Military Base Realignments and Closures
Observations Related to the 2005 Round Gao ID: GAO-07-1203R September 6, 2007This correspondence follows up an August 1, 2007, meeting to discuss concerns about changes in the cost and savings estimates and the potential loss of expertise and experience from the closure of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, among other issues, since the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth as part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round became effective. The work since the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (the Commission) recommendations became effective has been done under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own initiative and has focused on the implementation of realignment and closure actions. This brief summary reviews our public observations made in 2005 about the 2005 BRAC round, specifically those related to Fort Monmouth. Also reviewed, under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct reviews on his own initiative, is the methodology of a forthcoming DOD report on the transfer of technical capabilities from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
While we concluded that DOD used a fundamentally sound overall process, we made numerous observations about the department's BRAC recommendations and decision-making process. On the one hand, DOD's decision-making process for developing its BRAC recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned, but we also identified limitations with cost and savings estimates and certain human capital challenges related to the potential loss of experience and expertise after certain recommendations were implemented, among other observations. Limitations with cost and savings estimates included the following (1) reassigning military personnel could provide a false sense of savings, (2) magnitude of savings from business process reengineering efforts was uncertain, (3) lengthy payback periods for many recommendations exist, (4) there are differences between communities and DOD on cost and savings estimates, (5) savings assumptions for some civilian and military personnel reductions lacked manpower studies, (6) full estimated environmental restoration costs were uncertain, (7)certain other expected costs and savings to the government were not accounted for, and (8) DOD's past efforts at tracking actual cost and savings had been limited.
GAO-07-1203R, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 2005 Round
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September 6, 2007:
The Honorable Frank Lautenberg:
The Honorable Robert Menendez:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Rush Holt:
The Honorable Frank Pallone:
The Honorable Jim Saxton:
The Honorable Christopher Smith:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related
to the 2005 Round:
This correspondence is in follow-up to our August 1, 2007, meeting to
discuss your concerns about changes in the cost and savings estimates
and the potential loss of expertise and experience from the closure of
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, among other issues, since the recommendation
to close Fort Monmouth as part of the Department of Defense's (DOD)
2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round became effective. As we
discussed with you, our BRAC work since the independent Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission's (the Commission) recommendations
became effective has been done under the authority of the Comptroller
General to conduct reviews on his own initiative[Footnote 1] and has
focused on the implementation of realignment and closure actions.
Consistent with our approach, we offered to briefly summarize the
observations we made in 2005 publicly about the 2005 BRAC round,
specifically those related to Fort Monmouth, under the authority of the
Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own initiative, and you
believed this would be helpful. As such, the objective of this
correspondence is to summarize the observations we made publicly on the
2005 BRAC round prior to the Commission's final recommendations. We
also agreed to review, under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct reviews on his own initiative, the methodology of a forthcoming
DOD report on the transfer of technical capabilities from Fort Monmouth
to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
The law authorizing the 2005 BRAC round[Footnote 2] directed us to
independently assess DOD's process and recommendations and report by
July 1, 2005.[Footnote 3] As such, we issued a report on that date and
testified before the Commission twice in 2005.[Footnote 4]
Subsequently, we have initiated several engagements under the authority
of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own initiative to
review implementation of certain BRAC actions because of broad
congressional interest in these actions. Some of the engagements that
we are currently undertaking address, in part, issues that you raised.
We will provide copies of those reports related to the closure of Fort
Monmouth when they are completed.
To prepare this correspondence, we relied on our report on the 2005
BRAC decision-making process and our testimonies before the Commission
in May 2005 and July 2005.[Footnote 5] We did not perform additional
interviews, information gathering, or analysis to prepare this
correspondence. We did not reevaluate or reassess our earlier findings.
Additionally, we reviewed the Commission's final report and included
information from that report,[Footnote 6] where applicable, to provide
context for how the issues we previously identified were addressed by
the Commission. We limited the scope of this correspondence to those
issues raised in our report and testimonies on the 2005 BRAC decision-
making process, but included updated information from our BRAC work
issued since 2005, as appropriate. Our previous work on which this
correspondence was based was performed in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Prior to the Commission's final decisions in September 2005, we
presented numerous observations about DOD's 2005 BRAC recommendations
and decision-making process. While we found that DOD used a
fundamentally sound overall process that was generally logical, well
documented, and reasoned to determine its BRAC recommendations, we
identified limitations with DOD's cost and savings estimates and
potential human capital challenges in implementing some of the
recommendations, among other observations. We noted that projected
savings could be overestimated. For example, in 2005, we found that
some of DOD's assumptions related to business process reengineering
were not validated and the actual savings for these recommendations
would be based on how the recommendations were implemented. Also in
2005, we identified the potential loss of expertise and experience due
to fewer than anticipated civilian employees moving to a gaining base
as a potential issue for some closure and realignment actions.
Because we drew from our past work and published documents in preparing
this correspondence, we did not seek official comments from DOD on its
contents, but did advise them that we were issuing this correspondence.
Background:
DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently
implementing its fifth round.[Footnote 7] In May 2005, the Secretary of
Defense made public 222 recommendations that were estimated to generate
net annual recurring savings of $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year
2012. In making its 2005 realignment and closure recommendations, DOD
applied legally mandated selection criteria that included military
value, costs and savings, economic impact to local communities,
community support infrastructure, and environmental impact. BRAC
legislation directed the Secretary of Defense in applying this criteria
to give priority consideration to the military value over other
criteria. In fact, military value was the primary consideration for
making BRAC recommendations, as reported by both DOD and the
Commission. DOD established a structured and largely sequential process
for obtaining and analyzing data that provided an informed basis for
identifying and evaluating realignment and closure options. DOD
incorporated into its analytical process several key considerations
required by BRAC legislation, including the use of certified
data,[Footnote 8] basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure
plan, and emphasizing its military value selection criteria.
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense established three goals for the
2005 BRAC round: (1) reducing excess infrastructure and producing
savings, (2) transforming DOD by aligning the infrastructure with the
defense strategy, and (3) fostering jointness across DOD. In our 2005
report, we stated our belief that the recommendations overall would
produce savings and noted that the extent of transformational and joint
progress would vary.
The Commission was an independent body that had the authority to change
the Secretary's recommendations if it determined that the Secretary
deviated substantially from the legally mandated selection criteria and
the force structure plan. The Commission formulated its list of
recommendations based on DOD's proposed recommendations and the
Commission's analysis of the extent to which DOD followed the selection
criteria and the force structure plan. For example, the Commission
found that DOD substantially deviated from military value and two of
the other selection criteria and the force structure plan and removed
the proposed realignment of the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors
Directorate and a related program manager from Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, from the recommendation that
included the closure of Fort Monmouth. After the Commission's review in
2005, it forwarded a list of 182 recommendations for base closures or
realignments to the President. The Commission estimated that its
recommendations would generate net annual recurring savings of $4.2
billion beginning in fiscal year 2012. The Commission's recommendations
were accepted in their entirety by the President and Congress,[Footnote
9] became effective November 9, 2005, and constitute the set of
recommendations that DOD was in the process of implementing at the time
of this correspondence.
We Made Numerous Observations about the 2005 BRAC Recommendations and
Process:
While we concluded that DOD used a fundamentally sound overall process,
we also made numerous observations about the department's BRAC
recommendations and decision-making process. On the one hand, we
reported that DOD's decision-making process for developing its BRAC
recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned.
On the other hand, we also identified limitations with cost and savings
estimates and certain human capital challenges related to the potential
loss of experience and expertise after certain recommendations were
implemented, among other observations.
Limitations with Cost and Savings Estimates:
In our assessment of DOD's 2005 BRAC round, we reported that DOD's
decision-making process for developing its BRAC recommendations was
generally logical, well documented, and reasoned and we stated our
belief that the 2005 BRAC recommendations would produce savings
overall; however, we identified some limitations with cost and savings
estimates. As in all previous BRAC rounds, DOD used the Cost of Base
Realignment Actions (COBRA) model to provide a standard quantitative
approach to compare estimated costs and savings across various proposed
recommendations. The COBRA model relies to a large extent on standard
factors and averages but is not intended to and consequently does not
present budget quality estimates, as we pointed out in 2005 (GAO-05-
785, p. 242).[Footnote 10] As a result, COBRA-developed cost and
savings estimates cannot be assumed to represent the actual costs that
Congress will need to appropriate funds to complete implementation of
BRAC recommendations, nor will they fully reflect the savings to be
achieved after implementation. In other words, the costs of
implementation identified in COBRA are likely to be different than the
costs that DOD will incur to complete implementation. We have examined
COBRA in the past, as well as during our review of the 2005 BRAC round,
and found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing
potential costs and savings among alternative closure and realignment
scenarios with the caveat that the estimates do not represent budget
quality data. Nonetheless, we raised a number of issues related to the
cost and savings estimates resulting from realignment and closure
decisions including the following.
* Reassigning military personnel could provide a false sense of
savings. We reported that nearly half (47 percent) of the projected net
annual recurring savings from DOD's BRAC recommendations were
associated with eliminating positions currently held by military
personnel. However, rather than reducing end strength levels, DOD
intended to reassign or shift these personnel to other areas, which may
enhance capabilities in these other areas, but also limits dollar
savings available outside of the personnel accounts for other uses.
Although we agree that transferring personnel to other positions may
enhance capabilities and allows DOD to redirect freed-up resources to
another area of need, we do not believe that such transfers produce a
tangible dollar savings that DOD can apply to fund other defense
priorities outside the military personnel accounts because these
personnel will remain in the end strength (GAO-05-785, p. 22-23). The
Commission concurred with our position and rejected the closure of
Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, in part because the Commission
believed that the closure would result in a cost increase and not a
savings. The Commission stated their belief that savings were unlikely
because the Air Force planned to use the positions for other missions,
meaning the incumbents would remain in the Air Force continuing to draw
salaries and benefits (Commission report, p. 160). In contrast, DOD
considers military personnel reductions attributable to BRAC
recommendations as savings because the reductions in military personnel
allow DOD to reapply these military personnel to support new
capabilities and to improve operational efficiencies. We would note
that the counting of "savings" in this way is a long-standing
disagreement between DOD and us.
* Magnitude of savings from business process reengineering efforts was
uncertain. About $500 million, or about 9 percent, of the projected net
annual recurring savings from DOD's proposed recommendations was based
on business process reengineering efforts, but the expected efficiency
gains from these recommendations were based on assumptions that were
subject to some uncertainty and had not been validated. We reported
that actual savings would be shaped by how the recommendations were
implemented (GAO-05-785, p. 24-26). In June 2007 we reported that the
Navy had revised its cost and savings estimates for its recommendation
to create fleet readiness centers and, while projected savings from the
recommendation are still likely to be substantial, they are subject to
some uncertainties and further efforts will be required to assess
actual savings as the recommendation is implemented.[Footnote 11] The
Commission also expressed concern about the savings that DOD claimed
for business process reengineering-related recommendations and
questioned the assumptions the department used to support these
projected savings (Commission report, p. 330).
* Lengthy payback periods for many recommendations. Many of DOD's
proposed recommendations are likely to experience lengthy payback
periods--the time required for cumulative estimated savings to exceed
cumulative estimated costs--which, in some cases, called into question
whether the department would be gaining sufficient monetary value for
the up-front investment cost required to implement its recommendations
and the time required to recover this investment. More than one-third
of DOD's proposed recommendations would have taken more than 6 years to
pay back or would never produce savings. The longer payback period
associated with certain recommendations was due, in part, to the
Secretary's stated goal for the 2005 BRAC round of transformation,
including rebasing in the United States of about 47,000 forces
stationed overseas, recommendations to move activities from leased
space to military installations, and recommendations involving the
reserve components that are projected to have a combination of
relatively high military construction costs and relatively low annual
recurring savings (GAO-05-785, p. 41-42). For example, in May 2007 we
reported that our analysis of the Air Force's recommendations related
to the Air National Guard showed that implementing these
recommendations would result in a net annual recurring cost of $53
million, rather than a net annual recurring savings of $26 million as
estimated by the Commission.[Footnote 12] The Commission reported that
the 2005 BRAC round was different from previous rounds in that the
historical goal of achieving savings was not always the primary
consideration and other goals, such as transformation, led to proposed
recommendations that had long payback periods or would never pay back
(Commission report, p. 3).
* Differences between communities and DOD on cost and savings
estimates. During our July 2005 testimony before the Commission, we
noted that we had observed a number of instances, such as the closure
of Fort Monmouth, where there were disagreements between what
installation officials believed it would cost to implement certain BRAC
recommendations and what DOD included in the COBRA model. We stated in
our July 2005 testimony that we believed these differences would be
worked out over time as implementation plans were developed, but we
also suggested that at least some of the differences needed to be
reconciled between the Commission, DOD, and affected installations. The
Commission's final report does not state what actions the Commission
took to address this suggestion.
* Savings assumptions for some civilian and military personnel
reductions lacked manpower studies. In 2005, we identified issues with
the assumptions that two joint cross-service groups used to determine
personnel reductions for closure and realignment actions, which raised
questions about projected savings. In the absence of more precise
manpower studies, the groups used generic savings factors to estimate
the number of personnel positions that could be eliminated when
organizations were co-located or consolidated. However, these
reductions were based on assumptions that had undergone limited testing
and full savings realization depends upon the attainment of these
personnel reductions (GAO-05-785, p. 157, 229). The Commission
expressed a concern that manpower reductions for at least one
recommendation, which created several joint bases, were determined
through the application of a formula and not through deliberations
among commanders of affected installations and, therefore, manpower
reductions were directed by the recommendation rather than derived from
manpower studies and analyses of the functions to be carried out
(Commission report, p. 219-222).
* Full estimated environmental restoration costs were uncertain.
Consistent with prior BRAC rounds, DOD excluded estimated environmental
restoration costs from its cost and savings estimates on the premise
that restoration is a liability that the department must address
regardless of whether a base is kept open or closed. Our prior work has
shown that environmental costs can be significant, accounting for about
one-third, or $8.3 billion, of the $23.3 billion in costs incurred
through fiscal year 2003 for implementing BRAC actions from the four
previous rounds. As for the 2005 BRAC round, we reported in January
2007 that, while the expected environmental cleanup costs from the 2005
BRAC round are not fully known, DOD data indicate that about $950
million will be needed to clean up those bases that were closed in the
2005 BRAC round.[Footnote 13] As we stated in testimony before the
Commission in 2005, environmental restoration has the potential to slow
the transfer of unneeded base property freed up by the BRAC process to
communities surrounding those bases, which has adverse effects on BRAC
communities, as this property cannot be put to productive reuse until
cleanup is substantially completed. In this regard, we stated that it
is critical that the department adequately plan for and fund
environmental restoration requirements to provide for the expedited
transfer of unneeded property to others for subsequent reuse (GAO-05-
905, p. 29). The Commission agreed with our concerns (Commission
report, p. 335).
* Certain other expected costs and savings to the government were not
accounted for. As we reported in 2005, the BRAC legislation required
that DOD take into account the effect of proposed closures and
realignments on the costs of any other activity of the department or
any other federal agency that may be required to assume responsibility
for activities at military installations. While the military services
and joint cross-service groups were aware of the potential for these
costs, estimated costs were not included in the cost and savings
analyses because it was unclear what actions an agency might take in
response to the BRAC action (GAO-05-785, p. 44-45). The Commission
report recommended that in the future the department improve
coordination with other affected federal agencies so that savings
estimates do not ignore the increased or shifted costs of federal
operations to agencies outside of DOD (Commission report, p. 308).
Additionally, although not required to be included in DOD's cost and
savings analysis, costs associated with transition assistance, planning
grants, and other assistance made available to affected communities by
DOD and other agencies could add to the total costs to the government
of implementing BRAC. We reported that in the prior four BRAC rounds,
four federal government agencies provided nearly $2 billion in
assistance through fiscal year 2004 to communities and individuals. DOD
officials said these agencies are slated to perform similar roles in
the 2005 round. However, in contrast to other BRAC rounds, assistance
will likely be needed not only for communities surrounding bases that
are losing missions and personnel, but also communities that face
considerable challenges dealing with large influxes of personnel and
military missions. These personnel increases are likely to place
additional demands on community services, including the provision of
adequate housing and schools and increased demand for roads and
utilities. Some communities may not have adequate resources to address
needs related to the large influxes of people in the short term and,
consequently, the federal government may have to provide some
assistance, thereby increasing BRAC implementation expenditures (GAO-
05-785 p. 47-52).
Potentially offsetting some of these costs, we reported in 2005 that
the cost and savings estimates excluded anticipated revenue from the
sale of unneeded former base property or the transfer of property to
communities through economic development conveyances. The potential for
significant revenue exists at certain locations (GAO-05-785, p. 47-48).
We noted in our July 2005 testimony that there was an indication that
the department would place greater emphasis on selling property as a
disposal process, but details were still being formulated at that time.
* DOD's past efforts at tracking actual cost and savings had been
limited. In our testimony before the Commission we stated that the
department proposed various actions where likely savings would depend
on how the actions were implemented, but the details of their
implementation had yet to be developed. We noted that we believed it
would be important for DOD to develop clearly defined implementation
plans and to monitor the implementation of these actions to ensure
compliance with proposed actions and to help ensure that these savings
in fact occurred. In our assessment of the 2005 BRAC process we
recommended that DOD establish mechanisms for tracking and periodically
updating savings estimates as the BRAC recommendations are implemented.
DOD concurred with this recommendation.
Human Capital Challenges:
We identified the potential loss of human capital skills, including
expertise and experience, as an issue for some of DOD's proposed
realignment and closure actions. We pointed out to the Commission that
gaining bases may face challenges if fewer people moved. For example,
related to the proposed but subsequently overturned closure of Naval
Shipyard Portsmouth, Maine, officials from one of the joint cross-
service groups estimated that it would have taken up to 8 years to
fully develop skills associated with maintaining nuclear-powered
submarines. Officials at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, expressed a similar
concern about the proposed closure of that installation and transfer of
a large portion of the work to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We
noted in our July 2005 testimony before the Commission that should
there be BRAC actions where the loss of personnel is extensive,
particularly for those skills requiring extensive education, training,
and experience, the department could face challenges in replacing these
critical skills. In this regard, we noted that it was important that
the department develop transition plans that recognize the loss of
human capital skills and provide for replacement capability to minimize
disruption to ongoing defense operations. We also concluded in 2005
that without such a plan, the department's ability to provide the
necessary support to military forces could be at risk (GAO-05-905, p.
25-26).
The Commission's report included concerns about the loss of
intellectual capital as a result of some closure or realignment
actions. For example, the Commission specifically noted that the loss
of some intellectual capital was to be expected from the relocation of
technical activities from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground. The
Commission report stated that the Commission agreed with DOD's view
that the loss of intellectual capital was an implementation challenge
that must be managed with careful planning and sequencing. The
Commission concluded that the adverse effects of moving existing
programs could be managed over the 6-year implementation period by
properly sequencing the movement of programs to ensure no loss in
service, or by providing temporary redundant or duplicative
capabilities as necessary to ensure continuous and uninterrupted
program integrity. Further, the Commission report stated "the
department pointed out that there is a nationally recognized science
and technology workforce in Maryland containing the highest percentage
of professional and technical workers (about 24 percent)." To address
the potential loss of intellectual capital, the Commission recommended
that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to certain congressional
committees that addresses aspects of the potential loss of expertise
and experience. Specifically, the Commission recommended that the
Secretary of Defense submit a report to the congressional committees of
jurisdiction that movement of operations, functions, or activities from
Fort Monmouth to the Aberdeen Proving Ground will be accomplished
without disruption of support to the Global War on Terrorism or other
critical contingency operations and that safeguards exist to ensure
that necessary redundant capabilities have been put in place to
mitigate the potential degradation of such support, and to ensure
maximum retention of critical workforce. Also, the Commission noted
that they believed congressional oversight on this issue may benefit
from a review by us (Commission report, p. 10-12). Because the
Commission suggested our review in its findings on the closure of Fort
Monmouth and you have requested that we review the methodology of the
DOD report, we will review the methodology after DOD issues its report.
Agency Comments:
Because we drew from our past work and published documents in preparing
this correspondence, we did not seek official comments from DOD on its
contents, but did advise them that we were issuing this correspondence.
_________:
We are sending copies of this correspondence to the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services;
the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations, Subcommittees on Defense; the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations,
Subcommittees on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies; the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia; the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform; members of the Congressional delegations from Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, and Virginia; the Secretary of Defense; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies to
others upon request. In addition, the correspondence will be available
at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink: http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this correspondence,
please contact me on (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this correspondence.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] 31 U.S.C. § 717.
[2] P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (2001).
[3] GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).
[4] GAO, Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC
Rounds, GAO-05-614 (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005); and Military Bases:
Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Selection
Process and Recommendations, GAO-05-905 (Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2005).
[5] GAO-05-785, GAO-05-614, and GAO-05-905.
[6] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005 Base Closure
and Realignment Commission Report to the President (Arlington, Va.:
Sept. 8, 2005).
[7] The first round in 1988 was authorized by the Defense Authorization
Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended (Pub. L.
No. 100-526, Title II, (1988)). Subsequently, additional BRAC rounds
were completed in 1991, 1993, and 1995 as authorized by the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended (Pub. L. No.101-
510, Title XXIX (1990)). The latest round--BRAC 2005--was authorized by
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L.
No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001)).
[8] The law that established certain provisions of the BRAC process
(Pub. L. No. 101-510, section 2903 (c)(5)) required specified DOD
personnel to certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that
information provided to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission
concerning the realignment or closure of a military installation was
accurate and complete. During the BRAC process, data were certified by
senior officials at DOD installations.
[9] The President was required to approve or disapprove the
Commission's recommendations in their entirety by September 23, 2005.
After they were approved, the recommendations were forwarded to
Congress, which had 45 days or until the adjournment of Congress to
disapprove the recommendations on an all-or-none basis; otherwise, the
recommendations became binding.
[10] Budget quality estimates were to be developed once BRAC decisions
were made and detailed implementation plans were developed.
[11] GAO, Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet
Readiness Centers Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual
Savings and Overcome Certain Challenges, GAO-07-304 (Washington, D.C.:
June 29, 2007).
[12] GAO, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations, GAO-07-641
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007).
[13] GAO, Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of
Unneeded Property, GAO-07-166 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007).
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Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Susan Becker, Acting Manager, Beckers@gao.gov (202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
