Military Readiness
Navy Is Making Progress Implementing Its Fleet Response Plan, but Has Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs Gao ID: GAO-08-264 February 1, 2008The Navy initiated its Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in March 2003 as a critical enabler to help meet the new demands of the twenty-first century security environment. FRP represents a major change in the way the Navy manages its forces, and is intended to more rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To achieve the desired capabilities under FRP, the Navy has altered its training, maintenance, and manning practices. The Navy expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to provide presence and engagement in forward areas, as well as surge a greater number of ships on short notice. The Navy intends to achieve this goal without increasing its operations and maintenance budget of about $40 billion for each of the next 5 years. However, GAO previously reported that the Navy had not fully incorporated a sound management approach to guide and assess implementation of FRP. As a result, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which the Navy has (1) made progress in implementing a sound management approach for FRP and (2) evaluated the long-term risks and tradeoffs of FRP-related changes.
The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. GAO's prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management approach include: defining clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The Navy has made progress in implementing FRP since GAO's prior reports. For example, it has established a goal of having three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days (referred to as 3+3+1). The Navy also has established a framework to set implementation goals for all forces, established some performance measures that are linked to the FRP phases, and begun efforts to identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other forces. In addition, the Navy has not fully developed performance measures to enable it to assess whether carrier strike groups have achieved adequate readiness levels to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. Moreover, the Navy has not fully identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. Until the Navy's management approach fully incorporates the key elements, the Navy may not be able to measure how well FRP is achieving its goals or develop budget requests based on the resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 months. GAO previously advocated that the Department of Defense adopt a risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes assessing the risks of various courses of action. However, the Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent changes because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its missions. In addition, while the Navy has developed force structure plans that include two upcoming periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10, the plans included optimistic assumptions about the length of the gaps and the availability of existing carriers and did not fully analyze how the Navy would continue to meet FRP goals with fewer carriers. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic assumptions and accurately identify the levels of risk the Navy is willing to accept during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed trade-off decisions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-264, Military Readiness: Navy Is Making Progress Implementing Its Fleet Response Plan, but Has Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:
February 2008:
Military Readiness:
Navy Is Making Progress Implementing Its Fleet Response Plan, but Has
Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs:
Military Readiness:
GAO-08-264:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-264, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy initiated its Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in March 2003 as a
critical enabler to help meet the new demands of the twenty-first
century security environment. FRP represents a major change in the way
the Navy manages its forces, and is intended to more rapidly prepare
and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To achieve the
desired capabilities under FRP, the Navy has altered its training,
maintenance, and manning practices. The Navy expects this new readiness
approach will enable its forces to provide presence and engagement in
forward areas, as well as surge a greater number of ships on short
notice. The Navy intends to achieve this goal without increasing its
operations and maintenance budget of about $40 billion for each of the
next 5 years. However, GAO previously reported that the Navy had not
fully incorporated a sound management approach to guide and assess
implementation of FRP. As a result, GAO was asked to examine the extent
to which the Navy has (1) made progress in implementing a sound
management approach for FRP and (2) evaluated the long-term risks and
tradeoffs of FRP-related changes.
What GAO Found:
The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound
management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation
goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively
assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals.
GAO‘s prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management
approach include: defining clear missions and desired outcomes,
establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning
activities with resources. The Navy has made progress in implementing
FRP since GAO‘s prior reports. For example, it has established a goal
of having three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy
within 30 days of being ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days
(referred to as 3+3+1). The Navy also has established a framework to
set implementation goals for all forces, established some performance
measures that are linked to the FRP phases, and begun efforts to
identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not yet established a
specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other
forces. In addition, the Navy has not fully developed performance
measures to enable it to assess whether carrier strike groups have
achieved adequate readiness levels to deploy in support of the 3+3+1
goal. Moreover, the Navy has not fully identified the resources
required to achieve FRP goals. Until the Navy‘s management approach
fully incorporates the key elements, the Navy may not be able to
measure how well FRP is achieving its goals or develop budget requests
based on the resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels.
The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs
associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as
carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The
Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance
periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will
extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it
has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32
months. GAO previously advocated that the Department of Defense adopt a
risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes
assessing the risks of various courses of action. However, the Navy has
not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent
changes because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how
the changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP
goals and perform its missions. In addition, while the Navy has
developed force structure plans that include two upcoming periods when
the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to
10, the plans included optimistic assumptions about the length of the
gaps and the availability of existing carriers and did not fully
analyze how the Navy would continue to meet FRP goals with fewer
carriers. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic assumptions
and accurately identify the levels of risk the Navy is willing to
accept during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have
the information it needs to make informed tradeoff decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Navy take actions to fully develop
implementation goals, performance measures, and links to resources for
FRP and to assess the risks to its ability to meet these goals under
changing conditions. The Navy generally concurred with the
recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-264]. For more information, contact Janet
St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps, but Has Not Fully Developed
Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs:
The Navy Has Not Fully Considered Long-term Risks and Tradeoffs of
Changes:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figure:
Figure 1: FRP Phases:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 1, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
The twenty-first century security environment has created new demands
for Navy forces, particularly with continued operations in support of
the Global War on Terrorism. One initiative that the Navy is continuing
to implement and mature to help meet these demands is its Fleet
Response Plan (FRP). In March 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations
initiated FRP to more rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in
ships and squadrons. Fleet Forces Command, the Navy command that holds
principal responsibility for managing fleet personnel, training,
requirements, maintenance, and operations, began to implement FRP in
May 2003. To achieve the desired capabilities under FRP, the Navy has
altered prior training, maintenance, and manning practices. The Navy
expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to provide
not only presence and engagement in forward areas, but also surge a
greater number of ships on short notice. The Navy's operations and
maintenance budget is projected to remain at about $40 billion in
constant dollars over the next 5 years.
The Fleet Response Plan modifies the Navy's pre-2001 deployment
pattern, replacing 6-month routine deployments with more flexible
deployment options intended to enable the quick response of naval
forces to crises, conflicts, or homeland defense needs. FRP set
specific requirements for carrier strike groups, which typically
include an aircraft carrier with an airwing, two destroyers, a frigate,
cruiser, and support ship, and possibly, depending on the mission, a
submarine. In June 2007, the Navy began extending FRP to expeditionary
strike groups, which may include amphibious ships with a Marine
Expeditionary Unit, aircraft, and landing craft; surface combatants
such as a cruiser, a destroyer, and a frigate; and possibly, depending
on the mission, a submarine and a land-based maritime patrol aircraft.
We have previously reported on the Navy's implementation of
FRP.[Footnote 1] In November 2005, we reported that while FRP
represents a major change in the way the Navy manages its forces, it
had not fully incorporated a sound management approach needed to guide
and assess implementation. Moreover, the Navy had not fully tested and
evaluated FRP or developed lessons learned to identify the
effectiveness of its implementation. In 2005, we recommended that the
Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and performance
measures to facilitate implementation of FRP and that it develop a
comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether FRP
has been successful. The Department of Defense (DOD) generally agreed
with our recommendations, citing several actions it had underway or
planned. In 2004 we examined the maintenance impacts of FRP, and we
observed that FRP did not shorten aircraft carrier maintenance
intervals and that the impact of FRP on the Navy's maintenance budget
was unknown.
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
required us to report on a variety of issues pertaining to FRP
management, readiness, and program expansion. [Footnote 2] These issues
included: the Navy's management approaches to implementing FRP; the
adequacy of Navy directives and guidance with respect to maintenance
and training requirements and procedures; the adequacy of the Navy's
evaluation criteria for the plan; the Navy's progress in identifying
the amount of funding required to effectively implement the operations
and maintenance requirements of the plan and the effect of providing
less funding the identified amount; Navy data on aircraft carriers,
destroyers, and cruisers that participated in the plan with respect to
readiness, response time, and availability for routine or unforeseen
deployments; and any recommendations pertaining to expanding the plan
to include expeditionary strike groups.
In April 2007, we briefed your offices on our preliminary observations.
This report updates the information provided in the briefing and
provides further detail based on the work we have completed since that
time. Specifically, our objectives for this report were to assess the
extent to which the Navy has (1) made progress in implementing a sound
management approach for FRP, and (2) evaluated the long-term risks and
tradeoffs of FRP-related changes.
To assess the Navy's progress in developing a sound management
approach, we reviewed and analyzed guidance and instructions on
manning, maintenance, and training; and key studies, messages, and
planning documents and compared these to best practices for managing
and implementing major efforts identified in our prior reports. We also
interviewed officials in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Fleet Forces Command and
Pacific Fleet; Naval Air and Sea Systems Commands; and Marine Corps
Forces Command to obtain information about initiatives that the Navy
has undertaken. To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated
the long-term risks and tradeoffs of FRP-related changes, we analyzed
historical and long-range carrier maintenance schedules, analyzed the
Navy's plans for meeting FRP goals during periods when only 10 aircraft
carriers are available, and interviewed Navy readiness officials in the
offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Fleet Forces Command. We
addressed both of these objectives for both carrier and expeditionary
strike groups. We conducted our review from November 2006 through
October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. The scope and methodology used in our review are described
in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound
management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation
goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively
assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals.
Our prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management
approach include defining clear missions and desired outcomes,
establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning
activities with resources.[Footnote 3] Since our prior reports, the
Navy has made progress in implementing FRP by issuing two instructions
that describe the FRP mission, define the four FRP phases, and
establish responsibility for oversight and execution of the plan. In
addition, the Navy has established a goal of having three carrier
strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being
ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days (referred to as 3+3+1).
The Navy has also established a framework to set implementation goals
for all forces, established some performance measures that are linked
to the FRP phases, and has begun efforts to identify needed resources.
However, the Navy has not yet fully developed a sound management
approach to FRP because the Navy still considers FRP an evolving
construct and is continuing to work on each element. Specifically, the
Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for
expeditionary strike groups and other forces. Moreover, the Navy has
not fully developed performance measures that enable it to assess
whether carrier strike groups have achieved adequate readiness levels
to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. Existing performance measures
also lack some details about acceptable levels of performance and
scope. In addition, the Navy has not fully identified the resources
required to achieve FRP goals. While the Navy has sponsored several
studies to identify FRP costs, these studies used assumptions that are
now outdated, such as a 12-carrier fleet, and did not link resources to
readiness requirements. The Navy has recently established a board to
identify training requirements and costs by FRP phase, and a task force
to link operation and maintenance costs to FRP goals for a specific
readiness level; however, it is not clear when these efforts will be
complete or whether the results will be used to develop long-term
guidance. Until the Navy's management approach fully incorporates all
of the key elements, the Navy may not be able to measure how well FRP
is achieving its goals or develop budget requests based on the
resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. We are
recommending that the Navy establish implementation goals for the
application of FRP to other forces; establish required overall
readiness levels for each FRP phase; develop additional performance
measures; and fully develop its ability to identify how resources
should be linked to FRP phases, goals, and readiness levels.
The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs
associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as
carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The
Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance
periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will
extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it
has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32
months. We have previously advocated that DOD adopt a comprehensive
risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes,
among other things, assessing the risks of various courses of action
for both near-and long-term challenges. Prior to making changes to its
maintenance cycle in the past, the Navy has conducted assessments of
the potential effects of the changes. However, the Navy has not fully
considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent changes
because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the
changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals
and perform its missions. Without assessing the short-and long-term
risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes in maintenance and
operational cycles, it will be difficult for the Navy to determine the
extent to which these changes could affect its ability to meet FRP
goals and perform its full range of missions. In addition, while the
Navy has developed force structure plans that include two upcoming
periods when the number of available[Footnote 4] aircraft carriers
temporarily drops from 11 to 10, the plans included optimistic
assumptions about the length of the gaps and the availability of
existing carriers and did not fully analyze how the Navy would continue
to meet FRP goals with fewer carriers. Until the Navy develops plans
that use realistic assumptions and accurately identify the levels of
risk the Navy is willing to accept during these gap periods, senior
Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed
tradeoff decisions. To improve the Navy's ability to weigh the
tradeoffs associated with meeting FRP goals, we recommend that the Navy
perform a risk assessment that considers the effects of changes in
carrier strike group operational and maintenance cycles under a range
of force structure assumptions, and that identifies strategies to
mitigate potential risks. Such a risk assessment should integrate plans
to meet FRP goals during two upcoming periods when the number of
available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10.
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendation to identify how resources should be linked to the Fleet
Response Plan phases, goals, and readiness levels and publish
appropriate guidance, and partially agreed with our other
recommendations. However, the department did not identify what, if any,
specific actions it would take beyond those it has already begun and
which we evaluated as part of our review. For example, in response to
our recommendation that the Navy perform a risk assessment that
considers the effects of changes on carrier strike group operational
and maintenance cycles under a range of force structure assumptions,
DOD stated no further direction from the Secretary of Defense was
needed but the Navy would continue to update its plans based on current
risk assessments. In light of the possible impact on operations and
potential financial impacts, we continue to believe that the Navy
should initiate an integrated risk assessment.
Background:
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, only those Navy
ships and air squadrons at peak readiness were deployed overseas,
usually for 6 months at a time. Most of the Navy's remaining units were
not available because they were in the early stages of their
maintenance or training cycles, or because the Navy did not have good
visibility of the readiness of these units. This prompted the Chief of
Naval Operations in March 2003 to task the Commander of Fleet Forces
Command to develop the FRP concept to enhance the Navy's surge
capability. The Chief of Naval Operations approved the concept and
directed the Commander of Fleet Forces Command to be responsible and
accountable for effectively implementing the plan. The Commander of
Fleet Forces Command is responsible for overall coordination,
establishment, and implementation of integrated requirements and
policies for manning, equipping, and training both Atlantic and Pacific
fleet units[Footnote 5] throughout the training cycle and is
responsible for articulating all fleet warfighting and readiness
requirements to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Composition of Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups:
Carrier strike groups are typically centered around an aircraft carrier
and its airwing, and also include a guided missile cruiser; two guided
missile destroyers; a frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more
supply ships with ammunition, fuel, and supplies (such as food and
spare parts). The Navy currently has 11 aircraft carriers in service,
with two additional carriers under construction. (The carriers are
listed in app. III.) Generally, three carrier strike groups are
deployed at any given time. The three deployed carriers include the USS
Kitty Hawk, which is home ported in Japan and is counted as being
continuously deployed. This carrier provides most of the U.S. naval
presence in the western Pacific Ocean region and some in the Indian
Ocean/Arabian Sea region. Carriers originating from the eastern and
western United States have traditionally provided presence in the
Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea regions, respectively.
There are also 10 carrier airwings, one of which accompanies each
deployed carrier. While the composition of each airwing can be tailored
to the carrier's specific mission, each airwing typically includes a
helicopter squadron as well as squadrons of aircraft for attack
(composed of aircraft such as the F/A-18), electronic warfare (composed
of aircraft such as the EA-6B), and reconnaissance (composed of
aircraft such as the E-2C) missions. The Navy cites a variety of roles
in which carrier strike groups may be employed, for example they (1)
are deployed worldwide in support of U.S. interests and commitments;
(2) respond to global crises from peacetime to full-scale war; (3) can
operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary
forces in times of crisis; and (4) can operate and support aircraft
attacks on enemies, protect friendly forces, and engage in sustained
independent operations of war.
Expeditionary strike groups are typically centered on amphibious ships
with a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit, aircraft, and landing
craft. Each expeditionary strike group notionally includes one
amphibious assault ship, one amphibious transport dock ship, and one
dock landing ship. These amphibious ships together can embark a Marine
Expeditionary Unit consisting of about 2,200 Marines, their aircraft,
their landing craft, their combat equipment, and about 15 days worth of
supplies. Like a carrier strike group, the expeditionary strike group
may also include several surface combatants such as a cruiser,
destroyer, and frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more P-3 long-
range, land-based, maritime patrol aircraft. Expeditionary strike
groups are designed to be independently deployable, strike-capable
naval formations, but they can also operate in conjunction with carrier
strike groups to form larger naval task forces. Generally, two or three
expeditionary strike groups are forward-deployed at any given time.
FRP Cycle:
FRP represents a change in the way the Navy manages its forces. The
plan changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, mans, and
deploys its ships to allow a greater number of ships to surge on short
notice while at the same time meeting forward-presence requirements.
Four phases within the FRP cycle serve as the framework to more rapidly
prepare and sustain the readiness of ships, aircraft, and personnel. As
depicted in figure 1, the four FRP phases are (1) basic, or unit-level
training; (2) integrated training; (3) sustainment (which may include
one or more extended periods of deployment); and (4) maintenance.
Figure 1: FRP Phases:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a representation of the FRP Phases. The following data
is depicted:
Basic:
Complete unit-level training;
Aircraft squadrons focus on basic capabilities and limited tactical
skills in their highest priority mission areas.
Integrated:
Independent unit ready for tasking or maritime security surge ready;
Sustainment:
Major combat operations surge, then, major combat operations ready;
Routine deployment;
Aircraft squadrons receive highest priority for resources during this
phase.
Maintenance:
Approximately 9 weeks for surface combatants;
Up to 11 months for carriers.
Total time cycle: 27–32 months[a].
Sources: GAO analysis of U.S. Navy data; Art Explosion (clipart).
[A] The length of the FRP cycle varies by type of ship or aircraft.
[End of figure]
At the end of the basic phase, a unit is characterized as an
"independent unit ready for tasking" and may be assigned independent
operations in support of homeland security, counternarcotics missions,
or assigned to provide disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. As
the training progresses, the capabilities of the units increase
accordingly as do the roles and missions assigned. Once the basic phase
is completed and the integrated phase begins, training can be tailored
to meet a combatant commander's request for a specific capability, such
as to support antipiracy operations, and the unit is characterized as
"maritime security surge" capable. Upon completion of the integrated
phase, a unit begins the sustainment phase and is characterized as
"major combat operations surge" capable, meaning the unit is ready for
operational employment, but is not necessarily able to lead combat
force operations. Once a unit is certified through advanced integrated
training and is fully capable of conducting all forward-deployed
operations, it attains the status of "major combat operations ready."
Routine deployments occur during the sustainment phase. Finally, ships
spend time in maintenance phase, when major shipyard or depot-level
repairs, upgrades, and modernization occur. The Fleet Forces Command
and Pacific Fleet commanders have delegated responsibility to their
subordinate force commanders (such as air, submarine, and surface) for
overseeing the FRP's basic phase; and they have delegated their
geographical fleet commanders (such as the Seventh Fleet, which
operates in the Western Pacific) responsibility for overseeing the
integrated and sustainment phases.
The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps, but Has Not Fully Developed
Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs:
The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound
management approach for FRP, but has not fully developed such an
approach because the Navy's implementation of FRP is still evolving.
The Navy's implementation of FRP has included some key elements of a
sound management approach, such as defining clear missions and desired
outcomes, developing some performance measures, and beginning to
identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not fully incorporated
certain key elements, such as fully developing implementation goals or
performance measures and aligning activities with resources.
The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps to Implement a Sound
Management Approach for FRP:
The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound
management approach for FRP since our prior reports. Our prior work has
shown that key elements of a sound management approach include defining
clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals,
measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources.[Footnote
6] The Navy's implementation of FRP has included some of these
elements. For example, the Navy has issued two FRP instructions, one in
August 2006 and another in August 2007.[Footnote 7] The August 2007
instruction defined the FRP mission as providing ready Navy forces to
meet combatant commanders' requests for forces in support of the
nation's maritime security. These forces consist of forward operating
and U.S.-based assets that may rotationally deploy or surge. Both
instructions also defined the four FRP phases, defined notional lengths
for each phase, and established responsibility for oversight and
execution of the plan with Fleet Forces and Pacific Fleet commanders
and their subordinate force and geographic fleet commanders.
The Navy has also updated instructions in the areas of personnel,
maintenance, and training to reflect desired outcomes under FRP. For
example, in January 2007, the Navy revised its personnel instruction
that provided guidelines on personnel deployment length under
FRP.[Footnote 8] The new instruction sets limits on the length of
deployments, dwell times between deployments, and requirements for time
spent in home port. The Chief of Naval Operations must grant a waiver
if those limits are exceeded. In the absence of a waiver, deployments
are limited to 7 months for units with a single deployment and 6 months
for units with multiple deployments within the same FRP cycle. In
addition, units must spend at least as much time between any two
deployments as they did on their most recent deployment; and units must
spend a minimum of 50 percent of the time in their home port over an
FRP cycle. With regard to maintenance, the Navy has revised notional
depot maintenance schedules to reflect the FRP cycle, and developed
guidelines on out-of-depot continuous maintenance. With regard to
training, the Navy revised surface, carrier, and air squadron training
readiness instructions to reflect changes in training phases and to
show the exercises that are expected to be completed in each phase.
In addition, the Navy established a 6+1 implementation goal for carrier
strike groups, meaning that it aims to have six carrier strike groups
available to deploy within 30 days and one more within 90
days.[Footnote 9] In its August 2007 instruction, the Navy modified
this goal to 3+3+1 and linked the goal to the FRP phases. As that
instruction noted, 3+3+1 means that the Navy's goal is to have three
carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of
being ordered to do so (in the FRP sustainment or integrated phases),
and one prepared to deploy within 90 days (in the FRP basic phase). The
Navy plans to use this same framework, which took the form X+Y+Z, to
set implementation goals for all forces. The first variable (X) refers
to the number of ships or aircraft deployed, the second (Y) refers to
the number that will be in a surge status, and (Z) refers to the number
that will be in a Ready for Tasking[Footnote 10] status.
Furthermore, the Navy has developed some performance measures to use in
evaluating its performance under FRP. In its August 2007 instruction,
the Navy established some performance measures for each FRP phase. For
example, two principal measures will be used to assess performance in
the maintenance phase: on-time completion of maintenance periods and
assessment scores for the level of maintenance completed.[Footnote 11]
The instruction also delineates performance measures for training in
FRP phases. The array of performance measures spelled out in the
instruction broke new ground by reaching across the entire FRP cycle
with measures that can be associated with a numeric goal and evaluated
over time. For example, one measure of maintenance efficiency was "on-
time completion of maintenance," and the Navy associated the measure
with a numeric goal of delivering ships within 30 days of the scheduled
completion date. Lastly, the Navy's aviation community has developed
the Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program training and
readiness funding profiles. That program has developed a matrix that
sets out expected readiness levels for aircraft squadrons, expressed in
terms of the current readiness reporting system's 5-point scale (with 1
being the highest and 5 the lowest), by squadron type and month of the
FRP cycle. Available resources are allocated based on a tiered
readiness profile, with the highest priority given to deployed units
and units in pre-deployment sustainment. For example, an F-18 A/B/C/D
squadron could expect 50 percent of required funding in the first month
of its maintenance phase in order to achieve a training readiness level
of 2.9, compared to 80 percent of required funding in the fifth month
of sustainment phase (which corresponds to the first month of a typical
deployment) in order to achieve a training readiness level of 1.9.
The Navy has also been working on other initiatives that include
identifying and validating the cost of the fleet response training
plans, calculating the notional training costs of a carrier strike
group through the FRP phases, and developing metrics to link operations
and maintenance costs for current and future years to FRP
implementation goals.
The Navy Has Not Developed Comprehensive Implementation Goals, Fully
Developed Performance Measures, or Fully Identified Resources Required
to Achieve FRP Goals:
The Navy has not developed comprehensive implementation goals for all
Navy assets, finished developing performance measures, or fully
identified all the resources required to achieve FRP goals-which are
all key elements of a sound management approach. Specifically, the Navy
has not yet established a specific implementation goal for
expeditionary strike groups and other forces that is analogous to the
3+3+1 goal for carrier strike groups. In addition, the Navy has not
fully developed performance measures because it has not established
required readiness levels that would enable it to measure whether the
carrier strike groups can meet the 3+3+1 goal, and existing performance
measures also lack some details about acceptable levels of performance
and scope. Furthermore, the Navy has not shown that it has identified
all resources required to achieve FRP goals or fully aligned needed
resources with FRP activities.
The Navy Has Not Established Implementation Goals for Expeditionary
Strike Groups or Other Forces:
The Navy has not yet established implementation goals for expeditionary
strike groups and other forces.[Footnote 12] While the Navy began
extending FRP to expeditionary strike groups in June 2007, it has not
developed an implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups that
would be analogous to the 3+3+1 goal for carrier strike groups because
it has only recently begun to apply FRP to expeditionary strike groups.
Marine Corps officials view FRP's goal of promoting increased readiness
of amphibious ships as promising, so long as it does not have the
effect of reducing the forward presence of the Marine Expeditionary
Units that embark on those ships. The Navy has also applied the FRP
concept to ship configurations that operate outside the umbrella of
either type of strike group, for both missions related to the Global
War on Terrorism and relief efforts, such as Hurricane
Katrina.[Footnote 13] However, the Navy has not established specific
FRP implementation goals for these other forces, other than a general
goal to have some forces deployed, some preparing for deployment, and
some in the basic phase of FRP. Navy officials agree that specific FRP
goals for these other forces are needed, and officials at Fleet Forces
Command said that preliminary goals have been developed for submarines,
surface ships, and other types of forces. However, these goals had not
been finalized at the time of our review and are not yet being used to
guide FRP implementation. Moreover, the preliminary goal for surface
ships was expressed in a single aggregated figure that included
destroyers, cruisers, frigates, amphibious ships, and minesweepers. An
aggregate figure may not provide a meaningful goal, though, as some
ships, such as destroyers, may be used in a variety of roles: as
components of carrier or expeditionary strike groups or as part of
smaller task forces. Until the Navy develops implementation goals for
all force configurations, it will not know whether it has enough ships
to be distributed among all possible roles. Furthermore, without goals
that establish how many expeditionary strike groups and other forces
are needed to be ready to deploy, the Navy may not be able to determine
whether it can provide all desired capabilities under FRP.
The Navy Has Not Fully Developed FRP Performance Measures:
Although the Navy has developed some performance measures in its 2007
FRP instruction and linked these measures to the four FRP phases, its
performance measures are not fully developed for two reasons. First,
the Navy has not established required readiness levels in its current
readiness system that would enable it to measure whether the carrier
strike groups are ready to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. The
Navy currently reports unit readiness in terms of the Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS), but DOD plans to transition to a
new system in 2009. SORTS uses a 5-point scale to assess units' ability
to meet the full range of their wartime missions, including major
combat operations. Overall SORTS scores, as well as individual scores
in each of five subcategories,[Footnote 14] are presented to the Chief
of Naval Operations in weekly and monthly readiness briefings, and
readiness is also reported to Congress quarterly, as required by law.
[Footnote 15] However, the Navy has not defined what overall readiness
levels are required to move ships from one FRP phase to another. The
Navy has established one phase-specific overall readiness measure.
Units must reach an overall readiness level of C-2, which is the next-
to-highest level, by the end of the integrated phase of FRP. The Navy
has also specified that units must achieve a certain training readiness
level by the end of the basic phase of FRP, but an overall readiness
level has not been specified. Moreover, although units are supposed to
be able to perform major combat operations while in the sustainment
phase, the Navy has not established a readiness level that would enable
it to measure when a unit was ready to transition from surge-to
deployment-ready status. While some Navy officials have said that they
believe that the requirement for deploying beyond the continental
United States--regardless of mission or FRP phase--is C-2, they were
unaware of any formal guidance to that effect.
The Navy relies on institutional knowledge and the commanders' judgment
to make the determination of when a unit such as a carrier strike group
is ready to deploy. Further, the Navy has not fully defined required
readiness levels because Navy officials are reluctant to invest in
developing measures based on SORTS, a legacy system that DOD will
discontinue as it introduces the new Defense Readiness Reporting System
by the middle of fiscal year 2009. Officials plan to continue to report
readiness information to Congress using SORTS until the new system is
fully in place. Under the new system, the Secretary of the Navy is
charged with defining the mission-essential tasks that will be used to
assess units' readiness for a range of potential missions. However,
these tasks have not yet been fully defined. Without a clear
requirement, senior leadership may not be able to determine whether
implementation goals are being met, and might instead use imprecise
proxy measures--such as the raw number of carriers that are not in
depot maintenance--as a way of estimating how many carrier strike
groups are available for deployment. Moreover, planners may not know
what required readiness level to use as a standard when developing
budget requests and making resource allocation decisions.
Second, the August 2007 FRP instruction outlined several performance
measures for specific tasks, but some of these measures lacked details
about acceptable levels of performance and scope. Navy
guidance[Footnote 16] directs that each complete standard for
determining whether a task can be accomplished should consist of one or
more measures as well as a criterion, or quantitative description of
the acceptable level of performance, for each measure. For example, a
measure might be "on-time maintenance," and its associated criterion
might be "within 30 days of promised completion date." However, in some
cases the measures described in the FRP instruction lacked criteria.
For example, the instruction contained five measures of basic phase
performance,[Footnote 17] but none of these measures specified criteria
about how well units must perform. Although information for one of the
measures (the M-rating--required training readiness under the current
readiness reporting system) could be inferred from Navy training
manuals, the other four measures lacked quantitative descriptions. For
example, the "cost performance" measure did not provide a quantitative
description (e.g., percentage of budgeted funds expended) or a numeric
goal (e.g., 95 percent).
The FRP instruction also did not fully address the scope of some of the
performance measures. For example, the maintenance phase performance
measure dealing with on-time maintenance completion did not indicate
whether it was applicable to aircraft as well as ships; nor did four of
the five basic phase performance measures. In addition, while FRP
changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, mans, and
deploys its ships, the instruction outlines performance measures
pertaining to maintenance, training, and deployment, but it did not
contain performance measures pertaining to manning. Navy officials have
said that they believe there is a goal of fully manning all ships and
aircraft at all times. Although this goal has appeared in various Navy
briefings, it is not documented in official Navy guidance. Navy
officials observed that FRP is still an evolving construct, and stated
that the Fleet Readiness Enterprise, which includes representatives
from training and readiness directorates, is developing appropriate
criteria that will delineate acceptable levels of performance.
Moreover, a Navy official noted that work that will provide further
details for the established performance measures is underway at lower
levels of command. However, until the FRP performance measures are
fully linked to quantified levels of acceptable performance, encompass
ships and aircraft, as applicable, and provide measures to assess
appropriate manning levels, decision makers may be unable to determine
the extent to which FRP is achieving its goals.
The Navy Has Not Fully Identified Resources Needed to Implement FRP:
The Navy also has not fully identified all resources required to
achieve FRP goals or aligned needed resources with FRP activities. In
the past, the Navy sponsored several studies to identify FRP costs, but
these are of limited utility to the Navy's understanding of links
between resources and FRP activities because they included a goal that
FRP would be cost-neutral, relied on assumptions that are now outdated,
and lacked other details. The Navy's principal studies[Footnote 18]
consequently did not reflect a bottom-up assessment of the resources
needed to implement FRP and achieve certain required readiness levels.
Additionally, these studies used assumptions that are now outdated,
such as a 12-carrier fleet, the former "6+2" carrier strike group
implementation goal, and a 27-month carrier strike group operational
cycle. These assumptions affect the proportion of time that carriers
spend in maintenance over their life cycles and the urgency with which
any single carrier might have to be readied to surge, either of which
would have resource implications. In addition, the studies did not
analyze the cost impact of relying more heavily on pier-side continuous
maintenance rather than depot maintenance, deploying for more than 6
months at a time or more than once in the same operational cycle, or
preparing for an actual surge. In case of a surge, for example, several
ships might need to be readied within the same 30-day period, imposing
additional costs on shipyards, and aircraft might need to be
transferred from one airwing to another, raising transportation costs.
More recently, the Navy established several task forces and initiatives
to help identify training requirements and costs, and to link costs to
expected readiness levels. However, these efforts are ongoing and have
not yet produced a comprehensive approach for aligning activities with
resources. For example, the Navy has established at least two bodies,
the Fleet Training Board of Directors and a Task Force on Readiness,
whose work should help the Navy align its FRP activities with its
resources and funding needs. The Fleet Training Board is tasked with
establishing a process for calculating and tracking fleet training
costs, which involves validating all costs associated with training as
well as identifying excesses and gaps in the training process.[Footnote
19] Although the Fleet Training Board has defined time frames for
presenting briefings to senior Navy leadership, its charter was still
in draft as of September 2007. The Navy's Task Force on Readiness,
whose charter was approved in April 2007, aims to develop a
comprehensive set of metrics linked to cost in order to inform current-
year execution of readiness objectives and future-year planning,
programming, and budgeting of readiness requirements. This linkage will
allow the Navy to identify the operations and maintenance funding
needed to execute various FRP implementation goals, such as the carrier
strike group's goal of 3+3+1, at specific readiness levels. However,
the task force has not yet shown how the three variables-funding,
implementation goals, and readiness levels-would interact and how a
change in one variable would affect the outcomes for the other two. The
task force on readiness has set a goal of having its results
incorporated into the development of the fiscal year 2010 budget.
However, it is not clear how the results of this task force will be
disseminated or whether they will be used to develop formal guidance
that could be used to develop future budgets. While the groups are
taking steps in the right direction, without a thorough analysis of the
costs of FRP that is based on updated information about force
structure, goals, and operations and maintenance cycles and that links
resource inputs to expected readiness outputs, the Navy may be unable
to identify what resources would be needed to achieve the intended
benefits under FRP and to develop its budget requests to reflect those
needs.
The Navy Has Not Fully Considered Long-term Risks and Tradeoffs of
Changes:
The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs
associated with the changes it has made in areas such as carrier
operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. Specifically,
the Navy has made several changes in its maintenance and operational
cycles to facilitate FRP; however, the Navy has not performed an
integrated assessment of how the changes would, taken as a whole,
affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its full range of
missions. Moreover, although the Navy has developed plans to show how
it would continue to meet FRP goals during two upcoming periods when
the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to
10, these plans do not consider several issues.
The Navy Has Not Fully Assessed Changes in Carrier Maintenance and
Operational Cycles:
The Navy has made several changes to maintenance and operational cycles
to facilitate FRP, but it has not fully assessed the implications of
these changes. Specifically, the Navy has extended the intervals
between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years
and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock
intervals to as much as 12 years, or only three times during their life
cycles. It has also lengthened operational cycles for carriers and
their airwings to 32 months. We have previously advocated that DOD
adopt a comprehensive risk management approach to aid in its decision
making that includes, among other things, assessing the risks of
various courses of action for both near-and long-term challenges.
[Footnote 20]
Prior to making changes to its maintenance cycle in the past, the Navy
has conducted assessments of the potential effects of the changes. For
example, when the Navy altered its previous system for scheduling depot
maintenance[Footnote 21] about a decade ago, the engineering community
conducted a formal study to determine which types of maintenance could
be performed at greater intervals without having a negative impact on
the integrity of the carrier or its expected total service life. A
similar study was completed in 2005 and used as the basis for revising
the notional depot maintenance schedule the following year to extend
the dry-docking cycle from 6 to 8 years. At that time, officials
concluded that the proposed extension was technically acceptable and
contained a manageable level of risk. Since then, the Navy has again
extended the dry-docking cycle, with a 12-year cycle planned for the
Nimitz as a test case and possible further extensions for other
carriers on a case by case basis. However, the Nimitz, which is the
oldest ship in its class, has spent more time in depot maintenance
during the first half of its service life than is planned for newer
ships and therefore might be an atypical example of the class.
Officials have stated that, while they will not conduct a comprehensive
study of the entire class of ships, they are confident that their test
study of the Nimitz will suffice to collect the data they need to
inform their decision as to whether to extend the cycle for other
ships.
The Navy has also extended the carrier operational cycle from the pre-
FRP 27 months to 32 months. Operational cycles were extended to 32
months in tandem with the extension of carrier dry-docking cycles, and
the technical studies that were performed at the time to determine the
effect on carriers applied to both operational and maintenance cycles.
However, these studies did not examine the full impact on carriers'
accompanying airwings, even though an effect of the extension of the
operational cycle is a corresponding increase in the air squadron
operational cycle. As a result of the extension of the operational
cycle, which may now last as long as 32 months, a Navy official stated
that one capstone pilot training exercise is conducted less frequently
than in the past. Pilots participate in this exercise, at Naval Air
Station Fallon, once per training cycle, normally shortly after they
complete the basic phase. During the air squadron training cycle that
existed prior to FRP, pilots participated once every 2 years; now they
are only required to do so once per FRP cycle, which is every 27 to 32
months. While Navy officials have told us that they were unsure what
effect less frequent Fallon exercises would have on pilot skills and
are reviewing the extent to which Fallon exercises may need to be
repeated during a multiple-deployment FRP cycle, they did not provide
us with documentation of their review or evidence that they had studied
the issue at the time the decision to extend the operational cycle was
made.
The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of
these changes to its maintenance and operational cycles because it has
not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes,
interacting with one another, might affect its ability to meet FRP
goals and perform its full range of missions. As a combined result of
increases to both maintenance and operational cycles, carriers have
fewer opportunities to be inspected in dry dock. In addition, they
spend about 22 percent less time in any type of depot maintenance
period compared to the pre-FRP 24-month cycle.[Footnote 22] Since the
oldest Nimitz-class carrier was commissioned about 32 years ago and the
newest is still under construction, neither we nor the Navy can know,
based on experience, all the effects that maintenance or operational
cycle increases could have on the carriers. Two possibilities have
arisen in discussions with Navy officials: extensions could have an
impact on total service life, and extending dry docking cycles beyond 8
years or operational cycles beyond 32 months could limit the
maintenance community's ability to respond to problems quickly.
However, there was no consensus about the likelihood or possible
severity of either of these outcomes.
Some evidence suggests that lengthening intervals between depot
maintenance periods may be associated with a reduction in total carrier
service life. For example, the 2006 guidance from the Chief of Naval
Operations[Footnote 23] on maintenance intervals projected that the
service life for Nimitz-class nuclear carriers would be slightly
reduced compared to past estimates. Moreover, FRP was developed to
enable carriers to be deployed for more time than before and under
conditions--such as short-notice surges with a premium on providing a
quick response--that tend to use up reactor fuel in nuclear carriers
more rapidly than would be the case with longer deployments with longer
transit time at slower speeds. In Nimitz-class carriers, reactor fuel
is replenished only once, at the midpoint of a carrier's life cycle, at
about the 23-year mark. Therefore, if reactor fuel is used up in less
than the scheduled time, the carrier may reach both the midpoint and
end of its service life earlier than planned. In addition, the Navy's
analysis leading to the operational cycle extension from 27 to 32
months assumed that operating tempo would not increase and carriers
would not make multiple deployments in a single FRP cycle. If the Navy
did have to replace carriers sooner than planned, there could
potentially be significant effects on long-term Navy budget
requirements. Without assessing the short-and long-term risks and trade-
offs associated with the changes in maintenance and operational cycles,
it will be difficult for the Navy to determine the extent to which
these changes could affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform
its full range of missions.
The Navy Has Not Fully Analyzed Ability to Meet FRP Goals during
Periods When Less than 11 Carriers Will Be Available:
The Navy has reported that FRP is supportable with 11 carriers and has
developed plans to show how it would continue to meet FRP goals during
two upcoming periods when the number of available[Footnote 24] aircraft
carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10. However, these plans have not
fully analyzed the risks that could arise because they may make
optimistic assumptions about the length of the gaps and lack some
details about how the Navy would mitigate these gaps. The first period
is expected to begin in fall 2008, after the Kitty Hawk's scheduled
November 2008 decommissioning, and will last until the Bush is prepared
for its first deployment in the summer of 2010, a gap of nearly 2
years. According to the Navy, the second period is scheduled to begin
in fall 2012 when the Enterprise is decommissioned, and will last for
33 months until the Ford is commissioned in fiscal year 2015.
The Navy's plans may have presented optimistic assumptions about the
total length of the gap. For example, the first plan projected that the
Bush would be operationally ready in the summer of 2010, which is about
a year after its scheduled commissioning date, but the second plan did
not address the time between the Ford's projected commissioning date
and its operational readiness date. According to a December 2006 DOD
report on the Ford's progress,[Footnote 25] the carrier is scheduled to
reach initial operational capability in September 2016, for a total gap
of 45 months, as opposed to the gap of 33 months in the Navy's report.
In addition, we have recently reported that the Ford is encountering
delays in technology development that could affect its delivery
schedule.[Footnote 26] In both cases, there may even be additional time
between operational readiness and actual first deployment. The average
interval between commissioning and deployment for all Nimitz-class
carriers was nearly 2 years, and no carrier since the Vinson (which
first deployed in 1983) has deployed within 1 year of its commissioning
date.
Both of the Navy's plans lack some details about how the Navy would
mitigate these gaps. The first plan reported that there would be 5
months between the scheduled decommissioning date of the Kitty Hawk and
the projected operational readiness date of the Bush when carrier
readiness status would fall below 6+1, and noted that these could be
mitigated with adjustments to scheduled maintenance periods or by
accelerating scheduled training. The first plan lacked specific
information about the carriers and their projected FRP phases for each
month of the gap period, so we could not validate the plan's
assumptions about how many carriers would be surge-ready during any
particular month. In addition, the plan did not link specific
mitigations, such as extending a carrier's maintenance interval or
accelerating unit-level training, to specific months in which surge-
ready availability fell below 6+1. Without such information, we could
not evaluate whether the Navy had weighed the possibilities and
determined the most appropriate way of mitigating a potential
shortfall. Moreover, applying the expected durations of basic and
integrated phases of FRP that the Navy formalized in the August 2007
FRP instruction, we identified at least 6 months in the first gap
period after the Kitty Hawk retires when there will not be enough
carriers in the right FRP phases to meet the 6+1 or 3+3+1
implementation goals, a difference that could affect the Navy's
mitigation planning.
The second plan showed the baseline depot maintenance schedule, and
presented several alternative ways in which identified gaps in the
Navy's ability to deploy 6+1 carriers between the scheduled
decommissioning date of the Enterprise and the projected commissioning
date of the Ford could be filled. These included: extending the carrier
depot maintenance cycle or operational schedules, deferring some global
presence deployments, or delaying the decommissioning date of the Kitty
Hawk. Applying the same expected durations of basic and integrated
phases of FRP to the second gap period, we identified at least 13
months when there will not be enough carriers to meet the 6+1 or 3+3+1
implementation goals. The second plan did not address how the Navy
could simultaneously have enough carriers available to surge to meet
FRP goals without stretching out some maintenance intervals beyond
currently approved limits. The Navy's decision to lengthen intervals
between depot maintenance periods, as discussed, was based on the
assumption that there would be 11 carriers at all times. Therefore,
during these periods the Navy may have to choose among not meeting FRP
carrier strike group goals, further extending carrier maintenance
cycles, shortening training, or some combination of these tradeoffs.
Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic schedule assumptions
and that can depict the likely challenges to implementation goals
during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the
information it needs to make informed trade-off decisions. As a result,
the Navy may not be able to achieve an optimal balance between
maximizing carrier strike groups' ability to surge on short notice in
support of FRP and performing the full range of Navy missions.
Conclusions:
The Navy considers FRP to be a critical enabler in meeting challenges
of the twenty-first century security environment. Although the Navy has
taken several important steps toward fully developing a sound
management approach for FRP, such as establishing oversight and
execution responsibility, developing implementation goals for carrier
strike groups, and identifying some key performance measures, this
process is incomplete. Without implementation goals for extending FRP
to expeditionary strike groups and other ship configurations;
performance measures that identify readiness levels and are fully
linked to acceptable levels of performance for FRP phases; and a
completed analysis that links needed resources to FRP phases, goals,
and readiness levels, the Navy may not be able to develop budget
requests based on the resources needed to achieve required readiness
levels or demonstrate to senior DOD officials and Congress whether it
can achieve the intended benefits under FRP.
The Navy has studied the effects of some aspects of changes it has made
during FRP's first years, such as extensions of operational and
maintenance cycles, and has begun to pursue other studies. However,
until the Navy performs a comprehensive risk assessment that addresses
the cumulative impact of changes to operational and maintenance cycles,
and the possible effects of having fewer carriers in the force
structure in the future, it will be unable to weigh the trade offs
associated with meeting FRP goals within projected budgets. Further,
assessing risk becomes increasingly important as the Navy expands FRP
to include other forces and as its force structure faces periods with
10 instead of 11 available carriers.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the Navy's management as FRP continues to evolve and as the
Navy moves forward with implementation, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following four
actions:
* establish implementation goals for the application of FRP to other
forces;
* establish required overall readiness levels for each FRP phase in its
readiness reporting system;
* develop additional performance measures that identify acceptable
levels of performance and scope; and:
* identify how resources should be linked to the FRP phases, goals, and
readiness levels and publish appropriate guidance.
To improve the Navy's ability to weigh the trade offs associated with
meeting FRP goals within current resource and force structure plans, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Navy to take the following action:
* perform a risk assessment that integrates consideration of the
effects of changes in carrier strike group operational and maintenance
cycles under a range of force structure assumptions, and that
identifies strategies to mitigate potential risks. Such a risk
assessment should integrate plans to meet FRP goals during two upcoming
periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily
drops from 11 to 10.
Agency Comments and our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with
one recommendation, and partially agreed with four recommendations.
DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy establish
implementation goals for the application of the Fleet Response Plan to
other forces. DOD stated that the Navy has developed preliminary goals
for submarines, surface combatants, and other types of forces, and will
continue to include additional Navy forces beyond those of the carrier
strike group. While we laud this progress, we urge the Navy to take
steps to finalize these goals as soon as possible. In addition, we
reiterate that the preliminary goal for surface ships was expressed in
a single aggregated figure that included destroyers, cruisers,
frigates, amphibious ships, and minesweepers. As discussed in the
report, an aggregate figure may not provide a meaningful goal, because
some ships, such as destroyers, may be used in a variety of roles: as
components of carrier or expeditionary strike groups or as part of
smaller task forces. Without implementation goals for all force
configurations, the Navy may not know whether it has enough ships to be
distributed among all possible roles and provide all desired
capabilities under FRP. Furthermore, since the Navy's system for
aligning resource inputs with readiness outputs is linked to its
implementation goals, identifying separate goals is a prerequisite to
identifying appropriate levels of funding.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop
required overall readiness levels for each Fleet Response Plan phase in
its readiness reporting system. DOD stated that, under the Defense
Readiness Reporting System, the Navy will be able to rapidly and
accurately assess a unit's readiness and ability to conduct missions
throughout the FRP continuum. While we hope that DOD can realize its
expectations for this system, we note that it is not scheduled to be
fully implemented for another year or more. Therefore, we urge DOD to
direct the Navy to develop a readiness level requirement within
existing systems so that it will have visibility over whether the
Navy's goals are being met up until the Defense Readiness Reporting
System is fully implemented, and ensure that this new system allows DOD
to assess units' readiness for each FRP phase.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop
additional performance measures that identify acceptable levels of
performance and scope. DOD stated that the Fleet Readiness Enterprise
is developing criteria that will show acceptable levels of performance.
While we support DOD's efforts to develop criteria, we urge the Navy to
take steps to finalize these criteria as soon as possible. DOD also
stated that the Navy has Figures of Merit to guide the allocation of
resources in specific areas, and furthermore trusts its unit commanders
to accurately report their ability to meet FRP requirements. At the
time of our review, these measures were still under development, so it
is unclear whether they will be sufficient to provide the necessary
information about the scope and acceptable levels of performance to
enable consistent and accurate measurement of performance. We continue
to believe that our recommendation merits further action and that DOD
needs to direct the Navy to fully link the FRP performance measures to
quantified levels of acceptable performance, encompass ships and
aircraft as applicable, and provide measures to assess appropriate
manning levels, so that decision makers will be able to determine the
extent to which FRP is achieving its goals.
DOD agreed with our recommendation to identify how resources should be
linked to the Fleet Response Plan phases, goals, and readiness levels
and publish appropriate guidance. DOD stated that the Navy is in the
process of developing a comprehensive set of top-level metrics that
will provide the Navy with the ability to link readiness outputs to
required resource inputs. When development is complete, the Navy will
have a set of quantifiable and traceable relationships between its
financial system and Fleet readiness. We agree that the actions cited
represent positive steps and urge the Navy to press forward with these
efforts. We note that we also recommended that the Navy publish
appropriate guidance upon completion.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy perform a
risk assessment that integrates consideration of the effects of changes
in carrier strike group operational and maintenance cycles under a
range of force structure assumptions and identify strategies to
mitigate potential risks. DOD stated that it understands that
modifications to existing plans will have numerous consequences and
indicated that the Navy will continue to update its plans based on
current risk assessments. DOD concluded that there was no need for
further direction from the Secretary of Defense in this matter. We
disagree, and continue to believe that the Navy should conduct an
integrated risk assessment and identify strategies to mitigate
potential risks. As discussed in the report, prior to making changes to
its maintenance cycle in the past, the Navy has conducted assessments
of the potential effects of the changes, and we emphasize the
interrelated nature of the changes that the Navy has made to implement
FRP. For example, as we discussed in our report, changing carrier
operational cycles may have repercussions on the opportunities
available for aircraft pilot training. In view of the possible impact
on the Navy's ability to perform its full range of missions and the
potential financial implications of intensifying operational tempo or
decreasing maintenance of the Navy's carriers to the point where their
planned service life could be jeopardized, we continue to believe that
it is critical for the Navy to fully consider the long-term risks and
trade offs of these changes through a comprehensive and integrated risk
assessment.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. We will also
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In
addition, this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have
any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or
stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Staff members who made key contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Managing Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Navy's progress in developing a sound management
approach, we reviewed and analyzed guidance and instructions on
manning, maintenance, and training; key studies, messages, and planning
documents. We reviewed prior GAO products to identify best practices
for managing and implementing major efforts and compared these best
practices to the Navy documents we analyzed.[Footnote 27] We also
interviewed officials in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.; Fleet
Forces Command; Commander, Air Forces Atlantic; Commander, Surface
Forces Atlantic; Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic, Norfolk,
Virginia; Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval
Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.; and Marine Corps Forces Command,
Norfolk, Virginia; about initiatives the Navy has undertaken. We also
contacted officials at the office of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet;
Commander, Naval Air Forces, San Diego, California; and Carrier
Planning Activity, Chesapeake, Virginia.
We also analyzed data from the Navy's current readiness reporting
system. Readiness data include ships' and airwings' scores under the
Status of Resources and Training System, which measures inputs such as
numbers of personnel, amount and condition of equipment on-board, and
completion of training exercises, and combines them under a five-point
rating system. Status of Resources and Training System data are limited
in that they only measure readiness against the standard of major
combat operations and do not specifically show readiness at each FRP
phase. DOD has recognized this limitation and has begun to develop a
new, capabilities-based system called the Defense Readiness Reporting
System, which was designed to measure units' ability to perform
specific tasks. The Navy has begun the transition to the Defense
Readiness Reporting System, full implementation of which it believes
will address the gaps in performance measures that we identified in our
review. However, this transition was not yet complete at the time we
conducted our review. The Navy continues to report Status of Resources
and Training System data in the Type Commanders' Readiness Management
System, and to use Status of Resources and Training System data as the
foundation of its weekly and monthly readiness reports to the Chief of
Naval Operations. With these noted limitations, we determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has considered the long-term
risks and trade offs of FRP-related changes, we interviewed Navy
readiness officials in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Arlington, Virginia; and program managers at Naval Sea Systems Command,
Washington, D.C., and Chesapeake, Virginia; and Fleet Forces Command,
Norfolk, Virginia. To assess whether the Navy had sufficiently taken
into account the possibility of not having enough carriers available to
meet either a 6+1 implementation goal or a 3+3+1 construct during the
years in which 10 carriers will be available, we analyzed the quarterly
long-range carrier maintenance schedule that was published in July 2007
and noted, based on the notional durations for each of the FRP phases
that were published in the August 2007 FRP instruction, how many
carriers would be in each phase during each month during fiscal years
2008 through 2010 and 2013 through 2016. For purposes of our analysis,
we assumed that no carrier would remain in any FRP phase for longer
than the planned time, and that the George Washington, which is
scheduled to be at its home port in Japan in 2009, would be deployable
at any time that it was not in depot maintenance. We also analyzed a
Navy risk mitigation plan for the years following the decommissioning
of the Enterprise and a less detailed plan that covered the years
following the decommissioning of the Kitty Hawk, and discussed our
observations with Navy readiness and carrier program officials.
We performed our work from November 2006 through October 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel And Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
January 8, 2008:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-264, "Military Readiness: Navy is Making Progress in
Implementing Its Fleet Response Plan, But Has Not Fully Developed
Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs," dated December 5, 2007 (GAO Code
350930).
DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. DoD
partially concurs with Recommendations 1, 2, 3, and 5 and concurs with
Recommendation 4. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations and
report are enclosed.
Signed by:
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosure: As Stated:
GAO Draft Report – Dated December 5, 2007:
GAO Code 350930 /GAO-08-264:
"Military Readiness: Navy Is Making Progress in Implementing Its Fleet
Response Plan, But Has Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and
Resource Needs"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to establish implementation goals for
the application of the Fleet Response Plan to other forces.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Navy needs to have implementation
goals, and as stated in the report, the Navy began to extend the Fleet
Response Plan to Expeditionary Strike Groups in June 2007. The Navy is
also developing Fleet Response Plan goals for Naval forces beyond the
Carrier Strike Group. Although not finalized at the time of this draft
review, officials at Fleet Forces Command have stated that preliminary
goals have been developed for submarines, surface combatants, and other
types of forces. The Department of the Navy shall continue to develop,
apply and refine the Fleet Response Plan to include Navy forces beyond
the Carrier Strike Group. No further direction from the Secretary of
Defense is necessary at this time.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to establish required overall
readiness levels for each Fleet Response Plan phase in its readiness
reporting system.
Dod Response: Partially Concur. As part of the Fleet Response Plan,
units are required to perform various types of missions at increasing
levels of complexity. Readiness to perform missions is based on the
unit's ability to accomplish various mission essential tasks. The
Defense Readiness Reporting System is being used to capture what
capabilities and tasks units are able and ready to perform. Under the
Defense Readiness Reporting System, the Navy will be able to rapidly
and accurately assess a unit's readiness and therefore the unit's
ability to conduct and complete missions assigned throughout the Fleet
Response Plan continuum. The Defense Readiness Reporting System uses a
mission assessment framework, so "readiness levels" are no longer
appropriate or desirable.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop additional performance
measures that identify acceptable levels of performance and scope.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. As stated within the report, the Fleet
Readiness Enterprise is currently developing appropriate criteria that
will delineate acceptable levels of competency in the performance of
mission essential tasks. In addition to these metrics, the Navy has
Figures of Merit in resource areas such as Personnel, Equipment,
Supply, Training and Ordnance. These Figures of Merit will allow the
Navy to judiciously allocate limited resources where they are most
needed. As noted in the report, the Navy relies heavily on its unit
commanders to accurately report their units' ability to attain FRP
timeline requirements and holds them fully accountable. In addition,
the Navy entrusts those commands, whose responsibility it is to
evaluate the performance of units as they finish various phases of
training, to enforce high levels of competence for the forces that they
evaluate. There is no need for further direction in this area from the
Secretary of Defense.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to identify how resources should be
linked to the Fleet Response Plan phases, goals, and readiness levels
and publish appropriate guidance.
DOD Response: Concur. Full implementation of the Fleet Response Plan
will give the Navy a solid framework to associate resources to mission
readiness in a way that is scalable and measurable. This will allow the
full impact of financial decisions to be expressed in terms of
capabilities. In order to have common metrics for describing the Fleet
Response Plan for Navy units beyond Carrier Strike Groups, the Navy
established an interdisciplinary team, Task Force Readiness, which is
linked to the Fleet Readiness Enterprise Executive Committee. This Task
Force is chartered to develop and implement a comprehensive set of top-
level metrics based on the concept of Operational Availability.
Development of these metrics continues; when completed, it will provide
the ability to link readiness outputs to the required resource inputs.
In this way, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
process will be directly associated with a unit's overall readiness.
The end state is a set of quantifiable and traceable relationships
between the Navy's financial systems and Fleet readiness.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to perform a risk assessment that
integrates consideration of the effects of changes in carrier strike
group operational and maintenance cycles under a range of force
structure assumptions, and that identifies strategies to mitigate
potential risks. Such a risk assessment should integrate plans to meet
Fleet Response Plan goals during two upcoming periods when the number
of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. For areas of significant technical or
operational risk, the Navy does conduct risk assessments, even if not
documented in a single formal treatise. As referenced many times
throughout the report, 6+1 or 3+3+1 is a goal, and a non-fiscally
constrained requirement for minimum risk in supporting operational
contingencies. It is also an average, which implies the actual measure
of surge ready forces is above and below the stated number at various
times throughout any given year. If operational necessity dictates, the
Navy has identified numerous ways to ensure asset availability. For
example, most maintenance periods can be moved or modified. This,
however, may result in a significant unprogrammed cost, along with
longer-term shipyard capacity and Fleet Response Plan goal attainment
challenges. The Navy realizes the dynamic environment within which it
operates and understands that modifications to existing plans will have
numerous consequences. The Fleet Response Plan remains an evolving
construct, and the Navy shall continue to update their plans based on
current risk assessments dependent upon operational needs, validated
assumptions and the most current information available. There is no
need for further direction from the Secretary of Defense in this
matter.
[End of section]
Appendix III: U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers:
Name: Kitty Hawk;
Year commissioned: 1961;
Home port: Japan.
Name: Enterprise;
Year commissioned: 1961;
Home port: Norfolk, Virginia.
Name: Nimitz;
Year commissioned: 1975;
Home port: San Diego, California.
Name: Dwight D. Eisenhower;
Year commissioned: 1977;
Home port: Norfolk.
Name: Carl Vinson;
Year commissioned: 1982;
Home port: Bremerton, Washington.
Name: Theodore Roosevelt;
Year commissioned: 1986;
Home port: Norfolk.
Name: Abraham Lincoln;
Year commissioned: 1989;
Home port: Everett, Washington.
Name: George Washington;
Year commissioned: 1992;
Home port: Norfolk.
Name: John C. Stennis;
Year commissioned: 1995;
Home port: Bremerton.
Name: Harry S. Truman;
Year commissioned: 1998;
Home port: Norfolk.
Name: Ronald Reagan;
Year commissioned: 2003;
Home port: San Diego.
Name: George H. W. Bush;
Year commissioned: Under construction;
Home port: [Empty].
Name: Gerald Ford;
Year commissioned: Under construction;
Home port: [Empty].
Source: The Navy.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Patricia W. Lentini, Assistant
Director; Renee S. Brown; Janine Cantin; Alissa Czyz; Karen Nicole
Harms; Matthew S. Lee; Sally Newman; Maria-Alaina Rambus; Rebecca Shea;
and Nicole Volchko made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would
Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing,
GAO-06-84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005); and Defense Logistics:
GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response
Plan, GAO-04-724R (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004).
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 341 (2006).
[3] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2003).
[4] For purposes of this review, we considered a new-construction
carrier to be available when it is ready to deploy.
[5] Units include ships, submarines, and aircraft.
[6] See, GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003) and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the
Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington,
D.C.: June 1996).
[7] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction 3000.15,
Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug. 31, 2006); Commander, Fleet Forces
Command and Commander, Pacific Fleet, Instruction 3000.15, Fleet
Response Plan (Aug. 21, 2007).
[8] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction
3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan. 16, 2007).
[9] Until 2006, the FRP implementation goal was 6+2 carrier strike
groups.
[10] Ready for Tasking means that the unit has successfully completed
the basic phase.
[11] The Fleet Forces Command's and Pacific Fleet Command's readiness
divisions use a tool called the Maintenance Figure of Merit to measure
ships' readiness based on the material conditions of their systems,
subsystems, components, and other facets.
[12] Examples of other forces could include units that are
characterized as "Independent Unit Ready for Tasking" and may be
assigned independent operations in support of homeland security, such
as counter-narcotics missions, or assigned to provide disaster relief
or humanitarian assistance. These units may consist of one or more
ships.
[13] Department of the Navy, Sea Power for a New Era: A Program Guide
to the U.S. Navy, 2006.
[14] The categories are personnel, equipment condition, supply,
training, and ordnance. For each category, as well as for the overall
level, units are assigned a score ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being the
highest.
[15] 10 U.S.C. §482. Unit commanders also may report readiness using a
measure called percent effectiveness, which allows them to render a
subjective judgment about how prepared their units are to perform
nontraditional missions that fall short of major combat operations.
[16] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction
3500.38B/MCO 3500.26/USCG Command Instruction 3500.1B, Universal Naval
Task List, January 2007.
[17] The five performance measures for the basic phase are: entitled
versus actual readiness, ready-for-tasking accomplishment, M-rating/
Navy Mission Essential Task List, flying/steaming hour accomplishment,
and cost performance.
[18] See Center for Naval Analyses, Explorations of the Fleet Response
Plan: Definitions, Cost, Capabilities, Risks (Alexandria, Virginia,
November 2005); Selected Costs of a Carrier Strike Group Across the
Fleet Response Plan Phases (Alexandria, Virginia, November 2005);
Budgeting for FRP Surge: The Ship Training Model (Alexandria, Virginia:
July 2006); Budgeting for FRP Surge: The Airwing (Alexandria, Virginia:
July 2006); and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV N814,
Estimating Costs for Fleet Response Plan Postures (Arlington, Virginia:
Aug. 27, 2004).
[19] The board is using the Fleet Training Capability Cost System,
which is an activity based costing and management system designed to
trace fleet resource utilization and costs, to help identify notional
training costs for a carrier strike group.
[20] GAO, Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance
DOD's Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions, GAO-06-13
(Washington, D.C: Nov. 15, 2005).
[21] The previous system, known as the Engineered Operating Cycle,
provided for repairs to be made at fixed time intervals. The system
that was introduced in 1994, known as the Incremental Maintenance Plan,
provided for repairs to be made depending on their condition. Major
carrier repairs and modernization are performed during depot
maintenance periods, or availabilities. There are three major types of
availabilities: planned depot periods, which last about 6 months; dry-
docking, which lasts about 10 ½ months and which provides a unique
opportunity to perform some types of hull and rudder maintenance; and
refueling complex overhaul, which lasts for 3 years or more. During
these availabilities, the carrier is unavailable to deploy.
[22] If carriers are operated throughout their service lives under a 24-
month operational cycle, they would spend 6 months in maintenance and
then 18 months preparing to deploy (or deployed) in every 24-month
period. Every third depot maintenance period would entail dry docking,
so over the course of a 6-year cycle they would have two ordinary depot
periods and one dry-docking period.
[23] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Notice 4700,
Representative Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair
Mandays for Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy Ships
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2006).
[24] For purposes of this review, we considered a new-construction
carrier to be available when it is ready to deploy. The carrier is
ready to deploy after it has completed these steps: commissioning,
completion of initial (shakedown) cruise and post-shakedown maintenance
period, and initial unit-level training period.
[25] DOD, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), CVN 21, December 31, 2006.
[26] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy Faces Challenges Constructing
the Aircraft Carrier Gerald R. Ford Within Budget, GAO-07-866
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2007).
[27] See GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would
Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing,
GAO-06-84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005) and Results-Oriented
Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).
[End of section]
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