Force Structure
The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-09-131 November 14, 2008Amid ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army embarked in 2004 on a plan to create a modular, brigade-based force that would be equally capable as its divisional predecessor in part because it would have advanced equipment and specialized personnel. GAO has previously reported that restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete. For this report, GAO assessed the extent to which the Army has (1) developed a plan to link funding with results and (2) evaluated its modular force designs. GAO analyzed Army equipment and personnel data, key Army reports, planning documents, performance metrics, testing plans, and funding requests. GAO also visited Army Training and Doctrine Command, including selected Army proponents and schools; Army Reserve Command; and the National Guard Bureau.
The Army will have established over 80 percent of its modular units by the end of 2008 but does not have a results-oriented plan with clear milestones in place to guide efforts to equip and staff those new units. The Army has been focused on equipping and staffing units to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the equipment and personnel level of non-deployed units has been declining. The Army now anticipates that modular units will be equipped and staffed in 2019--more than a decade away--but has provided few details about what to expect in the interim. And while the Army projects that it will have enough equipment and personnel in the aggregate, its projections rely on uncertain assumptions related to restoring equipment used in current operations, as well as meeting recruiting and retention goals while simultaneously expanding the Army. Further, GAO's detailed analysis of Army data shows that the Army could face shortfalls of certain modern equipment. Such items are important because the success of the modular design rests in part on obtaining key enablers needed for modular units to function as planned, such as equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. GAO has previously reported that the Army lacks a funding plan that includes interim measures for equipping and staffing the modular force, making it difficult to evaluate progress. Without a plan for equipment and staffing that links funding with results and provides milestones, the Army cannot assure decision makers when modular units will have the required equipment and staff in place to restore readiness. Finally, without this plan the Army risks cost growth and further timeline slippage in its efforts to transform to a more modular and capable force. The Army uses several approaches in testing unit designs and capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive assessment of modular forces. Testing the force is intended to determine whether modular units are capable of performing missions across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army has focused its testing efforts on combat units conducting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. However, gaps in the Army's testing could affect its forces' ability to deliver needed capabilities. First, the Army has not fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because the doctrine that would define how modular support units will train, be sustained, and support the fight has not been completed. This doctrine provides a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of support units. Further, the Army has not assigned a focal point the responsibility for integrating assessments across activities, such as equipping and training. Second, the Army tested the capability of modular designs primarily unconstrained by resources, not at the level of personnel and equipment that the Army plans to provide units. Lacking an analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at levels that it plans to have, the Army will not be in a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities that it is fielding can perform mission requirements.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-131, Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2008:
Force Structure:
The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and Staff Modular
Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities:
Army Modularity:
GAO-09-131:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-131, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Amid ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army embarked in
2004 on a plan to create a modular, brigade-based force that would be
equally capable as its divisional predecessor in part because it would
have advanced equipment and specialized personnel. GAO has previously
reported that restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require
billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete. For this
report, GAO assessed the extent to which the Army has (1) developed a
plan to link funding with results and (2) evaluated its modular force
designs. GAO analyzed Army equipment and personnel data, key Army
reports, planning documents, performance metrics, testing plans, and
funding requests. GAO also visited Army Training and Doctrine Command,
including selected Army proponents and schools; Army Reserve Command;
and the National Guard Bureau.
What GAO Found:
The Army will have established over 80 percent of its modular units by
the end of 2008 but does not have a results-oriented plan with clear
milestones in place to guide efforts to equip and staff those new
units. The Army has been focused on equipping and staffing units to
support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the
equipment and personnel level of non-deployed units has been declining.
The Army now anticipates that modular units will be equipped and
staffed in 2019”more than a decade away”but has provided few details
about what to expect in the interim. And while the Army projects that
it will have enough equipment and personnel in the aggregate, its
projections rely on uncertain assumptions related to restoring
equipment used in current operations, as well as meeting recruiting and
retention goals while simultaneously expanding the Army. Further, GAO‘s
detailed analysis of Army data shows that the Army could face
shortfalls of certain modern equipment. Such items are important
because the success of the modular design rests in part on obtaining
key enablers needed for modular units to function as planned, such as
equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. GAO has
previously reported that the Army lacks a funding plan that includes
interim measures for equipping and staffing the modular force, making
it difficult to evaluate progress. Without a plan for equipment and
staffing that links funding with results and provides milestones, the
Army cannot assure decision makers when modular units will have the
required equipment and staff in place to restore readiness. Finally,
without this plan the Army risks cost growth and further timeline
slippage in its efforts to transform to a more modular and capable
force.
The Army uses several approaches in testing unit designs and
capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive
assessment of modular forces. Testing the force is intended to
determine whether modular units are capable of performing missions
across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army has focused its testing
efforts on combat units conducting ongoing counterinsurgency
operations. However, gaps in the Army‘s testing could affect its
forces‘ ability to deliver needed capabilities. First, the Army has not
fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because the
doctrine that would define how modular support units will train, be
sustained, and support the fight has not been completed. This doctrine
provides a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of support units.
Further, the Army has not assigned a focal point the responsibility for
integrating assessments across activities, such as equipping and
training. Second, the Army tested the capability of modular designs
primarily unconstrained by resources, not at the level of personnel and
equipment that the Army plans to provide units. Lacking an analysis of
the capabilities of the modular force at levels that it plans to have,
the Army will not be in a position to realistically assess whether the
capabilities that it is fielding can perform mission requirements.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army develop and report to Congress a results-
oriented plan, that includes milestones that better links funding to
results; complete a plan for developing doctrine for its modular
forces; and better assess the effectiveness of modular forces with
authorized levels of equipment and personnel. Because DOD‘s comments
disagreed or were not fully responsive to these recommendations, GAO
elevated them to Congress for consideration.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-131]. For more
information, contact John Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or
pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Army Has Made Progress Establishing Modular Units but Does Not Have
a Plan That Links Funding and Results to Guide Its Efforts to Equip and
Staff the Modular Force:
The Army Has Not Fully Evaluated the Capabilities of the Modular Force
across the Full Spectrum of Conflict:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: List of Key Equipment and Personnel Enablers:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Key Equipment Enablers Identified by GAO:
Table 2: Key Personnel Enablers Identified by GAO:
Table 3: Projected Availability of Selected Key Modern Equipment
Compared to the Authorized Level in Fiscal Year 2012:
Table 4: Projected Availability of Selected Key Equipment Enablers at
the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012:
Table 5: Key Equipment Enablers Available at the Authorized Level in
Fiscal Years 2007 and 2012.
Table 6: Key Equipment Enablers Available and Shortages of Modern
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2007:
Table 7: Key Equipment Enablers Available and Shortages of Modern
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012:
Table 8: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel On
Hand by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Authorized Levels:
Table 9: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Occupational
Specialties at Fiscal Year 2007 Authorized Levels:
Table 10: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel
Available by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Design Levels:
Figure:
Figure 1: Actual and Planned Army Modular Unit Restructuring Including
the Army's Expansion Plan, March 2008:
Abbreviations:
ACE: Analysis and Control Element:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities:
TRADOC: Army's Training and Doctrine Command:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 14, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
During a period of continuing high demand for military capability, the
Army is undertaking a significant transformation of its organization
and force structure as well as an expansion of its force by more than
74,200 military personnel. One major initiative of this transformation-
-referred to as Army modularity--is the redesign of units from a large
division-based structure to a brigade-based structure. An important
difference between the new modular brigade combat teams and the
previous division-based brigades is an increased capability to operate
independently enabled by embedded combat support functions such as
military intelligence, reconnaissance, and logistics. Although somewhat
smaller in size than the divisional brigades, the new modular brigades
are envisioned to be just as capable because they will have different
equipment--including key enablers[Footnote 1] such as advanced
communications and surveillance equipment--and a broad mix of
personnel. Continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan led the
Defense Department to expand the Army to help reduce the stress on the
force and meet increasing strategic demands. This initiative, called
Grow the Force, will increase equipment and personnel needs, and we
have reported that the full costs to restructure and rebuild the Army
are large but uncertain.[Footnote 2]
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007[Footnote 3] directed the Comptroller General to provide to
congressional defense committees an annual assessment, among other
things, of the Army's progress equipping and staffing modular units in
the active and reserve components, progress by the Army in conducting
further testing and evaluation of the Army's modular unit designs, and
the use of funds by the Army for equipping its modular units. In
accordance with this mandate for fiscal year 2008, we provided a
briefing to your offices in March 2008 on our preliminary observations.
This report expands on the information reported in those briefings and
addresses in more detail the extent to which the Army (1) has developed
a comprehensive plan that links results to investments with defined
milestones and (2) has tested and evaluated its modular force design.
To assess the Army's plan to guide its efforts to equip and staff the
modular force, we analyzed relevant Army plans and reports to Congress
for equipping and staffing the modular force. We developed in
conjunction with the Army a means for analyzing key equipment and
personnel enablers of the modular force. Based on our review of Army
modularity studies and reports, we defined key enablers as those pieces
of equipment or personnel that are required for the organization to
function as planned, providing the modular design with equal or
increased capabilities compared with the previous divisional structure
in areas such as a unit's firepower, survivability, and intelligence-
surveillance-reconnaissance. To develop a preliminary list of key
equipment and personnel enablers, we reviewed key Army modularity
reports and obtained official comments from the Department of the Army
and Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which is responsible
for the design and evaluation of modular units.[Footnote 4] We then
submitted the preliminary list to the Headquarters, Department of the
Army, for official input and held subsequent discussions with Army
officials. Our identification and analysis of fifteen key equipment
enablers compares total Army (active, National Guard, and Reserve)
equipment authorizations and design requirements for the operating and
institutional forces with total Army on-hand quantities in April 2007
with planned equipment deliveries and projected equipment on hand in
fiscal year 2012. Our identification and analysis of nine key personnel
enablers compares active Army personnel authorizations and design
requirements for the operating and institutional forces with active
Army on-hand personnel strength in April 2007 and projected personnel
strength for fiscal year 2012 (see app. I for details on our analysis
of key equipment and personnel enablers). The Army's fiscal-year 2007
to 2012 equipment and personnel plans were the most recent data
available to us when we developed this analysis. The Army provided
updated data on the status of the Army's equipment as compared to the
design requirement as of June 29, 2008. We did not assess the
reliability of this 2008 data. However, the 2008 data were generally
consistent with the data we analyzed in 2007. To assess the extent to
which the Army has tested and evaluated the design of the modular
force, we examined TRADOC's modular force assessment process and plans
to evaluate modular combat and combat support unit designs. Although we
did not independently test the reliability of Army data electronically,
we determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report based on discussions with Army officials about the data
quality control procedures used to ensure the reliability of the
relevant equipment and personnel databases. We conducted this
performance audit from April 2007 to September 2008 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology used in the
report are described in more detail in appendix II.
We conducted this review as part of a continuing body of work related
to the Army's transformation to the modular force. In December 2007, we
reported that the Army is making progress establishing modular units in
the active and reserve components but has not established sufficient
management controls to provide accountability for results for
establishing modular units and expanding the force.[Footnote 5] In
response to that report, the Secretary of Defense agreed with our
recommendations to improve management controls and develop a
comprehensive Army strategy and funding plan for staffing and equipping
modular units. We also found that while the Army is evaluating lessons
learned from its ongoing counterinsurgency operations, it lacks a
comprehensive plan to determine whether fielded modular unit designs
meet the Army's original goals for modular units across the full
spectrum of conflict.[Footnote 6] In January 2008, we reported that the
Army did not develop a transparent and comprehensive funding plan for
its estimated $70.2 billion Grow the Force initiative that would allow
decision makers to understand the full magnitude of the funds needed
and weigh competing defense priorities.[Footnote 7]
Results in Brief:
The Army will have established 84 percent of its planned modular units
by the end of 2008 although non-deployed units may not be fully
equipped and staffed, and the Army continues to lack a plan to guide
efforts to equip and staff new units that links funding with results
and defines interim milestones. Our prior work has shown that
successful transformation initiatives have a plan that links overall
results with funding needs. The Army has been concentrating on
providing units deploying to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
with specially trained personnel and the most modern equipment
available. However, as military operations have continued, the
equipment and personnel levels of non-deployed units have declined. The
Army has extended its estimates of how long it will take to equip the
modular force from 2011 to 2019, and the full costs have not been
determined. The Army projects that it will have enough equipment and
personnel in the aggregate by 2012, but it will continue to rely on
older equipment to mitigate significant shortfalls in modern equipment.
Moreover, the Army's projections depend on uncertain planning
assumptions related to repairing equipment used in operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan and recruiting and retaining personnel. According to a
2004 Army Task Force Modularity study, the success of the modular
design rests in part upon the availability of key enablers, such as
equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. Despite our
December 2007 recommendations to develop measures of progress, the Army
continues to lack a results-oriented plan to equip and staff modular
units that provides interim milestones against which to measure the
Army's progress. For example, in its 2008 annual report to Congress on
modularity and other equipment issues,[Footnote 8] the Army did not
provide detailed information--such as equipment available and planned
investments compared to requirements--that would enable Congress to
assess the Army's progress in meeting its equipment needs. Section 323
of the John Warner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 does
not require the Army to submit detailed information in its annual
report. However, until the Army assembles and provides sufficient
detail to show how requirements, proposed investments, and planned
procurements are linked, it will not be in the best position to
demonstrate that it is making progress in delivering the modern
equipment and specialized personnel capabilities envisioned in its
modular force design. Because the Army has not provided the kind of
results-oriented plan needed to enhance congressional oversight of the
Army's equipping and staffing plans, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and
report to Congress, in conjunction with its annual report on the
progress of the modular force, a results-oriented plan that provides a
detailed assessment of the Army's progress toward meeting overall
personnel equipment requirements for the modular force by year and
identifies any risks associated with equipment and personnel
shortfalls.
The Army uses a variety of analytic approaches to evaluate its modular
forces and update organizational designs, but these approaches have not
yet represented a thorough assessment of the capabilities of modular
units across the force. Specifically, the Army has not (1) completed
the doctrine of how support units will operate or designated a focal
point for ensuring that assessments are integrated or (2) assessed the
modular force's capabilities with the levels of equipment and personnel
that the Army expects to provide. Methodically testing, exercising, and
evaluating new concepts are established practices for entities that are
undergoing significant organizational transformation. According to the
Army, the utility of its modular design is being proven in current
operations, and lessons learned from current operations have identified
changes that have made units more capable. However, while the Army has
placed priority on developing the doctrine that defines how combat
units will train, be sustained, and fight, it has not completed
developing doctrine for how modular support forces will operate or
designated an organization focal point to lead an integrated assessment
of their capabilities. Until the doctrine is completed and a focal
point is established to integrate assessments of areas that affect
their capabilities, the Army will not have assurance that its support
forces will have the capabilities they require. In addition, the Army
projects that it will face significant shortfalls of selected modern
equipment and personnel in some modular units that could result in less
capability than envisioned by the modular force design. Lacking a
comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at
authorized levels, the Army will not be in the best position to
prioritize investments to maximize the capabilities that it is fielding
across the Army. We are recommending that the Army complete the
development of doctrine for modular support forces, establish a focal
point for integrating assessments of support forces capabilities, and
assess the effectiveness of modular forces with the authorized levels
of equipment and personnel.
In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with one
recommendation, agreed with two recommendations, and partially agreed
with one recommendation. DOD disagreed with our recommendation that it
develop and report to Congress a results-oriented plan that links
investments with expected results and provides interim milestones. DOD
stated that modularity is a strategy for having interchangeable units
to support operations, not a program for equipping, manning, or
modernizing the force that requires a plan separate from the Army's
overall equipping and manning plans. However, although DOD has
processes for equipping, manning, and modernizing the force, these
plans are not clearly linked in a way that demonstrates the results of
investment decisions made through these processes. Without a plan that
details how investments will be linked to improvements in readiness and
the goals and milestones against which progress may be assessed, DOD
leaders and congressional decision makers will not have complete
information with which to make informed investment decisions. DOD
agreed with our recommendations that it complete doctrine for modular
support forces and appoint a focal point for ensuring that support
units' requirements for doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities are integrated, and DOD cited in
its written comments some actions it has taken to provide doctrine and
appoint a focal point for integration of activities across these
domains. However, the actions DOD cited in its comments do not meet the
intent of the recommendations, and the department did not specify any
additional actions that it intends to implement the recommendations. We
continue to believe that by implementing these recommendations, DOD
could improve the operation of its modular support forces. DOD
partially agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities of
modular forces across the full spectrum of possible missions and with
authorized levels of personnel and equipment, stating that the Army is
currently assessing modular force capabilities and additional direction
is not required. As the report discusses, we believe that assessing
whether modular forces are capable of fulfilling the range of missions
they may be called upon to undertake is important and that until the
Army begins to test units with realistic personnel and equipment levels
and across the full spectrum of conflict, the Army faces risks
associated with shortfalls of key equipment should a different type of
capability be needed in future operations in a different kind of
conflict. Because DOD did not specify in its written comments actions
that it will take to address three of our recommendations, we have
elevated these as matters for congressional consideration, suggesting
that Congress consider requiring the Army to provide in its annual
report on modularity more detailed information on equipping plans,
status of doctrine for support forces, and testing of modular forces
with equipment and personnel levels that can realistically be expected
in the near future. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in
detail in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section of this
report.
Background:
The Army's modular restructuring initiative began in 2004 as part of
the overall transformation of the Army and was informed by earlier Army
studies, such as the Striker Brigade Combat Team effort. The foundation
of the modular force is the modular brigade combat team. A primary goal
of the restructuring was to increase the number of available brigade
combat teams to meet operational requirements while maintaining combat
effectiveness that is equal to or better than previous division
brigades. Modular combat brigades have one of three standard designs--
heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade. In addition,
combat support and combat service support formations have a common
design that can be tailored to meet varied demands of the combatant
commanders. As opposed to the Army's legacy units, the standardized
modular unit designs are being implemented in the National Guard and
Army Reserves with the same organizational structure, equipment, and
personnel requirements as active duty units. The Army plans to have
reconfigured its total force--to include active and reserve components-
-into the modular design.
With the assistance of the Army, GAO identified the types of personnel
and equipment that will enable the brigade-based modular force to be as
capable as its predecessor, the division-based force. These key
equipment enablers are classified by category, such as tactical radios.
Within each category we identified the different equipment items that
provide that capability; for example, in the tactical radio category,
there are 317 different types of equipment (see table 1).
Table 1: Key Equipment Enablers Identified by GAO:
Key equipment enablers by category: All-source Analysis System;
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides battlefield commanders
with enhanced situational awareness and intelligence on enemy forces;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 4.
Key equipment enablers by category: Analysis and control element;
Description of equipment capabilities: Furnishes higher-level
commanders with intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination
capability;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 8.
Key equipment enablers by category: Battle command systems;
Description of equipment capabilities: Enhances the commander's
information- gathering and decision-making capability;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 95.
Key equipment enablers by category: Fire support sensor system;
Description of equipment capabilities: Designates targets to enable
ground and air delivered precision-strike capability;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 6.
Key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar;
Description of equipment capabilities: Detects the location of mortars,
artillery, and short and long-range rockets through the use of radar;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 6.
Key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node;
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides high-speed, high-
capacity tactical communications down to battalion level;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 8.
Key equipment enablers by category: Long range advanced scout
surveillance;
Description of equipment capabilities: Affords long- range target
acquisition capabilities to armor and infantry scouts enabling them to
conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 3.
Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - high frequency;
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides commanders with radios
that provide beyond the line-of-sight voice and data capability;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 17.
Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - tactical;
Description of equipment capabilities: Allows higher-level units to
command and maintain contact with lower-level units;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 317.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light;
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides multipurpose
transportation using light, mobile four-wheel drive vehicles;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 43.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium;
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides multipurpose
transportation using medium trucks;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 176.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - heavy;
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides multipurpose
transportation using heavy trucks;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 106.
Key equipment enablers by category: Trojan spirit;
Description of equipment capabilities: Furnishes high-capacity, secure
satellite communications services to tactical Army units;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 14.
Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - Prophet;
Description of equipment capabilities: Allows an all-weather, near-
real-time view of an area of responsibility through the use of signals
and intelligence sensors;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 8.
Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - small;
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities to ground commanders;
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 51.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of table]
We also classified key personnel enablers by category, such as
psychological operations, and within each category we examined specific
types of officer and enlisted skills. For example, within the
psychological operations category we identified psychological
operations officers and enlisted psychological operations specialists
as key personnel enablers of the modular force (see table 2).
Table 2: Key Personnel Enablers Identified by GAO:
Key personnel enablers by category: Ammunition;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Manage and maintain armament, missile and electronic systems,
conventional and nuclear munitions and warheads; and the detection,
identification, rendering safe, recovery, or destruction of hazardous
munitions.
Key personnel enablers by category: Armor;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Direct, operate, and employ tanks, armored vehicles, support infantry
and related equipment.
Key personnel enablers by category: Civil affairs;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Support the commander's relationship with civil authorities, the local
populace, non-governmental organizations and international
organizations.
Key personnel enablers by category: Communication and information
systems operation/Signal Corps;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Manage all facets of Army and designated Department of Defense
automated, electronic, and communication assets. More specifically,
Signal Corps personnel are involved in the planning, design,
engineering, operations, logistics and evaluation of information
systems and networks.
Key personnel enablers by category: Field artillery;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Provide fire support to Army units through the employment of field
artillery systems. These personnel control, direct and perform
technical firing operations, and coordinate the efforts of multiple
fire support assets.
Key personnel enablers by category: Mechanical maintenance;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Perform repair functions on Army weapons systems and equipment that
support maneuver forces in their preparation for and conduct of
operations across the entire operational spectrum.
Key personnel enablers by category: Military intelligence;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Provide commanders with all-source intelligence assessments and
estimates at the tactical, operations, and strategic levels dealing
with enemy capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, effects of
terrain and weather on operations, and predicts enemy courses of
action.
Key personnel enablers by category: Psychological operations;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Plan, conduct, and evaluate operations that convey selected information
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups and individuals throughout the
entire spectrum of conflict.
Key personnel enablers by category: Transportation;
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category:
Manage all facets of transportation including the planning, operating,
coordination and evaluation of all methods of transportation.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of table]
As part of the redesign of the modular force, the Army is developing
unit blueprints that identify design requirements for equipment and
personnel. The design requirement, also known as the Objective Table of
Organization and Equipment or objective requirement, represents the
Army's goal of a fully modernized level of equipment and staffing for
each type of modular unit and is unconstrained by resources. Because
the Army's design requirements represent a future objective that is
continually updated and refined over time, the Army establishes an
interim requirement, known as the Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment, and authorizes equipment and personnel levels across the
Army based on its current inventory of equipment and personnel, planned
procurement timelines, and anticipated funding. The Army expects to use
this modified list of equipment and personnel for the foreseeable
future to guide the conversion of existing divisions to modular
brigades. In sum, the design requirement is the level that the Army
would like each unit to have in the long-term, whereas the authorized
level is what the Army can afford in the interim.
The Army also considered DOD's strategic plan as it restructured to a
brigade-based force. For example, the Army's Brigade Combat Team
designs were intended to be effective across the full spectrum of
conflict, including global war, major theater war, smaller scale
contingencies, insurgency/counter-insurgencies, and stability and
support operations. Full spectrum of conflict includes a span of
threats ranging from low intensity conflict, where the major threats
are from ambush and skirmishes carried out by insurgents, to high-
intensity conflict, where an enemy operates large numbers of armored
vehicles and advanced weapons. DOD's most recent strategic plan, the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, now refers to Army combat power in
terms of brigade combat teams rather than number of divisions,
consistent with the Army's new structure. In addition, the Army will
create a number of different types of modular support units, and
multifunctional and functional support brigades, which will provide,
for example, intelligence, logistics, communications, and other types
of important support capability to brigade combat teams.
The Army has traditionally evaluated units' designs and capabilities,
such as support units and support capability, across a number of
domains or areas: doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Doctrine describes how
DOD fights, trains, and sustains it forces and is generally the
starting point for assessing capabilities. Organization refers to the
design of units--how many and what types of personnel and materiel
(equipment) a unit needs to provide a specific capability. Training,
materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities are also important
components in building and sustaining capabilities. By looking across
the domains, the Army can evaluate how proposed changes in one area can
affect other areas and the units' overall capability. For example, the
Army may evaluate the effect of adding more or different types of
materiel or equipment on the capability of a unit to determine whether
such changes would require changes in a unit's doctrine, organization,
or training requirements. TRADOC is responsible for developing designs
of modular units and evaluating whether modular combat and support
units will be capable of successfully conducting operations across the
full spectrum of conflict. Other organizations within the Army have
responsibilities for personnel, equipment, and facilities that are also
critical to building and maintaining the modular force.
The Secretary of Defense announced an initiative in January 2007--
referred to as the Grow the Force initiative--to expand the size of the
Army by about 74,200 military personnel to meet increasing strategic
demands and to help reduce stress on the force. This planned expansion
includes building six additional active modular brigade combat teams
and additional modular support units, which will require a substantial
increase in funding for personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. In
January 2007, the Army estimated this expansion may require about $70.2
billion in increased funding initially and a significant amount in
annual funding to sustain the expanded Army.
The Army Has Made Progress Establishing Modular Units but Does Not Have
a Plan That Links Funding and Results to Guide Its Efforts to Equip and
Staff the Modular Force:
The Army is making progress establishing modular units, but does not
have a transparent results-oriented plan with clear milestones to guide
efforts to fully equip and staff the modular force. Although the Army
has extended the timeline from 2011 to 2019 for fully equipping the
modular force, it has not identified the total cost needed to achieve
its revised equipping goal. Our prior work has shown that successful
transformation initiatives have a plan that links overall results with
funding needs. While the Army projects that it will make progress
toward its authorized equipment and staffing goals, it is likely to
face some significant shortfalls by 2012 of modern equipment that is
required for the modular force to operate as originally designed.
Further, the Army's equipment and personnel plans depend on some
assumptions related to rehabilitating equipment used in operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan and related to recruitment and retention that may
be uncertain, given the current pace of operations. According to a key
2004 Army Task Force Modularity study, the success of modular design
rests in part on the availability of key enablers that are required for
modular brigade combat teams to function as planned.[Footnote 9]
Without providing a detailed plan for equipment and staffing that links
funding with results, the congressional decision makers will not have
information to track the Army's progress toward equipping and staffing
its forces.
The Army Is Making Progress Restructuring the Modular Force but Is
Forming Units with Shortages in Equipment and Personnel:
The Army is making progress establishing modular units. In accordance
with Army strategy, including its expansion plans, the Army plans to
have converted 256 of 303 (84 percent) modular combat and support units
through the end of fiscal year 2008. Figure 1 shows the status of the
conversions for active, reserve, and National Guard combat and support
brigades.
Figure 1: Actual and Planned Army Modular Unit Restructuring Including
the Army's Expansion Plan, March 2008:
This figure is a bar graph showing actual and planned army modular unit
restructuring including the Army's expansion plan, March 2008. The X
axis represents the number of modular units, and the Y axis represents
the component and unit type. The bars represents units converted
through fiscal year 2007, units expected to convert in fiscal year
2008, and units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
Component: Total Army;
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 65;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 3;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8.
Component: Total Army;
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 52;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 27;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 18.
Component: Total Army;
Unit Type: Functional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 93;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 16;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 21.
Component: Active Army;
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 39;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 1;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8.
Component: Active Army;
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 29;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 3;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 7.
Component: Active Army;
Unit Type: Functional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 28;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 8;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8.
Component: National Guard;
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 26;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 2;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 0.
Component: National Guard;
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 19;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 19;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8.
Component: National Guard;
Unit Type: Functional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 30;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 6;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 2.
Component: U.S. Army Reserve;
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 0;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 0;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 0.
Component: U.S. Army Reserve;
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 4;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 5;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 3.
Component: U.S. Army Reserve;
Unit Type: Functional support brigades;
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 35;
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 2;
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 11.
[See PDF for image]
Source: United States Army.
Note: The Army will convert two additional units in the National Guard
to brigade combat teams in fiscal year 2008. However, one of the
brigade combat teams will be redesignated as a maneuver enhancement
brigade in fiscal year 2008 and the other as a battlefield surveillance
brigade in fiscal year 2010.
[End of figure]
As we reported in December 2007,[Footnote 10] however, modular units
are being established with shortfalls of some equipment and personnel.
To meet operational needs, the Army has allocated available equipment
and personnel to deployed and next-to-deploy units. As a result,
although the Army is converting units to modular unit designs,
nondeployed units do not have all the equipment or personnel needed for
the new combat and support brigades. Using a combination of regular and
supplemental appropriations, the Army has spent billions of dollars
procuring and repairing equipment in recent years. However, equipping
deployed and deploying forces has been the priority, and the amount of
equipment left for non-deployed forces has declined. In February 2008,
the Chief of Staff of the Army testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee that the Army's readiness is being consumed as fast
as it can be built. The Army has announced a plan to restore balance to
the force by 2011, but it has not detailed how it will achieve its
goals of sustaining the force, preparing for missions, resetting
equipment, and transforming for the future.
The Army Has Not Linked Planned Investments with Interim Milestones:
The Army has extended its estimate for when it can fully equip the
modular force from 2011 to 2019, but it still has not identified the
total cost or established interim milestones toward reaching its
revised equipping goal. Our prior work has shown that successful
transformation initiatives have a clear plan with interim milestones
that links overall results with funding needs.[Footnote 11] In our
December 2007, report we recommended that the Army develop a
comprehensive strategy and funding plan as well as measures of progress
for equipping and staffing the modular force. [Footnote 12] We also
recommended that the Secretary of the Army report this information to
Congress to assist in its oversight of Army plans. Even though the Army
agreed with our recommendations, it has not yet developed the
comprehensive strategy or measures of progress needed to enable
congressional oversight.
The Army's current investment plan is depicted in its 5-year defense
plan, known as the future years defense program. However, this plan
does not provide details about the Army's equipping and staffing plans
to reach goals that stretch until 2019. When developing its personnel
or equipment plans, the Army must consider a number of factors. First,
the Army gives priority to meeting the needs of deployed forces, and
these requirements depend on dynamic operational conditions. For
example, the surge of forces into Iraq in 2007 required the Army to
equip and staff additional units quickly. Second, the Army must
consider the wear and tear of ongoing operations on its equipment and
make assumptions about how much equipment currently in use can be
repaired. Third, the Army must determine how much equipment to buy to
replace worn-out equipment and modernize the force. Finally, the Army
has to decide how to distribute equipment and personnel across its
remaining units within acceptable levels of risk.
Army officials told us that they use internal tracking systems to plan
procurements of equipment and assess projected levels against
requirements; however, visibility outside the Army over the progress in
equipping and staffing the force is limited. The Army has not provided
congressional decision makers with this detailed information. The John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
(hereafter Public Law 109-364) requires the Secretary of the Army to
include in a report submitted annually with the President's budget,
among other things, an assessment of the progress made during that
fiscal year toward meeting the overall requirements of the funding
priorities for equipment related to the modularity initiative as well
as the requirements for repair and recapitalization of equipment used
in the Global War on Terrorism, and reconstitution of equipment in
prepositioned stocks.[Footnote 13] In its fiscal year 2008 report, the
Army submitted a list of requested fiscal year-2009-funding amounts for
selected equipment. However, the Army did not provide comprehensive
information that is necessary to determine the progress it is making in
equipping modular forces. Specifically, the Army's report did not
include: (1) planned annual investments in acquisition and reset for
equipment beyond fiscal year 2009 and quantities that it expects to
procure or repair, (2) annual target levels for equipment and
personnel, (3) key assumptions underlying the Army's plans, or (4) an
assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army requirements
and the impacts of shortfalls. While Public Law 109-364 does not
expressly delineate the level of detail the Army should submit in the
progress assessment included in its annual report, unless DOD provides
information that links requirements, funding requests, and planned
procurements, Congress may not have the best information on which to
base funding decisions.
Army Projects That It Will Meet Overall Equipment and Personnel
Requirements but Faces Challenges in Meeting These Goals:
The Army's equipping and staffing projections indicate that the Army
will have enough equipment and personnel to meet aggregate equipping
and staffing requirements by 2012. However, our analysis of the Army's
projections showed some potential shortfalls of modern equipment, and
its projections are based partly on the continued use of some older
equipment. For example, the Army projects that it will exceed its
authorized level of medium tactical vehicles by fiscal year 2012, but
its projections include continued use of more than 12,500 obsolete two-
and-one-half-ton medium trucks that are not deployable
overseas.[Footnote 14] As table 3 shows, our analysis of Army data
found that when older equipment is excluded, shortfalls are projected
in selected types of modern equipment within the key equipment
categories. For example, our analysis showed significant shortages
projected for three systems that make up the tactical internet: the
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System and the Single Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System.[Footnote 15] According to the 2004
Task Force Modularity study, the full benefits of networking may not be
realized if only some elements of the force have the capability.
Appendix I contains a more complete discussion of our analysis, and
findings.
Table 3: Projected Availability of Selected Key Modern Equipment
Compared to the Authorized Level in Fiscal Year 2012:
Key Enabler Category (Specific equipment items): Radios - Tactical;
* Single channel ground and airborne system;
* Enhanced position location reporting system;
* Rescue radio;
* Squad radio;
Percentage of authorized equipment projected to be available[A]: 67.
Key Enabler Category (Specific equipment items): Tactical wheeled
vehicles - light;
* High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle;
Percentage of authorized equipment projected to be available[A]: 52.
Key Enabler Category (Specific equipment items): Tactical wheeled
vehicles - medium;
* Medium trucks;
Percentage of authorized equipment projected to be available[A]: 46.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: We did not analyze the Army's ability to provide equipment to
units either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current
operations. For the purpose of this table, our analysis excluded
equipment items that the Army authorizes as substitutes because we
assessed the Army's progress obtaining modern equipment items. Data
retrieved from Army databases reflect equipment levels as of April 23,
2007.
[A] The types of authorized equipment represented here are some of the
top equipment we identified as part of our study. For example, there
were 7 kinds of tactical radios and 2 types of light and 2 kinds of
medium tactical vehicles in the top 15 shortfalls. In the tactical
radio and medium and light truck categories, we used generic
descriptions to describe several related systems. For example, the
tactical radios category includes four different types of Single
Channel Ground and Airborne System radios.
[End of table]
The Army's projections of when it will be able to fully equip and staff
the modular force are based on assumptions that will affect the actual
equipment and personnel available. Expanding the size of the Army,
rehabilitating equipment that has experienced wear and tear from
overseas operations, recruiting and retaining personnel, and
competition for increasingly scarce resources, each presents the Army
challenges in planning and implementation as described below.
* Expanding the Army: The Army's planned expansion includes building
six additional active modular brigade combat teams and additional
modular support brigades within its increased end strength of
74,200.[Footnote 16] Our prior work on recruiting and retention as well
as equipping modular units have identified some potential difficulties
that could arise in implementing an increase in the size of the Army at
a time when the services are supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.[Footnote 17] For example, our prior work has identified
shortages in mid-level officers for a larger force.
* Repair and restore deployed equipment: Equipment is currently
experiencing significant wear and tear in overseas operations, reducing
the equipment's expected service life. It is uncertain whether it is
economically feasible to repair and restore equipment that has been
deployed overseas, also known as equipment reset, to preserve its
service life.[Footnote 18] An Army procurement official confirmed that
the Army's equipment projections rest on some uncertain assumptions
related to the ability to reset the force.
* Recruiting and retention of personnel: While the services have
generally met their recruiting and retention goals, several factors
suggest that challenges for recruitment and retention are likely to
continue. For instance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
testified in February 2008 before the Senate Armed Services Committee
that recruiters have difficulty meeting their accession goals because
of a decline in the willingness of persons in a position of influence
to encourage potential recruits to enlist during a time of war. Another
factor that DOD has reported contributing to the Army's recruiting
challenges is that more than half of today's youth between the ages of
16 and 21 are not qualified to serve in the military because they fail
to meet the military's entry standards.[Footnote 19] Further, the Army
has experienced decreased retention among officers early in their
careers and shortages within certain specialty areas such as military
intelligence[Footnote 20] (see app. I for a detailed analysis of the
Army's projections for specific personnel that are critical to the
modular force).
* Availability of personnel: A growing number of Army personnel are
unavailable for assignment because they are in training or are
students, are transiting between positions, or are in a "holding
facility" due to medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation reasons.
Historically, about 13 percent of the Army's end-strength has been
unavailable.[Footnote 21] However, the number of service members who
are unavailable now is likely to be greater because the number of
personnel unavailable due to war wounds has increased over the past
several years.[Footnote 22]
* Availability of Funding: The Army's ability to execute its equipment
and personnel plans rests on several assumptions related to future
costs and available funding. DOD has relied on a combination of regular
appropriations and supplemental funding to finance the transition to
modularity. How long supplemental funding will be available for this
purpose is unclear. We have previously reported that DOD tends to
understate future costs in its equipment plans by employing overly
optimistic planning assumptions in its budget formulations.[Footnote
23] A growing governmentwide fiscal imbalance could limit growth in
defense funding and force choices among competing defense priorities,
and rising costs for acquisition programs could require DOD to reassess
the types and quantities of equipment it procures in the
future.[Footnote 24] A senior Army official in the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Programs stated that significant increases in costs
to procure equipment required for current operations, such as armored
vehicles, represents another factor that may lead the Army to procure
less equipment than expected. Moreover, personnel costs are rising
dramatically, and as the costs for military pay and benefits grow,
questions arise whether DOD has the right pay and compensation
strategies to cost-effectively sustain the total force in the
future.[Footnote 25]
While Congress has provided substantial funding in response to DOD
requests, our analysis has shown the Army has not adequately
demonstrated to Congress how it intends to invest future funding to
procure the modern equipment and provide staff with critical skills
that will enable modular units to operate most effectively and when it
can expect all modular units to have the equipment and personnel they
are authorized. Decision makers may not be fully informed of the Army's
equipment status because the Army has not developed a comprehensive
equipment and personnel plan that details the equipment the Army has in
its inventories as compared with the equipment required for units to
operate effectively in their modular designs and that sets milestones
against which to measure the Army's progress equipping and staffing the
modular force with key enablers.
The Army Has Not Fully Evaluated the Capabilities of the Modular Force
across the Full Spectrum of Conflict:
The Army uses a variety of approaches in testing unit designs and
capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive
evaluation of modular forces. Testing the modular force is intended to
determine whether modular units are capable of performing potential
missions across the full spectrum of conflict--and therefore needs to
be as realistic as possible. Gaps in the Army's testing of the modular
support forces and lack of a focal point for ensuring thorough testing
of these forces could result in less capable support forces than
planned. First, the Army has not fully assessed the effectiveness of
its support units because it has not completed the doctrine that would
define how modular support units will train, be sustained, and support
the fight. Without this underpinning doctrine, the Army does not have a
basic framework upon which to develop measures to assess the
effectiveness of support units. Second, the Army has been testing the
capability of modular forces primarily at unconstrained design levels,
not the authorized level of personnel and equipment units that the Army
actually plans to provide. However, our analysis found significant
shortfalls in the Army's projected equipment and personnel when
measured against design levels; as a result, this approach may not
realistically test the capabilities of units that will generally be
given less equipment and fewer personnel than called for in the design
level. To support ongoing operations, the Army has focused its testing
and evaluation efforts thus far on conducting ongoing counterinsurgency
operations. However, without testing that is realistic and includes
support forces across a full spectrum of potential conflict, the Army
faces risks associated with equipment and personnel shortfalls should
another type of conflict occur.
Lack of Doctrine for Support Units Hinders Testing of the Modular
Force:
The urgent need for modular combat units has caused the Army to place
its priority on assessing these critical units, but it has not
completed doctrine that would define how support units--which also have
important roles--will operate. Further, unlike its approach for
assessing combat units, TRADOC has not identified an organization
responsible for performing integrated assessments of its modular
support forces. In managing its transformation to the modular design,
the Army has assessed combat units across seven domains or areas--
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and
facilities (DOTMLPF). These areas are interrelated--for example, adding
more or different types of materiel or equipment can change the
capability of a unit that would need to be reflected in the unit's
organization or doctrine. TRADOC has made some changes in how its
modular units operate based on lessons learned in current operations.
The Army has stated that its transformation efforts will be based on
the underlying doctrine that defines how the Army trains, sustains, and
fights. Doctrine represents an approved guidebook that details how
units are expected to operate, how they will be organized, trained, and
equipped to perform their missions. Army officials stated that without
doctrine it is difficult to assess a unit because doctrine provides the
standards by which a unit is evaluated. Even though many support units
have been converted to modular designs, the Army has not yet completed
the doctrine that is basic to developing strategies to train and equip
units. For example, doctrine for logistics units had not been
completed, and the Army did not have a firm estimate for when it will
be completed. Similarly, doctrine for all military intelligence and
signal units was incomplete, and military intelligence officials were
uncertain when this might be finalized. In 2005, the Army Science Board
cited the lack of completed doctrine for modular support units as one
issue that might limit effectiveness of the modular force. These
officials explained that the Army cannot be sure that unit training is
appropriate if doctrine is incomplete, because doctrine provides the
standards by which the Army assesses unit training. Without approved
doctrine, the Army cannot be assured that its efforts to assess and
train modular units are adequate.
Once doctrine is in place, the Army can evaluate support units across
the other domains of the DOTMLPF domains. In contrast to its approach
for combat units, however, the Army has not identified an organization
responsible to ensure that integrated assessments of its support units
are performed across the DOTMLPF domains that affect the unit's
capabilities. For combat brigades, the Army has designated experienced
officials within TRADOC's infantry and armor centers, called
capabilities managers, who act as focal points for evaluating combat
unit designs and coordinating comprehensive assessments of these units
across the DOTMLPF domains to determine how best to mitigate potential
risks with changes to doctrine and unit design, resolve training and
equipping issues, and incorporate lessons learned. By assigning
responsibility and authority for assessing forces to the capability
managers, the Army has created a focal point for evaluating unit
capabilities that clarifies lines of accountability and helps ensure
that the designs of support units are fully tested across the DOTMLPF
domains. For example, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team capability
manager monitors the status of doctrine for Stryker units and lessons
learned from current operations and updates as necessary doctrine and
unit design as needed. Similarly, TRADOC established a capability
manager for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team formation who, among other
things, monitors the development of assessments across the DOTMLPF
domains to ensure these areas are integrated and that the infantry unit
design supports operational requirements. For example, the commander of
one infantry brigade combat team stated that the infantry capability
manager could help resolve concerns regarding training and equipment
issues before deploying units to support the global war on terror.
Without a responsible focal point to ensure that assessments across the
DOTMLPF domains are conducted in an integrated fashion, the Army runs a
risk that support units will not have the capabilities needed to
support the modular force.
The Army Has Not Comprehensively Tested the Modular Force Based on
Authorized Equipment and Personnel Levels:
TRADOC conducts computer simulations to test and evaluate the
capability of the modular force based on designed equipment and
personnel levels but does not perform these tests based on either
authorized or available equipment or personnel levels.[Footnote 26]
According to the Army, TRADOC assessed the modular force in 2004 based
on the resources, equipment, and personnel specified in the modular
unit design, not the authorized levels that would reflect the equipment
and personnel that the units will actually have. During this assessment
process, TRADOC identified some risks related to this modular
transformation process and identified enablers, [Footnote 27] such as
those we discussed earlier in this report, that would be needed to
mitigate these risks. For example, when TRADOC used computer modeling
tools to assess the combat capabilities of modular combat units, it
determined that there was a risk associated with having two combat-
focused, or maneuver, battalions in a modular combat brigade, as
opposed to the three maneuver battalions that made up a combat brigade
in the previous divisional structure. Based on this analysis, the Army
made adjustments in the design of the units, such as adding battlespace
awareness equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles and increasing the
number of intelligence personnel, before accepting the modular designs.
However, the Army's design represents an ideal future objective that is
unconstrained by resources.[Footnote 28]
Measured against the design level, the Army is projecting significant
shortfalls in a number of different equipment and personnel areas.
Since the Army accepted the modularity concept based on the design
level, these shortfalls could also affect the capabilities modular
units can deliver to combatant commanders. As table 4 shows, our
analysis of selected key enabler equipment projections against design
requirements found that the Army projects it will have less than half
of the design requirement for some key equipment, such as battle
command equipment, fire-finder radars, tactical and high frequency
radios, and medium-wheeled vehicles. (For details of this analysis, see
table 7 in app. I.)
Table 4: Projected Availability of Selected Key Equipment Enablers at
the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012:
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Battle command (includes
computers and communications equipment);
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 40.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar;
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 17.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: High frequency radios;
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 45.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node (signal
equipment);
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 55.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Light tactical wheeled
vehicles;
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 56.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Medium tactical wheeled
vehicles;
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 31.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Tactical radios;
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 38.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned Prophet
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system;
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 61.
Selected key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle
(small);
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 61.
Source: GAO analysis of Army equipment databases.
Note: We did not analyze the Army's ability to provide equipment to
units either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current
operations. Our analysis also excluded equipment items that the Army
authorizes as substitutes because we assessed the Army's progress
obtaining modern equipment items. Data retrieved from these databases
reflect equipment levels as of April 23, 2007.
[A] Design equipment is more modern equipment. Some of the progress
equipping the modular force is based on maintaining older equipment and
while this may allow the Army to have the equipment it needs overall,
the Army still has shortfalls for specific types of modern equipment.
[End of table]
According to the Army, such enablers are critical to the modular force.
During the development of the new modular brigade combat team designs,
the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army to develop designs
that would be "as capable as" the legacy designs the Army wanted to
replace.[Footnote 29] Working under Army TRADOC, in 2004, the Army Task
Force Modularity assessed several brigade combat team design
alternatives and concluded that selected key enablers largely
determined the performance of each of the alternatives.[Footnote 30] As
a result, the Army made some changes to modular unit blueprints and
assumed that modern equipment--including advanced battle command
systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and top of the line intelligence-
surveillance-reconnaissance equipment that provide a brigade commander
enhanced situational awareness--would be available for these units.
These changes were meant to mitigate the risks associated with smaller
but more numerous brigades; the Army created four modular brigade
combat teams out of three former divisional brigades and reduced from
three to two the number of battalions within a combat brigade.[Footnote
31] The Army approved an initial brigade combat team design, which
senior Army leaders assessed as "good enough" for the Army's modular
restructuring.
Since the initial 2004 assessment of the modular brigades, the Army has
used a case-by-case review process to analyze specific shortfalls and
identify any needed risk mitigation strategies. These assessments have
been focused on supporting ongoing counterinsurgency operations.
However, because these assessments focus on a few specific shortfalls
and do not examine how all the equipment and staffing work together in
modular force across the full spectrum of conflict, it is unclear
whether the currently authorized personnel and equipment achieve the
capability that was originally envisioned.
Conclusions:
Restructuring and modernizing the Army amid ongoing operations presents
a complex and growing challenge. To date, the Army has received
billions of dollars in regular and supplemental appropriations that
have helped to prepare deploying units, but these investments have not
yet translated into improved readiness for non-deployed units. As
operations have continued, the target date for rebuilding the Army has
slipped considerably and is now more than a decade away. We previously
recommended that the Army establish management controls to assess
progress in achieving its goal of fully equipping the modular force and
report this information to Congress, and the Army agreed. However, in
its 2008 report to Congress, the information the Army provided focused
primarily on the 2009 budget year and did not include the detailed,
year-by-year information that would represent the comprehensive
management controls that are needed to demonstrate progress in
equipping and staffing the modular force. Without detailed planning for
results that includes interim targets for equipping and staffing the
modular force and clearly links investments with goals for equipping
and staffing modular units, DOD and Congress will not have the
information needed to fully assess the Army's progress or determine the
impact of any shortfalls. Moreover, without the information the Army
needs to show progress toward its goals, the Army could face
difficulties competing for increasingly scarce resources in the future
and risks additional slippage in its timeline for rebuilding the Army.
The Army's transition to the modular design has provided flexibility in
supporting ongoing operations, but the effectiveness of the design
across the full range of potential conflicts and with potential
shortfalls in key equipment and personnel is still unknown.
Understandably, the Army has focused its evaluation efforts on combat
brigades supporting ongoing operations, although these are primarily
counterinsurgency operations and do not represent the full spectrum of
potential conflicts. However, although the integration of support
forces with combat brigades is a key factor to the success of the
modular design, the underpinning doctrine for modular support forces
has yet to be completed. And, unlike its approach for combat forces,
the Army has not yet identified an organization or focal point to be
responsible for conducting integrated assessments of support forces
across the DOTMLPF domains. By conducting an assessment of the total
force against the full spectrum of requirements and identifying
capability gaps in combat and support units, the Army can identify
options that balance short-term needs with long-term risks. Lacking an
analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at authorized levels-
-which represents what the Army actually plans to have--the Army will
not be in a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities
that it is fielding can perform mission requirements.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the Army's focus on the relationship between investments and
results and the completeness of the information that the Army provides
Congress, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army take the following action:
* Develop and report to Congress a results-oriented plan that provides
detailed information on the Army's progress in providing the modular
force with key equipment and personnel enablers. The plan should show
actual status and planned milestones through 2019 for each type of key
equipment and personnel, including:
- goals for on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each
fiscal year;
- projected on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each
fiscal year, including planned annual investments and quantities of
equipment expected to be procured or repaired as well as key
assumptions underlying the Army's plans; and:
- an assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army
requirements and the risks associated with any shortfalls.
To enhance the Army's efforts to comprehensively assess modular designs
we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to take the following three actions:
* Develop a plan, including timelines, for completing doctrine for
modular support forces.
* Establish an organizational focal point to ensure that integrated
assessments of modular support units' designs are performed across the
DOTMLPF domains.
* Assess the capabilities of the modular force based on the amount and
type of authorized equipment and personnel to identify capability
shortfalls between authorized and design levels and take steps to
revise authorized levels where appropriate.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
In commenting on these recommendations, DOD either disagreed or offered
responses that we considered not to be fully responsive to the intent
of our recommendations. We are therefore elevating the following
matters for Congressional consideration.
Congress should consider amending section 323 of Public Law 109-364 to
require the Army to include in its statutorily required report on
modularity a results-oriented plan that provides (1) goals for on-hand
equipment and personnel levels at the end of each fiscal year; (2)
projected on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each
year, including planned annual investments and quantities of equipment
expected to be procured or repaired, as well as key assumptions
underlying the Army's plans; and (3) an assessment of interim progress
toward meeting overall Army requirements and the risks associated with
any shortfalls.
To ensure that Congress is kept informed about the progress in
implementing modular designs across the Army's operating forces and the
capabilities of the modular force and associated risks from personnel
and equipment shortfalls, it should consider revising section 323
Public Law 109-364 to require the Army to report on the status of its
transition to modularity to include assessments of (1)the status of
development of doctrine for how support forces will train, be
sustained, and fight, (2) capabilities of modular units with expected
personnel and equipment and risks associated with any shortfalls
against required resources.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with one
recommendation, agreed with two recommendations, and partially agreed
with one recommendation. DOD disagreed with our recommendation to
report detailed information on the Army's progress in equipping and
staffing the modular force. The department agreed with our
recommendations to develop a plan for completing doctrine for modular
support forces and establishing a focal point for assessing modular
support units' designs. However, the department stated that its current
processes adequately address these issues. The department partially
agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities of the
modular force. However, DOD stated that the Army assesses the
capabilities of the force in many ways and that its current assessments
are adequate and that additional actions are not necessary. As
discussed below, we continue to believe that the actions we recommended
are important to improve the Army's ability to identify gaps in
personnel and equipment and target investments to improve capabilities
more efficiently as well to manage the transition of support forces to
modular designs and operations. Therefore, we have raised these actions
as matters for congressional consideration.
DOD stated that our first recommendation to develop and report to
Congress a results-oriented plan that provides detailed information on
the Army's progress in providing the modular force with key equipment
and personnel enablers is not needed because the department's budget,
yearly acquisition reporting, and congressionally required reporting
provide information on the status and plans for equipping and manning
the force. In addition, DOD stated that yearly goals and projections
for on-hand equipment and personnel are highly variable, given
fluctuations attributed to unit position in the Army Force Generation
cycle, equipment repair and reset plans, and planned modernization
acquisitions. Although we agree that the Army provides Congress with
information on planning, budgeting, and acquisitions systems, these
systems do not constitute a coherent plan that provides sufficient
information on the agency's progress in equipping and staffing the
modular force. Without the benefit of a clear plan and milestones
against which to assess progress, the Army cannot assure Congress that
it is on a path to restore readiness or when it will have the equipment
and personnel it needs. The Army has relied heavily on supplemental
funding to support its transition to modularity, and the Army has
placed its priority for equipping and staffing on deploying forces.
However, in light of pressures on the federal budget, the Army needs to
make clear how it will use the funding it requests, when the Army
expects to be able to fully resource its forces in accordance with its
force generation cycle and the extent to which improvements are being
achieved in the interim. Therefore, we have elevated this to a matter
for congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress consider
directing the Army to include in its annual report on modularity
detailed information on equipment and personnel levels, progress toward
equipment and staffing goals, and risks associated with any shortfalls.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army
develop a plan, including timelines, for completing doctrine for
modular support forces but stated that its current assessments are
adequate. However, DOD's response did not address two specific issues
we raised: (1) the doctrinal manuals for support forces are not
complete and (2) no plan with milestones for completing the manuals has
been developed. In its comments, DOD stated that it had published Field
Manual 3-0, Operations and that this manual included doctrine for
modular support forces. We agree that Field Manual FM 3-0 serves as
broad-based direction for all Army doctrine; however, it does not
include specific modular support force doctrine that defines how
modular support units will train, be sustained, and fight. As the
report discusses, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command has
published, in separate field manuals, doctrine for each of the types of
modular combat units that details how these units will train, be
sustained, and fight. Our report highlights the need for the support-
unit-specific doctrine to provide the standards by which support unit
training can be evaluated. Until the Army develops a plan to complete
such doctrine that includes a timeline and designates appropriate
authority and responsibility, it is not clear that priority will be
placed on this effort. We believe that the actions the department has
taken do not meet the intent of our recommendation to improve the
assessment of support forces and that our recommendation has merit.
Therefore, we have elevated this to a matter for congressional
consideration, suggesting that Congress consider requiring DOD to
report on the Army's progress in developing specific doctrine for
modular forces, including support forces, in its annual report on Army
modularity.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Army establish an
organizational focal point to ensure that integrated assessments of
modular support units' designs are performed across the doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities
domains. However, in its written comments, the Army indicated that the
Deputy Chief of Staff is the focal point for organization, integration,
decision making, and execution of the spectrum of activities
encompassing requirements definition, force development, force
integration, force structure, combat development, training development,
resourcing, and privatization and that these activities included being
the focal point for integrated assessments of unit designs across the
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and
facilities domains. However, our recommendation was not directed toward
the responsibilities or authorities of senior Army leadership. Rather,
our recommendation focuses more narrowly on the need to address the
current lack of integrated assessments of modular support units. Our
recommendation was intended to encourage as a best practice the Army's
current strategy of appointing a focal point for ensuring integrated
assessments of modular combat units and to highlight how applying this
strategy could improve the integration of assessments for support
units. We recognize that there are a number of ways that the Army could
address the intent of this recommendation to improve integration of
assessments for support forces, so we have not elevated this as a
matter for congressional consideration at this time. However, we
continue to believe that employing the best practice of appointing a
focal point for integration would improve the Army's ability to
integrate assessments across domains for each type of support unit.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities
of the modular force based on the amount and type of authorized
equipment and personnel in order to identify capability shortfalls
between authorized and design levels and to revise authorized levels
where appropriate. In its comments, DOD stated that the Army assesses
the capabilities of the force in many ways and that modular brigades
are assessed based on the missions assigned and the ability to
accomplish these missions given personnel, training, and equipment
available. Further, DOD stated that the Army is currently assessing its
capabilities and no new direction is needed. We agree that the Army
performs many types of assessments of force capabilities. However,
although the Army provided us documentation of its assessments of
modular combat force designs with the level of equipment called for in
the unit design, we found no evidence that the Army has assessed the
modular forces with the equipment that these forces can realistically
expect to have given the personnel and equipment available. As our
report discussed, we identified significant shortfalls in the Army's
projected equipment and personnel when measured against the design
levels. Further, the Army has focused its testing and evaluation
efforts thus far on conducting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. We
continue to believe that until the Army begins to test units with
realistic personnel and equipment levels and across the full spectrum
of conflict, the Army faces risks associated with shortfalls of key
equipment should a different type of capability be needed in future
operations in a different kind of conflict. Therefore, we elevated this
to a matter for congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress
consider requiring an assessment of modular force capabilities and
associated risks at expected levels of personnel and equipment and
across the full spectrum of conflict.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Army. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or
pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: List of Key Equipment and Personnel Enablers:
For the 15 key equipment and the 9 key personnel enabler categories we
identified, each profile presents a general description of the
equipment item or functions of military personnel. We grouped key
enablers into broad equipment and personnel categories that include
more specific equipment items and military occupational specialties
that are critical to the modular force design. For example, tactical
radios are a key equipment enabler category that includes numerous
equipment items, such as the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
System, that may consist of both older and more modern variants.
Signals is a key personnel enabler category that includes two enlisted
occupational specialties (nodal network operator/maintainer and
satellite communication systems operator/maintainer) and one officer
(signal corps officer) occupational specialty.
Our selection methodology generally required that equipment and
personnel be assigned to at least two types of modular units (brigade
combat teams, multifunctional support brigades, or functional support
brigades) to qualify as a key enabler.[Footnote 32] We excluded certain
types of equipment that are important to brigade combat teams, such as
Abrams and Bradley tanks, because they are present in both the new
brigade designs as well as the previous divisional structure. After we
identified a preliminary list of key enablers, we submitted this list
to the Headquarters, Department of the Army, for official input and
held subsequent discussions with Army officials. Based on our
discussions, we developed and submitted to the Department of the Army a
final list of key equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force
that served as the basis for our data request. An Army procurement
official identified the specific equipment line items associated with
each of the key equipment enablers and personnel officials verified
that we had identified the appropriate skills associated with these
enablers.
Key Equipment Categories:
All-Source Analysis System:
The All-Source Analysis System is the Army's primary intelligence
integration program, found at all Army echelons at battalion and higher
level organizations. This system is composed of a laptop and desktop
configuration that provides battlefield commanders with enhanced
situational awareness and timely intelligence on enemy force
deployments, capabilities, and potential courses of action. Our
analysis includes the four equipment items that encompass this system
such as All Source Analysis System: AN/TYQ-93. The Office of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated that capabilities from this
system will convert into the Army Distributed Command Ground System,
which is expected to be fielded to active Army, Army National Guard,
and Army Reserve units by the end of fiscal year 2010.
Analysis and Control Element:
The Analysis and Control Element is a subsystem of the All Source
Analysis System that provides commanders above the brigade level with
intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination capability. This
category includes eight different equipment items including the
Analysis and Control Element (ACE) AN/TYQ-89 which operates at the
divisional level.
Battle Command Systems:
Battle command systems enhance the ability of the commander to gain
information and make decisions through the use of technology, such as
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance equipment. Our analysis includes 95
equipment specific equipment items within this enabler category, such
as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below and the Movement
Tracking System. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below forms
the principal digital command and control system for the Army at
brigade levels and below; it also connects platforms from lower-level
units through the Tactical Internet. The Movement Tracking System is a
tracking and communications satellite-based system that provides
situational awareness to combat support and combat service support
units. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Programs indicated that to mitigate the overall shortfall of battle
command equipment, the Army will retain older variants that are in
oversupply until new equipment is delivered. However, shortfalls in
this category are greater than the availability of older equipment.
Fire Support Sensor System:
The Fire Support Sensor System designates targets to enable ground and
air delivered precision strike capability. Our analysis includes six
equipment items for this enabler category, such as the Armored Knight
Fire Support Vehicle, the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle, and the Stryker
Fire Support Vehicle. For example, the Knight vehicle provides
precision strike capability by locating and designating targets for
both ground and air-delivered laser-guided ordnance and conventional
munitions. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Programs indicated that force structure changes are expected to
reduce overall requirements for this system, which would eliminate
potential equipment shortages. The officials also stated the Army plans
to continue to modernize its fleet of Fire Support Vehicles with
upgrades and replacements of non-repairable equipment.
Firefinder Radar:
Firefinder radar is specialized equipment that detects the location of
mortars, artillery, and short and long-range rockets through the use of
radar. Our analysis includes six equipment items for this enabler
category, such as the Firefinder AN/TPQ-36 that locates medium-range
rockets. To mitigate overall shortfalls of these radars, the Army will
retain a surplus of older radars until its modernization efforts
replace existing equipment.
Joint Network Node:
The Joint Network Node is the Army's modernization of the tactical
communications network. This node provides high-speed, high-capacity
tactical network communications and data transport down to battalion
level, which supports command and control, intelligence, and logistics
communications. Our analysis includes 8 equipment items for this
enabler category, such as the Battalion Command Post which provides
communications at the battalion level. In June 2007, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology
approved a merger of the Joint Network Node with the Warfight
Information Network-Tactical system.
Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance:
The Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System provides long range
target acquisition and far target location capabilities to armor and
infantry scouts enabling them to conduct reconnaissance and
surveillance operations outside of enemy fire. It is a component of the
Fire Support Sensor System, which provides target designation
capability for fire support teams. Our analysis includes 3 equipment
items for this enabler category, such as the Night Vision Sight Set and
Long Range Scout Surveillance System AN/TAS-8. Army officials in the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army
plans to mitigate shortages by using substitute items that can provide
the same or similar capabilities as the required item until the Army
can procure the modernized item.
Radios - High Frequency:
High Frequency radios provide commanders with radios that provide
beyond the line of sight voice and data capability. Our analysis
includes 17 equipment items for this enabler category, such as the High
Frequency Radio Set AN/PRC-150C man pack that is carried by soldiers.
The Army's goal is to procure the Joint Tactical Radio System, which
provides a networking capability with multichannel, multiwaveform
capabilities to increase speed and reliability of service. Currently,
the Army is using older radios that it plans to replace; however, these
older systems do not exist in enough numbers to address these
shortages.
Radios - Tactical:
Tactical radios provide the ability and flexibility for command and
control of combat forces on the battlefield and maintain contact with
the lowest level, the squad leader. Our analysis includes 317 equipment
items for this enabler category, such as the Enhanced Position and
Location Reporting System. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
System radio provides commanders with a secure combat net radio with
voice and data handling capability in support of Command and Control
operations. The Enhanced Position and Location Reporting System radio
provides a tactical Internet and communications capability. The Army's
goal is to procure the Joint Tactical Radio System, which provides a
networking capability with multichannel, multiwaveform capabilities to
increase speed and reliability of service. In the near term, the Army
maintains older less capable radios such as earlier versions of the
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System to meet its tactical
radio requirements.
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles - Light:
The family of light tactical wheeled vehicles consists of the High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, which is a light, mobile, four-
wheel drive vehicle. It has six configurations: troop carrier, armament
carrier, shelter carrier, ambulance, missile carrier, and scout
vehicle. Our analysis includes 43 equipment items for this enabler
category such as the 1-1/4 ton cargo and troop carrier. Current
operations are placing a heavy burden on these vehicles, and the Army
has made numerous design and configuration changes to these vehicles
such as improving their armored protection. Ultimately, the Army plans
to replace this vehicle with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle that will
be available in 2015.
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles - Medium:
The family of medium tactical wheeled vehicles provides multipurpose
transportation such as re-supply and mobility assets for combat support
and combat service support units and includes cargo, tractor, van,
wrecker, and dump trucks. Our analysis includes 176 equipment items for
this enabler category; some of the older vehicles are 2-1/2 ton cargo
vehicles, while newer models are 5 ton trucks. The Army has a medium
vehicle modernization strategy that is scheduled to be completed in
2022. Until then, the Army will use older trucks to meet its
requirements.
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles - Heavy:
The family of heavy wheeled tactical vehicles performs unit resupply
for combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Our
analysis includes 106 equipment items for this enabler category, such
as Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, Palletized Load System
trucks, Heavy Equipment Transport, and Line Haul trucks. The Heavy
Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks provides all-weather, rapidly
deployable transport capabilities for re-supply of combat vehicles and
weapon systems. The Palletized Loading System truck is a prime mover
with a load handling system. The Heavy Equipment Transport truck
transports equipment such as tanks, fighting and recovery vehicles, and
self-propelled howitzers. Line Haul trucks include the line haul
tractor, light equipment transporter, and dump trucks. To address the
shortfall of these trucks, the Army uses older equipment items that are
authorized as substitute items.
Trojan Spirit:
The Trojan Spirit is an intelligence dissemination system that provides
high capacity satellite communications services at Top Secret and
Special Compartmented Information levels to tactical Army forces. Our
analysis includes 14 equipment items for this enabler category, such as
the Trojan Spirit Lite. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army plans to modernize and
upgrade Trojan Spirit with current technology to prevent the
obsolescence of this program until the system is replaced by the
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical in the 2014-2021 timeframe.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Prophet:
The Prophet unmanned aerial vehicle provides an all-weather, near-real-
time view of an area of responsibility through the use of signals and
intelligence sensors. According to the Army, the Prophet provides the
brigade combat team commander with the intelligence capability to
visually display the battles space. Our analysis includes eight
equipment items for this enabler category including the Countermeasures
Detection System AN/MLQ-40. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army's strategy to mitigate
equipment shortfalls is to maintain older equipment longer as
substitutes until they can be replaced.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Small:
The small unmanned aerial vehicle provides reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities to ground commanders.
Our analysis includes 51 equipment items for this enabler category,
such as the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System and
the Raven B. The Army has a shortfall for these items at the authorized
and design level, and the conversion to the modular force structure
increased the requirement for these vehicles. However, the Army does
not have older equipment to make up for these shortages.
Table 5 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the on hand or
available equipment at the authorized level for modular force units for
the total Army--active and reserve components--in fiscal years 2007 and
2012. For example, the Army projects to have 100 percent of its
authorized equipment by 2012 in the Analysis and Control Element
category,[Footnote 33] whereas the Army had 21 percent of authorized
levels in fiscal year 2007. In contrast, the Army projects to have 67
percent of authorized levels of small unmanned aerial vehicles in
fiscal year 2012 --an improvement from fiscal year 2007, when it had 34
percent of its authorized level.
Table 5: Key Equipment Enablers Available at the Authorized Level in
Fiscal Years 2007 and 2012.
Key equipment enablers by category: All-Source analysis system;
Description of capabilities: Provides battlefield commanders with
enhanced situational awareness and intelligence on enemy forces;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 96;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 185.
Key equipment enablers by category: Analysis and control element;
Description of capabilities: Furnishes higher-level commanders with
intelligence processing, analysis and dissemination capability;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 21;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 100.
Key equipment enablers by category: Battle command systems;
Description of capabilities: Enhances the commander's information
gathering and decision-making capability;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 50;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 115.
Key equipment enablers by category: Fire support sensor system;
Description of capabilities: Designates targets to enable ground and
air delivered precision-strike capability;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 131;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 177.
Key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar;
Description of capabilities: Detects the location of mortars,
artillery, and short and long-range rockets through the use of radar;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 71;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 123.
Key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node;
Description of capabilities: Provides high-speed, high-capacity
tactical communications down to battalion level;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 54;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 159.
Key equipment enablers by category: Long-range advanced;
scout surveillance;
Description of capabilities: Affords long-range target acquisition
capabilities to armor and infantry scouts enabling them to conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance operations;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 64;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 155.
Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - high frequency;
Description of capabilities: Provides commanders with radios that
provide beyond the line of sight voice and data capability;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 50;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 101.
Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - tactical;
Description of capabilities: Allows higher-level units to command and
maintain contact with lower-level units;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 185;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 208.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light;
Description of capabilities: Provides multipurpose transportation using
light, mobile four-wheel drive vehicles;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 91;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 126.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium;
Description of capabilities: Provides multipurpose transportation using
medium trucks;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 98;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 128.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - heavy;
Description of capabilities: Provides multipurpose transportation using
heavy trucks;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 91;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 125.
Key equipment enablers by category: Trojan Spirit;
Description of capabilities: Furnishes high-capacity, secure satellite
communications services to tactical Army units;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 93;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 133.
Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - Prophet;
Description of capabilities: Allows an all-weather, near-real-time view
of an area of responsibility through the use of signals and
intelligence sensors;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 20;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 99.
Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle; - small;
Description of capabilities: Provides reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition capabilities to ground commanders;
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 34;
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 67.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data reflects equipment levels as of April 23, 2007. We did not
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide equipment to units
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current
operations. For the purpose of this table, our analysis excluded
equipment items that the Army authorizes as substitutes because we
assessed the Army's progress obtaining modern equipment items.
[End of table]
Table 6 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the on hand or
available equipment at the design level for modular force units for the
total Army--active and reserve components--in fiscal year 2007. This
data includes an analysis at the aggregate level of all equipment on
hand in a category and the specific modern equipment required in the
design.
Table 6: Key Equipment Enablers Available and Shortages of Modern
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2007:
Key equipment enablers by category: All-source analysis system;
Design requirement (Number required): 3,713;
All equipment: Available: 1,750;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 47;
Available: 1,750;
Percent: 47.
Key equipment enablers by category: Analysis and control element;
Design requirement (Number required): 34;
All equipment: Available: 7;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 21;
Available: 7;
Percent: 21.
Key equipment enablers by category: Battle command systems;
Design requirement (Number required): 379,275;
All equipment: Available: 71,133;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 19;
Available: 64,520;
Percent: 17.
Key equipment enablers by category: Fire support sensor system;
Design requirement (Number required): 1,007;
All equipment: Available: 1,147;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 114;
Available: 381;
Percent: 38.
Key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar;
Design requirement (Number required): 204;
All equipment: Available: 121;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 59;
Available: 0;
Percent: 0.
Key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node;
Design requirement (Number required): 2,713;
All equipment: Available: 504;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 19;
Available: 504;
Percent: 19.
Key equipment enablers by category: Long range advanced scout
surveillance;
Design requirement (Number required): 3,508;
All equipment: Available: 1,103;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 31;
Available: 1,103;
Percent: 31.
Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - high frequency;
Design requirement (Number required): 23,434;
All equipment: Available: 7,467;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 32;
Available: 2,910;
Percent: 12.
Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - tactical;
Design requirement (Number required): 543,501;
All equipment: Available: 554,645;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 102;
Available: 161,734;
Percent: 30.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light;
Design requirement (Number required): 153,960;
All equipment: Available: 111,056;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 72;
Available: 72,740;
Percent: 47.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium;
Design requirement (Number required): 87,305;
All equipment: Available: 78,307;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 90;
Available: 25,989;
Percent: 30.
Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicle - heavy;
Design requirement (Number required): 57,924;
All equipment: Available: 38,527;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 67;
Available: 26,402;
Percent: 46.
Key equipment enablers by category: Trojan spirit;
Design requirement (Number required): 388;
All equipment: Available: 242;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 62;
Available: 221;
Percent: 57.
Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - Prophet;
Design requirement (Number required): 252;
All equipment: Available: 114;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 45;
Available: 114;
Percent: 45.
Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - small;
Design requirement (Number required): 2,679;
All equipment: Available: 834;
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 31;
Available: 834;
Percent: 31.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data reflect equipment levels as of April 23, 2007. We did not
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide equipment to units
either deploying, about to be deployed or returning from current
operations. Our analysis also excluded equipment items that the Army
authorizes as substitutes because we assessed the Army's progress
obtaining modern equipment items.
[A] Design Equipment is more modern equipment. Some of the progress
equipping the modular force is based on maintaining older equipment,
and while this may allow the Army to have the equipment it needs
overall, the Army still has shortfalls for specific types of modern
equipment.
[End of table]
Table 7 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the projected
available equipment at the design level for modular force units for the
total Army--active and reserve components--in fiscal year 2012. This
data includes an analysis at the aggregate level of all equipment
projected on hand in a category and the design equipment, which
represents the specific equipment items that are required in the
design.
Table 7: Key Equipment Enablers and Projected Shortages of Modern
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012:
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: All-source analysis system;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 3,713;
All Equipment: Available: 3,363;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 91;
Available: 3,363;
Percent: 91.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Analysis and control element;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 34;
All Equipment: Available: 34;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 100;
Available: 34;
Percent: 100.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Battle command systems;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 379,275;
All Equipment: Available: 164,674;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 43;
Available: 150,032;
Percent: 40.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Fire support sensor system;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 1,007;
All Equipment: Available: 1,548;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 154;
Available: 782;
Percent: 78.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Firefinder radar;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 204;
All Equipment: Available: 209;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 102;
Available: 34;
Percent: 17.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Joint network node;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 2,713;
All Equipment: Available: 1,495;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 55;
Available: 1,492;
Percent: 55.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Longrange advanced scout
surveillance;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 3,508;
All Equipment: Available: 2,695;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 77;
Available: 2,627;
Percent: 75.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Radios - high frequency;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 23,434;
All Equipment: Available: 15,191;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 65;
Available: 10,634;
Percent: 45.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Radios - tactical;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 543,501;
All Equipment: Available: 623,672;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 115;
Available: 205,153;
Percent: 38.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 153,960;
All Equipment: Available: 154,341;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 100;
Available: 86,486;
Percent: 56.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 87,305;
All Equipment: Available: 102,206;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 117;
Available: 27,103;
Percent: 31.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - heavy;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 57,924;
All Equipment: Available: 53,194;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 92;
Available: 39,139;
Percent: 68.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Trojan Spirit;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 388;
All Equipment: Available: 345;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 89;
Available: 322;
Percent: 83.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - prophet;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 252;
All Equipment: Available: 573;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 227;
Available: 153;
Percent: 61.
Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - small;
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 2,679;
All Equipment: Available: 1,644;
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 61;
Available: 1,629;
Percent: 61.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data reflect equipment levels as of April 23, 2007.We did not
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide equipment to units
either deploying, about to be deployed or returning from current
operations. Our analysis also excluded equipment items that the Army
authorizes as substitutes because we assessed the Army's progress
obtaining modern equipment items.
[A] Design equipment is more modern equipment. Some of the progress
equipping the modular force is based on maintaining older equipment and
while this may allow the Army to have the equipment it needs overall,
the Army still has shortfalls for specific types of modern equipment.
[End of table]
Key Personnel Enabler Categories:
We identified nine key personnel enabler categories. Within a category,
we selected military occupational specialties that are critical to the
modular force design.
Ammunition Personnel:
Ammunition personnel manage and maintain armament, missile and
electronic systems, conventional and nuclear munitions and warheads and
the detection, identification, rendering safe, recovery, or destruction
of hazardous munitions.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer:
The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer is responsible for operations
that include the location, rendering safe, removal, disposal, and
salvage of unexploded conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical
munitions. Explosive ordnance officers are assigned to modular units
such as the headquarters units within a combat support brigade
(maneuver enhancement). The Army's goal is to fill this occupational
branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army
offers several incentives to captains, such as choice of occupational
branch, duty station, civilian graduate education, military school or
cash bonuses in exchange for 3 additional years of obligated service.
The Army also offers similar options to pre-commissioned cadets in
exchange for extending their initial service obligations and bonuses to
recruit active duty Air Force and Navy officers to transfer to the
Army.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist (Enlisted):
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialists locate, identify, render safe,
and dispose of conventional, biological, chemical or nuclear ordnance
or improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction, and large
vehicle bombs. They also conduct intelligence gathering operations of
foreign ordnance. Explosive ordnance specialists are assigned to
modular units such as the headquarters units within a combat support
brigade (maneuver enhancement). The Army's goal is to fill this
occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher. Current operations
have increased the need for explosive ordnance disposal specialists, a
need which has led to a shortfall for this occupational specialty.
Shortages are also because a high level of prerequisites needed for
personnel to qualify for this specialty, a high attrition rate
experienced in training, and low retention of career personnel due to
competition from the private sector. To meet staffing goals, the Army
has given this specialty a high recruiting priority and offers its
second-highest enlistment bonus to new recruits and retention bonuses
to personnel who re-enlist. Personnel from overfilled occupational
specialties are also encouraged to convert to this one without
extending their service obligations, or they can receive a retention
bonus by re-enlisting.
Armor Personnel:
Armor personnel direct, operate, and employ tanks, armored vehicles,
support infantry, and related equipment.
Cavalry Scout (Enlisted):
The cavalry scout leads, serves, or assists as a member of a scout unit
in reconnaissance, security, and other combat operations. More
specifically, the cavalry scout operates and maintains scout vehicles
and weapons and engages enemy armor with anti-armor weapons; serves as
a member of observation and listening posts; gathers and reports
information on terrain features and enemy strength; and collects data
for the classification of routes, tunnels and bridges. Calvary scouts
are assigned to modular units such as the headquarters units of
battlefield surveillance brigades and the special troop battalion and
combined arms battalions of heavy brigade teams. The Army's goal is to
fill this occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher. To meet
staffing goals, the Army offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits and
retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist.
Artillery Personnel:
Artillery personnel provide fire support to Army units through the
employment of field artillery systems. These personnel control, direct
and perform technical firing operations, and coordinate the efforts of
multiple fire support assets.
Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator (Enlisted):
The field artillery Firefinder radar operator is responsible for
operating or providing leadership in the operation of field artillery
radar systems. Specific responsibilities include establishing and
maintaining radio and wire communications, operating and maintaining
Firefinder radars, and constructing fortifications and/or bunkers used
during field artillery operations. Field artillery Firefinder radar
operators are assigned to modular units such as the fires battalion of
a fires brigade. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty
at 95 percent or higher. To accommodate growth in staffing needs for
field artillery Firefinder radar operators, the Army has significantly
increased its recruiting requirements and training capacity. To meet
staffing goals, the Army has given this specialty a high recruiting
priority and offers its second-highest enlistment bonus for new
recruits and retention bonuses for personnel who re-enlist. Personnel
from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert
to this one without extending their service obligations, or they can
receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Civil Affairs Personnel:
Civil Affairs personnel support the commander's relationship with civil
authorities, the local populace, nongovernmental organizations, and
international organizations. These personnel must possess critical
skills associated with a specific region of the world, foreign language
expertise, political-military awareness, and cross-cultural
communications.
Civil Affairs Officer:
The civil affairs officer prepares economic, cultural, governmental and
special functional studies, assessments, and estimates. These personnel
also coordinate with, enhance, develop, establish, or control civil
infrastructure in operational areas to support friendly operations.
Additionally, they develop cross-cultural communicative and linguistic
skills that facilitate interpersonal relationships in a host country
environment. Civil affairs officers are assigned to modular units such
as the headquarters unit of the combat support brigade (maneuver
enhancement) and heavy brigade combat team. The Army's goal is to fill
this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing
goals, the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as choice
of occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education,
military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of
obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre-
commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service
obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy
officers to transfer to the Army.
Civil Affairs Specialist (Enlisted):
Civil affairs specialists identify critical requirements needed by
local citizens in combat or crisis situations. They also locate civil
resources to support military operations, mitigate non-combatant injury
or incident, minimize civilian interference with military operations,
facilitate humanitarian assistance activities, and establish and
maintain communication with civilian aid agencies and organizations.
Civil affairs specialists are assigned to modular units such as the
headquarters unit of the maneuver enhancement brigade and heavy brigade
combat team. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at
100 percent or higher. The Army only recruits personnel to fill this
occupational specialty from current servicemembers. To meet staffing
goals, the Army offers retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist and
critical skills retention bonuses targeted to senior noncommissioned
officers with 17 or more years of service who remain on active duty.
Mechanical Maintenance Personnel:
Mechanical maintenance personnel perform repair functions on Army
weapons systems and equipment that support maneuver forces in their
preparation for and conduct of operations across the entire operational
spectrum.
Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic (Enlisted):
The Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic supervises and performs field,
intermediate, and depot-level maintenance and recovery operations on
light and heavy wheeled vehicles, associated trailers and material
handling equipment. Light-wheel vehicle mechanics are assigned to
modular units such as the forward support company within a fires
brigade and the brigade support battalion within an infantry brigade
team. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 95
percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army designated this
specialty a high recruiting priority, offers enlistment bonuses to new
recruits and retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist. Personnel
from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert
to this one without extending their service obligations, or they can
receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Military Intelligence Personnel:
Military intelligence personnel provide commanders with all-source
intelligence assessments and estimates at the tactical, operations, and
strategic levels dealing with enemy capabilities, intentions,
vulnerabilities, effects of terrain and weather on operations, and
predict enemy courses of action. In particular, they collect
intelligence assets; produce threat estimates; ensure proper
dissemination of intelligence information; conduct interrogation
operations of enemy prisoners of war; interpret imagery; and perform
counterintelligence operations.
Intelligence Analyst (Enlisted):
The intelligence analyst supervises, performs or coordinates the
collection, management, analysis, processing and dissemination of
strategic and tactical intelligence. Furthermore the intelligence
analyst processes incoming information, determines its significance and
reliability, and performs analyses to determine changes in enemy
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
Intelligence analysts are assigned to modular units such as the
headquarters unit of a heavy brigade combat team and the military
intelligence battalion of the battlefield surveillance brigade. The
Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 95 percent or
higher. The Army expects staffing needs for this occupational specialty
to increase due to the conversion to the modular force. To meet
staffing goals, the Army designated this specialty a high recruiting
priority, offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits, retention bonuses
to junior personnel who re-enlist and critical skills retention bonuses
to senior non-commissioned officers who remain on active duty.
Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged
to convert to this one without extending their service obligations, or
they can receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Human Intelligence Collector (Enlisted):
Human intelligence collectors supervise and conduct interrogations and
debriefings in English and foreign languages and prepare and edit
tactical interrogation reports and intelligence information reports.
Additionally, they translate and use captured enemy documents and open
source foreign language publications in support of promoting peace, the
resolution of conflict and the deterrence of war. Human intelligence
collectors are assigned to modular units such as the headquarter unit
of heavy brigade combat teams and the military intelligence battalion
of the battlefield surveillance brigade. The Army's goal is to fill
this occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher. The Army expects
staffing needs for this occupational specialty to increase because of
conversion to the modular force. However, the Army is challenged to
increase training capacity for this occupational specialty because of
the need for a one-to-one student-teacher ratio. To meet staffing
goals, the Army has temporarily suspended foreign language requirements
for this specialty, offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits,
retention bonuses to junior personnel who re-enlist and critical skills
retention bonuses to senior non-commissioned officers with 14 or more
years of service who remain on active duty. Personnel from overfilled
occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert to this one
without extending their service obligations, or they can receive a
retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator (Enlisted):
The unmanned aerial vehicle operator supervises or operates unmanned
aerial vehicles, to include mission planning, mission sensor/payload
operations, launching, remotely piloting and recovering the aerial
vehicle. Unmanned aerial vehicle operators are assigned to modular
units such as the special troops battalion of heavy and infantry
brigade combat teams. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational
specialty at 95 percent or higher. The Army expects staffing needs for
this occupational specialty to increase because of the conversion to
the modular force. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers enlistment
bonuses for new recruits and retention bonuses to personnel who re-
enlist, and is increasing its training capacity to meet increased
staffing needs.
Psychological Operations Personnel:
Psychological operations personnel plan, conduct, and evaluate
operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.
Psychological Operations Officer:
This officer commands or serves on the staff of psychological
operations units. Specifically, these officers advise United States
military and/or civilian agencies on the use, planning, conduct, and
evaluation of psychological operations. Additionally, they inform and
train foreign governments and militaries on psychological operations.
The Army's goal is to fill this occupational branch at 100 percent or
higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers several incentives to
Captains, such as choice of occupational branch, duty station, civilian
graduate education, military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3
additional years of obligated service. The Army also offers similar
options to pre-commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their
initial service obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air
Force and Navy officers to transfer to the Army.
Psychological Operations Specialist (Enlisted):
The psychological operations specialist supervises, coordinates, and
participates in the analysis, planning, production, and dissemination
of tactical and strategic psychological operations. These personnel
assist in the collection and reporting of psychological operation data;
assist in analyzing and evaluating current intelligence to support
psychological operations; conduct research on intended psychological
operation targets; and assist in the delivery of psychological
operations products. Psychological operations specialists are assigned
to modular units such as the headquarters unit within brigade combat
teams. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 100
percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army has given this
specialty a high recruiting priority, and offers enlistment bonuses to
new recruits and retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist.
Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged
to convert to this one without extending their service obligations, or
they can receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Signal Corps Personnel:
Signals personnel manage all facets of Army and designated Department
of Defense automated, electronic, and communication assets. More
specifically, Signal Corps personnel are involved in the planning,
design, engineering, operations, logistics, and evaluation of
information systems and networks.
Signal Corps Officer:
This officer directs and manages the installation, operation,
networking and maintenance of signal equipment. Furthermore, the
general signal officer advises commanders and staffs on signal
requirements, capabilities and operations. Signal officers are assigned
to modular units such as the headquarters and support company units
within heavy brigade combat teams and the signal company within the
battlefield surveillance brigade. The Army's goal is to fill this
occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals,
the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as choice of
occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education,
military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of
obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre-
commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service
obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy
officers to transfer to the Army.
Nodal Network Systems Operator-Maintainer (Enlisted):
The nodal network systems operator-maintainer supervises, installs,
operates and performs field level maintenance on Internet protocol
based high-speed electronic nodal systems, such as the Joint Network
Node; integrated network control centers; network management
facilities; Communications Security devices; and other equipment
associated with network operations. These personnel also perform
network management functions in support of maintaining, troubleshooting
and re-engineering of nodal assets as needed in support of operational
requirements. Nodal network systems operator-maintainers are assigned
to modular units such as the signal company within a battlefield
surveillance brigade and the brigade support battalion within a heavy
brigade combat team. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational
specialty at 95 percent or higher. The Army created this occupational
specialty in part because of the conversion of the modular force and is
reclassifying personnel from the network switching systems operator-
maintainer specialty to this one. To meet staffing goals, the Army
offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits and retention bonuses to
personnel who re-enlist.
Satellite Communication Systems Operator-Maintainer (Enlisted):
The satellite communication systems operator-maintainer supervises,
installs, operates and maintains multichannel satellite communications
ground terminals, systems, networks and associated equipment. Satellite
communication systems operator-maintainer are assigned to modular units
such as the special troop battalion within an infantry brigade combat
team and the signal network support company within a fires brigade. The
Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 90 percent or
higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers its highest enlistment
bonus to new recruits, retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist,
and critical skills retention bonuses for senior enlisted personnel who
remain on active duty.
Transportation Corps Personnel:
Transportation personnel are responsible for the management of all
facets of transportation including the planning, operating,
coordination, and evaluation of all methods of transportation.
General Transportation Officer:
The general transportation officer functions as a logistical unit
commander or as a staff officer responsible for the functional
planning, coordination, procurement and control of the movement of
materiel, personnel or personal property on commercial and military
transport; and the coordination of all facets of transportation
pertaining to water, air, and land transport systems. General
transportation officer are assigned to modular units such as the
headquarters unit of a sustainment brigade. The Army's goal is to fill
this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing
goals, the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as choice
of occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education,
military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of
obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre-
commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service
obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy
officers to transfer to the Army.
Motor Transport Operator (Enlisted):
The motor transport operator supervises or operates wheeled vehicles to
transport personnel and cargo in support of operational activities.
Motor transport operators are assigned to modular units such as the
headquarters unit of a sustainment brigade and the headquarters unit of
a maneuver enhancement brigade. The Army's goal is to fill this
occupational specialty at 95 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals,
the Army has given this specialty a high recruiting priority, offers
its highest enlistment bonus to new recruits, retention bonuses to
junior personnel who re-enlist and critical skills retention bonuses
for senior enlisted personnel with 19 to 23 years of service who remain
on active duty. Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are
also encouraged to convert to this one without extending their service
obligations, or they can receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting.
Table 8 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel
on hand or projected to be on hand at the authorized level in fiscal
years 2007 and 2012 by key enlisted and officer career field enabler
category.
Table 8: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel On
Hand by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Authorized Levels:
Key enabler enlisted career field: Field artillery;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 103;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 96.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Armor;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 105;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 98.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Communication and information
systems operation;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 90;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 92.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Military intelligence;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 89;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 94.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Psychological operations;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 90;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Civil affairs;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 143;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 103.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Mechanical maintenance;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 102;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 93.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Transportation;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 93;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 93.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Ammunition;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 91;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 94.
Key enabler officer career field: Signal corps;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 103;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 100.
Key enabler officer career field: Military intelligence;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 94;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101.
Key enabler officer career field: Psychological operations;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 108;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101.
Key enabler officer career field: Civil affairs;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 107;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 100.
Key enabler officer career field: Transportation corps;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 96;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101.
Key enabler officer career field: Ammunition;
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 87;
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data reflect personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We did not
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide personnel to units
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current
operations.
[End of table]
Table 9 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel
on hand or projected to be on hand at the authorized level in fiscal
year 2007 by key enabler enlisted and officer occupational specialty
and rank.
Table 9: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Occupational
Specialties at Fiscal Year 2007 Authorized Levels:
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Cavalry scout;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 113;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 104;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 93.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Civil affairs
specialist;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): N/A[A];
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): N/A[A];
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 100.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Explosive ordnance
disposal specialist;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 123;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 111;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 29.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Firefinder radar
operator;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 99;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 106;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 93.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Human intelligence
collector;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 84;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 105;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 39.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Light-wheel vehicle
mechanic;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 95;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 104;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 102.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Military intelligence
analyst;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 107;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 101;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 67.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Motor transport
operator;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 82;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 105;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 107.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Network nodal operator-
maintainer;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 68;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 75;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 83.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Psychological operations
specialist;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 73;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 108;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 105.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Satellite communication
system operator-maintainer;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 80;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 101;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 99.
Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Unmanned aerial vehicle
operator;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 104;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 131;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 109.
Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Civil affairs officer;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 101;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 95;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 144.
Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Explosive ordnance
disposal officer;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 80;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 119;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 95.
Key enabler officer occupational specialties: General signal corps
officer;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 105;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 88;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 119.
Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Psychological operations
officer;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 151;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 73;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 134.
Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Transportation officer;
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 99;
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 79;
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 94.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data reflect personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We did not
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide personnel to units
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current
operations.
[A] Active Army civil affairs specialist authorizations are only at the
grade of E6 and above because of the level of training and experience
required to perform the civil affairs specialist's duties and
responsibilities.
[End of table]
Table 10 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel
available or projected to be available at the design level in fiscal
years 2007 and 2012 by key enlisted and officer career field enabler
category.
Table 10: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel
Available by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Design Levels:
Key enabler enlisted career field: Field artillery;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 44;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 47.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Armor;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 59;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 61.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Communication and information
systems operation;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 42;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 41.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Military intelligence;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 61;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 45.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Psychological operations;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 23;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 18.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Civil affairs;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 4;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 5.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Mechanical maintenance;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 38;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 53.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Transportation;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 28;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 28.
Key enabler enlisted career field: Ammunition;
Percent of design level
- 2007 actual: 42;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 55.
Key enabler officer career field: Signal corps;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 58;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 52.
Key enabler officer career field: Military intelligence;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 50;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 52.
Key enabler officer career field: Psychological operations;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 56;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 43.
Key enabler officer career field: Civil affairs;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 17;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 19.
Key enabler officer career field: Transportation corps;
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 31;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 28.
Key enabler officer career field: Ammunition;
Percent of design level
- 2007 actual: 69;
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 101.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data reflect personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We did not
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide personnel to units
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current
operations.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Army's plan to guide its efforts to equip and staff the
modular force, we obtained and analyzed relevant Army plans and reports
to Congress for equipping and staffing the modular force. Because the
Army lacks a mechanism to measure progress equipping and staffing the
modular force, we developed in conjunction with the Army an analysis of
key equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force. Based on our
review of key Army modularity studies and reports, we defined key
enablers as those pieces of equipment or personnel that are required
for the organization to function as planned, providing the modular
design with equal or increased capabilities to the previous divisional
structure in areas such as a unit's firepower, survivability, and
intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance performance. To develop a
preliminary list of key equipment and personnel enablers, we reviewed
key Army modularity reports using this definition and received input
from Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which is responsible
for the design and evaluation of modular units, and Army Combined Arms
Support Command. In addition, our selection methodology required that
equipment and personnel must be assigned to at least two types of
modular units (brigade combat teams, multifunctional support brigades,
or functional support brigades) to qualify as a key enabler. We
excluded certain types of equipment that are important to brigade
combat teams, such as Abrams and Bradley tanks, because they are
present in both the new brigade designs as well as the previous
divisional structure. After we identified a preliminary list of key
enablers, we submitted the list to the Headquarters, Department of the
Army, for official input and held a follow-up discussion with an Army
official to discuss the Army's responses. Based on our analysis and
this discussion, we developed a final list of key equipment and
personnel enablers of the modular force (See app. I for a list of key
equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force). An Army
procurement official identified the specific equipment line items
associated with each of the key equipment enablers. Our analysis of key
equipment enablers compares total Army (active, National Guard, and
Reserve) equipment design requirements and authorizations for the
operating and institutional forces against total Army on-hand
quantities in fiscal year 2007 and planned equipment deliveries by
fiscal year 2012.[Footnote 34] However, our analysis excludes planned
procurements funded by emergency supplemental requests for fiscal year
2008 because this data had not been entered into the Army equipment
databases at the time of our request. Our analysis of key personnel
enablers compares active Army personnel design requirements and
authorizations for the operating and institutional forces against
active Army on-hand personnel strength in fiscal year 2007 and
projected personnel strength for fiscal year 2012. [Footnote 35] This
analysis excludes about 13 percent of authorized end strength for the
modular force because of military personnel who are in the transient,
transfers, holdees, students category, according to Army personnel
officials. The Army's fiscal year 2007 to 2012 equipment and personnel
plans were the most recent data available to us when we developed this
analysis. Data retrieved from Army databases reflect equipment levels
as of April 23, 2007, and personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We
shared the data with Department of the Army officials and provided them
an opportunity to identify actions the Army intends to take to address
equipment and personnel shortfalls. To assess the reliability of
relevant Army equipment and personnel databases, we discussed data
quality control procedures with Army officials responsible for managing
the relevant equipment and personnel databases. Although we did not
independently test the data electronically, we determined the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. The Army
provided updated data on the status of the Army's equipment as compared
to the design requirement as of June 29, 2008. We did not assess the
reliability of this 2008 data. However, the 2008 data were generally
consistent with the data we analyzed in 2007.
To assess the extent to which the Army has developed a comprehensive
plan to test and evaluate the design of the modular force, we analyzed
TRADOC's modular force assessment process, including documents related
to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities evaluations, and the use of modular force
observations teams and lessons learned from ongoing operations. We also
met with officials at TRADOC analysis centers and subject-matter
experts at Army proponents and centers, for example, the Signal Center,
to understand their efforts to develop and assess the design of the
modular force. Further, we visited the Future Force Integration
Directorate and the Army Evaluation Task Force at Fort Bliss to examine
the Army approach to assessing the future modular force. In addition,
we also assessed the Army's plans to respond to recommendations from
prior GAO work related to the evaluation of the modular force across
the full-spectrum of conflict. Finally, we examined documents related
to the combatant commanders' evaluation of the modular units assigned
to the commands.
To assess the extent to which the Army has developed a comprehensive
and integrated plan to fund its transformation and expansion of the
modular force, we reviewed DOD's fiscal years 2007 to 2009 base budget
requests and fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supplemental Global War on
Terror requests and met with Army budget officials. We also assessed
the Army's plans to respond to recommendations from prior GAO work
related to Army modular force and Grow the Force funding plans.
We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and
Logistics), Pentagon, Virginia:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Pentagon,
Virginia:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness),
Pentagon, Virginia:
* Office of the Director (Program Analysis and Evaluation), Pentagon,
Virginia:
* Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8), Pentagon, Virginia:
Department of the Army:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), Pentagon,
Virginia:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (G-4), Pentagon,
Virginia:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (G-3/5/
7), Pentagon, Virginia:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-8), Pentagon,
Virginia:
* Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and
Economics, Pentagon, Virginia:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, Pentagon, Virginia:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management
and Comptroller, Pentagon, Virginia:
* Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management,
Pentagon, Virginia:
* Army Budget Office, Pentagon, Virginia:
* U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia:
* National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia:
* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia:
* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia:
* U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Alexandria, Virginia:
* U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia:
* U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Michigan:
* U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia:
* Major Subordinate Organizations:
-Army Capabilities Integration Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia:
* Future Force Integration Directorate, Fort Bliss, Texas:
-Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia:
-Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
* Current Force Integration Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
* -Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
-TRADOC Analysis Centers: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico; Fort Lee, Virginia:
* U.S. Army Proponents:
-Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia:
-Signals Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia:
-Intelligence Center and Office Chief of Military Intelligence, Fort
Huachuca, Arizona:
* U.S. Army Schools:
-U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia:
-U.S. Army Signals School, Fort Gordon, Georgia:
-U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona:
-U.S. Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia:
Other Government Agencies:
* Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C.
* Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2007 to September 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
October 10, 2008:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report. "Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to
Equip and Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Force
Capabilities," dated September 5, 2008 (GAO Code 351007/GAO-08-1066).
Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed.
The Department concurs with two of the draft report's recommendations,
non- concurs with one, and partially concurs with the other. The
rationales for our position are included in the enclosure.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point
of contact for this effort is Ms. Anne Swanek, PSA/LW&M,
Anne.Swanek@osd.mil, (703) 693-9879.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report – Dated September 5, 2008 GAO Code 351007/GAO-08-1066:
"Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and
Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Force Capabilities":
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and report to Congress a
results-oriented plan that provides detailed information on the Army's
progress in providing the modular force with key equipment and
personnel enablers. The plan should show actual status and planned
milestones through 2019 for each type of key equipment and personnel,
including:
* goals for on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each
fiscal year;
* projected on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each
fiscal year, including planned annual investments and quantities of
equipment expected to be procured or repaired, as well as key
assumptions underlying the Army's plans; and:
* an assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army
requirements and the risks associated with any shortfalls.
DOD Response: Non-Concur. Army Modularity is a strategy for having
interchangeable units to support operations. It is not a program for
equipping, manning, or modernizing the force that requires a plan
separate from the Army's overall equipping and manning plans. The
Department's budget, yearly acquisition reporting, and Congressionally
required reporting such as the annual Army Report on Modularity provide
information on the status and plans for equipping and manning the
force. The Army management of equipment and personnel are tied to the
Army's force generation model, growth of the Army, appropriated budget
requests, and war time demands. The numbers and types of modular
brigades, as well as the general manning and equipping needs for each
type of brigade have been established and are continuously assessed to
keep pace with the changing operational environment. This, in
conjunction with unit readiness assessments, acquisition production
plans, and strategic force analysis, provides the Department with
adequate plans to inform capability and resourcing decisions. Projected
on- hand equipment and personnel manning levels are forecasted semi-
annually by the Army. Detailing yearly goals and projections for on-
hand equipment and personnel is highly variable, given fluctuations
attributed to unit position in the Army Force Generation cycle,
equipment repair and reset plans, and planned modernization
acquisitions.
The Army's year to year equipping, staffing, and readiness plans, for
all brigades, are considered Department resourcing priorities and are
based on: (1) deployment needs to fulfill missions; (2) existing Army
equipment and personnel; (3) planned upgrades and expansions; and (4)
emerging needs.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan, including
timelines, for completing doctrine for modular support forces.
DOD Response: Concur. The Army released an updated Field Manual 3-0,
"Operations," on February 1, 2008. This includes the doctrine for the
Modular Force and the support forces.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish an organizational focal
point to ensure that integrated assessments of modular support units'
designs are performed across the doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains.
DOD Response: Concur. Army General Order #3 identifies the Deputy Chief
of Staff, G-3/5/7, as the focal point for organization, integration,
decision-making, and execution of the spectrum of activities
encompassing requirements definition, force development, force
integration, force structuring, combat development, training
development, resourcing, and prioritization. These responsibilities
include being the Department of the Army organizational focal point to
ensure that integrated assessments of modular support units' designs
are performed across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTLMPF) domains. The Army
Training and Doctrine Command and the Army Test and Evaluation Command
support G-3/5/7 in this effort.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to assess the capabilities of the
modular force based on the amount and type of authorized equipment and
personnel to identify capability shortfalls between authorized and
design levels and take steps to revise authorized levels where
appropriate.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Army assesses capabilities of the
force in many ways. Key elements in unit capability assessment are the
training of the brigades and the unit status reports. Additionally, the
modular brigades are assessed based on the missions assigned and the
ability to accomplish these missions given personnel, training, and
equipment available. Unit readiness assessments frame both general unit
readiness and readiness relative to a specific mission. Equipment
readiness is a portion of this assessment. Due to the fact the Army is
currently assessing its capabilities, additional Secretary of Defense
direction is not required at this time.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant
Director; Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Kelly Baumgartner;
Hillary Benedict; Herbert Bowsher; Kurt Burgeson; Grace Coleman;
Stephen Faherty; Barbara Gannon; David Hubbell; Jim Melton; Steve
Pruitt; Steven Rabinowitz; Terry Richardson; Kathryn Smith; Karen
Thornton; and J. Andrew Walker made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In a 2004 study, the Army's Task Force Modularity Integrated
Analysis Report identified a set of key enablers, including battle
command, unmanned aerial vehicles, and intelligence-surveillance-
reconnaissance capabilities that are required for modular brigade
combat teams to function as planned.
[2] See prior GAO work: GAO, Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will
Cost Billions of Dollars for Equipment, but the Total Cost Is
Uncertain, GAO-08-669T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2008); GAO, Force
Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the Army's
Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve Accountability for
Results, GAO-08-145 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2007); and GAO, Force
Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force
Initiative Funding Plan, GAO-08-354R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008).
[3] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323(d).
[4] We grouped key enablers into broad equipment and personnel
categories that include more specific equipment items and military
occupational specialties that are critical to the modular force design.
For example, "tactical radios" is a key equipment enabler category that
includes multiple variants of the Single Channel Ground and Airborne
Radio System. Similarly, "signals" is a key personnel enabler category
that includes two occupational specialties: nodal network operator/
maintainer and satellite communication systems operator/maintainer.
[5] GAO-08-145.
[6] The full spectrum of conflict includes counter-insurgency,
stability, and major combat operations.
[7] GAO-08-354R.
[8] Annual Report to Congress on the Progress of Army Modular Force
Initiative, Reset, and Army Prepositioned Stocks, February 27, 2008,
issued pursuant to Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323(c).
[9] Based on our review of key Army modularity reports and input from
the Department of the Army, we defined key enablers as those pieces of
equipment or personnel that are required for the organization to
function as planned and that provide the modular design with equal or
increased capabilities--such as a unit's firepower, survivability, and
intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance--compared with the previous
divisional structure.
[10] GAO-08-145.
[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003) and Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership,
Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's
Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).
[12] GAO-08-145.
[13] Annual Report to Congress on the Progress of Army Modular Force
Initiative, Reset, and Army Prepositioned Stocks, issued pursuant to
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323(c)(4).
[14] These assets are included in the equipment available total in 2007
and the projected equipment total in 2012.
[15] We have recently reported that between 2003 and 2007 the Army
procured more than 240,000 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
Systems than it had planned to meet the requirements of current
operation using mostly supplemental funds. See GAO, Defense
Acquisition: Department of Defense Needs Framework for Balancing
Investments in Tactical Radios, GAO-08-877 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15,
2008).
[16] The Army had not fully identified the types of units it intended
to build as part of the Grow the Force initiative at the time the
equipment and personnel data were retrieved. As a result, the
additional equipment and personnel requirements were not included in
Army databases.
[17] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link
Between Its Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements, GAO-
07-397T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007).
[18] Army equipment undergoing reset is included in the Army's
projections of available equipment on hand through fiscal year 2012.
Further information related to Army reset challenges can be found in
GAO, Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That
Equipment Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While Meeting
Ongoing Operational Requirements, GAO-07-814 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
19, 2007); and GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the
Army's Implementation of its Equipment Reset Strategies, GAO-07-439R
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007).
[19] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Plan to Address Enlisted
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005).
[20] GAO, Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's
Emerging Accession and Retention Challenges, GAO-07-224 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
[21] The endstrength of the Army is composed of uniformed personnel in
its operational or warfighting units, those assigned to infrastructure
organizations, and personnel who are in training or hospitals and are
unavailable for assignment to either operating forces or to meet
infrastructure needs.
[22] The Army has created special Warrior Transition Units to provide
assistance to wounded warriors.
[23] GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve
Transparency of DOD's Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington,
D.C.: May 7, 2004).
[24] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, GAO-08-467SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2008).
[25] GAO, 21ST Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).
[26] TRADOC is responsible for analyzing whether modular combat and
support units will be capable of successfully conducting operations
required across the full spectrum of conflict.
[27] GAO-05-325SP.
[28] To manage within expected budgets and what it deems acceptable
levels of risk, the Army authorizes equipment and personnel levels that
may be significantly lower than the design requirement. Table 1 of this
report describes our analysis of projected shortfalls of enablers
against the authorized levels.
[29] The Chief of Staff of the Army identified the need for the Army
Modularity Task Force to design brigade combat teams to have the
ability to rapidly take action at the tactical and operational level,
which relies in part on improving the battlefield commander's
capabilities to assess the situation on the battlefield.
[30] Key enablers included the following equipment items: the all
source analysis system, battle command systems, unmanned aerial
vehicles, radars, the fire support, and the long-range advanced scout
surveillance system.
[31] The Army's objective is for the new modular combat brigade, which
will include about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, to have at least the same
combat capability as a brigade under the division-based force, which
ranged from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel.
[32] We included in our analysis one key enabler category--the Fire
Support Sensor System--that did not meet our selection criteria because
this equipment system is only assigned to one of the three types of
modular units (brigade combat team). We included this key equipment
enabler category because a 2004 Army Task Force Modularity study
specifically identified the need for units at all levels to have sensor
equipment, which this enabler provides. In particular, this enabler
category includes the M707 Knight, which the 2004 Army report
specifically identified as a "key enabler" of the modular force. An
Army official subsequently concurred that this enabler category is
critical to the modular force.
[33] The Analysis and Control Element is a sub-system of the All Source
Analysis System that provides commanders above the brigade level with
intelligence processing, analysis and dissemination capability.
[34] We obtained data on Army equipment design requirements from the
Army Force Management System database, Army authorized equipment levels
from the Army Structure and Composition System database, Army on-hand
equipment levels from Logistics Information Warehouse and projected
deliveries from the Army EQUIPFOR Module and Force Developmental
Investment Information System databases.
[35] We obtained data on Army personnel design requirements from the
Army Force Management System database, Army authorized personnel levels
from the Army Personnel Authorization Module database, Army on-hand
personnel levels from the Total Army Personnel Database and projected
personnel levels from the Active Army Strength Forecaster.
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