Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative
Gao ID: GAO-07-1088R September 12, 2007The U.S. relies on infrared satellites to provide early warning of enemy missile launches and protect the nation, its military forces, and allies. In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program to replace the nation's current missile detection system and provide expanded capabilities to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. DOD expected to field SBIRS by 2004 at a cost of about $4.2 billion. However, over the past 11 years, SBIRS has proven to be technically challenging and substantially more costly. In an effort to stem cost increases and schedule delays, DOD has restructured the program multiple times, including revising program goals. SBIRS is now estimated to cost over $10.4 billion, and the first satellite launch is expected in 2008. Because of continuing problems with SBIRS, DOD began a parallel alternative effort in 2006 known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS), to compete with SBIRS and ensure that the nation's missile-warning and defense capabilities are sustained, or possibly provide a follow-on capability to SBIRS. Congress requested that GAO assess both SBIRS and AIRSS. As agreed with your office, with respect to SBIRS, we focused on the extent to which DOD is prepared to deliver the first two SBIRS satellites within revised cost, schedule, and performance goals. With respect to AIRSS, we examined the adequacy of DOD's decision to proceed with AIRSS as an alternative to SBIRS as well as whether DOD is attaining the knowledge it needs to position the program for success.
Over 12 months after its restructuring, SBIRS still faces challenges in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals--particularly relating to the development of spacecraft and ground system software. At the time of our review, for example, spacecraft software development efforts were behind schedule by as much as 32 percent. Moreover, management reserves--designed to cover unanticipated work--were being depleted at a much higher rate than anticipated. In addition, DOD has not adequately justified its decision to proceed with AIRSS, and there is disagreement within the department on the purpose and scope of the program. DOD has also not adequately positioned the program for success. For example, a demonstration satellite is not being planned in a way that would maximize DOD's ability to incorporate knowledge gained into the AIRSS program. Based on these findings, we recommend that DOD reexamine the AIRSS program. DOD concurred with our findings and recommendation.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Cristina T. Chaplain Team: Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management Phone: (202) 512-4859GAO-07-1088R, Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative
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GAO:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 12, 2007:
The Honorable Bill Nelson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative:
The U.S. relies on infrared satellites to provide early warning of
enemy missile launches and protect the nation, its military forces, and
allies. In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program to replace the nation's current
missile detection system and provide expanded capabilities to support
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. DOD expected
to field SBIRS by 2004 at a cost of about $4.2 billion. However, over
the past 11 years, SBIRS has proven to be technically challenging and
substantially more costly. In an effort to stem cost increases and
schedule delays, DOD has restructured the program multiple times,
including revising program goals.[Footnote 1] SBIRS is now estimated to
cost over $10.4 billion, and the first satellite launch is expected in
2008. Because of continuing problems with SBIRS, DOD began a parallel
alternative effort in 2006 known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite
System (AIRSS), to compete with SBIRS and ensure that the nation's
missile-warning and defense capabilities are sustained, or possibly
provide a follow-on capability to SBIRS.
You requested that we assess both SBIRS and AIRSS. As agreed with your
office, with respect to SBIRS, we focused on the extent to which DOD is
prepared to deliver the first two SBIRS satellites within revised cost,
schedule, and performance goals. With respect to AIRSS, we examined the
adequacy of DOD's decision to proceed with AIRSS as an alternative to
SBIRS as well as whether DOD is attaining the knowledge it needs to
position the program for success. To address these objectives, we
reviewed schedule and funding information and performed our own
analysis of cost and schedule projections using the contractor's 2006
cost performance report data. We also examined the resources committed
and planned as well as users' needs for the competing effort. We
presented our preliminary findings on SBIRS and AIRSS in briefings to
your staffs in March 2007. This letter transmits the information
provided in that briefing. We conducted our work between August 2006
and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. A copy of the briefing is enclosed.
Results in Brief:
Over 12 months after its restructuring, SBIRS still faces challenges in
meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals--particularly relating to
the development of spacecraft and ground system software. At the time
of our review, for example, spacecraft software development efforts
were behind schedule by as much as 32 percent. Moreover, management
reserves--designed to cover unanticipated work--were being depleted at
a much higher rate than anticipated. In addition, DOD has not
adequately justified its decision to proceed with AIRSS, and there is
disagreement within the department on the purpose and scope of the
program. DOD has also not adequately positioned the program for
success. For example, a demonstration satellite is not being planned in
a way that would maximize DOD's ability to incorporate knowledge gained
into the AIRSS program. Based on these findings, we recommend that DOD
reexamine the AIRSS program. DOD concurred with our findings and
recommendation.
Background:
DOD initiated the SBIRS program to meet all military infrared
surveillance requirements through a single, integrated system and to
provide better and timelier data to the Unified Combatant Commanders,
U.S. deployed forces, U.S. military strategists, and U.S. allies. SBIRS
is to replace the existing infrared system, the Defense Support Program
(DSP), which has provided early missile warning information since the
1970s. The SBIRS program was originally conceived as having high-and
low-orbiting space-based components and a ground segment for mission
data processing and control to improve current capabilities. However,
in 2001, the SBIRS Low component was transferred from the Air Force to
the Missile Defense Agency and renamed the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System. The Air Force continued developing SBIRS High
(herein referred to as "SBIRS"). It, along with its associated ground
segment, is one of DOD's highest priority space programs. Originally,
SBIRS consisted of four satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO),
two infrared sensors placed on separate host satellites in highly
elliptical orbit (HEO)--known as "HEO sensors"--and a ground segment
for mission-data processing and control. The Air Force also had planned
to acquire a fifth GEO satellite to serve as a spare that would be
launched when needed.
Since its inception, SBIRS has been burdened by immature technologies,
unclear requirements, unstable funding, underestimated software
complexity, poor oversight, and other problems that have resulted in
billions of dollars in cost overruns and years in schedule delays.
These problems have been documented in GAO reports as well as
independent teams chartered by DOD.[Footnote 2] In addition, the
program has been restructured several times to account for cost and
schedule problems. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) directed the Air
Force to begin parallel efforts to develop a viable competing
capability for SBIRS, referred to as AIRSS. USD (AT&L) identified three
overall objectives for AIRSS:
* motivate successful execution of the SBIRS program by initiating a
viable competing capability;
* pursue an alternative approach, with acceptable technical risk that
offers DSP-like missile warning capability to ensure current
capabilities are sustained, if SBIRS GEO falters; and:
* develop a next-generation SBIRS system to meet worldwide surveillance
requirements by initiating efforts for technology risk reduction,
system definition, and evaluation of alternative sensor architectures.
In 2006, the Air Force completed studies that provided recommendations
for technology development, a road map for inserting those
technologies, options for future infrared systems that offer the
potential to improve the performance and reduce the cost of SBIRS, and
an acquisition strategy for AIRSS. In 2006, program officials awarded
contracts that aim to advance key technologies and capabilities. USD
(AT&L) directed the Air Force to have the first AIRSS satellite
available for launch no later than May 2015. The Air Force has budgeted
over $3.3 billion for AIRSS, from fiscal year 2007 through 2013.
Space Based Infrared System:
Although the Air Force has acted to reduce risks in the SBIRS program
and has had some recent successes, the program still faces risk of not
delivering promised capabilities within its revised goals. To reduce
risk, the SBIRS program cut back on quantity and capability in the face
of escalating costs. It deferred capabilities, such as mobile data
processors for the Air Force and the Army and a fully compliant backup
mission control facility, and it pushed off a decision to procure the
third and fourth satellites. The Air Force also concurrently initiated
AIRSS as a secondary means of achieving the same capability. However,
about 11 months after the most recent SBIRS program's restructuring, a
November 2006 assessment report by the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) showed that some efforts within the program were
experiencing significant cost increases and schedule overruns and that
the outlook is worsening. Furthermore, the program is rapidly spending
its management reserves--funds set aside to address unexpected
problems.
DCMA projected additional cost increases in some areas, including
satellite sensor and software development as well as satellite
integration, test, and assembly. Our analysis of data from the
contractor's cost performance reports shows that some of these areas
have been particularly problematic and are still exceeding cost and
schedule goals, even after the program's recent restructuring. For
example, we estimate that the cost of the satellite's pointing and
control assembly will increase about $25 million by the time its
fabrication is complete. Although the program has put into place
strategies for deferring work that can be completed at a later time--
thereby reducing cost and schedule risks--some work cannot be deferred.
For example, some software development activities for the satellite's
pointing and control assembly can be completed at a later date.
However, all of the software related to the satellite's flight system
must be completed before launch. In addition, DCMA program assessment
reports through November 2006 indicated that efforts to develop
software are significantly behind schedule. In particular, efforts to
develop software for the spacecraft lagged behind schedule--by as much
as 32 percent. Furthermore, due to the growing amount of rework
resulting from unresolved software discrepancies, DCMA estimated that
further schedule slips in software delivery are likely to occur. During
our review, program officials acknowledged that some of the problems
identified by DCMA were still an issue.
In addition, the contractor's management reserve, which is supposed to
last through 2012, has decreased from about $232 million to $166
million (about 28 percent) within a span of about 7 months, indicating
that unexpected problems continue to emerge. For example, additional
development and testing for spacecraft software and issues with the
satellite sensors have necessitated additional expenditures. Our
analysis shows that if this expenditure rate continues, an additional
$500 million, or more, will be required through September 2012. In
addition, the program has deferred needed capabilities to meet cost and
schedule goals, but the costs associated with these capabilities are
not part of the program's total cost estimate. The cost associated with
fully fielding these capabilities is estimated to be about $491
million.
Alternative Infrared Satellite System:
In reviewing DOD's decision to pursue AIRSS, we found that USD (AT&L)
established objectives for the program that were incompatible given the
time frame and budget to complete the work under each objective. One
was to solely ensure current missile-warning and defense capabilities
are sustained, and the other was to develop the next generation of
missile-warning and defense systems. The first would require DOD to
pursue a low-risk technology path in order to deliver capability
quickly. The second would require DOD to advance technologies and/or
design and, thus, budget more time for knowledge building in advance of
an acquisition program. In other words, one objective served as an
insurance policy for SBIRS; the other was a major effort to advance the
way DOD detects missile launches.
Subsequently, USD (AT&L) never clarified what was wanted from the
program, and the Air Force, in turn, set out to develop advanced
capabilities. Moreover, we found that there was disagreement within OSD
as to whether the approach being pursued for AIRSS was the only and/or
best option available to the Air Force. For example, DOD's Cost
Analysis Improvement Group as well as Program Analysis and Evaluation
staffs expressed concern that the focus on developing technology would
hinder delivery of an AIRSS satellite available for launch in 2015.
During our review, it also became evident that AIRSS could not
realistically serve as a back-up to SBIRS because the proposed
satellite delivery schedule is very aggressive for meeting the 2015
launch availability date, according to AIRSS program officials.
In addition, in its effort to pursue advanced capability, the Air Force
has not positioned the AIRSS program for success. First, in our
opinion, not enough time is budgeted for developing and launching the
first satellite. At the direction of USD (AT&L), the Air Force set 2015
as the launch date for the first satellite. Our assessment found the
period planned between "preliminary design"review and "critical design"
review for AIRSS is shorter than for most other major space
programs.[Footnote 3] Specifically, the program is allowing only 12
months from preliminary to critical design review, and 4 years from
critical design review to satellite delivery. By contrast, the SBIRS
High program took 44 months from preliminary design review to critical
design review. Two newer programs, Space Radar and Transformational
Satellite Communications System (TSAT), have planned for 16 and 27
months respectively. AIRSS Program officials acknowledged that the
current time frame is very optimistic.
Second, the AIRSS program may be optimistic in its assumptions about
technology risk. The program's schedule shows critical technologies
reaching a high level of maturity at program start, and most are now
rated at a technology readiness level of 5 or higher--meaning that the
basic components have been integrated with reasonably realistic
supporting elements in order that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. These readiness levels are comparatively higher
than other satellite programs we have reviewed. However, we found that
the program was still facing considerable technical risk since it is
working to build an infrared telescope with a large viewing capability
that has never before been developed and it is planning to use
"cryocoolers" that have yet to demonstrate low levels of jitter, high
efficiency, and long life, and a sensor chip whose assembly's
performance level has yet to be verified.[Footnote 4]
Third, the Air Force's research laboratory officials have stated that
on-orbit testing is the only way to validate the proposed capability
for AIRSS and reduce risk to an acceptable level. To achieve these
results, the Air Force is proposing to launch a small-scale
demonstration satellite in late 2010. However, the results from the on-
orbit demonstration satellite will not be ready in time to fully inform
the development of the first AIRSS satellite. Furthermore, AIRSS
officials plan to award contracts for the first satellite before data
from on-orbit testing is completed. Our analysis shows that if the
tests do not go well, DOD will not have time to return to an approach
using lower-risk technology.
Conclusion:
SBIRS continues to face risks that endanger DOD's ability to sustain,
replace, and expand its current missile-warning and defense
capabilities. Moreover, the program still has complex and difficult
work ahead as it undertakes efforts to integrate technology.
Recognizing these risks, the Office of the Secretary of Defense made a
sound decision in pursuing the AIRSS program to act as an alternative
to the third SBIRS GEO satellite. However, the program has since
diverged from this purpose and opted to pursue a higher risk effort in
order to advance capability. Moreover, the Air Force has added risk to
this effort by compressing the schedule and limiting the knowledge
gained from the demonstration effort. While it is acceptable in any
given portfolio to take some high risks, it is not sound for all
investments to be high risk--particularly when the capability is as
critical to the conduct of military operations as the mission-warning
capability is.
Recommendation:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to reassess its
investment in AIRSS and alternative ways of reducing the risk posed by
the SBIRS program, to more confidentially assure that current missile-
warning and defense capabilities are sustained.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided draft copies of this letter to DOD for review and comment.
DOD concurred with our findings and recommendation. DOD's letter is
reprinted as Enclosure I.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the SBIRS program's ability to meet cost and schedule
projections, we examined schedule and funding information for
developing hardware and software. We reviewed formal program reviews
and DCMA and contractor-performance reports. In addition, we performed
our own analysis of cost and schedule projections using the
contractor's, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, 2006 cost
performance-report data. To determine the potential problems and risks
relating to cost, schedule, and performance that are still facing the
SBIRS program, we reviewed technical reports and program briefings and
held discussions with program and contractor officials regarding
ongoing challenges.
To assess efforts in attaining the knowledge DOD needs before the start
of a competing effort, we examined the resources (technology,
communications infrastructure, and funding) committed and planned for
the competing effort as well as the users' needs for the competing
system. We considered DOD's plans for maturing the critical
technologies when we obtained technology-readiness information for each
critical technology against best-practice standards to determine if
technologies will be sufficiently mature when DOD plans to start
product development. We also reviewed risk-management plans and
concept-development information.
We will send copies of the correspondence to Department of Defense and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this correspondence, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or
chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
correspondence. Principal contributors to this report were Arthur
Gallegos, Assistant Director; Maricela Cherveny; Claire Cyrnak; Jean
Harker; Leslie Pollock; and Greg Campbell.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Cristina Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Networks And Information Integration:
6006 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-6000:
August 31, 2007
Ms. Christina T. Chaplain:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, NW:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Chaplain:
The Department agrees with comments to GAO Report No. 07-1088R, "Space
Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative," August 1,2007.
Consistent with the GAO recommendations, we are reassessmg the
Alternative Infrared Space System (AIRSS) and are likewise
investigating alternative ways of reducing the Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) risks.
One such example of the commitment to aggressively investigate
alternative SBIRS risk reduction strategies is the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logist~cs (USD(AT&L))
involvement in conducting quarterly program reviews to address cost,
schedule, and performance issues with senior leadership across the
Department and our industry partners. Additionally, the Acting
USD(AT&L) has established a team of software experts under the
Director, Defense Research and Evaluation (DDR&E) to assess the
software development effort and assist the SBIRS Wing in minimizing
programmatic risk.
The Department is also reexamining the AIRSS program to clarify program
objectives and ensure our nation's missile warning and defense
capabilities are sustained. It is expected these changes wlll be
reflected in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 budget that will continue
technology maturation for future space-based infrared applications. We
look forward to continuing the close relationship the Department has
with the GAO on space-based infrared systems.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John R. Landon:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
(C3ISR & IT Acquisition):
[End of section]
Enclosure II: Briefing Slides:
Missile Detection Systems Development:
SBIRS/AIRSS Briefing to Congressional Staff:
Preliminary Findings:
March 13, 2007
Briefing Overview:
* Due to extreme cost, schedule, and technical problems, DOD has
recently restructured the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High
missile detection satellite program and undertaken a competing effort,
known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS), in order to
ensure continuity of missile detection operations.
* Per requests by the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House
Armed Services Committee and discussions with committee staff members,
we assessed both SBIRS High and AIRSS.
* Due to extent and significance of findings, we plan to brief first on
SBIRS High, then on AIRSS;
- SBIRS High: Background; Program Status; Objective; Results in Brief;
GAO Findings
- AIRSS: Background; Program Status; Objectives; Results in Brief; GAO
Findings
- Conclusions
- Scope and Methodology
Background:
* SBIRS High was undertaken in 1996 to improve DOD's missile
detection/warning capabilities.
* The program has experienced schedule slips of at least 6 years and
cost increases that have triggered legislative requirements to reassess
and recertify the program several times”most recently in spring 2006. *
While DOD‘s total program cost estimate was about $4.1 billion, it is
now $10.4 billion”more than a 300 percent unit cost increase.
* Our reviews have attributed past problems to an acquisition approach
that decreased oversight of contractors, technology challenges, and
software development problems.
Background: Space Based Infrared Systems:
Legacy System: Defense Support Program (DSP);
* Missile Warning (with a classified Probability of Detection) for
North America.
* Detection and reporting of strategic and theater ballistic missiles
and other infrared events of interest.
In Development: SBIRS High;
* DSP Successor.
* Higher Sensitivity”Sees Dimmer Objects, More Often.
* Taskable Sensor”Can do Many Missions at Once.
* More Accurate Estimate of Missile Location”Including Launch Point and
Impact Point.
In Development: Space Tracking and Surveillance System;
* Space Tracking and Surveillance System formerly called SBIRS Low.
* Critical Element of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense ”Managed by
Missile Defense Agency.
* Tracks Threat Missiles Through Entire Flight”From Launch to Intercept.
*Sees Extremely Dim Targets”Can Track and Discriminate Objects That are
Not Burning•Inherent Capabilities Also Support Other Missions.
Missions: Missile Warning;
DSP: Primary Mission;
SBIRS H: Primary Mission;
STSS: Offers Inherent Capability.
Missions: Missile Defense;
DSP:
SBIRS H: Primary Mission;
STSS: Primary Mission.
Missions: Technical Intel;
DSP:
SBIRS H: Primary Mission;
STSS: Offers Inherent Capability.
Missions: Battlespace Characterization;
DSP:
SBIRS H: Primary Mission;
STSS: Offers Inherent Capability.
SBIRS High Program Status: RestructuredAcquisition Strategy:
* Restructured Acquisition Baseline.
- Up to 3 GEO satellites and 2 highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors on
classified hosts.
- Milestone Decision Authority will decide whether to procure GEO 3
based on the performance of GEO 1.
- Worldwide system requirements can not be met with 3 GEO satellites--a
constellation of 4 satellites is needed; A plan for follow-on missile
warning satellites is needed.
* December 2005 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).
- Directs that maintaining schedule, even at the sacrifice of
performance, should be the key to program management.
SBIRS High Program Status: Recent Program Accomplishments:
HEO PAYLOAD:
* Initial on orbit performance exceeding specifications.
GEO PAYLOAD:
* 100% of GEO 1 payload components delivered and integrated.
* September 2006: Completed Acoustic Testing.
GEO BUS:
* 95% GEO 1 bus components delivered and integrated.
* August 2006: Completed Spacecraft Functional Testing.
* December 2006: Began First-time Thermal Vacuum Testing.
Objective: SBIRS High:
* Determine to what extent DOD is prepared to deliver the first two
SBIRS satellites within cost, schedule and performance goals.
Findings: SBIRS High:
* In brief, we found that SBIRS High continues to face substantialrisks
as it enters what is perhaps the most difficult phase of
development”integration. Even though the program has just recently been
restructured, management reserves[Footnote 5] are being spent at higher
than anticipated rates, and cost and schedule variances are
deteriorating.
* Faces challenges in meeting cost and schedule goals.
* Total program cost not fully accounted for.
* Faces challenges in software development.
Finding: Challenges to Meet Cost and Schedule Goals:
* SBIRS High program not meeting cost and schedule goals;
- Program assessment reports by the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA), after restructuring, show that cost and schedule variances are
deteriorating: November 2006 DCMA report shows Variance at Completion
at about $25.6 million; causes include integration test and operations,
thermal vacuum test preparations, and engineering rework.
- GAO analysis shows that some efforts that were having trouble before
the February 2006 re-baseline, such as assembly, integration, and test,
are still over-running cost and schedule, and that contractor estimates
are overly optimistic.
* Management Reserve (MR) expenditure rate is not sustainable and may
result in a need for additional funding;
- Contractor (Lockheed Martin) spent approximately 28 percent ($66
million) of its MR from April 2006 to November 2006;
- MR designed to last to 2012; at current rate contractor MR will
deplete by May 2008 (5 months before projected GEO 1 launch date).
- If this trend continues, $500 million in additional MR will be
required through September 2012.
Finding: Total Program Cost Not Fully Accounted For:
* To meet SBIRS validated operational requirements, 2 HEO payloads and
4 GEO satellites are needed to complete the constellation and achieve
required coverage;
* Current program unit cost for GEOs 1-3 is about $3.5B;
* Fourth GEO satellite not part of current acquisition baseline: Cost
of GEO 4 and/or 5 satellites have been estimated but there are
uncertainties due to several factors including industrial base issues,
technology obsolescence, number of satellites to be procured, and
engineering rework.
* SBIRS High program has deferred needed capabilities to meet cost and
schedule goals; these capabilities are not part of the program‘s total
cost estimate;
* Additional funds will be needed if these and other deferred
capabilities are eventually provided.
Capability: Mission Control Station-Backup Facility;
FY06-FY11 ($ mil.); 75;
To Completion ($ mil.); 0;
Total ($ mil.); 75.
Capability: Integrated Training Suite Increment 2;
FY06-FY11 ($ mil.); 71;
To Completion ($ mil.); 7;
Total ($ mil.); 78.
Capability: Air Force Multi-Mission Processors;
FY06-FY11 ($ mil.); 79;
To Completion ($ mil.); 15;
Total ($ mil.); 94.
Capability: Army Multi-Mission Processors;
FY06-FY11 ($ mil.); 62;
To Completion ($ mil.); 10;
Total ($ mil.); 72.
Capability: Relay Ground Station 3rd Antenna;
FY06-FY11 ($ mil.); 61;
To Completion ($ mil.); 5;
Total ($ mil.); 66.
Capability: Ground refresh;
FY06-FY11 ($ mil.); 105;
To Completion ($ mil.); 0;
Total ($ mil.); 105.
Capability: Total;
FY06-FY11 ($ mil.); 453;
To Completion ($ mil.); 38;
Total ($ mil.); 491.
Finding: Challenges in Software Development:
Spacecraft Software Challenges:
* DCMA program assessment reports through November 2006 show software
development is behind schedule;
- Most recent report shows schedule variance around -32 percent;
- DCMA high risk threshold for schedule variance is -5 percent;
* Pointing and Control Assembly (PCA) software;
- Restructured work to allow viable off-ramp options;
- Off-ramp options may lower risk;
* Flight Software System (FSS);
- All FSS capabilities are needed for launch –no off-ramp possible;
- Increased schedule risk due to delayed qualification
* Tracking algorithms and software not yet completed or demonstrated;
* Hundreds of open deficiency reports --and growing;
* According to the DCMA, there is not enough schedule margin to
accommodate unforeseen risks.
Ground Software Challenges:
* The program office is attempting to reduce the length of time it will
take to certify the accuracy of the data processed from GEO 1
(currently about two years) by accelerating ground software development;
* Late delivery of space software databases to inform the ground
software development team has created a lack of coordination between
the space and ground systems;
* GAO is assessing reported software capability of contractor.
Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS):
AIRSS Background:
* After the most recent Nunn-McCurdy breach, DOD restructured the
SBIRSHigh program and directed the Air Force to begin developing a
competing capability to ensure that the nation‘s missile warning
capability is sustained;
* The December 2005 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) also stated
the AIRSS effort should:
- ’plan for a new program for space-based Overhead Non-imaging Infrared
that generates competitionfor the SBIRS High GEO 3 satellite“;
- ’perform technology risk reduction, perform system definition, and
evaluate alternative sensor architectures“;
- ’provide insuranceagainst further difficulties encountered on the
SBIRS program“;
- ’pursue an approach with acceptable technical riskthat offers DSP-
likemissile warning capability“;
* There is no full cost estimate of AIRSS because the system has not
been defined due to its early stage of development;
* Congress reduced the fiscal year 2007 AIRSS budget by $35 million for
program moderation;
* The latest program cost estimate from Fiscal Year 2007 through 2013
is over $3.3.
Cost ($ in millions):
FY 2007: 67.552;
FY 2008: 230.887;
FY 2009: 354.308;
FY 2010: 543.534;
FY 2011: 708.657;
FY 2012: 722.287;
FY 2013: 736:998;
Total FY 2007-2013: 3364.223.
Source: Air Force.
AIRSS Status: Activities since Acquisition Decision Memorandum:
* DOD completed 30-day and 120-day studies into alternative infrared
concepts (including Wide Field of View (WFOV));
* Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC)/Air Force Research Laboratory
issued two Broad Agency Announcement contracts for development of WFOV
technologies to Raytheon ($54.4 million) and SAIC ($26 million);
* SMC issued two Program Research and Development Announcement
contracts for system design to General Dynamics ($23.3 million) and
Northrop Grumman Space Technology ($24.8 million);
* Air Force Space Command drafted a requirements document for global
space infrared surveillance systems, a family of systems that includes
AIRSS as the SBIRS High follow-on;
- review by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is scheduled for
summer 2007;
* National Security Space Office (NSSO) completed its infrared
architecture study in DEcember 2006.
Objectives: AIRSS:
* Determine how DOD has justified its decision to proceed with
preliminary efforts for an alternative to SBIRS High, known as the
Alternative Infrared SatelliteSystem (AIRSS);
* Determine to what extent DOD is taking the steps necessary to build
the knowledge it needs to pursue AIRSS.
Findings: AIRSS:
* Specifically, AIRSS is not being pursued as a ’plan B“ program as
originally envisioned. Rather than seek to maintain continuity of
operations, the program is focused on advancing capabilities. Moreover,
it is doing so within highly compressed timeframes. There is
disagreement among DOD stakeholders as to the wisdom of this approach,
given past experiences with space acquisitions;
* The Air Force is moving forward and pursuing two potentially
incompatible objectives within one program: 1) ensure sustainment of
current missile warning capability, and 2) develop next-generation
SBIRS High;
*Faces challenges in meeting its target delivery date of 2015.
Finding: Air Force pursuing incompatible goals within AIRSS:
* The December 2005 ADM directs the Air Force to:
- develop a competitor for GEO 3 to ensure sustainment of missile
warning capability (DSP-like);
- pursue technology risk reduction'
* However, the AIRSS program is primarily focused on technology that is
newer than the technology on SBIRS GEO;
- FY07 funding is largely being spent pursuing these technologies that
pose technical challenges;
* The AIRSS on-orbit demonstration satellite results will not be ready
in time to fully inform development of the firstAIRSS satellite;
* Some DOD officials believe AIRSS should be following lower-risk
approach in order to assure continuity of missile detection
capability; - Cost Analysis Improvement Group and Program Analysis and
Evaluation staff expressed concern that the focus on technology
development will hinder the delivery of an AIRSS satellite available
for launch in 2015;
* According to AIRSS officials, the Air Force wants to look to
thefuture promised by current technologies, not spend time resurrecting
DSP-like technologies. They assert that there are no viable
alternatives beyond these two paths. However, others in DOD disagree
and believe the 120-day study should have been more robust.
Finding: AIRSS may face challenges in meeting launch date of FY 2015:
* AIRSS program technology schedule shows critical technologies
reaching a high level of maturity by program start. Moreover, most are
now rated at a technology readiness level (TRL) 5 or higher;
* However, the WFOV capability has not been achieved with the materials
and technologies specifically planned for AIRSS. For example,
- Mercury-cadmium-telluride sensor chip assembly performance level has
yet to be verified;
- Full-earth infrared telescope has yet to be developed and
demonstrated;
- Cyrocoolers have yet to demonstrate low jitter, high efficiency and
long life;
* Some DOD stakeholders also believe the WFOV technology development
schedule is optimistic;
* Moreover, according to the Air Force Research Laboratory,
flighttesting is the only way to validate the WFOV approach to a
pointwhere risk is significantly lowered. But this test is not
scheduled to happen until 2010;
* GAO believes that if the flight test does not go well, DOD will not
have time to return to a lower risk technology effort that focuses on
sustaining current capability;
* The AIRSS office assessed current and projected technology readiness
levels (TRLs) for enabling technologies for a WFOV capability. Although
the technologies offer varying levels of performance, final WFOV design
will determine which technologies will be used.
Item: Focal Plane Array Sensor, Sensor Chip Assembly –(mercury-cadmium-
telluride, or HgCdTe);
TRL 2006: 5-6;
TRL 2008: 8;
Item: Focal Plane Array Sensor, Sensor Chip Assembly –(mercury-cadmium-
telluride, or HgCdTe)- Hybrid Focal Plane Assembly;
TRL 2006: 5-6;
TRL 2008: 8;
Item: Focal Plane Array Sensor, Sensor Chip Assembly –(mercury-cadmium-
telluride, or HgCdTe)- Read-out Integrated Circuits;
TRL 2006: 6;
TRL 2008: 8;
Item: Cryocooler, 110K (for HgCdTe);
TRL 2006: 7;
TRL 2008: 8;
Item: Cryocooler, Spatial filtering algorithms for theater reporting;
TRL 2006: 6-7;
TRL 2008: 8-9;
Item: Radiation hardened Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FGPAs); 30K
gates;
TRL 2006: 8;
TRL 2008: 9;
Item: Radiation hardened Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FGPAs); 400K
gates;
TRL 2006: 5;
TRL 2008: 6;
Item: Processor (300 multimode interference photonic switches(MIPS));
TRL 2006: 8;
TRL 2008: 9;
Item: 18ºInfrared Telescope;
TRL 2006: 5-6;
TRL 2008: 6;
Item: Spacecraft (structure, power, attitude control system (ACS),
etc.);
TRL 2006: 8;
TRL 2008: 8;
Item: Communications suite;
TRL 2006: 8;
TRL 2008: 8;
Finding: AIRSS may face challenges in meeting launch date of FY 2015:
* AIRSS officials acknowledge its schedule is ’very aggressive“for
meeting a 2015 launch availability date;
- 12 months from preliminary to critical design review (CDR);
- 4 years from CDR to satellite delivery•AIRSS officials plan to award
system contracts before data from key sensor on-orbit testing is
completed;
* GAO has reported that it is important for DOD to gain knowledge about
technology readiness prior to proceeding with system development.
Conclusion:
While it is okay in any given portfolio to take some high risks,it is
not sound for all investments to be high risk”particularly if the
capability being pursued is critical to the conduct of military
operations and national security. The SBIRS High program continues to
face risks that endanger DOD‘s ability to sustain its missile detection
capability. Recognizing this risk, DOD made asound decision in pursuing
AIRSS to act as an alternative to thethird GEO satellite, envisioning
this as a low-risk approach. However, the program is now pursuing a
higher risk effort than originally envision because it believes there
are not other viable alternatives. Given internal disagreements about
whether there are other alternatives, DOD should direct the Air Force
to further explore the availability of more mature technologies and
designs, or justify its decision not to do so.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the program‘s ability to meet cost and schedule
projections, we examined schedule and funding information for
developing hardware and software. We reviewed formal program reviews,
DCMA and contractor performancereports. In addition, we performed our
own analysis of cost and schedule projections using Lockheed Martin‘s
2006 cost performance report data. To determine the problems and
potential risks relating to cost, schedule, and performance that are
still facing the SBIRS High program, we reviewed technical reports and
program briefings and held discussions with program and contractor
officials regardingongoing challenges.
To assess DOD‘s efforts in attaining the knowledge it needs before the
start of a competing effort, we examined the resources (technology,
communications infrastructure, and funding) committed and planned for
the competing effort as well as the users‘ needs for the competing
system. We considered DOD‘s plans for maturing the critical
technologies when we obtained technology-readiness information for each
critical technology against best practice standards to determine if
they will be sufficiently mature when DOD plans to start product
development. We also reviewed risk management plans and concept
development information.
* Key documents reviewed and analyzed;
- SBIRS High Acquisition Decision Memorandum;
- SBIRS High Program Review Updates to AT&L;
- SBIRS High Program office and prime contractor schedules and
technology development plans;
-SBIRS High Program Assessment Reports –Defense Contract Management
Agency, Lockheed Martin Sunnyvale;
- SBIRS High Lockheed Martin Cost Performance Reports;
- AIRSS Office update briefings•AIRSS 120-day study report;
-National Security Space Acquisition Policy;
- Selected Acquisition Reports for major DOD space acquisitions;
- DOD budget documentation for SBIRS High and AIRSS;
Locations for interviews and documentation:
* Air Force;
- SBIRS High Program Office and AIRSS office, Los Angeles Air Force
Base;
- Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO;
- Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM;
- Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC
* Other Defense;
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation,
Arlington, VA;
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group,
Arlington, VA;
- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-2 and J-8), Arlington, VA;
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Arlington, VA;
- National Security Space Office, Fairfax, VA;
- U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE;
- U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington D.C.;
- Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, VA and Sunnyvale, CA;
* SBIRS High Contractors;
- Northrop Grumman Space Technology, Azusa, CA;
- Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, CA.
We conducted our work from August 2006 to February 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
{End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD restructured the program, to include setting new cost and
schedule goals, in 2002, 2004, and 2005.
[2] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High
Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, GAO-04-48
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, GAO-07-406SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). Report of the Defense Science Board/
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of
National Security Space Programs, (May 2003) (also referred to as the
"Young Panel report") and the July 2004 update to this report. Space-
Based Infrared System Independent Review Team, Final Report, February
2002.
[3] Preliminary design review determines whether preliminary designs
are complete and if the program is prepared to start detailed design
and test procedure development. Critical design review assesses the
systems final design, and according to GAO best practices, at least 90-
percent of engineering drawings should be completed to provide tangible
evidence that the design is stable.
[4] "Cryocoolers" are refrigeration devices used to reach cryogenic
temperatures, or very low temperatures (below -238 °F, -150 °C, or 123
K). Cryogenic refrigeration technology for satellites enables the
performance of onboard infrared sensors to enhance missile detection,
conduct intelligence gathering, and enable space situational awareness.
[5] A management reserve budget is an amount of the total allocated
budget withheld by contractors for management control purposes.
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