Defense Infrastructure
Realignment of Air Force Special Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico Gao ID: GAO-08-244R January 18, 2008In September 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommended closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, unless a new mission for the base could be identified by December 31, 2009. In June 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) would establish a new mission at Cannon Air Force Base and the command would take ownership of the base on October 1, 2007. As a result, Cannon Air Force Base will remain open. While DOD has satisfied the intent of the recommendation by finding a new mission for the base, this BRAC recommendation was unusual because it contained a contingency clause. Therefore, we reviewed DOD's implementation of this recommendation under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This report (1) describes the factors underpinning the decision to house AFSOC at Cannon Air Force Base and (2) provides information on the cost estimate and timeline for the movement of personnel to establish the AFSOC mission.
DOD's decision to establish an AFSOC mission at Cannon was the result of a confluence of events, chiefly, the BRAC 2005 contingency clause that provided urgency for finding a new tenant for the base and an AFSOC study pointing to Cannon Air Force Base as the best location for the AFSOC mission. In October 2005, AFSOC evaluated three alternatives to address the lack of existing capacity at Hurlburt Field and rated Cannon as most desirable. Subsequently, in response to the BRAC 2005 contingency clause, the Air Force began to look in January 2006 for another mission for Cannon Air Force Base. The Air Force solicited interest from DOD and other agencies that would consider selecting Cannon Air Force Base for their missions. According to Air Force officials, the intent was to identify a tenant that would make maximum use of the base facilities and the base's associated range, the Melrose Training Range. AFSOC was the only respondent out of six that expressed interest in using the entire base and the associated range. The remaining five planned to use portions of the base. In June 2006, DOD announced that a new AFSOC mission would be established at Cannon. Although AFSOC took ownership of Cannon Air Force Base on October 1, 2007, there is some uncertainty over the total cost and timeline of personnel growth required to establish the new mission, although AFSOC estimated the cost at about $517 million over the next 6 years at the time of our review. First, DOD has programmed about $283 million for military construction projects from fiscal year 2008 through 2013 to support the movement of units to Cannon. Second, AFSOC has identified about $233 million in additional required funding that has yet to be programmed. These funds would primarily be used to construct or modify existing mission-related facilities to accommodate aircraft that are larger and more varied than the ones previously located at the base. AFSOC originally projected that about 5,700 personnel would be moved to Cannon by the end of fiscal year 2010. However, because of funding constraints, the decision to move about 1,400 of these people is under review by DOD. Further, the expected number and pace of personnel growth may change further because AFSOC plans to bring fewer aircraft to Cannon than originally projected.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-244R, Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 18, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special
Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico:
In September 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
recommended closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, unless a new
mission for the base could be identified by December 31, 2009. In June
2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC)1 would establish a new mission at Cannon Air
Force Base and the command would take ownership of the base on October
1, 2007. As a result, Cannon Air Force Base will remain open. While DOD
has satisfied the intent of the recommendation by finding a new mission
for the base, this BRAC recommendation was unusual because it contained
a contingency clause. Therefore, we reviewed DOD‘s implementation of
this recommendation under the authority of the Comptroller General to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative. [Footnote 2] This report (1)
describes the factors underpinning the decision to house AFSOC at
Cannon Air Force Base and (2) provides information on the cost estimate
and timeline for the movement of personnel to establish the AFSOC
mission.
To determine the factors underpinning the decision to establish an
AFSOC mission at Cannon Air Force Base, we interviewed officials
involved in the decision-making process from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations, Environment and
Logistics; the United States Special Operations Command; and the Air
Force Special Operations Command. In addition, we reviewed Air Force
documents that described efforts to identify a new mission for Cannon
Air Force Base and AFSOC site evaluations and analyses of potential
locations for AFSOC missions. To provide information on costs, we
reviewed the planned military construction and operations and
maintenance funding required for AFSOC units to operate at Cannon Air
Force Base. In addition, we reviewed Special Operations Command, AFSOC,
and Air Combat Command cost estimates and financial data and
interviewed Special Operations Command and AFSOC officials. Based on
these discussions and observations, we believe the DOD data are
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To provide
timeline information on moving personnel to Cannon Air Force Base, we
reviewed Special Operations Command personnel information and AFSOC
site survey data and interviewed Special Operations Command and AFSOC
officials. Finally, we met with State of New Mexico and community
officials to obtain information on the state‘s efforts to assist in the
reuse of Cannon. We conducted this performance audit from June 2007
through January 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
DOD‘s decision to establish an AFSOC mission at Cannon was the result
of a confluence of events, chiefly, the BRAC 2005 contingency clause
that provided urgency for finding a new tenant for the base and an
AFSOC study pointing to Cannon Air Force Base as the best location for
the AFSOC mission. According to AFSOC officials, relocating some AFSOC
units from Hurlburt Field, Florida, became a priority as Hurlburt Field
was nearing full capacity of its ramp and hangar space and the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review recommended the growth of the AFSOC mission.
In October 2005, AFSOC evaluated three alternatives to address the lack
of existing capacity at Hurlburt Field and rated Cannon as most
desirable. Subsequently, in response to the BRAC 2005 contingency
clause, the Air Force began to look in January 2006 for another mission
for Cannon Air Force Base. The Air Force solicited interest from DOD
and other agencies that would consider selecting Cannon Air Force Base
for their missions. According to Air Force officials, the intent was to
identify a tenant that would make maximum use of the base facilities
and the base‘s associated range, the Melrose Training Range. AFSOC was
the only respondent out of six that expressed interest in using the
entire base and the associated range. The remaining five planned to use
portions of the base. In June 2006, DOD announced that a new AFSOC
mission would be established at Cannon.
Although AFSOC took ownership of Cannon Air Force Base on October 1,
2007, there is some uncertainty over the total cost and timeline of
personnel growth required to establish the new mission, although AFSOC
estimated the cost at about $517 million over the next 6 years at the
time of our review. First, DOD has programmed about $283 million for
military construction projects from fiscal year 2008 through 2013 to
support the movement of units to Cannon. Approximately $201 million, or
71 percent, of these funds are for constructing facilities at other Air
Force locations, but these projects were moved to Cannon to support the
relocation of the AFSOC units. For example, $11.2 million was
programmed to construct a special operations squadron and maintenance
facility and $15.5 million was programmed to construct a corrosion
control hangar at other locations, but these projects were moved to
Cannon. The remaining $82 million in programmed funds were to construct
or modify existing support facilities at Cannon. For example, the Air
Force had already programmed $8.1 million in fiscal year 2011 to
construct a new dormitory. Second, AFSOC has identified about $233
million in additional required funding that has yet to be programmed.
These funds would primarily be used to construct or modify existing
mission-related facilities to accommodate aircraft that are larger and
more varied than the ones previously located at the base. Approximately
$19 million of the additional funding would be used to obtain some
temporary facilities until permanent facilities become available.
Moreover, AFSOC originally projected that about 5,700 personnel would
be moved to Cannon by the end of fiscal year 2010. However, because of
funding constraints, the decision to move about 1,400 of these people
is under review by DOD. Further, the expected number and pace of
personnel growth may change further because AFSOC plans to bring fewer
aircraft to Cannon than originally projected.
This report also presents a matter for congressional consideration
should Congress authorize a future base closure round. In a written
comment letter, DOD had no comments on a draft of this report.
Background:
On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense made public his
recommendations for the 2005 BRAC round. The BRAC Commission,
established by law as an independent entity to evaluate DOD‘s
recommendations, presented its findings, along with its own
recommendations, to the President on September 8, 2005. The President
approved the commission‘s recommendations in their entirety and
forwarded them to Congress on September 15, 2005. When Congress did not
pass a joint resolution of disapproval of the recommendations, they
became effective on November 9, 2005. The 2005 BRAC Commission
terminated on April 15, 2006.
DOD recommended the outright closure of Cannon Air Force Base. The BRAC
Commission also recommended closing Cannon Air Force Base but added a
contingent condition that the base could remain open if a new mission
could be found by December 31, 2009. DOD subsequently identified a new
mission for Cannon, and therefore the base will remain open.
Factors That Affected the Decision to Move to Cannon:
DOD‘s decision to establish an AFSOC mission at Cannon Air Force Base
was the result of a confluence of events: chiefly, the BRAC Commission
contingency clause that provided urgency for finding a new tenant to
keep the base open and AFSOC‘s desire for another location.
Air Force‘s Response to the BRAC 2005 Contingency Clause:
In January 2006, the Air Force began an effort to identify a new use
for Cannon Air Force Base. On the basis of an evaluation of the base‘s
infrastructure, facilities, and community and regional resources, the
Air Force developed a prospectus of the base that was distributed to
federal organizations both within and outside DOD. The prospectus was
to solicit federal agency interest in using the base. Air Force
officials told us that the ideal candidate would be one that intended
to fully utilize the facilities, including the adjacent Melrose
Training Range. The Air Force received responses from six organizations
but only AFSOC expressed interest in fully using the base and range.
The remaining five organizations expressed a desire to use limited
facilities on the base and, therefore, did not meet the intent of the
solicitation. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency wanted to use
some of the facilities at Cannon Air Force Base to temporarily store
equipment. After a second solicitation did not yield viable responses
other than AFSOC‘s, the Air Force focused its attention on evaluating
AFSOC‘s proposal, and in June 2006 DOD announced that AFSOC would
establish a mission at Cannon Air Force Base.
AFSOC officials said that at about the same time that the Air Force was
completing its search to identify a new mission for Cannon Air Force
Base, AFSOC was completing its own study comparing basing alternatives.
Information from the Air Force‘s solicitation results and AFSOC‘s
comparison study was combined in a series of briefings to DOD.
AFSOC‘s Desire for Another Location:
According to AFSOC officials, in recent years it was becoming
increasingly apparent that Hurlburt Field, Florida, was nearing full
capacity of its ramp and hangar space. In addition, these officials
told us that they were having an increasingly difficult time scheduling
training time at the adjacent training range at Eglin Air Force Base.
The officials said that these constraints were likely to intensify
because Eglin was expecting to have additional demands placed on it as
a result of (1) decisions to locate more aircraft (such as the Joint
Strike Fighter) there and (2) the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review call
for growth in the AFSOC mission. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review proposed increasing the Special Operations Forces by 15
percent and establishing an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron under U.S.
Special Operations Command.
Starting in October 2005, AFSOC examined three alternatives to address
the lack of existing capacity at Hurlburt Field and the anticipated
increase in the AFSOC mission as proposed in the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review. The three alternatives were (1) increasing capacity at
Hurlburt Field; (2) establishing an AFSOC mission at Davis-Monthan Air
Force Base, Arizona; and (3) establishing an AFSOC mission at Cannon
Air Force Base, New Mexico. AFSOC evaluated each of these locations
based on the 11 criteria shown in figure 1. As the figure shows, Cannon
Air Force Base was rated the most desirable on 9 of the 11 criteria and
tied on 2 criteria. AFSOC officials said that the installation scored
particularly high in the criteria deemed to be the most important--the
availability of ramp space, lack of encroachment, increased training
opportunities, local community support, and military construction
costs.
Figure 1: AFSOC‘s Comparison of Basing Alternatives:
Factor: Operations security;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Moderately desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Least desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Good flying weather;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Moderately desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Most desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Lack of encroachment;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Least desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Least desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Training opportunities;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Moderately desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Moderately desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Community support;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Moderately desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Least desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Flexibility;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Moderately desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Moderately desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Ramp space;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Least desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Moderately desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Growth potential;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Least desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Least desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Types of terrain;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Moderately desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Most desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Availability of facilities;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: Least desirable;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: Least desirable;
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: Most desirable.
Factor: Military construction costs;
Hurlburt Field, Florida: ~$1.1B;
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: ~$1.43B
Cannon AFB, New Mexico: ~$150-$255M.
Source: AFSOC data.
[End of figure]
Establishing an AFSOC mission in New Mexico was in line with an
interest AFSOC had expressed in the mid-1990s. According to AFSOC
officials, a western United States location would provide additional
training opportunities for AFSOC and other special operations forces.
Cost and Timeline of AFSOC‘s Move to Cannon:
AFSOC took ownership of Cannon Air Force Base on October 1, 2007, and
plans to spend about $516.6 million to establish the mission over the
next 6 years. First, DOD has programmed about $283.3 million in fiscal
years 2008 through 2013 for military construction projects. Second,
AFSOC has identified a need for about $233 million in additional
funding that has yet to be programmed. These funds are needed primarily
to construct new or modify existing mission-related facilities to
accommodate aircraft that are larger and more varied than the smaller
aircraft previously located at the base. [Footnote 3] In addition,
AFSOC originally projected that about 5,700 personnel would be located
at Cannon by the end of fiscal year 2010. However, because of funding
constraints, the decision to move about 1,400 of them is under review
by DOD. Moreover, the expected number and pace of personnel growth may
change further because AFSOC plans to bring fewer aircraft to Cannon
than originally projected.
Funding Requirements to Establish AFSOC Mission at Cannon:
AFSOC anticipates spending about $516.6 million to locate the AFSOC
units but has programmed only about $283.3 million in military
construction funds from fiscal years 2008 through 2013. Our analysis
indicates that about $201 million (71 percent) of these funds were
originally programmed to build facilities at other locations that will
now be built at Cannon based on the decision to move some AFSOC units
to the base. For example, $11.2 million was programmed to construct a
special operations squadron and maintenance facility and $15.5 million
was programmed to construct a corrosion control hangar at other
locations, but these projects were moved to Cannon. The remaining $82
million in programmed funds were to construct or modify existing
support facilities at Cannon. For example, the Air Force had already
programmed $8.1 million in fiscal year 2011 to construct a new
dormitory.
As shown in table 1, $283.3 million of the $516.6 has been programmed,
but additional military construction, operation and maintenance, and
procurement totaling $233.3 million had not been programmed at the time
of our report. This additional funding is to construct new or modify
existing facilities and infrastructure to accommodate AFSOC‘s mission.
Table 1: Programmed and Unprogammed Funding to Establish AFSOC Mission
at Cannon, Fiscal Years 2008 to 2013 (Dollars in millions):
Type of Funding: Programmed;
Fiscal Year 2008: $9.2;
Fiscal Year 2009: $18.1;
Fiscal Year 2010: $26.2;
Fiscal Year 2011: $126.4;
Fiscal Year 2012: $40.9;
Fiscal Year 2013: $62.5;
Total: $283.3.
Type of Funding: Unprogrammed Military construction;
Fiscal Year 2008: 0.0;
Fiscal Year 2009: 0.0;
Fiscal Year 2010: $53.0;
Fiscal Year 2011: $22.0;
Fiscal Year 2012: $48.5;
Fiscal Year 2013: 0.0;
Total: $123.5.
Type of Funding: Operation and maintenance;
Fiscal Year 2008: $3.7;
Fiscal Year 2009: $24.9;
Fiscal Year 2010: $22.9;
Fiscal Year 2011: $16.6;
Fiscal Year 2012: $17.7;
Fiscal Year 2013: $14.8;
Total: $100.6.
Type of Funding: Procurement;
Fiscal Year 2008: 0.0;
Fiscal Year 2009: $6.6;
Fiscal Year 2010: $2.2;
Fiscal Year 2011: $0.4;
Fiscal Year 2012: 0.0;
Fiscal Year 2013: 0.0;
Total: $9.2.
Type of Funding: Subtotal unprogrammed;
Fiscal Year 2008: $3.7;
Fiscal Year 2009: $31.5;
Fiscal Year 2010: $78.1;
Fiscal Year 2011: $39.0;
Fiscal Year 2012: $66.2;
Fiscal Year 2013: $14.8;
Total: $233.3.
Type of Funding: Total;
Fiscal Year 2008: $12.9;
Fiscal Year 2009: $49.6;
Fiscal Year 2010: $104.3;
Fiscal Year 2011: $165.4;
Fiscal Year 2012: $107.1;
Fiscal Year 2013: $77.3;
Total: $516.6.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
[End of table]
As seen in table 1, AFSOC has identified a need for $123.5 million more
in military construction funds for projects such as an aircraft washing
facility for C-130 aircraft, hangars for the Predator unmanned aerial
system, and squadron operations facilities for an AC-130 squadron.
AFSOC also identified a need for about $100.6 million in additional
operation and maintenance funding. According to AFSOC officials, about
$10.3 million is for minor construction projects, such as enlarging
entrance bay doors, reworking concrete ramps, and adding partition
walls and doors to buildings, and $27.6 million is for upgrading and
securing communications infrastructure. AFSOC officials told us that
$19.6 million is needed to procure temporary hangars for fuel cell
maintenance and corrosion control for C-130 aircraft and to lease
facilities for squadron operations until permanent facilities are
built.
Timeline for Moving Personnel to Cannon Air Force Base:
Cannon Air Force Base may have lower personnel levels and grow at a
slower rate than initially projected. In July 2007, AFSOC estimated
that Cannon Air Force Base would have about 3,900 personnel by the end
of fiscal year 2008 and grow to a peak of about 5,700 by the end of
fiscal year 2010. However, in September 2007, in response to our
request, AFSOC provided us with revised data indicating plans for lower
personnel levels and a slower rate of growth at Cannon. AFSOC‘s plans
as of November 2007 indicated that a total of about 2,400 personnel
would have moved to Cannon by the end of fiscal year 2008 and grow to a
potential peak of about 4,000 personnel by the end of fiscal year 2009.
Figure 2 displays initial and revised estimates of personnel to be
moved to Cannon.
Figure 2: Comparison of Initial and Revised Projected Personnel Growth
at Cannon, Fiscal Years 2008 to 2013:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph that illustrates a comparison of
initial and revised projected personnel growth at Cannon, fiscal years
2008 to 2013. The vertical axis of the graph represents number from
1,000 to 6,000. The horizontal axis of the graph represents fiscal
years 2008 to 2013. Lines are depicted that represent the following:
AFSOC initial projections; AFSOC revised projections. The graph
specifically depicts the following data:
AFSOC initial projection:
2008: 3,909;
2013: 5,680.
AFSOC revised projection:
2008: 2,373;
2013: 3,983.
Source: Air Force data.
[End of figure]
DOD officials told us that funding constraints caused them to reduce
the projected personnel growth at Cannon by about 1,400 personnel and
the decision to move these personnel is under review by DOD.
However, our analysis shows that AFSOC may not achieve even the
expected growth of about 4,000 personnel by 2010. AFSOC‘s revisions of
the planned personnel growth may be overstated because of the projected
decrease in aircraft to be located at Cannon. AFSOC officials told us
that fewer aircraft are being moved to Cannon than originally planned
and at a slower rate. For example, AFSOC originally projected that 104
aircraft would be based at Cannon by 2010, but subsequently projected
that 68 will be there by then.
Conclusions:
DOD will incur additional costs to establish a new mission at Cannon;
however, these costs were not considered as part of the BRAC process
because the decision to relocate AFSOC was made after the BRAC
Commission was disestablished and the President‘s report of the BRAC
recommendations was sent to Congress. In addition, because these costs
were not part of the BRAC process, Congress did not have visibility at
the time of approval over the Cannon recommendation and its impact on
the total costs and savings from implementing the BRAC 2005
recommendations.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
If Congress decides to authorize a future base closure round, it may
want to consider whether to allow a future BRAC Commission the
authority to add a contingent element to a recommendation and, if so,
under what conditions.
Agency Comments:
In a written comment letter, DOD had no comments on a draft of this
report. DOD‘s letter is reprinted in enclosure I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Commander of Special Operations
Command, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We
will provide copies of this report to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions on the information discussed in
this report, please contact me on (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures – 2:
[End of correspondence]
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
Unites States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
Unites States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
Unites States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
December 20 2007:
Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-244R, "Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force
Special Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico,"
dated December 4, 2007 (GAO Code 351051). The Department has reviewed
the Draft Report and has no comments.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond. DoD appreciates the work that
has gone into GAO's assessment.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Dr. Kalev I. Sepp:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Special Operations Capabilities:
[End enclosure]
Enclosure II:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant
Director; Aisha Cabrer; Colin Chambers; Mae Jones; Julia Matta; and
Allen Westheimer made significant contributions to this report.
[End enclosure]
Related GAO Products:
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and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. Washington, D.C.:
December 12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased
and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. Washington, D.C.:
December 11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute
of Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,
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Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
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Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor
Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers.
GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the
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Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers
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Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.
GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.
Military Bases: Observations on DOD‘s 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. Washington, D.C.:
July 18, 2005.
Military Bases: Analysis of DOD‘s 2005 Selection Process and
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.
Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds.
GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and
Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.
Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD‘s 2004 Report on the Need for
a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2004.
Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming
Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] AFSOC is the Air Force component of the U.S. Special Operations
Command; it is headquartered at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and it has
approximately 12,900 active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard
and civilian personnel. The active duty component is located at
Hurlburt Field, Florida; Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; and at two
overseas locations. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard
components are not affected by the realignment of units to Cannon.
[2] 31 U.S.C. § 717 (b).
[3] The F-16 fighter has a wingspan of 32 feet and 8 inches and a
height of 16 feet. The C-130 has a wingspan of 132 feet and 7 inches
and a height of 38 feet and 6 inches and, consequently, requires larger
hangars and other facilities.
[End of section]
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