DOD Personnel Clearances
Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and Quality Gao ID: GAO-09-261R December 19, 2008This correspondence provides our preliminary assessment of the timeliness and quality of the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program. These findings are based on an ongoing engagement that we have been conducting since February 2008 under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. In 2009, we plan to issue a report providing more details regarding these findings. In response to a draft of this briefing report, DOD provided written comments and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provided comments via email. Our summary and evaluation of DOD's and OPM's comments and DOD's written comments are included. We are addressing this product to Congress at Congress' request due to Congress' continued interest in the DOD personnel security clearance program.
GAO-09-261R, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and Quality
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 19, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about
Timeliness and Quality:
The enclosed briefing provides our preliminary assessment of the
timeliness and quality of the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel
security clearance program. These findings are based on an ongoing
engagement that we have been conducting since February 2008 under the
Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative.[Footnote 1] In 2009, we plan to issue a report providing
more details regarding these findings. In response to a draft of this
briefing report, DOD provided written comments and the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) provided comments via email. Our summary and
evaluation of DOD's and OPM's comments are included in enclosure II and
DOD's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in enclosure
III. We are addressing this product to you at your request due to your
continued interest in the DOD personnel security clearance program.
We are sending copies of this letter to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence; and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management. This letter will also be available at no charge on our Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this letter,
please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report.
Signed by:
Brenda S. Farrell:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Chairman:
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
The Honorable Anna G. Eshoo:
Chairman:
The Honorable Darrell Issa:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management:
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal:
Workforce and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman The Honorable Brian Bilbray:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I:
Department of Defense Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations
about Timeliness and Quality:
Briefing for Congressional Committees:
December 19, 2008:
Briefing Overview:
* Introduction:
* Background:
* Objectives:
* Scope and Methodology:
* Summary:
* Preliminary Observations:
* Agency Comments:
* GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
* Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
* Related GAO Products:
[End of section]
Introduction:
In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) approved personnel
security clearances for about 630,000 requests for initial and renewal
confidential, secret, and top secret clearances for DOD‘s military,
civilian, and industry personnel.
Since 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has been
responsible for implementing policy relating to determination of
eligibility for access to classified information and reporting annually
to Congress on progress in improving the clearance process.
The Office of Personnel Management‘s (OPM) federal and contract
investigators conduct most of DOD‘s clearance investigations and DOD
adjudicators use their reports to make clearance eligibility decisions.
We placed DOD‘s personnel security clearance program on our high-risk
list in 2005 and continued that designation in 2007, our most recent
update, because of a variety of problems including delays and
incomplete documentation of initial top secret clearances.
The executive branch established a Joint Reform Team, consisting of
OMB, DOD, OPM, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
in June 2007 to reform the security clearance process for DOD and other
agencies.
[End of section]
Background: The Six Phases of DOD‘s Security Clearance Process:
Figure 1: Six Phases in DOD‘s Personnel Security Clearance Process:
[Refer to PDF for image]
1. Requirements setting: DOD determines if a position requires the
subject to access classified information, and if so, the level of
clearance needed.
2. Application submission: Subject provides application materials and
security officer reviews and submits request for investigation.
3. Investigation: OPM, or one of its contractors, conducts and
investigation and forwards an investigative report to an adjudication
facility.
4. Adjudication: On the basis of information in the investigative
report, DOD adjudicators determine eligibility to access classified
information.
5. Appeal: If a clearance is denied or revoked, subject can appeal the
adjudicative decision.
6. Clearance updating: If subject has long-term need to access
classified information, clearance is updated: top secret, 5 years;
secret, 10 years; and confidential, 15 years.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD-provided information.
Note: In our current audit, we measure the timeliness and completeness
of the investigation and adjudication phases (numbers 3 and 4).
[End of figure]
Background: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004:
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)
[Footnote 2] currently requires adjudicative agencies to make a
determination on at least 80 percent of all applications for a security
clearance within 120 days, on average, after the date of receipt of the
application, with no longer than:
* 90 days allotted for the investigation and;
* 30 days allotted for the adjudication.
IRTPA also requires the executive branch to implement a plan by
December 17, 2009, under which adjudicative agencies, to the extent
practical, must make a determination on at least 90 percent of all
applications for a security clearance within 60 days, on average, after
the date of receipt of the application, with no longer than:
* 40 days allotted for the investigation and;
* 20 days allotted for the adjudication.
Background: Investigative Standards:
OPM federal or contract investigators conduct clearance investigations
by using governmentwide standards.[Footnote 3] The types of information
gathered in an investigation depend on the clearance level. For initial
top secret clearances, investigators gather information in the
following 14 areas:
1. completion of forms (e.g., complete personnel security
questionnaire);
2. national agency databases (e.g., FBI) check;
3. national agency database check of spouses;
4. date and place of birth;
5. citizenship;
6. education;
7. employment;
8. social references;
9. former spouse interview;
10. residence;
11. financial review;
12. local agency databases (e.g., local law enforcement) check;
13. public records review (e.g., bankruptcy);
14. subject interview.
OPM investigators also follow OPM‘s internal guidance on fulfilling
these requirements.
Background: Adjudicative Guidelines:
Once an investigation is complete, DOD adjudicators review the
investigative report and decide whether to grant clearance eligibility
to the subject. To make their determination, federal requirements
[Footnote 4] specify that adjudicators consider the following separate
adjudicative guidelines:
1. allegiance to the United States;
2. foreign influence;
3. foreign preference;
4. sexual behavior;
5. personal conduct;
6. financial considerations;
7. alcohol consumption;
8. drug involvement;
9. emotional, mental, and personality disorders;
10. criminal conduct;
11. security violations;
12. outside activities;
13. misuse of information technology systems.
Background: Adjudication Documentation: DOD Adjudicative Regulation:
DOD regulation 5200.2R[Footnote 5] requires that adjudicators maintain
a written or automated record of each favorable and unfavorable
adjudicative determination, including the rationale underlying the
determination when a clearance applicant has potential security
concerns. DOD interprets rationale to include, at a minimum, the
identification of the applicable adjudicative guidelines and the
associated mitigating factors.
Background: Four Key Factors to Consider for Clearance Reform:
As we have previously noted,[Footnote 6] ongoing governmentwide
security clearance reform efforts could benefit from establishing a
coherent mission and integrating strategic goals, among other best
practices we have identified.
In addition, we have previously noted that the following four key
factors should be part of clearance reform efforts:
1. Ensuring a strong requirements-determination process.
2. Building quality in all clearance processes to promote positive
outcomes, such as facilitating reciprocity”in which agencies accept
clearances granted by other federal agencies.
3. Developing additional metrics to provide a fuller picture of
clearance processes.
4. Including the long-term funding requirements of security clearance
reform.
Background: Ongoing Security Clearance Reform Efforts:
The Joint Reform Team issued an implementation plan in December
2008 to guide ongoing clearance reform efforts.
This plan includes some elements that are consistent with best
practices and key factors that GAO has previously identified.
Specifically, the plan identifies the following metrics:
* Timeliness metrics for various components of the clearance process;
* Metrics for both investigation and adjudication quality,[Footnote 7]
and;
* Initial steps to measure clearance reciprocity.
Still much remains to be done to implement the reforms and sustain the
recent progress of the Joint Reform Team.
GAO has ongoing work being conducted at the request of the Chairman of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Chairwoman of
the of the committee‘s Subcommittee on Intelligence Community
Management to evaluate the Joint Reform Team‘s Efforts.
[End of section]
Objectives:
Our ongoing audit work addresses the following questions:
1. How timely is the process for determining eligibility for DOD
initial confidential, secret, and top secret personnel security
clearances?
2. How complete is the documentation of investigations for DOD initial
top secret personnel security clearances?
3. How complete is the documentation of adjudications for DOD initial
top secret personnel security clearances?
[End of section]
Scope and Methodology:
To assess the timeliness of DOD‘s personnel security clearance process,
we reviewed the timeliness requirements specified in federal law and in
OMB performance goals laid out in annual reports. We measured the
timeliness of personnel security clearances using OPM and DOD data for
448,255 initial confidential, secret, and top secret clearances
adjudicated in fiscal year 2008 by the central adjudication facilities
of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and the Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office. We conducted electronic testing on these
data and found that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this product.
To assess the completeness of investigation and adjudication
documentation, respectively, we reviewed federal investigative
standards, OPM‘s internal guidance, and adjudicative guidelines. We
collected and reviewed a random sample of 100 OPM investigative reports
and associated adjudication documentation for initial top secret
clearances granted to DOD military, civilian, and industry personnel in
July 2008 by the central adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army, U.S.
Navy, and U.S. Air Force. We focused on top secret clearances because
we have identified documentation problems with this clearance level in
previous work; top secret clearance investigations require information
to be gathered for 14 investigative standards; and granting top secret
clearances enables subjects to access information that, if improperly
disclosed, could cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.
Our review of this sample enabled us to estimate the level of
completeness of the investigation and adjudication documentation of the
approximately 3,500[Footnote 8] initial top secret clearances favorably
adjudicated at these central adjudication facilities in July 2008. The
estimates from this sample have a margin of error of plus or minus 10
percent or less.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 through December
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our assessment based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our assessment
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Summary:
While many clearances continue to experience delays, OMB, DOD, and OPM
have made significant progress in meeting IRTPA‘s requirements by
making a determination in fiscal year 2008 on at least 80 percent of
initial confidential, secret, and top secret personnel security
clearances in less than an average of 120 days.
The vast majority of favorably adjudicated initial top secret clearance
investigative reports OPM provided to DOD adjudicators in July 2008
were missing at least one type of required documentation.
Required documentation of DOD‘s application of federal adjudicative
guidelines was incomplete in an estimated 22 percent of files for
initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008.
We provided our draft briefing report to the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In response to this
draft, we received written comments from DOD (see enclosure III) and
comments via email from OPM which we summarize below. Throughout our
briefing report, we also incorporated our responses to each agency‘s
comments where appropriate.
* In his comments to our briefing report the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence (USDI) stated that while our observations of the
timeliness and quality of the DOD personnel security program are fair,
DOD does not share some of the same concerns that we identified in our
briefing report.
* In email comments to our briefing report, OPM‘s Federal Investigative
Services Division (FISD) agreed with our observation that DOD and OPM
have made significant progress in improving the timeliness of the DOD
personnel security clearance program. However, OPM did not concur with
our observations concerning the completeness of the documentation of
initial top secret personnel security clearance investigations.
[End of section]
Preliminary Observations: Timeliness:
While many clearances continue to experience delays,OMB, DOD, and OPM
have made significant progress[Footnote 9] in meeting IRTPA
requirements by making a determination in fiscal year 2008 on at least
80 percent of initial personnel security clearances in less than an
average of 120 days:
Table 1: Average Days[A] to Complete 80 Percent of DOD Initial
Personnel Security Clearances[B] in Fiscal Year 2008:
Clearance type: Initial confidential, secret, and top secret;
Average days to complete 80% of initial clearances, Government
requirement: 120 Days;
Average days to complete 80% of initial clearances, GAO‘s analysis: 87
Days.
[A] We measured clearance timeliness of the investigation and
adjudication phases from the date that OPM receives a completed
clearance application to the adjudication date.
[B] These initial confidential, secret, and top secret clearances were
adjudicated at the central adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army,
U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and the Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office during fiscal year 2008.
Source: GAO analysis of OPM and DOD data.
[End of table]
However, DOD and OMB officials have noted that the existing clearance
process is not likely to allow DOD and other agencies to meet IRTPA‘s
2009 timeliness requirements, which require the implementation of a
plan by December 2009 under which, to the extent practical, at least 90
percent of initial personnel security clearance determinations take no
longer than 60 days, on average. To meet these more demanding
timeliness requirements, the executive branch established a Joint
Reform Team to reform the security clearance process for DOD and other
agencies.
Delays in completing clearances increase the length of time a subject
holds an interim clearance:
* while awaiting initial clearances, DOD facilities grant most subjects
interim clearances, which require a limited review of a subject‘s
background:
- national agency checks;
- local file checks at a subject‘s facility (e.g., personnel records,
security files);
- SF-86 (i.e., the information the subject provides).
Delays in the clearance process increase the time that subjects, who
might ultimately be denied a clearance, have access to classified
information.
Preliminary Observations: Completeness of Investigation Documentation:
The vast majority of OPM-provided investigative reports which DOD
adjudicators used to grant initial top secret clearances in July 2008
were missing some required documentation.
* We estimated that 87 percent[Footnote 10] of about 3,500 OPM-provided
investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to grant initial top
secret clearances in July 2008 were missing at least one type of
documentation required by federal investigative standards and OPM‘s
internal guidance.
The types of missing investigation items ranged from subject
interviews[Footnote 11]”which OPM officials told us is an important
element of a clearance investigation because the subject is a key
source of information”to record checks at a subject‘s place(s) of
employment and residence(s).
Most frequently, investigative reports were missing completed security
clearance forms, verification of all employment, and information from
the required number of social references. Additionally, some reports
had multiple incomplete investigative items.
Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Incomplete OPM Investigation Reports
by Investigative Standard:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Investigative standard: Employment;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 33%.
Investigative standard: Social references;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 32%.
Investigative standard: Forms;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 31%.
Investigative standard: National records;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 18%.
Investigative standard: Residence;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 17%.
Investigative standard: Education;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 16%.
Investigative standard: Subject interview;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 12%.
Investigative standard: Local records;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 9%.
Investigative standard: Spouse records;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 8%.
Investigative standard: Financial;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 3%.
Investigative standard: Former spouse;
Percentage of incomplete investigative reports: 2%.
Note: These estimates have a margin of error, based on a 95-percent
confidence interval, within +/- 10 percent, and are based on our review
of a random sample of 100 OPM investigative reports favorably
adjudicated by the central adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army,
U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force in July 2008. All estimates are rounded
to the nearest whole percentage.
[End of figure]
Incomplete investigations may cause delays, increase costs, and
introduce risk in the adjudication process.
* DOD adjudicators are sometimes required to perform work of an
investigative nature because of incomplete investigative reports,
which increases the amount of time required and the costs involved
to make an adjudicative determination.
- For example, DOD adjudicators told us that when investigation
reports lack complete law enforcement database checks and financial
verification information they follow up by conducting additional
criminal history and financial verification (e.g., obtaining missing
bankruptcy records).
* An incomplete investigative report introduces risk into the clearance
process because adjudicators do not have all of the required
investigative information about a clearance subject when making a
decision to grant a personnel security clearance.
Because the federal investigative standards do not assign a level of
importance to each investigative requirement, we did not make
evaluative judgments about the importance of one missing investigative
item over another during our review. We assessed only whether the
documentation for each required investigative item was complete. In
addition, we did not make judgments about the adequacy of the
investigative reports to support decisions made by DOD adjudicators to
grant or deny clearances.
* OPM officials reviewed and concurred with a subset of our assessment.
- In their written response, officials from OPM‘s Federal Investigative
Services Division‘s Quality Management Group reviewed eight of the
sample investigative reports and concurred with our assessment that
documentation for at least one item required by federal investigative
standards or OPM‘s internal guidance was missing and an unresolved
issue of a potential security concern was present in one report.
Preliminary Observations: Completeness of Adjudication Documentation:
Required documentation of DOD‘s application of federal adjudicative
guidelines was incomplete in some files for the initial top secret
clearances adjudicated in July 2008.
Figure 3: Estimated Percentage of Incomplete Adjudication Files by
Adjudicative Guideline:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Adjudicative guideline: Foreign influence;
Percentage of incomplete adjudicative files: 9%.
Adjudicative guideline: Financial considerations;
Percentage of incomplete adjudicative files: 9%.
Adjudicative guideline: Criminal conduct;
Percentage of incomplete adjudicative files: 5%.
Adjudicative guideline: Personal conduct;
Percentage of incomplete adjudicative files: 2%.
Adjudicative guideline: Alcohol consumption;
Percentage of incomplete adjudicative files: 1%.
Adjudicative guideline: Drug involvement;
Percentage of incomplete adjudicative files: 1%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD adjudication reports.
Note: These estimates have a margin of error, based on a 95-percent
confidence interval, within +/- 8 percent and are based on our review
of a random sample of 100 DOD initial top secret clearances favorably
adjudicated at the central adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army,
U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force in July 2008”some of which included
multiple incomplete items. All estimates are rounded to the nearest
whole percentage.
[End of figure]
We estimated that 22 percent[Footnote 12] of about 3,500 adjudication
files that DOD granted in July 2008 were missing documentation required
by a DOD regulation.
In addition, DOD adjudicators granted clearance eligibility using
incomplete OPM-provided investigation reports.
* As we noted above, we estimated that DOD adjudicators granted
eligibility to 87 percent[Footnote 13] of initial top secret clearances
in July 2008 based on incomplete investigative reports.
* We did not make evaluative judgments about the importance of one
missing investigative item over another.
* Further, we did not evaluate the merit of the DOD adjudicators‘
decisions to grant clearances.
Adjudicators and adjudication facility leadership reviewed and
concurred with a subset of the adjudicative files we reviewed, and we
incorporated their feedback in our analysis.
The use of incomplete adjudicative files could:
* increase the risk of adjudicators missing patterns of behavior in
subsequent clearance renewals since adjudicators may refer to prior
adjudication files as part of their decision-making process and;
* undermine efforts to achieve clearance reciprocity (an agency
accepting a clearance awarded by another agency).
Additionally, the use of incomplete clearance documentation in the
investigative and adjudicative phases may increase the risk of
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
• As we have previously reported,[Footnote 14] DOD and other agencies,
in the past, have paid little attention to quality metrics, which can
provide a more complete picture of the clearance process.
[End of section]
Agency Comments:
In response to a draft of this briefing report, DOD provided written
comments and OPM provided comments via email. Our summary and
evaluation of DOD‘s and OPM‘s comments are included in enclosure II,
and DOD‘s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in enclosure
III.
[End of section]
GAO Contact and Acknowledgements:
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
this briefing, please contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or
farrellb@gao.gov.
Key contributors to this report were David E. Moser, Assistant Director;
James D. Ashley; Catherine Gelb; Mae Jones; Shvetal Khanna; James P.
Klein; Caryn E. Kuebler; Ronald La Due Lake; Dolores McGhee; Gregory A.
Marchand; and Thomas R. Predmore.
[End of section]
Appendix I - Scope and Methodology:
Timeliness:
To assess the extent to which the process for determining security
clearance eligibility for Department of Defense (DOD) initial
confidential, secret, and top secret security clearances is timely, we:
* Measured the timeliness of 448,255 initial clearances”at the
confidential, secret, and top secret levels”adjudicated in fiscal year
2008 by the adjudication facilities of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S.
Air Force, and Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office.
* Analyzed the data to measure whether initial clearances were
completed according to statutory requirements specified in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.
* Obtained and reviewed data from the Joint Personnel Adjudication
System, DOD‘s clearance database, and the Personnel Investigation
Processing System, the Office of Personnel Management‘s (OPM)
investigations database. We conducted electronic testing on these data
and found that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
product.
Investigation Documentation Completeness:
To determine the extent of documentation completeness of the
investigative reports for DOD initial top secret security clearances,
we:
* Selected a random sample of OPM-provided investigative reports for
100 initial top secret personnel security clearances for DOD military,
civilian, and industry personnel working on DOD contracts that were
favorably adjudicated during July 2008 at the central adjudication
facilities of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. We sampled
from 3,993 clearances and found that some of the reports, such as
conditionally granted clearances, were out of the scope of our audit
since we assessed only final determinations. Therefore, we estimate,
that the number of clearances that DOD granted at the U.S. Army, U.S.
Navy, and U.S. Air Force central adjudication facilities in July 2008
was 3,500 (+/- 300 clearances), based on a 95 percent confidence level.
* Developed a data collection instrument based on the federal
investigative standards and OPM‘s internal guidance. We solicited and
incorporated feedback on this data collection instrument from officials
at OPM‘s Federal Investigative Services Division, DOD‘s Personnel
Security Research Center, and the Air Force‘s central adjudication
facility.
* Used the instrument to categorize an investigative item in the
selected investigative report as incomplete if the report did not
contain all of the required documentation for that item.
- For example, we categorized the employment area as incomplete if
investigators did not document an actual or attempted check of the
subject‘s employee record(s) or interviews of employment references
such as supervisors and coworkers.
* Reviewed a subset of the data collection instruments and associated
investigative reports initially completed by team members for data
reliability purposes by having a second team member independently
verify information.
Adjudication Documentation Completeness:
To determine the extent of documentation completeness in the
adjudication files, we:
* Selected the same random sample of 100 OPM investigative reports and
associated adjudication documentation for 100 initial top secret
clearances for DOD military, civilian, and industry personnel that were
favorably adjudicated during July 2008 at the central adjudication
facilities of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force.
* Developed a data collection instrument based on the federal
adjudicative guidelines and solicited feedback from DOD‘s Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Personnel
Security Research Center.
* Engaged adjudicators in GAO‘s security office to review the sample
adjudication files and apply the data collection instrument to them.
* Engaged adjudicators in GAO‘s security office to independently review
a random subset of the completed data collection instruments and
adjudication files to ensure the reliability of our data.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 through December
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our assessment based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our assessment
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform
Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1050T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 30, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Regarding Security
Clearance Reform. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-965R].
Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance
Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-776T].
Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD‘s
Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-551T]. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Related to the
Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-580R]. Washington, D.C.: March 25,
2008.
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform
Security Clearance Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T]. Washington, D.C.: February
27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts
to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-470T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More
Informed Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-350]. Washington, D.C.: February 13,
2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for
Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-842T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve
the Security Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1070]. Washington, D.C.: September
28, 2006.
[End of section]
[End of Enclosure I]
Enclosure II: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided our draft briefing report to the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In response to this
draft, we received written comments from DOD (see enclosure II) and
comments via email from OPM which we summarize below. Throughout our
briefing report, we also incorporated our responses to each agency's
comments where appropriate.
Department of Defense:
In his comments to our briefing report the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence (USDI) stated that while our observations of the
timeliness and quality of the DOD personnel security program are fair,
DOD does not share some of the same concerns that we identified in our
briefing report.
In response to our observation that 80 percent of initial DOD
clearances completed in fiscal year 2008 took an average of 87 days to
complete the investigation and adjudication phases, the USDI noted that
at the end of October 2008, 80 percent of DOD's initial security
clearances were completed within an average of 76 days. As we state in
our briefing report, we measured the average time to complete 448,255
initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. We did not measure
the time to complete clearances in fiscal year 2009. Our analysis
provides a representative assessment of the timeliness of clearances
completed in fiscal year 2008.
In response to our observation that the vast majority of favorably
adjudicated initial top secret investigative reports OPM provided to
DOD adjudicators in July 2008 were missing at least one type of
required documentation, the USDI stated that DOD adjudicators use a
risk-managed approach when granting security clearances, to ensure that
critical DOD positions are filled. The USDI stated that he is confident
in DOD's risk-managed approach for adjudicating security clearances,
even when the investigative reports are not complete. He also described
the steps involved in this approach. As we state in our final briefing
report, we did not evaluate the merit of DOD adjudicators' decisions to
grant clearances using the risk-management guidelines the USDI
describes. As we also state in our briefing report, we did not make
evaluative judgments about the importance of one missing investigative
item over another in our review. We assessed only whether the
documentation for each required investigative item was complete in the
reports that DOD adjudicators used to make their clearance eligibility
decisions. Our preliminary observation is that DOD adjudicators granted
eligibility to an estimated 87 percent of initial top secret clearances
in July 2008 based on incomplete investigative reports.
In response to our observation regarding incomplete documentation of
adjudicative decisions, the USDI stated that it is essential that DOD
adjudicators appropriately document adjudicative rationale. Further,
the USDI noted that by the end of 2009, DOD plans to deploy
enhancements to the Joint Personnel Adjudication System that will
facilitate and standardize the documentation process throughout DOD. We
agree that appropriate documentation of the adjudicative rationale is
essential, because, as we noted in the briefing report, the use of
incomplete clearance documentation may increase the risk of
adjudicators missing patterns of behavior in subsequent clearance
renewals since adjudicators may refer to prior adjudication files as
part of their decision-making process and may undermine efforts to
achieve clearance reciprocity (an agency accepting a clearance awarded
by another agency).
In response to our observation in our draft report that DOD has not
developed quality metrics, the USDI stated that the quality of
investigations and adjudications are of paramount importance and
described the development of two tools to assess clearance quality that
DOD plans to begin using in March 2009. We revised our final briefing
report to reflect the USDI's additional information provided.
Furthermore, as we noted in the briefing report, the Joint Reform
Team's December 2008 clearance reform implementation plan includes some
elements which are consistent with best practices and key factors that
we have previously identified. Specifically, the plan includes metrics
for both investigation and adjudication quality and initial steps to
measure clearance reciprocity. While much remains to be done to
implement the reforms and sustain the recent progress of the Joint
Reform Team, we are encouraged by the inclusion of these elements in
the Joint Reform Team's implementation plan.
Office of Personnel Management:
In email comments to our briefing report, OPM's Federal Investigative
Services Division (FISD) agreed with our observation that DOD and OPM
have made significant progress in improving the timeliness of the DOD
personnel security clearance program. However, OPM did not concur with
our observations concerning the completeness of the documentation of
initial top secret personnel security clearance investigations.
In response to our observations about the completeness of the
documentation of investigations for DOD initial top secret personnel
security clearances, OPM stated that it provided us with investigation
policy guidance prior to the construction of our data collection
instrument to assess investigation documentation completeness. OPM
stated that the instrument was detailed, but accurately represented the
requirements and complexity of the investigative process, and OPM
further stated that it believes this instrument would have provided
more accurate findings--indicating that OPM believes we used a
different data collection instrument to assess investigation
documentation completeness. However, the instrument, which we developed
collaboratively, is the instrument we ultimately used to assess
completeness.
In response to our statement that OPM reviewed and concurred with a
subset of our analysis of 8 investigation reports, OPM stated that it
disagreed with most of our findings about individual investigative
items in those 8 reports. Further, OPM stated that these 8 reports met
the federal investigative standards and supported DOD's adjudicative
needs. In the review of these reports, OPM provided an explanation for
why some required items were missing based on the complexity of the
investigation process and the unique aspects of the individual
investigation. However, in OPM's written response to our analysis, it
concurred with our assessment that documentation for at least one item
required by the federal investigative standards or OPM's internal
guidance was missing in each of these reports. Moreover, as DOD
adjudicators review investigative reports, they consider adjudicative
guidelines which are separate from the federal investigative standards
to make their determination. As we note in our final briefing report,
we did not make judgments about the adequacy of the investigative
reports to support an adjudicative determination. Instead, we
categorized these reports as incomplete if they did not contain all of
the documentation required by the federal investigative standards and
OPM's internal guidance.
In addition, OPM responded to our observations about the completeness
the documentation of initial top secret investigations by providing
reasons that some required information was missing from the 8
investigative reports we reviewed with OPM. As we state in our briefing
report, we discuss one reason for an incomplete investigative item. We
recognize that there are additional reasons for missing information in
investigative reports and will discuss these reasons in more depth in
the report we will issue in 2009.
Further, OPM indicated that during a meeting, we acknowledged the
several reasons OPM discussed for missing information and stated that
an investigative file would be considered complete if it included
documentation explaining the reasons OPM was unable to complete a
required element. OPM stated that OPM agreed to this measurement.
However, at this meeting we stated only one aspect of our methodology
and made no agreement with OPM about our full methodological approach.
In response to our observation that an estimated 31 percent of
investigative reports were missing forms, OPM stated that the forms do
not affect the adjudicative process and are not required elements of
the investigation report. We disagree. The federal investigative
standards for initial top secret clearances require the completion of
forms, including the personnel security questionnaire (Standard Form
86), applicable releases, and supporting documentation. In our review,
we found that nearly a third of the investigative reports included
incomplete forms.
[End of Enclosure II]
Enclosure III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Under Secretary Of Defense:
Intelligence:
5000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-5000:
December 18, 2008:
Ms. Brenda S. Farrell:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Farrell:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft briefing for
Congressional Committees, Department of Defense Personnel Clearances:
Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and Quality (GAO-09-261R).
The observations outlined in the briefing are a fair assessment of the
timeliness and quality of the Department's personnel security program:
however, DoD does not share some of the same concerns. The enclosure
provides specific feedback on the Department's adjudicative decisions
and quality assessment program. Should you have additional questions or
concerns, please contact my point of contact, Ms. Becky Allen, at (703)
604-1173 or rebecca.allen@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James R. Clapper, Jr.
Enclosure: As stated:
Department of Defense Response:
GAO draft briefing for Congressional Committees:
Department of Defense Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations
about Timeliness and Quality (GAO-09-261R):
GAO Observation: While many clearances continue to experience delays,
OMB, DOD, and OPM have made significant progress in meeting IRTPA
requirements by making a determination on an average of 80 percent of
initial confidential, secret, and top secret personnel security
clearances within 120 days.
DoD Response: I endorse and support your observation that significant
progress has been made to improve the timeliness of the security
clearance process as outlined in your report. It is important to note
that the timeliness data in this brief does not reflect current
performance levels. At the end of October 2008, 80% of the Department's
initial security clearances were completed within an average of 76
days, which is 11 days faster than outlined in your brief. The
Department anticipates further improvements in the timeliness of
security clearance process as Joint Security Suitability Reform Team
reform efforts are fully completed and implemented.
GAO Observation: The vast majority of favorably adjudicated initial top
secret clearance investigative reports OPM provided to DOD adjudicators
in July 2008 were missing at least one type of required documentation.
DoD Response: The Department of Defense is committed to safeguarding
classified information and follows procedures outlined in EO 12968,
"Access to National Classified Information." According to EO 12968 and
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum, "Reciprocal
Recognition of Existing Personnel Security Clearances," dated November
14, 2007, adjudicators may consider risk when granting interim security
clearances or clearances based on a deviation from National
investigative standards. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C., the Secretary of
Defense must deploy a fully operational force. In many cases
operational readiness hinges on the ability to access classified
information. To ensure critical operational mission positions are
filled, the Department assumes a risk managed approach when granting
security clearances. I am confident in our risk managed approach for
adjudicating security clearances, even when the investigative reports
are not complete.
The risk managed approach includes a process of gathering preliminary
information to mitigate risk and considered against the National
adjudicative guidelines, and includes:
* a review of local security and personnel files.
* a review of the completed National Agency Check, which includes the
Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) fingerprint check.
* a consideration of personnel who have had continuous long-term access
to classified information, investigative history and performance.
* an incorporation of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) practice
of reporting derogatory information that may develop during the
investigative process.
* the employment of risk managed procedures at the agency or command
level for personnel granted interim security clearances, or for
personnel granted a security clearances based on an exception,
condition, or deviation (the aforementioned factors are weighed against
National adjudicative standards).
GAO Observation: Required documentation of adjudicative rationale in
DOD adjudication files was incomplete in about 20 percent of the
initial top secret clearance files adjudicated in July 2008.
DoD Response: It is essential that the Department appropriately
document adjudicative rationale. The Department will deploy
enhancements to the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) that
will facilitate and standardize the documentation process throughout
DoD. This enhancement is scheduled for deployment by the end of 2009.
GAO Observation: DOD and has not developed quality metrics, which can
provide a more complete picture of the clearance process.
DoD Response: Because the quality of investigations and security
clearance adjudications are of paramount importance, the Department
developed and successfully demonstrated tools last year that assess
both investigative and adjudicative quality. The Rapid Assessment of
Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) is used to assess investigative
quality and the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and
Rationales (RADAR) is used to assess adjudicative quality. The
Department will begin using RAISE by the end of March 2009. Use of
RADAR will begin the following year.
[End of Enclosure III]
Footnotes:
[1] 31 U.S.C. § 717.
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 3001(g) (2004).
[3] 32 C.F.R. §§ 147.18 - 147.24 (2008). While these standards were in
place at the time of our review, the executive branch issued revised
investigative standards in December 2008.
[4] 32 C.F.R. §§ 147.3 - 147.15 (2008). The federal investigative
standards support adjudicative decisions but are distinct from the
adjudicative guidelines.
[5] DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, DOD Personnel Security Program (January
1987).
[6] Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint
Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility
Process, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1050T]
(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008).
[7] The implementation plan calls for developing a survey to measure
the quality of investigations and a similar tool to measure adjudication
quality.
[8] We sampled from 3,993 clearances and found that some of the reports
were out of the scope of our audit. Therefore, we estimate that the
number of clearances that DOD granted at the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and
U.S. Air Force central adjudication facilities in July 2008 was 3,500
(+/- 300 clearances), based on a 95 percent confidence level.
[9] In 2007, we reported that a sample of 2,259 initial clearances for
DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete the
investigation and adjudication phases.
[10] This estimate has a margin of error, based on a 95-percent
confidence interval, of +/- 9 percent.
[11] Missing subject interviews in the investigative reports we
reviewed were the result of the subject‘s deployment.
[12] This estimate has a margin of error, based on a 95 percent
confidence interval, of +/- 10 percent.
[13] This estimate has a margin of error, based on a 95 percent
confidence interval, of +/- 9 percent.
[14] DOD Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security
Clearance Process, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-776T]
(Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008).
[End of section]
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