Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative

The U.S. relies on infrared satellites to provide early warning of enemy missile launches and protect the nation, its military forces, and allies. In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program to replace the nation's current missile detection system and provide expanded capabilities to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. DOD expected to field SBIRS by 2004 at a cost of about $4.2 billion. However, over the past 11 years, SBIRS has proven to be technically challenging and substantially more costly. In an effort to stem cost increases and schedule delays, DOD has restructured the program multiple times, including revising program goals. SBIRS is now estimated to cost over $10.4 billion, and the first satellite launch is expected in 2008. Because of continuing problems with SBIRS, DOD began a parallel alternative effort in 2006 known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS), to compete with SBIRS and ensure that the nation's missile-warning and defense capabilities are sustained, or possibly provide a follow-on capability to SBIRS. Congress requested that GAO assess both SBIRS and AIRSS. As agreed with your office, with respect to SBIRS, we focused on the extent to which DOD is prepared to deliver the first two SBIRS satellites within revised cost, schedule, and performance goals. With respect to AIRSS, we examined the adequacy of DOD's decision to proceed with AIRSS as an alternative to SBIRS as well as whether DOD is attaining the knowledge it needs to position the program for success.

Over 12 months after its restructuring, SBIRS still faces challenges in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals--particularly relating to the development of spacecraft and ground system software. At the time of our review, for example, spacecraft software development efforts were behind schedule by as much as 32 percent. Moreover, management reserves--designed to cover unanticipated work--were being depleted at a much higher rate than anticipated. In addition, DOD has not adequately justified its decision to proceed with AIRSS, and there is disagreement within the department on the purpose and scope of the program. DOD has also not adequately positioned the program for success. For example, a demonstration satellite is not being planned in a way that would maximize DOD's ability to incorporate knowledge gained into the AIRSS program. Based on these findings, we recommend that DOD reexamine the AIRSS program. DOD concurred with our findings and recommendation.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director: Cristina T. Chaplain Team: Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management Phone: (202) 512-4859