Military Training
Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges Gao ID: GAO-07-936 August 6, 2007The Army considers modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. The Army has estimated that restructuring units from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive modular brigade-based force will require a significant investment through fiscal year 2011. To facilitate this transformation, Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353 directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy for the modular brigades. This law also directs GAO to report on the implementation of the strategy. This report discusses (1) the extent to which the Army's training strategy addresses the five elements specified in the public law and (2) the actions the Army has taken to implement its training strategy and the implementation challenges it faces. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Army training strategy documentation and interviewed Army training personnel.
While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the five elements specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be done to fully develop the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-163 requires the Army's training strategy for modular brigades to include five elements: (1) purpose; (2) performance goals, including specific performance goals for live, virtual, and constructive training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a funding model. GAO's analysis indicated that the Army articulated the purpose of its strategy, but the remaining elements require further development. While an overarching performance goal has been established, the Army has not completed development of specific goals for live, virtual, and constructive training. Moreover, neither constructive training events nor the goals for them are clearly articulated. The Army also has not developed objective metrics to measure performance against its goal, but relies on a commander's professional experience to make a subjective assessment. In addition, the reporting process does not provide detailed collective training status and the funding model does not realistically estimate training costs. Until the Army fully develops the required elements in its training strategy, it will not be in a sound position to assess if it can achieve the long-term institutional benefits of having a consistently trained force, measure how well units have been trained, and accurately determine training costs. The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but key implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of forces, limited capacity of the Army's training centers, and the availability of training personnel. While the Army is developing guidance to implement its strategy, commitments to ongoing operations have limited the availability of forces to train as envisioned. The strategy is designed to support a model built on the assumption that a third of the Army's active duty brigade combat teams are deployed at one time; however, almost half of these brigades are deployed. Moreover, units are currently spending much less than the 2 years in training between deployments envisioned in the model, and training is focused on mission rehearsal instead of full spectrum operations. To support the model the Army's combat training centers must provide 36 combat training rotations for brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010; however, the centers can only accommodate 28 rotations. While the Army is developing an exportable training capability to supplement the number of rotations conducted at the centers, the concept has not been tested and its costs are unclear, even though the Army has identified funding needs for fiscal year 2009. Personnel short falls at the combat training centers also hamper implementation of the strategy. Without developing a plan to address the challenges of current commitments and limited capacity, the Army will not know if it will be able to meet its training strategy goals. Moreover, until the Army completes the testing of the exportable training capability, it will be unable to verify that the concept is the most appropriate approach to meet its training requirements or what funding is required to establish the capability.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-936, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges
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Report to the Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2007:
Military Training:
Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's Strategy for Training
Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges:
GAO-07-936:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-936, a report to Congressional Committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army considers modular force transformation its most extensive
restructuring since World War II. The Army has estimated that
restructuring units from a division-based force to a more agile and
responsive modular brigade-based force will require a significant
investment through fiscal year 2011. To facilitate this transformation,
Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353 directs the Army to develop and
implement a training strategy for the modular brigades. This law also
directs GAO to report on the implementation of the strategy. This
report discusses (1) the extent to which the Army‘s training strategy
addresses the five elements specified in the public law and (2) the
actions the Army has taken to implement its training strategy and the
implementation challenges it faces. To address these objectives, GAO
reviewed Army training strategy documentation and interviewed Army
training personnel.
What GAO Found:
While the Army‘s training strategy addresses each of the five elements
specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be
done to fully develop the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-
163 requires the Army‘s training strategy for modular brigades to
include five elements: (1) purpose; (2) performance goals, including
specific performance goals for live, virtual, and constructive
training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a funding
model. GAO‘s analysis indicated that the Army articulated the purpose
of its strategy, but the remaining elements require further
development. While an overarching performance goal has been
established, the Army has not completed development of specific goals
for live, virtual, and constructive training. Moreover, neither
constructive training events nor the goals for them are clearly
articulated. The Army also has not developed objective metrics to
measure performance against its goal, but relies on a commander‘s
professional experience to make a subjective assessment. In addition,
the reporting process does not provide detailed collective training
status and the funding model does not realistically estimate training
costs. Until the Army fully develops the required elements in its
training strategy, it will not be in a sound position to assess if it
can achieve the long-term institutional benefits of having a
consistently trained force, measure how well units have been trained,
and accurately determine training costs.
The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but
key implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of
forces, limited capacity of the Army‘s training centers, and the
availability of training personnel. While the Army is developing
guidance to implement its strategy, commitments to ongoing operations
have limited the availability of forces to train as envisioned. The
strategy is designed to support a model built on the assumption that a
third of the Army‘s active duty brigade combat teams are deployed at
one time; however, almost half of these brigades are deployed.
Moreover, units are currently spending much less than the 2 years in
training between deployments envisioned in the model, and training is
focused on mission rehearsal instead of full spectrum operations. To
support the model the Army‘s combat training centers must provide 36
combat training rotations for brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010;
however, the centers can only accommodate 28 rotations. While the Army
is developing an exportable training capability to supplement the
number of rotations conducted at the centers, the concept has not been
tested and its costs are unclear, even though the Army has identified
funding needs for fiscal year 2009. Personnel short falls at the combat
training centers also hamper implementation of the strategy. Without
developing a plan to address the challenges of current commitments and
limited capacity, the Army will not know if it will be able to meet its
training strategy goals. Moreover, until the Army completes the testing
of the exportable training capability, it will be unable to verify that
the concept is the most appropriate approach to meet its training
requirements or what funding is required to establish the capability.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army (1) take a series of actions to improve
its ability to assess unit training and identify funding needs for
training by clarifying specific goals, metrics, and its funding model
and (2) revise the training strategy, clarify capacity, and complete
testing of the exportable training capability. In commenting on a draft
of this report, the Department of Defense generally concurred with four
recommendations and did not concur with two.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-936].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Elements Required
to Support the Strategy Need Further Development:
Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but Key
Implementation Challenges Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools:
Table 2: The Army's Combat Training Centers:
Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of Army
Training:
Table 4: Status of Master Plans:
Figures:
Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades:
Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 6, 2007:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure
itself from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive
modular brigade-based force--an undertaking it considers the most
extensive reorganization of its force since World War II. According to
Army estimates, this initiative will require a significant investment
through fiscal year 2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq supporting the Global War on
Terrorism. Transformation is guided by the Army Campaign Plan, which
provides guidance about basing, restructuring specialties in the Army,
increasing the length and stability of tours in the United States, and
training. The Army is expanding its operational force from 33 existing
combat brigades to 42 modular combat brigades in the active force and
creating 28 National Guard modular combat brigades. Support units will
also be reorganized into functional support brigades to provide
independent support to several brigade combat teams during combat
operations. The Army expects to complete reorganization of the force by
the end of fiscal year 2011. In addition to transformation, the Army
plans to increase in size from 512,400 to 547,000 personnel over the
next 5 years.
To help manage its personnel and equipment, coordinate training, and
prioritize resources, the Army developed a force rotation model called
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Under this model, active and Guard
units will progress through a series of three stages, called readiness
pools--reset/train, ready, and available. Active duty brigades will
spend approximately 1 year in each pool over a 3-year cycle and Guard
units will train under a 6-year cycle spending approximately 4 years in
reset/train and 1 year each in the ready and available pools. Units
will progress from the reset/train pool to the ready pool and from the
ready pool to the available pool based on their commander's assessment
following completion of an exercise at one of the Army's combat
training centers.[Footnote 1] Once a brigade is assigned to the
available pool, it is considered fully mission ready and available to
deploy.
Because of the magnitude and associated costs of the Army's
transformation, Congress directed the Army to develop and implement a
training strategy for brigade-based combat teams and functional
supporting brigades to ensure their readiness. Public Law No. 109-163
Section 353 directs the Army to develop and implement a training
strategy that includes the following five elements: (1) purpose; (2)
performance goals, which should include specific goals for live,
virtual, and constructive training;[Footnote 2] (3) metrics; (4) a
reporting process; and (5) a funding model.[Footnote 3]
Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353 also directs GAO to report on the
status of the Army's implementation of this training strategy. In
February 2007, the Army issued a three-page report to Congress
responding to the legislative requirement to report on its development
of a training strategy.[Footnote 4] This brief Army document touches on
each of the five elements as directed, but does not provide a great
deal of detail. Specifically, the report briefly discusses certain
elements of the strategy, such as performance goals, training ranges,
and funding requirements, and indicates that the Army has begun
implementing its strategy. According to Army officials, the overall
training strategy, however, is an integrated collection of documents
reflecting the Army's guidance, strategies, models, systems, and
processes that must work together to develop a trained and ready force.
In addition, Army guidance, including the Army's Chief of Staff
Memorandum on Army training transformation[Footnote 5] and the Army's
2007 Posture Statement,[Footnote 6] states that this training strategy
directly supports the Army's Force Generation model. For this report,
we focused our analysis on this broader collection of documents in
addition to the three-page report. Specifically, we assessed the (1)
extent to which the Army's training strategy addresses the five
elements specified in the public law and (2) actions the Army has taken
to implement its training strategy and identify challenges it faces in
implementing the training strategy.
In conducting this analysis, we used the language of Public Law No. 109-
163 Section 353, relevant Army regulations, and the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)[Footnote 7] as criteria for
determining how the elements of the Army training strategy address the
five elements specified in the public law and to what degree further
development is needed. In order to determine the extent to which the
Army's training strategy addressed the five specified elements and
actions taken to implement the strategy, we reviewed the Army's Report
to Congress on the Army Training Strategy and Army Training Strategy
documents, guidance, and funding plans. We performed content and data
analysis on this material to determine if the elements identified by
the Army met the requirements of the mandate and what implementing
instructions and guidance have been developed. We also examined the
extent to which funds and resources have been expended or programmed to
support the strategy. Additionally, to determine the challenges facing
implementation, we interviewed Army personnel responsible for
developing and implementing the Army training strategy at the
Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau, three of the Army's
combat training centers, Army Training Doctrine Command, Army Forces
Command, and the United States Army, Europe. We then compared the
reports and testimony of officials in the field with the Army Training
Strategy documents, guidance, and funding plans provided by Army
headquarters to identify possible constraints. We conducted our review
from August 2006 through June 2007 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the five elements
specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be
done by the Army to fully develop the strategy. The purpose of the
Army's training strategy is clearly articulated in the Chief of Staff's
strategic direction and in the 2006 Strategic Training Guidance.
However, the performance goals, metrics, reporting process, and funding
model require further development. A performance goal--as defined in
GPRA--should be a target level of performance expressed as a tangible,
measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be compared.
The Army has established an overall performance goal for brigades in
the modular force to be "fully mission capable" when they are available
for deployment. In addition, the Army has developed specific
performance goals for live and virtual training for all of the brigade
combat teams and some of the functional supporting brigades. However,
the use of these goals to guide training is not mandatory, and neither
constructive training nor the goals for it are clearly articulated in
the templates that units use to plan training. In addition, the Army's
training strategy currently lacks metrics that can objectively measure
achievement against its stated overarching performance goal. To measure
achievement of fully mission capable status, the Army relies on a
commander's professional assessment--a subjective evaluation on whether
he or she believes a unit is fully capable of completing its mission.
Additionally, while the Army has characterized two types of metrics it
collects as measures of training performance, none of the metrics
collected objectively determines fully mission capable status.
Furthermore, the reporting systems the Army uses to support the new
training strategy do not provide enough information. For example, the
Army's reporting system, the unit status report, provides an overview
of training status, but does not provide detailed information about the
status of collective training. The Army intends to use a "new"
Department of Defense (DOD) system to capture unit collective training
information as part of the unit status report by the end of fiscal year
2008. Moreover, the Army's current funding model does not realistically
estimate the costs associated with achieving the overall performance
goal of being fully mission capable. Specifically, the model calculates
costs for all of the training events identified in the planning
templates, even though they are not mandatory or tied to the overall
performance goal. Until the Army fully develops the required elements
in its training strategy, it will not be in a sound position to assess
if it can achieve the long-term benefits of having a consistently
trained force, measure how well units have been trained, and accurately
determine the costs of training. To improve the Army's ability to
assess unit training and identify funding needs for training, we
recommend that it clearly identify constructive training events and the
total activity goals associated with them, develop metrics that can
objectively and reliably measure achievement against the Army's stated
performance goal, and revise its methods--including a funding model--to
better estimate the costs associated with achieving the performance
goal. In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations to develop metrics and revise its methods to estimate
costs. However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the
Army establish milestones for developing constructive training goals.
DOD stated that the Army has documented these goals. To support this
position, Army officials provided us with additional evidence. After
reviewing this evidence, we have modified our recommendation to
emphasize the Army's need to clearly identify constructive training and
the goals associated with it in the planning templates.
The Army has taken some actions to implement the training strategy, but
key implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of
forces, the capacity of the Army's training centers, and personnel
shortages. Our analysis of the Army's implementation planning documents
shows that the Army has developed guidance, such as training templates
and instructions, for implementing the training strategy; however,
actual implementation has been hindered by current operational
commitments. The Army's overall training strategy was designed to
support ARFORGEN, which is built on the assumption that one-third of
the Army's active duty brigade combat teams are deployed at one time;
however almost half of these brigades are currently deployed. Because
of the pace of operations, active duty units cannot spend the 2 years
in training expected by the model; in fact, units are spending much
less time in training before being deployed again.[Footnote 8] Training
objectives for recent combat training center rotations are focused on
mission rehearsal exercises to prepare troops for ongoing operations;
they do not cover all the combat skills needed for full-spectrum
operations. According to Army officials, implementation of the training
strategy, which includes building full-spectrum operational skills,
cannot occur until operational commitments decrease and forces are
available to enter into the phased ARFORGEN cycles. The Army has not
adjusted its training strategy to account for conducting the current
high level of operations. Furthermore, the Army's combat training
centers do not currently have the capacity to support ARFORGEN
requirements. For example, to support the model, the Army estimates
that its three maneuver combat training centers must provide 36 combat
training rotations for modular brigade combat teams by fiscal year
2010. However, the centers can accommodate only 28 combat training
rotations,[Footnote 9] and there are no plans to increase the capacity
of the fixed site combat training centers in light of the planned
increase in the Army's end strength. Instead, the Army is developing an
exportable training capability to supplement the number of rotations
that can be conducted at the centers. This capability is intended to
create a combat training center-like event for brigade combat teams at
their home stations. While the Army has developed plans for
establishing two organizations--one in the United States and one in
Germany--to conduct this exportable training, the concepts have not yet
been tested and it is unclear how much it will cost, even though budget
documents show that the Army plans to request funding for building the
exportable training capability in the United States in fiscal year
2009. Furthermore, it is unclear what adjustments may or may not be
needed in order to fulfill existing training commitments in Germany.
Implementation of the training strategy has also been hampered by a
lack of personnel available to fill combat training center instructor
slots because of other operational commitments. For example, the Army's
training center for functional support brigades and theater brigades
cannot execute training exercises because of a shortage of staff. The
Army does not have a plan to address this challenge. Without developing
a plan to address the challenges associated with the Army's current
operational commitments, the Army will not know if it will be able to
achieve its goals of having fully mission capable trained forces to
conduct full-spectrum operations. Moreover, until the Army completes
its testing of the exportable training capability, it will not know
what resources--such as funding--are needed to implement the strategy
or if the concept is the most appropriate approach for addressing the
limited capacity of the existing combat training centers. To address
the challenges facing the implementation of the strategy, we recommend
revising or adjusting the training strategy to account for current
operations and complete the proof of principle test for the exportable
training capability, to verify that it can support increasing capacity
requirements and use the results to guide future funding requests. DOD
concurred with our recommendation to revise or adjust the training
strategy and to establish milestones for the proof of principle test.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Army clarify the
capacity needed at the combat training centers. DOD stated that the
Army has been continuously identifying and updating capacity demands,
leading the Army to recently decide it needed additional exportable
training capability. As a result, we have revised our recommendation to
emphasize that the proof of principle should be completed in order for
DOD to verify whether the capability is the most appropriate approach
for meeting its future capacity demands and to adjust its fiscal year
2009 request, and future funding requests, accordingly.
Background:
The Army's conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army's total
force--active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve--and directly
affects not only the Army's combat units but related command and
support organizations. A key to the Army's new modular force design is
embedding within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other
support units that previously made up parts of division-level and
higher-level command and support organizations, allowing the brigades
to operate independently. The Army is also organizing support forces
into functional supporting brigades. These brigades will continue to
provide high-level support, such as aviation, rocket artillery, or
large-scale logistics, as part of the brigade-based force. By fiscal
year 2011, the Army plans to have reconfigured its total force into the
modular design. The foundation of the modular force is the modular
brigade combat teams that will have a common organizational design and
are intended to increase the rotational pool of ready units. Modular
combat brigades (depicted in fig. 1) will have one of three standard
designs--heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade.
Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Army data and National War College, National
War College, and US Army (images left to right).
[End of figure]
The Army plans to use a force rotation model--ARFORGEN--to manage the
modular force. Under the model, active, reserve, and Guard units
progress through a series of readiness pools. The Army uses these
pools--reset/train, ready, and available, which are described in table
1--and mission requirements to prioritize resources and coordinate
training, personnel, and equipment.
Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools:
Readiness pool: Reset/train;
Tasks being conducted: 1. Receiving personnel and equipment
2. Individual and collective training on core tasks;
Available for: 1. Homeland security
2. Humanitarian and disaster relief;
Move to next pool when: Unit successfully completes combat training
center-level collective training event.
Readiness pool: Ready;
Tasks being conducted: Collective training on theater-specific tasks;
Available for: Mobilization for full-spectrum operations;
Move to next pool when: Unit successfully completes theater-focused
combat training center-level collective training event.
Readiness pool: Available;
Tasks being conducted: 1. Deployed in operational mission 2. Standby
for immediate deployment as required;
Available for: 1. Conducting active operations 2. Mobilization for full-
spectrum operations;
Move to next pool when: Unit returns to home station.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of table]
Units will transition through these pools based on the commander's
assessment of unit capability levels following a combat training center-
level collective training event, validated by the next higher commander
and monitored by United States Army Forces Command, as shown in figure
2. Army guidance, including the Army's Chief of Staff Memorandum on the
transformation of Army training and the Army's 2007 Posture Statement,
states that the Army's training strategy, from initial entry training
to unit combat training center rotations, directly supports ARFORGEN.
Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of figure]
In addition to training at the home station, the modular force trains
at the Army's combat training centers. These centers allow brigades to
perform advanced training under a variety of conditions that
approximate actual combat as closely as possible, enabling units to
assess and build upon skills learned at the home station using a
combination of live, virtual, and constructive training. The Army
maintains four combat training centers, as shown in table 2. The Joint
Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), the Joint Readiness Training
Center, and the National Training Center are collectively referred to
as the maneuver combat training centers.
Table 2: The Army's Combat Training Centers:
Name: Battle Command Training Program;
Location: Fort Leavenworth, KS;
Element trained: Corps, division, and brigade staff;
Focus: Full- spectrum operations in a joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational environment.
Name: Joint Multinational Readiness Center;
Location: Hohenfels, Germany;
Element trained: Brigade combat team, selected division maneuver and
support units, special operations forces, and selected brigade support
elements;
Focus: Full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational environment.
Name: Joint Readiness Training Center;
Location: Fort Polk, LA;
Element trained: Brigade combat team, selected division maneuver and
support units, special operations forces, and selected brigade support
elements;
Focus: Full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational environment.
Name: National Training Center;
Location: Fort Irwin, CA;
Element trained: Brigade combat team, selected division maneuver and
support units, special operations forces, and selected brigade support
elements;
Focus: Full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational environment.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of table]
Army's Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Elements Required
to Support the Strategy Need Further Development:
While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the required five
elements to some extent, additional work needs to be done to fully
develop these elements in the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No.
109-163 requires the Army's training strategy for brigade-based combat
teams and functional supporting brigades to include five elements: (1)
purpose; (2) performance goals, which should include specific goals for
live, virtual, and constructive training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting
process; and (5) a funding model. The Army has fully articulated the
purpose of the strategy, but the remaining elements needed to manage
training require further development. Although the Army has established
an overarching performance goal, the specific goals for live, virtual,
and constructive training are either incomplete or not mandatory.
Moreover, the Army does not have an objective method of measuring
performance against its stated overarching performance goal. In
addition, the current reporting and funding systems do not provide the
level of detail necessary to achieve the Army's stated performance
goal. Until the Army fully develops the required elements in its
training strategy, it will not be in a sound position to assess if it
can achieve the long-term benefits of having a consistently trained
force, measure how well units have been trained, and accurately
determine the cost of training.
Purpose of the Strategy Is Fully Articulated:
The Army has clearly articulated the purpose of training for its
brigade combat teams and functional supporting brigades. The purpose is
stated in the Army Chief of Staff's strategic direction memorandum of
May 9, 2006, and the Strategic Training Guidance dated June 26, 2006.
The overall purpose of the Army's training strategy is to train to win
the current war while developing leaders for the next war using
ARFORGEN. In order to achieve this purpose, the Chief of Staff of the
Army established the guidelines for training, which are shown in table
3.
Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of Army
Training:
Guidelines: Retain the Warrior Ethos as training foundations.
Guidelines: Train to support the ARFORGEN.
Guidelines: Synchronize the modular transformation of units.
Guidelines: Appropriately resource the training base with equipment.
Guidelines: Improve home station training.
Guidelines: Achieve full-spectrum capability with full-spectrum
training.
Guidelines: Focus on defeating improvised explosive devices.
Guidelines: Assimilate future combat systems.
Guidelines: Stay current and relevant.
Guidelines: Build the bench (develop decision making at the lowest
level).
Guidelines: Remain a values-based Army built on standards and
discipline while embracing a culture of innovation.
Guidelines: Preserve combat power by reducing accidents.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of table]
Furthermore, the Strategic Training Guidance identifies the processes,
skills, and technologies needed to meet the Army's goals and
objectives. For example, among the issues the guidance explains are
ARFORGEN for training units; the development of military and civilian
leaders through training and education; the various training methods,
such as institutional training (e.g., schoolhouse training) and
operational training (e.g., home station and the combat training
centers); and the systems and technologies present in the Training
Support System. Our analysis of these documents, guidelines, and
guidance showed that they defined the purpose of a strategy, which GPRA
identified as necessary, such as including a description of the
operational processes, skills and technology, and the human capital,
information, and other resources required to meet goals and objectives.
Overarching Performance Goal Established, but Supporting Goals Are Not
Complete or Mandatory:
Our review of training strategy documentation reveals that the Army has
identified one overarching performance goal for its modular brigades.
However, the specific supporting performance goals for live, virtual,
and constructive training required by the mandate[Footnote 10] are
neither complete for all the brigades nor are units required to execute
the training the goals measure. The Army has identified progression
through the ARFORGEN readiness cycle to achieve fully mission capable
status as the overarching performance goal for the modular brigade-
based combat teams and functional supporting brigades. To achieve fully
mission capable status, units must progress first from the reset pool
to the ready pool and then from the ready pool to the available pool.
To pass through each pool, brigade combat teams must undergo (1) a
maneuver combat training center-level training event and (2) a
commander's assessment. Functional supporting brigades complete a
command and staff training exercise at the Battle Command Training
Center and a commander's assessment.
The Army is developing planning templates that identify supporting
activity goals for live and virtual training. These planning templates
list training events with recommended frequencies and associated
activity levels for each live and virtual training event. While the
templates include constructive training exercises, they are not clearly
identified. In addition, the templates do not clearly articulate total
activity goals for constructive training, as they do for live and
virtual training. According to Army officials, commanders can use these
planning templates to develop training programs for their units, and
the Army can also use the total activity goals as indicators of
readiness. In addition, the Army has not completed the planning
templates for all the functional supporting brigades, although Army
officials stated that they intend to complete them during fiscal year
2007. Army officials stated that preparing the templates for combat
units had priority and they focused on completing those planning
templates first.
In addition, according to Army officials, execution of the planning
templates is not mandatory. Instead, commanders may opt to conduct
different training events, or decide to train to activity levels that
are higher or lower than those specified in the planning templates.
Army officials stated they do not want to take away the commanders'
flexibility in training their units by making the planning templates
mandatory. Because achievement of the supporting activity goals is not
required by the Army, they are not effective performance goals. By GPRA
standards, effective performance goals are target levels of performance
expressed as a tangible, measurable objective against which actual
achievement is compared. Without requiring units to achieve these
goals, units may be conducting different levels of live, virtual, and
constructive training, and the Army will not be able to determine if
units are trained consistently.
Army Lacks Metrics That Objectively Measure Achievement of Performance
Goal:
Our analysis of the Army's training strategy shows that it currently
lacks metrics that can objectively measure achievement against its
stated overarching performance goal. The mandate requires that the
Army's training strategy include metrics that measure training
performance against the strategy's performance goals.[Footnote 11] The
Senate committee report on GPRA states that performance indicators
(metrics) are used to measure whether a goal is being achieved, and GAO
standards identify clarity, objectivity, and reliability as key
attributes of successful indicators.[Footnote 12] However, the Army has
decided to continue to rely on the subjective assessment of the
commander to determine the readiness progression of its units in order
to provide commanders with more flexibility in their training plans--
just as it did before the development of the current training strategy.
Units move through the ARFORGEN operational readiness cycle based on
the commander's assessment. The commander bases the assessment on
personal observations, feedback from training events, and external
evaluations. The Army has not developed a set of uniform standards or
parameters to guide the commander's development of the assessment;
instead, the assessment is the commander's subjective evaluation of the
unit's ability to complete its mission based on the commander's
professional experience. Consequently, the achievement of the
overarching performance goal is not being objectively measured, making
it difficult to evaluate training to a single Army standard across
units.
The Army's report to Congress also characterizes two systems as
providing metrics to quantify training performance against the
performance goals specified by the strategy: (1) the unit status report
and (2) the training resource model (TRM). However, the metrics
collected by these systems do not objectively determine fully mission
capable status. The Army's unit status report enables a commander to
determine and report his or her unit's overall level of readiness to
accomplish its designed wartime mission based on the unit's equipment,
personnel, and training levels. The training component of the unit
status report allows commanders to report their evaluation of their
unit's proficiency in its mission-essential tasks. While the unit
status report includes objective measures--in the areas of equipment
and personnel--training levels are determined based on the commander's
subjective evaluation of their unit.
In addition, the Army uses TRM to collect data on training activity.
TRM determines operational funding requirements for unit training based
on a unit's activity level, measured in terms of miles driven--tank-
miles--or hours flown--flight-hours. Army officials stated that tank-
miles and flight-hours are indicators of estimated readiness, although
driving large numbers of tank-miles does not necessarily indicate high
readiness while failing to drive a required number of tank-miles does
not automatically equate to low readiness. Instead, the activity
measurements are weighed against a commander's assessment of unit
readiness. Therefore, while units report their activity levels to the
Army on a regular basis, these reports do not provide a basis for
determining if units pass through the pools of the ARFORGEN cycle and
reach fully mission capable status.
In using the unit status report and TRM to meet the requirements of the
mandate, the Army is relying on systems and metrics that are not
directly linked to the new overarching performance goal. To measure
units' progress in achieving the strategy's overarching performance
goal, the Army continues to rely on a subjective commander's
assessment. As a result, the Army is using metrics that are not able to
objectively quantify actual training performance against the
performance goals currently specified by the strategy. Until the Army
develops metrics that can objectively measure achievement of its
performance goals, it will not be able to objectively measure how well
its forces have been trained and achieve the long-term benefit of
having a consistently trained force.
Reporting System and Funding Model Do Not Provide Enough Information:
Current reporting systems and funding models do not provide all the
information needed to manage the training progression of units through
ARFORGEN. The mandate requires that the Army's training strategy
incorporate a process to report the status of collective
training[Footnote 13] for monitoring the training performance of
modular brigade-based combat teams and functional supporting
brigades.[Footnote 14] While the Army's unit status report provides an
overview of unit training, our analysis shows that it does not provide
specific details on unit collective training performance. By fiscal
year 2008, the Army is scheduled to use a new system called the Defense
Readiness Reporting System-Army[Footnote 15] that is intended to
establish new performance indicators to evaluate the ability of units
to execute their mission-essential tasks as part of the unit status
report. In addition, the system is intended to support the
implementation of ARFORGEN by requiring commanders to submit a detailed
assessment of their units' collective training, which ties directly to
the mission-essential tasks. Moreover, the Army has developed an
additional system, the Digital Training Management System, that allows
commanders at brigade and lower levels to plan collective training,
incorporate theater-specific tasks, and integrate lessons learned. It
also allows their supervisors to monitor the progress of units as they
complete training events and upgrade their collective training status.
However, this system is not linked to the unit status report.
In addition, the Army's funding model (TRM) for estimating training
costs does not fully estimate the costs required to achieve the Army's
stated performance goals. The mandate requires that the Army's training
strategy include a model to quantify and forecast the operation and
maintenance funding required for each fiscal year to attain the
performance goals specified in the strategy.[Footnote 16] In its report
to Congress, the Army identifies two types of costs needed to support
the training of its brigade combat teams and functional supporting
brigades: (1) operational unit costs, which include the resources
required to conduct and support unit training, maintain unit equipment,
and sustain day-to-day unit operations, and (2) costs to support the
Training Support System, which include all of the training support
products, training facilities, and services required to enable the
execution of training. TRM is part of a broad process used to calculate
institutional, operational, and Training Support System requirements.
According to DOD, this process, which includes models and cost
estimates based on expert judgment, is reviewed and validated by
officials on the Army operations staff.
Army officials use TRM to forecast the operational unit costs for the
training of active component and reserve component units. The estimated
cost per tank-mile/flight-hour and the level of activity associated
with recommended training events are generated by TRM. TRM uses
reported activity data--the actual past costs of training, maintenance,
and routine operations--from units to generate these estimates. TRM
estimates costs based on the full execution of all of the training
events and activity goals detailed in the planning templates. However,
TRM activity goals represent recommended, not required, training events
and frequencies. As a result, the estimates generated by TRM do not
necessarily reflect the cost of the actual amount of training that a
unit will conduct. Moreover, TRM forecasts the greatest cost for
training because it includes training that is not required to be
completed. Because the Army has not standardized what training is
necessary for all units to complete to become fully mission capable, it
cannot link training costs to the achievement of its performance goals.
In using TRM to meet the requirements of the mandate, the Army is
forecasting the costs of implementing the new training strategy with a
funding model that does not realistically estimate the cost of
achieving the overarching performance goal of the strategy. As a
result, the Army risks not having enough information to determine the
level of funds needed to fully train its units and risks investing
funds in training that has not been tied to units achieving performance
goals.
Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but Key
Implementation Challenges Remain:
The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but
key implementation challenges remain. Our analysis of the Army's
implementation documents, current training curriculum, and event
training objectives show that the Army is developing guidance, such as
training templates and instructions, to implement the training
strategy. However, implementation of the strategy has been limited
because the Army's current ongoing operational commitments limit the
availability of forces as needed to fully execute the strategy and
training is focused on mission rehearsal instead of full-spectrum
operations. In addition, capacity at the Army's combat training centers
is currently inadequate to support the requirements of ARFORGEN. While
the Army intends to address combat training center capacity by
developing an exportable training capability, this capability has not
been tested. Furthermore, implementation is challenged by the limited
availability of training personnel and the Army's current lack of a
plan to deal with the issue. Without developing a plan to address the
challenges associated with the Army's current operational commitments
and the limited capacity of the existing combat training centers, the
Army will not know if it will be able to achieve its goals of having
fully mission capable trained forces to conduct full-spectrum
operations. Moreover, until the Army completes its testing of the
exportable training capability, it will not know what resources--such
as funding--are needed to implement the strategy or if the concept will
meet its needs.
Army Is Developing Guidance for Implementing the Strategy:
The Army is developing guidance, such as training templates and
instructions, to implement its training strategy. As required by the
mandate,[Footnote 17] the Army is developing and attempting to
implement a strategy for training brigade-based combat teams and
functional supporting brigades. As part of this effort, the Army
developed one-page training templates that illustrate ARFORGEN core
tasks and reporting criteria for each type of brigade combat team and
functional supporting brigade to help commanders design unit training
plans. This is in addition to the previously mentioned planning
templates that list possible training events and associated activity
goals.
In addition to creating the training templates, the Army is developing
instructions that will provide the Army training community with a road
map to execute the training strategy. The Army's June 2006 Strategic
Training Guidance indicates that these instructions, or master plans,
will turn guidance into actions that support modular brigade training.
Specifically, these instructions will provide planning guidance for
several Army training entities, including the combat training centers,
home station training, the training support system, deployed training,
and institutional training as detailed in table 4.
Table 4: Status of Master Plans:
Name: Combat Training Center Master Plan;
Purpose: Articulates the current state of the combat training centers
and identifies resourcing requirements and outlines a road map to adapt
the combat training centers to support the Army transformation/Army
Campaign Plan efforts;
Status: Complete/issued for fiscal years 2008-2013. Fiscal years 2010-
2015 draft being staffed for publication with an issuance date of no
later than the end of December 2007.
Name: Home Station Master Plan;
Purpose: Addresses modular force operational and organizational
concepts and doctrine, and describes the training support capabilities
required at home station during reset/ train and ready force pools;
Status: Complete/under review at Department of the Army.
Name: Training Support System Master Plan;
Purpose: Captures what resources are needed and are available to
support training on all major U.S. Army installations;
Status: Under development/estimated issuance November 2007.
Name: Institutional Instructions;
Purpose: Integrates soldiers into units preparing for deployment and
determines what skills can be learned hands-on or through distributive
learning at other locations including home stations and deployed bases;
Status: Will not be formally issued/concepts have been incorporated
into current institutional training.
Name: Deployment Instructions;
Purpose: Addresses deployment training for units as a component within
the Training Support System Master Plan;
Status: Will not be formally issued/incorporated into Training Support
System Master Plan.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of table]
Although our review identified that the Army has developed preparation
tools, such as templates and instructions, to implement the training
strategy, the Army still faces many challenges in its implementation
that these tools do not account for.
Ongoing Operational Commitments Limit the Availability of Forces Needed
to Fully Implement the Training Strategy:
While the Army's overall training strategy is designed to support
ARFORGEN by training units through a series of phases, the Army has not
fully implemented the model because ongoing operational requirements
have prevented troops from being available for the required amount of
time to complete the training phases. Army guidance, including the
Army's Chief of Staff Memorandum on the transformation of Army training
and the Army's 2007 Posture Statement, states that the Army's training
strategy, from initial entry training to unit combat training center
rotations, directly supports ARFORGEN. However, our analysis indicates
that the Army's current operational commitments preclude ARFORGEN from
reaching its steady state.
ARFORGEN as described in the Army Campaign Plan assumes that only one-
third of the Army's combat brigades are deployed at any one time.
However, because of the Army's current operational demands, almost half
of the Army's active duty combat brigades are deployed. According to
Army officials, ARFORGEN normally provides combatant commanders with 18
to 21 combat brigades to support operations. While the number of combat
brigades needed to support the Army's operational commitments varies
over time, as of April 2007, the number of combat brigades needed to
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan exceed those provided by the
model. To meet these demands, the Army has reduced the time that units
spend in ARFORGEN's rotation pools, revised its reserve mobilization
policy, and extended active unit deployments from 12 months to 15
months. Furthermore, under ARFORGEN, active duty units are expected to
spend 2 years resetting and training in between deployments; however,
brigades are currently spending much less time in training before being
deployed again.[Footnote 18]
Additionally, the Army currently focuses training on preparing units
for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which does not necessarily
include the development and maintenance of skills for full-spectrum
operations, such as preparing for a wide range of scenarios from low-
intensity combat to high-intensity combat. Our analysis of past and
recent unit training plans and discussions with Army training officials
indicate that unit commander training plans have focused solely on
preparing for their unit's assigned mission instead of moving
progressively from preparing for core missions to training for full-
spectrum operations, as described in ARFORGEN. Since February 2004, all
combat training rotations conducted at the Army's National Training
Center have been mission rehearsal exercises to prepare units for
deployments, primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan. Army officials we spoke
with indicated that until the Army's operational commitments decrease,
ARFORGEN will not reach its steady state, and because the Army's
training strategy is designed to support ARFORGEN, it cannot be fully
executed until that time. The Army has not adjusted its training
strategy to account for conducting the current high level of
operations. In addition--as stated in the Army's guidance--until
ARFORGEN reaches its steady state, other programs essential to
providing combat training to units such as functional brigades may be
curtailed. According to the Army's ARFORGEN implementation guidance,
until the Army fully executes ARFORGEN, its ability to train units for
continuous full-spectrum operations may be at risk. Without revising
the training strategy so that it includes a plan to support full-
spectrum training while maintaining a high level of ongoing operations,
the Army may not train the force to meet the full range of possible
threats.
Army Faces Challenges in Expanding Capacity at Its Combat Training
Centers:
The Army faces challenges in implementing its training strategy because
the current capacity of the combat training center programs cannot
fully support the training requirements described by ARFORGEN and the
model does not reflect the planned increase in Army end strength. While
steps are being taken to expand the program--such as developing a
mobile combat training center called the Exportable Training Capability
(ETC)--these efforts are not yet fully developed or tested, and may be
affected by a variety of existing training commitments. Moreover, the
operations groups at the Army's combat training centers are not fully
staffed because of ongoing commitments.
Current Combat Training Center Capacity Does Not Support ARFORGEN
Requirements:
Capacity at the Army's three maneuver combat training centers is
currently inadequate to support the requirements of ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN
requires that combat brigades complete two combat training center-level
events--one at the end of the reset/train pool and another during the
ready pool--prior to entering the available force pool. While the Army
has identified the increased resources needed to train the modular
brigade combat teams as part of its Combat Training Center Way Ahead
process, currently the Army's combat training centers only have the
capacity to accommodate up to 28 combat training rotations per
year.[Footnote 19] However, by fiscal year 2010, the Army must conduct
36 combat training center rotations to support the modular force
structure and the implementation of ARFORGEN.
The Army determined its combat training center capacity needs with the
assumption that under ARFORGEN it would have to train a rotational pool
of 70 combat brigades. However, the Army intends to increase the size
of its active force from 512,400 to 547,000 over the next 5
years.[Footnote 20] The Army intends to accomplish this by establishing
6 new combat brigades, resulting in a rotational pool of 76 combat
brigades. As of June 2007, Army officials identified a requirement for
40 combat training center rotations per year to support the Army's
increased end strength.
Exportable Training Capability Not Fully Developed or Tested:
The Army plans to meet the increased demand for combat training
rotations required under ARFORGEN by developing a mobile combat
training center, the ETC. The ETC includes the essential combat
training center support, including a fully equipped operations group
with personnel and vehicles; an instrumentation system; and an opposing
force, to conduct brigade-level training exercises. The Army intends
the ETC to travel to training areas such as unit home stations to
provide combat training center-level exercises. Normally, the ETC will
conduct training events to units in the reset/train phase of ARFORGEN;
however, in some circumstances the ETC may provide training events to
units in lieu of a combat training rotation at a one of the current
maneuver training centers.
The ETC concept, however, has not been fully developed or tested. While
the Army has created an organizational and operation concept for the
ETC and has conducted mobile combat training exercises before, it has
not conducted these exercises on the magnitude the proposed ETC concept
will employ. For example, Army officials at the National Training
Center stated that the National Training Center has provided home
station mission rehearsal exercises at three Army installations located
in the United States, but these exercises were on a smaller scale than
those conducted at the center. In addition, the Army's JMRC in Germany
currently hosts a mobile training capability it calls the Expeditionary
Training Capability. JMRC uses this capability to assist with joint
training with allied forces based in Europe and to expand the
capability of JMRC by providing combat training center capabilities to
existing German and allied ranges. According to JMRC officials, the
capability currently has the capacity to support the training of one
battalion-size element. This is substantially different from the Army's
ETC concept, which is intended to support an entire brigade. As this
testing has not been completed, it is unclear how the Army identified
$19.3 million in fiscal year 2009 for the establishment of the
continental U.S.-based ETC in its fiscal year 2008 budget
submission.[Footnote 21]
The Army currently plans to establish two ETCs, one based in Germany at
JMRC and another based in the continental United States at the Joint
Readiness Training Center. However, current operational commitments--
such as surging brigades to Iraq and Afghanistan and JMRC's
multinational support role--interfere with the Army's ability to
develop and test the ETC concept needed to support the Army's fiscal
year 2010 combat training center requirements. The Army planned to
conduct a proof of principle of the capability in fiscal year 2007
using JMRC's Expeditionary Training Capability; however, the proof of
principle was delayed because units were not available to conduct the
training because of operational commitments. Subsequently, the proof of
principle has been rescheduled for August 2008. The Army indicated that
past mobile training events provide it with the basis to determine what
is needed to establish the ETC and that the proof of principle test
will enable it to refine its concept for the ETC. Without this testing,
the Army does not have an accurate picture of the instrumentation,
training facilities, and personnel requirements needed or the insight
to determine if this capability is the most appropriate approach to
meet its future training requirements.
In addition, officials at JMRC stated that they may be unable to
provide the number of ETC rotations required by ARFORGEN because of a
variety of commitments. The staff supporting the Expeditionary Training
Capability is drawn from the staff supporting combat training center
operations on the ground at JMRC. Therefore, the Expeditionary Training
Capability and JMRC cannot operate at the same time. Moreover, the Army
intends for JMRC to provide 4 of the 12 ETC rotations required each
year to support ARFORGEN. However, officials at JMRC indicated that
their role in Europe is not limited to providing combat training center
rotations to brigade combat teams in Europe and conducting training
rotations in the United States; JMRC is also involved in training with
U.S. allies in Europe and supporting company-and battalion-level
training for the brigade combat teams and functional supporting
brigades. Furthermore, to accomplish both of JMRC's missions it would
require precise coordination between combat brigade commanders and
officials at United States Forces Command and United States Army Europe
in order to efficiently schedule training events. Army officials stated
that ideally, given the logistical and cost challenges associated with
bringing JMRC's Expeditionary Training Capability to the United States,
the proposed training events would need to be scheduled consecutively,
which may not be possible given the uncertainty caused by current
operations and JMRC's existing commitments.
In addition to the challenges mentioned above, the Army's initial plans
to develop the ETC may require revision to accommodate the proposed
increase in the number of the Army's combat brigades. The Army designed
the ETC based on an assumption that the Army would have a total of 70
combat brigades. Based on that assumption, the Army identified that in
order to support ARFORGEN, it would have to provide 12 combat training
center rotations each year through the ETC. However, as discussed
earlier the Army intends to expand the size of its force, resulting in
an additional six combat brigades. The Army has identified that the
proposed increase will require the establishment of a second U.S.-based
ETC and is developing plans for establishing it, but as of June 2007
these plans have not been approved. Without the additional capacity,
the Army projects it will not be able to accommodate the number of
combat training rotations required to carry out its training strategy.
Operations Groups at the Army's Combat Training Centers Not Fully
Staffed:
The operations groups at the Army's combat training centers are not
fully staffed because of ongoing commitments that require the
assignment of officers and noncommissioned officers to operational
units. According to Army Regulation 350-50,[Footnote 22] the primary
purpose of the Army's combat training centers is to develop leaders and
soldiers with a joint expeditionary mindset and to train units for full-
spectrum joint operations. The Army authorizes each of the combat
training centers with the number of personnel needed to support the
training of brigade or larger-sized units. However, because of the
ongoing commitments, the combat training centers are experiencing
staffing issues, such as personnel shortfalls at the Army's Battle
Command Training Program.
The Battle Command Training Program is the Army's capstone combat
training center. The center is currently staffed at 85 percent of its
authorized level, but this level does not reflect the requirements of
supporting ARFORGEN. The Army has expanded its Battle Command Training
Program from corps, division, and National Guard brigade combat teams
to include training for the active duty brigade combat teams--conducted
by one reorganized and expanded operations group--and has created two
new operations groups specifically to provide training exercises for
the functional and theater brigades. When the center's staffing levels
are compared to this expanded structure, the center only has 51 percent
of the personnel required. Until the two new operations groups are
fully staffed, they may be able to plan and conduct seminars, but
cannot conduct the full-spectrum staff training exercises needed to
support ARFORGEN. Based on ongoing operational requirements, an Army
official stated that the Army's Human Resources Command indicated that
it will not fill all of the positions for the Battle Command Training
Program until the first quarter of fiscal year 2009.
While personnel shortages are most critical at the Brigade Command
Training Program, the operations groups at the maneuver combat training
centers are staffed at an average of from 70 to 80 percent of their
current authorization. Army officials stated that the personnel needed
to fill observer/controller positions are not available because of the
increase in the length of combat tours, the number of combat brigades
needed to support the surge, the increase in the number of combat
brigades, and the need for advisors for Afghan and Iraqi forces. These
specific demands draw personnel from the same group of experienced
officers and noncommissioned officers needed to staff the combat
training centers. While Army officials told us that the staffing levels
at the maneuver combat training centers have not degraded the centers'
ability to train leaders and soldiers to Army standards, officials
indicated that this staffing level is not optimum.
Conclusions:
The Army faces numerous administrative and operational challenges
during current operations. These include--but are not limited to--the
transformation to the modular brigade-based force, an increase in size,
large operational commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and shortened
training cycles at home stations. Nevertheless, the Army recognizes
that it must continue to train its forces to meet the challenges at
home and abroad. To this end, the Army's current leadership has
identified an overarching training goal to be achieved in its strategic
guidance. However, without clearly stated training events and goals,
fully developed objective performance measures, and a training resource
management process--including funding models--that realistically
estimates its funding needs, the Army may not be able to achieve the
long-term benefits of having a consistently trained force, measuring
how well units have been trained, and accurately determining the cost
of training. While we fully acknowledge the Army's need to focus on its
current operational priorities, these priorities call for units to
spend less time in training and to focus on specific mission rehearsal
exercises instead of full-spectrum operation training. The Army has not
adjusted its strategy to take these factors into account. When forces
are available to fully execute the training program as envisioned, the
Army recognizes that the current combat training center capacity may
not be adequate to provide the necessary rotations to train its current
modular force structure. The Army has a plan to develop the ETC to meet
the training capacity requirements for its current modular force, but
has not yet tested the concept to determine its costs or its viability
as a solution to meet the requirements of ARFORGEN and the proposed
increase in the number of combat brigades. By further developing and
refining its training strategy, the Army will be able to provide
consistent training across the force and remain ready to confront the
full range of threats around the world.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve its ability to assess unit training and identify funding
needs while preparing the modular force and taking advantage of the
long-term institutional benefits of the information provided by a fully
developed strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Army to take the following three actions:
* modify the planning templates to clearly identify constructive
training and the goals associated with it,
* develop metrics that support the Army's training strategy by
objectively and reliably measuring achievement against the Army's
overall performance goal, and:
* review and revise the funding model to more realistically estimate
the costs associated with achieving the Army's performance goals.
To address the challenges facing the implementation of the strategy, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to take the following three actions:
* revise and adjust the training strategy to account for the current
high level of operations so that it includes a plan to support full-
spectrum threat training when most of the force is deployed;
* clarify the capacity needed at the combat training centers to support
the expanded modular force; and:
* complete the proof of principle for the ETC to verify that it is the
most appropriate approach to meet the additional capacity requirements
for both ARFORGEN and the proposed expanded number of brigades and use
the results to adjust the Army's fiscal year 2009 and future funding
requests as appropriate.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with
four of our recommendations and did not concur with two.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to establish milestones for
developing constructive training goals for modular brigade combat teams
and functional supporting brigades. DOD stated that the Army has
documented these goals. Specifically, DOD officials provided us with
additional evidence on the establishment of specific constructive goals
for the brigade combat teams and the functional supporting brigades.
While we agree that the Army Training Strategy and ARFORGEN planning
templates include some constructive training events, they are not
clearly identified as constructive training. In addition, unlike live
and virtual training, no total activity goals are established for
constructive training. Consequently, we revised our recommendation to
direct the Army to modify the planning templates to clearly identify
which events are constructive training and the goals associated with
it.
DOD concurred with comments to our recommendation that Army develop
metrics that support the Army's training strategy by objectively and
reliably measuring achievement against the Army's overall performance
goal, but noted that it currently uses a combination of objective and
subjective metrics to measure unit readiness. However, as stated in our
report these objective metrics--such as the number of personnel,
equipment, and the status of the equipment--do not relate directly to
training. Training is subjectively evaluated based on the professional
judgment of the unit commander. We recognize that the Army continues to
adapt and refine the metrics used to evaluate unit readiness, however
we continue to believe our recommendation to increase the objectivity
and reliability of training metrics has merit.
DOD concurred with comment to our recommendation that the Army review
and revise the funding model used to support the Army's training
strategy so that it captures all of the costs associated with achieving
the Army's performance goals. DOD stated that its TRM captures the
Army's operations tempo requirements, but does not include training
infrastructure requirements. DOD explained that these other costs are
quantified and forecasted by the training resource management process,
which incorporates data and estimates from multiple sources, and the
outputs of which are reviewed, validated, and approved by Army staff.
We have modified our report to recognize that the model is part of a
broader process for estimating these costs. However, we continue to
believe that the model DOD uses to estimate operations and maintenance
costs does not provide a realistic estimate of training costs since it
is based on the full execution of the planning templates, even though
units are not required to complete all the events identified in the
templates, and have clarified our recommendation accordingly.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Army revise and adjust
its training strategy to account for the current high-level of
operations so that it includes a plan to support full-spectrum threat
training when most of the force is deployed. The Army is currently
revising its strategy to recognize that it needs the capability to
respond to a full-spectrum threat. This revised strategy is scheduled
to be presented to Army leadership for a decision in fall 2007.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to clarify the capacity
needed at the combat training centers to support the expanded modular
force. In its written response, DOD noted that the Army has
continuously identified and updated the throughput and capacity demands
required of its combat training centers to support the brigade combat
team modular force. It noted that this process led the Army to identify
the need to establish the ETC that is intended to increase training
capacity through an ARFORGEN synchronization process, which prioritizes
and allocates training rotations. In June 2007, the Army updated its
capacity evaluation to support its increased end strength. DOD stated
that by establishing two ETCs in the United States and an ETC in
Germany to augment its existing three maneuver combat training centers,
the Army will be able to meet the requirements of the 76 brigade combat
team force. While we have not yet conducted a detailed analysis of the
Army's evaluation, we believe this evaluation complies with the intent
of our recommendation. In addition, the Army's analysis of its capacity
requirements would be enhanced by completing the proof of principle
testing for the ETC. The results of this testing will provide the Army
with the insight needed to determine if the capability is the most
appropriate approach to meet its future capacity demands and to develop
resource requirements for the ETC.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish milestones for
conducting the proof of principle testing and stated that the Army
plans to conduct the test in August 2008. However, we note that the
Army will not have the results of this testing before submitting its
fiscal year 2009 budget request. As such, we revised our recommendation
to stress the need to complete this testing, validate its concept, and
use the results to adjust its fiscal year 2009 and any future funding
requests as needed.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to other
interested parties upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202)-512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are Laura
Durland, Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon; Renee S. Brown; Natasha
Ewing; Kevin Handley; John W. Lee; Lonnie J. McAllister II; and Tamika
Weerasingha.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In conducting this review, we first examined the language of Public Law
No. 109-163 Section 353, which directs the reporting of the Army's
implementation of its training strategy. On the basis of this mandate,
we assessed the extent to which the strategy addresses the five
elements specified in the public law by reviewing relevant regulations
and by using as a model the principles embodied in the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). We identified criteria for
the Army's training strategy in the mandate language and in GPRA and
the guidance for implementing GPRA. We used these criteria to evaluate
how the strategy addressed the elements and to what degree further
development is needed. Furthermore, we reviewed the Army's report to
Congress on the Army training strategy to assess how the Army says it
meets the requirements of the mandate. Moreover, we performed content
and data analysis to determine if the elements identified by the Army
met the requirements of the mandate, and to determine what implementing
instructions and guidance have been developed. We also examined the
extent to which funds and resources have been expended or programmed to
support the strategy.
In order to determine how the five elements are adapted into the
training strategy and to obtain information about the current status of
the Army training strategy, we interviewed Army personnel at the
Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau, three combat training
centers, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Forces Command, and
the United States Army, Europe responsible for developing and
implementing the training strategy. Specifically, we interviewed
various officials at the Department of the Army Office of the G-3/5/7
to discuss the details and status of the training resource model and
the training strategy's master plans. Additionally, we reviewed
documentation provided in the meetings to further assist our analysis.
To ensure that we did not overlook the National Guard's perspective, we
spoke with the National Guard regarding the effect of the Army's
overall training strategy and its implementation. Additionally we
visited two of the Army's three maneuver combat training centers--the
Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, and the
National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California--as well as the
Battle Command Training Program combat training center in Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. During these visits, we spoke to Army officials in
charge of training to obtain an understanding of the training processes
at the centers and to assess the implementation of the training
strategy into their specific processes. Furthermore, to identify the
constraints that may prevent the Army from implementing its training
strategy and the potential impact on implementation, we reviewed the
Army's strategy and schedule for implementation. Additionally, we spoke
with training leaders to obtain their perspectives on the challenges we
identified, what they recognized as challenges, and how they felt these
challenges will affect the implementation of the strategy. Finally we
compared the Army training strategy with the reports and testimony of
the Army's training leaders in the field to identify and verify the
possible constraints.
We conducted our review from August 2006 through June 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
Personnel And Readiness:
18 July 2007:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report GAO-0-7-936, "Military
Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's Strategy for
Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges," dated
June 19, 2007 (GAO Code 350917).
The DoD appreciates the opportunity to provide input to this report.
The training of the modular force while at war is a challenging
endeavor. The Army has several key initiatives underway which address
many of the issues noted in the draft report. The DoD concurs with
recommendation Four. We concur with comment on recommendations Two,
Three, and Six. The DoD non-concurs with recommendations One, and Five.
Detailed comments are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Readiness:
Enclosure:
As Stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated June 19, 2007 GAO Code 350917/GAO-07-936:
"Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's
Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation
Challenges"
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish milestones for developing
constructive training goals for modular brigade combat teams and
functional supporting brigades.
DOD Response: The DoD non-concurs. The constructive training goals are
documented in both the Army Training Strategy and the Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN) training templates. As stated on page 8 of the
Army Training Strategy, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
executes its support to ARFORGEN with leader and staff seminars
throughout a unit's training cycle and a Brigade Command and Battle
Staff Training exercise for BCTs early in their Reset/Train period.
BCTP will be responsible for training functional and support brigade
headquarters utilizing a Support Brigade Command and Staff Exercise
beginning in FY2008. The ARFORGEN training templates establish
constructive training goals in each phase of the ARFORGEN cycle for
BCTs and functional/support brigades. AC Corps/Divisions conduct two
BCTPs during their ARFORGEN training cycle.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop metrics that support the
Army's training strategy by objectively and reliably measuring
achievement against the Army's overall performance goal.
DOD Response: The DoD concurs with comment. The Army is and will
continually adapt and refine training of the force to meet the
realities of the current threat, operational environment, and other
factors. We cannot predict what the enemy will do nor the conditions
under which we will conduct operations, therefore the training strategy
provides commanders a "doctrinal training template" that they modify
based on the current operating environment, time, personnel and
equipment available, into a "situational training template". They are
assisted by feedback and lessons learned from units in combat.
Army unit commanders measure their readiness against the unit's core
mission for which it was designed and organized and, upon receiving a
directed mission, they also measure readiness against it. This
assessment is made by the commander with a focus on mission
accomplishment which serves as the basis for an informed decision using
measures of resources in four key areas; personnel, equipment on hand,
equipment readiness, and training. These areas yield a C-level
assessment for unit readiness. The commander then has the prerogative
to change (raise or lower) this assessment if he/she feels a change
yields a more accurate assessment of the unit's readiness. Finally,
this evaluation by the commander is an informed, objective evaluation
in which the commander will also leverage his/her experience, training,
education, and judgment to make the final assessment.
The DoD is implementing the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
which focuses on mission accomplishment. The commander assesses the
unit's ability to execute its mission based on designated mission
essential tasks. The tasks have specified conditions and standards that
the commander uses to inform the assessment. The commander also
considers the availability and status of resources to inform this
assessment. The DRRS is currently being implemented throughout the
Army. Until the transition is complete, the Army continues to use the
legacy reporting system. The Army has established ARFORGEN readiness
metrics/goals as published in the ARFORGEN Implementation plan (Annex F
to the Army Campaign Plan). Readiness reporting published in AR 220-1
also establishes key objective data points and information requirements
that will allow the Anny to track a unit's level of tactical
proficiency as it progresses through the ARFORGEN cycle.
The continuing process of assessing readiness, while a unit progresses
through the ARFORGEN cycle, allows the Army to adapt and respond to the
current threat. Our training strategy and the metrics we use to measure
combat readiness is working and sustaining our warfighting readiness.
We see the results every day in Afghanistan and Iraq. In support of
this recommendation, the Army will continue to take steps to ensure we
employ the appropriate metrics that accurately measure ARFORGEN
performance goals and combat readiness.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to review and revise the funding model
used to support the Army's training strategy so that it captures all of
the costs associated with achieving the Army's performance goals.
DoD Response: The DoD concurs with comment. The Training Resource Model
(TRM) is under constant review and revision. The TRM has adapted over
time to support the validation and resourcing of Transformation,
ARFORGEN, and, most recently, the Grow-The-Army training requirements.
The TRM is a single model that accounts for every validated Operations
Tempo requirement. These requirements are focused on unit operations
and maintenance and by design do not include all of the training
infrastructure requirements. The TRM has evolved just as the Army and
the training strategy have evolved. The model contains the approved
ARFORGEN BCT training strategies and costs each unit in its respective
year of the multi year strategy. As such, the Army does have a model
that reflects the overarching performance goals of the ARFORGEN
training strategy.
The GAO report states that the current funding model does not account
for all the costs; specifically, the model does not include the costs
of expanding the combat training centers. The operations and
maintenance costs related to the Exportable Training Capability (ETC)
have been identified by the Army and are reflected in the Training
Resource Model (TRM).
TRM is part of a larger training resource management process (PPBS) and
a methodology that accurately quantifies, forecasts and prioritizes
Army training requirements. The methodology encompasses a rigorous
validation process that accurately captures all institutional,
operational, and training support requirements. It includes cost
estimates developed thru the TRM, ITRM (Institutional Training Resource
Model), the Combat Training Center Directorate of TRADOC and the
resource processes of the Training Support Systems. The outputs of all
of these sources are reviewed, validated and approved by the Army's
Training Program Evaluation Group which operates under the G3/5/7. It
is this body that provides the single resource point of contact for
training resources. The Army is committed to constantly reviewing the
overall resource management process to ensure we accurately quantify
and forecast Army training requirements.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to revise and adjust the training
strategy to account for the current high-level of operations so that it
includes a plan to support full-spectrum threat training when most of
the force is deployed.
DoD Response: The DoD concurs. In January 2007, the Army began an
effort to revise its Training and Leader Development Strategy. The
revised strategy is scheduled to be presented to the Army leadership
for a decision in the Fall of 2007. A draft version of the revised
strategy was provided to GAO on June 26, 2007. This is a strategic
document that applies to the Army's total force, not just to brigade
combat teams and functional support brigades. The strategy describes a
vision, with specific goals and objectives to be assessed at the
strategic level. The capability for the Army to respond to a full-
spectrum threat is a continuous theme restated throughout the strategy.
In the near term, the Army is addressing ways to increase training time
and regain full spectrum capabilities. Training guidance at the
tactical level is addressing more core mission essential task list
(CMETL) maneuver at home station and devoting more time to high
intensity conflict training at the Combat Maneuver Training Centers
(CMTCs).
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to clarify the capacity needed at the
combat training centers to support the expanded modular force.
DoD Response: The DoD non-concurs. Since October 2004 and under the
ARFORGEN process and the CTC Way Ahead Study, the Army has been
continuously identifying and updating throughput/capacity demands for
the CTCs to support the BCT Modular Force. Based on the analysis
conducted during the CTC Way Ahead Study and considering the current
capacity of the maneuver OTCs, the Army will establish the first CONUS
Exportable Training Capability (ETC) in FY 2010 and has programmed to
do so. The ARFORGEN Synchronization process will prioritize and
allocate CTC (and ETC) training rotations support training requirements
associated with training the expanded modular force. Additionally, the
Army is also programming resources to bring a second CONUS ETC on line
in FY2012 to provide additional modular force training capabilities.
Bottom Line: The CTC program with two CONUS ETC, the Joint Multi-
National Training Center (JMRC) as a dual missioned CTC, the Joint
Readiness Training Center, and the National Training Center (NTC) will
be able to meet the ARFORGEN requirements for 76 Modular BCTs. The Army
maintains a rigorous review of the CTC program and will continue to
ensure the CTCs meet current and future training requirements.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish milestones for completing
the proof of principle for the exportable training capability, complete
the testing, and use the results to factor into future funding
requests.
DoD Response: The DoD concurs with comment. The Army has established
milestones for executing the proof of principle event in FY2008 and has
programmed resources for this purpose. At the time of the initial GAO
inquiry in Feb 2007, the Army was tentatively planning to conduct the
ETC proof of principle in FY2007, but has now established milestones to
execute the proof of principle in FY2008. The Army will also leverage
previous experience gained conducting CTC supported mission rehearsal
exercises at unit home stations in support of the Iraq "surge"
initiative in its exportable training capability concept. The Army has
exported six CTC rotations over the last few years, including two this
year to Fort Stewart and Fort Lewis.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Army's combat training centers enable commanders, their staffs,
and units to execute advanced training under a variety of conditions
that approximate actual combat as closely as possible. The combat
training centers include the Battle Command Training Program at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, which focuses on computer-assisted battle
commander-centric training exercises at the Joint Task Force, Army,
corps, division, and brigade levels, and the maneuver combat training
centers--the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels,
Germany; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana;
and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California--which
conduct brigade-sized live training exercises.
[2] Live training is that which is conducted in a physical environment.
Virtual simulation training provides crews, leaders, and units with
realistic training experiences using sophisticated simulators.
Constructive simulation training is the use of computer models and game-
type simulations.
[3] National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2006 (2006).
[4] Department of the Army, Report to Congress, Subject: Army Training
Strategy for Brigade Based Combat Teams and Functional Supporting
Brigades (Washington, D.C.: December 2006).
[5] Army Chief of Staff Memorandum, Transformation of Training
(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006).
[6] Army Posture Statement 2007, February 14, 2007.
[7] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[8] Specific information about the length of time spent in training is
classified.
[9] The centers can surge to accommodate 32 rotations a year.
[10] Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006).
[11] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006).
[12] See GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, app. I, GAO-03-143 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).
[13] Collective training is training that is conducted within a unit
and focused on preparing the unit to perform its assigned missions.
[14] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (2) (D) (2006).
[15] In June 2002, DOD issued a directive establishing the Department
of Defense Readiness Reporting System. This system is intended to
measure and report on the readiness of military forces and the
supporting infrastructure to meet missions and goals assigned by the
Secretary of Defense. All DOD components are required to align their
readiness reporting processes in accordance with the directive.
[16] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (2) (E) (2006).
[17] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (1) (2006).
[18] Specific information about the length of time spent in training is
classified.
[19] According to an Army official, the maneuver combat training
centers could surge to conduct additional rotations--adding one each at
the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center
and two rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center for a
total of 32 combat training rotations per year.
[20] Secretary of Defense, Testimony on Iraq to the House Armed
Services Committee (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2007).
[21] Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/2009 Budget
Estimates, Operation and Maintenance, Army, Justification Book
(Washington, D.C.: February 2007).
[22] Army Regulation 350-50, Combat Training Center Program,
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2003).
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