Stabilizing Iraq
DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces Gao ID: GAO-07-711 July 31, 2007Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-711, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2007:
STABILIZING IRAQ:
DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security
Forces:
Stabilizing Iraq:
GAO-07-711:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-711, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to
develop Iraqi security forces. DOD recently requested an additional $2
billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-
Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-
Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to
train and equip Iraqi forces.
This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and
MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2)
assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded
equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these
objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and
interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.
What GAO Found:
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD
accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program
for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside
traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree
of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials.
These officials stated that since the funding did not go through
traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability
requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply.
Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively
specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the
Iraqi forces.
DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces‘ receipt of U.S.-
funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability.
First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment
distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-
I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to
the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a
discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the
former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I
officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the
lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons.
Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not
consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the
equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the
Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has
placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents.
However, GAO‘s review of the January 2007 property books found
continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the
property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are
an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and
limited personnel to maintain the system.
Efforts to Account for Equipment Distributed to the Iraqi Security
Forces:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches Iraqi security forces
as intended, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) determine
what DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program
and (2) after defining these procedures, ensure that sufficient staff,
functioning distribution networks, and proper technology are available
to meet the new requirements.
DOD concurred with both recommendations.
hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-711].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at
(202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief;
Background;
DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Accountability
Procedures Apply to the Train-and-Equip Program for Iraq;
MNF-I Cannot Fully Account for Iraqi Forces' Receipt of Equipment;
Conclusions;
Recommendations for Executive Action;
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation;
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology;
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense;
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments;
Figures:
Figure 1: Military Chain of Command in Iraq;
Figure 2: Efforts to Account for Equipment Distributed to Iraqi
Security Forces;
Figure 3: Discrepancies of MNSTC-I Reports of Selected Equipment Issued
to Iraqi Security Forces, June 2004 through September 2005;
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command
DOD: Department of Defense
IRRF: Iraq Relief and Reconstruction and Fund
ISFF: Iraq Security Forces Fund
MNC- I: Multinational Corps-Iraq
MNF-I: Multinational Force-Iraq
MNSTC-I: Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 31, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to
develop the Iraqi security forces, including at least $2.8 billion to
purchase and transport equipment to Iraqi forces.[Footnote 1] DOD
recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue these efforts.
In the fall of 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) shared responsibility for the U.S.
program to train and equip the Iraqi security forces, composed of both
military and police forces.[Footnote 2] After the collapse of many
Iraqi forces in the spring of 2004, the United States restructured the
multinational force and increased resources to develop Iraqi forces.
The train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under the authority of
the Department of Defense (DOD) and is implemented by MNF-I's major
subordinate commands, including the Multinational Security Transition
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).
This report (1) examines the property accountability[Footnote 3]
procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program
for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the
U.S.-funded equipment issued to Iraqi security forces. Our work focused
on accountability requirements for the transportation and distribution
of U.S.-provided equipment; we did not review any requirements relevant
to the procurement of this equipment.
To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed documentation and
interviewed current and former officials from DOD, MNF-I and U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM). We also analyzed MNSTC-I property book
records as of January 2007.[Footnote 4] We performed our work from
March 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. A detailed description of our scope and
methodology is included in appendix I of this report. Because of broad-
based congressional interest in this issue, we performed our work under
the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to
conduct reviews on his own initiative. The work performed for this
review has also contributed to several related GAO products on
Iraq.[Footnote 5]
Results in Brief:
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD
accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program
for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside
traditional security assistance programs, which, according to DOD
officials, allowed DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the
program. These officials stated that, since the funding did not go
through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD
accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs--
including registering small arms transferred to foreign governments--
did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have an order or
orders comprehensively specifying accountability procedures for
equipment distributed to the Iraqi security forces.
DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi security forces' receipt
of U.S.-provided equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in
accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of
all equipment distributed to the Iraqi security forces from June 2004
until December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a consolidated
property book system to track the issuance of equipment to the Iraqi
security forces and attempted to recover past records. Our analysis
found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported
by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I
officials stated that this lapse was due to an insufficient number of
staff and the lack of a fully operational network to distribute
equipment, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the
program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting documents
that confirm when the equipment was received, the quantities of
equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the equipment. Since
June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting this
documentation. However, our review of the 2007 property books found
continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the
property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are
an inefficient data management tool given the large amount of data and
limited personnel available to maintain the system. MNSTC-I plans to
move the property book records from a spreadsheet system to a database
management system by summer 2007.
To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches Iraqi forces, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) determine what DOD
accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program and (2)
after defining the required accountability procedures, ensure that
sufficient staff, functioning distribution networks, and proper
technology are available to meet the new requirements.
DOD concurred with both of our recommendations and is currently
reviewing policies and procedures for equipment accountability to
ensure proper accountability is in place for the Iraq train-and-equip
program.
Background:
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to
develop the Iraqi security forces, first under the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and later through the Iraq Security Forces
Fund (ISFF).[Footnote 6] DOD has apportioned about $2.8 billion in ISFF
funds to purchase and transport equipment to Iraqi military and police
forces.[Footnote 7] DOD does not report IRRF funds for Iraqi forces'
equipment and transportation as a separate line item.[Footnote 8] DOD
has requested an additional $2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces
in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget requests.
The United States restructured the multinational force and increased
resources to train and equip the Iraqi forces after they collapsed
during an insurgent uprising in the spring of 2004. This collapse
ensued when MNF-I transferred security responsibilities to the Iraqi
forces before they were properly trained and equipped to battle
insurgents. Iraqi security forces include the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air
Force under the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Police, National
Police, and Border Enforcement under the Ministry of Interior.
The train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under DOD authority and
is implemented by MNF-I's major subordinate commands, including MNSTC-
I and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) (see fig. 1). This differs from
traditional security assistance programs, which operate under State
Department authority and are managed in country by the DOD under the
direction and supervision of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission.
Figure 1: Military Chain of Command in Iraq:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
[A] MNC-I's major subordinate commands include multinational divisions
responsible for seven different geographic areas of operations.
[B] The Gulf Regional Division is responsible for helping the Iraqi
government rebuild the country's infrastructure.
[End of figure]
MNSTC-I was established in June 2004 to assist in the development,
organization, training, equipping, and sustainment of Iraqi security
forces. MNC-I is responsible for the tactical command and control of
MNF-I operations in Iraq. MNC-I's major subordinate commands were
responsible for distributing equipment to some Iraqi security forces in
2003 and 2004.
DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Accountability
Procedures Apply to the Train-and-Equip Program for Iraq:
As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD equipment
accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program
for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq under
IRRF and ISFF but outside traditional security assistance programs,
which, according to DOD officials, allowed DOD a large degree of
flexibility in managing the program. DOD defines accountability as the
obligation imposed by law, lawful order or regulation accepted by an
organization or person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control
of property, documents or funds, with or without physical
possession.[Footnote 9] DOD officials stated that, since the funding
did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD
accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs--
including the registration of small arms transferred to foreign
governments--did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have an
order or orders comprehensively specifying accountability procedures
for equipment distributed to Iraqi military forces under the Ministry
of Defense, according to MNSTC-I officials.
According to DOD officials, because Iraq train-and-equip program
funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs,
the equipment procured with these funds was not subject to DOD
accountability regulations that normally apply in the case of these
programs. For traditional security assistance programs, DOD regulations
specify accountability procedures for storing, protecting,
transporting, and registering small arms and other sensitive items
transferred to foreign governments. For example, the Security
Assistance Management Manual, which provides guidance for traditional
security assistance programs, states that the U.S. government's
responsibility for equipment intended for transfer to a foreign
government under the Foreign Military Sales program does not cease
until the recipient government's official representative assumes final
control over the items.[Footnote 10] Other regulations referenced by
the Security Assistance Management Manual prescribe minimum standards
and criteria for the physical security of sensitive conventional arms
and require the registration of small arms transferred outside DOD
control.[Footnote 11]
During our review, DOD officials expressed differing opinions about
whether DOD regulations applied to the train-and-equip program for
Iraq. For example, we heard conflicting views on whether MNF-I must
follow the DOD regulation that requires participants to provide small
arms serial numbers to a DOD-maintained registry.[Footnote 12] Although
DOD has not specified whether this regulation applies, MNSTC-I began to
consolidate weapons' serial numbers in an electronic format in July
2006 and provide them to the DOD-maintained registry, according to
MNSTC-I officials.
Moreover, MNF-I issued two orders[Footnote 13] in 2004 to its
subordinate commands directing steps to account for all equipment
distributed to Iraqi security forces, including military and police.
Although these orders are no longer in effect and have not been
replaced,[Footnote 14] they directed coalition forces responsible for
issuing equipment to the Iraqi security forces to record the serial
numbers of all sensitive items such as weapons and radios, enter
relevant information onto a Department of the Army hand receipt, and
obtain signatures from the Iraqi security official receiving the items,
among other tasks. Army regulations state that hand receipts maintain
accountability by documenting the unit or individual that is directly
responsible for a specific item. According to a former MNSTC-I
official, hand receipts are critical to maintaining property
accountability. However, the orders did not require the consolidation
of all records for equipment distributed by the coalition to the Iraqi
security forces.
According to officials in the MNSTC-I Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate, although these orders were valid when they were issued in
2004, they are no longer in effect. In addition, these orders have not
been replaced with a comprehensive order or orders that address the
equipment distributed to Iraqi security forces, according to MNSTC-I
officials. For forces under the Ministry of Interior, MNF-I issued two
new orders in December 2005 to address the problem of limited records
for equipment distributed to Ministry of Interior forces.[Footnote 15]
Among other guidance, the orders established accountability procedures
for equipment MNC-I and MNSTC-I distribute to Ministry of Interior
forces, such as Iraqi police and national police. In addition, MNF-I
issued other orders related to some types of equipment. However,
according to MNSTC-I officials, MNF-I has not issued an order or orders
that address the accountability of all equipment distributed by
coalition forces to Iraqi military forces under the Ministry of Defense.
MNF-I Cannot Fully Account for Iraqi Forces' Receipt of Equipment:
Two factors led to DOD's lack of full accountability for the equipment
issued to Iraqi security forces (see fig. 2). First, until December
2005, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment
distributed to Iraqi security forces. Second, MNSTC-I has not
consistently collected supporting documents that confirm the dates the
equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the
Iraqi units receiving the equipment.
Figure 2: Efforts to Account for Equipment Distributed to Iraqi
Security Forces:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
[End of figure]
First, until December 2005, no centralized set of records for equipment
distributed to Iraqi security forces existed. MNSTC-I did not
consistently collect equipment distribution records as required in the
property accountability orders for several reasons. The lack of a fully
operational network to distribute the equipment, including national and
regional level distribution centers, hampered MNSTC-I's ability to
collect and maintain appropriate equipment accountability records.
According to former MNSTC-I officials, a fully operational distribution
network was not established until mid-2005, over 1 year after MNF-I
began distributing large quantities of equipment to the Iraqi security
forces. In addition, staffing weaknesses hindered the development of
property accountability procedures, according to former MNSTC-I and
other officials. For example, according to the former MNSTC-I
commander, several months passed after MNSTC-I's establishment before
the command received the needed number of staff. As a result, MNSTC-I
did not have the personnel necessary to record information on
individual items distributed to Iraqi forces. Further, according to
MNSTC-I officials, the need to rapidly equip Iraqi forces conducting
operations in a combat environment limited MNSTC-I's ability to fully
implement accountability procedures.[Footnote 16]
Our analysis of MNSTC-I's property book system[Footnote 17] indicates
that MNSTC-I does not have complete records confirming Iraqi forces'
receipt of the equipment, particularly for Iraqi military forces. MNSTC-
I established separate property books for equipment issued to Iraq's
security ministries--the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior--
beginning in late 2005. At that time, they also attempted to recover
past records. MNSTC-I officials acknowledge that the property books did
not contain records for all of the equipment distributed and that
existing records were incomplete or lacked supporting documentation. We
identified discrepancies between data reported by the former MNSTC-I
commander and MNSTC-I property book records (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Discrepancies of MNSTC-I Reports of Selected Equipment Issued
to Iraqi Security Forces, June 2004 through September 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of data reported by the former MNSTC-I property
book records.
Note: Some equipment was NATO-funded and/or Iraqi funded. However,
neither source specifies the amount and MNSTC-I officials do not know
the amount of the non-U.S.-funded equipment.
[End of figure]
Although the former MNSTC-I commander reported that about 185,000 AK-47
rifles, 170,000 pistols, 215,000 items of body armor, and 140,000
helmets were issued to Iraqi security forces as of September
2005,[Footnote 18] the MNSTC-I property books contain records for only
about 75,000 AK-47 rifles, 90,000 pistols, 80,000 items of body armor,
and 25,000 helmets.[Footnote 19] Thus, DOD and MNF-I cannot fully
account for about 110,000 AK-47 rifles, 80,000 pistols, 135,000 items
of body armor, and 115,000 helmets reported as issued to Iraqi forces
as of September 22, 2005. Our analysis of the MNSTC-I property book
records found that DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for at least
190,000 weapons reported as issued to Iraqi forces as of September 22,
2005.
The second factor leading to the lapse in accountability is MNSTC-I's
inability to consistently collect supporting documents that confirm
when the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered,
and the Iraqi units receiving the equipment. We requested and received
a sample of documents confirming equipment received by Iraqi units
during specific weeks in February, April, July, and November 2006. Due
to the limited number of these records, we cannot generalize the
information across all of MNSTC-I records. Our preliminary review of
this sample found that in the period prior to June 2006, MNSTC-I
provided only a few supporting documents confirming that Iraqi units
had received the equipment. For the period after June 2006, we found
that MNSTC-I possessed more supporting documents. According to MNSTC-I
officials who rotated in country in June 2006, the command began to
place greater emphasis on collecting documentation of Iraqi receipt of
equipment. However, MNSTC-I officials also stated that security
constraints make it difficult for them to travel within Iraq and
collect hard copies of all documentation. They depend instead on
warehouse staff to send the receipts via scanner, fax or computer.
Furthermore, the property books consist of extensive electronic
spreadsheets--the January 2007 property book records for the Ministry
of Defense contained 227 columns and 5,342 rows. Staff identify
erroneous entries through periodic manual checks and report errors to
the property book officer, according to MNSTC-I officials. Although
MNSTC-I issued a draft Standard Operating Procedures handbook to help
assigned personnel input data accurately and produce relevant reports,
these procedures require multiple steps and could lead to the
unintentional inclusion of incorrect data in calculations and reports,
making them prone to error. MNSTC-I officials acknowledged they have
identified numerous mistakes due to incorrect manual entries, which
required them to find the original documentation to reverify the data
and correct the entries. MNSTC-I officials also have acknowledged that
the spreadsheet system is an inefficient management tool given the
large size of the program, large amount of data, and limited number of
personnel available to maintain the system. MNSTC-I plans to move the
property book records from a spreadsheet system to a database
management system by summer 2007.
Conclusions:
Complete and accurate records are an essential component of a property
accountability system for equipment issued to Iraqi security forces.
However, DOD and MNF-I cannot ensure that Iraqi security forces
received the equipment as intended. DOD's and MNF-I's lack of clear and
consistent guidance contributed to partial data collection in the
field. Further, insufficient staffing, the lack of a fully developed
network to distribute the equipment, and inadequate technology have
hampered record keeping and data collection. Given DOD's request for an
additional $2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces, improving
accountability procedures can help ensure that the equipment purchased
with these funds reaches the intended recipients. In addition, adequate
accountability procedures can help MNF-I identify Iraqi forces'
legitimate equipment needs, thereby supporting the effective
development of these forces.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that U.S. funded equipment reaches the Iraqi security
forces as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following two actions:
* Determine which DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply
to the program.
* After defining the required accountability procedures, ensure that
sufficient staff, functioning distribution networks, standard operating
procedures, and proper technology are available to meet the new
requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Defense for
review and comment. We received written comments from the DOD that are
reprinted in appendix II.
DOD concurred with both of our recommendations and indicated that they
are currently reviewing policies and procedures for equipment
accountability to ensure that proper accountability is in place for the
Iraqi train-and-equip program. DOD also indicated that it is important
to ensure that proper staffing, financial management, property
distribution, information management and communications systems are in
working order.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, this report is available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable:
John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Relations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology;
This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures that
the Department of Defense (DOD) and Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
may have applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2)
assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded
equipment issued to Iraqi security forces. Our work focused on the
accountability requirements for the transportation and distribution of
U.S.-funded equipment and did not review any requirements relevant to
the procurement of this equipment. We performed our work from March
2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
To examine the laws and regulations that govern property
accountability, we reviewed the relevant legislation that has
appropriated funds to train and equip Iraqi security forces, pertinent
DOD regulations, and applicable U.S. military orders. We interviewed
officials from the Department of State and DOD, including the office of
the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Material
Readiness; Defense Security and Cooperation Agency; the Defense
Logistics Agency; Tank-automotive and Armaments Command; and Defense
Reconstruction and Support Office. We also interviewed current and
former officials from MNF-I, including Multinational Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-
I).
We reviewed MNF-I's accountability procedures for the U.S.-funded
equipment it has issued to the Iraqi security forces, and we reviewed
documentation from and interviewed current and former officials with
the U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I in Baghdad, Iraq;
Tampa, Florida; Washington, D.C; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. To
provide our analysis on the amount of equipment reported by MNF-I as
issued to the Iraqi security forces, we interviewed key officials to
gain an understanding of the MNSTC-I property book data and information
reported by the former MNSTC-I commander. To assess the reliability of
the former MNSTC-I commander's data, we compared the data to classified
information and interviewed former MNSTC-I officials about their
procedures for collecting the data. Although we could not fully
determine the reliability and accuracy of these data, we determined
that they were sufficiently reliable to make broad comparisons against
the MNSTC-I property books and to assess major discrepancies between
the two reports. In assessing the documents supporting the January 2007
MNSTC-I property books, we were limited by MNSTC-I's inability to scan
large amounts of these supporting paper documents and provide them to
us electronically. We obtained a sample by requesting supporting
documents for 1 week in each of the following months--February, April,
July, and November of 2006 (a month in every quarter)--to develop a
judgmental sample.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense;
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2400 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400:
International Security Affairs:
July 19, 2007:
Mr. Joseph Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
The following are the Department of Defense's (DoD's) comments on the
GAO draft report 07-711, "Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-
Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces," dated May 30, 2007
(GAO Code 320411). DoD's comments are directed to the Draft Report's
two recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
"determine which DoD accountability procedures apply or should apply to
the program to ensure that U.S. funded equipment reaches Iraqi Security
Forces as intended."
DoD concurs. In view of the matters raised in the GAO report, DoD is
reviewing policies and procedures to ensure U.S. funded equipment
reaches the intended Iraqi Security Forces under the Iraq
program.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense,
"after defining the required accountability procedures, ensure that
sufficient staff, functioning distribution networks, and proper
technology are available to meet the new
requirements."
DoD concurs. In addition to ensuring proper staffing, it is important
that DoD's accountability, financial management, property distribution,
and information management and communications processes and systems be
in working order and available to trained
logisticians.
DoD's key agency supporting the program for Iraq, the Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq, has established and improved upon the
accountability processes and systems originally developed to address
the unique operational environment in Iraq. These processes and systems
are used to account for, manage, and distribute property, regardless of
whether the property is to be granted, leased, or sold to the Ministry
of Defense (MoD) or the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
These systems should be continuously improved upon, and the refined and
improved processes should be documented in standing operating
procedures and guidelines in order to support the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) in confronting the challenges of the operational environment.
Steps are being taken to incorporate features fully into a proper
accountability system. Such measures include implementing increased
supervisory checks, balances and physical security redundancies,
internal control monitoring, issuance of standing operating procedures,
introduction of suitable automated tools, and collaboration with other
DoD organizations on accountability-related issues. DoD subordinate
organizations also continue to engage in documenting historical data on
equipment transferred to the MoD and MoI early in the
program.
DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment. If you have questions or if
there is additional information that we may provide, please let me
know.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mark T. Kimmitt:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for the Middle East:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments;
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] This amount includes funds from the Iraq Security Forces Fund only.
The $2.8 billion figure is current as of March 2007. For the Iraq
Reconstruction and Relief Fund, DOD does not report funds for Iraqi
forces' equipment as a separate line item.
[2] The Coalition Provisional Authority was the U.N.-recognized
authority led by the United States and the United Kingdom that was
responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq. Multinational Force-
Iraq was known as Combined Joint Task Force-7 until May 2004.
[3] DOD defines accountability as the obligation imposed by law, lawful
order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping
accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or funds,
with or without physical possession (DODI 5000.64, Accountability and
Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property, E2.2).
[4] Property books as defined by MNSTC-I differ from official property
books as defined by the U.S. Army. MNSTC-I officials stated that the
property books are asset visibility tools.
[5] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audit Approach
and Findings, GAO-07-385T (Washington, D.C.) Jan. 18, 2007); Securing,
Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.) Jan. 9, 2007); and
Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T
(Washington, D.C.) Sept. 11, 2006).
[6] See the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and
for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, P.L. 108-106;
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13; Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, P.L. 109-234; Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2007, P.L. 109-289, and U.S. Troops Readiness,
Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007,
P.L. 110-28.
[7] Data current as of March 4, 2007.
[8] The Gulf Regional Division of the Army Corps of Engineers prepares
DOD's reports on IRRF funding.
[9] See DODI 5000.64, Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned
Equipment and Other Accountable Property, E2.2.
[10] See DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, C7.5.
The Foreign Military Sales program is a traditional security assistance
program under which eligible recipient governments purchase from the
U.S. government defense articles, services, or training. In the latter
part of 2006, Iraq signed a foreign military sales agreement with the
United States that allows Iraq to use Iraqi funds to procure U.S.
defense goods and services. Such foreign military sales are subject to
specific DOD accountability regulations.
[11] DOD 5100.76-M, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms,
Ammunition, and Explosives, C1.1.1; DOD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics
Management System, C18.7.4.3; and DOD 4000.25-2-M, Military Standard
Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures, C12.7.4.3.
[12] DOD 4000.25-2-M, Military Standard Transaction Reporting and
Accounting Procedures, C12.7.4.3; and DOD 4000.25-M Defense Logistics
Management System, C18.7.4.3.
[13] MNF-I Directive 04-015, OST Supply and Equipment Distribution
Guidance (May 2004): MNC-I FRAGO 155 [12 June 2004 DTU] to MNC-I OPORD
04-01, Iraqi Security Force Property Accountability Requirements (June
2004). In March 2004, MNF-I's predecessor, the Combined Joint Task
Force-7, also issued an order requiring property accountability
procedures for an element of the Iraqi security forces. CJTF-7 FRAGO
447, ICDC Property Accountability, to CJTF-7 OPORD 04-01.
[14] MNF-I officials could not provide us with the exact date that the
orders ceased to be in effect because that information was lost during
a computer failure. However, they did confirm that by November 2005 the
orders were no longer in effect. According to former and current MNSTC-
I officials, these orders covered equipment that MNF-I issued to Iraqi
forces that was provided by a variety of sources, including the United
States, Iraq, and other coalition countries, as well as weapons
captured and redistributed to Iraqi forces since the start of Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
[15] MNF-I FRAGO 05-411, Material Accountability System for Minister of
Interior (MOI) Civil Security Forces, (Dec. 21, 2005). MNF-I FRAGO 05-
401, Pacing Item Equipment Accountability Support From MNC-I (Dec. 18,
2005).
[16] See GAO-07-308SP for more information on these problems.
[17] We reviewed MNSTC-I property book records as of January 2007.
MNSTC-I maintains its book records in an electronic spreadsheet format.
[18] To assess the reliability of the former MNSTC-I commander's data,
we compared the data to classified information and interviewed former
MNSTC-I officials about their procedures for collecting the data.
Although we could not fully determine the reliability and accuracy of
these data, we determined that they were sufficiently reliable to make
broad comparisons against the MNSTC-I property books.
[19] These numbers incorporate records MNSTC-I recovered from earlier
phases of the train-and-equip program for Iraq.
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