deployed soldiers, personnel tempo was not properly recorded in the
Electronic Military Personnel Office, the Army's online integrated
personnel reporting system. In addition, Marine Corps inspection teams
recently concluded that inspected commands did not have procedures in
place to ensure that personnel tempo information was reported. Of the
326 active and reserve units inspected in fiscal years 2005 and 2006,
43 percent had not consistently or accurately reported personnel tempo
in the Marine Corps Total Force System, the service's integrated
personnel database.[Footnote 29]
DOD Has Focused on Deployment and Activation Data Rather than on
Personnel Tempo Data:
Shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, DOD shifted its focus
away from collecting and maintaining personnel tempo data and began
focusing on collecting and maintaining data to track activations and
deployments related to major operations.[Footnote 30] This data
collection for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi
Freedom does not include the full range of personnel tempo events that
are listed in 10 U.S.C. §487. The increased priority on data related to
global war on terrorism deployments diminished the level of effort
given to personnel tempo data collection and the quality of the data
collected.
The October 2001 memorandum that suspended the high-deployment
compensation and deployment management provisions did not suspend the
requirement for the services to collect and submit personnel tempo
data. It stated that deployment data tracking and reporting remained a
priority, as previous operations had proven that such efforts were
valuable for developing after-action reports and completing analyses
related to the scope of operations.
Subsequent DOD and service guidance reiterated the requirement to
continue reporting personnel tempo information for service members
mobilized or deployed in support of the global war on terrorism, and
the DOD guidance required that personnel tempo data reporting be
timely, accurate, and complete. Despite this guidance, DOD officials
expressed a low level of confidence in the quality of the personnel
tempo data that have been collected. They told us that they routinely
rely on an alternative set of data from DMDC to examine tempo trends
and they noted that DMDC can conduct only limited quality control on
personnel tempo data, because DMDC is responsible only for compilation
and does not have the resources to identify anomalies in data provided
by the services. The services are responsible for collecting personnel
tempo data and although both the Army and Marine Corps issued
implementing guidance based on the OSD instruction, which required
timely, accurate, and complete reporting of personnel tempo data, the
implementing guidance did not contain quality control procedures to
ensure complete and accurate personnel tempo data are collected and
transmitted to DMDC.
In February 2007, DOD submitted a proposal to Congress to modify the
deployment definition.[Footnote 31] The proposal would maintain the
basic definition of deployments but would narrow the scope to exclude
non-operational temporary duty including absences for conferences and
training and participation in training or exercises designated by the
secretaries of the military departments. A change in the definition of
deployment would impact personnel tempo calculations by changing the
days that could be counted for purposes of personnel tempo. If the
proposal is approved, DOD will work with the military departments to
develop revised high-deployment thresholds and compensation proposals
that are more closely tailored to individual service deployment cycles.
However, without quality controls on the collection of Army and Marine
Corps data, DOD officials have stated that neither DMDC nor the
services have the complete and accurate data needed to effectively
implement a personnel tempo compensation program.
Conclusions:
Since the onset of the global war on terrorism, the Army and Marine
Corps have deployed approximately 931,000 of their service members for
military operations abroad. Facing limitations on its available reserve
component forces, DOD recently instituted an integrated set of policies
that provides it with increased access to its reserve component forces
as it plans for a long-term global war on terrorism. Although the new
policies will better position the services to meet their long-term
requirements, current global demands are making it difficult for the
services to meet rotation goals in the short term. Faced with these
challenges, the management of personnel tempo is critical as DOD
strives to retain a quality force for the future. However, the Army and
Marine Corps have not maintained complete and accurate personnel tempo
data and they do not have quality control procedures in place to ensure
the accuracy of their personnel tempo data. Furthermore, the high-
deployment compensation and deployment management provisions which
could have helped to identify faulty data have been waived for national
security reasons since 2001. Without quality control procedures to
ensure the completeness and accuracy of personnel tempo data, the data
could not be used as an accurate basis to determine eligibility for the
current high-deployment compensation programs found in Title 37 of the
U.S. Code or for an alternative compensation program based on DOD's
recent legislative proposal. Until the Army and Marine Corps establish
quality control procedures for the collection of their personnel tempo
data, Congress and others need to be cautious when using DOD's
personnel tempo data because they cannot be assured that the data fully
and accurately reflect service members' actual tempos.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the personnel tempo
data that DOD reports to Congress and the President, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to provide guidance which directs the Army and
Marine Corps to develop quality control procedures for validating the
accuracy of the personnel tempo data they collect and report to DMDC,
whether under the existing personnel tempo definition or under any
revised definitions that Congress may approve.
Agency Comments:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department concurred with the
recommendation. The department's comments and our evaluation are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV. In addition, the department
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, the
report is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix V.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempo Trends Based on
Available Data:
According to the 2005 Annual Defense Report to the President and the
Congress, personnel tempos for the Army and the Marine Corps increased
significantly between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003 and then
the rates declined slightly in fiscal year 2004. At the time of our
report, the Department of Defense (DOD) had not released the 2006
Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, which would
have contained 2005 personnel tempo data.
DOD has reported two measures of personnel tempo. The first divides the
total number of days deployed under the personnel tempo definition by
the total end strength of each service or service component. The second
also begins with the total number of days deployed under the personnel
tempo definition but divides this figure only by the number of
personnel who were actually deployed during the fiscal year. Table 2
shows Army and Marine Corps personnel tempo figures as reported in the
2005 Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress. However,
as discussed earlier in this report, we determined that DOD's personnel
tempo (PERSTEMPO) data may not produce reliable personnel tempo
summaries and trends because the Army and Marine Corps lack quality
control procedures for collecting these data and reporting them to
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).
Table 2: Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos:
Service: Army;
Personnel tempo measure: (by end strength);
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2001: 14.9;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2002: 24.9;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2003: 55.7;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2004: 54.8.
Service: Marine Corps;
Personnel tempo measure: (by end strength);
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2001: 24.8;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2002: 34.7;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2003: 64.8;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2004: 49.6.
Service: Army;
Personnel tempo measure: (by deployed personnel only);
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2001: 34.1;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2002: 60.2;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2003: 124.6;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2004: 119.4.
Service: Marine Corps;
Personnel tempo measure: (by deployed personnel only);
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2001: 63.0;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2002: 82.9;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2003: 130.7;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2004: 102.1.
Source: 2005 Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress.
[End of table]
We also performed our own analysis of DMDC's PERSTEMPO data. This
analysis of PERSTEMPO data shows that the Army personnel tempo average
rose substantially from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2004 and then
rose more slowly in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006. In contrast,
the Marine Corps personnel tempo average peaked in fiscal year 2003.
Table 3 shows the results of our analysis.
Table 3: GAO Calculations of Army and Marine Corps Personnel Tempos:
Service: Army;
Personnel tempo measure: (by deployed personnel only);
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2002: 28.3;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2003: 77.1;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2004: 92.5;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2005: 97.6;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2006: 104.9.
Service: Marine Corps;
Personnel tempo measure: (by deployed personnel only);
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2002: 34.6;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2003: 63.9;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2004: 49.3;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2005: 57.5;
Tempo (days) for fiscal year 2006: 60.1.
Source: GAO analysis of DMDC PERSTEMPO data.
Note: The PERSTEMPO data that support these analyses are unreliable.
[End of table]
Our analysis shows similar trends to the trends from the 2005 Annual
Defense Report to the President and the Congress. However, there are
differences in figures, which may be attributed to differences in data
analysis assumptions. (See app. III for additional information
concerning the methodology for our analysis.) In addition, our analysis
includes fiscal years 2005 and 2006 but it does not include fiscal year
2001 data. Finally, our analysis is subject to the same major
limitation as the trend information from the Annual Defense Report
because our data were drawn from the same source that was found to be
incomplete or inaccurate because the Army and Marine Corps lack quality
control procedures for collecting these data and reporting them to DMDC.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Retention/Attrition Rates for Enlisted Occupational
Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment Rates:
This appendix responds to the requirement that we identify enlisted
occupational specialties that are experiencing unusually high or low
deployment rates and analyze retention rates for those occupational
specialties.[Footnote 32] The Department of Defense (DOD) collects and
tracks retention data for its active component forces but it uses
attrition rather than retention data in managing its reserve component
forces. This appendix contains retention/attrition rate data for
enlisted occupational specialties that have experienced unusually high
or low deployment rates, but it does not attempt to make any
conclusions concerning relationships between deployment and retention
or attrition rates because other factors, beyond deployment, can affect
retention. Specifically, previous studies and surveys have indicated
that in addition to deployments, a wide variety of other factors
influence service members' decisions regarding whether or not to stay
in the military. Some of these factors include basic pay, reenlistment
bonuses, family medical care, quality of leadership, and civilian
career opportunities.
Service Retention and Attrition Tracking:
The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment,
regardless of length), mid-career (second or subsequent enlistments up
to 10 years of service), and career (10 or more years of service). The
Marine Corps tracks retention by first enlistment and second or
subsequent enlistment. DOD tracks National Guard and Reserve attrition
rates, which are defined as the number of service members who leave
those components in a given year divided by the components' average
strength as measured at the beginning of the fiscal year and at the end
of that fiscal year.
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates:
To determine which enlisted occupational specialties had unusually high
or low deployment rates, we used several steps. First we obtained
fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2006 data from the Defense Manpower
Data Center's (DMDC) end strength files and from its Contingency
Tracking System Deployment file. We then analyzed these files by
military occupational specialty (MOS), and for each MOS we determined
the yearly end strength population, the population of deployed
personnel, the number of days the deployed population could have
possibly served, and the number of days the deployed population
actually served.
We then calculated two deployment measures for each occupational
specialty. First we calculated a days-served ratio by dividing the
total number of days the deployed population actually served in fiscal
year 2006 by the number of days they could have possibly served in
fiscal year 2006. Second we calculated a population ratio by dividing
the deployed MOS population in fiscal year 2006 by the total MOS
population in fiscal year 2006. We then calculated the quartiles for
both the days-served ratio and the population ratio. If both the days-
served ratio and the population ratio for an occupational specialty
were in the highest quartile, then the occupational specialty was
classified as having an unusually high deployment rate. If both
measures were in the bottom quartile then the occupational specialty
was classified as having an unusually low deployment rate. After we
identified the occupational specialties with unusually high and low
deployment rates, we requested and DMDC provided retention/attrition
data for each of those specialties for fiscal years 2001 through 2006.
Active Component Retention Rates:
Table 4 shows active component Army and Marine Corps retention rates
for personnel in occupational specialties with unusually high or
unusually low deployment rates. For purposes of this table, a person is
considered retained if, at the end of the year, the person is on active
duty and holds a primary MOS with the same two first digits as the
first two digits of the MOS that the person held at the beginning of
the year.
Table 4: Retention Rates for Active Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates:
Unusually high deployment rates:
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Cannon Crewmember;
Code: 13B;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 9987;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 9487;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 79.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 77.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 85.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 82.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 79.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 83.7.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Combat Engineer;
Code: 21B;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 9109;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 88.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 81.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 82.1.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Bridge Crewmember;
Code: 21C;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 781;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 84.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 80.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 77.7.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Artillery Mechanic;
Code: 63D;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 621;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 650;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 85.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 83.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 87.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 78.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 81.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 85.2.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator;
Code: 13R;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 466;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 586;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 77.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 82.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 86.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 83.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 79.4;
Retention rates (percent): FY 2006: 79.5.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Technical Engineer;
Code: 21T;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 261;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 84.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 77.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 87.7.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Cannon Fire Direction Specialist;
Code: 13E;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 1603;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 258;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 80.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 79.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 84.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 78.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 69.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 79.5.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Interior Electrician;
Code: 21R;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 157;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 72.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 84.1.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Tactical Automated Fire Control Systems
Specialist;
Code: 13C;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 746;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 52;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 81.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 82.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 85.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 69.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 74.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 88.5.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Digital Wideband Transmission Equipment
Operator;
Code: 0622;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 2;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 576;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 79.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 79.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 81.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 69.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 70.3.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Fire Support Man;
Code: 0861;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 382;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 430;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 76.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 79.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 76.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 81.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 82.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 86.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Unit Level Circuit Switch (ULCS)
Operator/Maintainer;
Code: 0614;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 3;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 386;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 81.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 86.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 82.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 78.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 77.2.
Service: USMC; Occupational specialty:
SHF Satellite Communicators Operator/Maintainer;
Code: 0627;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 208;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 84.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 74.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 80.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 77.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 68.8.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Tactical Data Systems Equipment (TDSE)
Repairer;
Code: 5962;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 111;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 124;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 84.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 83.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 78.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 81.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 73.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 74.2.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Aviation Radio Repairer;
Code: 5937;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 139;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 103;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 74.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 82.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 86.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 76.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 65.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 80.6.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Field Artillery Radar Operator;
Code: 0842;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 92;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 100;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 84.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 75.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 76.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 82.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 77.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 72.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Tactical Air Operations Module Repairer;
Code: 5963;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 80;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 78;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 70.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 78.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 81.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 85.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 69.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 71.8.
Unusually low deployment rates:
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Microwave Systems Operator-Maintainer;
Code: 25P;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 1054;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 78.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 79.2.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Watercraft Operator;
Code: 88K;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 729;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 538;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 87.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 80.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 75.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 74.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 82.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 87.7.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Mortuary Affairs Specialist;
Code: 92M;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 412;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 445;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 85.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 86.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 85.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 81.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 85.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 88.5.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Combat Documentation/Production Specialist;
Code: 25V;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 487;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 371;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 86.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 84.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 86.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 84.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 82.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 88.7.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Watercraft Engineer;
Code: 88L;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 410;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 330;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 85.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 84.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 83.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 79.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 75.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 83.0.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Senior Non-Commissioned Logistician;
Code: 92Z;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 145;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 159;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 84.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 74.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 76.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 77.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 72.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 71.1.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Satellite/Microwave Systems Chief;
Code: 25T[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 73;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 70.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 68.5.
Service: Army;
Occupational specialty: Health Care Specialist;
Code: 68W[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 10;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 100.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Motor Transport Marine;
Code: 3500;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 215;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 768;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 93.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 87.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 90.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 87.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 92.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 89.1.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Corrections Specialist;
Code: 5831;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 683;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 615;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 83.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 78.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 78.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 81.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 84.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 79.3.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Aircraft Maintenance Marine;
Code: 6000[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 293;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 486;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 92.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 91.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 91.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 94.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 89.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 88.5.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Data/Communications Maintenance Marine;
Code: 2800;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 554;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 459;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 86.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 84.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 83.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 82.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 79.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 81.7.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Ground Ordnance Maintenance Marine;
Code: 2100;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 178;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 310;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 86.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 83.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 83.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 91.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 90.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 89.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Electronics Maintenance Marine;
Code: 5900;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 119;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 246;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 85.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 63.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 73.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 41.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 48.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 35.4.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Logistics Marines;
Code: 0400;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 26;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 237;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 88.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 96.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 88.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 94.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 89.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 92.8.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle
Crewman;
Code: 1800;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 60;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 177;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 83.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 77.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 34.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 83.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 88.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 74.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Tiltrotor Mechanic, MV-22;
Code: 6116[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 138;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 88.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 79.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 93.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 98.8;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 92.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Food Service Marine;
Code: 3300;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 45;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 123;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 88.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 91.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 82.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 88.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 91.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 87.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Criminal Investigator CID Agent;
Code: 5821;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 73;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 107;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 87.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 87.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 88.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 81.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 94.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 86.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: CASS EO Configuration Operator/Maintainer/
Technician/IMA;
Code: 6466[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 69;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 75;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 88.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 84.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 87.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 89.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 80.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 77.3.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Combat Illustrator;
Code: 4611;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 57;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 50;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 89.5;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 83.6;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 79.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 80.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 80.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 72.0.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Legal Services Marine;
Code: 4400;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 21;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 41;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 95.2;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 83.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 95.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 86.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 92.7.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Tactical Air Operations Module/Air Defense
Technician;
Code: 5979;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 35;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 32;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 80.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 80.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 84.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 82.1;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 96.4;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 84.4.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC)
Marine;
Code: 6800[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 13;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 15;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 80.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 88.9;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 93.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 93.3;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 86.7.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Small Ensemble Leader;
Code: 5522;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 0;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 13;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 76.9.
Service: USMC;
Occupational specialty: Basic Marine Air Ground Task Force;
Code: 0500;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 1;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 11;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2001: 100.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2002: 0.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2003: 66.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2004: 66.7;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2005: 80.0;
Retention rates (percent), FY 2006: 100.0.
Source: GAO analysis based on DMDC data.
[A] Several factors can lead to wide fluctuations in retention rates.
For example, some new occupational specialties have been introduced
while other specialties have been phased out. In addition, some
specialties include recruits, trainees, or officer candidates.
Retention rates for those specialties are very low because personnel
generally graduate from the programs and are given different
occupational specialty codes. For clarity in reporting, we are not
reporting retention rates for these occupational codes or for
occupations that have been phased out or which had less than 10
personnel in fiscal year 2006.
[End of table]
Reserve Component Attrition Rates:
Table 5 shows reserve component Army and Marine Corps attrition rates
for personnel in enlisted occupational specialties with unusually high
or unusually low deployment rates. For purposes of this table, a person
is generally considered attrited if, at the end of the year, the person
is no longer in the Selected Reserve or if the person holds a primary
MOS where the first two digits differ from the first two digits of the
MOS that the person held at the beginning of the year.
Table 5: Attrition Rates for Reserve Component Army and Marine Corps
Enlisted Occupational Specialties with Unusually High or Low Deployment
Rates:
Unusually high deployment rates:
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Civil Affairs Specialist (RC);
Code: 38A;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 1,630;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 2,515;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 22.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 22.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 14.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 22.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 16.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 19.4.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Psychological Operations Specialist;
Code: 37F;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 1,032;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 1,410;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 21.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 20.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 15.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 27.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 20.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 20.3.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Cable Systems Installer-Maintainer;
Code: 25L[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001:
Occupation population, FY 2006: 769;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 16.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 20.9.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: CH-47 Helicopter Repairer;
Code: 15U[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001:
Occupation population, FY 2006: 298;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 18.3;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 19.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 25.2.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Human Intelligence Collector;
Code: 97E;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 232;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 272;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 30.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 21.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 18.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 26.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 30.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 21.0.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Visual Information Equipment Operator-
Maintainer;
Code: 25R;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 50;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 55;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 24.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 25.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 24.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 23.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 18.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 25.5.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Personnel Services Specialist;
Code: 75H[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 5,613;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 29;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 20.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 20.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 18.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 99.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 80.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 79.3.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Land Combat Electronics Missile System
Repairer;
Code: 35A[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001:
Occupation population, FY 2006: 12;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 75.0.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Radar Repairer;
Code: 35M;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 6;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 10;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 83.3;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 25.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 40.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 52.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 41.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 60.0.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
Crewmember;
Code: 13M;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 1,985;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 1,957;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 20.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 19.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 16.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 15.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 24.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 15.4.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
Operational Fire Direction Specialist;
Code: 13P;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 691;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 894;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 20.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 21.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 17.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 15.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 26.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 14.7.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Electronic Maintenance Chief;
Code: 35W[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 226;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 230;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 16.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 16.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 13.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 10.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 20.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 79.1.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Special Forces Engineer Sergeant;
Code: 18C;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 237;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 196;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 13.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 10.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 11.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 20.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 21.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 8.7.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Land Combat Electronics Missile System
Repairer;
Code: 35A[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001:
Occupation population, FY 2006: 159;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 100.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 91.2.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Army Bandperson;
Code: 02A[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001:
Occupation population, FY 2006: 147;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 40.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 99.3.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: CH-47 Helicopter Repairer;
Code: 67U[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 894;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 96;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 16.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 15.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 14.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 77.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 67.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 86.5.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: AVENGER System Repairer;
Code: 35T[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001:
Occupation population, FY 2006: 86;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 95.3.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Utility Airplane Repairer (RC);
Code: 67G[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 119;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 72;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 16.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 17.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 20.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 28.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 36.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 44.4.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Construction Engineering Supervisor;
Code: 51H[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 793;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 71;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 14.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 14.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 16.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 50.3;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 85.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 90.1.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Special Forces Assistant Operations and
Intelligence Sergeant;
Code: 18F;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 85;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 66;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 16.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 8.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 11.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 23.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 11.3;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 12.1.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Interior Electrician;
Code: 51R[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 671;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 63;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 24.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 22.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 17.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 52.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 83.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 90.5.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Integrated Family of Test Equipment
Operator/Maintainer;
Code: 35Y[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 51;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 62;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 21.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 17.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 16.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 25.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 33.3;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 93.5.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Information Systems Chief;
Code: 74Z[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 64;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 36;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 14.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 14.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 8.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 15.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 72.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 97.2.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Plumber;
Code: 51K[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 393;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 35;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 26.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 20.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 16.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 50.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 86.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 82.9.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: General Engineering Supervisor;
Code: 51Z[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 231;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 20;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 15.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 15.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 16.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 50.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 87.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 90.0.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Communications Interceptor/Locator;
Code: 98H[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 41;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 20;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 31.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 36.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 32.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 37.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 45.9;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 5.0.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: APACHE Attack Helicopter Systems Repairer;
Code: 35K[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001:
Occupation population, FY 2006: 13;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 100.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 92.3.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Field Artillery Cannoneer;
Code: 0811;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 791;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 821;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 19.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 20.0;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 19.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 25.4;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 21.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 21.0.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Basic Field Artillery Man;
Code: 0800;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 142;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 113;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 34.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 21.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 33.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 30.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 14.7;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 31.0.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Artillery Meteorological Man;
Code: 0847;
Occupation population, FY 2001: 8;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 33;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 37.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 14.3;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 15.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 6.1;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 16.2;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 18.2.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Ground Radio Repairer;
Code: 2841[A];
Occupation population, FY 2001: 310;
Occupation population, FY 2006: 32;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2001: 24.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY: 2002: 21.8;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2003: 21.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2004: 36.6;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2005: 25.5;
Attrition rates (percent), FY 2006: 59.4.
Unusually low deployment rates:
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Recruiter;
Code: 79R;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 1,628;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 1,548;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 12.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 11.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 11.9;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 18.9;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 15.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 14.7.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Army Bandperson;
Code: 42R[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 649;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 9.4.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Field Artillery Automated Tactical Data
System Specialist;
Code: 13D[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 76;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 50.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 44.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 55.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 42.1.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: M1 ABRAMS Tank System Maintainer;
Code: 63A[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001: 1;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 71;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 100.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 100.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 62.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 30.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 42.9;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 47.9.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Optical Laboratory Specialist;
Code: 91H[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 56;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 66.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 16.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 19.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 23.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 30.4.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Transmission & Distribution Specialist (RC);
Code: 21Q[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 17;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 31.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 20.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 23.5.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: UH-1 Helicopter Repairer (RC);
Code: 15M[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 11;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 36.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 66.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 54.5.
Service component: USAR;
Occupational specialties: Electronic Maintenance Chief;
Code: 94W[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 10;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 20.0.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Recruiter;
Code: 79R;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 101;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 34;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 34.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 28.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 31.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 38.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 26.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 52.9.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Satellite Communications Systems Operator-
Maintainer;
Code: 25S[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 25;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 100.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 12.0.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: CID Special Agent;
Code: 31D[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 22;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 45.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 22.7.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Career Counselor;
Code: 79S;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 104;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 15;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 29.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 35.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 27.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 30.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 12.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 40.0.
Service component: ARNG;
Occupational specialties: Transmission & Distribution Specialist (RC);
Code: 21Q[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 10;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 20.0.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Engineer Equipment Mechanic;
Code: 1341;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 334;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 370;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 21.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 26.9;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 17.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 26.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 20.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 20.5.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Aviation Supply Specialist;
Code: 6672;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 252;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 221;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 23.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 19.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 21.1;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 22.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 23.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 21.7.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Water Support Technician;
Code: 1171;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 185;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 203;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 25.9;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 29.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 22.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 15.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 18.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 25.6.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Aviation Information Systems (AIS)
Specialist;
Code: 6694[A];
Occupation population: FY 2001:
Occupation population: FY 2006: 53;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001:
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 11.1;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 9.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 20.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 15.1.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: METOC Observer;
Code: 6821;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 30;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 48;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 26.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 51.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 18.2;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 13.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 8.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 10.4.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Helicopter Airframe Mechanic, CH-53;
Code: 6153;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 20;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 28;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 25.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 28.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 13.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 12.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 7.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 14.3.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL)
Asset Manager;
Code: 6042;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 14;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 26;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 14.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 11.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 21.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 8.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 23.1;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 38.5.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Legal Services Specialist;
Code: 4421;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 47;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 25;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 42.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 36.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 30.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 37.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 29.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 40.0.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Aircraft Maintenance Chief;
Code: 6019;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 36;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 25;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 22.2;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 29.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 32.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 25.9;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 40.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 16.0.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Aviation Radar Repairer;
Code: 5942;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 3;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 20;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 33.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 14.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 33.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 21.4;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 17.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 10.0.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Aircraft Communications/Navigation/Electrical
Systems Technician, CH-53;
Code: 6323;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 17;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 20;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 11.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 28.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 4.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 20.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 27.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 35.0.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Aircraft Communications Systems Technician,
IMA;
Code: 6412;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 18;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 19;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 5.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 22.2;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 17.6;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 23.5;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 6.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 15.8.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, F-
404;
Code: 6227;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 13;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 18;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 30.8;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 25.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 20.0;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 16.7.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Aircraft Electronic Countermeasures Systems
Technician, Helicopter, IMA;
Code: 6483;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 9;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 15;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 22.2;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002:
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 14.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 7.1;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 7.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 13.3.
Service component: USMCR;
Occupational specialties: Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-64;
Code: 6123;
Occupation population: FY 2001: 11;
Occupation population: FY 2006: 11;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2001: 9.1;
Attrition rates (percent): FY: 2002: 6.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2003: 26.7;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2004: 27.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2005: 27.3;
Attrition rates (percent): FY 2006: 27.3.
Source: GAO analysis based on DMDC data.
[A] Several factors can lead to wide fluctuations in attrition rates.
For example, some new occupational specialties have been introduced
while other specialties have been phased out. In addition some
specialties include recruits, trainees, or officer candidates.
Attrition rates for those specialties are very high because personnel
generally graduate from the programs and are given different
occupational specialty codes. For clarity in reporting, we are not
reporting attrition rates for these occupational codes or for
occupations that have been phased out or which had less than 10
personnel in fiscal year 2006.
[End of table]
In examining tables 4 and 5, it is important to note that personnel in
some high-deploying occupational specialties may not be deploying for
their chosen specialty. For example, many personnel with field
artillery occupational specialties have been deployed to perform
military police or security functions. For these personnel, retention
decisions may be influenced not only by the factors previously cited
(basic pay, reenlistment bonuses, family medical care, quality of
leadership, and civilian career opportunities) but also by the fact
that they have been deployed and are working outside of their chosen
occupational specialties. For individual service members these other
factors may have a larger impact on retention decisions than their
deployment rates.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which changes in mobilization and deployment
policies have affected reserve component availability and provided an
approach to meet the requirements for the global war on terrorism, we
reviewed and analyzed past and present Department of Defense (DOD)
mobilization and deployment policies as well as requirements for the
global war on terrorism, comparing the effects of policies before and
after Secretary Gates' January 19, 2007, memorandum regarding the
utilization of the total force. Specifically, we discussed the
implementation of mobilization authorities and the effects of various
personnel policies with responsible officials from the (1) Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia; (2)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Arlington,
Virginia; (3) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Virginia; (4) Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Arlington,
Virginia; and (5) Commandant, Marine Corps (Manpower, Plans, and
Policy), Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia.
In meetings with the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff,
and service officials, we discussed the effects of reserve mobilization
and deployment policies enacted following the September 11, 2001,
attacks; the advantages and disadvantages of those policies when
compared to the policies implemented on and after the January 19, 2007,
when the Secretary of Defense issued a total force policy memorandum;
and, the impact of policies on the availability of reserve component
members for future mobilizations and deployments. We also discussed the
use of special pays and bonuses as instruments that could encourage
reserve component members to volunteer for mobilizations that exceeded
the prior 24-cumulative-month time limitation on involuntary
mobilizations. Finally, we collected and reviewed data regarding the
population of previously mobilized reserve component members to
determine reserve component availability under the prior 24-cumulative-
month limitation.
To assess the extent to which DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have
collected, maintained, and reported complete and accurate personnel
tempo data, we reviewed legislation and DOD policies regarding
personnel tempo; Army, Marine Corps, and DOD systems and procedures for
collecting and reporting personnel tempo data; and previous inspections
and reviews of the personnel tempo data.
We examined legislation to identify the definition of personnel tempo
and related terms; the reporting requirements for DOD and the military
departments; the assignment of roles and responsibilities; the
thresholds for identifying high-deploying personnel and the
corresponding provisions for compensation; and the conditions for
modifying the personnel tempo provisions or issuing waivers to those
provisions. We also examined corresponding DOD and service policies
concerning the collection and management of personnel tempo data. We
also reviewed DOD's Annual Reports to the President and the Congress,
which congressional legislation identified as the means for
transmitting personnel tempo data. We compared and contrasted the DOD
guidance on personnel tempo and deployment data collection that was
issued before the personnel tempo oversight and compensation provisions
were waived in October 2001 to guidance that was issued after the
waiver.
We also discussed the implementation and efficacy of DOD and service
personnel tempo and deployment and activation data collection policies
with responsible officials from the (1) Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, Arlington, Virginia, including Military
Personnel Policy, Arlington, Virginia and Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC West), Seaside, California; (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia; (3) Department of the Army, Human
Resources Command, including Alexandria, Virginia (Active) and St.
Louis, Missouri (Reserve); (4) United States Marine Corps, Manpower
Plans and Policy Division, Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia; (5)
United States Marine Corps, Inspection Division, Office of the
Inspector General, Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia; and (6)
National Guard Bureau, G-1, Selected Reserve Branch, Arlington,
Virginia.
We compiled and reviewed documentation on DOD and service evaluations,
inspections, and reviews of personnel tempo data. In addition, we
reviewed documentation on the DMDC and service systems used to collect,
process, and archive personnel tempo and deployment data. Furthermore,
we reviewed the personnel tempo proposal submitted by OSD to Congress
for consideration in the upcoming national defense authorization act
and conferred with our Office of General Counsel regarding its status
and potential impact.
Although not part of our reporting objectives, in order to meet the
reporting requirements of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 we provide data on personnel
tempo trends in appendix I, and retention rates for enlisted
occupational specialties that have experienced unusually high or low
deployment rates in appendix II.
To develop personnel tempo trends, we analyzed fiscal year 2001 to
fiscal year 2006 data from the DMDC Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)
database using statistical analysis software (SAS). We also obtained
and analyzed fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2006 data from the DMDC
end strength databases---the Active Duty Military Personnel Master File
and the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System. Using the
PERSTEMPO and end strength data, we completed an analysis identifying
the yearly end strength population, the population of deployed
personnel, and the total number of cumulative days deployed. Because of
known limitations in the PERSTEMPO database, we completed a comparative
analysis with fiscal years 2001-2006 data from the DMDC Contingency
Tracking System (CTS) Deployment and Activation File datasets. Using
the CTS and end strength data, we completed an analysis identifying the
yearly end strength population, the population of deployed personnel,
and the total number of cumulative days deployed. From these three
figures, we calculated the yearly personnel tempo average for each
database---PERSTEMPO, CTS Deployment File, and CTS Activation File. We
compared the resulting calculations as well as the corresponding trends
as one measure of the reliability of the PERSTEMPO data. To assess the
reliability of the PERSTEMPO data, we spoke with knowledgeable DMDC
officials about data quality issues and the internal controls on the
system, and we reviewed prior GAO work on the PERSTEMPO data and
system. Based on this information, we determined the PERSTEMPO data
were not reliable indices of personnel tempo trends. We did not use
PERSTEMPO data to support findings or recommendations and present
PERSTEMPO data only in appendix I, with the associated data reliability
caveats, because of the known limitations in the reliability of the
data. These data are included in appendix I because of the legislative
mandate to provide personnel tempo trends, and despite the known
limitations, they are the only data DOD maintains on personnel tempo
for all global war on terrorism contingencies.
To determine retention rates for enlisted occupational specialties that
have experienced unusually high or low deployment rates, we obtained
fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2006 data from the DMDC CTS Deployment
File, and active and reserve end strength files. Using these data, we
calculated deployment statistics and defined the occupational
specialties experiencing unusually high or low deployment rates based
on quartile analysis. The identified occupational specialties were then
transmitted to DMDC, and DMDC provided retention or attrition data for
each occupation specialty for the fiscal years 2001-2006 period. To
assess the reliability of CTS and end strength data, we spoke with DMDC
officials who were knowledgeable of the data and systems, reviewed data
system documentation, obtained written responses to questions regarding
the internal controls on the systems, reviewed previous GAO work on the
data and systems, and performed electronic data tests for anomalous and
missing data. We determined the CTS and end strength data we used were
reliable for the purposes of this report. To ensure the accuracy of
GAO's analysis, all programs were verified for logic and accuracy by an
independent reviewer.
We discussed our methodology for calculating and tabulating these data
with officials from the (1) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness, Arlington, Virginia, including Military Personnel
Policy, Arlington, Virginia and Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC
West), Seaside, California; (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve
Affairs, Arlington, Virginia; (3) Department of the Army, Human
Resources Command, Alexandria, Virginia (Active); (4) National Guard
Bureau, G-1, Selected Reserve Branch, Arlington, Virginia; and (5)
United States Marine Corps, Manpower Plans and Policy Division,
Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia. The following list contains
details about the methods and assumption we used in analyzing DMDC data
files:
1. End-of-September End Strength files were used to represent the end
strength for the preceding fiscal year for both active and reserve
service members.
2. For the yearly analysis, the number of days activated/deployed
includes both the day the activation or deployment started and the day
it ended.
3. For activations or deployments that extend across fiscal years, the
days for each year are counted through September 30 of that year and
subsequent days are attributed to the following year.
4. Activations or deployments that began in fiscal years 2005-2006 and
had "unknown" end dates were included in the yearly analysis because
the missing dates could indicate ongoing activations or deployments.
5. Activations or deployments that began in fiscal years 2001-2004 and
had "unknown" end dates were excluded from the yearly analysis based on
the assumption that activations or deployments do not typically extend
for 2 years and the dates more likely represent "missing" data.
6. The MOS analysis was based on Primary Service Military Occupational
Specialty (PMOS) codes.
7. In instances of data anomalies, we communicated with DMDC and
incorporated their suggestions for resolution.
8. The data we received from DMDC contained no PERSTEMPO events that
began in fiscal year 2001.
Because there are a variety of factors affecting retention for which we
were not able to account in our analysis, we did not attempt to make
any conclusions concerning the relationship between deployment and
retention or attrition rates. However, we collected and reviewed
information about some of these other factors that affect retention.
We conducted our work from June 2006 to May 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:
June 29 2007:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Military Personnel: DoD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data
and Needs Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy," dated June 1,
2007 (GAO Code 350868).
The DoD primary action officer for this GAO study is LtCol Greg
Bennett, OASD/RA(M&P), who can be reached at (703) 693-2241 or via e-
mail at gregory.bennett@n,osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
T. F. Hall:
Attachment:
As stated:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
GAO DRAFT REPORT ” DATED JUNE 1, 2007
GAO CODE 350868/GAO-07-780:
"Military Personnel: DoD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs
Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy":
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
provide guidance, which directs the Army and Marine Corps to develop
quality control procedures for validating the accuracy of the personnel
tempo data they collect and report to DMDC, whether under the existing
personnel tempo definition or under any revised definitions that
Congress may approve.
Dod Response: The Department concurs with the recommendation.
Department Of Defense Comments:
Technical Corrections:
1. 1st Page, 1st Paragraph, 1st Sentence:
Recommendation: Rewrite 1st sentence as follows: "Congress has
repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military operations;
and since 2001, approximately 931,000 US. Army and Marine Corps service
members, have deployed for military operations abroad in support of the
Global War on Terrorism, including approximately 312,000 Guard and
Reserve members."
Rationale: Accuracy in the reported number deployed.
[See comment 1]
2. 1st Page, 1st Paragraph:
Recommendation: Rewrite the 1st paragraph as follows: "Congress has
repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military operations.
Utilizing the Partial Mobilization Authority (10 US. Code 12302) as
authorized by Presidential Executive Order 13223 on September 14, 2001,
the US. Army and Marine Corps have deployed approximately 931,000
members, of which approximately 312,000 have been Guard and Reserve,
for military operations abroad in support of the Global War on
Terrorism. Prior to this authorization, and as a result of
Congressional concerns the Department of Defense was required to report
personnel tempo to Congress as mandated in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (FY 2000 NDAA). Title 37 of the
U.S. Code was amended with the addition of a section requiring the
secretaries of the military services to pay high-deployment
compensation payments to service members for lengthy or numerous
deployments in excess of set limits. A section was added to Title 10 of
the U.S. Code requiring management of deployments of service members in
danger of exceeding high-deployment days thresholds! Sections were
added to Title 10 of the US. Code requiring the Secretary of Defense to
include personnel tempo information in his annual report to the
[See comment 2]
President and Congress and making the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (OSD P&R) responsible for monitoring personnel
tempo and establishing related standards and policies, subject to the
authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense.
Rationale: There are several disparate issues that are being addressed
in the original paragraph as written. 1) Implication that the Congress
has recently placed statutory limits on the numbers of reserve
personnel that can be involuntarily called to active duty due to
concern about the negative effects on individual service members and
service readiness. The legislative authorities have been implemented
over the last 60 years and have been modified as needed to address
certain requirements and grant certain levels of authority. None of the
involuntary recall legislative authorities have been modified as a
result of current military operations in support of the Global War on
Terror and 2) that personnel tempo issues are related to the time limit
that an individual may be involuntarily activated. The third sentence,
of the paragraph, implies that the time limits in the involuntary
activation legislative authorities are related to the personnel tempo
issues that were addressed in the National Defense Authorization Act of
2000. Personnel tempo applies to both the Active and Reserve Components
and addresses compensation, management and reporting of individuals
that exceed certain deployment standards. Personnel tempo does not
place any restrictions on the time duration that a reserve service
member may be involuntarily activated.
3. 6th Page, "Results in Brief," 1st Paragraph, 4th Sentence:
Recommendation: Rewrite 1st sentence as follows: "For example, as of
August 31, 2006, almost 421,000 reserve component personnel had been
activated..."
Rationale: Accuracy in the reported number activated.
[See comment 3]
4. 10th" Page, "Reserve Mobilization," 1st para, 2nd Sentence:
Recommendation: Rewrite 2nd sentence as follows: "Most reserve
component members who have been called to active duty for other than
normal training since September 11, 2001, have been activated under one
of the three legislative authorities listed in table 1."
Rationale: Service members are activated either in either a voluntary
status or an involuntary status. Service member are not mobilized in a
voluntary status.
[See comment 4]
5. 10th Page, "Reserve Mobilization," Table 1: Mobilization
Authorities:
Recommendation: Change table to reflect the following bold changes:
[See comment 5]
Table 1: Activation (in bold) Authorities:
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12301 (d) "With members consent" (in bold)
Type of Activation: Voluntary;
Maximum Number of Ready Reserve Members Who Can Be Activated (in
bold)at Once: Unlimited;
Maximum Length of Activation (in bold): Unlimited
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12302 "Partial Mobilization";
Type of Activation: Involuntary;
Maximum Number of Ready Reserve Members Who Can Be Activated (in
bold)at Once: 1,000,000
Maximum Length of Activation (in bold): 730 days/24 consecutive months;
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12304: "Presidential Reserve Call-up";
Type of Activation: Involuntary;
Maximum Number of Ready Reserve Members Who Can Be Activated (in
bold)at Once: 200,000;
Maximum Length of Activation (in bold): 365 days/12 consecutive months.
Rationale: 10 USC 12301(d) is not full mobilization but rather
activation with the members consent (voluntary activation). The full
mobilization authority is 12301(a), which is not a voluntary
activation. The words activation and activated better reflect the
status of an individual who has been called to active duty under one of
the authorities listed above. 10 USC 1230 was an incomplete cite of the
legislative section, it should be 12304.
6. 10th Page, "Reserve Mobilization," Table 1: Mobilization Authorities:
Recommendation: Annotate that 10 USC 12304 was used to support ongoing
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and has not been utilized since 2004.
Rationale: Provides clarity on the use of the three authorities. The
table currently implies that all three legislative authorities have
been utilized to support operations in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom, Nobel Eagle and Iraqi Freedom.
[See comment 6]
7. 16th Page, 1st Paragraph, 1st Line:
Recommendation: Rewrite sentence as follows: "According to DOD data,
almost 421,000 reserve component personnel were currently activated or
had been previously activated as of August 31, 2006."
Rational: Accuracy in numbers reported.
[See comment 3]
8. 18th Page, "Mobilization policy Changes..." Last Paragraph, 1st
Sentence:
Recommendation: Rewrite sentence as follows: "The new guidance
specifies that future involuntary mobilizations will generally be
limited to 12 months, with possible service exceptions for individual
skill training required for deployment and post-mobilization leave, and
other exceptions if approved by the Secretary of Defense."
Rationale: Pre-deployment training implies block unit training. The
Secretary of Defense has stipulated that only individual skill
training, i.e. military occupational skills, will be permitted.
[See comment 7]
9. 19th Page, Footnote 25 (and elsewhere it the report):
Recommendation: Rewrite last sentence as follows: "The secretaries of
the military departments will be able to add other operational
commitments discretionally."
Rational: Proper usage, the military has secretaries of the military
departments not service secretaries.
[See comment 8]
10. 25th Conclusions," 1st Paragraph, 1" Line:
Recommendation: Change "1.5 million" to "931K"
Rationale: There have been approximately 931K Army and Marine Corps
personnel that have deployed in support of the GWOT, not the 1.5
million stated.
[See comment 1]
11. 30th Page, "Service retention and Attrition Tracking" last line on
page:
Recommendation: Change to read "DoD tracks National Guard and Reserve
attrition rates, which is defined as the number of service members who
leave those components in a given year divided by the components'
average strength as measured at the beginning of the fiscal year and at
the end of that fiscal year."
Rationale: DoD does not track strength through the use of attrition,
attrition is calculated as described above.
[See comment 9]
GAO Comments:
1. We revised the numbers as suggested to reflect additional data
provided by DOD.
2. We disagree with DOD's assertion that several disparate issues are
being addressed in the original paragraph as written and have not
changed the report text in response to that assertion. The entire
paragraph supports the initial clause of our topic sentence--"Congress
has repeatedly expressed concerns about the pace of military
operations." The sentences that follow the topic sentence all document
ways that Congress has expressed its concern through legislation over
the years. We note both the recent concerns that have been addressed
through personnel tempo provisions and the long-standing concerns that
were addressed through restrictions on the numbers of personnel who can
be mobilized and the allowable lengths of mobilizations. However, in
order to clarify the timing of the actions taken by Congress, we have
made minor adjustments to the text. Furthermore, we note that, contrary
to DOD's assertion that none of the involuntary recall authorities have
been modified, in 2006, the Presidential Reserve Call-up authority
found in 10 U.S.C. §12304 was amended[Footnote 33] with an extension of
the number of days members could be called under the authority and the
addition of criteria to be used to ensure fair treatment of reserve
personnel before mobilizing them under this authority.
3. We revised the numbers as suggested to reflect additional data
provided by DOD.
4. We have adjusted the text as suggested to provide additional
clarification. Throughout the report we had used the term mobilization
as it is commonly used to include personnel activations as well as the
assembling of equipment. However, we acknowledge that activation is the
more technically appropriate term and have thus changed "mobilization"
to "activation" as suggested in this and other comments.
5. We have made the changes to the table as suggested.
6. We have added the suggested text as a footnote prior to the table.
7. We have adjusted the text as suggested to provide additional
clarification.
8. We have adjusted the text as suggested.
9. We have adjusted the text as suggested.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Ms. Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Acknowledgements:
In addition to the contact named above, Michael Ferren, (Assistant
Director), Sara Hackley, Molly Whipple, Rebecca Shea, Lynn Milan,
Laurie Hamilton, William Bates, Nicole Harms, Cheryl Weissman, Alissa
Czyz, and Ricardo Marquez made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 106-65, §923 (1999) defined personnel tempo as "the
amount of time members of the armed forces are engaged in their
official duties, at a location or under circumstances that make it
infeasible for a member to spend off-duty time in the housing in which
the member resides when on garrison duty at the member's permanent duty
station." This is codified at 10 U.S.C. §487.
[2] Pub. L. No. 106-65, §586 (1999), codified at 37 U.S.C. §436 with
subsequent amendments.
[3] Pub. L. No. 106-65, §586 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. §991 with
subsequent amendments. Initially, this section required general or flag
officer management of members who had been deployed 182 days or more
out of the preceding 365 days, to ensure that they were not deployed
for more than 220 days out of the preceding 365 without special
approval. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
amended this section to require management of service members to ensure
that the they were not deployed for more than 220 days out of the
preceding 365 or more than 400 days out of the preceding 730 days
without approval of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary could
delegate his approval authority to certain civilian officers and to a
general or flag officer in that member's chain of command.
[4] Pub. L. No. 106-65, §923 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. §487 with
subsequent amendments.
[5] Pub. L. No. 106-65, §923 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. §136.
[6] Pub. L. No. 109-364, §345 (2006).
[7] At service discretion, this period may exclude individual skill
training required for deployments and postmobilization leave.
[8] However, this data collection for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring
Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom does not include the full range of personnel
tempo events that are listed in 10 U.S.C. §487.
[9] 10 U.S.C. §12304 was used to support ongoing operations in Bosnia
and Kosovo and has not been utilized since 2004.
[10] OSD Personnel and Readiness, "Mobilization / Demobilization
Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to
Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks"
(Sept. 20, 2001); "Addendum to the Mobilization / Demobilization
Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to
Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks"
(July 19, 2002).
[11]GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve
Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues,
GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).
[12] GAO-04-1031.
[13] 10 U.S.C. §487.
[14] 10 U.S.C. §991.
[15] 10 U.S.C. §991.
[16] 10 U.S.C. §487.
[17] 37 U.S.C. §436.
[18] Pub. L. No. 108-136, §541 (2003).
[19] Initially, 37 U.S.C. §436 allowed for a $100 per diem allowance to
be paid to service members who had been deployed 251 days or more out
of the preceding 365 days. In 2003, this section was amended by the FY
2004 NDAA to allow a monthly allowance of up to $1,000 for service
members who had been deployed for 191 or more consecutive days or 401
or more days out of the preceding 730 days. The act created additional
provisions for determining compensations eligibility for members of the
reserve components on active duty.
[20] Department of Defense Instruction 1336.5, Automated Extract of
Active Duty Military Personnel Records (May 2, 2001).
[21] A few minor or temporary restrictions prevented the whole force
from being available. For example, personnel are temporarily not
available until they complete their initial training and pregnant
service members are not permitted to be involuntarily activated, though
they may volunteer to be activated under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d).
[22] The data showed that more than 160,000 of these personnel were not
available for mobilizations of 12 months or more. The remainder had
been mobilized but still had between 12 and 23 months of availability
before they would have reached the 24-cumulative-month limitation.
[23] 10 U.S.C. §12302.
[24] GAO-04-1031.
[25] The Selected Reserve includes individual mobilization augmentees
who train regularly with active component units as well as members who
train regularly with National Guard or Reserve units. Individual Ready
Reserve members are service members who have completed the active duty
or Selected Reserve portions of their military contracts but who have
not reached the end of their military service obligation. Although they
were previously trained during periods of active duty service they do
not participate in regular training.
[26] The rotation goals in the memorandum and implementing guidance
generally called for reserve component personnel to be involuntarily
mobilized for no more than 1 year and then demobilized for 5 years, but
the guidance allowed the services to implement the 1:5 ratio with tour
and demobilization periods of less than 1 and 5 years based on
Secretary of Defense-approved force generation models. Marine Corps
deployments are typically 7 months rather than 1 year. Under the new
policies, active component personnel are to be deployed for 1 year and
then at home station for 2 years.
[27] Creditable deployment time will be based on participation in
Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Operation Iraqi Freedom, or
time with theater units in nearby areas. The secretaries of the
military departments will be able to add other operational commitments
discretionally.
[28] Because the services were required to begin collecting data under
10 U.S.C. §991 on October 1, 2000, and the initial per diem payment
provision, 37 U.S.C. §436, required that service members be deployed
for 250 days out of the previous 365 in order to be eligible for per
diem payments, the first time service members would have been eligible
to receive per diem payments was October 1, 2001. The payment provision
was waived 7 days later, on October 8, 2001, and according to DOD
officials, no payments were ever issued.
[29] Marine Corps inspection teams were focused primarily on financial
inspections and personnel tempo was only a part of the inspections. The
inspections were not comprehensive and covered only a portion of the
Marine Corps.
[30] These data are tracked in DMDC's Contingency Tracking System.
[31] This proposal was part of the legislative package submitted for
consideration as part of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Bill.
[32] Pub. L. No. 109-364, §345 (2006).
[33] Pub. L. No. 109-364, §522 (2006).
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
