Quadrennial Defense Review
Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements Gao ID: GAO-07-709 September 14, 2007The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget every 4 years including an assessment of the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006, represents the first comprehensive review that DOD had undertaken since the military forces have been engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO was asked to assess (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR and (2) what changes, if any, in the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of the report, including any changes that would better reflect 21st century security conditions. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed DOD's methodology, QDR study guidance, and results from key analyses and also obtained views of defense analysts within and outside of DOD.
DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several strengths, but several weaknesses significantly limited the review's usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and risk associated with executing the national defense strategy. Key strengths of the QDR included sustained involvement of senior DOD officials, extensive collaboration with interagency partners and allied countries, and a database to track implementation of initiatives. However, GAO found weaknesses in three key areas. First, DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated assessment of different options for organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities. Without such an assessment, DOD is not well positioned to balance capability needs and risks within future budgets, given the nation's fiscal challenges. Second, DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion that it had the appropriate number of personnel to meet current and projected demands. During its review, DOD did not consider changing personnel levels and instead focused on altering the skill mix. However, a year after the QDR report was issued, DOD announced plans to increase Army and Marine Corps personnel by 92,000. Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it needs, DOD cannot provide an analytical basis that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect the number of personnel needed to execute the defense strategy. Third, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are required by the QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD's risk management framework because DOD had not developed assessment tools to measure risk. Without a sound analytical approach to assessing risk, DOD may not be able to demonstrate how it will manage risk within current and expected resource levels. As a result, DOD is not in the best position to demonstrate that it has identified the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate risk. Through discussions with DOD officials and defense analysts, GAO has identified several options for refining the QDR legislative language that Congress could consider to improve the usefulness of future QDRs, including changes to encourage DOD to focus on high priority strategic issues and better reflect security conditions of the 21st century. Congress could consider options to clarify its expectations regarding what budget information DOD should include in the QDR and eliminate reporting elements for issues that could be addressed in different reports. For example, the requirement to assess revisions to the unified command plan is also required and reported under other legislation. Further, some reporting elements such as how resources would be shifted between two conflicts could be eliminated in light of DOD's new planning approach that focuses on capabilities to meet a range of threats rather than on the allocation of forces for specific adversaries. GAO also presents an option to have an advisory group work with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide DOD with alternative perspectives and analyses.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-709, Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2007:
Quadrennial Defense Review:
Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved Department of Defense
Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements:
Quadrennial Defense Review:
GAO-07-709:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-709, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law to conduct a
comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force
structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget every 4
years including an assessment of the force structure best suited to
implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk. The
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006,
represents the first comprehensive review that DOD had undertaken since
the military forces have been engaged in operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
GAO was asked to assess (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DOD‘s
approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR and (2) what changes, if any,
in the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of the report,
including any changes that would better reflect 21st century security
conditions. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed DOD‘s methodology, QDR
study guidance, and results from key analyses and also obtained views
of defense analysts within and outside of DOD.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several strengths,
but several weaknesses significantly limited the review‘s usefulness in
addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and risk associated
with executing the national defense strategy. Key strengths of the QDR
included sustained involvement of senior DOD officials, extensive
collaboration with interagency partners and allied countries, and a
database to track implementation of initiatives. However, GAO found
weaknesses in three key areas. First, DOD did not conduct a
comprehensive, integrated assessment of different options for
organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities.
Without such an assessment, DOD is not well positioned to balance
capability needs and risks within future budgets, given the nation‘s
fiscal challenges. Second, DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis
for its conclusion that it had the appropriate number of personnel to
meet current and projected demands. During its review, DOD did not
consider changing personnel levels and instead focused on altering the
skill mix. However, a year after the QDR report was issued, DOD
announced plans to increase Army and Marine Corps personnel by 92,000.
Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel
it needs, DOD cannot provide an analytical basis that its military and
civilian personnel levels reflect the number of personnel needed to
execute the defense strategy. Third, the risk assessments conducted by
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
which are required by the QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD‘s
risk management framework because DOD had not developed assessment
tools to measure risk. Without a sound analytical approach to assessing
risk, DOD may not be able to demonstrate how it will manage risk within
current and expected resource levels. As a result, DOD is not in the
best position to demonstrate that it has identified the force structure
best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate risk.
Through discussions with DOD officials and defense analysts, GAO has
identified several options for refining the QDR legislative language
that Congress could consider to improve the usefulness of future QDRs,
including changes to encourage DOD to focus on high priority strategic
issues and better reflect security conditions of the 21st century.
Congress could consider options to clarify its expectations regarding
what budget information DOD should include in the QDR and eliminate
reporting elements for issues that could be addressed in different
reports. For example, the requirement to assess revisions to the
unified command plan is also required and reported under other
legislation. Further, some reporting elements such as how resources
would be shifted between two conflicts could be eliminated in light of
DOD‘s new planning approach that focuses on capabilities to meet a
range of threats rather than on the allocation of forces for specific
adversaries. GAO also presents an option to have an advisory group work
with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide DOD with alternative
perspectives and analyses.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that for future QDRs, DOD develop methods to conduct a
more thorough analysis of force structure and risk. GAO is also
providing options for Congress to consider to revise QDR legislation.
DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-709]
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The QDR's Approach Had Several Strengths but Analytical Weaknesses
Limited Its Usefulness in Assessing Force Structure, Personnel
Requirements, and Risk:
Options for Modifying Some Legislative Requirements Could Improve
Usefulness of Future QDRs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology38:
Appendix II: Quadrennial Defense Review Legislation in Effect for the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review40:
Appendix III: Summary of New Changes in 10 U.S.C. §118 for Future
Quadrennial Defense Reviews43:
Appendix IV: DOD Comments44:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments48:
Related GAO Products: 49:
Table:
Table 1: Key Elements of Capabilities-Based Planning:
Figure:
Figure 1: Organizational Structure for the Development of the 2006 QDR:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 14, 2007:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Warner:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
Among the 21st century challenges facing the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the nation are difficult decisions concerning how to strike
an affordable balance between national security and domestic needs.
Aided by annual and supplemental funding of over $400 billion per year
since fiscal year 2003, DOD has been maintaining a high pace of
operations while simultaneously transforming its military forces to
meet emerging threats of the new security environment. However, as we
have emphasized in previous reports, the federal government now faces
increasing fiscal challenges, and DOD may face increasing competition
for federal dollars.[Footnote 1] The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) represents the first comprehensive review of the national defense
strategy that DOD has undertaken since military forces have been
engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, the 2006 QDR
provided an opportunity for DOD to move beyond its long-standing
approaches and methods and identify the capabilities required to meet
current, emerging, and future threats.
The QDR is a key component of national security planning. To ensure
that the country's defense needs are reviewed periodically, Congress
directed DOD to conduct comprehensive QDRs every 4 years to examine
elements of the defense program and policies of the United States
including the national defense strategy, force structure,[Footnote 2]
modernization, infrastructure, and budget plan.[Footnote 3] Key
assessments required during the review that relate to national security
planning include: (1) the force structure best suited to implement the
defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk; (2) the budget plan
that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute
successfully the full range of missions called for in the national
defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk;[Footnote 4] (3)
the Secretary of Defense's assessment of the nature and magnitude of
the political, strategic, and military risks associated with executing
the missions called for under the national defense strategy; and (4)
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's assessment of risk.
DOD submitted its report on the third quadrennial review to Congress on
February 6, 2006.[Footnote 5] In the report, DOD concluded that "For
the foreseeable future, steady-state operations including operations as
part of a long war against terrorist networks and associated rotation
base and sustainment requirements will be the main determinant for
sizing U.S. forces." DOD also confirmed that for the long term it must
size and shape U.S. forces for three main types of missions: homeland
defense, the war on terrorism/irregular warfare,[Footnote 6] and
conventional campaigns. In addition, DOD acknowledges that it must
implement departmentwide change to ensure that organizational
structures, processes, and procedures effectively support its strategic
priorities. For example, DOD created the Defense Business
Transformation Agency to integrate and oversee corporate-level business
systems and initiatives in areas such as acquisition and logistics.
Further, DOD reached several key decisions in the 2006 QDR that
emphasized the need to continue changing the mix of joint capabilities
and forces, such as stabilizing Army and Marine Corps active duty
personnel at fiscal year 2006 congressionally authorized levels while
increasing special operations forces in areas such as civil affairs
units and special forces battalions, and military personnel for sea,
air, and land teams.
DOD viewed the 2006 QDR as a refinement of the concepts it introduced
in its 2001 QDR report, such as shifting the basis of force planning
from focusing on specific adversaries and geographic locations to
capabilities-based planning that identifies the capabilities the
military will need to prepare for a range of potential military
operations against unknown enemies. In the 2001 QDR report, DOD
introduced a risk management framework designed to help address the
tension between preparing for future threats and meeting the demands of
the present with finite resources and to size, shape, and manage the
department to accomplish its strategic priorities. DOD planned to use
the framework in conducting the 2006 QDR.
Our work on past QDRs[Footnote 7] has shown long-standing weaknesses in
DOD's assessment of force structure requirements. In past QDRs, DOD has
not focused on longer-term threats and requirements for support
capabilities, and its QDR reports have provided little information on
some required issues, such as assumptions used in its analyses.
Moreover, we have reported that force structure decisions were not
clearly supported by analysis and linked to strategic plans. Further,
in November 2005,[Footnote 8] we reported that DOD has not fully
implemented a risk management approach and it planned to refine its
risk management framework during the 2006 QDR.
In 2006, Congress passed legislation[Footnote 9] which added new
reporting elements that will apply to the next QDR in 2010 as well as
future QDRs. For example, the Secretary of Defense must establish an
independent panel to conduct a postreview assessment of the QDR
including the recommendations, assumptions used, and vulnerabilities of
the strategy and force structure underlying the review. The new
legislation also required that the Secretary of Defense submit to the
Senate and House Committees on Armed Services quarterly reports on the
status of the department's implementation of the 2006 QDR decisions,
beginning in January 2007.[Footnote 10] DOD submitted its first and
second quarterly reports to Congress on January 31, 2007, and June 14,
2007, respectively.[Footnote 11]
You asked us to evaluate DOD's overall approach and supporting analysis
in preparing the 2006 QDR and assess whether the QDR legislative
requirements could be reevaluated to improve the usefulness of the
report, including any changes needed to better reflect the security
conditions of the 21st century. Accordingly, this report assesses (1)
the strengths and weaknesses of DOD's approach and methodology for the
2006 QDR and (2) what changes, if any, in the QDR legislation could
improve the usefulness of future QDRs.
To assess the 2006 QDR's strengths and weaknesses, we reviewed DOD's
study guidance for the QDR and discussed the advantages and
disadvantages of the review's process with DOD's officials. We also
examined the methodology and results of the QDR key analyses and
assessed how capabilities-based planning principles were applied during
the assessments. To understand how the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted their risk assessments,
we reviewed the QDR's study guidance on assessing risk and held
discussions with officials responsible for conducting risk assessments
during the QDR. We reviewed DOD's quarterly report to Congress on the
status of implementation for the 2006 QDR and post-QDR study team
reports and implementation plans to review the processes that DOD has
to implement QDR initiatives. Further, we held discussions with Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials responsible for monitoring
the status of initiatives related to the QDR and ongoing work in the
post-QDR study teams. To determine whether changes to the QDR
legislation could improve the usefulness of future QDRs, we identified
potential options from our analyses of prior QDRs and obtained the
views of DOD civilian and military leaders who participated in the 2006
QDR as well as nongovernmental defense analysts, many of whom had
played key roles in previous QDRs or in prior defense strategy reviews.
We performed our review from May 2006 through May 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several
strengths, several weaknesses significantly limited the review's
usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and
risk associated with executing the national defense strategy. On the
positive side, the 2006 QDR benefited from the sustained involvement of
key senior DOD officials who provided top-down leadership and oversight
of the review process. Second, for the first time, DOD collaborated
extensively with several major interagency partners, such as the
Department of Homeland Security, as well as representatives of some
allied countries to identify capabilities that would address current
and future security threats. Third, leaders of the QDR's six study
teams collaborated with each other to avoid duplication of work as they
developed options to address DOD's challenges. Fourth, DOD has
developed a database for monitoring the implementation of about 170 QDR
initiatives, which range from changing organizational structures to
enhancing military capabilities. However, weaknesses in three key
areas--force structure analysis, assessment of personnel requirements,
and assessment of the level of risk--hampered DOD's ability to
determine the military force best suited to implement the defense
strategy, which is a fundamental QDR goal, and thoroughly demonstrate
how the risks associated with desired capabilities were evaluated. As a
result, DOD is not well positioned to balance capability needs and
risks within future budgets given the nation's serious budget
pressures.
* First, although the 2001 QDR and the 2006 QDR study guidance
emphasized that DOD planned to use capabilities-based planning to
perform its analysis, DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated
assessment of alternative force structures. A key reason why DOD did
not conduct such an assessment of its force structure was that it has
not developed an integrated capabilities-based planning approach for
comparing alternative force structures. Although DOD relied on several
analyses of different parts of the force structure to make decisions
about capabilities, it did not integrate these analyses into a
comprehensive assessment. For example, while DOD conducted separate
studies about tactical aircraft and ground forces, these were not
integrated into an overall assessment of the numbers and size of units
needed. Further, instead of assessing different levels of forces and
their capabilities and evaluating the trade-offs among capabilities,
DOD's primary assessment approach was to compare currently planned
forces to potential scenarios to determine whether and to what extent
the planned force structure would experience shortages.
* Second, DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its
conclusion that the number of personnel in the active and reserve
components across the military departments was appropriate to meet
current and projected operational demands. A key reason why DOD did not
provide a clear basis for its personnel requirements is that existing
personnel levels were taken as a given, and DOD focused on analyzing
options on how to change the skill mix of active and reserve military
personnel and civilians. Further, within 1 year after the QDR was
published, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to seek
congressional approval to increase Army and Marine Corps personnel by
92,000. These plans call into question the analytical basis of the QDR
conclusion that the number of personnel and the size of the services'
force structure were appropriate to meet current and future
requirements. Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number
of personnel it needs, DOD cannot provide an analytical basis for its
conclusion that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect the
number of personnel needed to fill DOD's combat force structure and
provide institutional support.
* Third, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are required by the
QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD's risk management framework to
demonstrate how risks associated with the proposed force structure were
evaluated. Although tasked to use the risk management framework to
demonstrate how risks were evaluated, several of the QDR study teams
relied primarily on professional judgment to assess risks and examine
the consequences of not investing in various capabilities. The Chairman
was not tasked to use the risk management framework in assessing risks
and did not choose to use it in his assessment. Our prior work has
shown that performing a data-driven risk assessment can provide a guide
to help organizations shape, focus, and prioritize investment decisions
to develop capabilities. DOD did not conduct a comprehensive data-
driven risk assessment because, according to DOD officials, it had
difficulties in developing the department-level measures that would be
necessary to assess risk and, as a result, the assessment tools were
not available for use during the QDR.
Without thorough alternative force structure assessments, analyses of
personnel requirements, and comprehensive risk assessments, DOD cannot
provide comprehensive analytical support for significant decisions so
that Congress can effectively evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks
of alternative force structures and associated expenditures of federal
resources. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop
appropriate methods for conducting comprehensive, data-driven
assessments in future QDRs of (1) the capabilities related to
alternative force structures and related personnel requirements and (2)
the risks associated with capabilities. DOD partially agreed with these
recommendations. In its comments, DOD agreed that the 2006 QDR did not
comprehensively assess alternatives to the planned force structure and
instead assessed force requirements within capability areas. DOD stated
that it is taking steps to provide more robust analysis of capabilities
for future QDRs. However, until DOD comprehensively assesses
alternative force structures that include examining alternatives across
capability areas, it will not have the detailed information it needs to
determine the force structure best suited to implement the defense
strategy and to demonstrate risks associated with the planned force
structure. DOD also agreed that the study teams inconsistently applied
DOD's risk management framework, although it noted the senior leaders
discussed a consolidated analysis of risk related to the proposed force
structure as the QDR decisions were finalized in November 2005. DOD
noted that further development of the department's risk management
methodology is necessary to appropriately assess risks and it discussed
some steps the department intends to take to identify performance goals
and develop metrics. However, DOD did not provide detailed information
or a time frame for the improvements it discussed.
Several options exist for refining legislative language that Congress
could consider to focus QDR statutory requirements on strategic issues
and eliminate some reporting elements that are already required under
other laws and that may no longer be as useful in the new security
environment. Specifically, some defense analysts we interviewed
suggested requiring DOD to focus its efforts on broad strategic issues
and provide more information on the analytic basis for its key
assumptions and strategic planning decisions. In addition, some defense
analysts suggested that to facilitate congressional oversight and
decision making, the QDR legislation should clarify Congress'
expectations for information related to budget plans and planned trade-
offs among capabilities. In addition, most analysts agreed that many of
the detailed requirements requiring reporting on more operational
issues, such as reporting on the unified command plan, may divert the
QDR's focus from strategic issues and should be eliminated from the QDR
and assessed separately. Finally, most defense analysts we interviewed
believe that recent legislation, which requires DOD to appoint an
independent panel to complete a post-QDR assessment of the results of
future QDRs,[Footnote 12] could be expanded to include providing advice
to the Secretary of Defense before or during the QDR process. We are
suggesting that Congress consider options to (1) clarify expectations
for how the QDR should address the budget plan that supports the
national defense strategy and (2) eliminate some reporting
requirements. DOD agreed with these suggestions. In our draft report we
also suggested that Congress consider broadening the scope of the post-
QDR assessment panel for future QDRs to include providing advice before
or during the QDR process. In its written comments, DOD stated that
having an independent panel that could provide advice and alternatives
to the Secretary of Defense before and during the QDR process would be
useful. However, DOD raised the concern that having the same panel
advise the department before and during the QDR as well as critiquing
the results could create mistrust between the department's leadership
and the panel. To reflect DOD's concern, we have revised our matter to
state that Congress should consider requiring an independent panel to
provide advice and alternatives to the Secretary of Defense before and
during the QDR. This change is intended to provide Congress with the
flexibility to establish separate independent panels prior to and
following the QDR.
Background:
In May 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
proposed the idea of a comprehensive quadrennial review by DOD of the
country's defense strategy and force structure. In August 1995, the
Secretary of Defense endorsed the idea, and the following year
legislation directed DOD to conduct the 1997 QDR.[Footnote 13]
Congress created a permanent requirement for DOD to conduct a QDR every
4 years in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
passed in 1999.[Footnote 14] According to this legislation, DOD was to
conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy,
force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget
plan, and other elements of the country's defense program and policies
with a view toward determining and expressing the nation's defense
strategy and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.
Originally the legislation identified 14 specific issues for DOD to
address, such as a comprehensive discussion of the national defense
strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to
implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk. In
addition, it allowed the Secretary of Defense to review any other
issues he considers appropriate. The legislation in effect during the
2006 QDR reflected several amendments to the original legislation, for
example, requiring DOD to assess the national defense mission of the
Coast Guard. (See app. II for the legislation in effect during the 2006
QDR.)
Among other requirements, the 1999 QDR legislation required that the
Secretary of Defense assess the nature and magnitude of the political,
strategic, and military risks associated with executing the missions
called for under the national defense strategy. In the 2001 QDR report,
DOD introduced a new risk management framework that identified four
areas of risk--operational, force management, future challenges, and
institutional. According to the 2001 QDR report, the framework would
enable DOD to address the tension between preparing for future threats
and meeting the demands of the present with finite resources. Further,
the framework was intended to ensure that DOD was sized, shaped,
postured, committed, and managed with a view toward accomplishing the
strategic priorities of the 2001 QDR.
Future QDRs will be affected by the new reporting elements added to the
QDR legislation by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007.[Footnote 15] Specifically, the legislation
requires DOD to establish an independent review panel to conduct an
assessment of the QDR no later than 6 months before the date that DOD's
report on the QDR is submitted to Congress. The panel is required to
submit, within 3 months after the date on which the QDR is submitted,
an assessment of the review, including its recommendations, the stated
and implied assumptions incorporated in the review, and the
vulnerabilities of the strategy and force structure underlying the
review. The legislation also specifies that the QDR review should not
be constrained to comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the
President. In addition, the legislation added several specific issues
that DOD is required to address such as providing the specific
capabilities, including the general number and type of specific
military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting
objectives. Lastly, the authorization act directs DOD to submit to the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees a report on the
implementation of recommendations identified in the 2006 QDR report no
later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter.[Footnote
16] (See app. III for a summary of additions to the QDR legislation, 10
U.S.C. §118 as a result of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.)
DOD considers the 2006 QDR a refinement of its predecessor 2001 QDR,
which detailed the department's intent to shift the basis of defense
planning from the long-standing "threat-based" model, which focused on
specific adversaries and geographic locations, to a "capabilities-
based" construct that seeks to prepare for a range of potential
military operations against unknown enemies. According to the 2001 QDR
report, the capabilities-based model focuses on how an adversary might
fight rather than specifically who the adversary might be or where the
war might occur.
The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) had the lead role in conducting
the 2006 QDR. The Joint Staff played a supporting role in the process
and had primary responsibility for leading the analytical work to
support the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's risk assessment. In
March 2005, the Secretary of Defense approved guidance, called the
Terms of Reference, for the review. The Terms of Reference identified
four focus areas and provided guidance to senior officials to develop
capabilities and make investment decisions to shape the future force
and reduce risks in these areas. The four focus areas were 1) defeating
terrorist networks, 2) defending the homeland in depth, 3) shaping the
choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and 4) preventing hostile
states and nonstate actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass
destruction. During the spring of 2005, DOD senior leaders held
meetings on the focus areas with interagency partners from across the
federal government and international allies to identify the potential
threats and the types of capabilities needed to address the challenges
associated with the focus areas. Officials from the intelligence
community, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, provided threat
assessments for each of the focus areas.
The Terms of Reference also established six study teams to assess
capabilities associated with the QDR focus areas and directed the teams
to develop options to reduce risk in these areas. Top-level civilian
and military leaders from OSD and Joint Staff led the study teams,
which included officials from the services and Combatant Commands. The
Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff co-chaired a senior level group, which was eventually referred
to as the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, and this group reviewed the
work of the study teams during the summer and fall of 2005. Other
members of the review group included the Under Secretaries of Defense,
the services' Under Secretaries, the services' Vice Chief of Staffs,
and the Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. The Deputy
Secretary and his working group determined what information each study
team would provide to the senior-level review group, which was led by
the Secretary of Defense. Figure 1 shows the structure that OSD
established to conduct the QDR.
Figure 1: Organizational Structure for the Development of the 2006 QDR:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
According to the 2006 QDR report, the foundation of this QDR is the
National Defense Strategy, published in March 2005. The Secretary of
Defense's National Defense Strategy is implemented through the National
Military Strategy, which is developed by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The National Military Strategy provides focus for
military activities by defining a set of interrelated military
objectives from which the service chiefs and combatant commanders
identify desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses risk.
The QDR's Approach Had Several Strengths but Analytical Weaknesses
Limited Its Usefulness in Assessing Force Structure, Personnel
Requirements, and Risk:
While DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several
strengths, several weaknesses significantly limited the review's
usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and
risk associated with executing the national defense strategy. On the
positive side, the 2006 QDR benefited from the sustained involvement of
key senior DOD officials, interagency and allied participation, and
internal collaboration among the QDR's participants. However,
weaknesses in the assessment of three key areas--force structure,
personnel requirements, and risk--hampered DOD's ability to undertake a
fundamental reassessment of the national defense strategy and U.S.
military forces. As a result of these weaknesses, Congress lacks
assurance that DOD has conducted the analysis needed to determine the
force best suited to implement the defense strategy. Further, DOD is
not well positioned to demonstrate to Congress how it considered risks
and made difficult trade-offs among its capabilities to balance
investments within future budgets, given the nation's fiscal
challenges.
Senior Leadership Involvement, Interagency and Allied Participation,
Internal Collaboration, and a System to Monitor Implementation Provided
Benefits:
DOD's approach for the 2006 QDR benefited from several strengths.
First, key senior DOD leaders maintained sustained involvement
throughout the review. As we have noted in previous reports,[Footnote
17] best practices clearly indicate that top-level leadership is
crucial for engineering major changes in an organization. Top leaders
establish the framework for change and provide guidance and direction
to others to achieve change. During the 2006 QDR process, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
co-chaired a senior level review group, now referred to as the Deputy's
Advisory Working Group, to review and approve initiatives of varying
complexity presented by the six study team leaders and leaders of
specialized issue areas, such as special operations forces. According
to an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, during most
of the QDR process, this senior level group met several times a week to
review the study teams' options and provide guidance to the teams to
ensure that the QDR's strategic priorities were addressed. Since the
QDR report was issued in February 2006, the Deputy's Advisory Working
Group continues to meet regularly to oversee implementation of the
QDR's strategic priorities, such as improving DOD's management
structures and business processes to support effective decision making.
Second, DOD collaborated with interagency partners, such as the
Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. international allies, such as
the United Kingdom, to discuss potential strategic challenges and
determine capabilities that are required to meet current and future
challenges. According to DOD officials, senior officials from the
Department of Homeland Security including the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Departments of Energy, State, and other federal agencies participated
in DOD's discussions establishing the strategic direction of the QDR
during the spring of 2005. U.S. agency officials discussed with DOD
officials the types of capabilities and investments needed to reduce
risk in the QDR's four focus areas--defeating terrorist networks,
defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at
strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states and nonstate actors
from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. For example, DOD
officials who coordinated the QDR stated that U.S. Coast Guard
officials identified current and planned maritime defense capabilities
as part of DOD's discussion on combating weapons of mass destruction.
Further, officials from U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom,
participated in the discussions to share their perspectives about how
DOD, its allies, and global partners could address the nontraditional,
asymmetric warfighting challenges of the 21st century, such as
preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by
nonstate actors. As a result of contributions from the interagency
partners and allies, DOD was in a better position to identify and
develop the four focus areas that eventually shaped the scope of the
QDR.
Third, leaders of the six study teams collaborated with each other to
avoid duplication of work as they developed options to address
challenges associated with the focus areas. The study team leaders held
weekly meetings to discuss whether their issues could be better
addressed by another study team, the progress of their work plans, and
whether they could provide each other with mutually supporting
analysis. Further, a group of senior officials, led by an official in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, attended the study
teams' weekly meetings to ensure that the options addressed the
capabilities associated with the four focus areas and helped identify
overlaps or gaps in the development of options. For example, three
study teams, which developed and identified options related to force
structure, personnel requirements, and roles and missions respectively,
coordinated their work to minimize any overlap and identify any gaps in
the development of options to increase the number of military and
civilian personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi,
and Chinese.
Fourth, following the release of the 2006 QDR, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense requested that officials in OSD establish procedures to track
the implementation of the 2006 QDR initiatives which encompassed a
range of military capabilities, from implementing its new personnel
management system to developing a new land-based, penetrating long-
range strike capability by 2018. Senior officials from the Office of
the Director, Administration and Management created a departmentwide
database and established criteria to categorize the implementation
status of each initiative. Specifically, implementation of an
initiative was categorized as "completed" if the initiative was fully
implemented or if DOD had taken actions that officials determined as
having met the intent of the initiative, even though the initiative may
take years to fully implement. OSD officials have provided periodic
briefings on the status of QDR initiatives to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and his advisory group since the publication of the 2006 QDR
report. DOD reported to Congress in January 2007 that it had completed
implementation of about 90, or 70 percent, of the 130
initiatives.[Footnote 18] Further, in January 2006 at the end of the
QDR process, the Deputy Secretary of Defense identified eight study
areas and established a process to continue developing DOD's approaches
for the issues associated with these study areas.[Footnote 19]
According to senior DOD officials, these areas identified for post-QDR
study were generally complex and involved multiple organizations, such
as developing interoperable strategic communications.[Footnote 20] The
Deputy Secretary provided guidance for the teams that included
requirements to (1) define objectives, timelines, and performance
metrics and (2) establish an oversight process as part of an
implementation plan to ensure the decisions made during the QDR were
achieved. According to DOD officials, DOD plans to provide Congress
with information about the status of the post-QDR study teams'
implementation in its quarterly reports. For example, in DOD's January
2007 report to Congress, DOD reported that one of the Institutional
Reform and Governance study team's objectives is to continue developing
concepts and overseeing initiatives related to reforming governance and
management functions such as capabilities-based planning.
Weaknesses in Assessment of Force Structure, Personnel Requirements,
and Risk Limited the QDR's Usefulness in Linking Force Structure to the
Defense Strategy and Addressing Affordability Challenges:
Weaknesses in the assessment of three key areas--force structure,
personnel requirements, and risk--significantly limited the review's
usefulness in reassessing the force structure best suited to implement
the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk, which is a key
requirement of the review. Our previous reporting on DOD's prior QDRs
and other work has shown that weaknesses in establishing a substantive
basis for force structure, personnel requirements, and risk have been
long-standing issues for the department. Further, until DOD can
demonstrate an analytical basis for its force structure and personnel
requirements, it will not be well-positioned to balance capability
needs within budgets that are likely to be constrained in the future,
given the nation's fiscal challenges.
DOD Did Not Conduct a Comprehensive, Integrated Analysis of Alternative
Force Structures Using a Capabilities-Based Approach:
Although the 2006 QDR study guidance emphasized that DOD would use
capabilities-based planning to focus on how a range of potential
enemies might fight, DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated
assessment of alternative force structures during the QDR using a
capabilities-based approach. Based on our discussions with DOD
officials and our review of DOD documents and non-DOD published
studies, a capabilities-based approach requires a common understanding
of how a capability will be used, who will use it, when it is needed,
and why it is needed. Further, each capability should be assessed based
on the effects it seeks to generate and the associated operational
risk[Footnote 21] of not having the capability. A capabilities-based
approach also seeks to identify capability gaps[Footnote 22] or
redundancies and make trade-offs among the capabilities in order to
efficiently use fiscal resources. In table 1 we identify several key
elements of a capabilities-based planning approach and provide
descriptions of these elements.
Table 1: Key Elements of Capabilities-Based Planning:
(Continued From Previous Page)
Key element: Establish an organizational structure;
Description:
* Identify roles, responsibilities, and organizational changes;
* Establish methods for recording and communicating decisions and
tracking their execution.
Key element: Establish an analytic framework;
Description:
* Use traceable and analytically-based data, information sources, and
standards consistently when conducting assessments;
* Refine and further develop an approach to assess risk.
Key element: Develop a national defense strategy;
Description:
* Identify strategic goals so capabilities can be developed to support
these goals.
Key element: Develop a wide range of specific and generic threats;
Description:
* Identify potential threats by using intelligence sources, strategic
studies, and professional military experience.
Key element: Develop a wide range of scenarios; Description:
* Develop scenarios that address various time frames and do not solely
focus on one or two major conventional campaigns;
* Ensure that the scenarios challenge the force and do not simplify
existing weaknesses and problems, e.g., do not assume that overseas
locations have a developed infrastructure;
* Identify the capabilities that are needed to perform missions
outlined in the scenarios.
Key element: Conduct a capability survey; Description:
* Identify the capabilities within the existing and planned force;
* Identify any gaps or excesses.
Key element: Develop capability options; Description:
* Perform comprehensive assessments to determine trade-offs among the
capabilities, such as identifying which capabilities can be substituted
with other capabilities;
* Link capability options to strategic goals to determine whether the
goals are being addressed;
* Assess the risk of each trade-off using a data-driven approach;
* Prioritize the best balance of investment across major capability
areas.
Key element: Link capability solutions to well-defined budget,
acquisition, performance plans;
Description:
* Identify the near-and long-term budgetary implications for the
capability options;
* Develop detailed acquisition plans;
* Establish mechanisms to establish clear authority and accountability,
milestones, and performance measures.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and non-DOD capabilities-based planning
studies.
[End of table]
DOD's primary basis for assessing the overall force structure best
suited to implement the national defense strategy, according to several
DOD officials, was a Joint Staff-led study known as Operational
Availability 06. The study compared the number and types of units in
DOD's planned force structure to the operational requirements for
potential scenarios to determine whether and to what extent the planned
force structure would experience shortages. However, the Joint Staff's
Operational Availability 06 Study did not assess alternatives to
planned force structures and evaluate trade-offs among capabilities.
In conducting the Operational Availability 06 Study, the Joint Staff
completed two different analyses. The first analysis, referred to as
the base case, relied on a set of operational scenarios that created
requirements for air, ground, maritime, and special operations forces.
During this study, the Joint Staff examined requirements for a broad
range of military operations over a 7-year time frame. Two overlapping
conventional campaigns served as the primary demand for forces with
additional operational demands created by 23 lesser contingency
operations, some of which represented the types of operations that
military forces would encounter while defending the homeland and
executing the war on terrorism. The Joint Staff then compared the
number of military units in DOD's planned air, ground, maritime, and
special operations forces to the operational demands of the scenarios.
The Joint Staff made two key assumptions during the analysis. First,
the Joint Staff assumed that reserve component units could not deploy
more than once in 6 years. Second, the Joint Staff assumed that while
forces within each service could be reassigned or retrained to meet
shortfalls within the force structure, forces could not be substituted
across the services.[Footnote 23] Results of the Joint Staff's first
analysis showed that maritime forces were capable of meeting
operational demands and air, ground, and special operations forces
experienced some shortages.
In response to a tasking from top-level officials the Joint Staff
performed a second analysis that developed a different set of
operational demands reflecting the high pace of operations in Iraq. In
this analysis, the Joint Staff used the same 2012 planned force
structure that was examined in the first analysis. When it compared the
operational demands that were similar to those experienced in Iraq with
DOD's planned force structure, the Joint Staff found that the air,
ground, maritime, and special operations forces experienced shortages
and they could only meet operational demands for a security environment
similar to Iraq, one conventional campaign, and 11 of the 23 lesser
contingency scenarios.
While the Operational Availability 06 Study had some benefits, several
weaknesses significantly limited the study's usefulness for integrating
a capabilities-based approach that assessed force structure options. On
the positive side, top leaders maintained sustained involvement in the
Operational Availability Study; for example, based on their guidance,
the Joint Staff conducted a second analysis that depicted operational
demands, which more accurately represented the current security
environment. That study demonstrated that significant shortages in
military forces exist when forces are not retrained or reassigned to
meet operational demands. However, weaknesses in the study's
methodology to assess different levels of force structure and use a
capabilities-based planning approach limited the study's usefulness in
reassessing the fundamental relationship between the national defense
strategy and the force structure best suited to implement the strategy.
First, the Joint Staff did not vary the number and types of units to
demonstrate that it assessed different levels or mixes of air, ground,
maritime, and special operations force structure in its second
analysis. Second, the Joint Staff did not identify capabilities of the
force structure and make recommendations about trade-offs among
capabilities.
Further, concurrent with the Operational Availability 06 Study, DOD
conducted separate assessments of some segments of its force structure
to inform decisions about investments for capabilities. For example,
DOD conducted a departmentwide study that assessed options about
different levels and types of tactical air assets, such as the Joint
Strike Fighter. However, in this study DOD did not fully address
whether and to what extent future investment plans are affordable
within projected funding levels, and in April 2007, we reported that
DOD does not have a single, comprehensive, and integrated investment
plan for recapitalizing and modernizing fighter and attack
aircraft.[Footnote 24] In another example, DOD also conducted a study
to determine whether ground forces in the Army, Marine Corps, and
Special Operations Command could meet operational demands for a broad
range of scenarios without relying extensively on reserve
personnel.[Footnote 25] However, options to increase ground forces were
not part of the study's scope, and the implications of the ongoing
operations in Iraq, such as the number of active brigade combat teams
that would be needed and their length of time in theater, were not
fully considered.[Footnote 26]
A key reason why DOD did not use an integrated capabilities-based
approach to assessing force structure options is that DOD did not have
a unified management approach to implement capabilities-based planning
principles into the QDR assessment. At the time of the QDR, no one
individual or office had been assigned overall responsibility and
authority necessary for implementing an integrated capabilities-based
planning approach. Further, DOD had not provided comprehensive written
guidance to implement departmentwide methods for capabilities-based
planning that specifies the need to identify capabilities at the
appropriate level of detail, identify redundant or excess capabilities
that could be eliminated, facilitate trades among capabilities, assess
and manage risk, and balance decisions about trade-offs with near-and
long-term costs. Currently, DOD is undertaking some initiatives related
to capabilities-based planning. However, these select initiatives do
not represent the type of comprehensive, unified management approach
needed to assess the force structure requirements to address a range of
potential military operations against unknown enemies. For example:
* The Joint Staff initiated the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System in 2003 to assess gaps in joint capabilities and
recommend solutions to resolve those gaps. Under this system, boards
comprised of high-level DOD civilians and military officials are
convened to identify future capabilities needed in key functional
areas, such as battle space awareness, and to make recommendations
about trade-offs among air, space, land, and sea platforms. While this
process may be important to assess gaps in joint warfighting
capabilities, we have reported that its focus is to review and validate
the initial need for proposed capabilities. However, we have also
reported that the process is not yet functioning as envisioned to
define gaps and redundancies in existing and future military
capabilities across the department and to identify solutions to improve
joint capabilities.[Footnote 27] Further, we reported that programs
assessed by the Joint Staff's process build momentum and move toward
starting product development with little if any early department-level
assessment of the costs and feasibility.[Footnote 28] According to
senior DOD officials, the Joint Staff's process does not thoroughly
link capabilities to the strategic priorities identified in the QDR.
* The Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Institutional Reform and
Governance post-QDR study team to develop departmentwide approaches
that would allow DOD to integrate and facilitate its capabilities-based
planning initiatives. Based on the study team's work, in March 2007 the
Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked several DOD organizations to develop
plans to facilitate a capabilities-based planning approach. For
example, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is tasked with
developing a process for identifying capability priorities and gaps at
the appropriate level of detail and ranking all capabilities from high
to low priority by October 2007. Further, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense has reaffirmed the department's commitment to portfolio
management and expanded the scope of responsibility for the four
capability portfolio test case managers.[Footnote 29] Among their new
responsibilities, each portfolio manager is required to provide the
Deputy's Advisory Working Group with an independent portfolio
assessment to inform investment decisions during DOD's fiscal year 2009
program review. DOD may establish more portfolios as the roles and
responsibilities of the existing managers evolve and operate in DOD's
existing decision processes, such as the Deputy's Advisory Working
Group.
DOD made some changes to the current force structure to address
perceived gaps in capabilities based on the QDR review, although these
did not represent major changes to the composition of the existing
force structure. For example, among the key force-structure-related
decisions highlighted in the QDR were to (1) increase Special
Operations forces by 15 percent and the number of Special Forces
Battalions by one-third; (2) expand Psychological Operations and Civil
Affairs units by 3,700 personnel, a 33 percent increase; (3) develop a
new land-based penetrating long-strike capability to be fielded by 2018
and fully modernize the current bomber force (B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s);
and (4) decrease the number of active component brigade combat teams
from 43 to 42 and the number of planned Army National Guard brigade
combat teams from 34 to 28. In January 2007--about a year after the QDR
was completed--DOD approved the Army's plan to increase the number of
active component brigade combat teams to 48. Since DOD did not conduct
a comprehensive, data-driven assessment of force structure alternatives
during the QDR, it is not in the best position to assure itself or
Congress that it has identified the force best suited to execute the
national defense strategy.
DOD Did Not Conduct a Thorough Review of Personnel Requirements:
Although DOD concluded in the 2006 QDR report that the size of today's
forces--both the active and reserve components across all four military
services--was appropriate to meet current and projected operational
demands, it did not provide a clear analytical basis for its
conclusion. In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced plans
to permanently increase the size of the active component Army and the
Marine Corps by a total of 92,000 troops over the next 5 years. But
again, DOD did not identify the analysis that it used to determine the
size of the increase. In February 2005,[Footnote 30] we recommended
that DOD review active personnel requirements as part of the QDR, and
in doing so, discuss its conclusions about the appropriate personnel
levels for each of the services and describe the key assumptions
guiding the department's analysis, the methodology used to evaluate
requirements, and how the risks associated with various alternative
personnel force levels were evaluated. While DOD agreed with our
recommendation, it did not perform a comprehensive, data-driven
analysis of the number of personnel needed to implement the defense
strategy as part of its 2006 QDR. Until DOD performs a comprehensive
review of personnel requirements, it cannot effectively demonstrate to
Congress a sound basis for the level of military and civilian personnel
it requests.
Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the number
of personnel required to meet an agency's needs are critical because
human capital shortfalls can threaten an organization's ability to
perform missions efficiently and effectively.[Footnote 31] Data-driven
decision making is one of the critical factors in successful strategic
workforce management. High-performing organizations routinely use
current, valid, and reliable data to inform decisions about current and
future workforce needs, stay alert to emerging mission demands, and
remain open to reevaluating their human capital practices. Further,
federal agencies have a responsibility to provide thorough analytical
support over significant decisions affecting requirements for federal
dollars so that Congress can effectively evaluate the benefits, costs,
and risks.
Rather than conducting a comprehensive assessment of its personnel
requirements, DOD's approach to active and reserve military personnel
and civilian personnel levels was to limit growth and initiate efforts
to use current personnel levels more efficiently. Consequently, the
study team that was assigned to review issues related to manning and
balancing the force took the existing force size as a given. From that
basis, the study team identified alternative courses of action for
changing the mix of specific skills, such as civil affairs, in the
active and reserve components to meet future operational requirements.
The team also considered whether changes in the mix of skills would
require more military and civilian personnel at headquarters staffs.
While these reviews are important for understanding how to use the
force more efficiently, they cannot be used to determine whether U.S.
forces have enough personnel to accomplish missions successfully
because these reviews did not systematically assess the extent to which
different levels of end strength could fill DOD's combat force
structure and provide institutional support at an acceptable level of
risk.
Although DOD's 2006 QDR concluded that the Army and Marine Corps should
plan to stabilize their personnel levels at 482,400 and 175,000 active
personnel respectively, by 2012, in February 2007 the President's
fiscal year 2008 budget submission documented a plan to permanently
increase the size of the active components of the Army by 65,000 to
547,400 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 to 202,000 over the next 5
years; and the Army National Guard by 8,200 to 358,200 and the U.S.
Army Reserve by 6,000 to 206,000 by 2013. Shortly after the increase
was announced, we testified before Congress[Footnote 32] that DOD's
record in providing an analytically driven basis for requested military
personnel levels needs to be improved and suggested that Congress
should carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits in evaluating
DOD's proposal for the increases. Both the Army and Marine Corps are
coping with additional demands that were not fully reflected in the
QDR. For example, the Marine Corps decided to initiate a new study to
assess active military personnel requirements shortly after the 2006
QDR was completed due to its high pace of operations and the QDR-
directed changes in force structure, such as establishing a Special
Operations Command requiring about 2,600 military personnel. Without
performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it
needs, DOD cannot ensure that its military and civilian personnel
levels reflect the number of personnel needed to execute the defense
strategy. Further it cannot ensure that it has a sufficient basis for
understanding the risks associated with different levels of military
and civilian personnel. For example, while too many active military
personnel could be inefficient and costly, having too few could result
in other negative consequences, such as the inability to provide the
capabilities that the military forces need to deter and defeat
adversaries.
DOD Did Not Conduct an Analytically Sound Risk Assessment of Its
Proposed Force Structure:
During the 2006 QDR, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not fully
apply DOD's risk management framework to demonstrate how risks
associated with its proposed force structure were evaluated.[Footnote
33] DOD introduced its risk management approach in 2001; however, we
have reported that it has faced difficulty implementing this
approach.[Footnote 34] For example, we found that DOD faced challenges
in integrating its risk management framework and reform initiatives
into a unified management approach. We have reported that an emerging
challenge for the federal government involves the need for completion
of comprehensive national threat and risk assessments in a variety of
areas.[Footnote 35] For example, evolving requirements from the
changing security environment, coupled with increasingly limited fiscal
resources across the federal government, emphasize the need for
agencies to adopt a sound approach to establishing resource decisions.
We have advocated that the federal government, including DOD, adopt a
comprehensive risk management approach as a framework for decision
making that fully links strategic goals to plans and budgets, assesses
values and risks of various courses of actions as a tool for setting
priorities and allocating resources, and provides for the use of
performance measures to assess outcomes.[Footnote 36] A risk management
approach represents a series of analytical and managerial steps that
can be used to assess risk, evaluate alternatives for reducing risks,
choose among those alternatives, implement the alternatives, monitor
their implementation, and that incorporate new information to adjust
and revise the assessments and actions, as needed. Further, such a data-
driven risk assessment can provide a guide to help shape, focus, and
prioritize investment decisions to develop capabilities.
A key reason why DOD did not apply its risk framework during the QDR is
that it had difficulty in developing department-level measures that
would be necessary to assess risk and as a result, the assessment tools
were not available for use during the QDR. The QDR's study guidance
tasked the QDR coordination group, led by officials in the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), to review the QDR risk
management guidelines and provide these guidelines to the QDR's study
teams for review. The guidelines were to provide some examples of how
to measure performance related to DOD's key areas identified in its
framework--operational, force management, institutional, and future
challenges. The QDR coordination group was to incorporate the study
teams' feedback about recommended changes. Lastly, the QDR coordination
group was to issue the guidelines and monitor the application of
performance measures during the QDR. According to an official in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the QDR coordination
group had difficulty developing the measures and thus did not issue
guidelines. As a result, the study teams did not have the assessment
tools to assess risk during the QDR.
Since department-level measures for assessing risk were not available
during the 2006 QDR, several of the study teams relied primarily on
professional judgment to assess the risks of not investing in various
capabilities. For example, the study team responsible for developing
capabilities told us that they examined information about potential
future threats and determined that DOD needed medical countermeasures
to address the threat of genetically engineered biological agents.
Members of the study team discussed the consequences of not developing
the medical procedures and treatments that would be needed to increase
survival rates if U.S. military personnel were to encounter the highly
advanced genetic material. Further, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff was not tasked to use the risk management framework in assessing
risks and did not choose to use it in his assessment. Rather, the
Chairman's assessment examined the extent to which the 2006 QDR
initiatives would address combatant commanders' operational needs for
potential future requirements.
Without a sound analytical approach to assess risk during future QDRs,
DOD will not have a sufficient basis to demonstrate how the risks
associated with the capabilities of its proposed force structure were
evaluated. Further, DOD may be unable to demonstrate how it will manage
risk within current and expected resource levels. Without an
analytically based risk assessment, DOD may not be able to prioritize
and focus the nation's investments to combat 21st century security
threats efficiently and wisely.
Options for Modifying Some Legislative Requirements Could Improve
Usefulness of Future QDRs:
The security environment of the 21st century has been characterized by
conflicts that are very different from traditional wars among states.
This environment has created the need for DOD to reexamine the
fundamental operations of the department and the capabilities needed to
continue to execute its missions. In addition, DOD has created new
organizations, such as the U.S. Northern Command and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, to counter new threats to
the homeland and support the federal response to any potential
catastrophic event, natural, or man-made. Through our discussions with
defense analysts, we have identified options for modifying several QDR
legislative requirements that could be considered in light of the
changed security environment, to make the QDR process and report more
useful to Congress and DOD. The QDR legislation contains numerous
issues for DOD to address, some that require reporting on broad issues,
such as the national defense strategy and the force structure needed to
execute that strategy, and some that are more detailed, such as the
requirement that DOD examine the appropriate ratio of combat forces to
support forces under the national defense strategy. Many defense
analysts we spoke with thought some of the strategic issues are of
great importance and should remain for future QDRs. Further, they
believe DOD should focus its efforts on providing more information on
the analytic basis for its key assumptions and strategic planning
decisions. However, they also asserted that several of the QDR's
detailed reporting elements detract attention from strategic issues,
are already required and reported under other laws, or are no longer
relevant in the new security environment. Options to improve the
usefulness of future QDRs include (1) clarifying expectations for how
the QDR should address the budget plan, (2) eliminating some reporting
elements for the QDR legislation that could be addressed in different
reports, (3) eliminating some reporting elements in the QDR legislation
for issues that may no longer be as relevant due to changes in the
security environment, and (4) establishing an independent advisory
group to work with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide
alternative perspectives and analyses.
Strategic Focus of Some QDR Legislative Requirements Is Considered
Useful for Establishing Defense Plans and Programs:
Several defense analysts we spoke with asserted that the permanent
requirement for DOD to conduct a comprehensive strategic review of the
defense program every 4 years is important and that Congress should
continue to require that DOD conduct future QDRs. Moreover, several
defense analysts acknowledge that certain key requirements remain
critical to the QDR's purpose of fundamentally reassessing the defense
strategy and program. Specifically, the requirements that task the
Secretary of Defense to (1) delineate a defense strategy and (2) define
sufficient force structure, force modernization, budget plan, and other
elements of a defense program that could successfully execute the full
range of missions called for by the defense strategy at low to medium
risk over 20 years were seen as critical elements needed to ensure that
Congress understands DOD's strategies and plans. Several defense
analysts told us that it is in the national interest to ensure that DOD
conducts the kind of long-range strategic planning that can provide
meaningful recommendations for meeting future national security
challenges and that enables debate on the costs and benefits of
requirements for future military and capabilities as well as risks in
capability gaps in light of national fiscal challenges.
The QDR legislation also directs DOD to define the nature and magnitude
of the political, strategic, and military risks associated with
executing the missions called for under the national defense strategy
in the QDR and include a comprehensive discussion of the force
structure best suited to implement that strategy at low-to-moderate
level of risk. Analysts saw these areas as important for DOD to provide
Congress the assurance that there is a sound analytical basis for its
risk assessment that includes how DOD identified risks and evaluated
alternatives for reducing risks. Additionally, analysts viewed this
discussion as important in assuring that the department has
incorporated a variety of perspectives in its risk assessments. Some
analysts stated that the requirements to discuss the assumed or defined
national security interests, the threats to the assumed or defined
national security interests, and the scenarios developed in the
examination of those threats are several key elements that should
remain to enable the department to demonstrate that principles of risk
assessment have been addressed. Similarly, analysts suggest that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's requirement to assess the
results of the QDR review, including an independent assessment of risk,
is helpful to provide another assessment that DOD and Congress can use
to understand the risks associated with the force structure and
consider the courses of actions the department might want to take to
reduce risks.
Legislative Options Are Available to Improve Usefulness of Future QDRs:
Some DOD defense analysts told us that the QDR legislation includes
numerous detailed requirements that may impede DOD's focus on high-
priority areas. Based on our discussions with analysts, we identified
several options that Congress should consider to enhance the focus of
future QDRs on high-priority issues and improve the thoroughness of
DOD's analysis:
* Clarify expectations for how the QDR should address the budget plan
that supports the national defense strategy. The QDR legislation has
several reporting elements that relate to budget planning to support
the defense strategy. First, the QDR legislation requires DOD "to
delineate a national defense strategy—" and "to identify the budget
plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute
successfully the full range of missions called for in that national
defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk."[Footnote 37]
Second, the legislation requires DOD "to conduct a comprehensive
examination—of the national defense strategy—with a view toward
establishing a defense program for the next 20 years." Third, based on
recent changes to the legislation that will apply to the next QDR in
2010 as well as future QDRs, DOD is required to "make recommendations
that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted to
Congress by the President."
Some defense analysts raised concerns about whether these reporting
requirements provide sufficient and clear guidance for DOD to use in
conducting QDRs. For example, they questioned whether the planning time
frame of 20 years established by the QDR legislation is most useful in
providing Congress with information to perform its oversight of the
defense program. Although DOD officials and defense analysts
acknowledged the benefits of forecasting threats and capabilities for a
20-year period, they stated it would be difficult to develop a detailed
budget plan for a 20-year period given the uncertain nature of threats
in the new security environment. Further, analysts asserted that rather
than enabling DOD to set strategic priorities without regard to current
budgets, the requirement to "make recommendations that are not
constrained to comply with the budget.," could lead the services and
the capability portfolio managers to push for inclusion of every
program in their plans. This could make it more difficult for DOD to
prioritize investments to meet key capability needs and assess the
affordability of new capabilities across the department.
Moreover, DOD's three QDR reports since 1997 have not fully described
DOD's methodology or approach for assessing its budget needs or budget
plans that explained how DOD intended to fund the full range of
missions called for in the national defense strategy. For the 2006 QDR,
DOD included several QDR initiatives in the President's fiscal year
2007 budget that was submitted to Congress at the same time as the QDR
report but stated that it would continue to define a budget plan for
the QDR by identifying the funding details in DOD's future years
defense program for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. In addition, the
report did not provide information about the extent to which DOD
considered the long-term affordability of the overall defense program.
We have emphasized in previous reports that the federal government now
faces increasing fiscal challenges, and DOD may face increasing
competition for federal dollars.[Footnote 38] Further, in November
2005, we reported that DOD has not demonstrated discipline in its
requirements and budgeting processes, and its costly plans for
transforming military operations and expensive acquisitions may not be
affordable in light of the serious budget pressures facing the
nation.[Footnote 39] For example, we reported that DOD's planned annual
investment in acquisition programs it has already begun is expected to
rise from $149 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $178 billion in fiscal
year 2011. Given these pressures, Congress may want a clearer view of
how DOD should budget for the capabilities associated with the proposed
force structure, and how it evaluated the trade-offs in capabilities to
maximize the effectiveness of future investments. If Congress decides
that it needs additional budget-related information to carry out its
oversight of future QDRs, then it might consider clarifying the
reporting element relating to the required budget plan to specify what
information DOD should include in the QDR. Further, Congress may want
to consider clarifying its expectations for the information DOD
provides in the QDR as to how it has addressed the long-term
affordability challenges of transforming military operations.
* Eliminate some reporting elements in the QDR legislation for issues
that could be addressed in different reports. According to some defense
analysts, some requirements contained in the QDR legislation are not
essential to the strategic purpose of the QDR and may divert DOD's
focus from that strategic purpose. While important, some reporting
elements are already examined in other DOD reviews, and Congress has
access to the results of these periodic reviews. These reporting
elements include the following:
- An evaluation of "the strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, and
ground transportation capabilities required to support the national
defense strategy." In November 2002 we reported that the QDR may not be
the appropriate venue for addressing mobility issues because
examination of this issue requires detailed analysis that can best be
conducted after DOD decides on a defense strategy, identifies a range
of planning scenarios consistent with the new strategy, and completes
its detailed analysis of requirements for combat forces.[Footnote 40]
Furthermore, DOD routinely conducts analyses of its mobility
requirements outside of the QDR process, according to DOD officials.
Since 1992, DOD has issued four major analyses of the U.S. military
strategic lift requirements: the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study,
Bottom Up Review; the 1995 Bottom Up Review Update; the 2001 Mobility
Requirements Study--2005, issued in 2001; and the Mobility Capability
Study, issued in 2005.
- An assessment of the "advisability of revisions to the Unified
Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy." DOD has a
process for assessing the Unified Command Plan and is required to
report changes to the plan to Congress under other legislation.
Specifically, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to
review periodically and not less than every 2 years the missions,
responsibilities, and forces of each combatant command and recommend
any changes to the President, through the Secretary of
Defense.[Footnote 41] This legislation also requires that, except
during times of hostilities or the imminent threat of hostilities, the
President notify Congress not more than 60 days after either
establishing a new combatant command or significantly revising the
missions, responsibilities, or force structure of an existing command.
As such, a major event or change in the political or security landscape
could trigger the need for a change in the plan. For example, in the
spring of 2007, the President announced that DOD intends to establish a
U.S. Africa Command to oversee military operations on the African
continent. According to an OSD official, DOD will revise the 2002
Unified Command Plan and report on the changes in the military command
structure after plans for U.S. Africa Command are more fully developed.
* Eliminate some reporting elements in the QDR legislation for issues
that may no longer be as relevant due to changes in the security
environment. As we reported in our assessment of DOD's 2001
QDR,[Footnote 42] a DOD official and some defense analysts said that
two reporting elements should be eliminated because they are related to
the allocation of forces under the old two-major-theater-war construct,
which is more limited than DOD's current force planning construct that
includes a broader range of threats. These reporting elements include
the following:
- A discussion of the "appropriate ratio of combat forces to support
forces (commonly referred to as the 'tooth-to-tail ratio') under the
national defense strategy." DOD's goal has been to reduce the number of
personnel and costs associated with the support forces, or "tail."
However, during the 2006 QDR process and report DOD did not identify
which units should be considered support and which should be considered
combat. Given rapidly changing technologies, differentiating between
support and combat troops has become increasingly irrelevant and
difficult to measure. For example, as the United States moves toward
acquiring greater numbers of unmanned aircraft piloted from remote
computer terminals and relies increasingly on space-based assets
operated by personnel in the United States, it will be more difficult
to distinguish between combat and support personnel.
- Assessments of "the extent to which resources must be shifted among
two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event
of conflict in such theaters," and the assumptions used regarding
"warning time." Both these reporting elements relate to the allocation
of forces under the old two-major-theater-war planning construct. Under
this construct, the amount of time that was assumed available for
warning and the separation time between major theater wars were
critical factors in planning the size and composition of U.S. forces
and assessing operational risk, particularly for assets that might need
to be shifted between theaters. However, under the new defense
strategy, along with DOD's new force planning construct, DOD assumes
that it will continue to be involved in a wide range of military
operations around the world. Given the full spectrum of threats that
DOD is planning to address, it may be more useful for DOD's force
structure assessments to be tied to requirements for a broad range of
potential threats.
* Establish an independent advisory group to work with DOD prior to or
during the QDR to provide alternative perspectives and analyses. As
part of our assessment of the 1997 QDR, we suggested that a
congressionally mandated panel, such as the 1997 National Defense
Panel, could be used to encourage DOD to consider a wider range of
strategy, force structure, and modernization options. Specifically, we
noted that such a review panel, if it preceded the QDR, could be
important because it is extremely challenging for DOD to conduct a
fundamental reexamination of defense needs, given that its culture
rewards consensus building and often makes it difficult to gain support
for alternatives that challenge the status quo. One of the recent
additions to the QDR legislation requires the establishment of an
independent panel to conduct an assessment of future QDRs after the
process is completed; however, most defense analysts we spoke with
agreed that an independent analysis of key issues for the Secretary of
Defense either prior to or during the next review would complement a
post-QDR assessment and strengthen DOD's ability to develop its
strategic priorities and conduct a comprehensive force structure and
capabilities analysis. The analysts agreed that an advisory group
established before or during the QDR process could function as an
independent analytical team to challenge DOD's thinking, recommend
issues for DOD to review and review assumptions, and provide
alternative perspectives in activities such as identifying alternative
force structures and capabilities, and performing risk assessments. An
independent group's assessments could be useful to DOD in future QDRs
to identify the capabilities of the nation's current and future
adversaries because potential enemies will likely be more difficult to
target than the adversaries of the Cold War era.
Conclusions:
The 2006 QDR represented an opportunity for DOD to perform a
comprehensive review of the national defense strategy for the first
time since military forces have been engaged in the Global War on
Terrorism. Sustained DOD leadership facilitated decision making, and
extensive collaboration with interagency partners and allies provided a
range of perspectives on threats and capabilities. However, weaknesses
in DOD's analysis of force structure, personnel requirements, and risk
limited its reassessment of the national defense strategy and U.S.
military forces. For example, by not fully incorporating capabilities-
based planning into a comprehensive assessment of alternative force
structures, DOD could not comprehensively identify capabilities gaps,
associated operational risks, and trade-offs that must be made to
efficiently use limited fiscal resources. Therefore, DOD was not in a
good position to assure Congress that it identified the force best
suited to execute the national defense strategy. Moreover, the
Secretary of Defense's announcement of plans to increase the sizes of
the Army and Marine Corps in January 2007 calls into question the
analytical basis of the QDR conclusion that the number of personnel and
the size of the force structure for the services were appropriate to
meet current and future requirements. Further, without a comprehensive
approach to assessing risk, DOD's 2006 QDR did not provide a sufficient
basis to demonstrate how risks associated with its proposed force
structure were evaluated. Unless DOD takes steps to provide
comprehensive analytical support for significant decisions in future
QDRs, the department will not be in the best position to distinguish
between the capabilities it needs to execute the defense strategy
versus those capabilities it wants but may not be able to afford at a
time when the nation's fiscal challenges are growing. Moreover,
Congress will be unable to effectively evaluate the benefits, costs,
and risks associated with decisions flowing from future QDRs.
Opportunities exist for Congress to consider further changes to the QDR
legislation that may encourage DOD to concentrate its efforts on high-
priority matters such as developing a defense strategy and identifying
the force structure best suited to execute the strategy. Unless
Congress clearly identifies its expectations for DOD to develop a
budget plan that supports the strategy, DOD may not thoroughly address
the challenges it will face as it competes with other federal agencies
and programs for taxpayers' dollars and may spend considerable effort
assessing options for capabilities that could be unaffordable given our
nation's fiscal challenges. Moreover, the large number of reporting
elements in the QDR legislation presents DOD with a challenge in
conducting data-driven comprehensive analyses of many significant
complex issues. A reassessment of the QDR's scope could provide greater
assurances that DOD will thoroughly assess and report on the most
critical security issues that the nation faces and could help it decide
what actions it needs to take to establish the most effective military
force to counter 21st century threats. Lastly, although Congress has
established a new legislative requirement for an independent panel to
conduct a post-QDR review, there is currently no mechanism for Congress
and the Secretary of Defense to obtain an independent perspective prior
to and during the QDR. Without an independent group of advisors that
could provide comprehensive data-driven analyses to DOD prior to and
during future QDR reviews, DOD may not consider a wider range of
perspectives, such as force structure options, thus limiting the
analytic basis of its QDR decisions.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance the usefulness of future QDRs and assist congressional
oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following two actions:
* Develop appropriate methods for the department to use in a
comprehensive, data-driven capabilities-based assessments of
alternative force structures and personnel requirements during future
QDRs.
* Develop appropriate methods for the department to use in conducting a
comprehensive, data-driven approach to assess the risks associated with
capabilities of its proposed force structure during future QDRs.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
To improve the usefulness of future QDRs, Congress should consider
revisions to the QDR legislation, including (1) clarifying expectations
on how the QDR should address the budget plan that supports the
national defense strategy, (2) eliminating some detailed reporting
elements that could be addressed in different reports and may no longer
be relevant due to changes in the security environment, and (3)
requiring an independent panel to provide advice and alternatives to
the Secretary of Defense before and during the QDR process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provided
written comments on a draft of this report. The department partially
agreed with our recommendations and agreed with the matters we raised
for congressional consideration regarding possible changes to the QDR
legislative language. In addition, the comments provided information
about steps the department is taking to update its methodologies for
analyzing force structure requirements and assessing risks. DOD's
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV. DOD also
provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.
In its comments, the department partially agreed with our
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense develop appropriate
methods for conducting comprehensive, data-driven capabilities-based
assessments of alternative force structures and personnel requirements.
DOD agreed with our conclusion that the 2006 QDR did not
comprehensively assess alternatives to planned structure; rather, its
analysis was limited to identifying shortfalls in current structure
when compared to various illustrative operational scenarios. However,
in its comments, the department noted that it has developed or is
developing new illustrative security environments to use to demonstrate
the demands associated with force structures and personnel requirements
for each strategic environment. The department also pointed out the
difficulty of undertaking an evaluation of the defense strategy and
producing a defense program within the QDR process, as required under
current QDR legislation. It said that as the department further
develops the underlying assumptions for the force planning construct
and refreshes the illustrative scenarios available for analysis, it
will be in a better position to analyze overall needed capabilities,
including personnel requirements. Finally, the department noted that
the 2006 QDR was based on information available in 2005, which included
a different demand than what military forces face today. At that time,
the department's collective decision, approved by the then Secretary of
Defense, was that the size of the force was about right, although the
force mix should be adjusted. As a result of this change in demand
since the 2006 QDR, according to DOD's comments, DOD has responded by
increasing Army and Marine Corps end strength. We believe that the
steps DOD outlined in its comments, such as revising the illustrative
scenarios and developing force demands for new security environments,
will help DOD to improve its force structure analyses. However, we
believe that a comprehensive assessment that identifies and documents
the basis for trade-off decisions across capability areas is critical
to developing the force structure best suited to execute the defense
strategy. Until DOD undertakes a comprehensive assessment of
alternative force structure options that clearly documents how the
department reached its force structure decisions, it will not be in the
best position to determine the force structure best suited to execute
the missions called for in the defense strategy at low-to-moderate
risk.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to develop
appropriate methods for conducting comprehensive, data-driven
assessments of the risks associated with the capabilities of its
proposed force structure during future QDRs. In its comments, the
department agreed that improving the department's risk methodology is
necessary to appropriately assess risk. It noted that in addition to
risks associated with capabilities, strategic, operational, force
management, and institutional risks need to be addressed in a risk
assessment methodology. The department cited several post-QDR
initiatives the department is undertaking to improve how the department
assesses risk, including new measures to help link strategic goals to
plans and budgets and develop performance metrics. Also in its
comments, the department described efforts to strengthen and integrate
existing assessments to allow decision makers to better set priorities,
allocate resources, and assess outcomes and risks and stated its intent
to improve risk assessment methods to inform risk measurement in future
QDRs. We agree that assessing risk associated with capabilities is only
one type of risk facing the department and that the initiatives the
department is undertaking to link strategic goals with plans and
budgets and improve its risk assessment methodology can, when
implemented, help it improve its ability to identify and manage risks.
Until the department's risk management framework is sufficiently
developed that it can support comprehensive assessments of risk across
domains, assess progress toward accomplishing strategic goals, and
provide senior leaders reliable analysis to inform decisions among
alternative actions, DOD will not be in the best position to identify
or assess risks to establish investment priorities.
DOD also provided its views on matters we raised for congressional
consideration in a draft of this review regarding possible revisions to
the QDR legislation. Specifically, DOD agreed with clarifying
expectations for addressing the budget plan and eliminating some
reporting requirements. In a draft of this report, we originally raised
as a matter for congressional consideration broadening the QDR
legislation by requiring the legislatively required independent
advisory panel, which would provide a post-QDR critique of the results
of the process, to provide DOD with alternative perspectives and
analysis prior to or during the QDR. The department stated that having
an independent panel that could provide advice and alternatives to the
Secretary of Defense before and during the QDR process would be useful.
However, it raised the concern that tasking the same independent panel
that is required to provide a post-QDR critique to also perform an
advisory function before and during the review could create mistrust
between the department leadership and the independent advisory panel.
To address DOD's concerns we have modified the matter for consideration
to suggest that an independent panel be required to provide advice and
alternatives to the Secretary of Defense before and during the QDR.
This change is intended to provide Congress with the flexibility to
establish separate independent panels to provide advice prior to and
following the next QDR.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Department of Defense's
(DOD) approach and methodology for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), we examined the relevant documentation including the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007; the National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005); the
1997, 2001, and 2006 QDRs; the QDR Terms of Reference (March 2005); the
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) issue papers for the QDR's focus
areas; and the 2006 QDR's study teams' briefings and other
documentation for the DOD's senior-level review group, as well as our
reports on aspects of previous QDRs. We also examined documents
identifying the methodology and results of the QDR's key force
structure analyses and risk assessments. We reviewed studies on
capabilities-based planning and compared the key elements of
capabilities-based planning identified in the studies to the QDR's
Terms of Reference and DOD's documented methodology for the Operational
Availability 06 Study to assess the extent to which capabilities-based
planning concepts were used during the QDR. We also discussed these
issues with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy); the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Directorate for Force Assessment; U.S. Special
Operations Command; and officials from the Army, Air Force, and Marine
Corps who participated in the QDR process. To understand how DOD
established processes to ensure that QDR initiatives are implemented,
we examined internal DOD documents, DOD's January 2007 quarterly report
to Congress on the status of implementation of the 2006 QDR, and post-
QDR study teams' reports to understand the methodology that was
developed to oversee implementation. We discussed the implementation
status of the QDR initiatives with officials from the Office of the
Director, Administration and Management and the Under Secretary of
Defense (Policy). We did not undertake an assessment of the
effectiveness of implementation of the QDR initiatives because it was
outside of scope of our review. We obtained and examined documents from
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the post-QDR study teams and
discussed the status of the teams' work with officials from the Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Institutional Reform and Governance
team, and the Joint Command and Control and Battlespace Awareness
capability portfolios. Moreover, we reviewed the internal controls on
DOD's tracking system for QDR initiatives and evaluated the reliability
of that data for DOD's use. We applied evidence standards from the
generally accepted government auditing standards in our evaluation of
DOD's database. As a result, we determined the information we used
meets these evidence standards and is sufficiently reliable for our
purposes.
To determine whether changes to the QDR legislation could improve the
usefulness of future reviews including any changes needed to better
reflect the security conditions of the 21st century, we examined a wide
variety of studies that discussed the strengths and weaknesses of DOD's
2006 QDR and prior reviews. Our review included studies from the RAND
Corporation, the National Defense University, and the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. To obtain opinions and develop
options to improve the usefulness of future QDRs, we interviewed
several DOD officials who participated in the 2006 QDR from the
services and the Joint Staff. Further, we met with 11 defense analysts
who had detailed knowledge of DOD's QDR process and/or participated in
DOD's 1997, 2001, or 2006 QDRs. We used a standard set of questions to
interview each of these analysts to ensure we consistently discussed
the reporting elements of the QDR legislation and DOD's approach and
methods for its three QDRs. To develop the questions, we reviewed the
QDR legislation, DOD's QDR reports, and our prior work on DOD's
strategic reviews. One of the defense analysts served in various
positions within and outside of DOD such as the former Chairman of the
Defense Science Board and the Chairman of the 1997 National Defense
Panel. Other defense analysts were senior officials from the following
organizations: the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for
American Progress, the Center for Naval Analysis, the Center for a New
American Security, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Lexington
Institute, the National Defense University's Institute for National
Strategic Studies, the RAND Corporation, and the Heritage Foundation.
Based on our review of QDR literature and our discussions with DOD
analysts, we developed a matrix summarizing these individuals' concerns
regarding the QDR legislative requirements and their views on the
options to address them.
Our work was conducted in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and
Tampa, Florida. We performed our review from May 2006 through May 2007
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Quadrennial Defense Review Legislation in Effect for the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review:
TITLE 10 U.S.C. §118. Quadrennial Defense Review:
(a) Review required.--The Secretary of Defense shall every four years,
during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a
comprehensive examination (to be known as a "quadrennial defense
review") of the national defense strategy, force structure, force
modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of
the defense program and policies of the United States with a view
toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United
States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each
such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) Conduct of review.--Each quadrennial defense review shall be
conducted so as--:
(1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most
recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant
to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.404a);
(2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans,
infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program
of the United States associated with that national defense strategy
that would be required to execute successfully the full range of
missions called for in that national defense strategy;
(3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide
sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions
called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level
of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in
the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a
level of risk; and:
(c) Assessment of risk.--The assessment of risk for the purposes of
subsection (b) shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That
assessment shall define the nature and magnitude of the political,
strategic, and military risks associated with executing the missions
called for under the national defense strategy.
(d) Submission of QDR to Congressional committees.--The Secretary shall
submit a report on each quadrennial defense review to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
report shall be submitted in the year following the year in which the
review is conducted, but not later than the date on which the President
submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress under section
1105(a) of title 31. The report shall include the following:
(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of
the national defense strategy of the United States, the strategic
planning guidance, and the force structure best suited to implement
that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.
(2) The assumed or defined national security interests of the United
States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review.
(3) The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests
of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review
and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats.
(4) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating
to--(A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the
cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and
burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations;
(C) warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than
war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations
and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and military and
political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.
(5) The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-
intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations
other than war and smaller-scale contingencies.
(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national
defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than
120 days.
(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the
national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment
necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge
those roles and missions.
(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly
referred to as the 'tooth-to-tail' ratio) under the national defense
strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of
headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
(9) The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground
transportation capabilities required to support the national defense
strategy.
(10) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory
deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict
deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.
(11) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more
theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict
in such theaters.
(12) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a
result of the national defense strategy.
(13) The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of
technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.
(14) The national defense mission of the Coast Guard.
(15) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.
(e) CJCS review.--(1) Upon the completion of each review under
subsection (a), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare
and submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman's assessment of the
review, including the Chairman's assessment of risk.
(2) The Chairman shall include as part of that assessment the
Chairman's assessment of the assignment of functions (or roles and
missions) to the armed forces, together with any recommendations for
changes in assignment that the Chairman considers necessary to achieve
maximum efficiency of the armed forces. In preparing the assessment
under this paragraph, the Chairman shall consider (among other matters)
the following:
(A) unnecessary duplication of efforts among the armed forces.
(B) changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.
(3) The Chairman's assessment shall be submitted to the Secretary in
time for the inclusion of the assessment in the report. The Secretary
shall include the Chairman's assessment, together with the Secretary's
comments, in the report in its entirety.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary of New Changes in 10 U.S.C. §118 for Future
Quadrennial Defense Reviews:
This appendix provides a summary of changes to the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) legislation (10 U.S.C. §118) as a result of the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007.[Footnote 43] The new requirements will be in effect when the
Department of Defense issues its next quadrennial review in 2010.
* The QDR should make recommendations that are not constrained to
comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President.
* The review shall include the following new reporting elements:
- the specific capabilities, including the general number and type of
specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and
warfighting objectives identified in the review; and:
- the homeland defense and support to civil authority missions of the
active and reserve components, including the organization and
capabilities required for the active and reserve components to
discharge each such mission.
* The Chairman shall describe the capabilities needed to address the
risk that he identified in his risk assessment.
* The Secretary of Defense shall establish an independent panel to
conduct an assessment of the QDR not later than 6 months before the
date on which the QDR will be submitted.
- Not later than 3 months after the date on which the QDR is submitted,
the panel shall submit an assessment of the review, including the
review's recommendations, the stated and implied assumptions
incorporated in the review, and the vulnerabilities of the strategy and
force structure underlying the review.
- The panel's assessment shall include analyses of the trends,
asymmetries, and concepts of operations that characterize the military
balance with potential adversaries, focusing on the strategic
approaches of possible opposing forces.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: DOD Comments:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense:
2100 Defense Pentagon:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100:
JULY 19, 2007:
Ms. Janet A. St Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report, GAO-
07- 709C, "Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could Benefit
from Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative
Requirements," dated June 6, 2007 (GAO Code 350845).
The Department partially concurs with the draft report's
recommendations. The rationale for the Department's position is
enclosed.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Technical comments were provided separate]. For further
questions concerning this report, please contact Ms. Elisabeth Cordray
a (703) 697-2451.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ryan Henry:
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report - Dated June 6, 2007:
GAO Code 350845 /GAO-07-709C:
"Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved
Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative Requirements"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop appropriate methods for the Department to use in conducting
comprehensive, data-driven capabilities-based assessments of
alternative force structures and personnel requirements during future
Quadrennial Defense Reviews.
DOD Response: The Department of Defense partially concurs with
Recommendation 1. It is accurate that the analysis performed to support
the 2006 QDR did not comprehensively assess alternatives to planned
force structure. However, DOD has sufficient methods for conducting
data-driven capabilities-based assessments of alternative force
structures and personnel requirements. As noted by GAO, the QDR
analysis did examine alternative force structures and personnel
requirements within particular capability areas. Each of the Services,
the Joint Staff, and the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation
have analytical tools and methodologies used to assess alternative
force structures and establish appropriate end strength levels to meet
the needs of the defense strategy. The Department continuously improves
its analytic processes through the analytic agenda, which establishes a
range of illustrative scenarios to set potential demands, military
concepts of operation and associated force structure, and a baseline
set of data for analysis.
The Operational Availability 2006 (OA-06) study, the key QDR analytic
tool, counted force demands and applied resources to determine
shortfalls. In OA analysis, force structure and personnel requirements
are derived using a set of particular concepts of operation. To
comprehensively assess alternative force structures, the analysis would
need to alter these concepts of operation for each illustrative
scenario. In OA-06, there were 26 separate illustrative vignettes, with
26 separate concepts of operation. To produce an alternative force
structure, analysts would need to produce different concepts of
operation for each vignette. While such analysis was not undertaken
comprehensively during the QDR, the methodology exists for assessing
alternative force structures.
OA-06 analysis was also based on a set of analytic tools aligned to the
previous strategy. The QDR updated the Department's Force Planning
Construct, however, analysis was designed and executed using the pre-
QDR guidance. The Department has developed a replacement to the
Baseline Security Posture (BSP), the Steady-State Security Posture
(SSSP), to demonstrate demands on the Department over time. The SSSP
has five strategic environments or future themes, from which to form a
basis for demand over time, and has developed or is developing a menu
of different surge-inducing events to overlay on those Steady-State
demands. Future analysis will produce a series of demands with
associate force structures and personnel requirements for each
strategic environment, thus providing even more robust capability
analysis. The Operational Availability 2008 study will be the
Department's first comprehensive look at the revised Force Planning
Construct.
The QDR is designed to evaluate the defense strategy and produce a
defense program aligned to that strategy. It is not feasible to
complete both of these tasks during the QDR process. The detail and
complexity of the analysis required to align the entire defense program
with a revised strategy extends well beyond the QDR, especially because
a significant portion of the review process is spent revising the
strategy. As in past reviews, the QDR represents the starting point of
a four-year process to analyze the implications of a revised strategy
and develop the best-suited defense program. As the Department further
develops the underlying assumptions for the force planning construct
and refreshes the illustrative scenarios available for analysis, it
will be in a better position to analyze overall needed capabilities, to
include personnel requirements.
Finally, all planning is based on assumptions, and changes to
assumptions lead to changes in demand. QDR analysis on force structure
and personnel requirements was based on the information available in
2005. The results of Departmental analysis informed its senior
leadership as they discussed the need to increase the size of the force
during the development of the QDR Terms of Reference. The collective
decision, approved by the Secretary of Defense, was that while the size
of the force was about right, the force mix (capabilities and personnel
specialties) should be adjusted to meet current and emerging national
security priorities. The 2006 QDR strategic environment was based on a
different level of demand than what military forces face today. As a
result of this change of demand, DOD responded by increasing Army and
Marine Corps end strength. As its preface notes, the QDR Report
represents a snapshot in time that must continually be reexamined.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop appropriate methods for the Department to use in conducting
comprehensive, data-driven approach to assess the risks associated with
capabilities of its proposed force structure during future Quadrennial
Defense Reviews.
DOD Response: The Department of Defense partially concurs with
Recommendation 2. GAO notes that the QDR coordination group failed to
provide further risk guidance to each study team as directed in the
Terms of Reference. As a result, the study teams inconsistently applied
the risk management framework as options were presented for decision.
Alternatively, the Department presented a consolidated analysis of risk
at the November Strategic Planning Council. The Department's leadership
found this approach to be an effective method for assessing the risk of
proposed force structure decisions.
As outlined in the QDR Report, further development of the Department's
risk methodology is necessary to appropriately assess risk. However,
the Department's risk management framework must be designed to assess
more than just risks associated with capabilities, as the GAO
recommends. Strategic, operational, force management, and institutional
risk are also key facets of risk that must be addressed in any
methodology. In order to fully address all of these aspects, the
Department established the Institutional Reform and Governance
execution roadmap.
This execution roadmap outlined several post-QDR initiatives to
implement new measures that will help link strategic goals to plans and
budgets, thereby helping the Department to better assess the risks of
various courses of action. For instance, future strategic guidance will
identify performance goals, which will be used by senior leaders in
assessing progress towards those goals. Additionally, efforts are
underway to identify metrics to measure progress in each of the risk
areas. The roadmap also places renewed emphasis on performance
assessment and feedback. One of the major roadmap initiatives is to
strengthen and integrate existing assessment mechanisms to allow the
Department's decisionmakers to better set priorities, allocate
resources, and assess outcomes and risk. The Department is
consolidating several individual assessments to produce a comprehensive
joint assessment that will provide a view of risk across various
missions, domains and timeframes. The comprehensive joint assessment
will then provide the starting point for updating the Department's
strategic guidance, performance goals, and associated plans and
programs.
The Department will continue to improve its risk assessment methodology
each year, drawing from best available industry, institutional, and
international practices. These improvements will be captured in
existing and emerging assessment processes and will inform risk
measurement in future QDRs.
Matters For Congressional Consideration:
The Department concurs with GAO's recommended legislative revisions
regarding clarity of expectations for addressing the budget plan and
eliminating outdated reporting elements. It is important for Congress
and the Executive Branch to work in close collaboration to tailor
individual QDRs to answer the most pressing strategic issues. Close
collaboration is necessary to ensure that both Congress and the
Secretary of Defense find the QDR a useful tool in assessing future
defense needs.
The Department partially concurs with the GAO recommendation to require
the newly established independent advisory panel to provide DOD with
alternative perspectives and analyses prior to and during the QDR. The
QDR 2006 benefited greatly from the analysis provided to the Secretary
of Defense by a "red team" of defense experts modeled after the 1997
National Defense Panel. The benefit was derived from open discussions
that produced a trusting and free environment for red team members to
challenge assumptions and analysis. To create such an environment, non-
attribution was critical. Red team members and the Department's
leadership knew their opinions, debates, and recommendations were
protected.
The Department agrees with the usefulness of an independent advisory
panel prior to and during the QDR. Using the same panel to provide
alternative views to Congress after the QDR may create mistrust between
the Department's leadership and the independent advisory panel and
reduce the benefit to the QDR process.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402, or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact name above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Deborah Colantonio; Alissa Czyz; Nicole Harms; Elizabeth
Morris; Brian Pegram; Rebecca Shea; and John Townes made major
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment
Strategy. GAO-07-415. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-07-
388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
United States Government Accountability Office: Supporting the Congress
through Oversight, Insight, and Foresight. GAO-07-644T. Washington,
D.C.: March 21, 2007.
Fiscal Stewardship and Defense Transformation. GAO-07-600CG.
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link between Its
Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements. GAO-07-397T.
Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive
Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation before Service Spend
Billions on New Capabilities. GAO-07-211. Washington, D.C.: January 26,
2007.
Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans. GAO-06-
745.Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force
Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for
High-Demand Support Forces. GAO-06-962. Washington, D.C.:
September 5, 2006.
DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Risk-
Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions. GAO-06-13. Washington,
D.C.: November 15, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of
Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense
Strategy. GAO-05-200. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2005.
21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government. GAO-05-325SP. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.:
January 1, 2005.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.:
July 2, 2003.
Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better
Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope. GAO-03-13. Washington, D.C.:
November 4, 2002.
A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.
Quadrennial Defense Review: Opportunities to Improve the Next
Review.GAO/NSIAD-98-155. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 1998.
Quadrennial Defense Review: Some Personnel Cuts and Associated Savings
May Not Be Achieved. GAO/NSIAD-98-100. Washington, D.C.:
April 30, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:
April 9, 1998.
Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of DOD War Game to Test Key Assumptions.
GAO/NSIAD-96-170. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 1996.
Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions. GAO/NSIAD-95-56.
Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 1995.
Footnotes:
[1] See examples, GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of
the Federal Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005)
and Fiscal Stewardship and Defense Transformation, GAO-07-600CG
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2007).
[2] Force structure represents the numbers, size, and composition of
the units that compromise U.S. forces, for example, ships or air wings.
[3] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-65 §901 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. §118.
[4] DOD is also required to identify any additional resources (beyond
those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required
to achieve such a level of risk.
[5] The first Quadrennial Defense Review was submitted to Congress in
May 1997 before the current legislation was enacted. The second
Quadrennial Review was submitted on September 30, 2001, pursuant to 10
U.S.C. §118.
[6] DOD refers to irregular warfare as conflicts in which enemy
combatants are not regular military forces of nation states.
[7] GAO, Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit from
Better Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope, GAO-03-13 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 4, 2002) and GAO, Quadrennial Defense Review: Opportunities
to Improve the Next Review, GAO/NSIAD-98-155 (Washington, D.C.: June
25, 1998).
[8] GAO, Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's
Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions, GAO-06-13
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).
[9] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, §1031 (2006).
[10] Pub. L. No. 109-364, §1032 (2006).
[11] Department of Defense, Quarterly Report to Congress on
Implementation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007) and Second Quarterly Report to Congress on
Implementation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington,
D.C.: June 14, 2007).
[12] Pub. L. No. 109-364 §1031 (2006).
[13] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L.
No. 104-201 §923 (1996).
[14] Pub. L. No. 106-65 §901 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. §118.
[15] Pub. L. No. 109-364, §§1031, 1032 (2006).
[16] DOD submitted its first and second quarterly reports to Congress
on January 31, 2007, and June 14, 2007, respectively. This reporting
requirement will terminate upon the publication of the next QDR or when
the Secretary of Defense notifies the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees in writing that implementation is complete for the 2006 QDR
recommendations.
[17] For examples, GAO, DOD's High Risk Areas Successful Business
Transformation Requires Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained
Leadership, GAO-05-520T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2005), and Force
Structure Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans, GAO-06-
745 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[18] Department of Defense, Quarterly Report to Congress on
Implementation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007). We did not find documentation in DOD officials'
briefings to the Deputy's Advisory Working Group or DOD's report to
Congress that indicates how effectively DOD is implementing the
initiatives, such as providing information on whether the activity is
on schedule or assessing the effectiveness of the initiatives. Further,
in June 2007, DOD reported that it had closed an additional 19
initiatives, which brings the number of QDR initiatives that DOD
considers completed to about 110, or 85 percent, of the 130
initiatives.
[19] The eight post-QDR study teams are Authorities; Irregular Warfare;
Building Partnership Capacity; Strategic Communications; Institutional
Reform and Governance; Joint Command and Control; Locate, Tag, Track;
and Sensor-based Management of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Enterprise.
[20] For example, DOD officials, including the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Director
for Strategic Communication, plan to develop formal processes that will
enable DOD to better coordinate and synchronize the assessment and
delivery of information to key allies and coalition partners.
[21] DOD defines operational risk as the ability to achieve military
objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency.
[22] According to DOD, a capability gap is the military inability to
achieve a desired effect by performing a set of tasks under specified
standards and conditions. The gap may be the result of not having an
existing capability or the lack of proficiency or sufficiency in an
existing capability.
[23] Our reporting shows that DOD's experience has been different than
this assumption. To meet operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan,
DOD has relied increasingly on reassigning and retraining personnel to
meet requirements. See GAO-06-962.
[24] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated
Investment Strategy, GAO-07-415 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2007).
[25] In December 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
Quadrennial Defense Review to review ground forces capability.
[26] The operational demands related to Iraq's security environment
were not part of DOD's planning scenarios used in the ground forces
study.
[27] GAO, Force Structure: Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a
Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Experimentation before
Services Spend Billions on New Capabilities, GAO-07-211 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
[28] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[29] In September 2006 the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced a new
DOD management effort to explore whether managing groups of military
capabilities across the entire department will enable DOD to improve
the interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability
redundancies and gaps, and maximize the effectiveness of capabilities.
DOD identified the following test cases: battlespace awareness, joint
command and control, joint net centric operations, and joint logistics.
[30] GAO-05-200.
[31] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar.15, 2002).
[32] GAO-07-397T.
[33] The QDR legislation requires that the Secretary of Defense assess
the nature and magnitude of the political, strategic, and military
risks associated with executing the missions called for under the
national defense strategy. The legislation also requires that upon the
completion of each QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman's
assessment of the review, including the assessment of risk. (10 U.S.C.
§118.)
[34] GAO-06-13.
[35] GAO-05-325SP.
[36] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[37] DOD is also required to identify any additional resources (beyond
those programmed in the current future years defense program) required
to achieve such a level of risk.
[38] For example, see GAO-05-325SP.
[39] GAO, DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005).
[40] GAO-03-13.
[41] 10 U.S.C. §161(b).
[42] GAO-03-13.
[43] Pub. L. No. 109-364 §1031 (2006).
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