Force Structure--Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan
Gao ID: GAO-08-354R January 18, 2008In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to expand the Army from a total of 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active and reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2013--an increase of 74,200 military personnel--in order to meet increasing strategic demands and to help reduce stress on the force. This planned expansion includes building six additional active modular brigade combat teams and additional modular support units, which will require a substantial increase in funding for personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. Currently, the Army estimates this expansion may require about $70 billion in increased funding through fiscal year 2013 and a significant amount in annual funding thereafter to sustain the expanded Army. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request contained $7.7 billion for Department of the Army funding related to the Grow the Force initiative. During the course of our review of Army modularity as required by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, we analyzed the $70.2 billion Grow the Force initiative funding plan. We are submitting this letter to Congressional staff at this time to provide the results of our analysis for Congressional consideration as Congressional committees evaluate DOD's fiscal year 2009 defense budget submission, which will request additional funding to grow the force. Specifically, we examined the supporting documentation and comprehensiveness of the $70.2 billion funding plan. We will issue a separate report in spring 2008 in response to the authorization act's requirement for GAO to report on the Army's transformation to the modular force in fiscal year 2008. We will also be reporting on the Army's planning and budgeting process for Grow the Force facilities.
The Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan for its Grow the Force initiative that allows decision makers to understand the full magnitude of the funds needed and weigh competing defense priorities. First, the Army's Grow the Force funding plan lacks transparency because Army budget materials and other documentation do not indicate how the Army developed the cost estimates that served as the basis of its $70.2 billion funding plan to grow the force. Army budget officials told us that they had limited time to prepare the funding plan before the President submitted the budget in February 2007. However, according to best practices, cost estimates should be transparent, comprehensive, and easily replicated and updated to help ensure the validity of the estimate. Second, the Army's funding plan is not comprehensive and may be somewhat understated because some costs were excluded and some factors are still evolving that could potentially affect the Grow the Force funding plan. For example, the $70.2 billion funding plan did not include over $2.5 billion for health care and educational support assistance associated with increasing personnel levels. In addition, in October 2007 the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to accelerate the Grow the Force implementation timelines for the active Army and Army National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010, which could increase costs such as budgeting for the hiring of military and civilian personnel sooner than programmed. The Army has an opportunity to update its Grow the Force initiative funding plan to reflect a more transparent and comprehensive approach. Without more complete information, decision makers could have difficulty understanding the basis for any future estimates the Army submits and weighing competing priorities. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense require the Army to (1) develop and provide Congress with an updated Grow the Force funding plan to support congressional oversight of the fiscal year 2009 budget submission, and (2) document the steps and sources of information used to develop an updated funding plan. DOD generally agreed with these recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Janet A. St. Laurent Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-4402GAO-08-354R, Force Structure--Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 18, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Force Structure - Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's
Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan:
In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to
expand the Army from a total of 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active and
reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2013--an increase of 74,200 military
personnel--in order to meet increasing strategic demands and to help
reduce stress on the force. This planned expansion includes building
six additional active modular brigade combat teams and additional
modular support units,[Footnote 1] which will require a substantial
increase in funding for personnel, equipment, and infrastructure.
Currently, the Army estimates this expansion may require about $70
billion in increased funding through fiscal year 2013 and a significant
amount in annual funding thereafter to sustain the expanded Army. The
President's fiscal year 2008 budget request contained $7.7 billion for
Department of the Army funding related to the Grow the Force
initiative.
During the course of our review of Army modularity as required by the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007,[Footnote 2] we analyzed the $70.2 billion Grow the Force
initiative funding plan. We are submitting this letter to you at this
time to provide the results of our analysis for your consideration as
your committees evaluate DOD's fiscal year 2009 defense budget
submission, which will request additional funding to grow the force.
Specifically, we examined the supporting documentation and
comprehensiveness of the $70.2 billion funding plan. We will issue a
separate report in spring 2008 in response to the authorization act's
requirement for GAO to report on the Army's transformation to the
modular force in fiscal year 2008. We will also be reporting on the
Army's planning and budgeting process for Grow the Force
facilities.[Footnote 3]
To assess the Army's supporting documentation for its funding plan to
Grow the Force, we analyzed Army and Department of Defense (DOD) budget
materials and discussed the key assumptions and cost estimating
methodology used to develop the funding plan with relevant Department
of the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officials. We also
assessed the extent to which the Army documented its cost estimate by
reviewing Army and best practices guidance on cost estimating and by
analyzing the Army's documentation for its cost estimate. We conducted
our work at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
Department of the Army Headquarters, U.S. Army National Guard and U.S.
Army Reserve Command. We conducted this performance audit from April
2007 to January 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We determined that the Army budget data we used were
sufficiently reliable for our review.
Results in Brief:
The Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan
for its Grow the Force initiative that allows decision makers to
understand the full magnitude of the funds needed and weigh competing
defense priorities. First, the Army's Grow the Force funding plan lacks
transparency because Army budget materials and other documentation do
not indicate how the Army developed the cost estimates that served as
the basis of its $70.2 billion funding plan to grow the force. Army
budget officials told us that they had limited time to prepare the
funding plan before the President submitted the budget in February
2007. However, according to best practices, cost estimates should be
transparent, comprehensive, and easily replicated and updated to help
ensure the validity of the estimate. Second, the Army's funding plan is
not comprehensive and may be somewhat understated because some costs
were excluded and some factors are still evolving that could
potentially affect the Grow the Force funding plan. For example, the
$70.2 billion funding plan did not include over $2.5 billion for health
care and educational support assistance associated with increasing
personnel levels. In addition,
in October 2007 the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to
accelerate the Grow the Force implementation timelines for the active
Army and Army National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010,
which could increase costs such as budgeting for the hiring of military
and civilian personnel sooner than programmed. The Army has an
opportunity to update its Grow the Force initiative funding plan to
reflect a more transparent and comprehensive approach. Without more
complete information, decision makers could have difficulty
understanding the basis for any future estimates the Army submits and
weighing competing priorities. We are recommending that the Secretary
of Defense require the Army to (1) develop and provide Congress with an
updated Grow the Force funding plan to support congressional oversight
of the fiscal year 2009 budget submission, and (2) document the steps
and sources of information used to develop an updated funding plan. DOD
generally agreed with these recommendations.
Background:
The Chief of Staff of the Army stated in September 2007 that increasing
the size of the Army will allow the Army to revitalize and balance the
force, reduce deployment periods, increase time soldiers spend at home
station in between deployments, increase capability, and strengthen the
systems that support the forces.[Footnote 4] The February 2007 force
structure plan sought to increase by six the number of active brigade
combat teams from 70 to 76 and the number of support brigades from 212
to 225. The initiative proposes to permanently increase Army end
strength by about 74,200 in the active Army, Army National Guard, and
Army Reserve by fiscal year 2013, as identified in table 1.
Table 1: Proposed Increases in Army End Strength by Component in Fiscal
Years 2007--2013:
Army Component: Active Army;
Fiscal year 2007: 36,000;
Fiscal year 2008: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2009: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2010: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2011: 7,000;
Fiscal year 2012; 1,000;
Fiscal year 2013: 0;
Total: 65,000.
Army Component: Army National Guard;
Fiscal year 2007: 0;
Fiscal year 2008: 1,319;
Fiscal year 2009: 1,247;
Fiscal year 2010: 1,335;
Fiscal year 2011: 1,432;
Fiscal year 2012; 1,487;
Fiscal year 2013: 1,381;
Total: 8,201.
Army Component: Army Reserve;
Fiscal year 2007: 0;
Fiscal year 2008: 0;
Fiscal year 2009: 0;
Fiscal year 2010: 0;
Fiscal year 2011: 0;
Fiscal year 2012; 0;
Fiscal year 2013: 1,010;
Total: 1,010.
Army Component: Total;
Fiscal year 2007: 36,000;
Fiscal year 2008: 8,319;
Fiscal year 2009: 8,247;
Fiscal year 2010: 8,335;
Fiscal year 2011: 8,432;
Fiscal year 2012; 2,487;
Fiscal year 2013: 2,391;
Total: 74,211.
Source: President's 2008 Budget Submission, February 2007.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
The Grow the Force initiative represents a shift in DOD's force
structure plans outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
In fiscal year 2004, the Army's authorized active end strength was
482,400 active military personnel. Since that time, the Army was
granted authority to increase its active end strength by 30,000. The
rationale for this increase was to provide flexibility to implement its
transformation to a modular force while continuing to deploy forces to
overseas operations. Rather than return the active Army end strength to
the 482,400 level by fiscal year 2011, as decided in the 2006 QDR,
DOD's 2007 proposal calls for increasing the active Army's permanent
end strength by 65,000 to 547,400 by fiscal year 2013.
Army budget materials identify the $70.2 billion funding plan by
appropriation through fiscal year 2013 (see table 2). DOD budget
officials told us that the $70.2 billion funding plan was included in
DOD's 2008--2013 Future Years Defense Program but was not identified as
a separate program. Rather, the funding was included within the total
for each respective appropriation because the Army developed its
program budget based on the total Army end strength. The Grow the Force
funding plan includes onetime costs for procurement and military
construction and recurring costs associated with military and civilian
personnel and operation and maintenance.
Table 2: Army Fiscal Year 2007--2013 Funding Plan for the Grow the
Force Initiative as of January 2007 (Dollars in billions):
Appropriations: Military Personnel;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2008: 0.7;
Fiscal year 2009: 3.9;
Fiscal year 2010: 4.6;
Fiscal year 2011: 5.2;
Fiscal year 2012: 5.5;
Fiscal year 2013: 5.6;
Total: 25.4.
Appropriations: Operation and Maintenance;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2008: 0.6;
Fiscal year 2009: 2.6;
Fiscal year 2010: 2.9;
Fiscal year 2011: 3.1;
Fiscal year 2012: 4.3;
Fiscal year 2013: 2.6;
Total: 16.1.
Appropriations: Procurement;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.9;
Fiscal year 2008: 4.1;
Fiscal year 2009: 4.2;
Fiscal year 2010: 5.1;
Fiscal year 2011: 3.0;
Fiscal year 2012: 0.6;
Fiscal year 2013: 0.0;
Total: 17.9.
Appropriations: Military Construction;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.4;
Fiscal year 2008: 2.4;
Fiscal year 2009: 4.3;
Fiscal year 2010: 2.4;
Fiscal year 2011: 0.7;
Fiscal year 2012: 0.5;
Fiscal year 2013: 0.1;
Total: 10.8.
Appropriations: Total;
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 1.3;
Fiscal year 2008: 7.7;
Fiscal year 2009: 15.0;
Fiscal year 2010: 15.0;
Fiscal year 2011: 12.0;
Fiscal year 2012: 10.9;
Fiscal year 2013: 8.3;
Total: 70.2.
Source: U.S. Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army Financial Management
and Comptroller, February 2007.
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
[A] Funds for fiscal year 2007 were contained in the Department of
Defense Fiscal Year 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global
War on Terror.
[End of table]
The Army's Grow the Force Funding Plan Is Not Transparent or
Comprehensive:
The Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan
for its Grow the Force initiative that allows decision makers to
understand the full magnitude of the costs and weigh competing
priorities. There is a lack of transparency in how the Army developed
the cost estimate that served as the basis for the $70.2 billion
funding plan. The Army estimated the costs to implement the Grow the
Force initiative at $70.2 billion, according to Army and Office of the
Secretary of Defense budget officials. However, based on our review of
Army budget materials and other documentation, it is not clear how the
Army developed this estimate. For example, Army documents do not
identify key assumptions, limitations, or the steps used to develop the
estimates. Army budget officials told us that they had limited time to
prepare the cost estimates and funding plan before the President
submitted the budget in February 2007. However, according to best
practices, high quality cost estimates use repeatable methods that will
result in estimates that are comprehensive and can also be easily and
clearly traced, replicated, and updated.[Footnote 5] The Army Cost
Analysis Manual states that cost analysts must document all steps in
the development of a cost estimate, including ground rules and
assumptions. The analyst must also state the source of all data and the
processes used to analyze the data.[Footnote 6] The Army has not
demonstrated that it followed its guidance for developing its Grow the
Force cost estimate.
In addition to a lack of transparency, the Army's February 2007 Grow
the Force funding plan is not comprehensive and may be understated
because some costs were excluded and some factors are still evolving
that could potentially affect this funding plan:
* The $70.2 billion funding plan provided to Congress excluded
operation and maintenance funds for health care and educational support
assistance totaling over $2.5 billion. According to the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Army's funding plan did
not include about $2.3 billion in health care support assistance and
about $217 million in educational assistance associated with increasing
personnel levels. Army officials told us these costs were excluded from
the Army's funding plan because the funds are provided respectively in
the Defense Health Program appropriation and Defense-wide Department of
Defense Education Activity appropriation. Nonetheless, Congress needs
to understand the full magnitude of costs to DOD as it considers the
Army's Grow the Force initiative.
* The number of Army civilians to be hired is likely understated. A
senior Army civilian personnel official said the Army's funding plan
included only a small number of civilians needed to be hired because
there was limited time to develop the estimate. Army major commands are
conducting a detailed mission needs analysis to identify overall
civilian personnel requirements. As a result, this official expects the
number of civilians needed to be hired to increase, thereby further
increasing costs.
* The Chief of Staff of the Army announced in October 2007 a plan to
accelerate the Grow the Force implementation timelines for the active
Army and Army National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010.
The Army initially identified the completion date of this initiative
for all Army components as fiscal year 2013. However, in October 2007
the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to accelerate the Grow
the Force implementation timelines for the active Army and Army
National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010. An Army
official in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated
that the Army is currently reviewing the cost estimates for
accelerating its planned force expansion. Accelerating the
implementation timeline could incur additional costs for reasons such
as the following:
- The Army would have to budget for the hiring of military and civilian
personnel sooner than programmed;
- The Army may have to increase recruitment and retention incentives to
meet end strength goals;
- Procuring equipment sooner than planned could require renegotiating
contracts, keeping production lines open longer, and paying overtime to
workers to meet increased production goals.
* The locations of the active and reserve units to be built were
unknown when the funding plan was developed. Because the locations of
the new units were unknown when the Army developed its cost estimate,
the Army used standard cost calculations to determine its military
construction estimate, which excluded environmental costs. Out of
concern about the lack of an overall plan to station and accommodate
permanent additional soldiers with the necessary facilities, Congress
restricted the Army from spending certain military construction funds
for the Grow the Force initiative until the Secretary of Defense
submits a detailed stationing plan to support Army end-strength growth
to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and
Senate.[Footnote 7] In response to this reporting requirement, on
December 18, 2007, the Army submitted to Congress a Grow the Force
stationing plan that identifies facilities necessary for brigade combat
teams, combat service and combat service support units, training, and
quality of life support facilities such as barracks, unit operations
facilities, maintenance facilities, and family housing.[Footnote 8] In
particular, the Army plans to build facilities for six infantry brigade
combat teams: two at Fort Carson, Colorado; two at Fort Stewart,
Georgia; and two at Fort Bliss, Texas. The Army stated it will revise
its initial $10.8 billion military construction cost estimate based on
the announced stationing locations and will include a full cost
determination and resource strategy as part of the fiscal year 2009
President's budget request and the fiscal years 2009--2013 Future Years
Defense Program. The Army noted that because the process of land
acquisition for federal agencies requires multiple approvals, and a
series of environmental and real estate planning studies, the December
2007 Army Stationing Plan did not identify installation expansion
actions. As a result, there could be additional land acquisition and
environmental costs that may not be included in the updated estimates.
* Changes to the force structure that served as the basis of the $70.2
billion funding plan could affect overall costs. The Army's $70.2
billion funding plan was based on a force structure plan of six
infantry brigade combat teams and additional support brigades, but Army
officials were still working on the specific force structure
requirements of the expanded Army in February 2007 when they developed
the funding plan. As a result, changes to the initial force structure
plan could increase costs. For example, the costs to procure heavy or
stryker brigade combat team--related equipment are more expensive than
for infantry brigades. An Army procurement official provided us
standard equipment estimates for brigade combat teams: Infantry ($590
million); Stryker ($1.7 billion to 1.9 billion); and Heavy ($1.2
billion to 2.5 billion). Army officials stated the force structure plan
has been revised since February 2007 but the Department of the Army has
not approved a final force structure document.
Given the magnitude of the Army's funding plan and potential changes to
the plan since DOD submitted its budget in February 2007, the Army
should be prepared to fully explain and document the basis for its
funding plan. The Army has an opportunity to update its Grow the Force
funding plan to reflect a more transparent and comprehensive approach,
given that the Army plans to request future funding. Without complete
information on the Army's $70.2 billion funding plan, decision makers
will have difficulty understanding the full magnitude of costs and
weighing competing priorities.
Conclusion:
Because the Army's funding request lacks transparency, and is not well-
documented and comprehensive, the Congress may not have the information
needed to consider the long-term costs and benefits associated with
increasing Army personnel levels or gauge the amount of funding that
should be appropriated to implement the initiative each year. To help
illuminate the basis for its request, the Army needs to describe its
process for documenting and revising its Grow the Force cost estimate,
the proposed force structure plan, implementation timelines, and how it
plans to manage and implement this initiative given competing
priorities for funding. The Army has an opportunity to address these
issues and facilitate congressional oversight of DOD's fiscal year 2009
budget request. Without more complete information on the Army's $70.2
billion funding plan, decision makers will have difficulty
understanding the full magnitude of costs and weighing competing
priorities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To support congressional oversight of the Army's Grow the Force
initiative and DOD's upcoming fiscal year 2009 budget request, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to take the following two actions:
* Provide Congress with additional information on the Army's Grow the
Force initiative at the earliest possible date, but not later than
March 30, 2008. This information should include the following:
- The force structure to be created by this initiative and associated
implementation timelines;
- A revised Grow the Force funding plan;
- The cost estimating methodology used to develop the Grow the Force
funding plan, including (1) key assumptions, (2) key factors that could
affect the Grow the Force funding plan, and (3) a clear definition of
costs that were excluded from the estimate.
* Maintain a transparent audit trail including documentation of the
steps used to develop the Grow the Force funding plan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the
recommendations. DOD comments are presented in their entirety in
appendix I.
Specifically, DOD agreed to (1) provide Congress with additional
information on the Army's Grow the Force initiative not later than
March 30, 2008, and (2) maintain a transparent audit trail including
documentation of the steps used to develop the Grow the Force funding
plan. In explaining how it planned to address our first recommendation,
DOD stated that it would identify the Army's Grow the Force
implementation timelines, force structure, and funding plan in the
Army's December 2007 Grow the Army Stationing Plan, the Army's Fiscal
Year 2008 Annual Report on Army Progress, the Army Campaign Plan, and
its revised funding estimates. We believe these are positive steps.
However, until DOD and the Army issue all of the stated documents, we
cannot determine the extent to which these actions will improve the
transparency of the Army's Grow the Force cost estimates and funding
plan. Identifying the Army's cost estimating methodology as well as DOD-
wide Grow the Force requirements as part of an updated Grow the Force
funding plan would provide a more transparent basis for understanding
the full magnitude of related requirements and costs.
In explaining how it planned to address our second recommendation, DOD
stated that although the Army's year-to-year staffing, equipping, and
facilities are not identified as a separate budget activity, the Army
will identify requirements and funding associated with the Grow the
Force plan in the development of the fiscal year 2010/2011 defense
budget and preparations for the fiscal year 2010--2015 Future Years
Defense Program. While we recognize the Army will not develop a
separate budget activity for the Army's Grow the Force funding plan,
there is a need for transparency of the Army's Grow the Force funding
plan given the significant amount of funding requested ($70.2 billion).
In addition to identifying requirements and funding plans to complete
this initiative, we believe the Army needs to maintain a transparent
audit trail to demonstrate how its Grow the Force funding request is
linked to Army requirements.
We are providing this letter today to relevant congressional defense
committees. If you or your have staff have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at
stlaurent@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report were Wendy Jaffe,
Assistant Director, Kelly Baumgartner, Grace Coleman, Barbara Gannon,
Terry Richardson, Kathryn Smith, and Karen Thornton.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of correspondence]
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
January 18, 2008:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report "Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force
Initiative Funding Plan," dated December 18, 2007 (GAO Code 351128/GAO-
08-354R). The Department concurs with the two GAO recommendations and
our comments are enclosed.
The Army's Grow the Force initiative is not a discrete budget element
of Army equipping, staffing, operations, and facilities. This
initiative was framed in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 defense budget. The
Department is increasing the Army end-strength by more than 74,000 and
is addressing the manning, equipping, and facilities needs for the new
and augmented combat and support brigades for those personnel. In
December, the Department provided to Congress the Army's end-strength
growth stationing plan. This, with the Army's FY2008 Annual Report on
Army Progress and revised funding estimates provide the force
structure, timelines, and funding plan for the Army's Grow the Force
initiative.
The Army's year to year equipping, staffing, and readiness plans are
considered Department resourcing priorities and are based on: (1)
deployment needs to fulfill missions; (2) existing Army equipment and
personnel; (3) planned upgrades and expansions; and (4) emerging needs.
Oversight of equipping, manning, and readiness plans comes through
existing Department requirements, readiness, acquisition, and
resourcing entities including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
Senior Readiness Oversight Council, Defense Acquisition Board, and the
Comptroller. The Department continually seeks to improve these
management and oversight processes for better overall efficiency.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report – Dated December 18, 2007:
GAO Code 351128/GAO-08-354R:
"Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force Initiative
Funding Plan"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress with additional
information on the Army's Grow the Force initiative at the earliest
possible date, but not later than March 30, 2008. This information
should include:
* The force structure to be created by this initiative and associated
implementation timelines;
* A revised Grow the Force funding plan and;
* The cost estimating methodology used to develop the Grow the Force
funding plan, including: (1) key assumptions, (2) key factors that
could affect the Grow the Force funding plan; and (3) a clear
definition of costs that were excluded from the estimate.
DOD Response: Concur. In December the Department provided the Army's
end-strength growth stationing plan to the Congress. This, in
conjunction with the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report on Army
Progress, submitted in accordance with section 323 of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Army
Campaign Plan, and revised funding estimates will frame the Grow the
Army force structure, implementation timelines, and funding plan.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to maintain a transparent audit trail
including documentation of the steps used to develop the Grow the Force
funding plan.
DOD Response: Concur. Although the Army's year-to-year equipping,
staffing, and facilities plans are not discretely segregated in the
budget by initiatives such as the Army's Grow the Force, the Army will
identify requirements and funding associated with the Grow the Army
plan in the development of the Fiscal Year 2010/2011 Defense Budget and
preparations of the Fiscal Year 2010-2015 Future Years Defense Program.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The modular support units are the following: two combat support
brigades, one fires brigade, one air defense brigade, one engineer
brigade, and two sustainment brigades.
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323 (2006).
[3] H.R. Rep. No. 110-186, (2007) at 12.
[4] Statement by General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army, before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives, September 26, 2007.
[5] GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and
Managing Program Costs, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington, DC.: July 2007).
[6] Department of the Army, Cost Analysis Manual, U.S. Army Cost and
Economic Analysis Center, May 2002.
[7] U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat.
126 (2007).
[8] The December 2008 Army Stationing Plan incorporates the
acceleration of the implementation timelines for active and National
Guard end strength from fiscal year 2013 to 2010.
[End of section]
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