Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs
Gao ID: GAO-09-175 November 14, 2008
The Department of Defense's (DOD) use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) continues to increase. In 2000, DOD components had fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in their inventory. By May 2008, they had more than 6,000. However, DOD faces challenges, such as UAS acquisition and the integration of UAS into joint combat operations. GAO has made a series of recommendations to address challenges, including the need for a UAS strategic plan. To improve upon the management and use of UAS, DOD has implemented several actions, such as establishing new task forces. GAO was asked to (1) identify key DOD efforts to improve the management and operational use of UAS and (2) assess the extent to which these efforts constitute an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee UAS efforts. GAO reviewed DOD documents such as directives and memorandums, and interviewed agency officials.
Over the past several years, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services have undertaken several initiatives to improve the management of UAS programs and the operational use of these systems. Specifically, DOD has established new entities and refocused the mission of an existing organization. DOD has also initiated several studies to determine UAS needs and help inform future UAS acquisition decisions. In addition, DOD issued the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 (Roadmap), which it characterizes as a comprehensive plan for the evolution and transition of unmanned systems technology, including UAS. Also, in select cases the military services are developing and fielding common UAS programs and proceeding to develop more common concepts of operations. DOD has taken steps to improve the management and operational use of UAS, but its approach lacks key elements of an overarching organizational framework needed to fully integrate efforts, sustain progress, and resolve challenges. First, DOD has increased management attention on UAS and commenced at least seven separate initiatives since September 2006 to address challenges presented by the rapid integration of UAS into the military services' force structure, yet no single office or entity, supported by an implementation team, is accountable for integrating these key management efforts. Although these efforts are intended to complement one another, the priorities for each initiative have not been fully integrated with a DOD-wide approach to resolve UAS challenges and determine how UAS will meet the department's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or other mission needs. Second, DOD has not defined the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the various UAS-related organizations to provide for effective communication of efforts within DOD and among external stakeholders. For example, DOD has not clarified how it will coordinate the efforts of its task forces addressing UAS issues. Third, DOD has not developed a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan to align departmental and service efforts to improve the management and operational use of UAS with long-term implementation goals, priorities, time lines, and other departmental planning efforts. DOD issued the Roadmap in 2007 to guide the development of unmanned systems to meet joint warfighter needs, but the Roadmap lacks key elements of a sound strategic plan, such as a focus on how to accomplish DOD's goals and objectives for UAS, milestones to track progress, identification of performance gaps, and clear linkages between proposed UAS investments and long-term planning goals. GAO's prior work has shown that a framework that includes an accountable implementation team, an established communications strategy, and a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan can serve as a basis for organizations that seek to transform their cultures in response to governance challenges and to sustain progress over time. In the absence of an approach that establishes clear accountability and a strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment decisions, DOD will continue to be challenged to fully integrate departmental and service efforts to resolve problems in the management and operational use of UAS.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-09-175, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs
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Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2008:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management and Integration of DOD
Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
GAO-09-175:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-175, a report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) use of unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS) continues to increase. In 2000, DOD components had fewer than 50
unmanned aircraft in their inventory. By May 2008, they had more than
6,000. However, DOD faces challenges, such as UAS acquisition and the
integration of UAS into joint combat operations. GAO has made a series
of recommendations to address challenges, including the need for a UAS
strategic plan. To improve upon the management and use of UAS, DOD has
implemented several actions, such as establishing new task forces. GAO
was asked to (1) identify key DOD efforts to improve the management and
operational use of UAS and (2) assess the extent to which these efforts
constitute an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee
UAS efforts. GAO reviewed DOD documents such as directives and
memorandums, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found:
Over the past several years, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, and the military services have undertaken several
initiatives to improve the management of UAS programs and the
operational use of these systems. Specifically, DOD has established new
entities and refocused the mission of an existing organization. DOD has
also initiated several studies to determine UAS needs and help inform
future UAS acquisition decisions. In addition, DOD issued the Unmanned
Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 (Roadmap), which it characterizes as a
comprehensive plan for the evolution and transition of unmanned systems
technology, including UAS. Also, in select cases the military services
are developing and fielding common UAS programs and proceeding to
develop more common concepts of operations.
DOD has taken steps to improve the management and operational use of
UAS, but its approach lacks key elements of an overarching
organizational framework needed to fully integrate efforts, sustain
progress, and resolve challenges. First, DOD has increased management
attention on UAS and commenced at least seven separate initiatives
since September 2006 to address challenges presented by the rapid
integration of UAS into the military services‘ force structure, yet no
single office or entity, supported by an implementation team, is
accountable for integrating these key management efforts. Although
these efforts are intended to complement one another, the priorities
for each initiative have not been fully integrated with a DOD-wide
approach to resolve UAS challenges and determine how UAS will meet the
department‘s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or other
mission needs. Second, DOD has not defined the roles, responsibilities,
and relationships among the various UAS-related organizations to
provide for effective communication of efforts within DOD and among
external stakeholders. For example, DOD has not clarified how it will
coordinate the efforts of its task forces addressing UAS issues. Third,
DOD has not developed a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan to
align departmental and service efforts to improve the management and
operational use of UAS with long-term implementation goals, priorities,
time lines, and other departmental planning efforts. DOD issued the
Roadmap in 2007 to guide the development of unmanned systems to meet
joint warfighter needs, but the Roadmap lacks key elements of a sound
strategic plan, such as a focus on how to accomplish DOD‘s goals and
objectives for UAS, milestones to track progress, identification of
performance gaps, and clear linkages between proposed UAS investments
and long-term planning goals. GAO‘s prior work has shown that a
framework that includes an accountable implementation team, an
established communications strategy, and a comprehensive and integrated
strategic plan can serve as a basis for organizations that seek to
transform their cultures in response to governance challenges and to
sustain progress over time. In the absence of an approach that
establishes clear accountability and a strategic plan to guide UAS
development and investment decisions, DOD will continue to be
challenged to fully integrate departmental and service efforts to
resolve problems in the management and operational use of UAS.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends DOD designate a single entity accountable for
integrating efforts related to UAS; define roles, responsibilities, and
relationships among UAS-related entities; and develop a UAS strategic
plan to align and integrate efforts and funding with long-term goals.
DOD partially concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with
two recommendations, citing actions it has already taken. GAO
recognizes DOD‘s efforts to date, but continues to believe additional
actions are needed.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-175]. For more
information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Departmental and Military Service Efforts Are Under Way to Improve the
Management and Operational Use of UAS:
DOD Efforts Lack Elements of an Overarching Organizational Framework to
Improve the Management and Operational Use of UAS:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD Components' Current and Planned UAS:
Table 2: Defense Budget Plans for UAS:
Table 3: Description and Purpose of UAS Task Force Organizations:
Table 4: Select DOD Initiatives to Improve Management and Operations of
ISR and UAS:
Table 5: DOD Goals and Objectives for Unmanned Systems:
Figure:
Figure 1: Number of Flight Hours for DOD's UAS:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
UAS: unmanned aircraft systems:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 14, 2008:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jim Saxton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Battlefield commanders have experienced a high level of mission success
in ongoing operations with transformational capabilities such as
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Beyond a traditional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) role, UAS have also been
outfitted with missiles to strike targets, with equipment to designate
targets for manned aircraft by laser, and with sensors to locate the
position of improvised explosive devices and fleeing insurgents, among
other tasks. Because of a greater demand for UAS, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has increased funding and sought additional funds for
these programs. DOD plans to spend more than $17 billion from fiscal
years 2008 through 2013 to invest in systems with expanded and new
capabilities. In addition, DOD recently reprogrammed about $1.3 billion
in fiscal year 2008 funds with congressional approval to increase ISR
capabilities, including UAS, to support ongoing operations.
Although DOD has experienced a high level of mission success with UAS
in ongoing operations, the dramatic increase in the demand for, and use
of, these assets has posed challenges for DOD, including the
development and acquisition of UAS programs and the integration of UAS
into combat operations. For example, some UAS were not designed to meet
joint service requirements or interoperability communications standards
and, as a result, cannot easily exchange data, even within the same
military service. Additionally, certain electromagnetic spectrum
frequencies that are required for wireless communications are congested
because a large number of UAS and other weapons or communications
systems use them simultaneously. Furthermore, DOD has been unable to
fully optimize the use of its UAS assets in combat operations because
it lacks an approach to allocating and tasking them that considers the
availability of all assets in determining how best to meet warfighter
needs. Moreover, DOD has been unable to fully evaluate the success of
its UAS missions because it lacks a complete set of performance
metrics. DOD is taking steps to address these challenges, such as
developing UAS interoperability standards and metrics to assess UAS
performance.
In March 2007, the Air Force requested that it be designated the
executive agent[Footnote 1] for medium-and high-altitude UAS as a way
to address challenges, including avoiding duplication of acquisition
efforts among different military services; standardizing UAS
operations, training, and procedures; and improving the distribution of
UAS intelligence information across all DOD components. The House
Committee on Armed Services also expressed concerns about the
department's approach to overseeing UAS programs, including the lack of
an executive agent to guide development and investment decisions in UAS
and to coordinate these efforts with related manned ISR programs. The
committee directed the Secretary of Defense to complete a review of UAS-
related competencies and determine whether the designation of one
military department as executive agent for UAS would best serve to
eliminate duplication of effort, enhance interoperability, and achieve
commonality with existing ISR systems.[Footnote 2] DOD decided not to
designate any one service as an executive agent for UAS and instead
took alternative actions. For example, DOD rechartered the Office of
Secretary of Defense's UAS Planning Task Force to lead a departmentwide
effort to coordinate UAS issues and to develop a plan to enhance
operations, enable interdependencies, and streamline the acquisition of
UAS.
This report responds to a request by the Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, that we evaluate several
aspects of DOD's UAS, including DOD's approach for managing and
overseeing UAS programs and its ability to support current and planned
UAS inventories. Specifically, the objectives of this review were to
(1) identify key departmental and service efforts to improve the
management and operational use of UAS and (2) assess the extent to
which DOD's efforts constitute an overarching organizational framework
to guide and oversee UAS efforts. We plan to continue our work in this
area and will report separately on additional UAS issues.
To identify key departmental and military service efforts to improve
the management and operational use of UAS, we obtained and analyzed
available internal DOD documentation, including briefings, directives,
memorandums, and plans that describe specific initiatives that DOD and
the military services have implemented relating to UAS. We interviewed
officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
DOD's unified combatant commands, and the military services to better
understand DOD's decision-making processes for implementing these
initiatives. We also interviewed officials who are leading and
participating in key initiatives to obtain information about their
goals, progress made to date, and any unresolved challenges. We
analyzed DOD plans for UAS studies and interviewed relevant officials
to determine how DOD intends to use the study results to inform current
and future UAS plans. To assess the extent to which DOD's efforts
constitute an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee
UAS efforts, we obtained and analyzed documents that describe the
roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the offices and entities
that are responsible for improving the management and operational use
of UAS. These documents include directives and memorandums, plans,
draft and finalized organizational charters, and UAS program management
and budget materials. We identified elements of an overarching
organizational framework based on our prior work and the Government
Performance and Result Act of 1993 to determine the extent to which
DOD's UAS oversight structure incorporates these key elements.[Footnote
3] We interviewed officials with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services responsible for
managing or overseeing UAS issues to obtain their views on the extent
to which DOD's efforts constitute an integrated approach. We conducted
this performance audit from September 2007 through November 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed discussion
of our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Over the past several years, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, and the military services have taken a number of steps
intended to address long-standing challenges in the management of UAS
programs and the operational use of these systems. To provide for
common, joint, and effective UAS programs and to address challenges
such as the development and acquisition of UAS and the integration of
these assets into combat operations, DOD established new entities
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including new task
forces for ISR and UAS. In addition, it refocused the mission of an
existing organization to coordinate the development of training
activities and to improve the operational employment of UAS. DOD has
also initiated several studies to determine UAS needs. For example,
U.S. Strategic Command is leading a departmentwide study to determine
all long-term requirements for ISR programs, including UAS. According
to officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff, the results of these studies will be used to guide future UAS
acquisition decisions. Additionally, in December 2007 DOD issued the
Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 (Roadmap),[Footnote 4] which it
characterizes as a comprehensive, departmentwide plan for the evolution
and transition of unmanned systems technology. The military services
are also taking several actions intended to improve the management and
operational use of UAS. For example, in select cases the military
services are developing and fielding common UAS programs and proceeding
to develop more common UAS concepts of operations.
While DOD has taken several steps to improve the management and
operational use of UAS, its approach lacks key elements of an
overarching organizational framework needed to fully integrate efforts,
sustain progress, and resolve long-standing challenges in acquiring and
operating UAS in a joint environment. First, despite its establishment
of new entities to address issues, DOD has not designated one office or
entity--supported by an implementation team--that is accountable for
integrating the various management efforts undertaken to address
challenges presented by the development and acquisition of UAS and
their integration into combat operations. Second, DOD has not defined
the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the various UAS-
related organizations to provide for effective communication of UAS
efforts within DOD and among external stakeholders, such as Congress.
Third, DOD has not developed a comprehensive and integrated strategic
plan to align departmental and service efforts to improve the
management and operational use of UAS with long-term implementation
goals, priorities, and time lines, and with other departmental planning
efforts. Our prior work has shown that a framework that includes an
accountable leadership entity supported by an implementation team, an
established communications strategy, and a comprehensive and integrated
strategic plan can serve as a basis for organizations that seek to
transform their cultures in response to governance challenges and to
sustain progress over time. Senior DOD leaders have increased their
emphasis on UAS and commenced at least seven separate initiatives and
related organizational changes since September 2006 that at least in
part are intended to address challenges that have arisen from the rapid
integration of UAS into the military services' force structure, such as
establishing the UAS Task Force. However, the accountability for these
initiatives resides with differing organizations within DOD, and
although these efforts are intended to complement one another, the
priorities for each initiative have not been fully integrated with a
DOD-wide approach to resolve UAS challenges and determine how UAS will
meet the department's ISR or other mission needs. In addition, DOD has
not clearly defined the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of
its newly created task forces (e.g., clarifying how the department will
coordinate efforts to implement the recommendations of the ISR Task
Force). Further, although DOD issued the Roadmap in 2007 to guide the
development of unmanned systems and related technologies to meet joint
warfighter needs, the Roadmap lacks key elements of a sound strategic
plan, such as a focus on how to accomplish DOD's goals and objectives
for UAS, milestones to track progress, an identification of current
performance gaps, and clear linkages between proposed UAS investments
and long-term planning goals. Moreover, we found that the Roadmap's
goals are not integrated with DOD's strategic goals for ISR, as
established in other comprehensive departmental planning documents. In
the absence of an approach that establishes clear leadership
accountability and a strategic plan to guide UAS development and
investment decisions, DOD will continue to be challenged to fully
integrate departmental and service efforts to resolve long-standing
problems in the management and operational use of UAS.
To develop a fully integrated framework to sustain progress and resolve
long-standing challenges in the management and operational use of UAS,
we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to (1)
designate a single departmental entity responsible and accountable for
integrating all cross-cutting DOD efforts related to UAS; (2) define
the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among various UAS-
related entities to facilitate communication within DOD and among
external stakeholders; and (3) develop a UAS strategic plan to align
and integrate respective departmental and service efforts and funding
with long-term goals. DOD did not concur with our first recommendation;
partially concurred with our second recommendation; and did not concur
with our third recommendation, citing actions it has already taken.
However, while recognizing DOD's efforts to date, we continue to
believe additional actions are needed. DOD's comments and our
evaluation appear later in this report.
Background:
UAS of all types and categories include aircraft, payloads, control
elements, and a human component. Aircraft can be rotary, fixed wing, or
lighter than air, and they are capable of flight without an on-board
crew. Payloads, which aircraft are designed to carry, allow the UAS to
accomplish their mission. The range of payloads includes sensors;
weapons; cargo, such as mission-critical supplies; and equipment to
extend communications networks. Control elements are responsible for
controlling the unmanned aircraft and their payloads as well as
communications. Control elements can be ground based, sea based, or
airborne. The human component consists of the personnel trained by the
military services to support UAS operations. For example, personnel are
trained as mission commanders, aircraft and payload operators,
maintainers, or intelligence analysts. The military services also use
contractors, in some cases, to perform these functions.
DOD documents categorize UAS into three main classes--man-portable,
tactical, and theater.[Footnote 5] Man-portable UAS are small, self-
contained, and portable and are generally used to support small ground
combat teams in the field. Tactical UAS are larger systems, generally
used to support operational units at tactical levels of command, such
as battalions or brigades. Tactical UAS are locally operated and
controlled by the units. Theater UAS are controlled by the Joint Forces
Air Component Commander and are generally used to support the combatant
commander's ISR priorities, but in certain circumstances they can be
assigned to support tactical operations. Theater UAS have traditionally
been more capable than tactical or man-portable UAS.
In 2000, DOD components had fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in their
inventory; as of May 2008, they had more than 6,000.[Footnote 6] Many
of the UAS currently being used to support military operations are part
of formal DOD acquisition programs. DOD components have also fielded
other types of UAS in order to meet urgent warfighter requests and for
technology demonstrations. UAS can be government owned and operated,
government owned and contractor operated, or contractor owned and
operated. Although every military service and U.S. Special Operations
Command operate several types of UAS, each does not currently operate a
UAS in every UAS class. Table 1 provides a summary of UAS currently
operated by DOD components and contractors and of UAS that are not yet
fielded but appear in DOD's acquisition plans.
Table 1: DOD Components' Current and Planned UAS:
DOD component: Army;
UAS category: Man-portable;
Current DOD UAS: * Micro Air Vehicle;
* Raven;
Contractor-operated UAS: * Micro Air Vehicle;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: Army;
UAS category: Tactical;
* Hunter;
* Shadow;
Contractor-operated UAS: DOD component: * Hunter;
* I-Gnat;
* Warrior-Alpha;
Planned DOD UAS: DOD component: * Sky Warrior;
* Fire Scout.
DOD component: Army;
UAS category: Theater;
Current DOD UAS: None;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: Air Force;
UAS category: Man-portable;
Current DOD UAS:
* Battlefield Air Targeting Micro Air Vehicle;
* Raven;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: Air Force;
UAS category: Tactical;
Contractor-operated UAS: Scan Eagle;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: Air Force;
UAS category: Theater;
Current DOD UAS: * Predator;
* Reaper;
* Global Hawk;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: Navy;
UAS category: Man-portable;
Current DOD UAS: * Gas Micro Air Vehicle;
* Raven;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: * Wasp Micro Air Vehicle.
DOD component: Navy;
UAS category: Tactical;
Current DOD UAS: * Shadow;
* Silver Fox;
Contractor-operated UAS: DOD component: * Scan Eagle;
Planned DOD UAS: * Small Tactical UAS;
* Fire Scout.
DOD component: Navy;
UAS category: Theater;
Current DOD UAS: None;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: * Broad Area Maritime Surveillance;
* Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle.
DOD component: Marine Corps;
UAS category: Man-portable;
Current DOD UAS: * Wasp Micro Air Vehicle;
* Raven;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: Marine Corps;
UAS category: Tactical;
Current DOD UAS: DOD component:
* Shadow;
Contractor-operated UAS: * Scan Eagle;
Planned DOD UAS: DOD component: * Tier II UAS;
* Tier III Vertical UAS.
DOD component: Marine Corps;
UAS category: Theater;
Current DOD UAS: None;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: U.S. Special Operations Command: None.
DOD component: U.S. Special Operations Command;
UAS category: Man-portable;
Current DOD UAS: * Raven;
* Puma All Environment Capable Variant;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: U.S. Special Operations Command;
UAS category: Tactical;
Current DOD UAS: DOD component:
* Neptune;
* Sentry;
* Predator;
Contractor-operated UAS: * Tiger Shark;
* Scan Eagle;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
DOD component: U.S. Special Operations Command;
UAS category: Theater;
Current DOD UAS: * Reaper;
Contractor-operated UAS: None;
Planned DOD UAS: None.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
[End of table]
DOD's Increasing Reliance on UAS:
Beyond replacing human beings in "dull, dirty, and dangerous" roles,
UAS are highly valuable because they possess characteristics that many
manned aircraft do not. For example, unmanned aircraft can fly for long-
duration missions and can provide a sustained presence over the
battlefield. Additionally, unmanned aircraft may be equipped with
multiple payloads that may enable them to satisfy several missions
during one flight. DOD's use of UAS has increased dramatically as the
military services continue to develop and field these systems. As shown
in figure 1, the number of flight hours performed by the military
services' UAS has increased each year since fiscal year 2002.
Figure 1: Number of Flight Hours for DOD's UAS:
This figure is a combination bar graph showing the number of flight
hours for DOD's UAS. The X axis represents the fiscal year, and the Y
axis represents the flight hours. The bars represent Air Force, Army,
and Navy & Marine Corps.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Navy & Marine Corps: 1,314;
Army: 4,795;
Air Force: 2,1092.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Navy & Marine Corps: 3,509;
Army: 8,385;
Air Force: 23,592.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Navy & Marine Corps: 4,511;
Army: 19,407;
Air Force: 35,884.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Navy & Marine Corps: 12,004;
Army: 48,147;
Air Force: 45,876.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Navy & Marine Corps: 24,720;
Army: 76,456;
Air Force: 63,816.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Navy & Marine Corps: 31,172;
Army: 135,662;
Air Force: 91,668.
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
Note: These data do not include smaller, man-portable UAS.
[End of figure]
As of the end of May 2008, the military services' UAS had performed
more than 230,000 flight hours in fiscal year 2008.
DOD has established goals for its continuing development and fielding
of UAS programs. The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
stated that DOD intended to increase UAS procurement to nearly double
the persistent surveillance[Footnote 7] capacity DOD had at the time of
that publication; to establish a plan to develop a new land-based, long-
range strike force by 2018, of which about 45 percent would be
unmanned; to expand maritime aviation to include unmanned aircraft for
both surveillance and strike missions; and to establish a UAS squadron
under U.S. Special Operations Command to provide the command with
organic capabilities to locate and target enemy capabilities. DOD's
funding plans for UAS reflect their growing importance to the
department. In fiscal year 2009, DOD requested approximately $3.5
billion for UAS procurement and research and development--approximately
$1 billion more than the department's fiscal year 2008 request. As
shown in table 2, DOD plans to make additional investments in UAS
programs from fiscal years 2010 through 2013.
Table 2: Defense Budget Plans for UAS:
Dollars in millions.
Procurement;
Fiscal year 2008: $1,587.4;
Fiscal year 2009: $2,170.3;
Fiscal year 2010: $2,310.9;
Fiscal year 2011: $1,968.8;
Fiscal year 2012: $1,556.3;
Fiscal year 2013: $1,325.3;
Total: $10,919.0.
Research, development, test and evaluation;
Fiscal year 2008: 927.6;
Fiscal year 2009: 1,320.4;
Fiscal year 2010: 1,364.4;
Fiscal year 2011: 1,110.5;
Fiscal year 2012: 904.0;
Fiscal year 2013: 729.7;
Total: $6,356.6.
Total;
Fiscal year 2008: $2,515.0;
Fiscal year 2009: $3,490.7;
Fiscal year 2010: $3,675.3;
Fiscal year 2011: $3,079.3;
Fiscal year 2012: $2,460.3;
Fiscal year 2013: $2,055.0;
Total: $17,275.6.
Source: GAO analysis of funding for UAS included in the President's
fiscal year 2009 budget request, not including supplemental funds.
[End of table]
Organizations Involved in UAS Management and Integration:
The responsibility for the management and integration of UAS is shared
among several DOD components. For example, each military service is
responsible for the development and acquisition of UAS capabilities to
meet validated combatant commander needs. In addition, DOD implemented
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System in 2003 as
the department's principal process for identifying, assessing, and
prioritizing joint military capabilities.[Footnote 8] DOD has also
established organizations that are intended to improve the management
and operational use of UAS and to integrate the military services' UAS
programs. In 2001, for example, the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Planning Task Force to serve as a joint advocate for
developing and fielding UAS. The task force was established to be the
single focal point within DOD to help create a common vision for future
UAS-related activities and to establish UAS interoperability standards.
The task force was responsible for coordinating detailed plans, or
roadmaps; recommending priorities for development and procurement
efforts; and preparing guidance to the military services and agencies
for UAS programs and functions. The task force published several
versions of the Roadmap, which described UAS programs, identified
potential missions for UAS, and provided guidance on the development of
emerging technologies.
In 2005, DOD established the Joint UAS Center of Excellence with the
mission of providing support to joint warfighters and the military
services to identify solutions for UAS capabilities and use. DOD
chartered the Joint UAS Center of Excellence to focus on developing
common UAS operating standards, capabilities, concepts, technologies,
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training. For example,
the Joint UAS Center of Excellence has the responsibility to develop
and update the joint concept of operations for UAS[Footnote 9] first
published in March 2007. The document provides overarching principles,
a discussion of UAS capabilities, operational views, and a discussion
of UAS use in various operational scenarios.
In September 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense combined all the ISR
systems across DOD to form a capability portfolio, in a test case for
the joint capability portfolio management concept.[Footnote 10]
Portfolio management principles are commonly used by large commercial
companies to prioritize needs and allocate resources. Under this
concept, a group of military capabilities, such as ISR, are managed as
a joint portfolio across DOD--rather than by individual military
service or individual program. In this way, DOD reasons that it can
potentially improve the interoperability of future capabilities,
minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability
effectiveness. DOD assigned the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence to be the lead office for this ISR portfolio, known as
the battlespace awareness portfolio. In addition, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required the Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence to develop a plan to guide the development and
integration of DOD's ISR capabilities from 2004 through 2018.[Footnote
11] To date, DOD has provided two updates of the Defense ISR
Integration Roadmap that discuss different management aspects of DOD's
ISR programs, including UAS.
DOD has also considered other proposals related to the management and
integration of UAS programs. In 2005, the military services were unable
to reach consensus on the scope, composition, requirements, and charter
for an executive agent for UAS. In 2007, the Air Force proposed that it
be designated executive agent for medium-and high-altitude UAS, for
several reasons, including to avoid duplicating separate service
acquisition efforts by centralizing the procurement of all medium-and
high-altitude unmanned aircraft and their associated ground equipment
and standardizing UAS operations, training, and combat tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Although the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council[Footnote 12] initially endorsed the establishment of an
executive agent for medium-and high-altitude UAS under the Secretary of
the Air Force, the Deputy Secretary of Defense ultimately decided that
an executive agent was unnecessary and instead took alternative
actions--such as convening the UAS Task Force--intended to provide for
common, joint, and operationally effective UAS programs.
Departmental and Military Service Efforts Are Under Way to Improve the
Management and Operational Use of UAS:
Over the past several years, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, and the military services have undertaken several
initiatives to improve the management of UAS programs and the
operational use of these systems. To address challenges such as the
development and acquisition of UAS and the integration of these assets
into combat operations, DOD has established new entities within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and refocused the mission of an
existing organization. DOD has also initiated several studies to
determine UAS needs and help inform future UAS acquisition decisions.
In addition, DOD issued the Roadmap, which it characterizes as a
comprehensive plan for the evolution and transition of unmanned systems
technology, including UAS. Furthermore, in select cases the military
services are developing and fielding common UAS programs and proceeding
to develop more common UAS concepts of operations.
New and Existing Organizations within DOD Are Intended to Address UAS
Challenges:
DOD has established two new entities within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to address UAS challenges. First, in September 2007, in lieu
of establishing an executive agent for UAS, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense directed the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to convene a task force to coordinate
critical UAS issues and develop a way forward to enhance operations,
enable interdependencies, and streamline UAS acquisition. In response
to this direction, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics rechartered the UAS Planning Task Force in
October 2007 as the UAS Task Force and assigned organizations within
the military services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to lead integrated product teams for issues related to the
acquisition and management of UAS. DOD also established a senior
steering group, composed of senior military officers and DOD civilians,
to periodically assess the UAS Task Force's progress and to address
unresolved issues. A primary near-term focus of the UAS Task Force has
been to implement the Deputy Secretary of Defense's direction to the
Army and the Air Force to combine the Army's Sky Warrior UAS and the
Air Force's Predator UAS programs into a single acquisition program in
order to achieve efficiencies in areas such as common development,
procurement, and training activities. Table 3 provides a description of
UAS Task Force organizations and summarizes their intended purpose.
Table 3: Description and Purpose of UAS Task Force Organizations:
Lead DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Description of organization: Acquisition streamlining;
Purpose of organization: Assess and evaluate programs for acquisition
streamlining and develop options to combine the Sky Warrior and
Predator UAS programs.
Lead DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Staff;
Description of organization: Research and development coordination;
Purpose of organization: Identify critical warfighter deficiencies with
potential to be supported by UAS, and identify opportunities to match
science and technology investments with these deficiencies.
Lead DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Navy;
Description of organization: Standardization and interoperability
improvements;
Purpose of organization: Develop interoperability standards with a near-
term focus on developing a profile for the combined Sky Warrior and
Predator program.
Lead DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
Force;
Description of organization: Civil airspace integration planning and
technology development;
Purpose of organization: Review and assess operational requirements;
identify acquisition solutions;
and recommend training and policy changes necessary to fully integrate
UAS into all necessary classes of airspace to support DOD requirements.
Lead DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Army;
Description of organization: Payload and sensor integration;
Purpose of organization: Review and assess operational requirements;
identify potential joint acquisitions;
and recommend integrated training and sustainment activities to
optimize UAS payload development and fielding.
Lead DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Description of organization: Frequency and bandwidth utilization;
Purpose of organization: Develop and implement a UAS frequency
management plan for all DOD UAS to support the full range of mission
requirements.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
[End of table]
Second, in April 2008 the Secretary of Defense established a separate
entity--the ISR Task Force--to develop options to deploy additional ISR
capabilities, including UAS, to support ongoing military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The ISR Task Force is also responsible for
developing options to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
deployed ISR and UAS assets and has made a series of recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense to increase ISR capabilities. Based on these
recommendations, DOD received congressional approval to reprogram about
$1.3 billion in fiscal year 2008 funds to increase ISR capabilities to
support ongoing operations. Of this amount, about $500 million will be
used for various UAS initiatives, such as increasing the number of
Predator combat air patrols[Footnote 13] and acquiring additional
contractor-operated UAS. The ISR Task Force is developing other
proposals to further increase the use of UAS, such as deploying
increased numbers of the Army's Shadow, a tactical UAS.
Furthermore, in November 2007 DOD refocused the mission of the Joint
UAS Center of Excellence (Center) to coordinate the development of
training activities and to improve the operational employment of UAS.
The Center was established in July 2005 under the Joint Staff with a
broad mission to enhance joint UAS operations. Since November 2007, the
Center has initiated work on a range of activities. For example, it has
conducted a study to evaluate alternative command and control
arrangements for UAS to optimize the use of assets that are capable of
conducting joint operations. In addition, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council requested that the Center assess the military
services' training and manning approaches for all categories of UAS and
develop recommendations to achieve joint-service efficiencies. It is
also revising the joint concept of operations for UAS[Footnote 14] to
include more detailed information on special operations forces' UAS
procedures and maritime and urban UAS operations, among other topics.
The Center is also assisting U.S. Joint Forces Command in its annual
effort to update joint doctrine to ensure the inclusion of consistent
and relevant information regarding UAS operations.
Several Studies Are Under Way to Assess Long-term UAS Demand and to
Improve UAS Effectiveness:
DOD organizations have initiated several studies to determine long-term
UAS needs that will be used to inform future UAS acquisition decisions.
For example, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence is leading an assessment of the demand for ISR
capabilities for conventional forces in the Global War on Terrorism and
irregular warfare. According to officials, the study is intended to
clarify mid-and long-term needs for specific ISR programs, including
UAS. The analysis is based on an assessment of ISR performance across a
range of military missions in Iraq, such as counterinsurgency
operations, and has been used to determine which ISR capabilities are
insufficient to meet the demand for these capabilities. According to
officials with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence, the analysis has been a key source of data used to
support DOD's decisions to increase investments in additional UAS
platforms and sensors. In addition, the analysis has been used to
develop guidance that the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided
to the DOD components, instructing them to further invest in UAS
capabilities. Based on current plans, these investments will be
reflected in DOD's budget request for the President's fiscal year 2010
budget.
In addition, U.S. Strategic Command is leading a departmentwide study
to determine all long-term requirements for ISR programs, including
UAS. In order to meet warfighter demand for the capabilities provided
by UAS assets, the department has requested increased production of
certain UAS, including the Predator, Sky Warrior, Reaper, and Global
Hawk, to their maximum production capacity. According to officials with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, U.S.
Strategic Command is currently developing an approach to determine the
mix of manned and unmanned ISR assets, including UAS, needed to support
the department's force plans established in DOD's planning documents.
The results of this study will be used by DOD to guide decisions in
future investments in UAS programs.
Furthermore, in its first quadrennial review of the roles and missions
of the armed forces, DOD is examining those concerning UAS operations
in particular. DOD's review is intended to determine whether there is
unnecessary duplication of capabilities across DOD components and how
the department could better develop UAS to increase combat
effectiveness and improve support to warfighters, among other issues.
This review is being conducted in 2008 and DOD must submit the results
to the relevant committees of Congress not later than the date for
submission of the department's budget request for the President's
fiscal year 2010 budget.[Footnote 15]
Roadmap Is Intended to Guide UAS Planning:
In December 2007, DOD issued the Roadmap, which it characterizes as a
comprehensive, departmentwide plan for the future development of
unmanned systems, including UAS. The 2007 Roadmap is an update of the
2005 Roadmap and incorporates the military services' individual
roadmaps and plans for UAS, unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned undersea
vehicles, and unmanned surface vehicles. The Roadmap identifies mission
areas within DOD that can be supported technologically and
operationally by unmanned systems and that should be considered by DOD
components when prioritizing future research, development, and
procurement of unmanned systems. Additionally, the Roadmap establishes
specific goals for unmanned systems to support larger DOD goals of
fielding transformational capabilities, establishing and implementing
joint standards, ensuring interoperability, balancing the portfolio,
and controlling costs. The specific goals for unmanned systems are as
follows:
* Improving the effectiveness of combatant command and coalition
unmanned systems through improved integration and joint services
collaboration.
* Emphasizing commonality to achieve greater interoperability among
system controls, communications, data products, and data links on
unmanned systems.
* Fostering the development of policies, standards, and procedures that
enable safe and timely operations and the effective integration of
manned and unmanned systems.
* Implementing standardized and protected control measures for unmanned
systems and their associated armament.
* Supporting rapid integration of validated combat capabilities in
fielded and deployed systems through a flexible test and logistical
support process.
* Aggressively controlling cost by utilizing competition, refining and
prioritizing requirements, and increasing interdependencies among DOD
systems.
The Military Services Have Initiated Efforts Intended to Improve UAS
Management and Operational Use:
The military services have also taken steps intended to improve the
management of UAS programs and the operational use of these systems.
For example, the Army, Air Force, and Navy joint-service airspace
integration work group has developed a two-phase strategy intended to
meet DOD's UAS operational and training needs. The first phase focuses
on resolving near-term issues to expand access to the national airspace
for specific UAS beyond current DOD and Federal Aviation Administration
restrictions. The second phase is intended to develop specific
performance standards for UAS technologies and operational procedures
that will provide UAS with an appropriate level of safety to operate in
the airspace required to accomplish its mission.
In addition, in select cases the military services have taken steps to
develop more common UAS programs, and the Army and Air Force are
developing a common concept of operations to employ similar UAS. For
example:
* In September 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the
Army's Sky Warrior UAS and the Air Force's Predator UAS be combined
into a single acquisition program. In February 2008, the Army and Air
Force signed a memorandum of agreement to establish an acquisition
partnership for the development and acquisition of the combined Sky
Warrior and Predator acquisition program. The goals of this effort are
to reduce total acquisition costs and facilitate increased
interoperability. As part of this effort, the services established an
executive steering group to provide overarching management of the Army
and Air Force combined acquisition effort.
* With guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army
and Marine Corps have developed a common set of UAS programs to support
land operations. For example, Army and Marine Corps ground forces, as
well as special operations forces, employ the Raven man-portable UAS.
Additionally, the Marine Corps began fielding the Shadow tactical UAS
in 2007 as the replacement system for the legacy Pioneer UAS. The
Shadow is the tactical UAS fielded by the Army's brigade combat teams.
* The Navy and Marine Corps have also taken steps to combine separate
UAS acquisition programs. The Navy made the decision to combine two
separate programs--the Navy's Small Tactical UAS and the Marine Corps'
Tier II UAS--into a single acquisition program to eliminate duplicative
development efforts while ensuring an integrated and interoperable
program for Navy and Marine Corps requirements.
* In August 2007, the Joint Staff validated separate concepts of
operations for the Army's Sky Warrior UAS and the Air Force's Predator
UAS, stipulating that a joint force commander be enabled to use these
assets as needed to meet theater requirements. However, the Army and
Air Force, in coordination with U.S. Joint Forces Command, are
currently identifying areas where commonality may be achieved in a
common concept of operations, and they have initiated work to develop a
joint-service concept of operations for the Sky Warrior and Predator
UAS that will describe the capabilities and requirements for UAS
employment at the theater level.
DOD Efforts Lack Elements of an Overarching Organizational Framework to
Improve the Management and Operational Use of UAS:
DOD has taken several positive steps to improve the management and
operational use of UAS, but its approach lacks key elements of an
overarching organizational framework needed to fully integrate efforts,
sustain progress, and resolve long-standing challenges. First, although
DOD has created new entities and assigned other offices to oversee
various aspects of UAS matters, no single office or entity is
accountable for integrating key management efforts undertaken to
address the full range of challenges that DOD faces in the development
and acquisition of UAS and the use of these assets in combat
operations. Second, DOD has not defined the roles, responsibilities,
and relationships among the various UAS-related organizations to
provide for effective communication of UAS efforts within DOD and among
external stakeholders, such as Congress. Third, DOD has not developed a
comprehensive and integrated strategic plan to align departmental and
service efforts to improve the management and operational use of UAS
with long-term implementation goals, priorities, and time lines, as
well as with other departmental planning efforts.
DOD Has Not Designated a Single Office or Entity That Is Accountable
for Integrating UAS Efforts:
DOD has not designated a single office or entity, supported by an
implementation team, that is accountable for integrating departmental
and service efforts to resolve the full range of challenges presented
by the development and acquisition of UAS and their integration into
combat operations. Our prior work has shown that as DOD and other
agencies embark on large-scale organizational change initiatives, there
is a compelling need to integrate various key management and
transformational efforts into a coherent and enterprisewide approach.
We have also reported that top-level leadership should vest an
implementation team with dedicated resources and funding to ensure that
change initiatives receive focused, full-time attention and are
implemented in a coherent and integrated way.[Footnote 16] Without such
leadership, DOD risks not being able to sustain its progress and ensure
the success of its efforts to improve the management and operational
use of UAS.
Although senior DOD leaders have increased management attention on UAS
by establishing new entities and assigning responsibilities to improve
the management and operational use of UAS to several different DOD
offices, no single office or entity is accountable for coordinating and
integrating the department's various cross-cutting UAS efforts. Our
prior work has shown that DOD lacked a robust oversight framework to
guide UAS development and investment decisions.[Footnote 17] As such,
we previously recommended that DOD designate a single organization with
sufficient authority to enforce the implementation of a UAS strategic
plan and to promote joint operations and the efficient expenditure of
funds. DOD did not agree with our recommendation noting that the
existing organizational framework provided sufficient oversight.
Since that time, DOD has taken additional actions that are intended to
both improve the management of UAS programs and the operational use of
these systems, and determine how UAS capabilities will support the
department's ISR needs. Our analysis shows that DOD has commenced at
least seven separate initiatives and related organizational changes
since September 2006 that at least in part are intended to do so. Yet
as shown in table 4, the accountability for these initiatives resides
with differing organizations within DOD. For example, the UAS Task
Force receives its direction and provides recommendations through the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics to the Deputy's Advisory Working Group.[Footnote 18]
Separately, the Joint UAS Center of Excellence has been directed to
coordinate efforts to improve the training and operational use of UAS
and will report progress through U.S. Joint Forces Command to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council. Although these efforts are intended to
complement one another, the priorities for each initiative have not
been fully integrated with a DOD-wide approach to resolve UAS
challenges and determine how UAS will meet the department's ISR or
other mission needs.
Table 4: Select DOD Initiatives to Improve Management and Operations of
ISR and UAS:
Initiative: Battlespace awareness capability portfolio manager;
Initiation date: Sept. 2006;
Purpose: To oversee ISR capabilities, including UAS programs, to
improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps,
and maximize capability effectiveness;
Reporting line of authority: Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
and the Deputy's Advisory Working Group.
Initiative: UAS Task Force;
Initiation date: Oct. 2007;
Purpose: To lead a DOD-wide effort to coordinate critical UAS issues
and develop a way ahead to enhance operations, enable
interdependencies, and streamline acquisitions;
Reporting line of authority: Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics and the Deputy's Advisory Working Group.
Initiative: Joint UAS Center of Excellence;
Initiation date: Nov. 2007[A];
Purpose: To focus the mission of the Joint UAS Center of Excellence on
coordinating training activities and improving the operational
employment of UAS;
Reporting line of authority: U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council.
Initiative: ISR support for conventional forces and missions in the
Global War on Terrorism and irregular warfare;
Initiation date: Jan. 2008;
Purpose: To evaluate the growing demand for ISR and UAS capabilities in
irregular warfare, and to identify mid-and long-term ISR and UAS needs
to gain an ISR advantage in irregular warfare;
Reporting line of authority: Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
and the Joint Staff.
Initiative: ISR Task Force;
Initiation date: April 2008;
Purpose: To assess and propose options for maximizing the number of
deployed ISR and UAS assets, and to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of their use;
Reporting line of authority: Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense.
Initiative: Quadrennial roles and missions review;
Initiation date: May 2008;
Purpose: To assess opportunities to expand jointness, achieve greater
operational effectiveness, and reduce unnecessary duplication in ISR
and UAS programs;
Reporting line of authority: Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
Initiative: ISR force sizing construct;
Initiation date: June 2008;
Purpose: To develop an operational ISR force sizing construct and test
it in coordination with U.S. Pacific Command;
Reporting line of authority: Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
[A] The Joint UAS Center of Excellence was established in 2005 with a
broad mission to develop common UAS operating standards, capabilities,
concepts, technologies, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and
training.
[End of table]
DOD also does not have an implementation team in place, with dedicated
resources and funding, to ensure that its efforts to improve the
management and operational use of UAS are implemented in a coherent and
integrated way. For example, most of the officials who lead DOD's UAS
Task Force's integrated product teams do so as an extra responsibility
outside of their normal work duties. In addition, the ISR and UAS task
forces do not have dedicated funding to support their activities, such
as travel funds for attending meetings, or to implement task force
initiatives and recommendations. Officials told us that the lack of
dedicated personnel and resources has created challenges for them in
completing their work. A senior UAS Task Force official told us that
the challenge created by the limited number of personnel assigned to
the task force is further exacerbated by the fact that these personnel
also participate in other ongoing UAS-related activities, such as the
ISR Task Force and the quadrennial roles and missions study. In
contrast, the Joint UAS Center of Excellence is composed of joint-
service personnel and has dedicated funding to perform its mission.
Without a long-term funding mechanism in place, DOD may be unable to
ensure that efforts to improve the management and operational use of
UAS can be sustained over a period of years.
DOD Lacks a Strategy to Facilitate Effective Communication of UAS
Efforts:
DOD does not have an effective strategy to facilitate communication of
UAS efforts within DOD and among external stakeholders, such as
Congress, because it has not clearly defined the roles,
responsibilities, and relationships of its various initiatives intended
to improve the management and operational use of UAS. We have
previously reported that establishing a communications strategy is
important because it creates shared expectations and is crucial in the
public sector, where policy making and program management call for
transparency regarding the goals and outcomes to be achieved and the
processes to be used in achieving them.[Footnote 19]
However, DOD has not clearly defined the missions, authorities, roles
and responsibilities, and near-and long-term goals for the ISR and UAS
task forces in directives or other publications. For example, the ISR
Task Force initiated its work under the broad direction specified in an
April 2008 Secretary of Defense memorandum. Senior task force officials
have expressed uncertainty about accountability for implementing the
task force's recommendations, because the Secretary of Defense's
memorandum does not specify how the implementation of the
recommendations will be handled. In August 2008, DOD decided to realign
the ISR Task Force under the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence. As of September 2008, DOD had not published a
directive or other publication to guide the efforts of the task force.
Although a senior task force official told us that efforts are under
way to promulgate such guidance, it is unclear how the guidance will
clarify the roles and responsibilities for the ISR Task Force, and how
the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence will coordinate efforts
to implement the task force's recommendations.
Furthermore, DOD has not defined the relationships within or among UAS
efforts. For example, the UAS Task Force's integrated product teams
addressing issues such as UAS acquisition streamlining and airspace
integration have not completed detailed action plans that are clearly
integrated with the UAS Task Force's charter and other departmental UAS
efforts. Although the UAS Task Force's integrated product teams had
initiated work on charters and action plans at the time of our work,
these efforts had not been finalized and milestones had not been
established for completing them. As a result, it is unclear to what
extent the UAS Task Force's integrated product teams had identified
specific goals, stakeholders and their empowerment, personnel and
resource requirements, and milestones for completing work. Moreover, it
is unclear how the UAS Task Force's work has been integrated with that
of other DOD entities that is intended to improve the management and
operational use of UAS.
An independent assessment of the UAS Task Force, completed in August
2008 at the request of the Task Force Director, concluded that a key
challenge in accomplishing its goals was the lack of an effective
communications plan. The assessment team made recommendations that the
task force and its integrated product teams complete formal charters,
develop detailed action plans with milestones that identify
stakeholders and resource requirements, and develop a strategy to
improve communication from the task force leadership to the integrated
product team members and across the task force's integrated product
teams. Without a communications strategy that clearly defines the
roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the various entities
addressing UAS challenges, DOD may not adequately address House
Committee on Armed Services concerns regarding the actions that DOD has
taken to overcome UAS-related challenges and how these efforts are
being coordinated with DOD's ISR manned and unmanned capabilities.
DOD Lacks a Comprehensive and Integrated Plan to Align Efforts to
Improve Management and Operational Use of UAS:
DOD continues to be challenged in improving the management and
operational use of UAS because it lacks a comprehensive and integrated
strategic plan that aligns individual UAS efforts with other
departmental planning efforts. Our prior work has shown that this type
of plan should contain results-oriented goals, measures, and
expectations that link institutional, unit, and individual performance
goals and expectations to promote accountability, and establish an
effective process and related tools for implementation and oversight.
Furthermore, such an integrated plan would be instrumental in
establishing investment priorities and guiding the department's key
resource decisions.[Footnote 20]
We have previously reported that DOD lacked a comprehensive plan or set
of plans for developing and fielding UAS across DOD.[Footnote 21]
Specifically, we found that DOD's UAS roadmaps have not constituted a
comprehensive strategic plan for integrating UAS into the military
services' force structure. As such, we recommended that the Secretary
of Defense modify the existing Roadmap or establish a comprehensive
strategic plan that would include key elements such as a clear link
connecting goals, capabilities, funding priorities, and needs. DOD
partially agreed with our recommendation but noted that since UAS are
one of many possible materiel solutions available to the department for
a given mission capability, they should not be the exclusive focus of a
separate strategic plan. DOD also stated that it would continue to work
to develop detailed mission capability plans.
In December 2007, DOD issued the current Roadmap, which incorporates
all of the department's individual roadmaps and master plans for
unmanned systems into a comprehensive document. The Roadmap contains
some elements of sound strategic planning to guide DOD's unmanned
systems programs, including UAS. For example, it contains a detailed
purpose, or mission statement, and a description of broad goals and
objectives that DOD has established for its unmanned systems programs.
Table 5 summarizes the Roadmap's goals and objectives for unmanned
systems.
Table 5: DOD Goals and Objectives for Unmanned Systems:
Goals: Improve the effectiveness of combatant command and coalition
unmanned systems through improved integration and joint services
collaboration;
Objectives: * Conduct experimentation with promising technologies;
* Conduct risk reduction on mature technologies.
Goals: Emphasize commonality to achieve greater interoperability among
system controls, communications, data products, and data links on
unmanned systems;
Objectives: * Field secure common data link communications systems for
unmanned systems control and sensor product data distribution;
* Improve capability to prevent interception, interference, jamming,
and hijacking;
* Migrate to a capability compliant with other communications
initiatives, when available;
* Increase emphasis on common standards to allow for greater
interoperability of unmanned systems;
* Ensure compliance with existing DOD and intelligence community
standards and profiles for motion imagery.
Goals: Foster the development of policies, standards, and procedures
that enable safe and timely operations and the effective integration of
manned and unmanned systems;
Objectives: * Promote the development, adoption, and enforcement of
government and commercial standards for the design, manufacturing, and
testing of unmanned systems;
* Coordinate with federal transportation organizations to ensure that
the operations of DOD unmanned systems adhere to comparable manned
systems requirements;
* Develop and field unmanned systems that can autonomously sense and
avoid other objects to provide a level of safety equivalent to
comparable manned systems.
Goals: Implement standardized and protected control measures for
unmanned systems and their associated armament;
Objectives: * Develop a standard unmanned systems architecture and
other standards for appropriate unmanned systems;
* Develop a standard unmanned systems architecture and other standards
for unmanned systems capable of weapons carriage.
Goals: Support rapid demonstration and integration of validated combat
capabilities in fielded and deployed systems through a flexible
prototyping, test, and logistical support process;
Objectives: * Develop and field reliable propulsion alternatives to
gasoline-powered engines;
* Develop common power sources for unmanned systems that meet size,
weight, and space requirements, preferably common with manned systems.
Goals: Control cost aggressively by utilizing competition, refining and
prioritizing requirements, and increasing interdependencies among DOD
systems;
Objectives: * Compete all future unmanned system programs;
* Implement configuration steering boards to increase the collaboration
between engineering and operations to field capabilities within budget
constraints;
* Develop common interoperability profiles for development, design, and
operation of unmanned systems.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense's Unmanned Systems Roadmap
2007-2032.
[End of table]
While the most recent Roadmap incorporates some strategic planning
elements, it only minimally addresses other key components that could
further align departmental and service efforts to improve the
management and operational use of UAS. For example, the Roadmap
provides a plan for the integration of UAS into the national airspace
system, which aligns with one of DOD's goals for unmanned systems: to
foster the development of policies, standards, and procedures that
enable safe and timely operations and the effective integration of
manned and unmanned systems. However, the Roadmap does not indicate how
DOD plans to achieve each of its goals and objectives for unmanned
systems, or contain a detailed timeline with milestones to track the
progress that DOD has achieved in meeting its goals and objectives.
Another element that is key for sound strategic planning is the
identification of performance gaps and clear linkages between proposed
investments and long-term planning goals. However, the Roadmap does not
identify DOD's performance gap for the most urgent mission priorities
that can be supported by unmanned systems or the resources needed to
close these gaps. The Roadmap identifies the most urgent mission
priorities that can be supported by UAS, including reconnaissance and
surveillance; target identification and designation; and chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive reconnaissance. But
the Roadmap does not clearly establish DOD's performance gap for these
missions, which would help the military services and defense agencies
prioritize future research, development, and procurement investments in
unmanned systems technology. Furthermore, although the Roadmap provides
summary data on DOD's current and planned investments in unmanned
systems, including UAS, it does not show linkages between proposed UAS
investments and the Roadmap's long-term planning goals.
Additionally, DOD has not clearly integrated the strategic goals for
UAS with other departmental planning efforts. For example, DOD issued
the ISR Integration Roadmap as a plan to guide the development and
integration of DOD's ISR capabilities. However, we reported in March
2008 that the ISR Integration Roadmap does not provide a clear vision
of a future ISR enterprise indicating what capabilities are required to
achieve DOD's strategic goals for ISR.[Footnote 22] Our analysis shows
that the current Roadmap does not link DOD's UAS activities with a
larger ISR strategy and the goals in the ISR Integration Roadmap. As a
result, although DOD continues to request funds to expand UAS
inventories, it does so without the informed understanding that it
could use to determine what long-term UAS force structure plans are
required to achieve the department's strategic goals for ISR and the
related funding needed to support these plans. DOD officials agreed
with our analysis that the Roadmap lacks several strategic planning
elements and that its strategic goals were not clearly linked with the
goals established in the ISR Integration Roadmap. Officials stated that
future versions of these documents would further refine planning
elements, such as the department's unmanned systems vision, strategy,
schedules, and investments. However, it is unclear whether these steps
would constitute a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan for UAS.
Furthermore, while the department is planning to establish capability
portfolio strategic plans for its existing joint capability
areas,[Footnote 23] including battlespace awareness, it is unclear how
strategic goals for UAS initiatives may be linked. According to DOD
documents, these strategic plans will be used as part of the capability
portfolio management process to evaluate capability demand against
resource constraints, identify and assess risks, and suggest capability
trade-offs within capability portfolios. However, since these planning
efforts are in the early stages and are focused on capability areas,
which are broader in scope, it is unclear how strategic goals for UAS
initiatives may be linked.
Conclusions:
Although DOD has experienced a high level of mission success with UAS
in ongoing operations, the dramatic increase in the demand for and use
of these assets has posed challenges. DOD has implemented various
initiatives intended to address concerns with the development and
acquisition of UAS, as well as with the integration of an increasing
number of these assets into combat operations. However, the department
continues to lack an overarching organizational framework to guide UAS
development and the additional investments it plans to make to further
increase UAS inventories. In the absence of such a framework, DOD faces
challenges in managing the current inventories of UAS systems,
developing coordinated concepts of operations, disseminating UAS plans,
and coordinating the efforts of the numerous organizations addressing
specific issues related to the UAS community. These challenges may
become even more difficult to fully resolve, as the very existence and
roles of DOD's UAS initiatives could change with the election of a new
presidential administration. Without a single entity responsible for
coordinating and integrating all cross-cutting UAS matters; clearly
defined roles, responsibilities, and relationships to facilitate
communication of UAS efforts; and a comprehensive and integrated
strategic plan that aligns individual UAS efforts with long-term goals,
priorities, and milestones, as well as with other departmental planning
efforts, DOD will continue to face challenges to fully integrating
departmental and service efforts to resolve long-standing problems in
the management and operational use of UAS.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To develop a fully integrated framework to sustain progress and resolve
long-standing challenges in the management and operational use of UAS,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three
steps:
* Designate a single departmental entity that is responsible and
accountable for integrating all cross-cutting DOD efforts related to
improving the management and operational use of UAS. This entity should
be supported by an implementation team with dedicated resources and
funding and should serve as the DOD point of coordination for all UAS
initiatives; integrate all UAS activities throughout DOD; and as part
of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, make
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in determining the priority
of the department's UAS-related initiatives.
* Define, in directives or other publications as appropriate, the
roles, responsibilities, and relationships among various UAS-related
entities to facilitate communication within DOD and among external
stakeholders.
* Develop a comprehensive and integrated UAS strategic plan, in
coordination with DOD components, to align UAS goals and funding with
long-term departmental planning efforts. The UAS strategic plan should,
at a minimum, include elements such as a comprehensive mission
statement, long-term goals and an explanation of how the goals are to
be achieved, a timeline with milestones to track progress toward short-
and long-term goals, and a determination of the resources needed to
close any current capability and capacity gaps. In addition, the
strategic plan should show clear linkages between UAS initiatives and
other comprehensive departmental planning efforts, such as the ISR
Integration Roadmap and the development of joint capability area
strategic plans.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with one recommendation and did not concur with the other two
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as
appropriate.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense designate a single departmental entity responsible and
accountable for integrating all cross-cutting DOD efforts related to
improving the management and operational use of UAS. DOD stated that in
response to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and in line with
recommended best practices from a March 2007 GAO report,[Footnote 24]
DOD has undertaken several initiatives to improve the department's
approach to investment and decision making, including the
implementation of capability portfolio managers. DOD further stated
that it had created the UAS Task Force--in lieu of an executive agent-
-to coordinate critical UAS issues to enhance operations, enable
interdependencies, and streamline UAS acquisition. DOD stated that
since UAS are gaining increasing roles in other capability portfolios,
the UAS Task Force also coordinates with other portfolio managers on
UAS issues. In our report, we specifically recognize that DOD has
initiated a number of efforts, including capability portfolio
management and the UAS Task Force. However, capability portfolio
management efforts are focused on joint capability areas, such as
battlespace awareness, which are broad in scope and the
responsibilities of the capability portfolio managers are continuing to
evolve. As yet, the Joint Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio
Manager has not been formally assigned the responsibility for
integrating all cross-cutting DOD efforts related to improving the
management and operational use of UAS. Furthermore, although the UAS
Task Force Director is responsible for coordinating some critical UAS
issues, making recommendations to the Deputy's Advisory Working Group,
and where necessary, assigning lead organizations for UAS acquisition
and management, the Director has not been assigned specific authority
or responsibility for integrating all cross-cutting DOD UAS
initiatives. Conversely, the accountability for the department's
various activities that are intended to improve the management and
operational use of UAS is distributed among multiple organizations
within DOD, and the priorities for these activities have not been fully
integrated with a DOD-wide approach to resolve UAS challenges.
Therefore, we continue to believe that a single entity--supported by an
implementation team--that is accountable for integrating cross-cutting
UAS issues would better position DOD to sustain its progress and ensure
the success of its efforts to improve the management and operational
use of UAS.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense define, in directives or other publications as appropriate, the
roles, responsibilities, and relationships among various UAS-related
entities to facilitate communication within DOD and among external
stakeholders. DOD stated that the UAS Task Force has developed a plan
of action and milestones to address these issues. DOD also stated that
it continues to improve the Roadmap, and sees the document as an
effective tool for communication both across DOD and with external
stakeholders. DOD also stated that several documents have been signed
or are in the process of being signed that define the roles,
responsibilities, and relationships among the key activities that
interact in decisions relating to the management and use of UAS to
provide specific warfighting capabilities. For example, DOD published a
directive in September 2008 that establishes policy and assigns
responsibilities for the use of capability portfolio managers,[Footnote
25] and the department is in the process of finalizing a charter for
the ISR Task Force. We recognize that DOD has completed some steps and
has additional efforts under way to further define the roles,
responsibilities, and relationships of its UAS initiatives. However,
neither the department's capability portfolio management directive nor
the most recent version of the Roadmap provide comprehensive
information on the various UAS-related entities, such as the UAS Task
Force, which are intended to improve the management and operational use
of UAS. Furthermore, we acknowledge in this report that DOD has efforts
under way to publish guidance further defining the missions,
authorities, roles and responsibilities, and near-and long-term goals
for the UAS Task Force and the ISR Task Force. As DOD finalizes this
guidance, we continue to believe it will be important that the result
clearly defines the roles, responsibilities, and relationships for each
of its UAS-related organizations.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense develop a comprehensive and integrated UAS strategic plan, in
coordination with DOD components, to align UAS goals and funding with
long-term departmental planning efforts. DOD stated that it has
undertaken several initiatives to improve the department's approach to
investment and decision making, including the implementation of its
capability portfolio managers, and that the department's strategic plan
for investment is aligned with portfolios that address specific
warfighting capabilities as opposed to platforms or material solutions,
such as UAS. DOD also stated that long-term goals and guidance for
achieving those goals are provided in top-level documents, such as the
Guidance for the Development of the Force, and that the Joint
Capabilities Integration Development System provides a structured
process to address warfighting capability and capacity gaps.
Furthermore, DOD stated that to ensure that emphasis is not lost on
making the most efficient use of UAS platforms and technologies, the
department created the UAS Task Force, which translates the
department's capabilities-based strategic plan into the platform-and
technology-based Roadmap that can be shared with external stakeholders
and industry. Lastly, DOD stated that our report came to a flawed
conclusion by asserting that since the Unmanned Systems Roadmap does
not have all of the elements of a strategic plan, DOD lacks a strategic
plan. We recognize that DOD has a number of initiatives, processes, and
guidance, including the Unmanned Systems Roadmap, that are part of the
department's strategic planning approach. However, we believe these
efforts, whether taken individually or collectively, do not constitute
a strategic plan for UAS that lays out a clear path for the
department's UAS programs. As we state in the report, in the case of
the Unmanned Systems Roadmap, the document lacks key elements of a
strategic plan, such as a focus on how to accomplish DOD's goals and
objectives for UAS, milestones to track progress, identification of
performance gaps, and clear linkages between proposed UAS investments
and long-term planning goals. Further, while the department is planning
to establish capability portfolio strategic plans for joint capability
areas, these are broader in scope and it is unclear how strategic goals
for UAS initiatives may be linked. Therefore, we continue to believe
that our recommendation that DOD develop a comprehensive and integrated
UAS strategic plan--or complementary set of plans--to align UAS goals
and funding with long-term departmental planning efforts has merit.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of
the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be made
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staffs have any questions about
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify key departmental and military service efforts to improve
the management and operational use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS),
we conducted a literature review of both previous reports prepared by
Congress and our prior work and consolidated a list of challenges
presented by the development and acquisition of UAS and their
integration into combat operations. We obtained and analyzed available
internal Department of Defense (DOD) documentation, such as briefings,
directives, memorandums, and roadmaps that describe specific UAS-
related initiatives implemented by DOD and the military services. We
interviewed officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, DOD's unified combatant commands, and the military
services to better understand DOD's decision-making processes for
implementing these initiatives. We also interviewed officials who are
leading and participating in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
UAS Task Force, including members of the task force's integrated
product teams, to obtain information about the task force's goals,
progress made to date, and any unresolved challenges. We interviewed
officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force to obtain information about
the task force's efforts to acquire UAS and to improve and the
effectiveness and efficiency of UAS in ongoing military operations. We
analyzed DOD plans for UAS-related studies and interviewed relevant
officials to determine how DOD intends to use the study results to
inform current and future UAS plans. We interviewed officials with the
military services to document the key actions that each service was
taking to improve the management and operational use of UAS programs.
To assess the extent to which DOD's efforts constitute an overarching
organizational framework to guide and oversee UAS efforts, we obtained
and analyzed documents that describe the roles, responsibilities, and
relationships of the offices and entities that are responsible for
improving the management and operational use of DOD's UAS programs.
These documents include briefings; directives and memorandums; DOD's
Unmanned Systems Roadmap;[Footnote 26] draft and finalized
organizational charters; and UAS program management and budget
materials. We identified key elements of an overarching organizational
framework based on our prior work and the Government Performance and
Result Act of 1993 to determine the extent to which DOD's oversight
structure incorporates these elements. We interviewed officials with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the
military services who are responsible for managing or overseeing key
UAS issues, such as acquisition, program management, research and
development, and training, to obtain their views on the progress that
has been made and the challenges that remain to improve the management
and operational use of UAS. In addition, we solicited their views on
the extent to which DOD's efforts constitute an integrated approach. We
analyzed DOD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap to determine which elements of
sound strategic plans it contains, and discussed the results of our
analysis with DOD officials responsible for preparing the document. We
also reviewed the conclusions and recommendations of a DOD assessment
of the management and operations of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's UAS Task Force, and interviewed the assessment team leader to
determine the approach taken in conducting the assessment. We conducted
this performance audit from September 2007 through November 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We interviewed officials and, where appropriate, obtained documentation
at the following locations:
Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
* Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation:
Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* Directorate for Intelligence:
* Directorate for Operations:
* Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment:
Department of the Army:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7:
* Army Training and Doctrine Command:
* Army Aviation Center of Excellence:
* Army Intelligence Center:
* Army UAS Training Battalion:
* Army National Guard:
* 25th Combat Aviation Brigade:
Department of the Navy:
* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare Division:
* Naval Air Systems Command:
* Headquarters Marine Corps, Department of Aviation, Weapons
Requirements Branch:
* Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron-2:
Department of the Air Force:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial
Management:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs:
* Air Force Air Combat Command:
* Air National Guard:
* Air Force Personnel Center:
* Air Force 480th Intelligence Wing:
* Air Force 432nd Wing:
Other DOD components:
* United States Central Command:
* United States Joint Forces Command:
* United States Special Operations Command:
* United States Strategic Command:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 2030-3000:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
October 23, 2008:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-1129, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions
Needed to Improve Management and Integration of DoD Efforts to Support
Warfighter Needs," dated September 23, 2008 (GAO Code 351096).
The DoD non-concurs with two of the draft report's recommendations and
partially concurs with the other. The rationale for our positions are
enclosed.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. For
further questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Dyke
Weatherington, Deputy Director, Unmanned Warfare,
Dyke.Weatherington@osd.mil, 703-695-6188.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
GAO Draft Report - Dated September 23, 2008 GAO Code 351096/GAO-08-1129
"Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Management and Integration of DoD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
designate a single departmental entity that is responsible and
accountable for integrating all cross-cutting DoD efforts related to
improving the management and operational use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS). This entity should:
* be supported by an implementation team with dedicated resources and
funding;
* serve as the DoD point of coordination for all UAS initiatives;
* integrate all UAS activities throughout DoD; and:
* as part of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
process, make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in
determining the priority of the Department's UAS-related initiatives.
DOD Response: Non-concur. In response to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) and in line with recommended best practices from a March
2007 GAO report (GAO-07-388), DoD has undertaken several initiatives to
improve the Department's approach to investment and decision making
including the implementation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs)
per DoD Instruction 7045.20, "Capability Portfolio Management"
(September 25, 2008). In accordance with the instruction, the Joint
Battlespace Awareness (BA) CPM derives authority from the Deputy's
Advisory Working Group (DAWG) to integrate, synchronize, and coordinate
BA portfolio content, including UAS, to ensure alignment to strategic
priorities and capability demand. Additionally, as the draft report
rightly points out, the Department has taken a number of steps intended
to address longstanding challenges in the management of UAS programs
and the operational use of these systems. One of these steps is the
creation of the UAS Task Force in lieu of an Executive Agent. The UAS
Task Force Director coordinates critical UAS issues to enhance
operations, enable interdependencies, and streamline acquisition of
UAS. The Task Force reports findings and recommendations to the DAWG,
and where necessary, assigns lead organizations for UAS acquisition and
management. Although UAS primarily contribute to the BA portfolio, they
are gaining increasing roles in other capability portfolios such as
Force Application and Force Support. The Task Force Director
coordinates with the CPMs and likewise has access to the DAWG to
identify issues and to make recommendations for UAS in the context of
their contribution to respective capability portfolios.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
define, in directives or other publications as appropriate, the roles,
responsibilities, and relationships among various Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) related entities to facilitate communication within DoD
and among external stakeholders.
DOD Response: Partially concur. As noted in the report, an independent
assessment of the UAS Task Force, conducted at the request of the Task
Force Director, recommended the development of a formal charter for the
Task Force that clearly identifies its role, stakeholders, and
relationships to other DoD activities. The Task Force has developed a
Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) to address this and other issues
identified by the review team. Additionally, the Department continues
to improve the Unmanned Systems Roadmap and sees it as an effective
tool for communication both across DoD and with external stakeholders.
Finally, there are several recent documents that have been signed or
are in final staffing such as DoD Instruction 7045.20, "Capability
Portfolio Management" (September 25, 2008) and the Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force Charter, that define the
roles, responsibilities and relationships among the key activities that
interact in decisions relating to the management and use of UAS to
provide specific warfighting capabilities.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop a comprehensive and integrated Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
strategic plan, in coordination with DoD Components, to align UAS goals
and funding with long-term departmental planning efforts. The UAS
strategic plan should, at minimum, include elements such as a
comprehensive mission statement; long-term goals, and an explanation of
how the goals will be achieved; a timeline with milestones to track
progress toward short- and long-term goals; and a determination of the
resources needed to close any current capability and capacity gaps. In
addition, the strategic plan should show clear linkages connecting UAS
initiatives with other comprehensive Departmental planning efforts,
such as the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration
Roadmap and the development of joint capability area strategic plans.
DOD Response: Non-concur. In response to the 2006 QDR and in line with
recommended best practices from a March 2007 GAO Report (GAO-07-388),
DoD has undertaken several initiatives to improve the Department's
approach to investment and decision making including the implementation
of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) per DoD Instruction 7045.20,
"Capability Portfolio Management" (September 25, 2008). The
Department's strategic plan for investment is aligned according to
portfolios that address specific warfighting capabilities (Battlespace
Awareness, Force Application, etc) as opposed to platforms or material
solutions such as UAS. Long-term goals and guidance for achieving those
goals is provided in top-level documents such as the Guidance for the
Development of the Force (GDF). Capability and capacity gaps are
addressed through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
(JCIDS) structured process as outlined in CJCSM 3170.01 C and are
articulated in terms of warfighting capability needs. Each CPM derives
authority from the Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG) to integrate,
synchronize, and coordinate portfolio content, including UAS, to ensure
alignment to strategic priorities and capability demands. To ensure
that emphasis is not lost on making the most efficient use of UAS
platforms and technologies, the Department created the UAS Task Force
to serve as a "platform advocate" at the senior decision-making level.
As the UAS advocate, the UAS Task Force translates the Department's
capabilities-based strategic plan into the platform/technology-based
Unmanned Systems Roadmap in a format and classification level that can
be shared with external stakeholders and industry. The GAO comes to a
flawed conclusion in asserting that since the Unmanned Systems Roadmap
does not have all of the elements of a strategic plan, that the
Department lacks a strategic plan. The Department's strategic planning
is based on warfighting capabilities to which UAS contribute.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact: Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant
Director; Susannah Hawthorne; James Lawson; Brian Mateja; Karen
Thornton; Matthew Ullengren; and Cheryl Weissman made contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and
Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System. GAO-
08-511. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2008.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess
and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of Future ISR
Requirements. GAO-08-374. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2008.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities. GAO-07-836. Washington,
D.C.: July 11, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. GAO-07-578.
Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. GAO-07-596T.
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Better Acquisition Strategy Needed for Successful
Development of the Army's Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System. GAO-06-593.
Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. Washington, D.C.:
April 6, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: New DOD Programs Can Learn from Past Efforts
to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies. GAO-06-447.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49.
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2005.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks. GAO-05-6. Washington, D.C.:
November 5, 2004.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's
Development and Fielding Efforts. GAO-04-530T. Washington, D.C.: March
17, 2004.
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] According to DOD Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent (Sept. 3,
2002), a DOD executive agent is the head of a DOD component to whom the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned
specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide
defined levels of support for operational missions or administrative or
other designated activities that involve two or more DOD components.
[2] H.R. Rep. No. 110-146, Title IX, at 372 (2007).
[3] See, for example, GAO, Defense Business Transformation: Achieving
Success Requires a Chief Management Officer to Provide Focus and
Sustained Leadership, GAO-07-1072 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2007);
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned
for a Department of Homeland Security Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-
293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); and Highlights of a GAO
Roundtable: The Chief Operating Officer Concept: A Potential Strategy
to Address Federal Governance Challenges, GAO-03-192SP (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 4, 2002).
[4] Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 (Dec. 10,
2007).
[5] Additional efforts are under way to further define UAS categories.
For example, the March 2007 Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems expands the three classes into five categories:
Tactical I, Tactical II, Tactical III, Operational, and Strategic.
Tactical categories I through III are correlated closely with the
typical operating altitudes for the systems in each category. The
Operational and Strategic categories represent those UAS used for
operational and strategic objectives.
[6] The total number represents the number of unmanned aircraft, rather
than UAS, and includes test and training assets.
[7] DOD defines persistent surveillance as a collection strategy that
emphasizes the ability of some collection systems to linger on demand
in an area to detect, locate, characterize, identify, track, target,
and possibly provide battle damage assessment and retargeting in near
or real time.
[8] The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System is one
component of DOD's capabilities-based planning process and plays a role
in identifying the capabilities required by warfighters to support the
national defense and military strategies.
[9] Department of Defense, Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (March 2007).
[10] In February 2008, DOD announced its plans to formalize the test
cases, including the ISR portfolio, as standing capability portfolio
management efforts.
[11] Section 923 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136) amended Title 10 of the U.S. Code by
adding section 426, which required the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence to develop the ISR Integration Roadmap and to submit to
Congress a report on the roadmap that addressed six management aspects
of the ISR enterprise.
[12] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council
that assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying
and assessing the priorities for joint military requirements to achieve
current and future military capabilities. Chaired by the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the council is composed of a senior
officer from each of the military services. Representatives from other
DOD entities, such as the combatant commands and the Joint Staff, serve
in an advisory role to the council.
[13] A combat air patrol is composed of the system equipment, manpower,
and communications infrastructure needed to provide continuous
operations.
[14] Department of Defense, Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems.
[15] Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181) amended section 118b of Title 10 of the
U.S. Code to require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a
comprehensive assessment, every 4 years, of the roles and missions of
the armed forces and the core competencies and capabilities of DOD to
perform and support such roles and missions, and require the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare and submit to the Secretary, in
each year of such assessment, the Chairman's assessment of the roles
and missions of the armed forces as well as any recommendations for
changes in assignment.
[16] See, for example, GAO-07-1072, GAO-03-293SP, and GAO-03-192SP.
[17] See GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance
DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 17, 2004), and Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and
Acquisition Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges, GAO-06-
610T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).
[18] The Deputy's Advisory Working Group is one of DOD's principal
integrated civilian-military governance bodies. It provides advice and
assistance to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on matters pertaining to
DOD enterprise management, business transformation, and operations and
strategic-level coordination and integration of planning, programming,
budgeting, execution, and assessment activities.
[19] GAO-03-293SP.
[20] See, for example, GAO-07-1072, GAO-03-293SP, and GAO-03-192SP.
[21] GAO-04-342.
[22] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of
Future ISR Requirements, GAO-08-374 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2008).
[23] Joint capability areas are collections of like DOD activities
functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy
development, investment decision making, capability portfolio
management, and capabilities-based force development and operational
planning.
[24] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[25] Department of Defense Directive 7045.20, Capability Portfolio
Management (Sept. 25, 2008).
[26] Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 (Dec.
10, 2007).
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