Defense Acquisitions
Departmentwide Direction Is Needed for Implementation of the Anti-tamper Policy Gao ID: GAO-08-91 January 11, 2008The Department of Defense (DOD) invests billions of dollars on sophisticated weapon systems and technologies. These may be at risk of exploitation when exported, stolen, or lost during combat or routine missions. In an effort to minimize this risk, DOD developed an anti-tamper policy in 1999, calling for DOD components to implement anti-tamper techniques for critical technologies. In March 2004, GAO reported that program managers had difficulties implementing this policy, including identifying critical technologies. This follow-up report (1) describes recent actions DOD has taken to implement its anti-tamper policy and (2) identifies challenges facing program managers. GAO reviewed documentation on actions DOD has taken since 2004 to implement its anti-tamper policy, and interviewed officials from the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent's Office, the military services, other DOD components, and a cross-section of program offices.
Since 2004, DOD has taken several actions to raise awareness about anti-tamper protection and develop resources that provide program managers with general information on its anti-tamper policy. These actions include developing a Web site with anti-tamper information and events, establishing an online learning module on anti-tamper protection, and sponsoring research on generic anti-tamper techniques. However, DOD lacks departmentwide direction for implementation of its anti-tamper policy. Without such direction, individual DOD components are left on their own to develop initiatives. For example, the Navy is developing a database that is intended to provide a horizontal view of what DOD components have identified as critical program information. While many officials we spoke with pointed to this database as a potential tool for identifying critical technologies that may need anti-tamper protection, the database is currently incomplete. Specifically, the Missile Defense Agency is not providing information because its information is classified at a level above what the database can support. Also, the Air Force is not currently providing information because not all commands have provided consent to participate. At the same time, program managers face challenges implementing DOD's anti-tamper policy--due largely to a lack of information or tools needed to make informed assessments at key decision points. First, program managers have limited information for defining what is critical or insight into what technologies other programs have deemed critical to ensure similar protection across programs. Determining whether technologies are critical is largely left to the discretion of the individual program manager, resulting in an uncoordinated and stove piped process. Therefore, the same technology can be identified as critical in one program office but not another. Second, program managers have not always had sufficient or consistent information from the intelligence community to identify threats and vulnerabilities to technologies that have been identified as critical. The potential impact of inconsistent threat assessments is twofold: If the threat is deemed to be low but is actually high, the technology is susceptible to tampering; conversely, if the threat is deemed to be high and is actually low, an anti-tamper solution is more robust than needed. Finally, program managers have had difficulty selecting sufficient anti-tamper solutions--in part because they lack information and tools, such as risk and cost-estimating models, to determine how much anti-tamper protection is needed. As a result, program managers may select a suboptimal solution. Given these combined challenges, there is an increased risk that some technologies that need protection may not be identified or may not have sufficient protection.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-91, Defense Acquisitions: Departmentwide Direction Is Needed for Implementation of the Anti-tamper Policy
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2008:
Defense Acquisitions:
Departmentwide Direction Is Needed for Implementation of the Anti-
tamper Policy:
Defense Acquisitions:
GAO-08-91:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-91, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) invests billions of dollars on
sophisticated weapon systems and technologies. These may be at risk of
exploitation when exported, stolen, or lost during combat or routine
missions. In an effort to minimize this risk, DOD developed an anti-
tamper policy in 1999, calling for DOD components to implement anti-
tamper techniques for critical technologies.
In March 2004, GAO reported that program managers had difficulties
implementing this policy, including identifying critical technologies.
This follow-up report (1) describes recent actions DOD has taken to
implement its anti-tamper policy and (2) identifies challenges facing
program managers.
GAO reviewed documentation on actions DOD has taken since 2004 to
implement its anti-tamper policy, and interviewed officials from the
Anti-Tamper Executive Agent‘s Office, the military services, other DOD
components, and a cross-section of program offices.
What GAO Found:
Since 2004, DOD has taken several actions to raise awareness about anti-
tamper protection and develop resources that provide program managers
with general information on its anti-tamper policy. These actions
include developing a Web site with anti-tamper information and events,
establishing an online learning module on anti-tamper protection, and
sponsoring research on generic anti-tamper techniques. However, DOD
lacks departmentwide direction for implementation of its anti-tamper
policy. Without such direction, individual DOD components are left on
their own to develop initiatives. For example, the Navy is developing a
database that is intended to provide a horizontal view of what DOD
components have identified as critical program information. While many
officials we spoke with pointed to this database as a potential tool
for identifying critical technologies that may need anti-tamper
protection, the database is currently incomplete. Specifically, the
Missile Defense Agency is not providing information because its
information is classified at a level above what the database can
support. Also, the Air Force is not currently providing information
because not all commands have provided consent to participate.
At the same time, program managers face challenges implementing DOD‘s
anti-tamper policy”due largely to a lack of information or tools needed
to make informed assessments at key decision points. First, program
managers have limited information for defining what is critical or
insight into what technologies other programs have deemed critical to
ensure similar protection across programs. Determining whether
technologies are critical is largely left to the discretion of the
individual program manager, resulting in an uncoordinated and stove
piped process. Therefore, the same technology can be identified as
critical in one program office but not another. Second, program
managers have not always had sufficient or consistent information from
the intelligence community to identify threats and vulnerabilities to
technologies that have been identified as critical. The potential
impact of inconsistent threat assessments is twofold: If the threat is
deemed to be low but is actually high, the technology is susceptible to
tampering; conversely, if the threat is deemed to be high and is
actually low, an anti-tamper solution is more robust than needed.
Finally, program managers have had difficulty selecting sufficient anti-
tamper solutions”in part because they lack information and tools, such
as risk and cost-estimating models, to determine how much anti-tamper
protection is needed. As a result, program managers may select a
suboptimal solution. Given these combined challenges, there is an
increased risk that some technologies that need protection may not be
identified or may not have sufficient protection.
What GAO Recommends:
To better ensure implementation of DOD‘s anti-tamper policy, GAO is
recommending that DOD issue departmentwide direction for its policy and
provide additional tools for program managers. DOD agreed to provide
additional tools to assist program managers. However, DOD believes that
a directive it is currently updating addresses GAO‘s other concern. GAO
continues to call for immediate departmentwide direction.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-91]. For more information, contact Ann
Calveresi-Barr at (202) 512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Lacks Departmentwide Direction for Implementing its Anti-tamper
Policy:
Program Managers Face Several Challenges in Identifying Critical
Technologies, Threats, and Sufficient Anti-tamper Solutions#:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Abbreviations:
AT&L: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics:
DOD: Department of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 11, 2008:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member: Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) invests billions of dollars
to develop and produce sophisticated weapon systems and technologies to
maintain military superiority. As such, these weapons and technologies
are highly sought after and at risk of exploitation when exported,
stolen, or lost or damaged during combat or routine missions. Such
exploitation can weaken U.S. military advantage on the battlefield and
erode the U.S. industrial base's technological competitiveness in the
international marketplace.
In an effort to protect U.S. weapons and technologies from
exploitation, DOD established a policy in 1999 requesting each military
service to implement anti-tamper techniques, which include software and
hardware protective devices, when technologies are determined to be
critical and vulnerable to exploitation. In March 2004, we reported on
several difficulties program managers faced in implementing this
policy,[Footnote1 1] including determining which technologies were
critical--the basis for considering the need for anti-tamper
protection. Difficulties with implementing DOD's anti-tamper policy, as
well as vulnerabilities in related government programs, prompted GAO to
designate the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S.
national security as a new high-risk area in 2007.[Footnote
The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to conduct a follow-up review to our
March 2004 report. In response, we identified (1) recent actions DOD
has taken to implement its anti-tamper policy and (2) challenges facing
program managers.
To conduct our work, we obtained information and documentation on
actions DOD has taken to implement its anti-tamper policy since 2004
and interviewed officials from the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent's
Office, military services, other DOD components, and the intelligence
community about these actions. We also determined the status of our
2004 report recommendations. We conducted structured interviews with
officials from a cross-section of programs that the Anti-Tamper
Executive Agent's Office and DOD components identified as considering
and/or implementing anti-tamper protection. We discussed with these
program officials their procedures for implementing anti-tamper
protection and any challenges they faced. We also interviewed officials
from program offices not identified by the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent
and DOD components to obtain their perspective about the anti-tamper
policy. We did not evaluate whether programs had implemented sufficient
anti-tamper protection. We conducted this performance audit (from
January 2007 to January 2008) in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
For more on scope and methodology, see appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Since we reported on DOD's anti-tamper efforts in 2004, DOD has
developed several anti-tamper resources to help program managers
implement its anti-tamper policy--such as an online anti-tamper
training course. DOD has also updated an acquisition policy document
and a guidebook that provides general information on anti-tamper
protection. However, DOD has not issued a formal directive or
instruction incorporating its anti-tamper policy into its acquisition
guidance to ensure proper implementation of the policy departmentwide.
Absent clear departmentwide direction, DOD components are left to
develop their own initiatives to assist in anti-tamper implementation.
The extent to which DOD components will benefit from these initiatives
is dependent on acceptance and adoption by all, which has yet to occur.
A lack of information or tools at three key decision points--
identifying critical technologies, threats and vulnerabilities, and
solutions--has significantly challenged program managers in effectively
implementing DOD's anti-tamper policy. First, program managers have
limited information for defining what is critical or insight into what
technologies other programs have identified as critical to ensure
similar protection across programs. Second, program managers have not
always had sufficient or consistent information from the intelligence
community to identify threats and vulnerabilities to critical
technologies. Third, program managers have had difficulty selecting
solutions, in part because they lack the information and tools, such as
risk and cost-estimating models, to determine how much anti-tamper
protection is needed to protect critical technologies. Given these
challenges, some technologies that need protection may not be
identified or may not be sufficiently protected.
We are recommending that DOD take actions to establish departmentwide
direction that prescribes how to carry out its anti-tamper policy and
identify and provide additional tools to assist program managers during
key decision points.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation to provide additional tools to assist program managers
in their anti-tamper decision process but nonconcurred with our
recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics provide specific direction on applying its
anti-tamper policy. DOD stated that the Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence) is currently updating the security and
counterintelligence support directive to acquisition programs.
Following the update, DOD plans to update a manual with a new section
explicitly for anti-tamper protection. We continue to believe that
direction on applying anti-tamper policy has long been needed and
should not be delayed and that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who is responsible for anti-
tamper policy, should be involved in developing and providing
direction.
Background:
To protect its critical assets, DOD has established several protection
measures for weapon systems. These measures include information
assurance to protect information and information systems, software
protection to prevent the unauthorized distribution and exploitation of
critical software, and anti-tamper techniques to help delay
exploitation of technologies through means such as reverse
engineering[Footnote 3] when U.S. weapons are exported or lost on the
battlefield. Examples of anti-tamper techniques include software
encryption, which scrambles software instructions to make them
unintelligible without first being reprocessed through a deciphering
technique, and hardware protective coatings designed to make it
difficult to extract or dissect components without damaging
them.[Footnote 4]
In 1999, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (AT&L) issued a policy memorandum for implementing anti-
tamper protection in acquisition programs. In the following year, AT&L
issued a policy memorandum stating that technologies should be
routinely assessed during the acquisition process to determine if they
are critical and if anti-tamper techniques are needed to protect these
technologies. In 2001, an AT&L policy memorandum designated the Air
Force as the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent. The executive agent's office,
which currently has four staff, is responsible for implementing DOD's
anti-tamper policy and managing anti-tamper technology development
through the Air Force Research Laboratory. The executive agent also
holds periodic information sessions to educate the acquisition
community about anti-tamper policy, initiatives, and technology
developments. To coordinate activities, military services and defense
agencies, such as the Missile Defense Agency, have an anti-tamper point
of contact. Program managers are responsible for ensuring anti-tamper
protection is incorporated on any weapon system with critical
technologies that need protection.[Footnote 5] Since it is not feasible
to protect every technology, program managers are to conduct an
assessment to determine if anti-tamper protection is needed.
When assessing if anti-tamper protection is needed, program managers
make several key decisions regarding the identification of critical
technologies, assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, and
determination of anti-tamper techniques or solutions. The process
begins with determining whether or not their system's critical program
information[Footnote 6] includes any critical technologies. If it is
determined that the system has no critical technologies, program
managers are to document the decision and request concurrence from
either the office within their component that is designated with anti-
tamper responsibilities or the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent. For systems
that are determined to have critical technologies, the next key steps
are to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities and select anti-
tamper techniques to protect those technologies. Techniques are
ultimately verified and validated by a team[Footnote 7] composed of
representatives from the DOD components. The program manager documents
decisions in an annex of the program protection plan.[Footnote 8]
In 2004, we reported that program managers had difficulty in carrying
out DOD's anti-tamper policy on individual weapons, such as identifying
critical technologies and experiencing cost increases or schedule
delays when applying anti-tamper techniques--particularly when the
techniques are not fully developed or when the systems are already in
design or production. We made several recommendations, including
increasing oversight over the identification of critical technologies
across programs, improving tools and resources for program managers in
identifying critical technologies, ensuring early identification of
anti-tamper costs and solutions, monitoring the development of generic
anti-tamper solutions and evaluating their effectiveness, and
developing a business case to determine whether the current
organizational structure and resources are adequate. DOD concurred or
partially concurred with these recommendations. DOD has taken some
steps to implement our recommendations including identifying available
anti-tamper technical resources and developing a searchable spreadsheet
of critical technologies, incorporating information in the Defense
Acquisition Guidebook on the need for early identification of anti-
tamper solutions in a weapon system, and sponsoring a study on anti-
tamper techniques and their general effectiveness. While DOD has taken
these steps to address parts of the recommendations, all remain open.
DOD Lacks Departmentwide Direction for Implementing its Anti-tamper
Policy:
DOD has recently taken several actions aimed at raising awareness about
its anti-tamper policy and assisting program managers in implementing
anti-tamper protection on a weapon system. Despite these actions, DOD
still lacks departmentwide direction to implement its anti-tamper
policy. Without such direction, DOD components are left to develop
their own initiatives to assist program managers in implementing anti-
tamper protection. While individual efforts are important, such as a
database to track critical program information DOD-wide, their
effectiveness may be limited because they have yet to be accepted and
adopted across all DOD components.
DOD Has Developed Some Resources for Program Managers to Use in
Implementing Anti-tamper Protection:
Since our 2004 report, DOD, through the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent,
has developed some resources aimed at assisting program managers as
they go through the anti-tamper decision process. DOD's resources range
from providing general information about the anti-tamper policy to
research on anti-tamper solutions. Specifically, DOD has:
* developed a guidebook that includes a checklist to assist program
managers in identifying security, management, and technical
responsibilities when incorporating anti-tamper protection on a weapons
system;
* developed a searchable spreadsheet to assist program managers in
identifying critical technologies;
* developed a Web site for program managers to provide general anti-
tamper information, policy resources, conference briefings,
implementation resources, and current events;
* coordinated with Defense Acquisition University to design and launch
an online learning module on anti-tamper protection;
* funded Sandia National Laboratories to study anti-tamper techniques
and their general effectiveness; and:
* sponsored research to develop generic anti-tamper techniques through
Small Business Innovation Research, a research program that funds early-
stage research and development projects at small technology companies.
DOD has also updated two acquisition documents with general anti-tamper
information. The first document--DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of a
Defense Acquisition System--currently states that one of the purposes
of the System Development and Demonstration phase of a weapon system is
to ensure affordability and protection of critical program information
by implementing appropriate solutions such as anti-tamper protection.
The second document--the Defense Acquisition Guidebook--has been
updated to include some basic information on the importance of
implementing anti-tamper protection early in the development of a
weapon system and describes program managers' overall responsibilities
for implementing the anti-tamper policy.
DOD Has Not Provided Direction to Implement Its Anti-tamper Policy:
While DOD has issued broad policy memorandums that reflect the
department's desire for routinely assessing weapon systems to determine
if anti-tamper protection is needed, the department has not fully
incorporated the anti-tamper policy into its formal acquisition
guidance. Specifically, DOD Instruction 5000.2 mentions anti-tamper
protection, but the department has not provided direction for
implementation of anti-tamper in a formal directive or instruction.
Currently, the department is coordinating comments on a draft
instruction (DOD Instruction 5200.39) on protection of critical program
information that includes anti-tamper implementation.[Footnote 9]
However, in commenting on the draft instruction, several DOD components
have raised concerns about when and how to define critical program
information that warrants protection, which have contributed to long
delays in finalizing the instruction. In addition, the department has
not provided specific guidance for program managers on how to implement
anti-tamper protection in a DOD manual because DOD officials said this
process cannot begin until the instruction is finalized. The date for
finalizing the instruction has not yet been determined.
Officials from the executive agent's office stated that departmentwide
direction would give credence to the anti-tamper policy in practice.
Anti-tamper points of contact told us that the policy memorandums are
not sufficient to ensure that program managers are implementing anti-
tamper protection on weapon systems when necessary. One service anti-
tamper point of contact stated that program managers might disregard
the policy memorandums because they are high-level and broad. Another
service anti-tamper point of contact said that implementation is
ultimately left up to the individual program manager. While a program
manager's decision should be approved by the milestone decision
authority[Footnote 10] and documented in the program protection plan,
some service and program officials said that programs are not always
asked about anti-tamper protection during the review.
Absent Departmentwide Direction, Components Have Been Left to Develop
Their Own Anti-tamper Initiatives:
Lacking departmentwide direction for the anti-tamper policy, DOD
components have been left to develop their own initiatives to assist
program managers in anti-tamper implementation. However, the usefulness
of these initiatives depends on the extent to which other components
participate in these efforts.
For example, the Missile Defense Agency developed a risk assessment
model to help program managers identify how much anti-tamper is needed
to protect critical technologies. Specifically, the model helps program
managers assess the criticality of the technology relative to the risk
of exploitation. However, when the Missile Defense Agency sought
comments on the initiative, the executive agent and services indicated
that it was too lengthy and complex to use. The executive agent, in
coordination with anti-tamper points of contact from the Missile
Defense Agency and services, has taken over this effort, and it is
still in development.
The Navy is also implementing an initiative: a database intended to
capture the information that programs across DOD components have
identified as critical. Many officials we spoke with pointed to this
database as a potential tool to improve identification of critical
program information across DOD components. To date, the Navy and the
Army are submitting information for the database, but the Missile
Defense Agency and Air Force are not. The Missile Defense Agency anti-
tamper point of contact stated that its information is classified at a
level above what the database can support and its program managers will
not submit information for the database unless DOD requires submissions
by all DOD components. However, the Missile Defense Agency does have
access to the database and uses it as a cross-check to determine if it
is identifying similar critical program information. The Air Force has
been briefed on the initiative but does not yet have consent from all
of the commands to participate. Without full participation across all
DOD components, the usefulness of this database as a tool to identify
critical technologies that may need anti-tamper protection will be
limited.
Program Managers Face Several Challenges in Identifying Critical
Technologies, Threats, and Sufficient Anti-tamper Solutions:
To determine whether anti-tamper protection is needed, program managers
must identify which technologies are deemed critical, determine the
potential threats and vulnerabilities to these technologies, and
identify sufficient anti-tamper solutions to protect the technologies.
Such decisions involve a certain level of subjectivity. However,
program managers lack the information or tools needed to make informed
assessments at these key decision points. As a result, some
technologies that need protection may not be identified or may not have
sufficient protection.
Limited Information and Coordination on What Is Critical Increase the
Risk That Some Technologies May Not Be Identified:
Determining technologies that are critical is largely left to the
discretion of the program managers. While DOD has some resources
available to program managers to help identify critical technologies,
they may be of limited use. For example, the executive agent's
searchable spreadsheet of critical technologies may not be
comprehensive because it relies on DOD's Militarily Critical
Technologies List, which we reported in 2006 was largely out of
date.[Footnote 11] Also, some program offices have used a series of
questions established in a 1994 DOD manual on acquisition systems
protection to help guide their discussions on what is critical.
However, these questions are broad and subject to interpretation, and
can result in different conclusions, depending on who is involved in
the decision-making process.
In addition, identifying what is critical varies by DOD component and
sometimes by program office. For example, one Air Force program office
tried various approaches, including teams of subject matter experts,
over 2 years to identify its list of critical program information. In
contrast, the Army took the initiative to establish a research center
to assist program managers in identifying critical program information,
but Army officials stated that the approach used by the center has led
to an underestimating of critical program information and critical
technologies in programs.
At the same time, there has been limited coordination across programs
on technologies that have been identified as critical--creating a stove
piped process--which could result in one technology being protected
under one program and not protected under another. While informal
coordination can occur, programs did not have a formal mechanism for
coordinating with other programs, including those within their service.
For example, officials from one program office stated they had little
interaction from programs within their service or other services to
ensure protection of similar technologies. A program under one joint
program executive office had not coordinated with other programs to
identify similar technologies as critical. In addition, according to an
Army official, contractors who have worked on programs across services
have questioned why one service is applying anti-tamper solutions to a
technology that another service has not identified as critical.
Finally, one program office we spoke with identified critical program
information on its system but indicated that a similar system in
another service had not identified any critical program information
and, therefore, had no plans to implement anti-tamper protection.
Despite the risk that some technologies that need protection may not be
identified or may not be protected across programs, no formal mechanism
exists within DOD to provide a horizontal view of what is
critical.[Footnote 12] However, any effort to do so could be undermined
by the programs' and services' different definitions and
interpretations of "critical program information" and "critical
technologies." The Anti-Tamper Executive Agent defines critical program
information as capturing all critical technologies. In contrast, the
Army's interpretation is that critical program information only
includes critical technologies that are state-of-the-art. For the Navy,
critical program information includes software, while hardware is part
of what the Navy defines as critical technologies. One program that is
part of a joint program office identified critical program information
as including company proprietary information. As a result, tracking
critical program information may not provide a horizontal view of all
technologies services and programs have identified as needing anti-
tamper protection.
Contradictory and Insufficient Intelligence Information Has Hindered
Some Programs in Identifying Potential Threats:
Once a program office identifies critical technologies, the next step
in the anti-tamper decision process is to identify threats to those
technologies. DOD's Program Manager's Guidebook and Checklist for Anti-
tamper states that multiple threat assessments should be requested from
either the service intelligence organization or counterintelligence
organization. One program office we visited stated that it has
requested and received multiple threat assessments from the
intelligence community, which have sometimes contradicted one another,
leaving the program office to decipher the information and determine
the threat. According to an anti-tamper point of contact, other
programs have received contradictory information--typically relating to
foreign countries' capabilities to reverse engineer. The potential
impact of contradictory intelligence reports is twofold: If the threat
is deemed to be low but is actually high, the technology is susceptible
to reverse engineering; conversely, if the threat is deemed to be high
and is actually low, the anti-tamper solution is more robust than
needed.
To assist with the process of identifying threats, program offices may
request threat assessments from a group within the Defense Intelligence
Agency. However, this group was not able to complete assessments for
approximately 6 months during 2006. While the group has resumed
completing assessments, an agency official stated that it is not able
to produce as many assessments as before due to limited resources. The
Defense Intelligence Agency does not turn down program offices that may
request assessments, but does have to put them in a queue and provide
them with previous assessments, if they exist, until it can complete a
full assessment for the program office. One program office indicated
that it took 6 to 9 months for the agency to complete its assessment.
Program Managers Need Tools to Assist in Designing Effective Anti-
tamper Solutions and Estimating Related Costs:
Program managers also lack the tools needed to identify the optimal
anti-tamper solutions for those critical technologies that are
vulnerable to threats. Most notably, program managers lack a risk model
to assess the relative strengths of different anti-tamper solutions and
a tool to help estimate their costs.
According to National Security Agency officials, who are available to
provide support to program managers considering or implementing anti-
tamper protection, program managers and contractors sometimes have
difficulty determining appropriate solutions. Four of five programs we
spoke with that had experience in this area of the anti-tamper decision
process had difficulty identifying how much anti-tamper protection was
enough to protect a critical technology. For example, one program
official told us that an anti-tamper solution developed for one of the
program's critical technologies may not be sufficient to prevent
reverse engineering. Another program office stated that it is difficult
to choose between competing contractors without knowing how to
determine the appropriate level of anti-tamper protection needed. An
anti-tamper point of contact said that program managers need a tool to
help them assess the criticality of a technology versus the types of
threats to that technology.
Implementing a suboptimal anti-tamper solution can have cost and
performance implications for the program. Specifically, if the solution
provides less anti-tamper protection than is needed, the program may
have to retrofit additional anti-tamper protection to allow for a more
robust solution. Not only can such retrofitting add to a program's
costs, it can compromise performance.
Given limited resources and tools for determining anti-tamper
solutions, some program office officials told us that to satisfy anti-
tamper solutions they relied on other protection measures. For example,
officials in one program office stated that anti-tamper protection and
information assurance[Footnote 13] were interchangeable and indicated
that following the National Security Agency's information assurance
requirements-- which number in the hundreds--should be sufficient as an
anti-tamper solution for this system. This same program was not aware
of anti- tamper resources and did not coordinate with an anti-tamper
validation and verification team on its solutions. Also, an official
from another program office indicated that anti-tamper protection and
information assurance are similarly defined. While DOD and service
officials agreed that some information assurance and anti-tamper
measures may overlap, fulfilling information assurance requirements
does not guarantee a sufficient anti-tamper solution.
Conclusions:
In establishing various policies to protect its critical assets, DOD
saw anti-tamper as a key way to preserve U.S. investment in critical
technologies while operating in an environment of coalition warfare and
a globalized industry. Program managers are ultimately responsible for
implementing DOD's anti-tamper policy. However, a lack of direction,
information, and tools from DOD to implement its policy has created
significant challenges for program managers. Further, this policy can
compete with the demands of meeting program cost and schedule
objectives, particularly when the optimal anti-tamper solution is
identified late in the schedule. Until DOD establishes a formal
directive or instruction for implementing its policy departmentwide and
equips program managers with adequate implementation tools, program
managers will continue to face difficulties in identifying critical
technologies and implementing anti-tamper protection.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
As DOD examines its policies for protecting critical assets, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary
of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the
Anti-Tamper Executive Agent and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, to issue or be involved in developing and providing
departmentwide direction for application of its anti-tamper policy that
prescribes how to carry out the policy and establishes definitions for
critical program information and critical technologies.
To help ensure the effectiveness of anti-tamper implementation, we also
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Anti-Tamper
Executive Agent to identify and provide additional tools to assist
program managers in the anti-tamper decision process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Anti-Tamper
Executive Agent to identify additional tools to assist program managers
in the anti-tamper decision process. DOD stated that the Anti-Tamper
Executive Agent is drafting Anti-Tamper Standard Guidelines to
facilitate proper implementation of anti-tamper protection across the
department.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) in coordination
with the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence) to issue departmentwide direction for application of its
anti-tamper policy that prescribes how to carry out the policy and
establishes definitions for critical program information and critical
technologies. DOD stated that the Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence) has primary responsibility for DOD Directive 5200.39, a
security and counterintelligence support directive to acquisition
programs, and its successor, DOD Instruction 5200.39 regarding
protection of critical program information. The Under Secretary of
Defense (Intelligence) is currently coordinating an update to this
directive. Once it is issued, the department plans to update DOD 5200.1-
M, which provides the execution standards and guidelines to meet the
DOD Instruction 5200.39 policy.
While DOD has issued broad policy memorandums beginning in 1999 that
reflect the department's desire for routinely assessing weapon systems
to determine if anti-tamper protection is needed, the department has
not fully incorporated anti-tamper policy into its formal acquisition
guidance. As we have reported, service officials indicated collectively
that these policy memorandums are high-level, broad, and leave
implementation ultimately up to the individual program manager. DOD did
not indicate when the update of DOD Directive 5200.39 might be complete
and guidance on anti-tamper implementation issued. We continue to
believe that such direction is currently needed and that the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who
issued the policy memorandums and is responsible for anti-tamper
policy, should be involved in developing and providing the appropriate
direction whether it be the update to DOD Directive 5200.39 or another
vehicle. That direction should include how to implement the anti-tamper
policy and how critical program information and critical technologies
are defined. We continue to believe that the direction, which has been
lacking since the policy was initiated in 1999, should not be further
delayed. If DOD continues to experience delays in updating DOD
Directive 5200.39, it should consider interim measures to meet the
immediate need for anti-tamper direction.
DOD's letter is reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, as well as the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office
of Management and Budget; and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. In addition, this report will be made
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov if you or
your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Others making key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Ann Calvaresi-Barr:
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify actions the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to
implement its anti-tamper policy since 2004, we reviewed DOD policies
and guidance governing anti-tamper protection on weapon systems and
obtained documents on various initiatives. We interviewed officials
from the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent, military services, and other DOD
components such as the Missile Defense Agency; Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency;
and the Air Force Research Laboratory about initiatives or actions
taken regarding anti-tamper. Through these interviews and documents, we
also determined the status of our 2004 anti-tamper report
recommendations. We interviewed DOD officials from Networks and
Information Integration, Science and Technology, and
Counterintelligence to discuss anti-tamper protection and how it
relates to other program protection measures.
To determine how program managers implemented DOD‘s anti-tamper policy,
we interviewed officials from 14 program offices. We are not
identifying the names of the programs due to classification concerns.
We conducted structured interviews with 7 of the 14 program offices to
discuss and obtain documents about their experiences with implementing
the anti-tamper decision process and identify any challenges they
faced. We selected 6 of these programs from a list of weapon systems
identified in Anti-Tamper Executive Agent, services, and component
documents as considering and/or implementing anti-tamper protection and
a seventh program considering anti-tamper that we identified during the
course of our fieldwork. Systems we selected represented a cross
section of acquisition programs and various types of systems in
different phases of development. For the remaining programs, we
interviewed 7 not identified by the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent or the
services as considering and/or implementing anti-tamper to obtain their
viewpoints on DOD‘s anti-tamper policy and implementation. We selected
these programs by identifying lists of DOD acquisition programs and
comparing them to the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent‘s, services‘, and
components‘ lists of program considering and/or implementing anti-
tamper. We did not evaluate whether programs had implemented sufficient
anti-tamper protection.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition And Technology:
3015 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3015:
Dec 20, 2007:
Ms. Calvaresi-Barr:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Calvaresi-Barr:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-9I SU, "Defense Acquisitions: Department-wide Direction
Is Needed for Implementation of the Anti-tamper Policy," dated October
I7, 2007 (GAO Code 120611).
Sincerely,
Mark D. Schaeffer:
Director:
Systems and Software Engineering:
Enclosure:
As stated
r
Systems and Software Engineering Gao Draft Report Dated October I7,
2007 GAO-08-91SU (GAO CODE 120611):
"Defense Acquisitions: Departmentwide Direction Is Needed For
Implementation Of The Anti-Tamper Policy":
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation I: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), in coordination with the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent and
the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), to issue department-wide
direction for application of its anti-tamper policy that prescribes how
to carry out the policy and establishes definitions for critical
program information and critical technologies. (p. 13/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD Response: Non-concur. The Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
(USD(I)) is the office of primary responsibility for DoDD 5200.39,
"Security Intelligence, and Counterintelligence Support to Acquisition
Program Protection," and its successor, DoDI 5200.39, "Critical Program
Information (CPI) Protection within the Department of Defense." USD(I)
is currently coordinating an update to the directive.
The Anti-Tamper Executive Agent (ATEA) has proposed the incorporation
of anti- tamper policy in this revision. The considered policy for anti-
tamper mandates:
"For critical technology type CPI, employ appropriate anti-tamper
during the RDA process unless waived in writing by MDA or equivalent."
Following the issuance of the updated DoDI 5200.39, the Department will
revised the DoD 5200.1-M, "Acquisition Systems Protection," the
implementing manual for the directive which provides the execution
standards and guidelines to meet the DoDI 5200.39 policy. The ATEA's
plan is to include a new section in the manual that is explicitly for
anti-tamper. This will describe how to implement anti-tamper to protect
technology CPI for U.S.-only cases, foreign military sales/direct
commercial sales, and science and technology programs.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent to identify and provide
additional tools to assist program managers in the anti-tamper decision
process. (p. I3/GAO Draft Report):
DOD Response: Concur. The ATEA is drafting a classified document called
the Anti- Tamper Standard Guidelines. This document will assist program
personnel in understanding how their system might be exposed to
adversaries and the consequence of technology CPI compromise. These
guidelines will facilitate proper implementation of AT protection of
identified technology CPI. The document will define AT protection
expectations and will help program personnel understand the rough
magnitude of AT protection required to field the system and also to
estimate the cost of AT prior to Milestone B. This information can also
provide the basis for identification of AT protection requirements to
potential contractors during a Request for Proposal. The document, by
providing standard anti-tamper guidelines for all programs to follow,
will help implement horizontal protection of technology CP1 across the
department.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Ms. Ann Calvaresi-Barr (202) 512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Anne-Marie Lasowski (Assistant
Director), Gregory Harmon, Molly Whipple, Karen Sloan, John C. Martin,
and Alyssa Weir made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related Products:
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 2007.
Export Controls: Challenges Exist in Enforcement of an Inherently Complex System. GAO-07-265. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2006.
Defense Technologies: DOD‘s Critical Technologies Lists Rarely Inform Export Control and Other Policy Decisions. GAO-06-793. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
President‘s Justification of the High Performance Computer Control Threshold Does Not Fully Address National Defense Authorization Act of 1998 Requirements. GAO-06-754R. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Export Controls: Improvements to Commerce‘s Dual-Use System Needed to Ensure Protection of U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11 Environment. GAO-06-638. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2006.
Defense Trade: Enhancements to the Implementation of Exon-Florio Could Strengthen the Law‘s Effectiveness. GAO-05-686. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Post-9/11 Security Environment. GAO-05-468R. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2005.
Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post-9/11 Environment. GAO-05-234. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Better Support Program Managers‘ Implementation of Anti-Tamper Protection. GAO-04-302. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Defense Trade: Better Information Needed to Support Decisions Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers. GAO-03-694. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Footnotes:
1. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Better Support Program
Managers‘ Implementation of Anti-Tamper Protection, GAO-04-302
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).
2. GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
3. Reverse engineering is the process of taking apart an item such as
hardware or software to see how it works. For example, a software
program may be reverse engineered to determine how the program performs
certain operations.
4. Information regarding the specific anti-tamper solutions used on an
individual system is typically classified because disclosure could aid
exploitation. In some cases, anti-tamper information is restricted at
the special access level.
5. According to guidelines accompanying the 2000 AT&L policy
memorandum, anti-tamper should be considered for all new start
programs; programs that did not reach systems development prior to May
1, 2000; and all preplanned product improvement, modifications, or
other technology insertion efforts. In addition, anti-tamper should be
considered for all foreign military sales or direct commercial sales
and for all upgrades to all programs, regardless of when systems
development occurred.
6. Critical program information is information, technologies, or
systems that, if compromised, would degrade combat effectiveness,
shorten the expected combat effective life of the system, or
significantly alter program direction.
7. A validation and verification team validates that a program office‘s
anti-tamper implementation will fulfill its intended function and
verifies that anti-tamper measures stipulated in the anti-tamper plan
operate according to specifications.
8. A program protection plan is a program manager‘s single source
document used to coordinate and integrate all protection efforts
designed to deny access to critical program information to anyone not
authorized or not having a need to know and prevent inadvertent
disclosure of leading edge technology to foreign interests.
9. According to DOD, the department began this process in 1999.
10. The milestone decision authority is a designated DOD individual
with the authority to approve entry of an acquisition program into the
next phase of the acquisition process and is accountable for cost,
schedule, and performance reporting to a higher authority, including
congressional reporting.
11. The spreadsheet is based primarily on the Militarily Critical
Technologies List”a compendium of goods and technologies that would
permit significant advances in military capabilities in the near
term”and the Developing Science and Technologies List”a compendium of
scientific and technological capabilities being developed worldwide
that could affect U.S. military capabilities in the long term. In 2006,
we reported that both lists are largely out of date and are of
questionable value. GAO, Defense Technologies: DOD‘s Critical
Technologies Lists Rarely Inform Export Control and Other Policy
Decisions, GAO-06-793 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).
12. In our March 2004 report (GAO-04-302) we recommended that DOD
improve its oversight of the identification of critical technologies by
all programs subject to the anti-tamper policy.
13. Information assurance refers to measures that defend and protect
information and information systems by ensuring their confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, availability, and utility.
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