DOD is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar but Still Faces Challenges
Gao ID: GAO-07-1029R August 2, 2007The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to achieve information superiority over adversaries and share information seamlessly among disparate weapons systems. Two programs envisioned as a part of this effort are Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and Space Radar. TSAT is designed to provide rapid worldwide secure communications with air and space systems--including Space Radar--through radio frequency and laser communications links. Space Radar is expected to provide global all-weather intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, particularly in denied areas, for military, national intelligence, and civil users. Both TSAT and Space Radar will require major software development efforts and employ a significant number of experienced staff. TSAT and Space Radar development efforts are expected to be among the most costly space systems ever developed by DOD. In 2004, TSAT was estimated to have a total life cycle cost of about $16 billion, of which $2.0 billion will have been spent at the end of fiscal year 2007. Space Radar is estimated to have a total life cycle cost from $20 billion to $25 billion, and the program has spent about approximately $464.5 million. TSAT expects to begin product development in fiscal year 2008, and launch the first satellite in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. Space Radar expects to begin product development in fiscal year 2009 and launch the first satellite in third quarter of fiscal year 2016. The systems are also expected to be among the most complex ever developed, largely because of the challenges associated with integrating critical technologies within the satellites and networking the satellites to other platforms. Congress requested that GAO assess DOD's progress in adopting best practice as both of these programs proceed toward product development. We presented our findings on TSAT and Space Radar in briefings to Congressional staffs in March 2007. This letter summarizes our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
DOD is making efforts to instill best practices on TSAT and Space Radar. These practices, as GAO has identified over the past decade, are to separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data to make decisions to move to next phases. Collectively, these practices ensure a high level of knowledge is achieved at key junctures in development and that a program does not go forward unless a strong business case on which the program was originally justified continues to hold true. TSAT and Space Radar have made progress in the maturation of technologies, but challenges remain. In a June 2007 update, DOD determined that six of the seven critical technologies for TSAT are at a technology readiness level (TRL) 6 (meaning the technology has been tested in a relevant environment), and the program expects to have the remaining technology at a TRL 6 prior to the preliminary design phase. Space Radar expects to have almost all critical technologies mature to a TRL 6 by program start in June 2009. However, the program currently has five critical technologies assessed to be TRL 3 to TRL 4. This signifies that DOD will need to gain significant knowledge on these technologies to gain sufficient insight into costs and schedule to be well positioned for success by program start. Both programs have deferred more ambitious technology development efforts to the science and technology environment. Both programs have also strived to employ best practices to help identify and determine achievability of requirements. Until all requirements are defined, vetted, and validated, the program office could still face challenges in closing potential gaps between requirements and resources. Both programs face long-term challenges for funding. As DOD seeks to fund Space Radar and TSAT, it will be (1) undertaking other new, costly efforts, including the Global Positioning System III, the Space Based Surveillance System, and the Alternative Infrared Satellite System; (2) addressing cost overruns associated with legacy programs; and (3) facing increased pressures to ramp up investments in assets designed to protect space systems. In total, these efforts will increase DOD's investment for all major space acquisitions from $6.31 billion to $9.22 billion, or about 46 percent over the next 3 years. Schedules for both programs may also be optimistic. The TSAT program may have underestimated the time for design, integration, and production activities. The Space Radar schedule is shorter between program start and initial launch capability than what DOD has achieved for other complex satellite systems. The Space Radar acquisition timeframe from program start to initial launch capability is 86 months, which our analysis shows is shorter than what DOD has achieved or estimated for other complex satellite systems. TSAT also faces further challenges in meeting workforce personnel requirements to manage and oversee the program in the future. Continued efforts by the programs to instill best practices on TSAT and Space Radar are good steps toward addressing acquisition problems, representing significant shifts in thinking about how space systems should be developed. While these steps can help better position these programs for success, they will not work without adhering to commitments to delay milestone decisions or make trade-offs if there are still gaps between requirements and resources. DOD space program and senior officials recognize this and have expressed a commitment to delay program milestones in order to provide the time needed to match resources to requirements, if necessary. However, DOD has not addressed funding pressures that have encouraged premature program starts and too much optimism for past satellite development efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Cristina T. Chaplain Team: Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management Phone: (202) 512-4859GAO-07-1029R, DOD is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar but Still Faces Challenges
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August 2, 2007:
The Honorable Bill Nelson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ellen Tauscher:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Sylvestre Reyes:
House of Representatives:
Subject: DOD is Making Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the
Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar but
Still Faces Challenges Face Radar but Still Faces Challenges:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to achieve information
superiority over adversaries and share information seamlessly among
disparate weapons systems. Two programs envisioned as a part of this
effort are Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and
Space Radar. TSAT is designed to provide rapid worldwide secure
communications with air and space systems--including Space Radar--
through radio frequency and laser communications links. Space Radar is
expected to provide global all-weather intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, particularly in denied areas, for military, national
intelligence, and civil users. Both TSAT and Space Radar will require
major software development efforts and employ a significant number of
experienced staff.
TSAT and Space Radar development efforts are expected to be among the
most costly space systems ever developed by DOD. In 2004, TSAT was
estimated to have a total life cycle cost of about $16 billion, of
which $2.0 billion will have been spent at the end of fiscal year 2007.
Space Radar is estimated to have a total life cycle cost from $20
billion to $25 billion, and the program has spent about approximately
$464.5 million. TSAT expects to begin product development in fiscal
year 2008, and launch the first satellite in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2016. Space Radar expects to begin product development in
fiscal year 2009 and launch the first satellite in third quarter of
fiscal year 2016. The systems are also expected to be among the most
complex ever developed, largely because of the challenges associated
with integrating critical technologies within the satellites and
networking the satellites to other platforms.
You requested that we assess DOD's progress in adopting best practice
as both of these programs proceed toward product development. We
presented our findings on TSAT and Space Radar in briefings to your
staffs in March 2007. This letter summarizes our findings, conclusions,
and recommendations. Copies of the briefings are enclosed.
Results in Brief:
DOD is making efforts to instill best practices on TSAT and Space
Radar. These practices, as GAO has identified over the past decade, are
to separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data to make
decisions to move to next phases. Collectively, these practices ensure
a high level of knowledge is achieved at key junctures in development
and that a program does not go forward unless a strong business case on
which the program was originally justified continues to hold true.
However, sustaining these efforts could prove challenging.
Specifically:
² Successful organizations we have studied ensure that technologies are
mature, that is, proven to work as intended before program start. In
the past DOD has chosen to extend technology invention into the
acquisition process, and as a result, programs have experienced
technical problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix.
By contrast, best practice organizations mature technologies to the
point of being tested in a relevant or operational environment before
committing to an acquisition program.
TSAT and Space Radar have made progress in the maturation of
technologies, but challenges remain. In a June 2007 update, DOD
determined that six of the seven critical technologies for TSAT are at
a technology readiness level (TRL) 6 (meaning the technology has been
tested in a relevant environment), and the program expects to have the
remaining technology at a TRL 6 prior to the preliminary design phase.
Space Radar expects to have almost all critical technologies mature to
a TRL 6 by program start in June 2009. However, the program currently
has five critical technologies assessed to be TRL 3 to TRL 4. This
signifies that DOD will need to gain significant knowledge on these
technologies to gain sufficient insight into costs and schedule to be
well positioned for success by program start. In addition, the program
office acknowledges that some of the seven technology risks it has
rated as high, including risks related to spectrum, software, and
integration with space radar users, will not be fully mitigated prior
to program start.
² Successful organizations defer more ambitious technology efforts to
corporate research departments (equivalent to the science and
technology [S&T] organization in DOD) until they are ready to be added
to future increments. Our best practice work has shown that a
technology development environment is more forgiving and less costly
than a delivery-oriented acquisition program environment. Events such
as test failures, new discoveries, and time spent attaining knowledge
are considered normal in this environment.
Both programs have deferred more ambitious technology development
efforts to the science and technology environment. TSAT, for example,
deferred the inclusion of the wide-field of view multi-access
communication technology to reduce risk on the program, and is
currently contributing about $16.7 million for "off-line" maturation of
this technology until opportunities arise for including it as part of
future increments. In addition, it also eliminated multi-access laser
communications[Footnote 1] capabilities from consideration for future
increments at this time due to the immaturity level of the technology.
Space Radar has deferred lithium-ion batteries, more efficient solar
cells, and onboard processing for its first increment, and like TSAT,
is contributing toward their development by S&T organizations. At this
time, Space Radar has not defined details of an increment beyond the
first one.
² Successful organizations extensively research and define requirements
before program start to ensure that they are achievable, given
available resources, and that they do not define requirements after
starting programs. In successful programs, negotiations and trade-offs
occur before product development is started to ensure that a match
exists between customer expectations and developer resources.
Both programs have also strived to employ best practices to help
identify and determine achievability of requirements. In 2006, the TSAT
program was restructured into an incremental approach to control risk
and increase confidence in the program schedule, putting agreements in
place between development partners that organize capabilities into
blocks based on technological maturity. For example, TSAT has reached
agreements with groups representing the needs of users and warfighters
that addresses which requirements will be included in the first and
second blocks of the program. Space Radar has also developed an
approach to obtain agreement and collaboration among users on program
requirements. In an effort to facilitate communication and reach
agreement over requirements between program partners within DOD and the
Intelligence Community (IC), Space Radar has proactively introduced a
variety of working groups that provide the program with a consolidated
senior group of participants to validate, coordinate and integrate
Space Radar requirements and concepts of operations throughout project
development. Nevertheless, the Space Radar development effort has not
yet had to fully define program requirements, including key performance
parameters. Until all requirements are defined, vetted, and validated,
the program office could still face challenges in closing potential
gaps between requirements and resources.
² Successful organizations ensure other resources--primarily funding,
time, and people --can also be matched to requirements before program
start. Funding: Both programs face long-term challenges for funding. As
DOD seeks to fund Space Radar and TSAT, it will be (1) undertaking
other new, costly efforts, including the Global Positioning System III,
the Space Based Surveillance System, and the Alternative Infrared
Satellite System; (2) addressing cost overruns associated with legacy
programs; and (3) facing increased pressures to ramp up investments in
assets designed to protect space systems. In total, these efforts will
increase DOD's investment for all major space acquisitions from $6.31
billion to $9.22 billion, or about 46 percent over the next 3 years.
More may be needed if technical, software, and other problems on
current programs worsen. At the same time, investment needs for other
weapon systems are also on the rise, while long-term budget forecasts
indicate that considerably fewer dollars will be available for
discretionary spending in coming years rather than more. Funding for
Space Radar is further complicated by the lack of long-term funding
agreements beyond fiscal year 2013, adding uncertainty to DOD's and the
intelligence community's ability to afford expensive programs such as
Space Radar. To its credit, Space Radar has worked to establish a key
funding agreement between DOD and the intelligence community that
addresses short-term cost sharing responsibilities. In prior reports,
we have stated that as long as too many programs compete for too few
dollars in DOD, programs will be incentivized to produce optimistic
estimates and suppress bad news. They will view success as securing the
next installment of funds versus delivering capability within cost and
schedule goals. We have recommended that DOD guide its decisions to
start space and other weapons acquisition programs with an overall
investment strategy that would identify priorities for funding so that
space systems that are expected to play a critical role in
transformation, such as Space Radar and TSAT, could be priorities along
with other legacy and transformational systems. To date, this has not
been done for space or for DOD's broader weapons portfolio.
Schedule: Schedules for both programs may also be optimistic. The TSAT
program may have underestimated the time for design, integration, and
production activities. For example, TSAT embarked on a major software
development effort in January 2006 that would build the overall network
architecture and provide network management capabilities for TSAT and
Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites, but DOD's Program
Analysis & Evaluation office has expressed concern about the overall
complexity of the program and the ability of the contractors to write
enough software code in one year as is necessary for the program to
proceed effectively. In addition, the Space Radar schedule is shorter
between program start and initial launch capability than what DOD has
achieved for other complex satellite systems. The Space Radar
acquisition timeframe from program start to initial launch capability
is 86 months, which our analysis shows is shorter than what DOD has
achieved or estimated for other complex satellite systems.
Workforce: TSAT also faces further challenges in meeting workforce
personnel requirements to manage and oversee the program in the future,
such as the impact from future Air Force workforce reductions of 40,000
active duty personnel--positions that the Air Force may not be able to
fill with civilians due to budgetary constraints.
Conclusion:
Continued efforts by the programs to instill best practices on TSAT and
Space Radar are good steps toward addressing acquisition problems,
representing significant shifts in thinking about how space systems
should be developed. While these steps can help better position these
programs for success, they will not work without adhering to
commitments to delay milestone decisions or make trade-offs if there
are still gaps between requirements and resources. DOD space program
and senior officials recognize this and have expressed a commitment to
delay program milestones in order to provide the time needed to match
resources to requirements, if necessary. However, DOD has not addressed
funding pressures that have encouraged premature program starts and too
much optimism for past satellite development efforts.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To ensure that TSAT and Space Radar do not succumb to funding pressures
within DOD, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of the Air Force to identify potential gaps between
requirements and resources before approving the start of product
development and, if necessary, adjust requirements and resources to
increase the likelihood of achieving program cost, schedule, and
performance goals.
We provided a draft of this letter to DOD for review and comment. DOD
concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments,
which were incorporated where appropriate. DOD's letter is reprinted as
Appendix I.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess DOD's progress in adopting best practices as both of these
programs proceed toward product development, we obtained and analyzed
pertinent documents from the program offices at the Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base, California. We
reviewed budget documents, risk management plans, and risk handling
plans as well as requirements documentation for both TSAT and Space
Radar. We also reviewed acquisition strategies, program office and
prime contractor schedules, and technology development plans for both
programs.
To accomplish our work, we conducted interviews with cognizant and
responsible program officials at Space and Missile Systems Center in El
Segundo, California, and with Department of Defense officials in
Arlington, Virginia. We also met with Air Force Space Command officials
at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, as well as the Space Radar
Integrated Program Office in Chantilly, Virginia. We also visited
contractor facilities in California, Colorado, and Maryland.
We conducted our work from July 2006 to March 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We will send copies of the letter to Department of Defense and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Principal
contributors to this report were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director;
Josie Sigl; Ann Hobson; Arturo Holguin; Jeff Barron; Rich Horiuchi;
Maria Durant; Jackie Wade; Tony Beckham; and Hai Tran.
Signed by:
Cristina Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
6000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
Networks And Information Integration:
Jul 20 2007:
Ms. Christina Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report 07-1029R, `DOD is Making
Progress in Adopting Best Practices for the Transformational Satellite
Communications System and Space Radar but Still Faces Challenges,'
dated June 19, 2007, (GAO Code 120647). The GAO assessment of the
Transformational Satellite Communications System and Space Radar
programs was informative and provided additional insight into issues
the Department was addressing with the Air Force since early 2006. The
Department concurs with the GAO recommendation and enclosed is a
response.
The principle action officer for this effort is Mr. Frank Myers. He can
be contacted at (703) 607-0289 or by email at frank.myers@osd.mil.
Signed by:
Dr. Ronald Jost:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3, Space and Spectrum):
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report June 19, 2007 GAO-07-1029R (GAO Code 120647):
"DOD Is Making Progress In Adopting Best Practices For The
Transformational Satellite Communications System And Space Radar But
Still Faces Challenges"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to identify potential gaps
between requirements and resources before approving the start product
development, and if necessary, adjust requirements and resources to
increase the likelihood of achieving cost, schedule, and performance
goals. (Page 8/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: The Department of Defense (DoD) concurs with the GAO
recommendation. DoD agrees that requirements and resources need to be
synchronized to ensure space acquisition programs succeed. For space
programs, DoD, and specifically the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
implemented a Back to Basics philosophy that is focused on maturing
technology prior to acquisition and delivery capability in smaller but
value-added increments through the use of a Block Approach. In this
paradigm, each specific capability increment is based on a balance of
capability, delivery timeline, technology maturity, risk and budget.
Tradeoffs in these areas mitigate any disconnects between requirements
and resources as well between requirements and technology. A Block
Approach for space acquisition, coupled with a robust Science and
Technology program to mature technologies and reduce risk, greatly
minimizes the potential for programs to experience significant cost
growth and schedule delays.
[End of section]
Enclosure II: Space Radar Briefing Slides:
Space Radar:
Briefing to Staff of the Subcommittees on Strategic Forces Armed
Services Committees:
Preliminary Findings:
March 13, 2007:
Briefing Contents:
Background:
Objective:
Preliminary Findings:
Conclusions:
Scope of Work:
Back-Up Slides:
Background: System Description and Capabilities:
Through an integrated program office, the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the intelligence community (IC) are collaborating to develop a
single common radar system, called Space Radar (SR), to provide global,
persistent, all-weather, day and night, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities, particularly in denied areas.
As envisioned, SR is to consist of a constellation of low earth
orbiting satellites, ground systems and communications network, and
would generate large volumes of radar data for transmission to ground-,
air-, ship-, and space-based platforms.
The core capabilities of SR are to include:
* Synthetic aperture radar imaging, surface moving target indication,
open ocean surveillance, high-resolution terrain information, and
advanced geospatial intelligence.
* Processing, disseminating, and exploiting collected data to support
both national and theater users.
Background: Program Cost and Complexity:
SR could be one of the more expensive and complex space systems DOD has
ever tried to develop. According to the program office, system
capabilities of the SR constellation will exceed that of any current on-
orbit system.
The Integrated Program Office estimates the cost of developing,
producing, and operating the system through 2027 from $20 billion to
$25 billion.
Ground segment processing systems will have to handle the large volumes
of data to be produced by the satellites. The program office estimates
that the SR ground segment development effort represents one of the
most significant challenges to the program and may involve about 5.3
million lines of new and reused software code.
Background: Management and Stakeholders:
Through the Integrated Program Office in Chantilly, VA, the Air Force,
National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) are responsible for space and ground segment
development.
The primary stakeholders are those agencies who will be developing,
operating, supporting, and using the products of the SR system to
support military warfighting and national intelligence requirements as
well as civil objectives, including the military services, combatant
commands, combat support agencies, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the IC, and
civil agencies.
Background: Program Status:
The development effort is currently in the concept development phase,
focusing on technology development and systems engineering activities.
Product development is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009 and the
first satellite is scheduled to be ready for launch in n fiscal year
2016.
With recent congressional concerns and funding reductions, the Under
Secretary of the Air Force has re-focused the SR acquisition approach.
Currently 10 satellites are to be developed (9 plus 1 spare however,
the definitive number of satellites is still under consideration until
key decision point-B (KDP-B), also known as program start.
Background: Knowledge About Requirements and Resources Should Influence
Program Start:
Our Best Practices reports show that gaining knowledge about
requirements and resources before product development is important for
space acquisition success.
The following steps should occur before acquisition programs are
initiated:
* Fully define and stabilize requirements;
* Assure other resources will be available (funding, technology, time);
and:
* Mature technologies to the point of being tested in a relevant or
realistic environment (technology readiness level 6-7) to reduce the
likelihood of costly and time-consuming rework during acquisition.
Objective:
Assess DOD's efforts to gain knowledge of requirements and resources as
the Space Radar development efforts proceed toward product development.
Results in Brief:
Program has strived to close knowledge gaps:
* Requirements: program has developed tools to get agreement and
collaboration among users and development partners.[:
* Resources:
- Program is following incremental acquisition approach which focuses
on use of mature technologies and is taking other actions to reduce
technical risk.
- Program has reached agreements, reflected in budget, for cost sharing
over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
Challenges remain:
* Requirements: Key performance parameters still to be defined.
* Resources:
- Program may not have planned enough time for design, integration, and
production activities.
- High-level agreements between DOD and the intelligence community for
long term (beyond FYDP) cost sharing and defining management roles and
responsibilities have not been finalized.
- Growth in DOD's space investment portfolio raises questions about its
ability to afford expensive development efforts such as SR.
Preliminary Findings:
Program Has Strived to Close Gaps: Requirements:
Program has developed tools to get agreement and collaboration among
users and development partners at both high and lower levels of
management.
* Requirements and Capabilities Working Group:
* Requirements and Capabilities Group:
* Executive Committee:
* Executive Steering Group:
* Joint Requirements Oversight Council/Mission Requirements Board:
According to the program office, coordination efforts on developing
requirements to date have been effective:
Resources - Technology:
Program is to include mature technologies and not push to adopt
advanced technologies (such as on-board processing, lithium-ion
batteries, and more efficient solar cells) unless they become mature in
time for preliminary design review (PDR). Efforts to develop follow-on
satellites have yet to be defined.
Table: Technology Expected to Be Mature at Program Start:
Technology: Analog to digital converter;
Current TRL: TRL 3;
Work to Be Done: Develop space-qualified advanced analog to digital
converter;
Expected TRL at KDP-B: TRL 5 [1].
Technology: Integrated radio frequency assembly;
Current TRL: TRL 4;
Work to Be Done: Integration and demonstration of radar tiles and
panels (including panel-mounted electronics), radar electronic unit,
and front-end processor. Demonstrate an integrated subscale
electronically scanned array antenna over simulated expected
environments;
Expected TRL at KDP-B: TRL 6.
Technology: Low earth orbit laser communication terminal;
Current TRL: TRL 4;
Work to Be Done: Laser terminal to be demonstrated in low earth orbit
simulated environment;
Expected TRL at KDP-B: TRL 6.
Technology: Surface moving target indication processing algorithms;
Current TRL: TRL 4;
Work to Be Done: Establish and demonstrate algorithm test beds; expand
data repository with relevant synthetic/collected data; validate
performance against stressing, full-scale datasets;
Expected TRL at KDP-B: TRL 6.
Technology: Open ocean surveillance processing algorithms;
Current TRL: TRL 3;
Work to Be Done: Performance of open ocean surveillance processing
algorithms to be demonstrated using test bed aircraft, synthetic, and
other data to validate performance predictions;
Expected TRL at KDP-B: TRL 6.
[1] Note: The program office is coordinating plans for demonstrating
the maturity of the advanced analog to digital converter. It has
established an initial test program but needs to resolve whether or not
testing is required at a higher level of assembly to meet the standard
for demonstrating technology maturity at KDP-B.
[End of table]
Current technology readiness levels (TRL) of critical technologies are
low-TRL 3 to TRL 4.
With one exception, the program office expects to have mature critical
technologies-TRL 6-at KDP-B (initiation of product development).
Concept definition contracts do not stipulate maturing technologies to
TRL 6 but require the demonstration of "appropriate" technology
maturity for a KDP-B technology maturity assessment.
Section 2366a of Title 10, United States Code, stipulates that a major
defense acquisition program may not receive KDP-B approval until the
milestone decision authority certifies that, among other things, the
technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. According to the program office, this requirement can be
satisfied with TRL 6.
Program Has Strived to Close Gaps: Resources - Technology:
Technical risk:
* Program has proactively identified and categorized risks and
developed plans to address them.
* Program established a software division at the same level as other
major divisions within the program office to elevate the visibility of
software development and oversight.
Resources - Cost Sharing:
According to the program office, a short-term agreement through fiscal
year 2013 has been established and used for developing the fiscal year
2008 budget estimates. NRO Military Intelligence Program is to fund the
SR program at least through FY13 (Air Force provided funding prior to
FY08).
Challenges Remain - Requirements:
Key performance parameters still to be defined and most requirement
performance specifications remain to be finalized or determined.
Challenges Remain - Program May Not Have Planned Enough Time:
GAO analysis shows acquisition time-frame from program start (KDP B) to
initial launch capability (ILC) for SR is shorter than what DOD has
achieved or estimated for other complex satellite systems. (First
chart):
GAO analysis also shows the time period between preliminary design
review (PDR) and critical design review (CDR) for SR is shorter than
other major space programs. (Second chart):
PDR determines whether preliminary designs are complete and if the
program is prepared to start detailed design and test procedure
development. CDR assesses the systems final design and according to GAO
best practices, at least 90% of engineering drawings should be
completed to provide tangible evidence that the design is stable.
Comparison of Months Between Program Milestones:
Figure: Space program schedules from KDP-B to Initial Launch Capability
(months):
[See PDF for image]
Note: All programs with (e) denotation used current estimated dates for
Initial Launch Capability. SBIRS - Space Based Infrared:
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data System:
[End of figure]
Comparison of Space Programs from Preliminary Design Review (PDR) to
Critical Design Review (CDR):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data:
[End of figure]
Program office officials believe the timeframe is conservative because
unlike other programs, they are conducting extensive up-front systems
engineering, technology development efforts, and requirements analyses
during Phase A. They also stated that the initial launch date is
established through systems engineering analyses and a funding
availability assessment.
We agree that the Phase A efforts are reducing risk and have been shown
to reduce development time when employed by successful organizations.
However, the SR development effort is perhaps more complex than other
space system acquisitions when considering software and other
development activities. E.g., software effort alone expected to be
among most complex to date.
Challenges Remain: Key risks need to be mitigated:
Program has rated 7 risks as high, including risks related to spectrum,
software, and integration with space radar users. Program office
acknowledges that some of these risks can not be fully mitigated prior
to KDP-B.
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Space Radar Integrated Program Office.
[End of figure]
Examples of top risks of the development effort:
Table: Risk and Consequence of Occurrence:
If: Program office does not take the necessary steps to understand the
periodicity and magnitude of interference on other spectrum users and
communicate this risk to prime contractors/payload developer.
Then: Radar payload performance and mission utility will be reduced.
If: Program office does not take the necessary steps to understand the
periodicity and magnitude of interference from other spectrum users and
communicate this risk to prime contractors/payload developer.
Then: Mission performance will be inadequate.
If: Horizontally integrated tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination end-to-end requirements are not defined and allocated to
pace Radar partner agencies 6 months prior to system design review.
Ten: Horizontal integration goals may not be achieved resulting in
performance degradation or cost growth and schedule slippage due to
redesign.
If: Integration and testing of the prototype payload panel reveals
characteristics that will not meet Space Radar mission requirements or
other impacts.
Then: Significant Changes to panel design may be required, impacting
the payload integration and testing schedule.
If: Program office software acquisition process is inadequate for
providing SR functionality that will require extensive development by
multiple parties and integration of complex software on a schedule that
is known to be aggressive. (According to the program office, software
in general and large, complex space system software in particular have
a history of not meeting schedule, cost, and functionality
requirements.)
Then: Cost increase and schedule slippage and/or functionality, ranging
from minor through Nunn-McCurdy breach to possible program failure may
occur.
[A] Due to security classification, not all top risks of the
development effort are listed. Source: SR Integrated Program Office:
[End of table]
The program office states that it can adequately address these risks
because it has or will have sufficient numbers of systems engineers and
detailed risk mitigation plans in place. We acknowledge the program's
attention to risk mitigation and efforts to bring on systems engineers
but do not have evidence to show how its risk mitigation measures go
beyond other acquisitions efforts, which were not successful in
addressing similar risks.
Challenges Remain - Agreements Need to be Finalized: Cost sharing:
Long-term cost-share agreement (beyond FYDP) between DOD and the
intelligence community has not been established.
* In January 2005, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence committed to share the cost in developing an SR
capability.
* A formal agreement that includes a time period beyond fiscal year
2013 has yet to be signed.
* Program office expects a cost-sharing agreement to be signed in
Spring of 2007.
Given recent changes in leadership (E.g., Secretary of Defense, Under
Secretary for Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence) and the
varied interests and missions of the SR development partners, it is
important that commitments to cost sharing be formalized soon.
Challenges Remain - Agreements Need to be Finalized: Roles and
Responsibilities:
Memorandum of agreement between DOD and IC drafted to define management
and oversight roles and responsibilities, including defining the
milestone decision authority has not been finalized.
* According to the DOD officials, the memorandum of agreement is to be
finalized within 30 days.
Challenges Remain - Program Affordability:
Growth in DOD's space investment portfolio raises questions about its
ability to afford expensive programs such as SR.
* DOD's investment for all major space acquisitions for space from 2006
through 2009 is expected to increase about 46 percent, from $6.31
billion to $9.22 billion.
* Space Radar is being undertaken at the same time as other major,
costly efforts, including Transformational Satellite Communications
System, Global Positioning System III, Alternative Infrared Satellite
System.
* In addition to these new programs, DOD is still addressing cost
overruns associated with legacy programs like Space Based Infrared
Systems High. Moreover, it is likely that DOD will be pressured to
increase funding space protection/control. DOD has not developed an
overall investment strategy for its portfolio of space programs or
conducted affordability assessments which would help prioritize space
radar against other space and non-space investments.
Conclusions:
Our best practices work shows that a knowledge-based process can enable
decision makers to be reasonably certain about their programs and make
informed investment decisions. SR is working toward closing gaps
between requirements and resources and has adopted our recommended
practices for negotiating requirements and maturing technologies.
However, if gaps remain at product development between requirements and
resources, SR must be prepared to conduct trade-off analyses or defer
milestones to increase the likelihood of achieving program cost and
schedule goals.
Scope of Work:
Key documents reviewed:
* SR requirements documentation (Initial Capabilities Document and
current versions of the Capabilities Development Document and Concept
of Operations):
* Risk Management Plan and risk handling plans:
* System Acquisition Strategy:
* SR KDP-A Technology Readiness Assessment:
* Program office and prime contractor schedules and technology
development plans:
* National Security Space Acquisition Policy:
* Selected Acquisition Reports for major DOD space acquisitions:
Locations for interviews and documentation:
Air Force:
* Space Radar Integrated Program Office, Chantilly, VA and Los Angeles
Air Force Base:
* Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO:
* Air Force National Security Space Office, Fairfax, VA:
* Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC:
Other Defense:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation,
Arlington, VA:
* Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-2 and J-8), Arlington, VA:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Arlington, VA:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington,
VA:
* Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and
Technology, Arlington, VA:
* Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA:
* National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Chantilly, VA:
* U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE:
SR Contractors:
* Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems, Baltimore, MD:
* Northrop Grumman Space Technology, Redondo Beach, CA:
* Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Littleton, CO:
Other:
* Congressional Budget Office:
We conducted our work from August 2006 to February 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Enclosure III: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
Briefing to Congressional Committee Staff:
March 13, 2007:
Briefing Contents:
Objective:
Background:
GAO Findings:
Conclusions:
Scope and Methodology:
Background: Importance of TSAT:
DOD is transforming its military capabilities. As part of this effort,
it plans to:
achieve information superiority over adversaries, and:
share information seamlessly among disparate weapons systems.
One of the key transformation initiatives is the Global Information
Grid (GIG), a collection of programs and initiatives modeled after the
Internet that is aimed at building a secure information network for
enhanced rapid decision making.
The Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT), the space-
borne element of the GIG, is designed to provide more rapid world-wide
secure communications with other systems using radio frequency and
laser (lasercom) crosslinks.
For example, in less than a second, TSAT could disseminate a radar
image from a Global Hawk that would take Milstar 12 minutes and the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) systems 2 minutes to
disseminate.
Cost, Funding & Schedule:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of figure]
The program has spent about $2.1billion since its inception. The
funding estimate for FY 07 is almost $733 million.
Entry into the system development and demonstration phase is scheduled
for the first quarter of FY 2008.
Initial launch is scheduled for first quarter, fiscal year 2016.
DOD and the Air Force reduced the FY 08 TSAT budget request by about
$573 million. The Air Force has also moved the first launch from FY 15
to FY 16.
Acquisition Schedule:
[See PDF for Image]
[End of figure]
Incremental Block Approach:
As GAO reported last year, DOD restructured the TSAT program to better
position it to gain critical knowledge before it enters the preliminary
design phase.
Before TSAT moves to product development:
all critical technologies must be mature, and:
system design review (SDR) must be complete prior to seeking
preliminary design phase approval.
Through a ’block“ acquisition approach, the program is to:
control risk through flexibility by scaling the capabilities initially
delivered in the first block;
meet the goal of maintaining scheduled deployment; and:
provide the ability to add additional capabilities in subsequent blocks.
Since the last GAO report, the program has specified what technologies
will be included in TSAT Blocks 1 and 2.
Objective:
Assess DOD‘s efforts to gain knowledge of requirements and resources as
the TSAT program proceeds toward product development.
Results in Brief:
TSAT program has continued to gain knowledge about requirements and
technologies:
* Reflected agreements on requirements in specifying future blocks.
* Made progress in technology maturation activities during FY 2006 and
the first quarter of FY 2007, and continues to focus on maturing its
key subsystem technologies to a technology readiness level (TRL) 6.
Challenges remain in matching other resources:
* Technology:
- Early tests have revealed challenges in laser communication:
- Limited scalability analyses raises integration risks:
* Time: Program may not have planned enough time for activities
involved with networking TSAT to other DOD systems:
* People: Program is not able to fill critical technical positions.
Program Has Strived to Close Gaps: Requirements:
After restructuring, program worked with users and other stakeholders
to reflect agreements on requirements in its plans for the subsequent
increment, or block, of TSAT.
Note on broader DOD requirements: Even with TSAT and other DOD
satellites assets, gaps between bandwidth needs and resources are
expected to continue to grow, requiring continued dependence on
commercial bandwidth. Moreover, systems such as Space Radar, may not be
able to rely on TSAT. More data provided in backup slides.
Maturing Technology:
TSAT continues to focus on maturing its key subsystem technologies to a
technology readiness level (TRL) 6. Systems tested at this level are
considered to be sufficiently mature and have been tested in a relevant
environment.
According to the program office, in FY 07, the three technologies not
already at TRL-6 remain on track to achieve TRL-6, prior to the
preliminary design phase.
The final test analysis for Phase II testing will not be available
until the end of the third quarter of FY 07. 13
Critical Technologies: Communication on-the-move antenna (COTM);
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): 6;
Purpose: Enables high capacity data communications to small terminals
(e.g., one foot antennas).
Critical Technologies: Packet processing payload;
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): 6;
Purpose: Converts incoming radio signals into digital data for delivery
to the correct Internet-like address.
Critical Technologies: Information Assurance-Transmission Security;
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): 6;
Purpose: Protects transmissions from jamming and interception.
Critical Technologies: Information Assurance-Space High Assurance
Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE);
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): 6;
Purpose: Facilitates security between network nodes.
Critical Technologies: Bandwidth Efficient Modulation (XDR+);
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): 5;
Purpose: Allows higher capacity protected communications.
Critical Technologies: Dynamic Bandwidth Resource Allocation (DBRA);
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): 5;
Purpose: Adjusts on-orbit resource allocations more efficiently, which
will allow more users to be serviced simultaneously.
Critical Technologies: Single-access Laser Communications;
Technology Readiness Level (TRL): 5;
Purpose: Provides a high bandwidth medium to transmit huge amounts of
data between satellites.
[End of table]
Challenges Remain: Early tests have revealed challenges in laser
communication:
Phase I testing involved two major components: Next Generation
Processor Router (NGPR) and lasercom. The program office is satisfied
with Phase I test results and is proceeding with Phase II tests.
Challenges Remain: Limited Scalability Testing Adds Risk:
As GAO previously reported in 2006, assessing scalability is an
integral part of technology development testing.
* Scalability analysis during the technology development phase can be
used to demonstrate whether a satellite can support thousands of users,
including those connected via communications-on-the-move technology in
a theater of operations.
According to TSAT officials, scalability analysis to date has been
focused on functionality at a very small scale (5-10 users).
Conducting detailed scalability analysis during the current phase could
reduce risk during subsequent integration effort, which is the most
risky phase of a satellite program.
Challenges Remain: Program Faces Inherent Integration Risks:
According to an official from the Office of Program Analysis &
Evaluation (PA&E), although the TSAT program is making strides in
maturing the critical technologies, these new technologies must still
be integrated into a single space communications system making the TSAT
development effort inherently risky.
GAO has previously reported on the inherent risks of integration. To
ensure program success, it is important that all significant testing
issues be resolved before DOD authorizes the program to enter the
formal acquisition process.
Software Development Schedule Optimistic:
A TMOS cost-plus award fee contract valued at over $2.0 billion was
awarded to Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems and Solutions in January
2006 to:
develop the overall network architecture; and:
provide network management capabilities for TSAT and AEHF satellites.
* TMOS involves a major software development effort and is to provide,
among other things, communications mission planning, policy management,
external network coordination, and situational awareness/common
operational picture in a secure environment.
Challenges Remain: Program may not have planned enough time for
networking activities:
TMOS delivery schedule may be optimistic.
PA&E has expressed concern about the overall complexity of the TSAT
program and that the TMOS program is optimistic in the amount of
software code that can be written in a year.
DOD and the Air Force reduced the FY 08 TSAT budget request by about
$573 million. The Air Force has also moved the first launch from FY 15
to FY 16.
Challenges Remain: Program is not able to fill critical technical
positions:
Over the next five years, the Air Force is to experience a projected
decrease of 40,000 active duty positions. TSAT program expects to be
impacted.
* The program office lacks the authorization to meet its government
personnel needs due to the workforce reductions. The program office
does not expect to receive the number of personnel requested for FY
2008.
* Program officials said they will need additional government
personnel to carry out oversight and management functions in the long-
run.
Program Office Resources:
From FY 06 to FY 07, the program‘s budget increased by 77 percent,
while program office military and civilian staff increased by 14
percent.
In addition to the 76 staff for FY 06, the program office currently
employs over 100 full-time equivalents from federally funded research
development center (FFRDC) (primarily Aerospace Corporation).
The program office is currently developing a workforce plan intended to
identify the necessary government personnel for the program.
* Based on prior GAO reports, a workforce plan should include five key
elements:
- involve management, employees, and stakeholders;
- analyze critical skill and competency gaps between current and
future workforce needs;
- develop strategies to fill identified gaps;
- build capabilities to address requirements; and:
- monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving strategic goals.
Conclusions:
Our best practices work shows that a knowledge-based process can enable
decision makers to be reasonably certain about their programs and make
informed investment decisions. TSAT is continuing to work toward
closing gaps between requirements and resources and has adopted our
recommended practices for maturing technologies. However, if gaps
remain at product development between requirements and resources, TSAT
must be prepared to conduct trade-off analyses or defer milestones to
increase the likelihood of achieving program cost and schedule goals.
Scope of Work:
Key documents analyzed:
* Risk Management Plan and risk handling plans;
* System TSAT requirements documentation (Block Delivery Plan);
* Acquisition Strategy;
* Program office and prime contractor schedules and technology
development plans;
* National Security Space Acquisition Policy;
* DOD Funding Estimate Reports.
We conducted our work between July 2006 and March 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Multi-access laser communications technology is to provide
simultaneous communications for a number of optical users at very high
data rates.
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