Defense Infrastructure
Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam Gao ID: GAO-07-1015 September 12, 2007Over the next several years, implementation of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will result in the realignment of U.S. forces and the construction of new facilities costing billions of dollars at installations overseas. The Senate and House reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to monitor DOD's overseas master plans and to provide congressional defense committees with assessments each year. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report, first, examines how the overseas plans have changed and the extent to which they address the challenges faced by DOD and, second, assesses the status of DOD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam.
The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans, which provide infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands' area of responsibility, have been updated to reflect U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements as well as GAO's prior recommendations for improving the plans. The plans also address DOD's challenges to a greater extent than they did in previous years. However, two areas continue to be of concern. First, the master plans do not address the issue of residual value--that is, the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. Although DOD officials believe that residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be in the master plans, compensation received for U.S capital improvements at installations returned to host nations could affect U.S. funding requirements for overseas construction. Second, the master plan for PACOM, which provides details on the command's training limitations in Japan and several other challenges, does not provide details regarding training limitations for the Air Force in South Korea, which could cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas basing plans. Without addressing the residual value issue and providing details on these training challenges, DOD cannot provide Congress a comprehensive view enabling it to make informed decisions regarding funding. GAO has previously recommended that overseas regional commands address residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing training limitations. Because these recommendations have not been fully addressed, GAO considers them to be open and believes that they still have merit. DOD's planning effort for the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. Among the challenges to be addressed is completing the required environmental impact statement, initiated in March 2007. According to DOD officials, this statement and associated record of decision could take up to 3 years to complete and will affect many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military infrastructure development--decisions needed to develop a master plan for the military buildup on Guam. DOD and the services are still determining the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam, needed in order to identify the housing, operational, quality of life, and services support infrastructure required for the Marine Corps realignment and the other services' buildup. DOD officials said that additional time is needed to fully address other challenges associated with the Guam military buildup, including funding requirements, operational requirements, and community impact. Until the environmental assessment and initial planning efforts are completed, Congress will need to be kept abreast of developments and challenges affecting infrastructure and funding decisions to make appropriate funding and oversight decisions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-1015, Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2007:
Defense Infrastructure:
Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress
Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam:
Defense Infrastructure:
GAO-07-1015:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1015, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Over the next several years, implementation of the Department of
Defense‘s (DOD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will
result in the realignment of U.S. forces and the construction of new
facilities costing billions of dollars at installations overseas. The
Senate and House reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military
construction appropriation bill directed GAO to monitor DOD‘s overseas
master plans and to provide congressional defense committees with
assessments each year. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year
2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review
DOD‘s master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews.
This report, first, examines how the overseas plans have changed and
the extent to which they address the challenges faced by DOD and,
second, assesses the status of DOD‘s planning effort and the challenges
associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on
Guam.
What GAO Found:
The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans, which provide
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the
overseas regional commands‘ area of responsibility, have been updated
to reflect U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements as
well as GAO‘s prior recommendations for improving the plans. The plans
also address DOD‘s challenges to a greater extent than they did in
previous years. However, two areas continue to be of concern. First,
the master plans do not address the issue of residual value”that is,
the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its
reuse of property. Although DOD officials believe that residual value
cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be in the master
plans, compensation received for U.S capital improvements at
installations returned to host nations could affect U.S. funding
requirements for overseas construction. Second, the master plan for
PACOM, which provides details on the command‘s training limitations in
Japan and several other challenges, does not provide details regarding
training limitations for the Air Force in South Korea, which could
cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in
other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas
basing plans. Without addressing the residual value issue and providing
details on these training challenges, DOD cannot provide Congress a
comprehensive view enabling it to make informed decisions regarding
funding. GAO has previously recommended that overseas regional commands
address residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to
address existing training limitations. Because these recommendations
have not been fully addressed, GAO considers them to be open and
believes that they still have merit.
DOD‘s planning effort for the buildup of military forces and
infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key
decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. Among the challenges to
be addressed is completing the required environmental impact statement,
initiated in March 2007. According to DOD officials, this statement and
associated record of decision could take up to 3 years to complete and
will affect many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and
makeup of the military infrastructure development”decisions needed to
develop a master plan for the military buildup on Guam. DOD and the
services are still determining the exact size and makeup of the forces
to be moved to Guam, needed in order to identify the housing,
operational, quality of life, and services support infrastructure
required for the Marine Corps realignment and the other services‘
buildup. DOD officials said that additional time is needed to fully
address other challenges associated with the Guam military buildup,
including funding requirements, operational requirements, and community
impact. Until the environmental assessment and initial planning efforts
are completed, Congress will need to be kept abreast of developments
and challenges affecting infrastructure and funding decisions to make
appropriate funding and oversight decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not recommending executive action. However, Congress should
require DOD to report on residual value and U.S. Pacific Command‘s
(PACOM) training limitations, as well as periodically on its planning
efforts for Guam and efforts to address various challenges. DOD
believes congressional action is not necessary.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies
and Requirements, Key Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations:
Planning Effort for Guam Is in Its Initial Stages with Many Key
Decisions and Challenges to Be Addressed:
Concluding Observations:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Proposed Increase in the Numbers of Active Duty Military
Personnel and Dependents on Guam:
Figures:
Figure 1: Location of Guam:
Figure 2: U.S. Military Installations on Guam:
Figure 3: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of Responsibility:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EUCOM: U.S. European Command:
JGPO: Joint Guam Program Office:
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command:
USFK: U.S. Forces Korea:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 12, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
Over the next several years, the ongoing implementation of the
Department of Defense's (DOD) integrated global presence and basing
strategy will result in a global realignment of U.S. forces and
installations, including a reduction of the number of troops stationed
overseas and a consolidation of overseas bases. While the strategy is
intended to make the overseas posture of the United States more
flexible and efficient, it will also require new facilities costing
billions of dollars, some of the cost to be borne by the United States
and some by other nations, such as Japan and South Korea. A key
component of the U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) integrated global
presence and basing strategy is the proposed military buildup on the
island of Guam--a U.S. territory located in the western Pacific Ocean.
This buildup includes personnel, weapons systems, and infrastructure of
all the military services--Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The
most ambitious undertaking involves moving approximately 8,000 marines
and their estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam.
As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations
Committee expressed concern about the use of military construction
budget authority for projects at overseas bases that may soon be
obsolete or closed because of changes being considered by DOD and the
military services. Accordingly, the Senate report accompanying the
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed
DOD[Footnote 1] to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for
changing infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in
each of the overseas regional commands.[Footnote 2] DOD was required to
provide a baseline report on these plans, along with yearly updates on
their status and their implementation with the annual military
construction budget submissions through 2008. Subsequently, the House
conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction
appropriation bill directed the department to prepare comprehensive
master plans with yearly updates through fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 3]
The Senate report directed that the master plans identify precise
facility requirements and the status of properties being returned to
host nations. Additionally, the Senate report stated that the plans
should identify funding requirements as well as the division of funding
responsibilities between the United States and host nations. The Senate
report also directed us to monitor the master plans developed and
implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the
congressional defense committees with assessment reports each year. In
July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military
construction appropriation bill directed us to review DOD's master
planning effort for Guam as part of our annual review of the overseas
master plans.[Footnote 4]
This is our fourth report responding to the requirements contained in
the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill
report. Our prior work found that DOD's overseas master plans generally
exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress, but that
there were opportunities for improvement.[Footnote 5] This report
examines, first, how the overseas master plans have changed since last
year, and the extent to which the plans address the challenges faced by
DOD during implementation. Second, representing our initial examination
of DOD's planning effort for the Guam military buildup, this report
assesses the status of DOD's planning effort and the challenges
associated with the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on
Guam.
In conducting our work, we visited overseas regional combatant
commands--PACOM, including U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces
Japan; U.S. European Command (EUCOM); and U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM)--to see selected installations and military construction
projects firsthand and to discuss compliance with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most recent guidance[Footnote 6] and the
challenges the commands face in implementing the plans. After the plans
were issued,[Footnote 7] we reviewed them to determine how the plans
have changed since last year and the extent to which the plans complied
with the congressional reporting requirements. We assessed whether the
plans provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner,
and we discussed with OSD and command officials whether improvements in
the guidance and reporting were needed. We generally concluded that a
plan was improved over those of prior years if it included details on
base categories, host nation funding levels, facility requirements and
costs, environmental remediation issues, and other challenges affecting
implementation of the plans. To determine the status of the Guam
planning effort, we met with officials of OSD, PACOM, and the Navy
Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO)--the office established to plan and
execute the military development on Guam--to discuss the status of
DOD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup of
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. We also visited U.S.
Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Army Pacific;
and Pacific Air Forces to discuss the various factors that can affect
U.S. infrastructure requirements and costs in Guam, and we reviewed
information included in the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan-
-a notional document detailing the future military development on Guam
over the next decade and beyond.[Footnote 8] It is important to note
that DOD considers the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan to be
separate and distinct from the overseas master plans that it provides
Congress annually in response to the Senate report and House conference
report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction
appropriation bill. In Guam, we visited the Naval Base Guam and
Andersen Air Force Base to tour existing installations and facilities
and observe future sites for military construction firsthand and to
identify challenges to these plans. We also met with the Governor of
Guam and his staff, members of the Guam legislature, staff from the
Office of the Delegate of Guam for the House of Representatives, and
various community groups to discuss their perspectives on the
challenges associated with the influx of military personnel and
missions to Guam.
We conducted our review from September 2006 through July 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix I for more information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans, which provide
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the
overseas regional commands' area of responsibility, have been updated
to reflect U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements and
our prior recommendations for improving the plans, and they address
DOD's challenges to a greater extent than in previous years. However,
they do not address the issue of residual value and the PACOM master
plan does not provide details regarding training challenges for the Air
Force in South Korea. The plans incorporate key changes associated with
the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategies. For
example, the plans describe the department's recent efforts to
establish missile defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland and
the creation of U.S. Africa Command. This year's plans also provide
information to respond to most of our prior recommendations. For
example, in 2006 we recommended that the plans explain how their
implementation could be affected by other relevant and related defense
plans and activities, and the 2008 plans describe how PACOM's force
structure plans are linked to the military buildup on Guam, and how
CENTCOM's increased troop strength and facilities requirements in Iraq
and Afghanistan are linked to ongoing operations in its area of
responsibility. This year, the overseas master plans provide a more
comprehensive description of the challenges DOD faces in implementing
the plans than they have done in previous years. Specifically, the
master plans address the uncertainties associated with host nations and
recent agreements, and they generally reflect environmental concerns
and training limitations where those exist. Two areas continue to be of
concern. First, OSD does not address the issue of residual value--the
value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its
reuse of property--in its guidance to the commands, and consequently
the master plans omit this information. That is because officials
believe that residual value, which is often diminished by actual or
anticipated environmental remediation costs, cannot be readily
predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the master plans. We
recognize the uncertainties associated with predicting residual value
of land and facilities returned to host nations. However, since 1989,
the U.S. government has received approximately $592 million in residual
value and payment-in-kind compensation[Footnote 9] from property
returns in EUCOM's area of responsibility, and EUCOM continues to
aggressively seek compensation for U.S. capital improvements at
installations returned to host nations, which could thus affect U.S.
funding requirements for overseas construction. As EUCOM continues the
return of facilities in Germany, Italy, and Iceland, this figure may
increase. Accordingly, we continue to believe that residual value
should be addressed in the master plans. A second area of concern is
that PACOM's master plan, which provides details on the command's
training limitations in Japan and several other challenges, does not
provide details on the challenges the Air Force faces with training in
South Korea. Senior USFK officials told us that these limitations could
cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in
other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas
basing plans. In May 2007, USFK officials said that some progress had
been made in addressing the Air Force's training challenges in South
Korea and that they expected the needed upgrades to possibly be
completed by mid-2007. We have previously recommended that overseas
regional commands address residual value issues and that PACOM explain
how it plans to address existing training limitations in our prior
reports and, because these recommendations have not been fully
addressed, we consider them to be open and also continue to believe
they have merit.
DOD's planning effort for the buildup of military forces and
infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key
decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. While the Guam Integrated
Military Development Plan provides an overview of the projected
military population, units, and infrastructure requirements for future
military realignments on Guam, it is not a master plan and does not
specify individual facility or infrastructure projects, nor does it
direct individual service programming actions or provide for specific
funding requirements. Also, the plan is not intended to meet the Senate
Appropriations Committee's mandate to provide a master plan for the
military buildup on Guam by December 2006.[Footnote 10] Among the
challenges to be addressed first is the required environmental impact
statement--initiated on March 7, 2007--which could take up to 3 years
to complete, according to DOD officials. According to these officials,
the results of the required environmental impact statement may affect
many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of
the military infrastructure development--decisions needed to develop a
master plan for Guam. Additionally, DOD and the services are still
finalizing the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam,
which must be determined in order to identify the housing, operational,
quality of life, and services support infrastructure required for the
Marine Corps realignment and the other services' buildup. DOD officials
also said that additional time is needed to fully address other
challenges associated with the military buildup. For example:
* Funding requirements are not yet fully identified and may be
difficult to meet given other DOD priorities and funding constraints,
according to DOD officials. DOD agencies, such as the Defense Logistics
Agency and Defense Education Activity, that will help support the
services' influx of personnel, missions, and equipment to Guam will
likely incur costs that are not yet included in current cost estimates
for the military buildup. Even so, costs for the total military buildup
on Guam are estimated at $13 billion, with the realignment of the
Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam estimated at $10.3 billion. The
remainder of the costs will be used to construct a Navy pier and
station an Army ballistic missile defense task force on Guam. The
Government of Japan has agreed to contribute about $6.1 billion toward
the costs of the Marine Corps move, although a portion of these funds
will be repaid by the U.S. government through rent or service charges.
Nevertheless, given other DOD priorities and funding constraints, DOD
officials are concerned about their ability to obtain a continuous flow
of funds adequate to pay the costs of the Guam buildup due to pressures
on DOD's budget from the cost of current operations. The Government of
Japan may also encounter challenges in funding its share of the Marine
Corps move, considering Japan's other national priorities and its
commitment under the defense policy initiatives with the United
States.[Footnote 11]
* Operational challenges have not been fully addressed, such as a plan
to provide appropriate mobility support and training capabilities to
meet Marine Corps requirements. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, officials
noted that during a contingency operation, the U.S. Marines in Guam
after the move from Okinawa will depend on strategic military sealift
and airlift to reach destinations in Asia that will be farther away
than was the case when they were based in Okinawa, Japan. For example,
in a contingency operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to
deploy from Sasebo, Japan, or another location to transport soldiers
and equipment in Guam to the area where the contingency is taking
place. In addition, existing training opportunities in Guam are not
sufficient to meet the training requirements of the projected Marine
Corps force.
* Many of Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements have
not been fully addressed. Historically, for example, construction
capacity on Guam has been approximately $800 million per year, as
compared with the estimated construction capacity of more than $3
billion per year projected to be needed by DOD to meet the planned
fiscal year 2014 completion date. DOD's preliminary analysis indicates
that 15,000 to 20,000 workers will be required to support this
development, which will likely necessitate additional foreign workers,
training of the workers, and support facilities, such as housing and
medical care. Similarly, demands on Guam's roads, port capabilities,
and utility services--such as electrical generation, wastewater
treatment, and solid waste disposal--can be expected with the military
buildup, and these have not been fully addressed. Without effective
partnering with other federal departments and coordination with the
Government of Guam, it will be difficult to successfully address many
of these unique requirements.
To further facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and other
users of the overseas master plans, Congress should consider requiring
DOD to ensure that future master plans address residual value issues
and future PACOM plans address existing training limitations. Congress
should consider requiring DOD, until it develops a master plan, to
report periodically on the status of its planning efforts on Guam,
including environmental assessments, the size and makeup of the forces
to be moved to Guam, and other challenges associated with the military
buildup. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that
congressional action was not necessary. We continue to believe that our
matters for congressional consideration have merit. We discuss DOD's
comments in detail later in this report. DOD also provided technical
comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated where
appropriate.
Background:
Military construction appropriations fund the planning, design,
construction, alteration, and improvement of military facilities
worldwide. The military construction appropriation request for fiscal
year 2008 included approximately $21.3 billion for military
construction and family housing, of which nearly $1.2 billion (5.6
percent) is designated for specific overseas locations, mostly
comprising enduring installations, and not for new and emerging
requirements outside existing basing structures.[Footnote 12] As of
fiscal year 2006, DOD had 3,731 installations, with 766 installations
located overseas.
DOD's Global Realignment:
In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a
defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global
threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining
overseas basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military
flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide. In
September 2001, DOD issued its Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which
addressed, among other issues, reorienting the U.S. military global
posture. The report called for developing a permanent basing system
that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of
the world as well as providing temporary access to facilities in
foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to train and operate in the
absence of permanent ranges and bases.
In August 2004, President Bush announced what has been described as the
most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since
the end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no
longer needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S.
forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in
strategic locations around the world. The integrated global presence
and basing strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies,
including the overseas basing and requirements study, the overseas
presence study, and the U.S. global posture study.
As a part of DOD's global realignment, in 2004 the United States and
Japan began a series of sustained security consultations aimed at
strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance to better address
today's rapidly changing global security environment. DOD's Defense
Policy Review Initiative established a framework for the future of U.S.
force structure in Japan designed to create the conditions to reduce
the burden on local Japanese communities and create a continuing
presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including
Guam, while repositioning U.S. forces to respond better to regional
crises. This initiative also includes a significant reduction and
reorganization of the Marine Corps posture on Okinawa, Japan, to
include relocating 8,000 marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents
to Guam. More than 10,000 marines and their dependents will remain
stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. The initiatives also
include the relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five from Atsugi Naval Air
Facility to Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan; the replacement of
the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station, Japan; transformation of
Army headquarters at Camp Zama, Japan; deployment of a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan; deployment of a
transportable ballistic missile defense radar system; relocation of
training activities; land returns; and shared use of facilities.
Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States and is
strategically located in the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,810 miles
southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii; 1,600 miles east of Manila, the
Philippines; and 1,560 miles southeast of Tokyo, Japan (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Location of Guam:
[See PDF for image]
Source: PACOM.
[End of figure]
Given its strategic location, Guam is an integral part of DOD's
logistical support system and serves as an important forward
operational hub for a mix of military mission requirements. According
to DOD, Guam provides strategic flexibility, freedom of action, and
prompt global action for the Global War on Terrorism, peace and wartime
engagement, and crisis response. About 29 percent of the land is
controlled by DOD (see fig. 2), 52 percent is privately owned, and 19
percent is under the supervision of the Government of Guam.
Figure 2: U.S. Military Installations on Guam:
[See PDF for image]
Source: PACOM.
Notes: ESQD is the explosive safety quantity distance arc, which
represents the prescribed minimum distance between explosive storing or
handling sites and specified exposures, such as inhabited buildings and
public highways. NCTS is the Naval Computer Telecommunications Station.
GLUP 77, the Guam Land Use Plan 1977, refers to Navy land scheduled to
be returned to the Government of Guam.
[End of figure]
Requirements for the Overseas Master Plans and a Master Plan for the
Military Buildup on Guam:
In 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern that the
overseas basing structure had not been updated to reflect the new
realities of the post-Cold War world.[Footnote 13] The committee has
also expressed concern about the use of military construction budget
authority for projects at bases that may soon be obsolete because of
changes being considered in overseas presence and basing. Consequently,
in Senate Report 108-82, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed
DOD to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for the changing
infrastructure requirements for U.S. military facilities in each of its
overseas regional commands. According to the Senate report, at a
minimum, the plans are to identify precise facility requirements and
the status of properties being returned to host nations. In addition,
the report stated that the plans should identify funding requirements
and the division of funding responsibilities between the United States
and cognizant host nations. The Senate report also directed DOD to
provide congressional defense committees a report on the status and
implementation of those plans with each yearly military construction
budget submission through fiscal year 2008. Subsequently, the House
conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction
appropriation bill also directed the department to prepare
comprehensive master plans with yearly updates through fiscal year
2009. The first report was due with the fiscal year 2005 military
construction budget submission and is to be updated each succeeding
year to reflect changes to the plans involving specific construction
projects being added, canceled, or modified, or funding for those
projects being redirected to other needs, and justification for such
changes. The Senate report also directed GAO to monitor the
comprehensive master plans being developed and implemented for the
overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense
committees with a report each year giving an assessment of the plans.
As initiatives for expanding U.S. military presence on Guam began to
emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness of
the military construction program and the need for a well-developed
master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure.
In July 2006, the committee recommended deferral of two military
construction projects at Andersen Air Force Base that were included in
the President's budget request until such time as they can be
incorporated into a master plan for Guam and viewed in that context. To
that end, the committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to
the appropriations committees a master plan for Guam by December 29,
2006, and a report accounting for the United States' share of this
construction program to project-level detail and the year in which each
project is expected to be funded.[Footnote 14] The Senate report also
directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of
its annual review of DOD's overseas master plans.
DOD Organizations and Responsibilities:
Within DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics was tasked to prepare the detailed, comprehensive master
plans. In turn, the Under Secretary assigned the overseas regional
combatant commands responsibility for preparing comprehensive master
plans for their areas of responsibility. As shown in figure 3, PACOM
coordinates East Asia and South Asia; EUCOM coordinates much of sub-
Saharan Africa and Europe, as well as the Indian Ocean islands off the
coast of southeast Africa; and CENTCOM coordinates efforts in the
Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia. Not shown are
Northern Command, which coordinates activities in North America, and
Southern Command, which coordinates activities in South America,
Central America, and the Caribbean. We did not include Northern and
Southern Commands in our review because they have significantly fewer
facilities outside of the United States than the other regional
commands in the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia. There are also four
functional unified combatant commands that are assigned worldwide
functional responsibilities not bounded by geography: Special
Operations Command, Strategic Command, Joint Forces Command, and
Transportation Command.[Footnote 15]
Figure 3: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of Responsibility:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
Note: This map does not reflect the future establishment of the U.S.
Africa Command. The Africa Command eventually will encompass the entire
continent of Africa except for Egypt, which will continue to fall under
CENTCOM's area of responsibility.
[End of figure]
Initial implementation details for the movement of U.S. Marines to Guam
and associated military construction projects took place under the
leadership of PACOM. In August 2006, OSD directed the Navy to establish
JGPO to facilitate, manage, and execute requirements associated with
the rebasing of Marine Corps assets from Okinawa to Guam, including
master planning efforts.[Footnote 16] The office's responsibilities
include integration of operational support requirements, development,
program, and budget synchronization; oversight of the construction; and
coordination of government and business activities. Specifically, JGPO
was tasked to lead the coordinated planning efforts among the DOD
components and other stakeholders to consolidate, optimize, and
integrate the existing DOD infrastructure capabilities on Guam. The
office is expected to work closely with the Government of Japan and the
local Guam government, other federal agencies, and Congress in order to
manage this comprehensive effort and to develop a master plan. At the
time of our review, JGPO and the Department of the Interior had formed
a federal interagency task force in order to coordinate efforts to
address issues relating to commerce, transportation, environment, and
other areas. JGPO falls under the direct oversight of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment.
Prior GAO Work:
In our prior work, we found that while DOD's master plans generally
exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress,
opportunities existed for the plans to provide more complete, clear,
and consistent information and to present a more definitive picture of
future requirements.
* In 2006, we reported that the master plans did not always explain how
their implementation could be affected by other relevant and related
defense plans and activities because there is not a requirement for
them to do so.[Footnote 17] However without such explanations and
linkage, it was difficult to determine the extent to which the master
plans were coordinated and synchronized with other defense plans and
activities and the effects these other activities have on the master
plans in terms of infrastructure and funding requirements. We also
reported that while the plans addressed a number of challenges that DOD
faced in implementation--such as uncertainties with host nation
relations and environmental concerns--PACOM's plan did not address
training limitations in South Korea and Japan. We explained how some of
these challenges could have a significant effect on infrastructure and
funding requirements and, because the plans did not always describe
such challenges and their potential effects, that Congress lacked the
complete picture it needed to evaluate the annual military construction
funding request.
* In 2005, we reported that without more complete, clear, and
consistent reporting of various items--host nation agreements and
funding levels, including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding
levels and sources in addition to military construction funds;
environmental remediation and restoration issues; population levels;
and facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S.
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific--across the master
plans, Congress and other users did not have the best data available to
facilitate their annual review and oversight.[Footnote 18] Also, we
reported that without the detailed information on individual
construction projects and the anticipated strategic end state of the
command's overseas basing infrastructure, Congress did not have the
best available and consistent data on which to track progress and
changes from year to year and between commands.
* In 2004, before DOD issued its initial overseas master plans, we
reported that various factors, such as residual property value,
environmental remediation, and the availability of multiple U.S.
funding sources, could affect the funding of U.S. infrastructure
overseas as well as the implementation of the plans once they were
issued.[Footnote 19] At that time, we recommended that the overseas
regional commands address these and other factors in the development of
their plans.
Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies
and Requirements, Key Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations:
The fiscal year 2008 master plans, which provide infrastructure
requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas
regional commands' area of responsibility, reflect changes--to include
recent decisions in the U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and
requirements--and they generally describe the challenges that DOD faces
in implementing the plans as well as our prior recommendations for
improving the plans. The plans generally incorporate key changes
associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing
strategies and provide a more comprehensive description of the
challenges DOD faces in implementing the plans than in previous years.
But while this year's plans provide information to respond to most of
our prior recommendations, they do not address residual value--that is,
the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its
reuse of property. Furthermore, PACOM's master plan does not describe
the challenges the Air Force faces in training in South Korea, although
it does describe for the first time the challenges addressing training
limitations in Japan.
Plans Reflect Key Changes in Overseas Basing Strategies and
Requirements:
This year's master plans incorporated key changes--including some very
recent changes--associated with the continuing evolution of U.S.
overseas basing strategies and requirements. In the 2008 master plans,
OSD recognized that further changes will result as it continues to
implement the global defense posture decisions. The department reported
that as the overseas political and military environment and strategic
landscape further evolve, global defense posture plans will continue to
mature to address new priorities. Specifically, several changes
identified in the overseas master plans included updated information
involving realignment initiatives in South Korea and Japan, DOD's
efforts to establish missile defense in Eastern Europe, and the
creation of U.S. Africa Command.
PACOM's master plan discussed the progress of dynamic realignment
initiatives, which will relocate military personnel and facilities in
South Korea and Japan. For example, last year PACOM reported that the
U.S. and Japanese governments had established an interim agreement in
October 2005 involving the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. This
year, PACOM updated this information by indicating that final
implementation documents were approved in May 2006. In addition, PACOM
described the importance of relocating 8,000 marines and their
dependents from Okinawa to Guam, returning additional land to Japan,
and retaining a forward Marine Corps command and control capability to
ensure a balanced, flexible contingency response capacity within the
Asia-Pacific region. With respect to South Korea, PACOM provided
information updating the status of the Land Partnership Plan and the
Yongsan Relocation Plan,[Footnote 20] including a list of U.S. military
camps and sites returned to the Government of South Korea, and
describing the results from the October 2006 meeting between the
Secretary of Defense and South Korea's Minister of Defense.
As a part of DOD's efforts to establish a U.S. presence in Eastern
Europe through a network of forward operating sites and cooperative
security locations, EUCOM's master plan stated that the United States
signed individual agreements with the governments of Romania and of
Bulgaria in 2005 and 2006, respectively, which will allow DOD access to
facilities and training sites. EUCOM also provided additional details,
such as the mission, planned capabilities, equipment and aircraft, and
population. Furthermore, EUCOM provided a status of ongoing
transformation realignments in its area of responsibility, including
listing the return of facilities to host nations, changes to its basing
categories, and the rationale for these realignments. The master plans
also described recent efforts to proceed with formal negotiations with
the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic on establishing
missile defense sites.
This year, DOD forecasted changes for next year's master plans
involving the development of a new command responsible for Africa,
which is expected to be established by September 30, 2008. The
President announced in February 2007 that the U.S. military will
establish a new, separate U.S. Africa Command to enhance security
cooperation, extend humanitarian assistance, and build partnership
capacity on the African continent. At the time of our review, U.S.
involvement in Africa is shared among three combatant commands. PACOM
is responsible for Madagascar, the Seychelles, and the Indian Ocean
area off the African coast. EUCOM is responsible for the largest swath
of the continent: North Africa; West Africa, including the Gulf of
Guinea; and central and southern Africa. CENTCOM covers the Horn of
Africa--including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, and
Sudan. There are 13 cooperative security locations throughout Africa
that historically have been identified in the EUCOM master plan. The
new U.S. Africa Command eventually will encompass the entire continent
of Africa except for Egypt, which will continue to fall under CENTCOM's
area of responsibility. Discussions are ongoing on the possible
headquarters location and what kinds of military forces would be
assigned to the command.
This year, the changes identified in the plans provided useful
information on evolving costs and facility requirements in overseas
basing. In addition, the commands continue to focus first on the
mission and then on the infrastructure requirements needed to support
the mission. For example, in CENTCOM's master plan, the descriptions of
each forward operating site focus first on the mission and then on
requirements by providing the type of mission the site has (such as
providing logistical support), the unit that it could host, and its
role in the region (such as supporting the war against terrorism or
strengthening capabilities for rapid and flexible response in the
central Asian states), as well as identifying the requirements for
equipment and facilities to support the mission at the site. All of the
commands provide similar information for their main operating bases,
forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations.
Even with the department's effort to update the plans as changes
occurred and decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. overseas
defense basing strategies and requirements continues. Accordingly, OSD
and the regional commands will be faced with more changes in the
future, and the changes occurring after this year's plans were
submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next year's plans.
Plans Generally Reflected Key Challenges:
The fiscal year 2008 master plans discussed a number of challenges that
DOD faces in the implementation of the plans, such as uncertainties
with host nation relations and environmental concerns. In our prior
reports, we explained how these challenges could have an effect on
infrastructure and funding requirements and, because the prior plans
did not always describe such challenges and their potential effects,
that Congress lacked the complete picture it needed to evaluate the
annual military construction funding requests. This year, the plans
provided a much more comprehensive description of challenges and the
potential effects on implementation.
This Year's Plans Provided More Complete Descriptions of Host Nation
Relations:
All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of
recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their fiscal
year 2008 master plans. In our review of the overseas master plans in
2005, we found that none of the commands fully explained the status of
or challenges to finalizing host nation agreements and recommended that
the commands briefly explain the status of negotiations with host
nations to provide more complete and clearer plans. These agreements
depend largely on the political environment and economic conditions in
host nations and can affect the extent of host nation support--access
to facilities or funding--to U.S. forces. Accordingly, the resulting
agreements may increase or decrease U.S.-funded costs for future
infrastructure changes. For example, this year:
* PACOM's master plan updated information on the results of the Defense
Policy Review Initiative, including the importance of certain
initiatives, such as the replacement of the Marine Corps Air Station
Futenma in hopes that it will lessen the effect of military aviation
operations on the local citizens of Japan. In addition, U.S. Forces
Japan identified decreasing funds for the Japanese facilities
improvement program, historically the source of major construction on
U.S. bases in Japan. U.S. Forces Japan anticipates the Government of
Japan will continue to decrease these funds on the basis that in
addition to this program and other forms of host nation support (i.e.,
utilities and Japanese labor force), the Government of Japan is also
responsible for providing funding for the Defense Policy Review
Initiative. Potential Government of Japan financial constraints may
result in U.S. facilities in Japan requiring more financial support
from the U.S. government than in the past. In addition, USFK provided
details on current realignment efforts, including the Government of
South Korea's approval of the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan
Relocation Plan and efforts to coordinate the transfer of U.S.-vacated
bases. The plans also discussed USFK's efforts to work with South Korea
to complete the transition of wartime operational control from the
United States to South Korea in the future.
* EUCOM's master plan identified specific information on efforts to
close or return installations, such as Naval Air Station Keflavik,
Iceland; Naval Support Activity La Maddalena, Italy; selected sites in
Germany, Belgium, and Turkey; and several classified locations in the
region. The plan also recognized that current U.S. basing may not
adequately support either strategic changes in an expanding North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance or the requirements of a rapidly
changing area of responsibility while seeking to preserve assets with
enduring value to its missions, goals, and national interests. EUCOM
also explained that its transformation execution depends on host nation
negotiations, political-military considerations, base realignment and
closure, and fiscal limitations.
* CENTCOM's master plan discussed efforts to solicit host nation
contributions and the amount of coordination and support that is needed
from DOD, the State Department, and Congress. The plan discussed the
challenge of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and CENTCOM's
intention to sustain long-term access to locations across its area of
responsibility. The plan also reflected land return actions in Kuwait
and Uzbekistan and changes to base category designations, such as
consolidation of a cooperative security location into a forward
operating site, both of which support surge capability for ground force
support.
This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Environmental
Challenges:
All of the commands addressed the extent of their environmental
challenges in this year's overseas master plans. In contrast, during
our review of the overseas master plans in 2005, none of the commands
identified environmental remediation and restoration issues. This year,
PACOM provided information on remediation actions taken by USFK before
returning installations to South Korea, such as skimming fuel from
groundwater at five camps. Last year, USFK also discussed its efforts
to coordinate with the Government of South Korea on remediation of
vacated U.S. bases; officials expect these efforts will accelerate the
return of vacated facilities and areas to the Government of South Korea
and the relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other
locations.[Footnote 21] This year, EUCOM identified areas for cleanup,
groundwater investigation, and monitoring and discussed contamination
at one site that did not present an unacceptable risk to human health
or the mission. Last year, CENTCOM did not report any environmental
issues. Though a senior CENTCOM official said that there were no
environmental issues last year in the command's area of responsibility,
this year, CENTCOM's master plan identified funding requirements for a
wastewater treatment plant and a water treatment and distribution
system at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, in hopes of avoiding potential
environmental problems. The extent to which the commands provide
information involving environmental activities provides the users of
the plans with the ability to compare and comprehend how costs have
varied and how these costs may affect planned U.S. funding levels.
Plans Generally Reflect Our Prior Recommendations:
The fiscal year 2008 overseas master plans have been updated to reflect
our prior recommendations for improving the plans, though they do not
address the issue of residual value as we recommended in 2004. To
improve the overseas master plans and address our recommendations from
last year, OSD provided additional guidance on October 12, 2006, to the
regional commands in preparing this year's plans. As a result, the
fiscal year 2008 master plans identify how implementation of the plans
could be affected by other relevant and related defense plans and
activities. For example, PACOM's force structure plans are linked to
the military buildup on Guam and CENTCOM's increased troop strength and
facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan are linked to ongoing operations. In
addition, the commands generally provided more detailed information on
a variety of key areas, such as precise facility requirements and
costs, time frames for an end state, base categories, host nation
funding levels, and effects of other defense activities. For example:
* Facility requirements and costs. This year, all of the regional
commands identified their precise facility requirements and costs for
fiscal year 2008 and for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and reported
estimated facility sustainment costs for fiscal year 2008. In addition,
CENTCOM provided information on supplemental appropriations for
facilities and projects at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan.
* Base categories. This year, all of the commands categorized their
installations into applicable base categories of main operating base,
forward operating site, and cooperative security location,[Footnote 22]
which provided users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and
requirements at these sites. The commands also supplemented the
information on base categories with detailed data on the installations'
capabilities, overall mission, population, and types of equipment and
facilities located at each site. For example, CENTCOM and EUCOM also
identified adjustments to the base categories, such as redesignating a
main operating base as a forward operating site or consolidating two
cooperative security locations into one. EUCOM also provided specific
details on sites no longer considered cooperative security locations in
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, such as sites with no operational
importance and a commercial facility readily available for military use
that did not require U.S. investment or presence.
* End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a common
strategic end state date of 2013, which identifies the last fiscal year
of the construction time frame. The strategic end state date of 2013
provides users a more complete and clearer basis for tracking progress
in meeting the command infrastructure objectives for their areas of
responsibility. Previously, OSD had provided the commands the
discretion in choosing an end date from 2011 to 2015.
* Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported
host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2008
and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, which
provided users a better basis to determine the extent to which U.S.
funding is needed for facility requirements. Also, PACOM identified
host nation funding for its bilateral agreements in South Korea, such
as the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan. On the
other hand, PACOM did not identify specific host nation funding from
the Defense Policy Review Initiative--while the Government of Japan's
share for the Guam relocation is $6.1 billion, the Government of Japan
has not made an official, public estimate of the costs for several
major realignments within Japan. Although, in relation to this
initiative, the command did identify the need for U.S. military
construction funds to support realignment costs not paid by the
Japanese government. EUCOM provided information on North Atlantic
Treaty Organization contributions and discussed a burden-sharing
arrangement with the Government of Norway. CENTCOM also provided host
nation estimates and explained that its efforts to attain host nation
funding were ongoing.
* Effects of other defense activities. This year, all of the commands
described the effects of other defense activities on implementation of
their master plans. Last year, only PACOM's plan gave some indication
of how its implementation could be affected by another activity--the
potential decrease in traditional Japanese construction funding that
would help Japan offset its Defense Policy Review Initiative costs,
such as those associated with the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam.
This year, PACOM discussed this topic as well as the progress of
bilateral negotiations with Japan and challenges associated with this
realignment. Last year, EUCOM's master plan did not explain the
potential effect of implementing base realignment and closure
recommendations on the movement of troops from Germany to bases in the
United States, commonly called overseas rebasing. EUCOM and Army
officials told us that any delay in the implementation of base
realignment and closure recommendations would cause them to delay the
movement of Army servicemembers and their families if facilities were
not available at receiving installations in the United States. This
would delay the closings of Army installations in Europe and increase
costs to operate those installations while they remain open. This year,
the overseas master plan identified that the base realignment and
closure recommendations supported overseas restructuring and that
EUCOM's transformation depends on this effort. Last year, CENTCOM's
master plan only made general references to operations in Iraq and did
not fully explain the potential effects of such operations on other
installations and facility requirements outside of Iraq in its area of
responsibility. This year, CENTCOM officials emphasized that
infrastructure requirements in their master plan directly supported and
responded to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in terms of
increased troop strength and its facilities requirements in theater. In
addition, CENTCOM's plan identified how future basing and
infrastructure will be defined by ongoing contingencies and global
defense posture.
Two Areas of Concern Continue to Be Overlooked:
While the overseas master plans have continued to evolve and have
provided more comprehensive data every year since 2004, two key topics
continue to be omitted from the plans. First, the master plans do not
address the issue of residual value--the value of property being turned
over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. As we reported
last year, residual value was excluded from OSD's guidance because it
is based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nation,
which is limited for most categories of military facilities and is
often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs.
Consequently, as we have noted in the past,[Footnote 23] DOD officials
believe that residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore
should not be assumed in the master plans. However, since these issues
vary by host nation and may not be clear to all users of the plans, we
continue to believe that OSD should require commands, at a minimum, to
explain the issues with obtaining residual value in each host nation
and report the implications for U.S. funding requirements. Also, the
U.S. government has received approximately $592 million since 1989 in
residual value and payment-in-kind compensation from property returns
in EUCOM's area of responsibility, and EUCOM continues to aggressively
seek compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations
returned to host nations. As EUCOM continues to return facilities in
Germany, Italy, and Iceland, this figure may increase. Accordingly, we
continue to believe that residual value should be addressed in the
master plans.
Second, while PACOM's master plan provided details on other challenges,
it did not describe the challenges the command faces in addressing
training limitations for the Seventh Air Force in South Korea, although
senior officials told us that these limitations could cause the United
States to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations,
downsizing, or relocating, which could affect overseas basing plans.
Specifically, we found that the PACOM master plan did not point out
that the Seventh Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain
combat capability in the long term because of a lack of adequate air-
to-surface ranges, according to senior Air Force and USFK officials.
For decades, the Government of South Korea has attempted to relocate
the Koon-Ni range, which had served as the primary air-to-ground range
for the Seventh Air Force. The air and ground range management of the
Koon-Ni training range was transferred to the Government of South
Korea, which closed the range in August 2005. While there is an
agreement with the Government of South Korea to train at other ranges,
according to senior Air Force and USFK officials, the other ranges do
not provide electronic scoring capabilities necessary to meet the Air
Force's air-to-surface training requirements and there is difficultly
in scheduling these ranges. As a result, the Air Force has been using
ranges in Japan and Alaska to meet its training requirements, which
results in additional transportation costs to the U.S. government. In
May 2007, officials said that some progress had been made in addressing
the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea and that they
expected the needed upgrades to be completed by mid-2007. In contrast,
the PACOM plan described the training limitations involving bombing and
live fire training ranges and the effects of airspace access
restrictions in Japan on C-130 training. In addition, the plan
discusses how noise and land use sensitivities and maneuver area
limitations in Okinawa require U.S. forces to deploy to other Pacific
Rim locations to supplement their training, which results in additional
transportation requirements and costs. The plan also discussed efforts
by U.S. Forces Japan and the Government of Japan to engage in bilateral
discussions to address training shortfalls and explore solutions.
We have previously recommended that overseas regional commands address
residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to address
existing training limitations in our prior reports. We believe that
identifying these issues would make Congress aware of potential
challenges to obtaining residual value and to training U.S. forces in
South Korea, which may affect facility requirements and funding in this
country. Even though our prior recommendations have not been fully
addressed, we continue to believe that they have merit and that
Congress would benefit from disclosure of this information.
Planning Effort for Guam Is in Its Initial Stages with Many Key
Decisions and Challenges to Be Addressed:
DOD's planning effort for the buildup of military forces and
infrastructure on Guam is in its initial stages, with many key
decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. While the Guam Integrated
Military Development Plan provides information on the projected
military population, units, and infrastructure that may be needed for
the Guam realignments, it lacks specific information and is not
intended to be a master plan. Additional time is needed for DOD to
address several challenges before JGPO can develop a Guam master plan.
First, the required environmental impact statement--which will take up
to 3 years to complete, according to DOD documents and officials--was
initiated on March 7, 2007. According to DOD officials, the results of
this environmental impact statement will influence many of the key
decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military
infrastructure development on Guam. Second, exact size and makeup of
the forces to be moved to Guam are not yet identified. Third, DOD
officials said that additional time is needed to fully address the
challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements,
and Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements. At the same
time, DOD has not established a comprehensive and routine process to
keep Congress informed on its progress in dealing with these issues and
the overall status of implementing the military buildup on Guam.
Planning Effort Is in Initial Stages:
While the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan provides the best
available information on the projected military population, units, and
infrastructure that may be needed for future Guam realignments, DOD
officials told us that their planning effort was still in its initial
phases with many key decisions and challenges yet to be addressed. In
July 2006, PACOM issued its Guam development plan--a notional document
describing the future development of the military services on Guam over
the next decade and beyond. The plan is based upon a notional force
structure that was used to generate land and facility requirements for
basing, operations, logistics, training, and quality of life involving
the Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Forces
in Guam. DOD officials told us that the plan was not a master plan
because it did not include specific information on facility
requirements, associated costs, and a timeline for specific actions and
was not intended to meet the requirement to provide a master plan to
both congressional appropriations committees by December 2006.[Footnote
24] In addition, the development plan does not direct individual
service programming actions or provide for specific funding
requirements. According to DOD documents and officials, additional
detailed service and joint planning will be required to identify
specific facility, infrastructure, and funding requirements and address
the challenges associated with the military buildup.
Environmental Impact Statement Process Affects Development and Timing
of a Guam Master Plan:
Among the challenges to be addressed before JGPO can develop a Guam
master plan is to complete the required environmental impact statement.
According to DOD officials, the results of the environmental statement-
-which could take up 3 years to complete--will affect many of the key
decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military
infrastructure development.
On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969[Footnote 25] (NEPA), as
implemented by the Council on Environmental Quality
Regulations,[Footnote 26] and Executive Order 12114. The notice of
intent in the Federal Register[Footnote 27] states that the
environmental impact statement will:
* Examine the potential environmental effects associated with
relocating Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units
(which comprise approximately 8,000 marines and their estimated 9,000
dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement
will examine potential effects from activities associated with Marine
Corps units' relocation to include operations, training, and
infrastructure changes.
* Examine the Navy's plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic
capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental
impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront
improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing.
* Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force
(approximately 630 servicemembers and 950 family members) in Guam. The
environmental impact statement will examine potential effects from
activities associated with the task force to include operations,
training, and infrastructure changes.
DOD officials recognize that the results of this environmental
assessment process may affect the development and timing of DOD's plan
for Guam.[Footnote 28] Under NEPA[Footnote 29] and the regulations for
implementing NEPA established by the Council on Environmental
Quality,[Footnote 30] an environmental impact statement must include a
purpose and need statement, a description of all reasonable project
alternatives and their associated environmental impacts (including a
"no action" alternative), a description of the environment of the area
to be affected or created by the alternatives being considered, and an
analysis of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and each
alternative.[Footnote 31] Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert
agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing
NEPA. For example, federal agencies such as DOD are required to ensure
the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the
discussions and analyses in the environmental impact statement.
Additionally, after preparing a draft environmental impact statement,
federal agencies such as DOD are required to obtain the comments of any
federal agency that has jurisdiction by law or certain special
expertise and request the comments of appropriate state and local
agencies, Native American tribes, and any agency that has requested
that it receive such statements. Until an agency issues a final
environmental impact statement and record of decision, it generally may
not take any action concerning the proposal that would either have an
adverse environmental impact or limit the choice of reasonable
alternatives. DOD officials stated that performing these alternative
site analyses and cumulative effects analyses will delay the Guam
master plan's completion. Based on the expected completion of the
environmental impact statement, according to JGPO officials, the master
plan may not be completed until fiscal year 2009.
Exact Size and Makeup of Forces to Move to Guam Are Not Yet Decided:
The exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the
housing, operational, quality of life, and services support
infrastructure required are not yet fully known and are expected to be
identified and assessed during the parallel environmental analysis and
the individual service and joint planning processes.
While DOD identified some Marine Corps units for relocation as a part
of realignment initiatives, there are assessments still under way to
determine the optimal mix of units in Guam and in Okinawa. The
following Marine Corps units have been identified for relocation to
Guam: Third Marine Expeditionary Forces Command Element, Third Marine
Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st
Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
The Marine Corps forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-
Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and
combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
Approximately 10,000 marines plus their dependents are expected to
remain on the island of Okinawa following the realignment of forces to
Guam. While these broad estimates provide a baseline, according to
officials we visited, the Marine Corps is still determining the
specific mix of units and capabilities needed to meet mission
requirements on both Guam and Okinawa. The mix of units is significant
because, according to Marine Corps officials, the functional and base
support requirements will be based on the type, size, and number of
units that will relocate to Guam. This determination will define the
training and facility requirements, such as barracks, family housing,
schools, and other infrastructure. In response to the ongoing
assessment by the Marine Corps, a JGPO official said that the office
was initiating a master plan that will reflect the building of flexible
infrastructure that could accommodate any type of military units that
may relocate to Guam. However, in the absence of information on the
number and mix of forces, it will be difficult to provide an accurate
assessment of specific facility requirements to support the Guam
realignment actions.
DOD is still determining requirements for berthing a transient aircraft
carrier and the exact size and mix of the Army missile defense task
force as well as the infrastructure requirements. In the future, the
Navy is planning on periodically berthing an aircraft carrier in Guam
and the support facilities needed for this ship are still being
determined. According to Navy officials, a new carrier pier with
additional capabilities will need to be constructed in order to
accommodate this plan. Additionally, most of the aircraft from the
aircraft carrier will also require temporary beddown at Andersen Air
Force Base, which may cause additional facilities requirements. The
Army is also planning on basing a ballistic missile defense task force
in Guam, though the size and mix of this task force as well as the
infrastructure requirements are still being determined. At the time of
this review, Army officials projected that the missile defense site
will be located at Andersen Air Force Base but acknowledged that the
site may be located elsewhere depending on the capability that will be
brought to Guam.
Additional Time Is Needed to Fully Address Several Challenges:
DOD faces several significant challenges associated with its master
planning effort for Guam, including funding requirements, operational
challenges, and community impacts that could adversely affect the
development and implementation of the master plan.
Funding Requirements:
Funding requirements for the military buildup on Guam are yet not fully
identified and may be difficult to meet given other priorities and
existing funding constraints, according to DOD officials. DOD agencies,
such as the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Education Activity,
that will help support the services' influx of personnel, missions, and
equipment to Guam will likely incur additional costs that are not yet
included in the current DOD $13 billion cost estimate for military
buildup on Guam. According to DOD officials, this cost estimate
includes the costs to move Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam, to
construct a Navy pier for a transient aircraft carrier, and to station
an Army ballistic missile defense task force. However, it does not
include the costs of other defense agencies to support the additional
military personnel and dependents on Guam. According to JGPO, these
costs will eventually be identified once further information is
available on the master plan.
Within the current DOD $13 billion cost estimate, the Marine Corps move
from Okinawa to Guam is estimated to cost about $10.3 billion. Of this
amount for the move, the Government of Japan has agreed to contribute
about $6.1 billion to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam.
Nearly half of Japan's contribution, or $2.8 billion, is expected to be
direct contributions while the remaining $3.3 billion will consist of
investment incentives for family housing and on-base infrastructure,
such as utilities, which over time could be recouped by Japan in the
form of rent or service charges. For example, the Government of Japan
will finance construction of family housing units in Guam, but these
construction costs will be reimbursed by payments from the
servicemembers' housing allowance using U.S. funds. Furthermore, the
Government of Japan's funds will not be made available until it has
agreed to specific infrastructure plans for Guam. In addition, DOD
officials recognize that the failure or delay of one plan outlined in
the Defense Policy Review Initiative may affect another, since various
planning variables need to fall into place in order for the initiative
to move forward. For example, DOD officials expect that if the Futenma
replacement facility in Okinawa (a facility intended to replace the
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and estimated to cost from $4 billion
to $5 billion) is not built, the Marine Corps relocation to Guam may be
delayed. DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement
facility as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be
completed in order for other realignment actions to take place. The
Government of Japan may encounter challenges in funding its share of
the Marine Corps move considering Japan's other national priorities and
its commitments associated with funding several other major
realignments of U.S. forces in Japan under the Defense Policy Review
Initiative. At the time of our review, the Japanese legislature had
approved $228 million for planning and initial construction funds for
force posture realignments, including efforts for project planning in
Guam, and authorized the Japan Bank for International Cooperation to
invest in businesses for Guam development.
DOD officials also expressed concern regarding the department's ability
to obtain a continuous flow of funds adequate to pay its share of the
current $13 billion cost estimate for military buildup on Guam in light
of ongoing operations and funding constraints and challenges. These
officials said that obtaining funding for the military buildup on Guam
at current estimated levels will be difficult because of the pressures
the department faces in funding other defense priorities and
activities, including the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
and procurement costs for weapons systems. Also, there are other costs
not included in the $13 billion cost estimate associated with the
Marine Corps' move to Guam that will increase overall costs.
Historically, for example, the Government of Japan has paid a large
portion of the operation and maintenance costs of the Marine Corps in
Okinawa in the form of host nation support that will be borne solely by
DOD after the move. For example, the DOD Inspector General reported
that the relocation to Guam will increase the Marine Corps' annual
funding requirements by $465 million for operations and maintenance
costs currently borne by the Government of Japan and for the costs of
the additional strategic lift needed after the move.
Additional costs will be incurred from building facilities that will
house equipment and aircraft during inclement weather, and there may be
additional incidental maintenance costs as a result of damage from
typhoons and seismic shocks. Guam is located in an area of the Pacific
commonly referred to as Typhoon Alley, where on average 31 tropical
storms develop annually. Also, earthquake risk in Guam is caused by the
island's proximity to the Mariana Trench, which leads to earthquakes
throughout the region. Marine Corps officials stated that in estimating
Guam facility development costs, DOD took into account that additional
costs will occur when constructing to Guam's typhoon and seismic
standards--including concrete and structural reinforcement and
providing backup and redundant utility systems. Estimated costs to
build infrastructure in Guam are based on the DOD Facilities Pricing
Guide. The area cost factors identify Guam as one of the more expensive
locations for military construction in comparison with other locations
in the United States and its territories. Specifically, the
construction costs for Guam are 2.64 times more expensive than the
baseline average presented in the DOD Facilities Pricing
Guide.[Footnote 32] The area cost factor is used by planners to adjust
average historical facility costs to a specific project location,
taking into consideration the costs of construction material, labor,
and equipment, along with factors such as weather, climate, seismic
conditions, mobilization, overhead and profit, labor availability, and
labor productivity for each area. In addition, Marine Corps officials
expect there will be additional facility repair costs periodically as a
result of damage from typhoons and seismic shocks.
Operational Challenges:
Several operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility
support and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements,
have not been fully addressed. For example, according to Marine Corps
Forces, Pacific, officials, the Marine Corps in Guam will depend on
strategic military sealift and airlift to reach destinations in Asia
that will be farther away than was the case when the units were based
in Okinawa. The Marine Corps depends on strategic lift for its
operational and training-related movement needs, including
transportation of forces and equipment. For example, in a contingency
operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to deploy from
Sasebo, Japan, or another location to transport soldiers and equipment
in Guam and then return to the area of responsibility where the
contingency is taking place. According to Marine Corps officials,
amphibious shipping capability and airlift capacity are needed in Guam,
which may include expanding staging facilities and systems support for
both sealift and airlift. The Marine Corps estimated additional costs
for strategic lift operating from Guam to be nearly $88 million
annually.
Existing training facilities and ranges on Guam are not sufficient to
meet the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A
DOD analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges
on Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force,
because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. The services are
in the process of conducting a training study that includes Guam and
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands[Footnote 33] to assess
the options for training in the region. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific,
officials stated that live fire artillery training, amphibious
landings, and tracked vehicle operations will be challenging because of
the combination of factors associated with the limited size of training
areas available on the Northern Mariana Islands and the associated
environmental concerns. Still, they are optimistic that the study,
which will include environmental limitations, facility requirements,
real estate requirements, and estimated costs, will result in the
identification and development of new training areas.
Economic and Infrastructure Requirements:
The effects of the increase in military forces, in terms of population
and military infrastructure, on Guam's unique economic and
infrastructure requirements have not been fully addressed. The current
population of Guam is estimated to be 171,000, and the projected future
military population could increase it by more than 15 percent. The
active duty military personnel and dependent population is estimated at
14,195 in Guam, and it is expected to increase to 39,130--an increase
of 176 percent (see table 1).
Table 1: Proposed Increase in the Numbers of Active Duty Military
Personnel and Dependents on Guam:
Service/unit: Marine Corps;
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 3;
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 2;
Baseline (current population): Total: 5;
Proposed plan: Active duty: 8,000;
Proposed plan: Dependents: 9,000;
Proposed plan: Total: 17,000.
Service/unit: Air Force;
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 1,930;
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 2,280;
Baseline (current population): Total: 4,210;
Proposed plan: Active duty: 4,560;
Proposed plan: Dependents: 3,730;
Proposed plan: Total: 8,290.
Service/unit: Navy;
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 4,350;
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 5,230;
Baseline (current population): Total: 9,580;
Proposed plan: Active duty: 5,600;
Proposed plan: Dependents: 5,280;
Proposed plan: Total: 10,880.
Service/unit: Army;
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 30;
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 50;
Baseline (current population): Total: 80;
Proposed plan: Active duty: 630;
Proposed plan: Dependents: 950;
Proposed plan: Total: 1,580.
Service/unit: Coast Guard;
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 140;
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 180;
Baseline (current population): Total: 320;
Proposed plan: Active duty: 170;
Proposed plan: Dependents: 230;
Proposed plan: Total: 400.
Service/unit: Special Operations;
Baseline (current population): Active duty: [Empty];
Baseline (current population): Dependents: [Empty];
Baseline (current population): Total: [Empty];
Proposed plan: Active duty: 350;
Proposed plan: Dependents: 630;
Proposed plan: Total: 980.
Service/unit: Total;
Baseline (current population): Active duty: 6,453;
Baseline (current population): Dependents: 7,742;
Baseline (current population): Total: 14,195;
Proposed plan: Active duty: 19,310;
Proposed plan: Dependents: 19,820;
Proposed plan: Total: 39,130.
Source: PACOM.
Note: GAO analysis of PACOM data presented in the Guam Integrated
Military Development Plan. Baseline numbers represent active duty
personnel stationed in Guam as of March 31, 2005.
[End of table]
The population could also swell further because DOD's estimates do not
include DOD civilians, contractors, or Navy transient personnel from an
aircraft carrier. According to Navy officials, transient personnel from
an aircraft carrier could add as many 5,000 personnel on Guam during a
port call. The sum of these increases is expected to have significant
effects on Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements. For
example:
* Construction capacity. As a result of Guam realignment actions, the
construction demands for infrastructure will exceed the availability of
local contract labor on the island, though the extent to which the Guam
local community and foreign workers can meet this increase has yet to
be determined. Historically, construction capacity on Guam has been
approximately $800 million per year, as compared with the estimated
construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year projected to be
needed to meet the fiscal year 2014 completion date for realignment
actions. Preliminary analysis indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 workers
will be required to support the development on Guam. Consequently, the
increased demand for workers may require workforce training for the
local population and possibly a need for foreign workers. Foreign
workers would have to temporarily enter the United States on temporary
nonagricultural workers visas, capped at 66,000 per year, and DOD
officials have already indicated that visa waivers might be needed in
order to mitigate limitations on the number of visas allowed into the
United States each year. Other challenges associated with an increase
of foreign workers in Guam include providing support facilities and
services, such as housing and medical care for these workers, as well
as possible social tensions between the local population and foreign
workers because of job competition.
* Public infrastructure. The effects of the increased demand on Guam's
roads, port capabilities, and utility services--such as electrical
generation, wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal--have not
been fully addressed. DOD and Guam officials recognize that the
island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand and
will require significant funding to address these needs. For example,
the Government of Guam has estimated that it will cost about $2.6
billion to improve the local infrastructure to accommodate forecasted
military and civilian growth on the island and that federal assistance
is needed to meet these requirements. DOD officials and the Guam
Integrated Military Development Plan identified several infrastructure
areas that are in need of improvements: (1) the two major roads in Guam
are in poor condition and, when ordnance (ammunition and explosives) is
unloaded from ships for the Air Force now and for the Marine Corps in
the future, it must be transported on one of these major roads that
runs through highly populated areas; (2) the Government of Guam plans a
number of projects to upgrade the capability and efficiency of Guam's
port facilities that total about $155 million with only $56 million
funded at the time of our review; (3) the utilities transmission lines
are antiquated and the system is not reliable, and voltage and
frequency fluctuations are common; (4) the wastewater treatment
facilities have a long history of failing and are near capacity; and
(5) the solid waste landfills have a number of unresolved issues
related to discharge of pollutants and are near capacity. Although the
Government of Japan has agreed to provide $700 million for utilities
infrastructure on DOD bases in Guam, this funding is neither intended
nor is it sufficient to improve the infrastructure throughout the
island. Future DOD operations may be constrained on Guam if
improvements are not made to Guam's infrastructure.
* DOD land use on Guam. DOD officials initially told Guam officials
that they could implement force structure plans with currently held
land although they are now reviewing the possibility of using
additional land to prevent future encroachment. For example, the Guam
Integrated Military Development Plan considered both existing and
former DOD land areas for potential use to accommodate realignment
actions. In terms of existing land, DOD owned about 40,000 acres of
land in Guam at the time of this review--approximately 29 percent of
the island. Former DOD land areas have previously been a part of the
base realignment and closure process or released to the Government of
Guam. There are political sensitivities to using former DOD land areas,
since local community officials in Guam are concerned with the
community's reaction to DOD's possible expansion of land holdings on
the island.
Funding uncertainties, operational challenges, and community impacts
may not only affect the development of the Guam master plan but also
increase costs for the U.S. government. Until DOD provides further
information on how these challenges will be resolved, it will not know
the precise costs of the Guam realignment plans to the U.S. government.
DOD's has begun efforts to create a successful partnership and
coordinate with other federal departments and agencies, the Government
of Guam, and other organizations, which are important in addressing
Guam's unique economic and infrastructure requirements. At the same
time, DOD has not established a comprehensive and routine process to
keep Congress informed on its progress dealing with these issues and
the overall status of implementing the military buildup on Guam. In the
absence of this information on how challenges will be addressed in the
future, Congress is not in a position to help ensure the best
application of limited federal funds and the leveraging of all
available options for supporting the military buildup on Guam.
Concluding Observations:
As U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to
evolve, so do the department's master plans. The plans continue to
improve each year by providing more complete, clear, and consistent
information and descriptions of the challenges DOD faces overseas.
However, we have previously recommended that overseas regional commands
address the extent to which they are seeking residual value
compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to
host nations and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing
training limitations that may affect infrastructure and funding
requirements. We believe that identifying these issues would provide
Congress an awareness of potential challenges of recouping residual
value from host nations and training U.S. forces in South Korea, which
may affect facility requirements and funding in these countries. We
continue to believe that these recommendations have merit and that
Congress would benefit from disclosure of this information.
In July 2006, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007
military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide a
master plan on the military buildup in Guam. DOD needs several more
years to complete a master plan. Completion of a Guam master plan
depends on the outcome of the environmental impact assessments and
statement that could take up to 3 years to complete, on decisions that
finalize the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam,
and on efforts that address challenges associated with the military
buildup, including funding, operational requirements, and local
economic and infrastructure needs. DOD's planning efforts for Guam are
evolving and up-to-date information on facility requirements and
associated costs would be useful for funding decisions and assessments
of all available options to assist DOD, federal departments and
agencies, the Government of Guam, and other organizations in addressing
the challenges associated with the military buildup.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
GAO is not recommending executive action. However, to further
facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and other users of
the overseas master plans, Congress should consider requiring the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that (1) future overseas master plans
address the extent to which the regional commands are seeking residual
value compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations
returned to host nations and (2) future PACOM plans address existing
training limitations in its area of responsibility and the potential
effects of those limitations on infrastructure and funding
requirements.
To help ensure the best application of limited federal funds and the
leveraging of all available options for supporting the military buildup
on Guam until DOD prepares a master plan, Congress should consider
requiring the Secretary of Defense to report periodically to all the
defense committees on the status of DOD's planning efforts for Guam,
including DOD's efforts to complete its environmental impact statement,
identify the exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam
and the associated infrastructure required, and address the various
challenges associated with the military buildup.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment responded that congressional
action is not necessary.
* In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration to
require that future overseas master plans address the extent to which
commands are seeking residual value compensation, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense stated that DOD already provides status reports on
its residual value negotiations to the Committees on Appropriations and
Armed Services and that prior legislation outlines reporting
requirements on the closure of foreign military installations
worldwide, with specific reporting requirements throughout the residual
value negotiation process. While we were aware of these reporting
requirements, these reports do not provide users of the master plans
the kind of information needed to address their concerns about the
status of residual value negotiations or the implications for U.S.
funding. Our recommendation to Congress is grounded in the fact that
residual value issues vary by host nation and the implications for U.S.
funding also vary accordingly and thus may not be clear enough to all
users of the plans. We continue to believe that the Secretary of
Defense should require commands to explain the issues with obtaining
residual value from each host nation and report the implications for
U.S. funding.
* In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration that
future PACOM plans address training limitations in its area of
responsibility, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense responded that
the department agrees that validated training requirements that are
affected by force posture transformation plans should be addressed in
overseas master plans. He further stated that nonprogrammed and
nonvalidated training limitations experienced by service components
were not appropriate for inclusion and would not be addressed in the
overseas commands' risk assessment for their master plans. While we are
not aware of any nonprogrammed and nonvalidated training limitations,
our report discusses only those training limitations raised by senior
command officials during our review. We assume that if there is a need
to make a distinction between nonvalidated versus validated training
limitations, OSD and the overseas commands would work together to
identify those validated limitations that should be addressed in their
master plans. In addition, last year OSD included in its guidance a
requirement for the combatant commands to identify and discuss risks to
their master plans as well as steps taken to mitigate those risks,
including validated training requirements and limitations. In response
to this guidance U.S. Forces Japan provided information on training
limitations, while USFK omitted this information from the overseas
master plan. This inconsistency led to our recommendation that Congress
require such reporting, and we continue to believe that this
information is necessary to provide a complete picture of the potential
effects on infrastructure and funding requirements in South Korea.
* In commenting on our matter for congressional consideration that the
Secretary of Defense report periodically to all the defense committees
on the status of DOD's planning efforts for Guam, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense responded that the Guam master plan is scheduled
to be completed in 2008, at which time a copy will be provided to
congressional defense committees. It should be noted that Senate Report
109-286 directed DOD to submit a master plan for the military buildup
on Guam by December 2006; however, DOD did not submit the plan for
several reasons that we discuss in this report. Moreover, because the
master plan cannot be completed until the environmental impact
statement is completed, a process that could take until 2009, Congress
may not see the master plan for another 2 years at least. Also, DOD
faces a variety of funding challenges, operational challenges, and
community impacts that may both affect the development and timing of
the Guam master plan and increase costs for the U.S. government. Thus,
in the interim before receiving a master plan, congressional oversight
could be enhanced by Congress periodically receiving an update on the
planning efforts in Guam, including DOD's efforts to complete its
environmental impact statement, identify the exact size and makeup of
the forces to be moved to Guam and the associated infrastructure
required, and address the various challenges associated with the
military buildup.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense's comments are reprinted in
appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments on a draft of this
report, which we incorporated where appropriated.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. The GAO staff members who made key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore:
Director Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the fiscal year 2008 overseas master
plans have changed since last year, and the extent to which the plans
address the challenges faced by the Department of Defense (DOD) during
implementation, we compared the reporting requirements in the
congressional mandate and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
guidance, which incorporated our prior recommendations. In order to
identify improvements to the overseas master plan, we compared and
contrasted the fiscal year 2007 and 2008 plans. We assessed the
quantity and quality of one plan's responses for each of the data
elements, including details on base categories, host nation funding
levels, facility requirements and costs, environmental remediation
issues, and other issues affecting the implementation of the plans, and
compared them to equivalent responses in other plans; formed
conclusions as to the completeness, clarity, and consistency of the
latest plan's responses; and generated observations and recommendations
for improving the plans. We also discussed with DOD officials our
observations and recommendations, specific reporting requirements, and
whether improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed. We also
interviewed cognizant officials from DOD about the various changes and
challenges that were identified within the plans. We met with officials
from OSD and each of the following commands and agencies: U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM); U.S. Army Pacific; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S.
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Forces
Korea; U.S. Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; Commander, Naval Forces
Korea; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Far East District; DOD Education
Activity; U.S. Forces Korea Status of Forces Agreement Office; U.S.
Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; U.S. Air Forces Japan; Commander, Naval
Forces Japan; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Naval Facilities Engineering
Command-Pacific, Japan; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe;
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; Naval Facilities Engineering
Command-Italy; U.S. Air Force Europe; Army Installation Management
Agency, Europe Regional Office; U.S. Central Command; and Special
Operations Command. In general, we discussed the reporting requirements
contained in OSD's guidance, host nation agreements and funding levels,
U.S. funding levels and sources, environmental remediation and
restoration issues, property returns to host nations, and training
requirements. We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies,
directives, international agreements, guidance, and media articles to
keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing strategies
and requirements. To see firsthand the condition of facilities and
status of selected construction projects, we visited and toured
facilities at Camp Schwab, Camp Kinser, Camp Foster, Torii Station,
Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air Base, Japan; Camp
Humphreys and Kunsan Air Force Base, South Korea; and Aviano Air Base,
Caserma Ederle, Dal Molin, and Naval Support Activity La Maddalena,
Italy.
To determine the status of DOD's planning effort for the buildup of
forces and infrastructure on Guam, we met with officials from OSD, the
Navy, PACOM, and the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO). In general, we
discussed the development of a Guam master plan and the Integrated
Military Development Plan with PACOM and JGPO officials. We also met
with officials from U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces,
Pacific; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; Third Marine Expeditionary Forces;
U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Pacific; and Pacific Air Forces to discuss
the various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure requirements
and costs associated with the buildup in Guam. We visited Naval Base
Guam and Andersen Air Force Base in Guam to see the installations and
future military construction sites firsthand. We also reviewed DOD's
military construction budgets for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and
planned for future years to identify U.S. funding levels and sources
planned for the military buildup in Guam. To identify challenges
associated with the buildup in this planning effort, we met with the
aforementioned DOD officials and other interested parties in Guam,
including the Governor, legislative leaders, the Chamber of Commerce,
the Civil Military Task Force, the Guam Women's Group, and the Office
of the Delegate from Guam to the U.S. House of Representatives. We did
not evaluate concerns raised by the officials, but we reviewed relevant
federal laws and discussed them with DOD officials. We also analyzed
available reports, documents, international agreements, and media
articles to keep abreast of ongoing activities in Guam pertaining to
challenges that may affect DOD's development and implementation of a
master plan.
While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning
efforts were not specifically required for the master plans in response
to the congressional mandates. In addition, we did not include Southern
and Northern Commands in our analysis because these commands have
significantly fewer facilities overseas than the other regional
commands in the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia.
We conducted our review from September 2006 through July 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, Dc 20301-3000:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
August 15, 2007:
Mr. Brian Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-07-1015, "Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are
Improving, but DoD Needs To Provide Congress Additional Information
about the Military Buildup on Guam", dated July 16, 2007 (GAO Code
350916).
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Philip W. Grone:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
(Installations and Environment):
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report, GAO-07-1015, "Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master
Plans Are Improving, but DoD Needs To Provide Congress Additional
Information about the Military Buildup on Guam", dated July 16, 2007
(GAO Code 350916):
Department Of Defense Comments:
Although the GAO did not recommend executive actions, the GAO, as a
matter for Congressional Consideration, stated that "Congress should
require DOD to report on residual value and U.S. Pacific Command's
(PACOM) training limitations, as well as periodically on its planning
efforts for Guam, including the environmental impact statement, the
exact size and makeup of forces, and efforts to address various
challenges."
DoD RESPONSE: For the reasons set out below, Congressional action is
not necessary.
Residual Value: The DoD already provides status reports on its residual
value negotiations to the Committees on Appropriations and Armed
Services pursuant to the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Report
No. 103-153, accompanying the Department of Defense (DoD)
Appropriations Act, 1994, as amended. Additionally, Section 2921 of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 (Public Law 101-510), as
amended, outlines reporting requirements on the closure of foreign
military installations worldwide, with specific reporting requirements
throughout the residual value negotiation process.
U.S. Pacific Command Training Limitations: The Department concurs that
validated training requirements which are affected by force posture
transformation plans should be addressed in the overseas master plans.
However, it is more germane for these issues to be addressed as part of
the discussions on risk assessment than to be addressed separately.
Therefore, DoD will advise overseas combatant commands to include
training issues as part of their risk assessment discussion, to include
steps taken to mitigate those risks. Non-programmed and non-validated
training limitations experienced by Service components are not
appropriate for inclusion and will not be addressed.
Report on planning efforts for Guam, including the environmental impact
statement, the exact size and makeup of forces, and efforts to address
various challenges. The U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations Report
No. 109-286, accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act
2006, requests that the Secretary of Defense to submit a master plan
for Guam including a report accounting for the U.S. share of the $10.3B
construction program (project-level detail) and the year in which each
project is expected to be funded. The Guam Master Plan is scheduled to
be completed in 2008, at which time a copy will be provide to the
Congressional Defense Committees.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant
Director; Nelsie Alcoser; Kate Lenane; Erika Prochaska; Roger
Tomlinson; and Cheryl Weissman made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense asked the overseas regional combatant commands to prepare
comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility.
[2] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003).
[3] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003).
[4] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006).
[5] GAO, DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve,
GAO-06-913R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2006); Opportunities Exist to
Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense
Infrastructure Overseas, GAO-05-680R (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005);
and Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs
Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004).
[6] Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Update of Overseas Master Plans (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 12, 2006). OSD also issued guidance in 2004 and 2005 to aid
the overseas regional commands in developing their plans.
[7] Department of Defense, Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing
Infrastructure Requirements at Department of Defense Overseas
Facilities (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). This year, OSD submitted
the overseas master plans to Congress on March 28, 2007, and made them
available to us on April 20, 2007, which did not provide us sufficient
time to fully assess the plans or provide a draft report to Congress by
May 15 as we have done in prior years.
[8] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan
(Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: July 11, 2006).
[9] In lieu of cash payments, a country may choose payment-in-kind
compensation--such as construction of facilities for U.S. forces--which
in turn reduces U.S. expenditures.
[10] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). The report directed the
Secretary of Defense to submit a master plan for Guam by December 29,
2006, to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress.
[11] DOD officials refer to the process through which the United States
and Japan negotiated the initiatives that realign U.S. forces in Japan
as the Defense Policy Review Initiative. The realignment initiatives
were the result of Security Consultative Committee meetings in 2005 and
2006 between U.S. and Japanese officials. The results of these meetings
established a framework for the future U.S. force structure in Japan,
including the Marine Corps move from Okinawa to Guam.
[12] We included Guam in our estimate for military construction and
family housing for overseas locations. However, we excluded worldwide
classified and unspecified appropriations from our total because these
categories may include domestic military construction and family
housing.
[13] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 10 (2003).
[14] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006).
[15] The functional commands have few facilities outside the United
States and are not required to issue master plans for changing
infrastructure requirements at DOD overseas facilities.
[16] JGPO is responsible for implementation of the base realignment and
closure decision to establish a joint base on Guam. This also includes
the realignment of installation management functions at Andersen Air
Force Base to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas.
[17] GAO-06-913R.
[18] GAO-05-680R.
[19] GAO-04-609.
[20] As discussed in our prior reports, within the provisions of the
Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan, USFK intends to
strengthen its overall military effectiveness by consolidating
installations north of Seoul, including the Yongsan Army Garrison
located in the Seoul metropolitan area, into two major hubs in the
central and southern sections of South Korea. USFK expects the
consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers to increase
readiness, efficiencies, and cost savings; enhance quality of life;
provide a less-intrusive presence; and increase training opportunities.
[21] On April 7, 2006, USFK announced a plan for the return of
facilities and areas that have been vacated by the command to the
Government of South Korea. This plan includes a number of measures
designed to address issues identified in joint South Korea and U.S.
environmental surveys of these vacated facilities and areas. For
example, the plan calls for the United States to remove underground
fuel storage tanks to preclude future leaks and initiate a technology
process for skimming fuel from the groundwater at locations where this
contamination was found.
[22] Overseas master plans defined the bases categories as the
following: (1) main operating base, a facility outside the United
States and U.S. territories with permanently stationed operating forces
and robust infrastructure and characterized by command and control
structures, enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force
protection measures; (2) forward operating site, a scalable location
outside the United States and U.S. territories intended for rotational
use by operating forces with limited U.S. military support presence and
possibly pre-positioned equipment; and (3) cooperative security
location, a facility located outside the United States and U.S.
territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence that is
maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host nation support.
Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistics
support, and rotational use by operating forces and can be a focal
point for security cooperation activities.
[23] GAO-04-609.
[24] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006).
[25] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347.
[26] 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508.
[27] 72 Fed. Reg. 10186-7 (Mar. 7, 2007).
[28] The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the policies and goals
defined in NEPA are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of
the federal government. Further, regulations for implementing the act
established by the Council on Environmental Quality specify that to the
fullest extent possible, agencies shall prepare draft environmental
impact statements concurrently with and integrated with other
environmental impact analyses and related surveys and studies required
by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and other
environmental review laws and executive orders. See 40 C.F.R. §
1502.25.
[29] 40 C.F.R. § 1500-1508.
[30] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347.
[31] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13-1502.16.
[32] The baseline average is 1.00, representing the average cost of
construction at U.S. and overseas locations. In 2004, the baseline
average was computed on the basis of construction costs at 202 U.S.
locations and 91 overseas locations.
[33] The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is a self-
governing commonwealth of the United States that administers its own
local government functions under its own constitution. The commonwealth
consists of 14 islands--Rota, Saipan, Tinian, and others--located north
of Guam.
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