Special Operations Forces
Management Actions Are Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces into the U.S. Special Operations Command Gao ID: GAO-07-1030 September 5, 2007The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and to perform other tasks such as training foreign military forces. To meet the demand for these forces, DOD established a Marine Corps service component under the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to integrate Marine Corps forces. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Marine Corps special operations command has identified its force structure requirements, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing its forces for assigned missions. GAO performed its work with the Marine Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed DOD plans for this new command.
While the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special operations command (Command), the Command has not yet fully identified the force structure needed to perform its assigned missions. DOD developed initial force structure plans to establish the Command; however, it did not use critical practices of strategic planning, such as the alignment of activities and resources and the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making processes when developing these plans. As a result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the Command has identified several force structure challenges that will likely affect the Command's ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise its force structure. Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command. While the Command has identified some skills needed to perform special operations missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine all of the critical skills and incremental training required of personnel in its special operations forces units. These analyses are critical to the Marine Corps' efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the management of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without the benefit of these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to assign some personnel to special operations forces units for extended tour lengths to account for the additional training and skills; however, the policy is inconsistent with the Command's goal for the permanent assignment of some personnel within the special operations community. Until the Command completes an analysis to identify and document the critical skills and competencies needed by its future workforce to perform its full range of special operations missions, the Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating alternative strategic human capital approaches for managing personnel assigned to its special operations forces units. USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the Command's training programs are preparing units for their missions because it has not established common training standards for many special operations skills and it has not formally evaluated whether these programs prepare units to be fully interoperable with other special operations forces. The Command is providing training to its forces that is based on training programs for conventional units that were assigned some special operations missions prior to the Command's activation and incorporates the training that USSOCOM's other service components provide to their forces. However, USSOCOM has not validated that the training for Marine Corps forces prepares them to be fully interoperable with DOD's other special operations forces. Without an evaluation, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the needed assurances that Marine Corps forces are fully interoperable with its other forces, which may jeopardize the success of future joint missions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-1030, Special Operations Forces: Management Actions Are Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces into the U.S. Special Operations Command
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2007:
Special Operations Forces:
Management Actions Are Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps
Forces into the U.S. Special Operations Command:
Special Operations Forces:
GAO-07-1030:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1030, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on special operations forces
to conduct military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and to perform
other tasks such as training foreign military forces. To meet the
demand for these forces, DOD established a Marine Corps service
component under the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to
integrate Marine Corps forces. Under the authority of the Comptroller
General, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Marine Corps special
operations command has identified its force structure requirements, (2)
the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital approach to
manage personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has
determined whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing its
forces for assigned missions. GAO performed its work with the Marine
Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed DOD plans for this new command.
What GAO Found:
While the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special
operations command (Command), the Command has not yet fully identified
the force structure needed to perform its assigned missions. DOD
developed initial force structure plans to establish the Command;
however, it did not use critical practices of strategic planning, such
as the alignment of activities and resources and the involvement of
stakeholders in decision-making processes when developing these plans.
As a result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the
Command has identified several force structure challenges that will
likely affect the Command‘s ability to perform its full range of
responsibilities, and is working to revise its force structure.
Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not
developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical
skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations
command. While the Command has identified some skills needed to perform
special operations missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive
analysis to determine all of the critical skills and incremental
training required of personnel in its special operations forces units.
These analyses are critical to the Marine Corps‘ efforts to develop a
strategic human capital approach for the management of personnel in its
special operations forces units. Without the benefit of these analyses,
the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to assign some
personnel to special operations forces units for extended tour lengths
to account for the additional training and skills; however, the policy
is inconsistent with the Command‘s goal for the permanent assignment of
some personnel within the special operations community. Until the
Command completes an analysis to identify and document the critical
skills and competencies needed by its future workforce to perform its
full range of special operations missions, the Marine Corps will not
have a sound basis for developing or evaluating alternative strategic
human capital approaches for managing personnel assigned to its special
operations forces units.
USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the
Command‘s training programs are preparing units for their missions
because it has not established common training standards for many
special operations skills and it has not formally evaluated whether
these programs prepare units to be fully interoperable with other
special operations forces. The Command is providing training to its
forces that is based on training programs for conventional units that
were assigned some special operations missions prior to the Command‘s
activation and incorporates the training that USSOCOM‘s other service
components provide to their forces. However, USSOCOM has not validated
that the training for Marine Corps forces prepares them to be fully
interoperable with DOD‘s other special operations forces. Without an
evaluation, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the needed assurances that
Marine Corps forces are fully interoperable with its other forces,
which may jeopardize the success of future joint missions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Marine Corps conduct an analysis of the
critical skills and competencies required of personnel in its special
operations command and that USSOCOM establish a basis to ensure they
are trained to be fully interoperable with DOD‘s special operations
forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally
concurred with GAO‘s recommendations and noted that actions consistent
with the recommendations are underway.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1030].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Although Some Progress Made in Establishing Marine Corps Special
Operations Command, Force Structure Needed to Perform Its Missions Has
Not Been Fully Identified:
Although Preliminary Steps Have Been Taken, the Marine Corps Has Not
Developed a Strategic Human Capital Approach to Manage the Critical
Skills And Competencies Required of Personnel in Its Special Operations
Command:
USSOCOM Does Not Have a Sound Basis for Determining Whether Marine
Corps Special Operations Forces Training Programs Prepare Units for
Missions:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Description of Special Operations Forces' Core Tasks:
Table 2: Description of Units within the Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command:
Table 3: Actual and Projected Funding for the Marine Corps Special
Operations Command, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Figures:
Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events in the Integration of Marine Corps
Forces into USSOCOM:
Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2007 Military Positions Authorized for Special
Operations Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve
Component:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
SEAL: Sea, Air, Land:
USSOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 5, 2007:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
In 1987, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) with a primary mission to provide trained
and combat-ready special operations forces to the department's
geographic combatant commanders.[Footnote 1] These forces differ from
conventional forces in that they are specially organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct operations in hostile or politically sensitive
environments and they employ military capabilities that are not present
in conventional military forces. Subsequent to its activation, USSOCOM
assumed operational control of existing units from the Army, Navy, and
Air Force.[Footnote 2] However, the Marine Corps did not assign any of
its forces to USSOCOM, citing a need to retain the flexibility needed
to perform its missions. Instead, the Marine Corps created a program to
deploy forces to the geographic combatant commands that were trained to
perform some special operations missions.
With the onset of the war on terrorism, DOD has greatly expanded the
role of USSOCOM. As part of its strategy for this war, the department
has relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations
in the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, special
operations forces have performed other types of military tasks, such as
training and advising foreign military forces in a number of countries
around the world, in order to build the capabilities of partner nations
to combat terrorists more effectively within their own borders. To meet
these commitments, special operations forces have experienced a
substantial increase in deployments. For example, we reported in July
2006 that from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the average
weekly number of special operations forces personnel who deployed to
the department's geographic combatant commands increased by 64
percent.[Footnote 3] DOD recognizes that it needs additional special
operations forces to defeat terrorist networks and has sought to
increase the number of these forces. One department initiative to
increase the number of special operations forces has been to integrate
Marine Corps forces into USSOCOM. In 2005, the Secretary of Defense
requested that the Marine Corps and USSOCOM develop plans to establish
a Marine Corps service component to integrate Marine Corps forces
within the special operations community. In October 2005, the Secretary
of Defense approved the establishment of a Marine Corps special
operations command (Command) as a service component to USSOCOM.
The Marine Corps activated its special operations command in February
2006, and in August 2006 began deploying special operations forces
units to conduct missions for the geographic combatant commanders. On
the basis of initial department guidance, the Marine Corps special
operations command will be comprised of approximately 2,600 Marines and
Navy personnel to train foreign military forces and conduct other
special operations missions. According to current plans, the Command
will be fully operationally capable by the end of fiscal year
2008.[Footnote 4] At DOD's request, the Congress has provided the
Marine Corps and USSOCOM with regular and supplemental appropriations
in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 totaling $509.5 million (excluding
military personnel costs) to establish the Marine Corps special
operations command.[Footnote 5] In addition, the Marine Corps and
USSOCOM have projected funding needs for the Command totaling $907.8
million for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
While USSOCOM is responsible for monitoring the status of its
personnel, it does not have authority over personnel management issues
such as recruiting, retention, or the assignment of servicemembers in
special operations forces units. Instead, personnel management is the
responsibility of each military service, and each service handles those
responsibilities differently. For example, the Marine Corps is
assigning personnel to its special operations command from a variety of
career fields,[Footnote 6] such as reconnaissance and intelligence, and
plans to rotate these personnel between special operations forces units
and conventional force units. This policy is in contrast to the
management of some special operations forces personnel in the other
military services. The Army, for example, has established separate
career fields for Special Forces and Civil Affairs soldiers and in
fiscal year 2007, the Navy established a separate career field for
SEALs. Once assigned to the Command, personnel will be provided with
additional training for the skills that are required to perform special
operations missions. In general, the Marine Corps will retain the
responsibility for providing training for basic Marine Corps skills to
personnel who are assigned to its special operations forces units.
USSOCOM, through its Marine Corps service component command, is
responsible for providing training for special operations-unique skills
to Marine Corps personnel in these units.
We prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our objective was to
evaluate DOD's efforts to establish a Marine Corps special operations
command. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) the Marine
Corps special operations command has identified the force structure
needed to perform its mission, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a
strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills and
competencies required of personnel in its special operations command,
and (3) USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps special operations
forces training programs are preparing these forces for assigned
missions.
To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations
command has identified the force structure needed to perform its
mission, we identified and reviewed reports related to the department's
efforts to increase the size of special operations forces by
integrating Marine Corps forces into USSOCOM. We analyzed available
internal DOD documentation such as briefings, guidance, and memoranda
that identified DOD's plans and time frames for establishing the Marine
Corps special operations command. We discussed DOD's decision-making
processes for developing force structure plans for the new Command with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff;
Headquarters, Marine Corps; USSOCOM; and the geographic combatant
commands. We also reviewed documents and interviewed officials with the
Marine Corps special operations command to determine the force
structure challenges the Command has identified and the plans that are
being developed to revise its force structure. To assess the extent to
which the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital approach
to manage the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in
its special operations forces units, we analyzed relevant Marine Corps
policies for assigning personnel to conventional force units and to
special operations forces units. We conducted interviews with officials
from Headquarters, Marine Corps, who are responsible for managing
personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special operations command. To
better understand the unique personnel needs of the Marine Corps
special operations command, we interviewed officials from the Command
to discuss the specialized skills and training that are required by
personnel who are assigned to special operations forces units to
perform the Command's assigned missions. To assess the extent to which
USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps special operations forces
training programs are preparing these forces for assigned missions, we
examined relevant laws and DOD doctrine related to the responsibilities
of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM for training special operations forces
personnel. We reviewed available documents that detail training
programs for Marine Corps special operations forces. We collected and
analyzed documents related to USSOCOM's evaluations of Marine Corps
special operations forces training, and we discussed the efforts that
have been taken by the Marine Corps special operations command and
USSOCOM to assess the effectiveness of these training programs. Our
assessment of data reliability concluded that the data used to support
this review were sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives. We
conducted our review from August 2006 through July 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special
operations command, the Command has not yet fully identified the force
structure needed to perform its assigned missions. The Marine Corps has
taken several steps to establish its special operations command, such
as activating the Command's headquarters, establishing Marine Corps
special operations forces units, and deploying these units to conduct
special operations missions. DOD developed initial force structure
requirements for the Command by basing the composition and number of
special operations units on existing units within the Marine Corps that
had performed similar missions in the past, but did not use critical
practices of effective strategic planning when developing these
requirements. We have previously reported on several practices that are
critical to effective strategic planning, including the alignment of
activities and resources to support organizational missions and the
involvement of stakeholders in decision-making processes to help ensure
efforts and resources are targeted to the highest priorities.[Footnote
7] However, DOD did not fully incorporate these critical practices
during its planning for the Marine Corps special operations command.
For example, the Command's activities and resources were not fully
aligned with the organization's mission. Neither the Office of the
Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps conducted a comprehensive,
data-driven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to
meet the Command's mission requirements, and the number of personnel
authorized for the Command was not directly tied to specific mission
requirements. In addition, we found that some key stakeholders were not
involved in the establishment of the Marine Corps special operations
command. For example, the special operations components within the
department's geographic combatant commands--which are responsible for
commanding special operations forces around the world--were not
involved in the process to establish the Marine Corps special
operations command or in the decisions to target the service's
resources to their highest priorities and mission requirements. As a
result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the Command
has identified several challenges related to its planned force
structure. For example, officials identified shortfalls in the number
of personnel available to conduct support functions for Marine Corps
special operations forces units. Additionally, the Command has
determined that the number and composition of its special operations
forces units are not aligned with the Command's mission requirements
and, at the time we issued our report, the Marine Corps special
operations command was developing several proposals to significantly
revise its force structure to better meet its mission needs. These
revisions would adjust the number and size of the Command's warfighter
units to better meet mission requirements. Although the Command had not
completed several analyses of the personnel and funding requirements
that are tied to these proposed force structure changes, it has set
milestones for completing its work. Until the analyses are completed,
however, the Command will be unable to determine whether the approved
plans for its personnel and funding should be adjusted in order for the
Command to perform all of its assigned missions.
Although some preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has
not developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in
its special operations command because the Command has not yet
conducted a comprehensive analysis to identify the critical skills and
competencies required of personnel in its special operations forces
units. Our prior work has shown that the analysis of critical skill and
competency gaps between current and future workforce needs is an
important step in strategic human capital planning.[Footnote 8] The
Marine Corps special operations command has begun to identify some of
the critical skills that are needed to perform special operations
missions. For example, as part of the effort to identify these critical
skills, it is developing a training course that will provide baseline
training to newly assigned personnel to prepare them for positions in
warfighter units. The Command plans to provide these personnel with
training on advanced survival skills and foreign languages. However,
the Command has not conducted a comprehensive analysis to fully
identify and document the advanced skills and additional training that
are necessary to support its full range of assigned missions. Moreover,
the Command has not yet fully determined which positions should be
filled by specially trained personnel who are strategically managed to
meet the Command's missions. Such analyses are critical to the Marine
Corps' efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the
management of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without
the benefit of these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an
interim policy to assign some personnel to special operations forces
units for extended tour lengths to account for the additional training
and skills. According to officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps, and
the Marine Corps special operations command, the interim policy is
designed, in part, to retain some personnel at the Marine Corps special
operations command long enough to complete specialized training and
conduct at least two deployments. However, the interim policy is
inconsistent with the Marine Corps special operations command's goal
for the permanent assignment of some personnel within the special
operations community. According to officials from the Command,
permanent assignments for personnel in special operations forces units
are necessary to develop and sustain the critical skills required to
support the Command's full range of assigned missions. Officials with
Headquarters, Marine Corps, told us the service plans to review the
interim policy and work with the Marine Corps special operations
command to develop a management strategy that better meets the
Command's personnel needs. However, until the Command completes a
comprehensive analysis to identify and document the critical skills and
training needed by its future workforce to perform the Command's full
range of assigned special operations missions, the Marine Corps will
not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating alternative
strategic human capital approaches for the management of personnel
assigned to its special operations forces units.
USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the Marine
Corps special operations command's training programs are preparing its
forces for their missions because it has not established common
training standards for many special operations skills and it has not
formally evaluated whether these programs will prepare units to be
fully interoperable with other special operations forces. The Marine
Corps special operations command has taken several actions to implement
training programs to fulfill its responsibility for training personnel
to a unique set of special operations forces standards. For example,
the Command has provided training to its forces that has been adapted
from the training programs for conventional units that were assigned
some special operations missions prior to the activation of the
Command. In addition, Command officials told us that training programs
for missions that conventional units are not assigned have been
determined by consulting with, and selectively incorporating, the
service-specific training that USSOCOM's other service components
provide to their special operations forces. Although USSOCOM is
responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of all training programs
and for ensuring the interoperability of all of DOD's special
operations forces, it does not have a sound basis to determine whether
Marine Corps training programs are preparing units for their missions
for two reasons. First, common training standards have not yet been
established for many special operations skills. USSOCOM has established
common training standards for some skills, and is working on an
incremental basis to develop common standards for additional skills
because of the recognition that current service-specific training may
not optimize opportunities for commonality, jointness, or efficiency.
Second, while USSOCOM has taken some limited steps to evaluate the
training provided to Marine Corps special operations forces, it has not
formally validated that the training programs developed by the Marine
Corps special operations command meet special operations forces
standards and prepare forces to be fully interoperable with the
department's other special operations forces. Without common training
standards for special operations skills or a formal evaluation of the
training and standards used to prepare Marine Corps forces for
deployments, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the needed assurances to the
geographic combatant commanders that these forces are being trained to
special operations forces standards and that these forces are fully
interoperable with DOD's other special operations forces, thereby
potentially impacting the success of future joint operations.
To facilitate the development of a strategic human capital approach for
the management of personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special
operations command and to validate that Marine Corps special operations
forces are trained in a manner that is fully interoperable with DOD's
other special operations forces, we are making recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense to (1) direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps
to conduct an analysis of the critical skills and competencies required
of personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces units, establish
milestones for conducting this analysis, and use the results of this
analysis to develop a strategic human capital approach for the
management of these personnel; and (2) direct the Commander, USSOCOM,
to establish a framework for evaluating Marine Corps special operations
forces training programs to ensure the programs are sufficient to
prepare Marine Corps special operations forces to be fully
interoperable with the department's other special operations forces. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with our
recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the
recommendations are underway.
Background:
In 1986, the President signed a joint resolution of Congress that
directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a unified combatant
command for special operations forces.[Footnote 9] In April 1987, the
Secretary of Defense established USSOCOM with the mission to provide
trained and combat-ready special operations forces to DOD's geographic
combatant commands. Since 2003, DOD has further expanded the role of
USSOCOM to include greater responsibility for planning and leading the
department's efforts in the war on terrorism. In addition to training,
organizing, equipping, and deploying combat-ready special operations
forces to the geographic combatant commands, USSOCOM has the mission to
lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global operations
against terrorist networks.
Tasks and Missions of Special Operations Forces:
DOD doctrine describes the characteristics of special operations
forces, and provides joint force commanders with the guidance and
information necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions
appropriate for special operations forces.[Footnote 10] According to
doctrine, special operations forces perform two types of activities:
special operations forces perform tasks that no other forces in DOD
conduct, and they perform tasks that other DOD forces conduct but do so
according to a unique set of conditions and standards. In particular,
special operations forces are specifically organized, trained, and
equipped to accomplish nine core tasks, which represent the collective
capabilities of all special operations forces rather than those of any
one unit. Table 1 defines these core tasks.
Table 1: Description of Special Operations Forces' Core Tasks:
Core task: Direct action;
Description: Short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive
actions conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage
designated targets.
Core task: Special reconnaissance;
Description: Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or
verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing
military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.
Core task: Foreign internal defense;
Description: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or
other designated organization, to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
Core task: Unconventional warfare;
Description: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations,
normally of long duration, predominately conducted through, with, or by
indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped,
supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source.
Core task: Counterterrorism;
Description: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism.
Core task: Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
Description: Actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe,
capture, or recover weapons of mass destruction.
Core task: Civil affairs operations;
Description: Operations that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations among military forces, government and nongovernmental
civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in
friendly, neutral, or hostile areas of operations in order to
facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S.
national objectives.
Core task: Psychological operations;
Description: Planned operations to convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives,
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
Core task: Information operations;
Description: Actions taken to affect adversary information and
information systems while defending one's own information and
information systems.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Prior Actions Taken to Integrate Marine Corps Forces into USSOCOM:
Since 1987, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have taken several steps to
expand the relationship between the two organizations. For example,
beginning in 1993, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM established a working
group to discuss efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and
interoperability. These efforts received a renewed emphasis with the
onset of the war on terrorism. In 2002, the Secretary of Defense
requested the military services to increase their support to USSOCOM.
In 2003, the Marine Corps established a specially trained and equipped
unit as a concept to demonstrate the Marine Corps' ability to conduct
special operations missions under the operational control of USSOCOM.
This unit deployed to Iraq in April 2004 to perform selected special
operations missions. The Secretary of Defense approved the
establishment of a Marine Corps service component to USSOCOM in October
2005. In February 2006, the Marine Corps activated its special
operations command. Since August 2006, the Marine Corps special
operations command has deployed its forces to perform special
operations missions to support the geographic combatant commanders'
requirements. Figure 1 provides a timeline.
Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events in the Integration of Marine Corps
Forces into USSOCOM:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Organization of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command:
The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is the Marine Corps
service component to USSOCOM. The Command is headquartered on Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Marine Corps special
operations command has five major subordinate units. These units
include two Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special
Operations Advisor Group,[Footnote 11] the Marine Special Operations
Support Group, and the Marine Special Operations School. Table 2
provides a description of each unit.
Table 2: Description of Units within the Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command:
Unit: Marine Special Operations Battalion;
Description: Provides special operations companies to perform direct
action, special reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense
operations: companies can deploy aboard a Marine Expeditionary Unit or
independently.
Unit: Marine Special Operations Advisor Group;
Description: Provides tailored, combat skills training and advisor
support for identified foreign forces to enhance the capability of
partner nation forces.
Unit: Marine Special Operations Support Group;
Description: Provides tailorable and scalable support capabilities for
worldwide special operations missions, including intelligence and
communications support, combined arms, military working dog support,
and combat service support.
Unit: Marine Special Operations School;
Description: Conducts assessment and selection of Marines assigned to
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, develops and
standardizes doctrine and tactics, and trains and certifies units for
worldwide deployments.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
By fiscal year 2011, the Command will be authorized 2,516 personnel--
2,483 military personnel and 33 civilians. With the exception of one
Marine Corps reserve position, all of the authorized military personnel
will be drawn from the military services' active components. The Marine
Corps special operations component will be the smallest service
component under USSOCOM. The other military services' special
operations components include the following.
* The Army component is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Army
special operations forces include Special Forces, Rangers, Special
Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units.
* The Navy component is the Naval Special Warfare Command. Naval
Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams,
and Special Boat Teams.
* The Air Force component is the Air Force Special Operations Command.
Air Force special operations forces include fixed and rotary wing
aviation squadrons, a combat aviation advisory squadron, special
tactics squadrons, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron.
Figure 2 shows the number of military personnel positions in fiscal
year 2007 authorized for DOD's special operations forces in the active
component and reserve component. The authorizations include positions
in special operations forces warfighter units, support units, and
headquarters units such as USSOCOM and its service component commands.
Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2007 Military Positions Authorized for Special
Operations Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve
Component:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Funding for the Marine Corps Special Operations Command:
Since fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have requested
baseline and supplemental funding for the Marine Corps special
operations command. In fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM
received $109.3 million in supplemental funds to establish the Marine
Corps special operations command. In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps
and USSOCOM received an additional $368.2 million in baseline funds for
the Command, and $32 million in supplemental funding. As shown in table
3, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have projected military construction,
operation and maintenance, and procurement funding for the Command for
fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
Table 3: Actual and Projected Funding for the Marine Corps Special
Operations Command, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013:
Dollars in millions.
Appropriation account: Military Construction;
Fiscal year 2006: $0;
Fiscal year 2007: $228.6;
Fiscal year 2008: $123.4;
Fiscal year 2009: $10.1;
Fiscal year 2010: $0;
Fiscal year 2011: $0;
Fiscal year 2012: $0;
Fiscal year 2013: $0.
Appropriation : Operation and Maintenance;
Fiscal year 2006: 0;
Fiscal year 2007: 65.6;
Fiscal year 2008: 100.4;
Fiscal year 2009: 110.6;
Fiscal year 2010: 74.5;
Fiscal year 2011: 69.9;
Fiscal year 2012: 72.3;
Fiscal year 2013: 75.8.
Appropriation account: Procurement;
Fiscal year 2006: 0;
Fiscal year 2007: 74.0;
Fiscal year 2008: 56.1;
Fiscal year 2009: 57.6;
Fiscal year 2010: 70.6;
Fiscal year 2011: 77.4;
Fiscal year 2012: 2.2;
Fiscal year 2013: 6.9.
Appropriation : Supplemental;
Fiscal year 2006: 109.3;
Fiscal year 2007: 32.0;
Fiscal year 2008: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2009: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2010: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2011: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2012: [Empty];
Fiscal year 2013: [Empty].
Total;
Fiscal year 2006: $109.3;
Fiscal year 2007: $400.2;
Fiscal year 2008: $279.9;
Fiscal year 2009: $178.3;
Fiscal year 2010: $145.1;
Fiscal year 2011: $147.3;
Fiscal year 2012: $74.5;
Fiscal year 2013: $82.7.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data as of February 13, 2007.
Note: Amounts include Marine Corps and USSOCOM funding for the Marine
Corps special operations command.
[End of table]
Although Some Progress Made in Establishing Marine Corps Special
Operations Command, Force Structure Needed to Perform Its Missions Has
Not Been Fully Identified:
Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special
operations command, the Command has not fully identified the force
structure needed to enable it to perform its assigned missions. The
Marine Corps has taken several steps to establish its special
operations command, such as activating the Command's headquarters,
establishing Marine Corps special operations forces units, and
deploying these units to conduct special operations missions; however,
DOD did not use critical practices of effective strategic planning when
developing the initial force structure plans for the Command. As a
result of limitations in the strategic planning process, the Marine
Corps special operations command has identified several force structure
challenges that will likely affect the Command's ability to perform its
full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise its force
structure to address these challenges.
Steps Taken to Establish Marine Corps Special Operations Command, but
Initial Force Structure Plans Were Not Developed Using Critical
Practices of Effective Strategic Planning:
The Marine Corps has taken several steps to establish the Marine Corps
special operations command. For example, the Marine Corps has activated
the headquarters of its special operations command, established some of
its special operations forces units--including 4 special operations
companies and 12 foreign military training teams to date--and deployed
these units to conduct special operations missions. However, the
initial force structure plans for the Command were not developed using
critical practices of effective strategic planning. According to
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and the
Marine Corps, the Secretary of Defense directed that the Marine Corps
establish a special operations command to meet the growing demand for
special operations forces in the war on terrorism. The Secretary of
Defense, with input from the Marine Corps, determined that 2,516
personnel was an appropriate size for the Command based on the
assumptions that the Command was to be staffed within the existing
Marine Corps end-strength, and the establishment of the Command could
not significantly affect the Marine Corps budget. Marine Corps planners
then based the composition and number of Marine Corps special
operations forces units on existing units within the service that had
trained to perform similar missions in the past. For example, Marine
Corps officials told us that the force structure plans for its special
operations companies were modeled after a Maritime Special Purpose
Force, which had previously trained to conduct some special operations
missions for conventional Marine Corps units.[Footnote 12]
Additionally, Marine Corps officials told us the initial force
structure plan to establish nine special operations companies was based
on the need to accommodate the deployment schedule of its Marine
Expeditionary Units. The initial force structure plan also included the
transfer of the Foreign Military Training Unit from the conventional
force to its special operations command. Using this existing force
structure, the Marine Corps planned to establish 24 foreign military
training teams under its special operations command.
DOD did not fully incorporate critical practices of effective strategic
planning when it developed these initial force structure plans for the
Marine Corps special operations command. We have previously reported
that strategic planning is important to ensure that an organization's
activities support its strategic goals. Effective planning principles,
such as those embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993[Footnote 13] and used by leading organizations, require federal
agencies to set strategic goals and develop strategic plans to
accomplish those goals. Our prior work has identified several critical
practices for effective strategic planning, including the alignment of
activities and resources to meet organizational missions and
stakeholder involvement. Our prior work has shown that leading
organizations recognize that an organization's activities, core
processes, and resources must be aligned to support its mission and
help it achieve its goals. Organizations should assess the extent to
which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their mission
and desired outcomes. In addition, successful organizations base their
strategic planning, to a large extent, on the interests and
expectations of their stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement is
important to help agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are
targeted at the highest priorities. Just as important, involving
stakeholders in strategic planning efforts can help create a basic
understanding among the stakeholders of the competing demands that
confront most agencies, the limited resources available to them, and
how those demands and resources require careful and continuous
balancing.[Footnote 14]
However, in our review of the planning process that preceded the
establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command, we found
the Command's activities and resources were not fully aligned with the
organization's mission. For example, although the alignment of
activities and resources to meet organizational missions, a critical
practice of effective strategic planning, should include an analysis of
the number of personnel required for an organization to accomplish its
missions, Marine Corps officials stated that the size of the Marine
Corps special operations command (2,516 personnel) was not determined
through an analysis of the Command's assigned missions. Specifically,
neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps
conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the number
of personnel needed to meet the Marine Corps special operations
command's mission requirements that directly tied the number of
personnel authorized for the Command with its assigned missions.
USSOCOM did not provide official mission guidance to the Marine Corps
until October 2006, almost 1 year after the Command's personnel
authorizations had been determined. In the absence of specific
guidance, Marine Corps planners did not conduct a comprehensive, data-
driven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to meet the
Marine Corps special operations command's full range of mission
requirements. Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data on
the number of employees required to meet an agency's needs are critical
because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency's ability to
perform its missions efficiently and effectively.[Footnote 15]
The alignment of activities and resources should also include an
analysis of the number and composition of Marine Corps special
operations forces units. However, the Marine Corps did not determine
the number and composition of its special operations forces units based
on specific guidance from USSOCOM. Although the Marine Corps special
operations command was established as the Marine Corps service
component under USSOCOM, USSOCOM did not provide guidance to Marine
Corps planners on the full range of missions assigned to the Command,
or on the number of special operations forces that the Marine Corps
needed to provide. Both USSOCOM and Marine Corps officials reported
that USSOCOM provided only informal guidance to Marine Corps planners
on the core tasks that would be assigned to Marine Corps special
operations forces units. According to Marine Corps officials involved
in the planning for the Marine Corps special operations command, the
informal guidance did not prioritize the core tasks to focus Marine
Corps planning efforts, and the guidance did not identify the required
capacity for specific capabilities within the Command.
The official guidance that USSOCOM provided to the Marine Corps special
operations command in October 2006 contained a complete list of
missions the Command would be expected to perform. However, the
guidance did not prioritize these missions to focus the Command's
planning efforts. Additionally, the guidance did not establish
milestones and benchmarks that the Command could use to determine when,
and to what level of proficiency, Marine Corps special operations
forces units should be able to perform all of their assigned missions.
In the absence of specific guidance, Marine Corps officials told us the
initial force structure plan to establish nine special operations
companies was not based on a USSOCOM requirement for the number of
these companies. Moreover, while the decision to transfer the foreign
military training teams to the Marine Corps special operations command
met the Command's mission to provide USSOCOM with a foreign internal
defense capability, the decision on the number of teams needed by the
Command to meet USSOCOM's mission requirements was left to the Marine
Corps. Marine Corps officials also told us that in the absence of clear
guidance on the required capacity for support personnel within the
Command, Marine Corps planners prioritized the assignment of personnel
in warfighter positions in special operations forces units over
positions in support units. Specifically, because planners were basing
the Command's force structure decisions on the personnel limit
established by DOD, the Marine Corps exchanged positions related to
support functions within the Command for positions in its warfighter
units. Support functions such as vehicle maintenance, motor
transportation, intelligence operations, communication support, and
engineering support provide important and necessary support to Marine
Corps special operations forces units, as well as other special
operations forces units in USSOCOM's other service components.
Furthermore, we found a lack of involvement by some key stakeholders in
the establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command. For
example, the special operations components with the department's
geographic combatant commands--which are responsible for commanding
special operations forces around the world--were not involved in the
process to establish the Marine Corps special operations command or in
the decisions to target the service's resources to their highest
priorities and mission requirements. Officials with the U.S. Pacific
Command's special operations command who are responsible for functions
such as operations and planning told us they provided little input into
the planning process to help determine how Marine Corps special
operations forces units should be organized and what capabilities were
needed in these units to meet the mission requirements of the
geographic combatant commands. Similarly, officials from the U.S.
Central Command's special operations command who were responsible for
operations and planning in that command told us they were not included
in the planning process that preceded the establishment of the Marine
Corps special operations command. In particular, officials told us they
were not involved in the decisions regarding the types of missions that
Marine Corps special operations forces units would need to perform,
although as we noted in our July 2006 report on special operations
forces deployment trends, 85 percent of all fiscal year 2005 special
operations forces deployments were to the U.S. Central Command's area
of responsibility.[Footnote 16]
Limitations in Strategic Planning Process Led to Force Structure
Challenges, although Plans Are Being Revised to Address These
Challenges:
The Marine Corps special operations command has identified several
force structure challenges that stem from limitations in DOD's
strategic planning process that will likely affect its ability to
perform its full range of responsibilities, and the Command is revising
its force structure plans to address these challenges. For example, the
Command has determined that the number and composition of its special
operations forces units are not aligned with the Command's mission
requirements. In particular, the Command has identified shortages in
positions such as authorized intelligence personnel, which will affect
the Command's ability to simultaneously provide intelligence support to
Marine Corps special operations forces and USSOCOM. Moreover, according
to Marine Corps special operations command officials, the limited
number of personnel available to perform support functions will prevent
the Command from effectively performing all of its mission
requirements. To illustrate this point, Marine Corps special operations
command officials told us that the initial force structure plans for
the Command call for less than one support person available for every
person assigned to a warfighter position. According to Command
officials, this ratio is less than what would be expected for a command
of similar size and assigned missions. Officials said an expected ratio
for a command such as theirs would be at least two support personnel to
one warfighter, and therefore their goal is to adjust the force
structure to meet this ratio.
In addition, Marine Corps special operations command officials reported
that the number of positions authorized for support personnel will also
affect the Command's ability to meet its responsibilities to organize,
train, and equip Marine Corps special operations forces. Officials
stated the number of personnel assigned to its command elements, such
as the headquarters and the staffs of the subordinate units, is
insufficient to effectively accomplish these responsibilities. Current
force structure plans authorize approximately 780 military personnel
and 33 civilian personnel for the Command's headquarters and the staffs
of its major subordinate units.
At the time of our work, the Marine Corps special operations command
was developing several proposals to significantly revise its force
structure to address the challenges stemming from the limitations in
the planning process and to better align the Command to meet USSOCOM's
mission guidance. These revisions would adjust the number and size of
the Command's warfighter units to better meet mission requirements.
Additionally, if approved, some of the positions made available through
the revisions could be used to remedy shortfalls in personnel who
perform support functions such as personnel management, training,
logistics, intelligence, and budget-related activities. Command
officials told us these proposals would likely mitigate many of the
challenges that have resulted from the lack of a comprehensive
strategic planning process, but they acknowledged that many of the
decisions that are needed to implement the force structure changes will
be made by Headquarters, Marine Corps. In order to move forward with
its proposals, the Command is working to complete several analyses of
the personnel and funding requirements that are tied to these proposed
force structure changes. It has set milestones for when these analyses
should be completed in order to determine whether any additional
funding or personnel would be required. However, the Command expects to
be able to implement these proposals within the funding levels already
identified and planned for future fiscal years. Until the analyses are
completed, the Command will be unable to determine whether the approved
plans for its personnel and funding should be adjusted in order for the
Command to perform all of its assigned missions.
Although Preliminary Steps Have Been Taken, the Marine Corps Has Not
Developed a Strategic Human Capital Approach to Manage the Critical
Skills And Competencies Required of Personnel in Its Special Operations
Command:
Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not
developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical
skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations
command. While the Marine Corps special operations command has
identified some skills that are needed to perform special operations
missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the critical
skills and incremental training required of personnel in its special
operations forces units. Such analyses are critical to the Marine
Corps' efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the
management of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without
the benefit of these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an
interim policy to assign some personnel to special operations forces
units for extended tour lengths to account for the additional training
and skills needed by these personnel. However, this interim policy is
inconsistent with the Marine Corps special operations command's goal
for the permanent assignment of some personnel within the special
operations community.
While Some Personnel Requirements Have Been Identified, Marine Corps
Special Operations Command Has Not Fully Identified the Critical Skills
and Competencies Required of Its Personnel:
While the Marine Corps special operations command has identified some
critical skills and competencies that are needed to perform special
operations missions, it has not fully identified these requirements
because it has not yet conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine
all the critical skills and additional training required of personnel
in its units. We have previously reported that strategic human capital
planning is essential to federal agencies' efforts to transform their
organizations to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Generally,
strategic human capital planning addresses two needs: (1) aligning an
agency's human capital program with its current and emerging mission
and programmatic goals, and (2) developing long-term strategies for
acquiring, developing, motivating, and retaining staff to achieve
programmatic goals. Our prior work has shown that the analysis of
critical skill and competency gaps between current and future workforce
needs is an important step in strategic human capital
planning.[Footnote 17] We have also reported that it is essential that
long-term strategies include implementation goals and timelines to
demonstrate that progress is being made.
As part of the effort to identify these critical skills, the Marine
Special Operations School is developing a training course that will
provide baseline training to newly assigned personnel to prepare them
for positions in warfighter units. For example, the Command plans to
provide these personnel with training on advanced survival skills and
foreign language in order to prepare them to perform special operations
missions. However, the Marine Corps special operations command has not
fully identified and documented the critical skills and training that
are required for personnel to effectively perform special operations
missions, and that build on the skills that are developed in
conventional Marine Corps units. Officials told us the Command had not
yet identified the full range of training that will be provided in this
course in order to establish a minimum level of special operations
skills for the Command's warfighters. Additionally, the Marine Corps
special operations command has not fully identified the advanced skills
and training necessary to support some of the Command's more complex
special operations missions, such as counterterrorism, information
operations, and unconventional warfare. While the Marine Corps special
operations command has established a time frame for when it wants to
conduct the training course under development, it has not set
milestones for when it will complete its analysis of the critical
skills and competencies required of its personnel.
Moreover, the Marine Corps special operations command has not yet fully
determined which positions should be filled by specially trained
personnel who are strategically managed to meet the Command's missions.
Officials told us there is broad agreement within the Command that
personnel assigned to operational positions in its warfighter units
require specialized training in critical skills needed to perform
special operations missions, and should therefore be strategically
managed to meet the Command's mission requirements. These personnel
include enlisted reconnaissance and communications Marines assigned to
the Marine Special Operations Battalions and infantry Marines assigned
to the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group, as well as some
officers assigned to these units. At the time of our review, however,
we found that the Command had not yet determined which additional
positions should also be filled by personnel who are strategically
managed. In particular, we were told by officials from the Command's
headquarters that a determination has not yet been made as to whether
personnel who deploy with warfighter units to provide critical combat
support, such as intelligence personnel, require specialized skills and
training that are incremental to the training provided in conventional
force units. For example, officials have not yet decided whether
intelligence personnel should attend the initial training course that
is under development. However, the Marine Special Operations School
plans to provide these personnel with specialized intelligence training
to enable them to support certain sensitive special operations missions
in support of deploying units. Officials acknowledge that until the
Command determines the extent to which support personnel require
specialized skills and training to perform their missions, the Command
cannot fully identify which positions should be filled by personnel who
are strategically managed.
Marine Corps Has Developed an Interim Policy to Manage Personnel in Its
Special Operations Command, but It Lacks Consensus on a Strategic Human
Capital Approach:
To address the personnel needs of the Marine Corps special operations
command, Headquarters, Marine Corps, has established an interim policy
that provides for extended assignments of some personnel in special
operations forces units; however, the absence of a comprehensive
analysis of the critical skills and training required of personnel in
special operations forces units has contributed to a lack of consensus
within the Marine Corps on a strategic human capital approach to manage
these personnel. The extended assignments apply to Marines who are
beyond their first term of enlistment, which is typically 3 to 5 years,
and who are assigned to one of the Marine Corps special operations
command's warfighter, training, or intelligence units. The policy
directs that these personnel will be assigned to the Command for 48
months, in part, to account for the additional training provided to
personnel in these units. According to officials at Headquarters,
Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps special operations command, the 48-
month assignment policy is designed to retain designated personnel
within special operations forces units long enough to complete at least
two deployments. All other Marines will be assigned to the Command for
approximately 36 months, which is a typical tour length for Marines in
conventional force units.
The interim policy also addresses a concern that personnel assigned to
special operations forces units will have opportunities for career
progression. In general, Marines are managed according to established
career progression models for their respective career fields. These
career progression models identify the experiences, skills, and
professional military education necessary for personnel to be
competitive for promotion to the next grade. For example, as personnel
are promoted to a higher grade, they are typically placed in positions
with increased responsibilities that are consistent with their career
progression models in order to remain competitive for further
promotion. The Marine Corps has not established a separate career field
for special operations forces personnel; instead, the Marine Corps is
assigning personnel from a variety of career fields, such as
reconnaissance, to its special operations forces units. However, the
current structure of the Marine Corps special operations command cannot
support long-term assignments of personnel within the Command, in some
cases, due to limited opportunities for progression into positions with
increased responsibilities. For example, our analysis of the Marine
Corps special operations command's force structure shows that the
Command is authorized 76 percent fewer reconnaissance positions for
personnel in the grade of E-7 as compared to the number of
reconnaissance positions for personnel in the grade of E-6. The Marine
Corps has established targets for the promotion of reconnaissance
personnel to the grade of E-7 after they have spent approximately 5
years in the grade of E-6. As a result, many reconnaissance personnel
who are promoted to E-7 while assigned to a special operations forces
unit will need to be reassigned to the conventional force in order to
move into an E-7 position and remain competitive for further promotion.
The interim policy is also consistent with the approved plan to
increase the authorized end-strength of the Marine Corps. In January
2007, the President approved plans to increase the active duty end-
strength of the Marine Corps from 179,000 in fiscal year 2006 to
202,000 by fiscal year 2011. This plan includes growth in the number
and size of conventional force units and is intended to reduce the
stress on frequently deployed units, such as intelligence units, by
achieving a 1 to 2 deployment to home station ratio for these units.
Marine Corps officials associated with units that will be affected by
these increases, such as reconnaissance and intelligence units, told us
that the rotation of personnel from Marine Corps special operations
units back into the conventional force is important to help ensure that
conventional force units are staffed with experienced and mature
personnel. For example, our analysis of Marine Corps data shows that by
fiscal year 2009, the Marine Corps will increase the servicewide
requirement for enlisted counterintelligence/human intelligence
personnel by 50 percent above fiscal year 2006 levels. Although the
Marine Corps is adjusting its accession, training, and retention
strategies to meet the increased requirement for enlisted
counterintelligence/human intelligence personnel, officials stated the
rotation of these experienced personnel from the Marine Corps special
operations command back into the conventional force can help meet the
increased personnel needs of conventional intelligence units, while
also ensuring that conventional force units have an understanding of
special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures. Additionally,
officials told us the rotation of personnel from special operations
forces units to conventional force units supports the Marine Corps'
process for prioritizing the assignment of personnel to units that are
preparing for deployments to Iraq and other war on terrorism
requirements.
Notwithstanding the intended outcome of the interim policy, Marine
Corps special operations command officials told us that the policy
might impact the Command's ability to prepare its forces to conduct the
full range of its assigned missions and that the policy is inconsistent
with the Command's stated goal for the permanent assignment of
personnel in its special operations forces units. In congressional
testimony, the Commander of the Marine Corps special operations command
specified his goal to develop a personnel management strategy that
would retain some personnel within the special operations community for
the duration of their careers. Officials from the Command told us that
a substantial investment of time and resources is required to train
personnel in special operations forces units on the critical skills
needed to perform special operations missions. For example, Marine
Corps special operations forces personnel will receive in-depth
training to develop foreign language proficiency and cultural
awareness, which is consistent with DOD's requirement to increase the
capacity of special operations forces to perform more demanding and
specialized tasks during long-duration, indirect, and clandestine
operations in politically sensitive environments.[Footnote 18] However,
these officials believe that the Command's ability to develop and
sustain these skills over time will be hampered if its special
operations forces units experience high personnel turnover. In
addition, according to USSOCOM doctrine, personnel must be assigned to
a special operations forces unit for at least 4 years in order to be
fully trained in some advanced special operations skills. Consequently,
officials from the Command have determined that limited duration
assignments would challenge the Command's ability to develop the
capability to conduct more complex special operations core tasks, and
to retain fully trained personnel long enough to use their skills
during deployments. The Marine Corps special operations command has
determined that to achieve its goal of permanent personnel assignments
within the special operations community, it requires a separate career
field for its warfighter personnel. According to officials from the
Command, a separate career field would allow the Marine Corps to manage
these personnel based on a career progression model that reflects the
experiences, skills, and professional military education that are
relevant to special operations missions. Moreover, according to
officials from the Command, the establishment of a special operations
forces career field would allow the Marine Corps to develop and sustain
a population of trained and qualified personnel, while providing the
Command and USSOCOM with a more appropriate return on the investment in
training personnel to perform special operations missions.
The Command's goal for the permanent assignment of some special
operations forces personnel is also consistent with USSOCOM's current
and projected needs for special operations forces personnel. USSOCOM
has identified the retention of experienced personnel who possess
specialized skills and training as a key component in its strategy to
support the war on terrorism. In its vision of how special operations
forces will meet long-term national strategic and military
objectives,[Footnote 19] USSOCOM has identified the need for a
comprehensive special operations forces career management system to
facilitate the progression of these personnel through increasing levels
of responsibility within the special operations community. In addition,
senior USSOCOM officials have expressed support for an assignment
policy that allows Marine Corps personnel to remain within the special
operations community for the duration of their careers.
Headquarters, Marine Corps, plans to review its interim policy for
assigning personnel to its special operations command annually to
determine whether it meets the mission requirements of the Command.
Additionally, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently directed
Headquarters, Marine Corps, to study the assignment policies for
personnel in certain Army special operations forces units who rotate
between conventional Army units and special operations forces units.
According to a Headquarters, Marine Corps, official, one purpose of
this study is to evaluate whether a similar management strategy may be
applied to personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces units.
Notwithstanding these efforts, officials with Headquarters, Marine
Corps, and the Marine Corps special operations command acknowledge that
the analysis of the critical skills and training required of personnel
in the Command's special operations forces units is a necessary step in
the development of a strategic human capital approach to the management
of these personnel. Until the Marine Corps special operations command
completes a comprehensive analysis to identify and document the
critical skills and additional training needed by its future workforce
to perform the Command's full range of assigned special operations
missions, the Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing
or evaluating alternative strategic human capital approaches for the
management of personnel assigned to its special operations forces
units.
USSOCOM Does Not Have a Sound Basis for Determining Whether Marine
Corps Special Operations Forces Training Programs Prepare Units for
Missions:
USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether Marine
Corps special operations forces training programs are preparing units
for their missions because it has not established common training
standards for many special operations skills and it has not formally
evaluated whether these programs will prepare units to be fully
interoperable with DOD's other special operations forces. The Marine
Corps special operations command has provided training for its forces
that is based on training that was provided to conventional units that
were assigned some special operations missions prior to the activation
of the Command, and by selectively incorporating the training that
USSOCOM's other service components provide to their forces. However,
USSOCOM has not formally validated that the training used to prepare
Marine Corps special operations forces meets special operations
standards and is effective in training Marine Corps special operations
forces to be fully interoperable with the department's other special
operations forces.
Marine Corps Special Operations Command Has Implemented Programs to
Train Personnel to Perform Special Operations Missions:
The Marine Corps special operations command has taken several actions
to implement programs to fulfill its responsibility for training
personnel to perform special operations missions. For example, the
Command operates the Marine Special Operations School, which has
recently finalized plans for a training pipeline to initially screen
all of the Marines and Sailors identified for assignment to the Command
to determine their suitability for such assignments. Once the initial
screening is completed, personnel who volunteer for assignments in one
of the Command's warfighter units--such as the Marine Special
Operations Battalions and the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group-
-will undergo an additional assessment that measures mental and
physical qualifications. As indicated by the Command's plans, personnel
who successfully complete this assessment will be provided with
additional baseline special operations training prior to being assigned
to one of the Command's warfighter units.[Footnote 20]
The Marine Special Operations School also provides training to
personnel in special operations companies. This training consists of
both classroom instruction and the practical application of specialized
skills. For example, the school has provided training to personnel in
skills such as precision shooting, close quarters battle, and special
reconnaissance techniques. In addition, the school's instructors
conduct exercises to train the special operations companies on the
unit's tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as predeployment
training events, to certify the companies are capable of performing the
primary special operations missions assigned to these units.[Footnote
21]
The Command's Marine Special Operations Advisor Group has also
developed a comprehensive training program designed to build the
individual and collective skills required to perform the unit's mission
to provide military training and advisor support to foreign forces. The
program includes individual training for skills such as light infantry
tactics and cultural and language training, as well as training for
advanced skills in functional areas such as communications,
intelligence, and medical training. The training program culminates
with a capstone training event that evaluates the proficiency of
personnel in mission-essential skills. The training event is used as a
means of certifying that these units are trained to perform their
assigned missions.
In addition, Marine Corps special operations companies and Marine
Special Operations Advisor Group teams conduct unit training to prepare
for the missions that will be performed during deployments. According
to officials with these units, this training is tailored to prepare
personnel for the specific tasks that will likely be performed during
the deployment. For example, officials stated that unit training may
include enhanced language and cultural awareness training for specific
countries and training in environmental terrains where these units will
be deployed.
Marine Corps special operations forces have used conventional Marine
Corps training standards to prepare personnel and units to conduct some
special operations missions. Officials with the Marine Corps special
operations command and its subordinate units told us that its special
operations forces units have trained personnel in some skills based on
the training programs for conventional units that were assigned some
special operations missions prior to the activation of the Command. For
example, according to Marine Corps policy, the service formerly
deployed specially organized, trained, and equipped forces as part of
the Marine Expeditionary Units that were capable of conducting some
special operations missions, such as direct action operations.[Footnote
22] Officials with the Marine Corps special operations command and the
Marine Corps Special Operations Battalions told us that the special
operations companies have been provided with training for skills such
as urban sniper, specialized demolitions, and dynamic assault that is
based largely on the training and standards for these skills that were
established for conventional Marine Corps forces.
For other skills, Marine Corps special operations forces personnel have
reviewed and incorporated the training plans that USSOCOM's Army, Navy,
and Air Force service components use to prepare their special
operations forces. Marine Corps special operations command officials
told us that conventional Marine Corps units are not typically trained
in many of the advanced skills required to perform some special
operations missions, such as counterterrorism and unconventional
warfare. To develop programs to train personnel on the skills required
to perform these and other special operations missions, Marine Corps
special operations forces have incorporated the training and standards
from the training publications of the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Air Force Special
Operations Command. However, according to a senior USSOCOM official,
Marine Corps special operations forces have had the discretion to
select the standards to use when training forces to perform special
operations skills.
During our review, we met with servicemembers who had recently
completed deployments with Marine Corps special operations forces units
as well as with servicemembers who were preparing for planned
deployments. In general, these servicemembers told us that they
believed they were adequately trained and prepared to perform their
assigned missions. Team leaders with the Marine Special Operations
Advisor Group, for example, stated that they received sufficient
guidance to properly plan and execute special operations missions
during deployments to train and advise foreign military forces.
However, at the time of our work, the Marine Corps special operations
companies that participated in the first deployments of these units had
not yet completed their deployments. As a result, we were unable to
discuss whether the training that was provided was adequate to fully
meet their mission requirements.
USSOCOM Has Not Formally Validated That Marine Corps Training Meets
Special Operations Forces Standards and Prepares Forces to Be Fully
Interoperable with Other Forces:
USSOCOM has not formally validated that the training used to prepare
Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards and prepares
forces to be fully interoperable with the department's other special
operations forces. The Marine Corps special operations command has made
progress in developing and implementing training programs for Marine
Corps special operations forces. However, the Command has not used
common training standards for special operations skills because USSOCOM
has not developed common training standards for many skills, although
work to establish common standards is ongoing. USSOCOM officials stated
the headquarters and the service components are working to develop
common training standards, where appropriate, because USSOCOM
recognizes that the service-specific training conducted for advanced
special operations skills may not optimize opportunities for
commonality, jointness, or efficiency. In addition, USSOCOM officials
told us that common training standards would further promote
departmentwide interoperability goals, address potential safety
concerns, and provide greater assurances to future joint force
commanders that special operations forces are trained to similar
standards.
Our prior work has shown that the lack of commonality in training
standards for joint operations creates potentially hazardous conditions
on the battlefield. For example, we reported in 2003 that the military
services and the special operations community did not use common
standards to train personnel to control air support of ground forces.
In particular, we found that the standards for these personnel in
special operations units differed among the Army, Navy, and Air Force
because personnel were required to meet their service-specific training
requirements, which led to hesitation by commanders in Afghanistan to
employ some special operations forces personnel to direct air support
of ground forces.[Footnote 23] In 2005, USSOCOM established minimum
standards for training, qualifying, evaluating, and certifying special
operations forces personnel who control air support of ground forces.
USSOCOM formalized a process in 2006 to establish and validate common
training standards for special operations skills. As part of this
process, USSOCOM established a working group comprised of
representatives from USSOCOM and each service component to determine
the baseline tasks that define the training standard and the service
component training requirements for special operations skills.
According to a USSOCOM official, the working group first identified the
common training requirements and standards for the skills of military
free fall and combat dive. In addition, USSOCOM and its service
components are working incrementally to identify common training
standards for other special operations skills, such as the training
required for personnel assigned to combined joint special operations
task forces.[Footnote 24] However, officials with USSOCOM and the
Marine Corps special operations command told us the process to
establish common training standards for applicable special operations
skills will likely take a considerable amount of time to complete due
to the number of advanced special operations skills and the challenge
of building consensus among the service components on what constitutes
a common training standard.
Furthermore, USSOCOM has not formally validated whether the training
used to prepare Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards
and prepares forces to be fully interoperable with the department's
other special operations forces. USSOCOM has taken some limited steps
to evaluate the training provided to Marine Corps special operations
forces. In November 2006, for example, USSOCOM representatives attended
a training exercise on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton for a Marine
special operations company that was preparing for an upcoming
deployment. In addition, USSOCOM representatives observed training
exercises in February 2007 for Marine Special Operations Advisor Group
teams that were preparing to deploy. A USSOCOM official told us that
the purpose of these evaluations was to observe some of the planned
training tasks and focus on areas where USSOCOM could assist the Marine
Corps special operations command in future training exercises. However,
USSOCOM has not formally assessed the training programs used by the
Marine Corps special operations command to prepare its forces for
deployments, despite the fact that USSOCOM is responsible for
evaluating the effectiveness of all training programs and ensuring the
interoperability of all of DOD's special operations forces. Our review
of the reports prepared for USSOCOM leadership and provided to Marine
Corps personnel showed that they did not contain a formal evaluation of
the training content and they did not provide an assessment of the
standards used during the training to determine whether the training
was in accordance with special operations forces standards.
Officials with the Marine Corps special operations command and its
subordinate units told us that USSOCOM has not been extensively
involved in the development of Marine Corps special operations forces
training programs and the performance standards used to train Marine
Corps special operations forces. In addition, USSOCOM officials told us
that a formal assessment of Marine Corps training programs has not
occurred, and will likely not occur, because the management of the
Marine Corps special operations command's training programs is, like
the other service components, a responsibility delegated to the Marine
Corps component commander. These officials told us the service
component commander has the primary responsibility for establishing
training programs and certifying that special operations forces are
capable of performing special operations missions prior to deployments.
In addition, a USSOCOM official stated that any training-related issues
affecting the readiness of special operations forces are identified in
readiness reports and are discussed during monthly meetings between
senior USSOCOM leadership and the service component commanders.
However, without common training standards for special operations
skills or a formal validation of the training used to prepare Marine
Corps special operations forces for planned deployments in the near
term, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate the needed assurances to the
geographic combatant commanders that Marine Corps special operations
forces are trained to special operations forces standards and that
these forces meet departmentwide interoperability goals for special
operations forces, thereby potentially affecting the success of future
joint operations.
Conclusions:
Since activating a Marine Corps component to USSOCOM, the Marine Corps
has made considerable progress integrating into the special operations
force structure, and several Marine Corps units have successfully
completed deployments to train foreign military forces--a key focus
area in DOD's strategy for the war on terrorism. The Marine Corps has
also taken an initial step to meet the unique personnel needs of its
special operations command. However, it does not have complete
information on all of the critical skills and additional training
required of its personnel in special operations forces units. This
information would enable the Marine Corps to assess the effectiveness
of its human capital planning to date and build consensus on the
development of alternative approaches for the management of its
personnel assigned to special operations forces units. Until the Marine
Corps develops a strategic human capital approach that is based on an
analysis of the critical skills and training required of personnel in
Marine Corps special operations forces units, it may be unable to align
its personnel with the Marine Corps special operations command's actual
workforce requirements, which could jeopardize the long-term success of
this new Command.
The Marine Corps special operations command faces an additional
challenge in training its forces to special operations forces standards
and meeting DOD interoperability goals because USSOCOM has not yet
established common training standards for many advanced skills. In the
absence of common training standards, the Marine Corps special
operations command is training its newly established special operations
forces units in some skills that were not previously trained in
conventional Marine Corps units. Unless USSOCOM validates that the
training currently being used to prepare Marine Corps special
operations forces is effective and meets DOD's interoperability goals,
it will be unable to ensure that Marine Corps special operations forces
are interoperable with other special operations forces in the
department, thereby potentially affecting the success of future joint
operations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To facilitate the development of a strategic human capital approach for
the management of personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special
operations command and to validate that Marine Corps special operations
forces are trained to be fully interoperable with DOD's other special
operations forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following two actions.
* Direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander,
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, to conduct an analysis
of the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in Marine
Corps special operations forces units and establish milestones for
conducting this analysis. This analysis should be used to assess the
effectiveness of current assignment policies and to develop a strategic
human capital approach for the management of these personnel.
* Direct the Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for
evaluating Marine Corps special operations forces training programs,
including their content and standards, to ensure the programs are
sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully interoperable
with DOD's other special operations forces.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with our recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the
recommendations are underway. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix
II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into
the report as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander, Marine Corps
Forces Special Operations Command, to establish milestones for
conducting an analysis of the critical skills and competencies required
in Marine Corps special operations forces units and, once completed,
use this analysis to assess the effectiveness of current assignment
policies and develop a strategic human capital approach for the
management of these personnel. DOD stated that the Marine Corps special
operations command is currently conducting a detailed analysis of the
critical skills and competencies required to conduct the missions
assigned to the Command. The department further noted that the Command
will also fully develop mission-essential task lists, and individual
and collective training standards in order to clearly state the
requirements for training and personnel. DOD also stated that USSOCOM
is providing assistance so that these processes are integrated with
USSOCOM's development of the Joint Training System, which is mandated
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We believe these are
important steps if fully implemented. We note, however, DOD's response
does not address the issue of milestones and gives no indication when
the ongoing analysis will be completed. We believe milestones are
important because they serve as a means of holding people accountable.
Furthermore, DOD did not address the need for the Marine Corps to use
the analysis being conducted by the Command to assess the effectiveness
of the current assignment policy. Without such an assessment, neither
the Marine Corps nor DOD will have needed assurances that the current
Marine Corps policy for assigning personnel to its special operations
command is providing DOD with an appropriate return on the investment
the department is making to train Marine Corps special operations
forces personnel. Moreover, without a strategic human capital approach
that is based on the comprehensive analysis of the critical skills and
training required of its special operations forces personnel, the
Marine Corps may be unable to effectively align its personnel with the
Marine Corps special operations command's workforce requirements.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the
Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for evaluating Marine
Corps special operations forces training programs to ensure the
programs are sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully
interoperable with DOD's other special operations forces. DOD stated
that USSOCOM is currently implementing the Joint Training System that
is mandated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3500.01D. According to DOD, the Joint Training System will provide the
framework for USSOCOM to evaluate component training programs to ensure
special operations forces operational capabilities are achieved. DOD
also stated that Headquarters, USSOCOM, established the Training
Standards and Requirements Integrated Process Team to complement the
Joint Training System, which is focusing on standardizing training for
individual skills across USSOCOM, and ensuring increased efficiency and
interoperability. DOD stated that USSOCOM delegates many authorities to
its service component commanders, including training their service-
provided forces. DOD further stated that the Marine Corps special
operations command has established the Marine Corps Special Operations
School, which is tasked with evaluating all unit training programs to
assess their combat capability and interoperability with special
operations forces. While we agree that implementing the Joint Training
System and standardizing training through the integrated process team
will help ensure the interoperability of Marine Corps special
operations forces, according to USSOCOM officials, these efforts will
likely take several years to complete. We continue to believe that in
the near term, USSOCOM needs to evaluate the Marine Corps special
operations forces training programs that are currently being conducted.
While the Marine Corps has trained its conventional forces in skills
related to the special operations forces' core tasks of direct action
and special reconnaissance, it has not traditionally trained its forces
in other special operations forces core tasks, such as unconventional
warfare. For this reason, it is incumbent on USSOCOM to validate the
ongoing training to ensure these new Marine Corps special operations
forces units are adequately prepared to perform all of their assigned
missions and are interoperable with DOD's other special operations
forces.
We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the
Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We will also make
copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition,
this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staffs have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or
pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations
command (Command) has identified the force structure needed to perform
its mission, we identified and reviewed Department of Defense (DOD)
reports related to the department's efforts to increase the size of
special operations forces by integrating Marine Corps forces into the
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These documents included the
2002 Special Operations Forces Realignment Study, the 2006 Operational
Availability Study, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the
2006 Unified Command Plan. We analyzed available internal DOD
documentation such as briefings, guidance, and memoranda that
identified DOD's plans and time frames for establishing the Marine
Corps special operations command. We discussed with officials at DOD
organizations the processes that DOD utilized to determine and
implement the plans for the new Command. These organizations include,
but are not limited to, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict; the Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate; Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations; Marine Corps
Combat Development Command; and Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve
Affairs. We also interviewed officials with USSOCOM and the special
operations components of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific
Command to determine the role of these commands in the decision-making
processes. We reviewed prior GAO reports and the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993[Footnote 25] that discuss key elements of
effective strategic planning. We interviewed officials from the Marine
Corps special operations command to determine the status of the
Command's efforts to activate Marine Corps special operations forces
units and discussed the challenges the Command has identified that may
affect the Command's ability to meet its full range of
responsibilities. We analyzed documents that describe the Marine Corps
special operations command's proposals to readjust its force structure
to overcome its identified challenges. We discussed the status of these
proposals with officials from the Marine Corps special operations
command and Headquarters, Marine Corps. However, at the time of our
review, the Marine Corps special operations command had not finalized
decisions on proposed changes to its force structure and concepts of
employment for its special operations forces units. As a result, we
were unable to assess the extent to which any proposed changes to the
Command's force structure would mitigate identified challenges and
specified personnel shortfalls.
To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps has determined a
strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills and
competencies required of personnel in its special operations command,
we examined relevant Marine Corps policies for assigning personnel to
conventional force units and the service's interim policy for assigning
personnel to special operations forces units. We interviewed officials
from the Marine Corps special operations command and Headquarters,
Marine Corps, to discuss the service's career progression models for
personnel assigned to Marine Corps special operations forces units. We
also reviewed DOD plans to increase the active duty end-strength of the
Marine Corps, and interviewed officials from Headquarters, Marine
Corps, to discuss the service's strategy to meet the personnel needs of
its special operations forces units and its conventional force units.
We analyzed the Marine Corps special operations command's planned force
structure and interviewed officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps,
and the Marine Corps special operations command to determine the
challenges the Marine Corps may face in developing a long-term plan to
assign personnel to its special operations forces units. To better
understand the unique personnel needs of the Marine Corps special
operations command, we interviewed officials from the Command to
discuss the specialized skills and training that are required by
personnel who are assigned to special operations forces units to
perform the Command's assigned missions. We reviewed available
documentation on the current and proposed training plans that identify
the critical skills and training that will be provided to Marine Corps
special operations forces personnel, and we interviewed officials with
the Command to discuss the status of their efforts to fully identify
all special operations critical skills and training requirements. We
reviewed congressional testimony by the Commander of the Marine Corps
special operations command[Footnote 26] and relevant Command planning
documents to identify the Marine Corps special operations command's
goal for a human capital plan that supports its assigned missions. We
examined USSOCOM annual reports and strategic planning documents
relevant to the Marine Corps special operations command, and
interviewed USSOCOM officials to discuss the management of special
operations forces personnel. We also reviewed our past reports that
discuss effective strategies for workforce planning.
To assess the extent to which USSOCOM has determined whether Marine
Corps special operations training programs are preparing these forces
for assigned missions, we examined relevant laws and DOD doctrine
related to the responsibilities of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM for
training special operations forces personnel. We analyzed Marine Corps
special operations command and USSOCOM training guidance for special
operations forces. We examined USSOCOM documents related to the
processes in place to establish common training standards for advanced
special operations skills, and interviewed officials to discuss the
status of USSOCOM's efforts to establish common training standards for
special operations skills. We examined available documents that detail
training programs for Marine Corps special operations forces. We
interviewed officials from the Marine Corps special operations command
and USSOCOM to discuss the processes used to identify and select
training standards for special operations skills. We collected and
analyzed documents related to USSOCOM's evaluations of Marine Corps
special operations forces training, and we discussed the efforts that
have been taken by the Marine Corps special operations command and
USSOCOM to assess the effectiveness of these training programs. We
conducted our work from August 2006 through July 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Using our
assessment of data reliability, we concluded that the data used to
support this review were sufficiently reliable to answer our
objectives. We interviewed the source of these data to determine how
data accuracy was ensured, and we discussed their data collection
methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control
measures.
We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following
locations:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict:
* Joint Staff:
* Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J8:
* U.S. Marine Corps:
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Combat Development Command):
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Installations and Logistics
Department):
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Intelligence Department):
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Manpower and Reserve Affairs):
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Plans, Policies, and Operations):
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Programs and Resources):
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Training and Education Command):
* Marine Corps Forces Command, Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia:
* Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii:
* I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California:
* II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina:
* III Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan:
* Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command:
* Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command Headquarters:
* 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion:
* 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion:
* Marine Special Operations Advisor Group:
* Marine Special Operations Support Group:
* Marine Special Operations School:
* U.S. Special Operations Command:
* U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Command Support:
* U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Special Operations:
* U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Special Operations
Knowledge and Futures:
* Theater Special Operations Commands:
* Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command:
* Special Operations Command, U.S. Pacific Command:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
Special Operations/:
Low-Intensity Conflict:
August 13, 2007
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-07-1030, "Special Operations Forces: Management Actions are
Needed to Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces into the U.S.
Special Operations Command," dated July 13, 2007 (GAO Code 350908).
The Department generally concurs with the recommendations, noting that
actions consistent with the recommendations are underway. DoD
appreciates the work that has gone into GAO's comprehensive assessment.
Your objective analysis will enhance the progression of U.S. Marine
Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to full operational
capability by the end of fiscal year 2008. MARSOC is an evolving
command, engaged in wartime Special Operations missions while
continuing to build the processes and institutions needed to fully
integrate into the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).
Sincerely,
Signed By:
Dr. Kalev I. Sepp:
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations Capabilities:
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 13, 2007:
GAO Code 350908/GAO-07-1030:
"Special Operations Forces: Management Actions Are Needed To Effectively
Integrate Marine Corps Forces Into The U.S. Special Operations
Command":
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander,
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, to conduct an analysis
of the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in Marine
Corps special operations forces units and establish milestones for
conducting this analysis. This analysis should be used to assess the
effectiveness of current assignment policies and to develop a strategic
human capital approach for the management of these personnel.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations
Command (MARSOC) is currently conducting a detailed analysis of
critical skills and competencies required to conduct their assigned
missions. MARSOC will fully develop Mission Essential Task lists
(METLs), Collective Training Standards, and Individual Training
Standards in order to clearly state requirements for training and
personnel. Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), in
an effort to facilitate this process, has placed a Joint Training
System (ITS) Specialist at Headquarters, MARSOC to implement this
program in an integrated fashion with USSOCOM's evolution of the ITS,
as mandated by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJSC)
3500.O1D.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command to establish a
framework for evaluating Marine Corps special operations forces
training programs, including their content and standards, to ensure the
programs are sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully
interoperable with DoD's other special operations forces.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) is currently implementing the CJCSI 3500.01D-mandated
Joint Training System (JTS). The JTS provides the framework for USSOCOM
to evaluate component training programs and ensure Special Operations
Force (SOF) operational capabilities are achieved. Additionally, HQ
USSOCOM established a Training Standards and Requirements Integrated
Process Team (IPT) in 2006 (as referenced in the GAO report) to
complement the ITS. The IPT focuses on individual skills to standardize
how skill sets are trained across the command, ensuring increased
efficiency and interoperability. HQ USSOCOM delegates many Title 10
authorities to component commanders, to include tasks of manning,
organizing, and training their Service-provided forces. MARSOC has
quickly established units and systems, to include the Marine Special
Operations School (MSOS) to meet Title 10 functions. MSOS has been
tasked with evaluating all unit training programs to assess their
combat capability and SOF interoperability. MARSOC implemented a
Recruit, Screen, Assess and Select process in May 2007 to screen
prospective SOF operators for accession into MARSOC. Over the course of
the next year, a refined initial training pipeline will be adopted to
give every Marine assigned to MARSOC the required SOF baseline skills.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Carole Coffey, Assistant
Director; Renee Brown; Jason Jackson; David Malkin; Karen Thornton; and
Matthew Ullengren also made key contributions to this report.
Footnotes:
[1] The department's five geographic commands--U.S. Central Command,
U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and
U.S. Southern Command--are responsible for U.S. military operations
within their areas. DOD plans to establish a U.S. Africa Command with a
full operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2008.
[2] Examples of existing special operations forces that were placed
under USSOCOM's control include Army Special Forces and Navy Sea, Air,
Land (SEAL) units.
[3] GAO, Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges
Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role, GAO-06-812 (Washington D.C.:
July 31, 2006).
[4] The Marine Corps special operations command defines fully
operationally capable as the organization, training, and equipping of 6
special operations companies and 16 foreign military training teams.
[5] Military personnel costs for all servicemembers, including special
operations forces personnel, are included in the services' budgets.
[6] The military services delineate their force structure through
career fields, or occupational specialties, which represent the jobs
that are necessary to meet their specific missions.
[7] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[8] GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce
Plans Needed, GAO-04-753 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004).
[9] Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 9115 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 167).
[10] Department of Defense, Joint Pub. 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations (Dec. 17, 2003).
[11] Prior to May 2007, the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group was
named the Foreign Military Training Unit.
[12] The Maritime Special Purpose Force was part of the Marine Corps'
Marine Expeditionary Unit--Special Operations Capable Program. This
program provided a forward deployed, sea-based Marine Air-Ground Task
Force capable of executing designated maritime special operations,
among other tasks. The Maritime Special Purpose Force was organized and
trained using Marine Expeditionary Unit assets to provide a special
operations-capable force that could be tailored to execute maritime
special operations missions.
[13] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[14] GAO/GGD-96-118.
[15] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).
[16] GAO-06-812.
[17] GAO-04-753.
[18] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February
2006).
[19] U.S. Special Operations Command, Capstone Concept for Special
Operations (2006).
[20] As discussed previously in this report, the Marine Corps special
operations command has not fully determined what baseline training will
be provided to special operations forces personnel or which personnel
will be required to receive this training.
[21] In addition to the training exercise to certify these units are
capable of performing special operations missions, the special
operations companies also conduct an extensive training program with a
Marine Expeditionary Unit prior to deployment.
[22] The Maritime Special Purpose Force was organized and trained using
Marine Expeditionary Unit assets to provide a special operations-
capable force that could be tailored to execute a maritime special
operations mission.
[23] GAO, Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues
Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces, GAO-03-505 (May 2, 2003).
[24] Combined joint special operations task forces are composed of
special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more
than one U.S. military department. They are formed to carry out a
specific special operation or to prosecute special operations in
support of a theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint
special operations task force may have conventional units assigned or
attached to support the conduct of specific missions.
[25] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[26] Statement of Major General Dennis Hejlik, Commander, U.S. Marine
Corps Forces Special Operations Command, before the Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, January 31, 2007.
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