Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-07-836 July 11, 2007Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing in many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the growing demand for ISR assets to support the warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing operations while optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, this report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and (2) DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters' needs. To perform this work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and interviewed DOD officials, including those supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not address coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them to ongoing operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD addresses the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations and may exacerbate integration challenges such as limited bandwidth. DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness of all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on how assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions they've been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings. This lack of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism for tracking the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets are supporting or how they are being used. Without an approach to allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for considering all ISR capabilities, DOD may be unable to fully leverage all available ISR assets and optimize their use. DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback to ensure the warfighter's needs were met. Although the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR has been tasked with developing ISR metrics, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus captured. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not capture all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD to develop additional quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but no DOD-wide milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of the results of joint operations; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring due to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without metrics and feedback, DOD may not be able to validate how well the warfighters' needs are being met, whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or which new systems would best support warfighting needs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-836, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities
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GAO:
July 2007:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize
Capabilities:
GAO-07-836:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-836, a report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as
high on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is
investing in many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS), to meet the growing demand for ISR assets to support the
warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD‘s efforts to integrate UAS
into ongoing operations while optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets.
Specifically, this report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken
steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and
(2) DOD‘s approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers
all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO
also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR
assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters‘ needs. To perform this
work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and
interviewed DOD officials, including those supporting ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found:
DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of
UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to
coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed
guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of
Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not
address coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them
to ongoing operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a
critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD
addresses the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue
to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets
into combat operations and may exacerbate integration challenges such
as limited bandwidth.
DOD‘s approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS,
hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does
not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command
charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be
allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness
of all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for
obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for
coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on
how assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions
they‘ve been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information
on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are
being tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings.
This lack of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism
for tracking the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets
are supporting or how they are being used. Without an approach to
allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for considering all
ISR capabilities, DOD may be unable to fully leverage all available ISR
assets and optimize their use.
DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets
because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently
receive feedback to ensure the warfighter‘s needs were met. Although
the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR has been tasked with
developing ISR metrics, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with
limited quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned
versus captured. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials
acknowledge that the current metrics do not capture all of the
qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset
effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR
missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD to develop additional
quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but no DOD-wide
milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for
an evaluation of the results of joint operations; however, DOD
officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring
due to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without metrics and
feedback, DOD may not be able to validate how well the warfighters‘
needs are being met, whether it is optimizing the use of existing
assets, or which new systems would best support warfighting needs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending actions to improve DOD‘s ability to coordinate the
deployment of its UAS and other ISR assets, consider the availability
of all ISR assets in allocating and tasking them, and evaluate the
performance of its ISR assets. DOD generally concurred with our
recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[end of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further
Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges:
DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does
Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets:
DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the
Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter's Needs Are Met:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: Central Command:
CONOPS: concept of operations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
JFACC: Joint Force Air Component Commander:
JFCC-ISR: Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
UAS: unmanned aircraft systems:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 11, 2007:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jim Saxton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being
transformed by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR),
and strike capabilities, some of which have been achieved through the
use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide early
warning of enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable
U.S. military forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and
lethality. ISR data can come from a variety of sources, including
surveillance and reconnaissance systems such as satellites; manned
aircraft like the U-2; unmanned aircraft systems like the Air Force's
Global Hawk and Predator and the Army's Hunter; other ground, air, sea,
or space-based equipment; and human intelligence teams.
Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations are supported by
the Department of Defense's (DOD) ISR assets, including theater-level
ISR assets that are generally used to support combatant commander ISR
priorities, tactical ISR assets that are generally used to support
operational units including conventional and special operations forces,
and assets acquired by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization to aid in the identification and elimination of improvised
explosive devices. Additionally, combatant commanders receive support
from ISR assets controlled by U.S. intelligence agencies such as the
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. U.S. allies also provide ISR
assets to support ongoing combat operations.
Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the
information they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that
is reflected in DOD's planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR
assets at every level of command is growing, and DOD is making
investments in a number of ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft
systems, manned platforms, and space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial
systems. Specifically, for UAS, funding has increased from $363 million
in fiscal year 2001 to $2.23 billion in fiscal year 2007, and DOD has
requested $2.54 billion for fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 1] As of
February 2007, DOD had more than 3,900 unmanned aircraft in its
inventory[Footnote 2] compared to fewer than 50 in 2000. The majority
of these aircraft are currently being used in support of ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In December 2005, we reported that while commanders are experiencing
mission success with UAS in ongoing operations, they face challenges in
fully optimizing the use of these assets, due in part to the growing
number of UAS.[Footnote 3] Specifically, we reported that DOD had
achieved operational successes with UAS, but challenges such as
interoperability and limited communications bandwidth were hampering
joint operations or preventing timely UAS deployment. Additionally, in
April 2006, we testified that while DOD continues to request funds to
support service plans for acquiring UAS, it lacks a viable strategic
plan to guide UAS development and investment decisions.[Footnote 4]
You asked us to review DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing
combat operations while optimizing the capabilities offered by all DOD
ISR assets. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD has
taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat
operations; and (2) DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR
assets considers all available ISR capabilities, including those
provided by UAS. We are also providing information on the extent to
which DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including UAS,
in meeting the warfighters' needs.
To address our objectives, we reviewed DOD and military service
publications and documentation pertaining to ISR, including those
specific to UAS such as joint publications, concepts of operations,
manuals on tactics and procedures, and the 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap. We
also interviewed officials from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning
Task Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of the
military services; U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and associated Army
and Air Force component commands; and the Joint Functional Component
Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR).
Further, we reviewed documentation, such as joint publications and
briefings that explain the process for tasking ISR assets, and
interviewed officials at CENTCOM to better understand how ISR assets
are assigned to specific missions. Additionally, we discussed the use
of UAS in military operations with Combined Air Operations Center
officials in Qatar and units that recently returned from or are
currently supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To
understand how requests for ISR support are generated and satisfied at
the tactical level, we spoke with units that recently returned from, or
are currently supporting, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as
well as units within the services such as the Marine Corps' Tactical
Fusion Center that are involved in determining if tactical assets are
available to satisfy those requests or if the requests need to be
forwarded for theater-level support. We performed our work from June
2006 to June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. More details on our scope and methodology are
presented at appendix I.
In addition to this report, we recently issued a report that discussed
whether DOD is acquiring its ISR assets in the most efficient manner.
We are also conducting work for the committee examining how DOD
determines its requirements for ISR systems and expect to report on
this work early next year.
Results in Brief:
DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of
UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully
coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical
Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of
Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.[Footnote 5] This guidance
represents an important first step for the use of UAS in combat
operations and DOD officials acknowledge these documents will continue
to evolve as DOD learns more about the capabilities of UAS and other
ISR assets and their application in combat operations. However, the
guidance does not address, on a DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance
coordination, which CENTCOM has recognized is a critical factor in
integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient deployment
and utilization of assets and by allowing the combatant commander time
to plan to support incoming assets. In the absence of such guidance,
CENTCOM has established procedures for the services to coordinate
system requirements prior to ISR assets arriving into CENTCOM's theater
of operations. These procedures apply only to CENTCOM's theater of
operations. However, we found that CENTCOM's procedures for advance
coordination were not always followed because the services indicated
that they were not aware of the requirement. According to CENTCOM
officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM's
service components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command, but were not aware if they were distributed
further, and the service officials we interviewed were not aware of the
requirement. As a result of this lack of advance coordination, CENTCOM
is not always aware, on a timely basis, of assets entering theater,
which can potentially exacerbate existing operational challenges such
as limited interoperability and communications bandwidth. While this
example is limited to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to
establish operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-
wide procedure for advance coordination is critical to enable DOD to
quickly support UAS and other ISR assets once deployed to support these
operations. Until DOD takes steps to address the need for DOD-wide
advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in
successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat
operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges such as
the lack of interoperability and limited bandwidth. Therefore, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
service secretaries and combatant commanders, establish DOD-wide
requirements for coordination in advance of introducing ISR assets into
theater; develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout
DOD; and establish a mechanism to ensure the services comply with these
requirements. DOD generally concurred with this recommendation. DOD
noted that it currently has a well-defined process to coordinate with
the combatant commanders on the introduction of UAS into theater and
cited several examples including the annual process for allocating
theater-level UAS, and actions between stateside units and units in
theater to plan for deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however,
acknowledged that a more standardized method could improve efficiency
of the coordination process and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process and
evaluate and provide direction for an improved coordination process.
Further, DOD noted that, based on this evaluation, if direction is
required, it will be issued via a Chairman's directive which is
mandatory and therefore establishes the mechanism that ensures
compliance. We recognize that DOD has various processes related to UAS
but note that none, including the examples cited by DOD, represent a
standardized, DOD-wide approach that the services and combatant
commanders can follow in coordinating the specific details of deploying
UAS assets, regardless of geographic area. Furthermore, we believe that
a directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure
compliance, and would encourage DOD to include provisions detailing how
implementation of the directive will be monitored.
DOD's current approach to allocating and tasking DOD's ISR assets,
including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of DOD's ISR
assets because it does not consider the availability of all ISR assets
in determining how best to meet warfighting needs. The Joint Functional
Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(JFCC-ISR), which is charged with recommending to the Secretary of
Defense how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support
the operational requirements of combatant commanders, has an awareness
of, or visibility into, most DOD ISR assets, but it does not have an
awareness of all ISR assets available to support the combatant
commanders, such as assets that are owned and controlled by U.S.
national intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency or
by our allies supporting ongoing operations. According to JFCC-ISR
officials, although they are working to gain better visibility over all
ISR assets, they currently do not have this level of visibility. DOD
does not currently have a mechanism for obtaining information on all
ISR assets, including all DOD, national, and allied assets, operating
in each of the combatant commanders' area of operations. Absent a
mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn more about the
capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building relationships with other
national and allied intelligence agencies and addressing limitations
related to intelligence agency system access. Similarly, during ongoing
operations, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), who is
responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air
operations, does not have information on how tactical assets embedded
in and controlled by tactical units are being used on a daily basis or
what missions they have been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units
have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in
other units are being tasked. DOD does not currently have a mechanism
for tracking the missions both theater and tactical-level ISR assets
are supporting or how they are being used on a daily basis. This lack
of visibility at all levels into how ISR assets are being tasked could
result in unnecessary duplicative taskings and limit DOD's ability to
leverage all available ISR assets. DOD recognizes the opportunity to
better plan for and control its ISR assets and has initiated a study to
assess this, but this study is not expected to be completed until
August or September 2007. Without an approach to its allocation and
tasking processes that considers all ISR capabilities, DOD may not be
in a sound position to fully leverage all the capabilities of available
ISR assets and to optimize the use of those assets, and therefore
cannot be assured that it is addressing warfighter needs in the most
efficient and effective manner. To provide greater visibility into the
availability and use of ISR assets, including UAS, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism to gain information
on all available ISR capabilities, where they are operating, and how
they are being used. DOD generally concurred with this recommendation.
DOD agreed that a mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets
is needed and commented that work is underway to develop such a
mechanism. DOD also stated that it is not currently practical to
provide situational awareness on some UAS, such as the small, hand-
launched UAS at the lowest operational level because of technological
limitations. It noted it will determine the operational levels that
will provide widespread situational awareness. We recognize that
obtaining situational awareness may not currently be practical for some
UAS but would encourage the department to seek to maximize coverage in
exploring options for improved situational awareness.
DOD is unable to fully evaluate the success of its ISR missions because
it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive
feedback from operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the
warfighter's needs were met. Although the JFCC-ISR has been tasked with
developing metrics and standards of performance to assess DOD ISR
mission accomplishment, DOD evaluates its ISR missions with limited
quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the
number of targets collected. While these metrics are a good start, DOD
officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not take into account
all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR
asset effectiveness, such as the cumulative knowledge provided by
numerous ISR missions, or provide insight on how the intelligence
collected contributed toward accomplishment of the mission. JFCC-ISR is
working with the combatant commanders to develop additional
quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to evaluate the
performance of ISR collection assets, but no DOD-wide milestones have
been established. Milestones would include the required steps and
planned dates for completion of those steps leading up to metrics
development. Furthermore, Joint Publication 2-01 calls for intelligence
personnel and consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on
how well intelligence operations perform to meet commander's
intelligence requirements; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this
feedback is not consistently occurring due, mainly, to the fast pace of
operations in theater. Without feedback and metrics for evaluating ISR
assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how well the
warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and
whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or which new
systems DOD should acquire in order to best support warfighting needs.
To improve DOD's ability to evaluate the effectiveness of its ISR
missions, we recommend DOD establish DOD-wide milestones for metrics
development, develop a process for systematically capturing feedback on
how effective ISR assets are in meeting warfighter requirements and
consider this information when making ISR acquisition, allocation, and
tasking decisions. DOD generally concurred with this recommendation.
DOD agreed milestones for development of ISR metrics should be
established, but pointed out that organizations within the department
collect feedback or conduct lessons learned studies. While the feedback
captured by those organizations is noteworthy, it is often not
immediate or specific to individual missions. DOD further commented
that it has mechanisms in place to inform its decision-making processes
on the acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets such as
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System which
assesses, among other things, capability gaps and solutions. We agree
that the mechanisms mentioned in DOD's response exist; however, DOD
currently does not have sufficient qualitative and quantitative metrics
needed to collect data on UAS performance nor does it have a means for
incorporating such data into the processes currently used to make
decisions on ISR assets.
Background:
UAS represent one of many DOD airborne ISR assets available to support
ongoing combat operations. Unmanned aircraft are deployed and
controlled at different levels of command and can be categorized into
three main classes: man-portable, tactical, and theater. Table 1
illustrates examples of UAS in each category. Man-portable UAS are
small, self-contained, and portable and are generally used to support
the small ground combat teams in the field. Tactical UAS are larger
systems that are generally used to support operational units at
tactical levels of command such as the battalion or brigade. Tactical
UAS are locally operated and controlled by the units. Theater UAS are
operated and controlled by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander
(JFACC) and are generally used to support combatant commander ISR
priorities, although in certain circumstances they can be assigned to
support tactical operations, such as when troops are being fired on.
Theater UAS traditionally have been more capable than tactical or man-
portable systems. For example, theater UAS typically contain
characteristics that make them more capable than other categories of
UAS, such as their more robust communications architecture and more
capable payloads that allow for production of more diverse intelligence
data products. However, some tactical systems, such as the Army's
Warrior UAS, are being developed that are capable of performing theater-
level requirements and, as currently envisioned, will be embedded in
and controlled at the tactical level by units.
Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics:
Man-portable UAS.
Dragon Eye;
Maximum altitude (feet): 500 AGL[B];
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 1.
Raven;
Maximum altitude (feet): 1,000 AGL;
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 1.
Tactical UAS.
Hunter;
Maximum altitude (feet): 15,000 MSL[C];
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 8-9.
Shadow;
Maximum altitude (feet): 15,000 MSL;
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 5.
ERMP (Warrior);
Maximum altitude (feet): 29,000 MSL;
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 36.
Theater UAS.
Predator;
Maximum altitude (feet): 26,000 MSL;
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 20.
Global Hawk;
Maximum altitude (feet): 60,000 MSL;
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 28.
Source: DOD.
[A] Endurance equals total time from takeoff to landing.
[B] AGL is feet above ground level.
[C] MSL is feet above mean sea level.
[End of table]
DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available DOD
theater-level airborne ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant
commanders. The allocation process is managed by U.S. Strategic
Command's Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). In 2003, DOD altered its
unified command plan to give U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for
planning, integrating, and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and
global operations. To execute this responsibility, U.S. Strategic
Command established the JFCC-ISR in March 2005. The JFCC-ISR is charged
with recommending to the Secretary of Defense how DOD's theater-level
ISR assets should be allocated, or distributed, among combatant
commanders and for the integration and synchronization of DOD,
national, and allied ISR capabilities and collection efforts.
Once DOD's ISR assets are allocated to the combatant commanders, they
are available to be assigned or tasked based on combatant commander
priorities against specific missions in support of ongoing operations.
Authority for tasking ISR assets, including UAS, is generally
determined by the level of the objective the asset is deployed to
support and the command level of the unit that controls the asset.
Therefore, most theater-level UAS assets that are controlled and tasked
by the JFACC are generally used to support theater-level objectives and
priorities, as established by the combatant commander. Most tactical
UAS assets controlled by the services or the U.S. Special Operations
Command are used to support tactical objectives and priorities, which
may differ from theater-level priorities. For example, authority to
task the Army's Hunter resides with the commander of the unit in which
it is embedded, whereas authority for tasking the Air Force's Predator
resides with the JFACC.
In August 2005 DOD issued its current UAS Roadmap which was developed
to assist DOD in developing a long-range strategy for UAS development,
acquisition, and other planning efforts as well as to guide industry in
developing UAS related technology. According to DOD officials, DOD is
in the process of developing an update to this Roadmap and expects to
issue the updated version in late summer 2007. The UAS Roadmap is
intended to guide UAS planning; however, it does address limited
operational aspects such as operational issues or challenges that have
emerged as a result of operating UAS in support of ongoing operations.
For example, the Roadmap acknowledges that the limited number of
bandwidth frequencies constrains DOD's ability to operate multiple
unmanned aircraft simultaneously.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further
Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges:
DOD components have developed guidance--such as a Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for UAS--to
facilitate UAS integration. However, DOD continues to face UAS
integration challenges, such as the lack of interoperability and
limited communications bandwidth. These challenges may be exacerbated
because DOD has not established DOD-wide advance coordination
procedures for integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD takes
steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may
continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS into combat
operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges.
DOD Has Developed Guidance to Facilitate the Integration of UAS:
DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of
UAS into combat operations. For example, in August 2006 DOD issued its
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical
Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This document was designed to
serve as a planning, coordination, and reference guide for the services
and provides a framework for warfighters employing UAS. Furthermore, in
March 2007 DOD issued its Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, which provides overarching principles, a discussion
of UAS capabilities, operational views, and a discussion of UAS use in
various operational scenarios. Each of the above documents represent an
important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations, and DOD
officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD
learns more about the capabilities of UAS and their application in
combat operations.
DOD Continues to Face UAS Integration Challenges:
DOD continues to face challenges, such as interoperability and
communications bandwidth, in integrating UAS into combat operations. In
December 2005 we reported that challenges such as the lack of
interoperability and limited communications bandwidth have emerged to
hamper recent joint operations or prevent timely UAS
employment.[Footnote 6] Specifically, some UAS cannot easily exchange
data, sometimes even within a single service, because they were not
designed with interoperable communications standards. Additionally, as
we previously reported, U.S. forces are unable to interchangeably use
some payloads from one type of UAS on another, a capability known as
"payload commonality." Furthermore, electromagnetic spectrum
frequencies, often referred to as bandwidth, are congested by a large
number of UAS and other weapons or communications systems using the
same frequency simultaneously. While some UAS can change to different,
less congested, frequency bands, most UAS were built without the
ability to change frequency bands. Thus, commanders have had to delay
certain missions until frequency congestion cleared. DOD is taking
steps to address these challenges such as equipping UAS with the
Tactical Common Data Link[Footnote 7] and, according to DOD officials,
it is developing common ground control stations to improve
interoperability of its UAS.
Lack of DOD-wide Advance Coordination May Exacerbate Integration
Challenges of UAS and Other ISR Assets:
Existing UAS integration challenges may be exacerbated because DOD has
not established DOD-wide advance coordination procedures for
integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations.
Specifically, DOD officials indicate that assets arriving in theater
without advance coordination may exacerbate UAS integration challenges,
such as further taxing the limited available bandwidth. As additional
ISR assets are rapidly acquired and fielded to meet the increasing
demand for ISR support in ongoing operations, CENTCOM has recognized
that advance coordination is a critical factor in integrating UAS into
combat operations by enabling efficient deployment of assets and
effective utilization of them once they are in theater. Furthermore,
advance knowledge of system requirements is crucial to allow the
combatant commander sufficient time to adequately plan to support
incoming assets. DOD officials acknowledge that having to incorporate
assets quickly into the theater infrastructure creates additional
challenges and further emphasizes the need for advance coordination.
In response to this issue, CENTCOM has developed procedures to ensure
the services coordinate their plans prior to deploying UAS to CENTCOM's
theater of operations. In May 2005 CENTCOM established the Concept of
Operations for Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, which states
that when a full-motion video-capable asset[Footnote 8] or weapons
system is scheduled for deployment to CENTCOM's theater of operations,
the controlling unit will notify CENTCOM of the deployment no later
than 30 days prior to arrival of the asset in theater. It also states
that the controlling unit will provide a system and platform concept of
operations to CENTCOM no later than 15 days prior to the asset's
arrival. According to CENTCOM officials, they distributed these
procedures to each of CENTCOM's service components, such as Central
Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. However, they
were unaware if the procedures were distributed further to the
services, and service officials we interviewed, including those at the
service Headquarters as well as those stationed within units returning
from ongoing operations, indicated they were not aware of the
requirement. CENTCOM officials indicate that the procedures have not
always been followed.
The Warrior Alpha, which was fielded by the Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization and operated by the Army to aid in the
identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices,
illustrates why this advance coordination is so critical. As a result
of coordinating with CENTCOM, the Army was made aware of limitations
such as bandwidth and limited ramp space and decided to deploy the
Warrior Alpha to an alternate location. While CENTCOM and Army
officials disagree on whether the coordination was completed in a
timely manner, all agree it was ultimately completed. While this
example is limited to CENTCOM's area of operations, the potential
exists for DOD to have to quickly establish operations in other areas
of the world, which makes the need for advance coordination even more
critical.
CENTCOM officials acknowledge the need for advance coordination for all
ISR assets entering CENTCOM's theater of operations, not just those
assets that are capable of full-motion video. To address this need,
CENTCOM developed in November 2006 an ISR Systems Concept of Operations
Standardization Memo. CENTCOM officials stated that the ISR memo is
intended to provide CENTCOM with awareness of what assets are coming
into theater and to allow CENTCOM to ensure the asset is able to be
incorporated into the existing infrastructure, given operational
challenges such as limited communications bandwidth. This memo requires
the inclusion of certain elements in all ISR system concepts of
operations, including how the asset will be tasked; how intelligence
will be processed, exploited, and disseminated; and system bandwidth
requirements that must be coordinated with CENTCOM prior to deployment
of ISR assets.
This ISR memo applies only to CENTCOM's theater of operations and does
not constitute DOD-wide guidance. While the Warrior Alpha example is
limited to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to establish
operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide
procedure for advance coordination would be critical for quickly
supporting UAS and other ISR assets once deployed. Until DOD takes
steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be
unable to successfully integrate UAS and other ISR assets into combat
operations and existing integration challenges may be exacerbated.
DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does
Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets:
DOD's current approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets,
including UAS, does not consider the capabilities of all ISR assets
because it lacks an awareness or visibility over all ISR capabilities
available to support the combatant commanders and how DOD ISR assets
are being used, which hinders DOD's ability to optimize the use of its
assets. Although DOD has established a process for allocating available
DOD ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant commanders to meet
their needs, it does not have an awareness of all ISR assets, which
impairs its ability to distribute or allocate DOD assets while
considering the capabilities of all ISR assets. Additionally, DOD's
process for tasking its ISR assets does not currently allow for
information at all levels into how DOD's ISR assets are being used on a
daily basis, which hinders its ability to leverage other assets
operating in an area and to avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings.
Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that
considers all ISR capabilities, DOD is not in a sound position to fully
leverage all the capabilities of available ISR assets and to optimize
the use of those assets, and therefore cannot be assured that it is
addressing warfighter needs in the most efficient and effective manner.
DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR
assets and has initiated a study to examine the issue.
DOD Does Not Have Visibility over All ISR Assets Available to Meet the
Warfighters' Needs:
Although DOD has established a process for allocating available DOD ISR
assets to the combatant commanders to meet the warfighters' needs, it
does not have an awareness or visibility over the total number and
types of ISR assets available to support combatant commanders or the
capabilities represented by those assets. DOD uses an annual process
for allocating or distributing its available ISR assets, including UAS,
to the combatant commanders to meet theater-level needs. That process
is managed by U.S. Strategic Command's JFCC-ISR, which is tasked with
making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to
allocate DOD ISR resources for theater use across the combatant
commands and ensuring the integration and synchronization of DOD,
national, and allied ISR capabilities and collection efforts. DOD
officials indicate that annual allocation levels are constrained by the
number of ISR assets in DOD's inventory and believe that JFCC-ISR is,
therefore, not able to allocate to the combatant commanders ISR assets
in sufficient numbers to meet all requests for ISR support. However,
our work suggests that additional information is needed to assess the
true demand for ISR assets and the best way to meet this demand.
Specifically, JFCC-ISR's ability to fulfill its mission of integrating
DOD, national, and allied partner ISR capabilities and making
recommendations on how best to allocate ISR assets to support the
warfighter depends, in part, on the extent to which it has awareness
and visibility over all ISR assets, including DOD, national, and allied
ISR assets. JFCC-ISR does not have complete visibility into all assets
that could be used to support combatant commanders' needs, which
hinders its ability to optimally distribute or allocate DOD ISR assets.
JFCC-ISR officials estimate it has 80-90 percent visibility into DOD
ISR assets but does not have the same level of visibility into other
national and allied ISR assets available to support theater-level
requirements, such as assets that are owned and controlled by U.S.
national intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency or
by our allies supporting ongoing operations. According to JFCC-ISR
officials, although they are working to gain better visibility over all
ISR assets, they currently do not have this level of visibility because
DOD does not currently have a mechanism for obtaining information on
all ISR assets--including all DOD, national, and allied assets--
operating in each of the combatant commanders' area of operations.
Absent such a mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn more about
the capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building relationships with
other national and allied intelligence agencies and addressing
limitations related to intelligence agency system access. Without an
approach to its allocation process that considers all available ISR
capabilities, JFCC-ISR does not have all the information it needs to
leverage the capabilities of all available ISR assets and to optimize
the allocation of DOD's ISR assets.
DOD Does Not Have Visibility over the Tasking of All DOD Airborne ISR
Assets, Including UAS:
DOD's process for tasking its airborne ISR assets, including UAS, does
not provide for visibility at all levels into how DOD airborne ISR
assets are being used on a daily basis. Once DOD ISR assets have been
allocated, those assets are available to the combatant commanders to be
assigned, or tasked, against specific requests for ISR support in
ongoing operations. The JFACC is responsible for planning,
coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations to focus the effect
of air capabilities and for assuring their effective and efficient use
in achieving the combatant commanders' objectives. However, while the
JFACC has visibility into how all theater-level ISR assets, like the
Air Force's Predator, are being used, he or she does not have
visibility into how tactical ISR assets, such as the Army's Hunter, are
being used on a daily basis or what missions they are supporting. The
JFACC generally tasks assets that support theater-level objectives,
while assets that support tactical-level objectives are tasked and
controlled by the services or by the U.S. Special Operations Command.
Tactical units utilize their embedded, or tactical, assets first to
satisfy unit intelligence needs. However, when tactical assets are not
available or capable of satisfying a unit's need for ISR support, the
unit requests theater-level ISR support. Requests for most theater-
level assets are entered into a central DOD database, but there is no
similar database that captures requests for tactical-level assets.
While there are procedures, such as the Air Tasking Order and Airspace
Control Order, for tracking where theater-and tactical-level assets are
operating for airspace control and deconfliction purposes, a comparable
mechanism for tracking the missions these assets are supporting or how
they are being used on a daily basis does not exist. For example, the
Air Tasking Order would track the time, date, and location where a UAS
was operating, but there is no mechanism that would track what
intelligence the UAS was supposed to gather on a mission or why the UAS
was being used on a mission. Without a database or similar mechanism
providing visibility into how tactical-level assets are being tasked,
the JFACC is limited in his or her awareness of how those assets are
being used on a daily basis, which hinders the JFACC's ability to
optimize the use of those assets.
This lack of visibility limits the JFACC's ability to leverage those
assets using techniques such as cross-cueing, which is the
collaborative effort of using capabilities offered by multiple ISR
platforms to fulfill a mission. By using techniques such as cross-
cueing, the JFACC has been able to use the different types of
capabilities brought by different theater-level manned and unmanned ISR
assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For example, a manned
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System was tasked to monitor an
area. When this system sensed movement in the area, a Predator was then
tasked to collect imagery to confirm suspected activity. Without
visibility into how tactical assets are being utilized, the JFACC is
limited in his or her ability to optimize the use of all available DOD
ISR assets and to focus the effect of these assets to ensure their
efficient and effective use. Such visibility will become even more
important given that services such as the Army are acquiring, and
planning to embed in units, ISR assets capable of satisfying theater-
level requirements, such as the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose or Warrior
UAS, which could otherwise be leveraged to support JFACC requirements.
Duplicative taskings that occur are often driven by a lack of
visibility into where ISR assets at all levels are operating and what
they are tasked to do. For example, a DOD official shared with us an
example of unnecessary duplication where an Army unit requested a full-
motion video-capable asset to support a high-priority requirement. When
the asset, a Predator UAS, arrived to support the requirement, its
operator realized the Army unit had also tasked one of its tactical
assets, a Hunter UAS, against the requirement. As a result of the lack
of visibility over all assets, the potential exists for multiple ISR
aircraft to be tasked to operate in the same area and against the same
requirement. However, some level of duplication may be necessary when
driven by mission requirements and system capabilities. Certain
missions, such as special operations, often need a certain amount of
duplication in order to achieve the desired result. For example, a
mission intended to track activity of suspected terrorists may require
multiple systems to follow identified individuals who flee the scene in
different directions. Furthermore, assets such as the Predator UAS
experience system limitations when equipped with a full-motion-video
sensor in that they are only able to provide surveillance of a narrow
or "soda straw" view. A certain level of duplication of UAS may be
necessary to support a mission to obtain a complete view of the area
under surveillance.
Greater visibility at the tactical level could provide units with a
greater awareness of where other ISR assets, including both theater-
level and those assets embedded in other units, are operating and what
they are being used to do. A mechanism that provides this visibility
would allow tactical units, when appropriate,[Footnote 9] to leverage
other assets operating in their area to optimize the information
captured and avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings.
DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR
assets and has initiated a Persistent ISR Capabilities Based Assessment
Study. The study, sponsored by the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board, focuses on what other actions such as better
planning, direction, command and control, and better fusion and
exploitation of information can provide the warfighter with more
persistent surveillance capability. The study is expected to be
completed in the August-September 2007 time frame.
DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the
Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter's Needs Are Met:
DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets
because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently
receive feedback from operators and intelligence personnel to ensure
the warfighter's needs are met. Specifically, although JFCC-ISR is
tasked with developing metrics and standards of performance to measure
the success of DOD ISR missions, existing metrics are limited and no
DOD-wide milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD officials
acknowledged that they do not consistently receive feedback from
operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the warfighter's needs
are met. Without feedback and a complete set of metrics for evaluating
its ISR assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how
well the warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR
assets, and whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or to
acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs.
DOD Is Developing Metrics to Measure Success of Its ISR Assets, but
Progress Has Been Limited and DOD Has Not Established Milestones:
DOD is working to develop additional quantitative ISR metrics as well
as qualitative metrics to measure the success of its ISR assets, but
existing quantitative metrics are limited and no milestones have been
established. The JFCC-ISR is tasked with developing metrics and
standards of performance to assess DOD ISR mission accomplishment.
Moreover, we recommended in a December 2005 report[Footnote 10] that
DOD ensure its performance measurement systems measure how effectively
UAS perform their missions, identify performance indicator information
that needs to be collected, and systematically collect identified
performance information. We continue to believe this recommendation has
merit, and DOD officials agree that metrics are needed not only for
UAS, but for all ISR missions. However, DOD currently assesses its ISR
missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the number of
targets planned versus the number collected against. While these
metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current
metrics do not take into account all of the qualitative considerations
associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the
cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions, whether the ISR
asset did what it was intended to do, whether it had the intended
effect, and whether the intelligence captured contributed towards
accomplishment of the mission.
The JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commands to develop
additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to
assess the effectiveness of ISR assets, although DOD officials
acknowledge the progress in developing metrics has been limited. In
developing these metrics, the JFCC-ISR is leveraging national
intelligence attributes, which include characteristics such as whether
the intelligence is comprehensive to perform all missions anywhere and
at anytime in any weather; credible to allow users to make sound
decisions and take appropriate action; persistent to collect often and
long enough to get the job done; and timely to meet user needs.
Furthermore, the JFCC-ISR has not made any progress in establishing DOD-
wide milestones for the development of these metrics. Milestones are
the required steps and planned dates for completion of those steps
leading up to metrics development.
DOD officials indicate that determining the success of ISR missions is
difficult given the nature of intelligence collection. Specifically,
hundreds of hours of ISR missions and target tracking could culminate
in the capture of a high value target; however, it may be difficult to
measure the effectiveness of each individual ISR mission that led to
the ultimate capture and mission success. This cumulative knowledge
provided by ISR assets is difficult to quantify. An official from the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics also acknowledged that it may be more difficult to
evaluate the success of ongoing operations due to the dynamic and
subjective nature of requirements. The official noted, however, that
DOD is better equipped to measure the success of its more mature and
traditional ISR missions, such as sensitive reconnaissance operations,
because the objectives are better defined allowing more direct
determination of success.
DOD Lacks Consistent Feedback on Whether ISR Assets Meet Warfighters'
Needs:
In addition to metrics, DOD also relies on feedback for evaluating how
successful its ISR assets are in meeting the warfighter's needs.
However, DOD lacks consistent feedback on whether ISR assets meet the
needs of the warfighters. Joint Publication 2-01[Footnote 11] calls for
intelligence personnel and consumers to evaluate and provide immediate
feedback on how well intelligence operations perform to meet
commander's intelligence requirements. This information could be used
to inform DOD's acquisition, allocation, and tasking of ISR assets.
While DOD officials indicate they occasionally receive feedback on ISR
asset performance, they acknowledge that feedback specific to how ISR
assets performed in individual ISR missions is not consistently
occurring. While there is real-time communication among unmanned
aircraft system operators, requesters, and intelligence personnel
during an operation, and agency officials indicate this communication
is beneficial to providing real-time feedback, there is little to no
feedback after the operation to determine whether the warfighters'
needs were met. Officials indicate that the fast pace of operations in
theater affects the ability of end users to provide feedback on every
ISR mission. For example, according to Marine Corps officials, there is
a mechanism for Marine Corps units to provide feedback, but the
feedback is not consistently provided because there is no systematic
process in place to ensure that this feedback is captured. Without
developing metrics and systematically gathering feedback that enables
it to assess the extent to which ISR assets are successful in
supporting warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the
true demand for ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating and
tasking its ISR assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new
systems that best support warfighting needs.
Conclusions:
DOD has achieved operational success with UAS in ongoing operations,
but it continues to face operational challenges that limit its ability
to fully optimize the use of these assets. These operational challenges
have been exacerbated by the lack of advance coordination when new
assets are being deployed in theater. While operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have been ongoing for some time, the potential exists for
DOD to need to establish operations in other areas of the world very
quickly. A DOD-wide procedure for advance coordination is critical to
enable DOD to quickly support ISR assets once deployed to ongoing
operations. Until DOD takes steps to address the need for DOD-wide
advance coordination, it may be limited in its ability to efficiently
deploy and utilize UAS assets and may not allow the combatant commander
time to plan to support incoming assets.
With the operational successes that have been realized with UAS,
commanders are requesting them in greater numbers. In spite of a
dramatic increase in UAS funding, DOD officials indicate that annual
allocation levels are constrained by the number of ISR assets in the
inventory and JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to the
combatant commanders DOD ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all
requests for ISR support. However, our work indicates that DOD's
approach to UAS may not leverage all of the DOD ISR assets currently
available and DOD may not be in the best position to determine if
perceived demand is well-founded. Given the substantial investment DOD
is making in UAS and the increasing demand for them, it is critical
that DOD's approach to managing its ISR assets, including UAS, allow it
to optimize the use of these assets. Without an approach to its
allocation and tasking processes that considers all ISR capabilities,
DOD may not be in a position to leverage all available ISR assets and
to optimize the use of those assets. Moreover, DOD lacks visibility
over the true demand for and use of ISR assets, which could hinder its
ability to make informed decisions about the need to purchase
additional UAS assets and what quantities should be purchased.
Furthermore, without developing metrics and systematically gathering
feedback that enables DOD to assess the extent to which ISR missions
are successful in supporting warfighter needs, decision makers may not
be in a position to determine which UAS systems would best support the
warfighters' needs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To mitigate challenges in integrating UAS, and other ISR assets, into
combat operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders, take
the following three actions:
* establish DOD-wide requirements for coordinating with the combatant
commanders in advance of bringing UAS into the theater of operations;
* develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout DOD;
and:
* establish a mechanism to ensure the services comply with these
requirements.
To ensure DOD has the information needed to consider all ISR assets
when allocating and tasking these assets, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for:
* obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, national,
and allied assets, operating in each of the combatant commanders' area
of operations; and:
* allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational
awareness on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not
prohibited by the mission, what they are being used to do.
To improve DOD's ability to evaluate the performance of its ISR
missions, we recommend the Secretary of Defense:
* establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and
quantitative metrics;
* develop a process for systematically capturing feedback from
intelligence and operations communities to assess how effective ISR
assets are in meeting warfighters' requirements; and:
* create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD's
acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with all of our recommendations. DOD generally agreed with our
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
service secretaries and combatant commanders, establish DOD-wide
requirements for coordinating with the combatant commanders in advance
of bringing UAS into the theater of operations; develop a plan for
communicating those requirements throughout DOD; and establish a
mechanism to ensure the services comply with these requirements. DOD
noted that it currently has a well-defined process to coordinate with
the combatant commanders on the introduction of UAS into theater and
cited several examples including the annual process for allocating
theater-level UAS, and actions between stateside units and units in
theater to plan for deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however,
acknowledged that a more standardized method could improve efficiency
of the coordination process and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process and
evaluate and provide direction for an improved coordination process.
Further, DOD noted that, based on this evaluation, if direction is
required, it will be issued via a Chairman's directive which is
mandatory and therefore establishes the mechanism that ensures
compliance. We recognize that DOD has various processes related to UAS
but note that none, including the examples cited by DOD, represent a
standardized, DOD-wide approach that the services and combatant
commanders can follow in coordinating the specific details of deploying
UAS assets, regardless of geographic area. Furthermore, we believe that
a directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure
compliance, and would encourage DOD to include provisions detailing how
implementation of the directive will be monitored.
DOD also generally concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary
of Defense develop a mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR
assets--including all DOD, national, and allied assets--operating in
each of the combatant commanders' area of operations; and allowing
users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational awareness
on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not prohibited by the
mission, what they are being used to do. Specifically, DOD agrees that
a mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets is needed and
commented that work is underway within the JFCC-ISR to develop such a
mechanism. DOD commented that it is not currently practical to provide
situational awareness on some UAS such as the small, hand-launched UAS
at the lowest operational level because these systems do not have the
capacity or capability to communicate their position to a common point.
DOD noted that it will determine the UAS operational levels that will
provide widespread situational awareness, including operational details
and timelines of data reporting. We recognize that situational
awareness may not currently be practical for some UAS but would
encourage the department to seek to maximize coverage in exploring
options for improved situational awareness.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and
quantitative metrics and stated that JFCC-ISR is standing up an
Assessments Division that will be responsible for the development of
metrics. We recognize the Assessment Division has been tasked with
development of ISR metrics and reemphasize the need to develop
milestones for metrics development. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendations that it develop a process for systematically capturing
feedback from intelligence and operations communities to assess how
effective ISR assets are in meeting warfighters' requirements and
create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD's
acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets. DOD agreed that
an improved and standardized process for collection and reporting of
feedback would enhance visibility and provide more effective warfighter
support, but pointed out that organizations within the department
collect feedback or conduct lessons learned studies. We acknowledge
that DOD has organizations such as the Army's Center for Lessons
Learned that are responsible for capturing feedback and developing
lessons learned based on that feedback. However, these organizations
are charged with capturing lessons learned on a number of issues and
are not focused on ISR effectiveness. Furthermore, our recommendation
pertains to DOD's guidance which states it is imperative that
intelligence personnel and consumers to evaluate and provide immediate
feedback on how well individual intelligence operations perform to meet
commanders' intelligence requirements. While the feedback that may be
captured by those lessons learned organizations is noteworthy, it is
often not immediate and specific to individual missions. As we noted in
our report, DOD officials acknowledged that feedback specific to how
ISR assets performed in individual ISR missions is not consistently
occurring. DOD further commented that it has mechanisms in place to
inform its decision making processes on the acquisition, allocation,
and tasking of its ISR assets such as the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System which assesses, among other things,
capability gaps and solutions. We agree that the mechanisms mentioned
in DOD's response exist; however, DOD currently does not have
sufficient qualitative and quantitative metrics needed to collect data
on UAS performance nor does it have a means for incorporating such data
into the processes currently used to make decisions on ISR assets.
The full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
DOD also provided technical comments separately and we have made
adjustments where appropriate. In particular, the Army provided
additional information on the coordination of the Warrior Alpha UAS in
its technical comments, including a timeline for introduction of the
asset into theater.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. We
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions regarding
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Sharon Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken
steps to facilitate the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
into combat operations, we examined DOD and military service
publications and documentation on UAS such as the 2005-2030 UAS
Roadmap, the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Joint Concept of
Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Concept of Operations for
Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, and the ISR Systems Concept of
Operations Standardization Memo. Additionally, we met with key DOD and
service officials, including those from the Joint UAS Center of
Excellence and the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task Force within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, and the Air Land Sea Application Center. We
also met with officials from U.S. Central Command and the services,
including units that had returned from deployment to the theater, or
that were currently supporting ongoing operations, to discuss the
integration of UAS into U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility
and to better understand integration challenges.
To determine the extent to which DOD's approach to allocating and
tasking its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets, including UAS, considers all available ISR assets to optimize
their capabilities, we met with key DOD and service officials,
including those from U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air
Force component commands, the Combined Air Operations Center at Al
Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and other organizations.
We interviewed and obtained documentation including the fiscal year
2007 ISR allocation briefing from officials of the Joint Functional
Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance to
better understand the allocation process. We also reviewed
documentation such as joint publications and briefings that explain the
process for tasking ISR assets and interviewed officials at U.S.
Central Command, Central Command Air Forces, and the Combined Air
Operations Center in Qatar to better understand how ISR assets are
assigned to specific missions. To understand how requests for ISR
support are generated and satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke
with units that recently returned from, or are currently supporting,
ongoing operations in Iraq as well as units within the services such as
the Marine Corps' Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in
determining if tactical assets are available to satisfy those requests
or if the requests need to be forwarded for theater-level support. To
understand how manned and unmanned assets are being leveraged to
optimize the intelligence captured, we met with manned and unmanned
units stationed at the Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates.
To understand DOD's ongoing efforts to study its process for tasking
ISR assets, we reviewed documentation and interviewed an official from
the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board.
To assess whether DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets,
including UAS, to ensure that warfighters' needs are met, we
interviewed DOD and service officials to discuss the metrics for
evaluating the performance of its ISR assets. We discussed with the
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance its efforts to establish metrics for evaluating ISR
assets performance. We reviewed metrics routinely captured to assess
the success of DOD's ISR missions. We also met with service officials
and service units recently returned from Iraq to determine the extent
to which feedback is received on how effective ISR support is in
meeting the warfighters' needs. We performed our work from June 2006 to
June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
Jun 21 2007:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report, GAO-
07-836, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities," dated May 15, 2007 (GAO
Code 350891).
The Department concurs with the draft report's recommendations 2, 4
(first bullet), and 5. The Department partially concurs with
recommendations 1, 3, 4 (second bullet), 6, and 7. The rationale for
the Department's position is enclosed.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Technical comments were provided separately. For further
questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Dyke Weatherington
at (703) 695-6188.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated May 15, 2007 GAO-07-836 (GAO Code 350891):
"Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the Service secretaries and Combatant Commanders,
establish DoD-wide requirements for coordinating with the Combatant
Commanders in advance of bringing unmanned aircraft systems into the
theater of operations.
DoD Response: Partial Concur, The Department currently has a well
defined process to coordinate with the Combatant Commanders for
introduction of programmed Unmanned Aircraft Systems (OAS) into the
specific theater of operations. Currently there are several processes
at the theater and organic levels, including ones to address Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration/Joint Concept Technology Demonstration
capabilities. The Global Force Management Allocation process is used
for theater-level assets (Global Hawk, Hunter, Predator, and Reaper).
For tactical-level UAS (Shadow, Raven, Pioneer), units conduct planning
actions with theater counterparts to include the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that will be
deployed. Demonstration capabilities are coordinated by the host unit
and may follow either of the above processes. The Department agrees
that a more standardized method could improve efficiency of the
coordination process, while allowing for the wide range of UAS
capabilities and levels of command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
will be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process to
improve efficiency.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the Service secretaries and Combatant Commanders,
develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout DoD.
DoD Response: Concur. The Department concurs that during the
coordination process, specific Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
requirements can be better articulated between the Military Services
and Combatant Commanders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be tasked to
evaluate and provide direction, if required, to the Military Services
and Combatant Commanders for an improved coordination process focused
on theater operation-specific UAS deployment requirements.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the Service secretaries and Combatant Commanders,
establish a mechanism to ensure the Services comply with these
requirements.
DoD Response: Partial Concur, Based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
evaluation, if direction is required, it will be provided through a
Chairman's Directive, which is mandatory and therefore establishes the
mechanism that ensures the Military Services comply with Unmanned
Aircraft Systems requirements during coordination.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop a mechanism for:
* obtaining information on all intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance assets, including all DoD, national, and allied assets
operating in each of the Combatant Commander's area of operations; and:
* allowing users at all levels within DoD to gain real-time situational
awareness on where DoD intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
assets are operating and, where not prohibited by the mission, what
they are being used to do,
DoD Response: Concur with the first bullet. This task is currently
being undertaken by USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command -
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). Partial
Concur with the second bullet. Real-time situational awareness on small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (OAS) operations is currently not practical.
These hand-launched systems are employed at the lowest operational
level and as such, do not have the capacity or capability to feed their
position to a common operational picture. The Department will determine
the UAS operational levels that will provide wide-spread situational
awareness, including operational details and timeliness of data
reporting.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
establish DoD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and
quantitative metrics.
DoD Response: Concur. The Joint Functional Component Command -
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance is currently standing up
an Assessments Division that will be responsible for development of
metrics for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance operations.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop a process for systematically capturing feedback from
intelligence and operations communities to assess how effective
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets are in meeting
warfighters' requirements.
DoD Response: Partial Concur. The Department currently captures
feedback from the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
operations across the range of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
capabilities, Organizations, such as the Joint Forces Command's Joint
Warfare Center and the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned, conduct
ongoing feedback collection operations. Additionally, all the Military
Services conduct their own lessons-learned studies, The Joint Staffs
UAS Center of Excellence consolidates all the Military Services'
feedback and makes it available across the DoD. The Department agrees
that an improved and standardized collection and reporting process will
enhance visibility across the range of UAS process will enhance
visibility across the range of UAS operations and allow better
integration of all DoD capabilities to address shortfalls and provide
more effective warfighter support.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DoD's
acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance assets.
DoD Response: Partial Concur. There are already mechanisms in place to
get information to DoD in regard to acquisition, allocation, and
tasking of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
For acquisition, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
Systems (JCIDS), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3170.01F, Capabilities Based Assessment is the DoD mechanism for
assessing how well current and programmed warfighting systems are
meeting required warfighter needs; determining capability gaps that
require solutions, and determining the associated timeframes in which
those solutions are required. In addition, JCIDS identifies potential
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel, and Facilities solutions, The Joint Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) Materiel Review Board is the focal point within the JCIDS
process to address specific joint UAS acquisition issues, including
feedback from Combatant Commanders and Military Services. For
allocation and tasking, there is a satisfaction/feedback "workbench" in
place within the Planning tool for Resource Integration,
Synchronization and Management collection management tool. With these
types of mechanisms in place, the challenge for the Department becomes
one of educating the ISR community that mechanisms exist, and
continuing to improve timeliness and efficiency of the process.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Patty Lentini, Assistant
Director; Renee Brown; Jamie Khanna; Kate Lenane; LaShawnda Lindsey;
Elisha Matvay; and Susan Tindall made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. GAO-07-578.
Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. GAO-07-596T.
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. Washington, D.C.:
April 6, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2005.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Figures include procurement, operations and maintenance, and
research, development and evaluation funding provided through DOD's
regular appropriations and do not include funding provided in
supplemental appropriations.
[2] This number represents the number of unmanned aircraft including
test and training assets, rather than unmanned aircraft systems, which
include aircraft, sensors, communications equipment, and ground control
stations.
[3] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005).
[4] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition
Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges, GAO-06-610T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).
[5] The Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the
Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems was prepared under the
direction of representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force for use
by their respective commands and other commands as appropriate. The
Joint Concept of Operations for UAS was prepared under the direction of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[6] GAO-06-49.
[7] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-163 § 141 (2006), required that the Secretary of Defense
take such steps to ensure that all service tactical unmanned aerial
vehicles (except those for which the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has waived this requirement
through the procedures outlined in the Act) are equipped and configured
so that the data link used is the Tactical Common Data Link and those
vehicles use data formats consistent with the architectural standard
for tactical UAS. Use of the tactical common data link will allow UAS
to be programmed to a wider range of frequencies, thus reducing
dependence on the currently congested frequencies such as C band.
[8] A full-motion video-capable asset has the capability to collect and
transmit real-time full-motion video imagery.
[9] Some missions, such as special operations are classified and it is
not always appropriate to share specifics of the missions.
[10] GAO-06-49.
[11] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations, page III-56 (Oct. 7,
2004).
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